Handout

Arguments for a two-operator analysis of impersonal
pronouns in modal sentences
Sarah Zobel
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
szobel[AT]gwdg.de
Journée Impersonnels CNRS/Paris8
Sept 20, 2011
The aim of this talk is to show that German man (Engl. ‘one’) and the impersonal
uses of first person singular ich (Engl. ‘I ’) and second person singular du (Engl. ‘you’)
are never bound by co-occurring overt modals. Instead, I argue, the overt modals are
in the scope of an obligatory generic operator that binds a variable contributed by
these pronouns.
1
Introduction
• German man has two possible interpretations depending on whether it occurs in
an episodic (1-a) or a non-episodic (1-b) sentence (Cabredo-Hofherr 2004, 2008; Zifonun
2000).
(1)
a.
b.
Man hat gestern ein Haus abgebrannt.
one has yesterday a house burned-down
‘Yesterday someone burned down a house.’
Man befolgt das Gesetz.
one obeys the law
‘One obeys the law.’
(man ∼ someone)
(man ∼ everyone)
The reading of man in (1-a) is usually called the existential reading, and the reading in
(1-b) its generic reading.
I adopt this intuitive characterization of episodic sentences: They report one specific situation or event
taking place at a specific point in time at a specific location with a specific set of participants. All other
sentences are called non-episodic.
There are uses in which man seems to have the same meaning as first person plural wir (Engl. ‘we’).
(2)
Man hat sich
lange
nicht mehr
gesehen.
one has oneself for-a-long-time not anymore seen
‘We have not seen each other for a long time.’
Some argue that this is a separate third interpretation of man (Kratzer 1997). Others reduce them to a
special case of the generic or existential readings (Zifonun 2000). I will assume the latter since a definite
answer to this question is orthogonal to my investigation.
1
• In addition to these two readings, man shows quantificational variability effects
with adverbs of quantification, as in (3).
(3)
Damals ist man normalerweise/selten älter als 60 geworden.
back-then is one usually/rarely
older than 60 become
’In those days, one usually/rarely lived till 60.’
(based on Malamud 2007:6)
For example, the quantificational variability effect with selten (Engl. ‘rarely’): If the
adverb of quantification is read as only quantifying over times or occasions, the generic
reading is expected to arise for man in (non-episodic sentence), which results in the
following interpretation:
(4)
Back then, a typical person was such that this person rarely lived till 60.
However, (3) is most naturally understood as the adverbs quantifying over the individuals
under discussion instead of times or occasions. That is, ‘Back then few people lived to be
60.’ This change of the quantificational domain for the quantifying adverbs is called a
quantificational variability effect.
There are various reasons to assume that quantificational variability effects should be grouped with the
generic readings of man. I will leave quantificational variability effects as a whole aside in this talk, and
thus will not go into detail on this point.
• The availability of quantificational variability effects has been used as principal motivation
to analyze impersonal pronouns as semantically indefinite(-like) expressions (cf.
Chierchia 1995a for Italian si, effects shown for man in Malamud 2007) since definite
expressions usually do not show them. In her most recent proposal, Malamud (to appear)
suggests that these pronouns introduce a free variable which is either existentially
closed to give the existential interpretation or bound by a generic operator to give the
generic interpretation.
• The main question I want to address:
If impersonal pronouns have indefinite-like behaviour, one would expect that in principle any quantificational expression that can bind variables contributed by indefinites
can bind the variable contributed by these pronouns.
Is this really what we find?
Specifically as a sub-case, I want to investigate the behaviour of impersonal pronouns
with co-occuring overt modals, which have been analysed as possible binders for variables contributed by indefinites.
