Hungary the Unwilling Satellite (1956)

Archiv für die Geschichte der Soziologie in Österreich, Graz
Hungary the Unwilling Satellite (1956)
By Ernest Manheim (Kansas City, Mo.)
Transliteration und Kommentar von Reinhard Müller1
The revolt in Hungary was not a conspiracy of the dispossessed upper and middle
classes. It was workers and students – the sons of peasants and workers, screened
and chosen by the regime – who led and carried out the revolution, and it was soldiers and officers of the Soviet sponsored army who initially supplied them with arms.
Some help came from a portion of the Russian garrison.
Hungary seemed the least likely place in which to test the strength of the Soviet satellite empire. An armed revolt in Eastern Germany may count on the support of 50
million Western Germans. The economic benefits of independence should be most
rewarding in Czechoslovakia, the most industrialized nation in the Soviet block. Hungary with its 10 million population is, next to Albania and Bulgaria, the smallest of the
Russian protectorates. Her vulnerable position between Russia, three of her satellites, Yugoslavia and Austria makes the position of an independent Hungarian government precarious. Substantial Russian forces are stationed in neighboring Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for just such events as have taken place, while no
help can be expected of Yugoslavia and neutral Austria.
What is the explanation of this first major rebellion against the Soviet empire? Until a
more complete account will be available history may shed some light on the matter.
Hungary has, with England, the longest history of constitutional government. The
English Magna Charta is seven years older than the Hungarian “Golden Bull” (Bulla
Aureata) which in 1222 gave Hungary a parliament much like that of England of the
period. Both legislative bodies began their evolution as the privileged representation
of minorities – in Hungary as the diet of the landed nobility and the freeholders. The
sheltered location and military security of England offered a more fertile soil for the
subsequent expansion of the representative system than do countries which lie along
the highways of invasions. Such is the location of Russia and Hungary.
The 13th century invaders of Hungary were the Mongols. Soon after their retreat began the long period of defensive campaigns against the Turks which ended in 1526,
when the Turks annihilated the Hungarian army and occupied the capital and the
central provinces for a century and a half. Among the invaders of Russia the Teutonic knights, Swedes, and Poles played prominent roles, but the Mongolian “Golden
Horde” was the longest to stay.
The Russian answer to the continuing threat of invaders was centralization, the absolute monarchy, and the preventive colonization of the main approaches to the settled regions of Russia. – In place of an absolute state, Hungary developed a highly
cohesive class of yeomen, the later petty nobility or gentry, who formed the bulk of
the army and participated in the local organs of self-government. lt was largely these
freeholders who kept the concern with national survival alive in what was for centuries largely a kingdom of peasants and land-owning soldiers. The continuing existence of this class marks the salient difference between the political complexion of
Hungary and Austria where this class was practically liquidated in the course of the
Counterreformation. Thus, Austria became the foothold and instrument of the empire
building Habsburgs and their absolute rule which Hungary resisted until the end of
the Habsburg dynasty in 1918.
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Archiv für die Geschichte der Soziologie in Österreich, Graz
The long period of close association between Austria and Hungary began in the political vacuum which the Turkish occupation created in Hungary. The army was reduced to scattered garrisons in isolated forts, the king, Louis II.,2 killed in battle, the
country divided into three independent sectors: the Turkish ruled provinces, the
duchy of Transsylvania – now a Romanian province – and the unoccupied West over
which the Habsburgs established a claim.
The Austro-Hungarian empire was a promising and, in many ways effective, if unhappy, combination. Potentially it was a step toward a federation of the diverse peoples of Central Europe. It has been often said that, as a stabilizing force, the empire
was a European necessity. By its design, it was the last of the medieval universal
monarchies overriding national and racial differences in its population.
Undoubtedly, the two dominant nations of the empire had as little in common as any
two peoples of Europe. The Austrians are a Germanic people who assimilated elements of Slavs – Slovenes, Czechs, Moravians, and Poles – and some Italians. The
Hungarians, on the other hand, speak a language which is unrelated to any other
European tongue except Finnish and Estonian. Their origin is still obscure, but there
is increasing support for the assumption that the tribes which took possession of
Hungary in the 9th century were descendants of the Sumerians, a brunet, round
headed people who occupied the “Fertile Crescent”, Mesopotamia, nearly 6000
years ago. A sizable stock of Hungarian words and a rich body of folklore seem
traceable to Sumeric culture, probably the oldest literate civilization. The invading
half a million “Magors” or Magyars came to Europe by way of the Caucasus. They
were cultivators, probably in possession of a cuneiform writing, who acquired seminomadic habits during their long lasting migrations in search of permanent settlements. With the conquest of the Hungarian plains, the Magyars drove a permanent
wedge between the Northern and Southern Slavs, who still surround most of Hungary today. By the end of the 10th century the bilk of the Magyars abandoned their
tents and settled in adobe villages. Although the adopted Christianity and Western
institutions, their settlements, economy, and government continued to be in marked
contrast to those in Austria. The typical Hungarian is still a dweller in the wide open
plains, while Austria is largely an alpine country.
