Interviewing the Embodiment of Political Evil:

A revenge towards professional and social treasons:
Gendarmic purges after WWII
Jonas Campion
Abstract
Accused of collaboration with Germans due to their presence in occupied
territories, European gendarmes (Belgian, French and Dutch one’s) are considered
as traitors after the Liberation. Consequently, they are subjected to purges process.
In a Resistancialist context, legal and internal procedures are initiated to repress the
Occupation faulty behaviours. The aim is to restore legality and legitimacy of these
police institutions. At the same time, extra-legal violence strike the gendarmes and
their symbols, emanating from resistance or popular movements. Here, the goal is
to punish them for the treasons but also to challenge their role and missions in
Liberated societies.
Registered within an exceptional framework of Justice and political transition,
purges can be understood like a phenomenon of revenge. In theory repressing the
faulty behaviours defined by internal discipline and Penal code, purges draw, in
practice, new relations within the bodies. Gendarme’s “victims” claim an
individual revenge – and not only reparation – for the wrongs incurred during the
war. In the same way, at the institutional level, some gendarmes want to be
collectively avenged from their colleagues with abnormal behaviours during the
war (promotion, course of career,…). They want to punish the traitors to the
Nation and to professional ideal, in order to restore the Resistant legend of the
institutions.
Between institutional, professional and personal needs, we want to understand
outcomes of Revenge revendication, which crosses purges within the three studied
gendarmeries. Using the legal and administrative purges archives, we propose to
highlight dynamics and logics, sometimes contradictory, between the behaviours
requiring revenge ; forms that this one should take ; symbolic effects which it
involves and answers concretely brought by the Military and Legal authorities.
Key Words: Gendarmerie, Second World War, purges, justice, revenge,
collaboration, Nazi occupation, Germany, Belgium, France, Netherlands.
*****
2
Gendarmic Purges after WWII
__________________________________________________________________
The gendarmerie is a national military force, charged with judicial,
administrative and military police missions. Organized during French Revolution,
this institution knows an expansion with European Wars. At the end of the XIXth
century, Belgium, France and the Netherlands have a gendarmerie force at the
heart of their police organisation1.
1. Occupations and gendarmeries: an unprecedented crisis time
Second World War is a crisis time for this institution. Indeed, although
gendarmes are soldiers, they stay in defeated and occupied countries. For German
authorities, this is necessary to maintain quiet and public order without mobilizing
too much men. Occupied authorities hope to secure national interest by using these
police forces. This situation is transnational whatever the nature of occupied and
occupation authorities (French political Regime of the ‘Etat français’ or
administrative authorities in Belgium and Netherland ; Militar or Zivil
Verwaltung). Furthermore, International law, like The Hague Convention of 1907,
pushes gendarmes to cooperate with German armies, as de facto authorities in
occupied countries2.
WWII is a specific conflict, with a great ideological scope. Therefore, National
and International laws are insufficient to regulate gendarme’s policing facing
political missions asked by the Germans (persecution against the Jews, fighting
Resistance, implementation of Obligatory Work Service). In all Occupied
countries, trouble are increasing during the War. The frontier between legality and
legitimacy of gendarmes’s daily practises grows up day after day. For all
policemen, it’s very difficult to deal with this situation. They are alone in a
changing environment in terms of gendarmerie’s organization, of colleague’s , of
grow up of violence, characterised in some areas by a Civil War perspective
between Resistants, Germans and Collaborators (especially in France, but also in
some areas of the Netherlands of Belgium). On the field, gendarmes are
responsible for their way of working, between Collaboration, Passivity, Resistance
or all intermediate choice’s (also depending of geography, chronology, …).