• Structure of the talk:
1) Introduce a supporting set of data: impersonally used personal pronouns in German
2) Survey the data and discuss modals as possible binders
3) Argue that the variable introduced by man is never bound by a modal
4) Formally spell out a two-operator account: the modal scopes under a generic operator
2
2
Impersonally used personal pronouns
• In non-episodic sentences, the two German personal pronouns ich 1 (1st sg.) and du
(2nd sg.) can be used like an impersonal pronoun, i.e. with a generic interpretation
instead of the “normal” deictic interpretation. In their generic interpretation, ich and du
are are truth-conditionally equivalent with the generic reading of man (cf. Zobel
2011 also for pragmatic distinctions).
(5)
a.
b.
c.
Ich muss als Bauer meine Kühe melken. (1p.sg.)
I must as farmer my
cows milk
Du musst als Bauer deine Kühe melken. (2p.sg.)
you must as farmers your cows milk
Man muss als Bauer seine Kühe melken. (impersonal)
one must as farmers one’s cows milk
The common meaning of (5-a), (5-b) and (5-c) can be roughly paraphrased as:
(6)
Ein Bauer muss seine Kühe melken.
‘A farmer must milk his cows.’
For the English translations of sentences with generic ich, du, and man, I use the impersonal pronoun
‘one’: ‘As a farmer, one has to milk one’s cows.’
• Like generic man, the impersonal use of ich and du show quantificational variability
effects. The meaning is the same as discussed for (3).
(7)
Damals bin ich normalerweise älter als 60 geworden.
back-then am I usually
older than 60 become
(8)
Damals bist du normalerweise älter als 60 geworden.
back-then are you usually
older than 60 become
• The truth-conditional equivalence of sentences with impersonal ich and du and generic
man and the availability of quantificational variability effects suggest that impersonal ich
and du have a semantic make up similar to man. That is, impersonally used personal
pronouns also introduce a free variable that can be bound by an appropriate operator
(cf. Malamud to appear, Zobel 2011).
• In the following discussion, I show that the behavior of impersonally used personal pronouns matches the behavior of man also with respect to co-occurring
modals. This means that any possible restriction on binding might be a general property
of these uses.
I only use data with German impersonal ich as additional illustrations for reasons of length. Similar data
with impersonal du could be provided instead.
1
The impersonal use of first person singular ich is not available for all speakers of German.
3
3
Intensional contexts for impersonal pronouns
• Assuming the intuitive characterization of episodic sentences: a sentence containing an
operator that introduces an intensional sentential context — a context that introduces
quantification over times and/or worlds — will typically be a non-episodic sentence.
This means, in these contexts a generic interpretation for man is expected and
should be available for ich and du.
• I group the intensional sentential contexts by modal verbs:
1. overt co-occuring necessity modal
2. overt co-occuring possibility modal
3. non-episodic interpretations with no overt co-occuring modal (→ generic operator)
Generic readings of man and impersonal ich are also found in conditionals. I assume that wenn-clauses
in German, like if -clauses in English, restrict quantificational expressions (cf. von Fintel and Iatridou
2002). A conditional with an overt modal in the consequent can not be grouped simply with respect
to this overtly occurring modal. There may in principle be a covert necessity modal that scopes over
the overt modal and that is restricted by the if -clause (cf. Geurts 2004). This complication has to be
addressed separately and I will thus leave aside conditionals at this point.
Necessity modal with and without negation:
(9)
Man muss vorsichtig sein.
one must cautious be
‘One must be cautious.’
(10)
Man muss nicht vorsichtig sein.
one must not cautious be
‘One does not have to be cautious.’
(11)
Ich muss doch als Lehrer merken, wenn jemand sozial total
isoliert
I must prt as teacher notics when someone socially completely isolated
ist.
is
‘As a teacher, one has to notice when someone is completely socially isolated.’2
(12)
Ich muss als Verbaucher ja auch nicht überprüfen, ob
das
I must as customer prt also not check
whether the
Kino
mir eine Schwarzkopie präsentiert.
movie-theater me a
pirated-copy screen
‘As a customer, one also doesn’t have to check, whether the movie theater screens
a pirated copy.’3
Possibility modal with and without negation:
2
3
(13)
Man kann vorsichtig sein.
one can cautious be
‘One can be cautious.’