It was, however, not these differences which prevented the rise of a common AustroHungarian nationality, but the bureaucratic and over-centralized character of the
Habsburg empire. A common nationality is the upshot of the habit of cooperation in
the management of matters of common interest. The absolutism of the Habsburgs
prevented the growth of such a community of interests. The liberation of Hungary
from Turkish rule in 1686 was the last opportunity for the creation of a mutually acceptable union. The attempt of imposing a union on Hungary by force planted the
seeds of an irreconcilable nationalism in Hungary. In 1848 Hungary declared her independence from Austria and deposed the king and Austrian emperor. Francis Joseph3 turned to Russia for help. Nicholas I.,4 who feared the potential effects of the
Hungarian revolution on Russia, sent a powerful army against the Hungarian republic. In August 1849 the Russian general Paskiewicz5 was able to report to his sovereign: “Hungary lies at the feet of Your Majesty.” The prime minister of the republic,
13 of its leading generals, and 114 officers and leaders of the independence movement were executed. The day of the revolution of 1848 has remained up to the present a national holiday in Hungary, and the defeat by the Russian forces a day of national mourning. Major streets in Budapest and other cities bear the names of the
executed leaders of the revolution and they are firmly implanted in every gradeschool child.
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Archiv für die Geschichte der Soziologie in Österreich, Graz
Hungary was the scene of two more invasions: the Nazi occupation and her subsequent conquest by Soviet troops in an extended campaign in which the German army
defended every block in the capital and every hamlet on its retreat West.6 From the
scorched earth which the German army left behind the Russian victors were still able
to extract enough material of some use, from machinery to faucets, to fill strings of
eastbound freight trains. As if to leave no room for doubt about the objectives of the
government which the Soviet army installed, the newly formed Hungarian army was
made to wear Russian uniforms, adopt Russian military etiquette, and march in the
distinctive formations of Soviet troops. It was a psychological error which the most
recently commissioned government of Kadar7 seems anxious to correct. Whether the
newly adopted national emblems and uniforms will make the Soviet system more
acceptable is a question which the Soviet government appears to have answered to
its own satisfaction: It continues to order reinforcements to Hungary and to deport
young workers and peasants to Russia.
1 Das Original des Typoskripts befindet sich im Archiv für die Geschichte der Soziologie in
Österreich, Graz, Nachlass Ernest Manheim, Signatur 31/5. Zuerst abgedruckt in: Archiv
für die Geschichte der Soziologie in Österreich. Newsletter (Graz), Nr. 19 (Dezember
1999), S. 28-29.
Vgl. dazu die überarbeitete und stark gekürzte Version von Ernest Manheim: Hungary followed its traditional pattern in latest heroic revolt, in: The Kansas City Times (Kansas City,
Mo.) vom 1. Dezember 1956. Anm. R.M.
2 Ludwig II. Jagiello (*1506, †bei Mohács 1526), seit 1516 König von Ungarn und Böhmen.
Anm. R.M.
3 Franz Joseph I. von Habsburg-Lothringen (*Schönbrunn [zu Wien] 1830, †Schönbrunn [zu
Wien] 1916), seit 1848 Kaiser von Österreich und König von Ungarn. Anm. R.M.
4 Nikolaus I. Pawlowitsch (Nikolaj I. Pavlovič) von Holstein-Gottorp-Romanov (*Zarskoje
Selo [Puškin] 1796, †Petersburg 1855), seit 1825 Kaiser von Rußland. Anm. R.M.
5 Ivan Fedorovič Paskevič (*Poltava 1782, †Warschau 1856), russischer General, seit 1829
Generalfeldmarschall; 1831 an der Niederwerfung des polnischen Aufstands beteiligt (Ehrentitel: Fürst Warschawski), 1849 Befehlshaber des russischen Interventionsheeres in
Ungarn und 1854 der Donauarmee. Anm. R.M.
6 Bemerkenswert ist, dass Ernest Manheim nicht auf die Eroberung Ungarns durch Rumänien 1919 hinweist, bei der er selbst als Freiwilliger in der ungarischen Armee gegen die
Okkupanten kämpfte. Anm. R.M.
7 János Kádár (d.i. János Csermanek; *Fiume [Rijeka] 1912, †Budapest 1989), ungarischer
Politiker (Innenminister 1948-1951, Ministerpräsident 1961-1968); bildete nach dem Ungarn-Aufstand 1956 im Auftrag der Sowjetunion eine neue Regierung. Anm. R.M.
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