2. A misunderstood service in occupied territories
At the end of the War, gendarme’s work in occupied countries is
misunderstood by new political authorities, and by a large part of population or
Resistance’s movements. For all of them, the gendarme’s continuous presence in
occupied territory is seen like a treason3. The term of treason is very strong in the
mind of Belgian’s, French’s or Dutch’s. Indeed, the treason is not only understood
on the legal definition4 . Treason is more than a crime, this is a breakdown of the
values of the Nation, the Resistance, and also of the Institution. No political,
practical or juridic arguments were accepted to understand gendarme’s
comportement. In Europe, during the fall 1944, the atmosphere is resistancialist:
each one want to be seen as a resistant, to punish the Collaborators, the traitors.
Jonas Campion
3
__________________________________________________________________
Due to their public role in social regulations, gendarmes are in the frontline of this
Justice need.
Gendarmes are subjected to purges process to respond to this need of Justice
related to Occupation faulty behaviours5. Legal and internal procedures are
initiated. Purges are very spread, into all units and all hierarchy of the
gendarmeries. Their aim is to restore the legality and the legitimacy of these police
institutions. At the same time, extra-legal violences strike the gendarmes and their
symbols, emanating from resistance or popular movements.
For the gendarmes, the process is expectable but misunderstood. During the
Occupation, it was already clearly announced to civil servant that they will be
prosecuted for their false comportement6. Further, in occupied territories, some
gendarmes were already threatened by Resistance Groups. In the Netherlands, an
officer was warned: “Gaat gij met uw werk door, dan zult gij sterven” 7. For
gendarmes, situation is unsafe. During an inquiry, a French Officer explain he only
did his work during War :
je suis condamné pour avoir exécuté les ordres du gouvernement
de Vichy. Alors je ne comprends plus! Quand je suis entré dans
la gendarmerie, j’ai prêté serment: je jure d’obéir à mes chefs…
Qu’ai-je fait en exécutant les ordres de Vichy? Sinon obéir à mes
chefs. Alors pourquoi me condamner? 8
3. Revenge or Justice?
If we define Justice like an official redemption process in a correction and
reintegration perspective, to recognize and punish wrongs and crimes in name of
Society, purges only partially fit with this definition. For people who criticizes
gendarmeries, the object of Purges can be read like a Revenge dynamic.
First, the person and private interests are in the heart of proceedings against
gendarmes. The goal isn’t to impose a just sentence, in an equal and reparative
perspective. Claimers against gendarmes want disproportionate and fast sanctions.
Furthermore, these people want to punish gendarmes by private procedures,
outside official institution as Penal Courts, or disciplinary procedures.
Beyond this definition, the Revenge is plural: in 1944-1945, different processes
overlap around European gendarmeries. They differ each other one from their
originators, and from their goals9. On one hand, gendarmes want revenge against
other gendarmes, because they have undermined the values and personal and
visions of gendarmerie. On the other hand, members of Resistance or civilians are
seeking revenge for arrest, interrogation and brutality made by gendarmes, or for
gendarme’s public contacts with the Germans.
Between institutional, professional and personal needs, we want to understand
outcomes of Revenge claim, into three related Gendarmeries: the French one, the
Belgian one and the Dutch Marechaussee. Using legal and administrative purges
4
Gendarmic Purges after WWII
__________________________________________________________________
archives, we propose to highlight dynamics of behaviours requiring revenge ;
forms that this one should take; symbolic effects which it involves and answers
concretely brought by the Military and Legal authorities.
By crossing cases of three institutions, we clarify professional and national
logics of Revenge during a State’s reorganization period. Revenge against
gendarmerie is a plural concept, without fundamental break between countries. In a
war context, Revenge is a political and exceptional perspective. It’s goal is to
punish traitors and collaborators, who acted against the Nation. But we also find a
personal, human and material component into this phenomenon.