(14)
Man kann nicht vorsichtig sein.
one can not cautious be
‘One can not be cautious.’
(15)
Ich kann als Ehepaar
bis zu 300.000 Euro auf Tagesgeld
anlegen
I can as married-couple up-to 300.000-Euro as overnight-loan put
ohne
Zinssteuer
zu zahlen.
without tax-on-interest to pay
http://www.online-im-park.de/2009/03/12/sensationsgeilheit-und-scheuklappenmentalitat/
http://www.gutefrage.net/frage/kino-to-legal-oder-nicht
4
‘As a married couple, one can put up to 300.000 Euros as an overnight loan
without paying tax on the resulting interest.’4
(16)
Ich kann doch als Brautpaar
nicht von meinen Gästen erwarten, dass sie
I can prt as bridal-couple not from my
guests expect
that they
mir quasi
die Feier finanzieren!
me more-or-less the party pay-for
‘As a bridal couple, one can’t expect the guests to pay for one’s party!’5
No overt modal with and without negation:
(17)
Man ist vorsichtig.
one is cautious
‘One is cautious.’
(18)
Man ist nicht
vorsichtig.
one is cautious
‘One is not cautious.’
(19)
Ich gehe doch als Gast dorthin um
einen schönen Abend zu haben und
I go prt as guest there so-that a
beautiful evening to have and
tolle Musik zu hören.
good music to listen-to
‘As a guest, one goes there to have a nice evening and to listen to good music.’6
(20)
Ich zahle
doch als Konzern
nicht einfach für nix
nur
I give-money prt as corporate-group not simply for nothing just
so
aus gutem Willen.
like-that out-of good will
‘As a corporate group, one does not simply give money for nothing, just like that,
out of good will.’7
• Summary: The entire spectrum of unnegated and negated modal elements can co-occur
with both pronouns. Intuitively, the pronouns seem to have their generic reading in all
of the examples, independently of the quantificational force of the overt modal or the
presence of negation.
4
Modals as possible binders
• Heim (1982):
– Indefinites are analyzed as contributing free variables that are either bound by operators higher up in the sentence or via existential closure at discourse level.
– Modals are unselective quantifiers like adverbs of quantification (as assumed in Lewis
1975).
– Thus, modals are possible binders for the free variables contributed by indefinites
and may also give rise to quantificational variability effects.
4
http://www.wallstreet-online.de/diskussion/1139180-1-10/uniopti-4
http://www.urbia.de/archiv/forum/th-2142726/Wieviel-Geld-zur-Hochzeit-schenken.html
6
http://106332.iboox.com/st 80.html
7
http://www.spongeblog.de/567/2006/07/07/zeiss-of-jena/
5
5
Heim adapts Kratzer’s (1981) semantics for modals. Kratzer analyzes modals as
propositional operators that introduce quantifiers over possible worlds: necessity modals
introduce universal quantification, possibility modals introduce existential quantification.
The different readings of modals are modelled with two contextually determined parameters, called the modal base and the ordering source, that jointly pick out the relevant set
of worlds used as domain of quantification — the best worlds with respect to the given
modal base and ordering source determined from the world of evaluation.
Heim adds the possibility for the modals to bind free individual variables in addition
to a world variable. She assigns the following truth conditions to the expressions that
arise when the modals ‘must’ and ‘can’ take a proposition p[x1 , . . . , xn ] — a proposition
containing x1 , . . . , xn as free variables — as their argument.
(21)
a.
b.
Jmust p[x1 , . . . , xn ]Kw,f,g = 1 iff
∀w0 ∈ O(f, g, w) ∀x1 , . . . xn [p[x1 , . . . , xn ](w0 ) = 1]
Jcan p[x1 , . . . , xn ]Kw,f,g = 1 iff
∃w0 ∈ O(f, g, w) ∃x1 , . . . xn [p[x1 , . . . , xn ](w0 ) = 1]
The notation O(f, g, w) denotes the set of relevantly best worlds with respect to a modal base f and
ordering source g that are accessible from w.
Heim uses the following examples to show that her account correctly derives universal
quantification over cats and men.
(22)
a.
b.
If a cat is exposed to 2,4-D, it must be taken to the vet immediately.
If a man is in Athens, he cannot be in Rhodes.
• Heim’s analysis has been partly challenged in turn by Chierchia (1995b) and Brennan (1997). (See Brennan 1997 for an overview of this discussion.)
Brennan (1997) proposes two tests to diagnose for quantificational variability effects
arising between a modal and an indefinite expression.
– Covariance test: Does the quantificational force found with the indefinite change
when the modal force is changed? If yes, one can assume that the variable is bound
by the modal.
– Counterfactual entailment test: Generic quantification supports counterfactual entailments (see (23)) but quantificational modality does not. Therefore, if appropriate
counterfactuals are entailed, the variable contributed by the indefinite expression is
bound by a generic operator.
(23)
Wooden houses burn very quickly. So if that house had been wooden instead of
stone, it would have burned very quickly.
Using these tests, Brennan argues that the following examples are indeed quantificational
modals since they show covariance and do not support counterfactual entailments.
(24)
a.
b.
A basketball player will be short. ∼ All basketball players are short.
A basketball player can be short. ∼ Some basketball players are short.
6
(25)
A basketball player can be short.# Therefore: If I were a basketball player, I could
be short.
(Brennan 1997:168 reusing Heim’s examples)
However, not all of Heim’s examples behave as the examples above. For the cat
example, no covariance can be observed when must is replaced by may; it is still a
statement about cats in general that are exposed to 2,4-D8 .
(26)
a.
b.
If a cat is exposed to 2,4-D, it must be taken to the vet immediately.
If a cat is exposed to 2,4-D, it may be taken to the vet immediately.
Contrary to (25), the example with the possibility modal supports counterfactual entailment.
(27)
If a cat is exposed to 2,4-D, it may be taken to the vet immediately. So, if Sienna were a cat who had been exposed to 2,4-D, she could be taken to the vet
immediately.
Brennan suggests that examples like (26) involve a generic operator that scopes over
the modal and binds the free variable provided by the indefinite noun phrase.
She concludes that modals are sometimes (but not always) able to bind a free
variable contributed by an indefinite. Those cases where binding is possible she calls
“quantificational modality”.
• Given that — apart from a covert generic operator — the overt modals might determine
the quantificational force of the variable contributed by man or impersonal ich, one needs
to decide between the following two accounts for the impersonal readings:
– One-operator story: If there is an overt modal or other overt quantificational
element, it binds the free variable contributed by these pronouns. Else, if no such
overt quantificational element is present in the sentential context, a covert generic
operator binds the variable.
– Two-operator story: The variable contributed by these pronouns is always bound
by a covert generic operator. Any overt quantificational element is interpreted in the
scope of the generic operator.
5
Arguments for the two-operator story
• Argument 1: No covariance can be observed. Switching between possibility and
necessity modals does not change the (quasi-) universal reading of man or impersonal ich.
The following example tries to conduct the covariance test in dialogue form.
Scenario: A and B talk about German laws pertaining to farmers.
8
2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) is a pesticide/ herbicide. It is the most widely used herbicide in the
world, and the third most commonly used in North America.
7
(28)
a.
b.
A: Das Gesetz sagt, dass man als Bauer seine Kühe manuell melken
the law
says that I
as farmer my cows manually milk
muss.
must
A: ‘According to the law, a farmer must milk his cows manually.’
B: Das stimmt doch nicht! Paragraph zwei sagt, dass man als Bauer
that be-true prt not paragraph-two says that I
as farmer
seine Kühe auch maschinell
melken kann!
my cows also in-an-automated-way milk can
B: ‘That’s not true! In the second paragraph it says that a farmer can milk
his cows also in an automated way.’
The two modals in A’s and B’s utterances are interpreted with respect to the same body of
law, i.e. the German law pertaining to farmers. In both utterances a property is ascribed to
all farmers. Crucially, B’s utterance does not mean that, according to the German law,
(only) some actual farmers milk their cows in an automated way (intended: a reading
similar to (24-b). Neither does it mean that, according to the German law, some farmers
can milk their cows in an automated way. It means that — as far as the law is concerned
— farmers in general can milk their cows in an automated way (maybe: assuming they
have some qualifying property).
The same concludion holds if above man is replaced by impersonal ich.
• Argument 2: The sentences containing the pronoun support counterfactual entailments. Whenever the following examples (repeat (5-c) and (5-a)) are true, the same
situation also supports (30).
(29)
a.
b.
(30)
Man muss als Bauer seine Kühe melken.
one must as farmer one’s cows milk
‘As a farmer, one has to milk one’s cows.’
Ich muss als Bauer meine Kühe melken.
I must as farmer my
cows milk
‘As a farmer, one has to milk one’s cows.’
So, if I were a farmer, I would have to milk my cows.
• At this point one might want to weaken the one-operator story to
– One-operator story (weakened): If there is an overt necessity modal or other
overt quantificational element with universal force, it binds the free variable contributed by impersonal ich. Else, if no such overt quantificational element is present
in the sentential context, a covert generic quantifier binds the variable.
The following argument is to my mind a good reason to also discard this weakened version.
• Argument 3: Sentences containing impersonal man or ich allow for exceptions. This points towards a covert generic operator, since only (generically induced)
quasi-universal quantification allows for exceptions. Necessity modals contribute strictly
universal quantification. Thus, if the pronouns are interpreted in a way that allows for
exceptions, the necessity modals drop out as viable alternatives.
Consider the following example:
8
(31)
Man melkt als Bauer seine Kühe.
one milks as farmer one’s cows
‘As a farmer, one milks one’s cows.’
Assume that there is a farmer who had an accident and has since then been physically
unable to milk his cows himself. If the examples would involve strictly universal quantification over farmers, this farmer would provide a counterexample to the generalization and
the example is expected to be false in this scenario. However crucially, the existence of
such a farmer who does not milk his cows does not falsify the claim that farmers in general
milk their cows. That is, the sentence is still seen as a general rule for all non-exceptional
farmers and the one farmer is seen as a valid exception because of his accident.
• In sum, the two-operator story that puts any overt quantificational expressions into the
scope of a generic operator which binds the variable contributed by the pronoun seems to
be the better option. It predicts that there is no covariance, that these sentences support
counterfactual entailments and that they allow for exceptions.
6
Spelling out the two-operator account
• The following ingredients are needed to spell out the two-operator account.
– A semantics for the modals können and müssen:
I adopt Kratzer’s analysis for the modals können (‘can’) and müssen (‘must’) as
introduced in section 4:
(32)
a.
b.
JkönnenKc,g,w = λphs,ti .∃w0 ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w0 ) = 1]
JmüssenKc,g,w = λphs,ti .∀w0 ∈ O(f, g, w)[p(w0 ) = 1]
Both modals are propositional operators that introduce quantification over possible
worlds. The possibility modal können states that there is a possible world in the set
of relevantly best worlds, O(f, g, w), where its argument proposition p holds. The
necessity modal müssen requires that the argument proposition p holds in all of the
relevantly best worlds O(f, g, w).
Reminder: The set of relevantly best worlds O(f, g, w) is determined by the contextually specified
values for the modal base f and the ordering source g with respect to the world of evaluation w.
– A semantics for the generic operator Gen:
Generic sentences are used to express generalizations, laws, rules of games, customs,
and social norms among others. In addition, generic sentences can be read as stating an inductive generalization or to report, enforce or introduce an existing rule/
generalization.
(33)
A dog has four legs.
For example, (33) can be either used to report an inductive generalization about
dogs or to report the existing genetic predisposition of dogs (‘a law of nature’). The
content of the generalization is that the property denoted by the predicate, has four
legs, is attributed to those individuals specified by the subject NP, a dog, to which
the rule is ‘applicable’.
9
For the meaning of Gen, I adopt the following modal account which is an adaptation of the proposal in Krifka et al. (1995).
(34)
Gen(P )(Q) is true in w iff ∀w0 ∈ G(f, g, w)∀x ∈ Dw0 [P (x)(w0 ) → Q(x)(w0 )]
The set of relevantly best worlds for a generic statement, G(f, g, w), contains those
worlds where all individuals that are P s count as un-exceptional with respect to
being Q (the world of evaluation will typically not be in this set). What counts
as non-exceptional, though, is judged with respect to the world of evaluation w. I
will paraphrase generic sentences of the form ‘Ps are Qs’ or ‘a P is a Q’ (and their
German counterparts) as
(35)
All relevantly non-Q-exceptional Ps are Qs.
– A semantics for German als (Engl. ‘as’):
For the purpose of this talk, I assume that the als-phrase contributes a predicate
that holds of the variable introduced by man or impersonal ich and is interpreted
in the restrictor of the generic operator. This means ‘ich/man . . . als Bauer ’ will
contribute farmer(x) to the restrictor of Gen.
Note: German als-phrases are more complex than that, but as far as I know no satisfactory analysis
has been proposed for their semantics at this point. But see Jäger (2003) and Asher (2006) for
English as-phrases, which share some characteristics with German als-phrases, and Flaate (2007)
for a comprehensive overview of the German data.
• Consideration: Since the modals and the generic operator are analyzed as propositional
operators that quantify over possible worlds, the question of relative scope has to be
addressed. Theoretically, both scope orderings should be possible.
However, I argue that the modal has to be in the scope of Gen.
The interaction between the generic operator and modals is quite understudied. Portner (2009) suggests
that for sentences like ‘A farmer can milk his cows.’ a two-operator account is needed. However, he does
not spell out the details.
• Arguing for Gen > modal: Consider the predicted readings for the following generic
sentences:
(36)
Man muss als Bauer seine Kühe melken.
one must as farmer his cows milk
‘As a farmer, one must milk his cows.’
(37)
Ein Bauer muss seine Kühe melken.
a farmer must his cows milk
‘A farmer must milk his cows.’
Assume that müssen in example (37) is read as necessity with respect to the German law.
Then the following two readings are predicted to be available.
– Gen > modal: All relevantly non-exceptional farmers are such that it is legally
necessary for them — according to the German law — to milk their cows.
– modal > Gen: According to the German law it is legally necessary that all relevantly non-exceptional farmers milk their cows.
10
Two readings spelled out in more detail:
– The first reading says that in general farmers have a legal obligation to milk their
cows. However, there may be farmers that count as legitimate exceptions for who this
legal obligation does not hold. That is, there may be exceptions to the application
of the law on farmers.
– The second reading is more intricate. It says that — were the German law obeyed
perfectly — all relevantly non-exceptional farmers with respect to milking their cows
would milk their cows. That is, the law “cares” only about non-exceptional farmers
and not about exceptional farmers.
Consider possible exceptions to ‘A farmer milks his cows’:
farmers who had an accident and are unable to do manual work, farmers who have
a hired help for this task, farmers who are alcoholics and therefore do not perform
their duties, etc.
The second reading says that all of these farmers are not covered by the law.
Only the first reading is available:
– Examples (37) and (36) are naturally used in discussions about the obligations of
farmers.
(38)
A: Is there something that farmers legally have to do?
The German version of A’s question could be answered by B in the affirmative with
either (37) or (36). Here, B does not want to communicate that the German law has
a particularly weak stance on farmers milking their cows (the second reading), but
that it is an obligation for farmers to milk their cows (the first reading).
– More strongly: Were the second reading available at all, (37) and (36) should be
possible answers for B in the following dialogue.
Scenario:
A tells B, “A friend of mine is a farmer and has a huge drinking problem. He starts
drinking as soon as he gets up in the morning and completely neglects his farm.
His wife has to milk their cows by herself. I hope, he doesn’t get into legal trouble
because of his behavior.”
(39)
B: Nein, nein. Keine Sorge. #Man muss als Bauer seine Kühe melken.
no
no no
worry one
must as farmer one’s cows milk
B: ‘No, no. Don’t worry. #A farmer must milk his cows.’
What we find is that B’s answer is completely incoherent. It can not be understood
as saying that only non-exceptional farmers are covered by the legal obligation and
that therefore A’s friend (an exceptional farmer with respect to milking his cows)
has nothing to worry about.
• Modelling the German data:
Straightforwardly combining the parts given above the following meaning for ‘Man kann
als Bauer seine Kühe melken’ (‘As a farmer, one can milk one’s cows.’) is derived:
11
(40)
∀w0 ∈ G(f, g, w)∀x ∈ Dw0 [farmer(x)(w0 ) → ∃w00 ∈ O(f 0 , g 0 , w0 )[x milks his cows in w00 ]]
The quasi-universal quantification of individuals quantifies into the modal statement, thus x in the
predication should really be the counterpart of the relevant x in w00 .
• There seems to be a problem: The quantifier that ends up with low scope will use as
world parameter the elements of the set of worlds quantified over by the higher quantifier,
i.e. will not depend on the world of evaluation. However, intuitively the interpretation of
the modal in the scope of the generic operator also depends on the world of evaluation:
‘Man kann als Bauer seine Kühe melken’ says something about the actual German law,
not about the German law of the non-exceptional-farmer worlds.
At closer examination, the dependence of the modal on the worlds that are quantified over
generically might not be as problematic as it seems. It has been argued independently
in Drewery (1998) that the worlds quantified over generically share the same rules with
the actual world that are used to determine which individuals count as non-exceptional.
She says that an individual is exceptional with respect to a rule if and only if the body
of rules contains another rule that the individual falls under and that overrides the first
rule. In the farmer case, the body of German law is used to determine the non-exceptional
individuals and is therefore — according to Drewery — shared by the worlds that are
quantified over generically. Thus, the German law in the non-exceptional-farmer
worlds can be assumed to be the same as the actual German law.
7
Summary
• I argued — after examining the intensional sentential contexts found with German generic
man and impersonally used singular personal pronouns — that the free variable contributed by these pronouns are bound by a generic operator even if there is an overt co-occurring
modal. The relative scope of the two quantifying expressions is that the modal is interpreted in the scope of the generic operator.
• Two big open conceptual questions remain:
1. How to model that in non-episodic sentences these pronouns can only be bound by
Gen or an adverb of quantification?
2. In what way is the generic reading connected to the other reading(s)?
As far as I can tell there are three possible types of solutions for these questions that need
to be further explored.
– Syntactic solution: the different interpretations are a matter of feature agreement
(cf. D’Alessandro and Alexiadou 2003)
– Lexical-semantic solution: there are distinct lexical items or feature specifications for
each interpretation (cf. Malamud to appear)
– Semantic-pragmatic solution: certain pragmatic considerations license the introduction of a shifting operator
This exploration has to be left for further research.
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• Another issue that needs to be researched further is whether the results for German
extend to the generic readings of impersonal pronouns and impersonally used personal
pronouns in other languages.
References
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Cabredo-Hofherr, Patricia. 2004. Impersonal pronouns in Somali, German and French. Presentation at ‘The syntax of the world’s languages 1’, August 5-8, 2004, Leipzig.
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