Firstly, the claim of Revenge is an internal phenomenon. Some gendarmes
wanted to punish other one on a professional perspective. After the war, it seems
necessary to punish gendarmes whose career path grows up during Occupation. By
accepting responsibilities or promotions, they broke normal functioning of
gendarmeries and created an unfair competition into promotions. People who then
refused wanted now a compensation. They want promotions, tributes, but also
better treatments, or better housing in a difficult material situation (shortages,
frauds, Black market). Furthermore, gendarmes who accepted promotions broke
the Resistancialist spirit and apparent unity of gendarmeries which is highlighted
in Liberated areas. So, applicants wanted Revenge in order to restore their own
career but also their own perception of gendarmeries.
Officers are arrested by suborders10. Denunciations are increasing among
colleagues. Hierarchy is shaken11. The situation is murky. It offers opportunities for
making false allegations. They are very useful to reduce competition for later
career developpements. Accused gendarmes live with bitterness what happens. A
French Officer has difficult to accept that “ces accusations sont portées
directement ou par intermédiaire, par un de mes subalternes, un sous-officier de
gendarmerie ambitieux et méprisable”12.
Outside the gendarmeries, the claim of Revenge came from people who were
killed, arrested, questioned, denounced or tormented by gendarmes. A gendarme
who killed a civilian in 1942 is now obliged to transfer to avoid violence against
him13. Not only Resistance members but also civilians wanted Revenge. Violence
increases against gendarmes. In France, before and after the Liberation, some
gendarmes (around 50) are killed by Resistants or Civilians without any
judgement. Everywhere, gendarmes are threatened. Some barracks are invaded,
soiled by painting, destroyed, attacked or bombed by IED14.
The political perspective in this claims is obvious. In France or in Belgium,
Revenge is called by Communists parties which want to compete gendarmeries
into policing functions15. By mobilizing some arrests or suffering of civilians,
they’re able to reduce legitimacy of the police forces into public space. The
situation of gendarmerie in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais is very representative of this
situation. Nord-Pas-de-Calais is a working area, with a strong Commnunist
presence before the War. After 1941, activists engage themselves into underground
Jonas Campion
5
__________________________________________________________________
networks. Vichy policemen and gendarmes strike very hard in collaboration with
German polices. In September 1944, the Communist party capitalize its losses by
claiming sanctions against Gendarmes, in a typical strategy of tension.
4. Revenge is violent. What are Official and Gendarmes Reactions?
Coming from Gendarmeries or outside them, Revenge take form of symbolic or
interpersonal violence. From September 1944 to the end of 1945 at least,
gendarmes or their symbols are attacked by press16, by lobbying, by
demonstrations, or by public violence. This is the result of increasing of violence
during war17. When Liberation occurred, the situation doesn’t change: in France,
Free French in London called for National Insurrection. In Belgium or in the
Netherlands, Resistants fight with allied armies. Furthermore, weapons are
everywhere.
Facing this situation, gendarmes authorities must take back control on Revenge
needs by reintegrating them into a judicial and official way18. From private to
public : purges have this goal, a very long and difficult process in the three
countries.
Yet, in each country, the gap is great between internal and judicial pronounced
sanctions and their perceptions by population or by Resistants 19. With internal
purges, sanctions are professional’s. They’re often misunderstood outside
gendarmerie forces because of their career, hierarchical, or financial consequences
which are invisible, although very disadvantageous for gendarmes and their
families20. Further, around 50% of suspected collaborators are finally cleared of
charges21. Criticisms grow up against gendarmes, and increase the need of a second
wave of Revenge. This situation explains some outbreak of violence that locally
occurs during the second half of 1945 or in 1946. We must examine them related to
the (non) progress/failure of the purges, like perceived in the local sociability.
Inside the gendarmeries, the issue is identical: to legalize procedures coming
from the field. More than ever, the situation is dangerous for gendarmerie’s
cohesion. Indeed, dynamics of Revenge threaten professional habitus and values
like obedience, compliance orders, hierarchical working22. For the gendarmeries,
Revenge need is a centrifugal factor which is considered very seriously by the
authorities. A game of influence goes up to insert back extra-legal into a formal
dynamic. In the daily policing, gendarmeries attempt to move up from private
vengeance to public and official Justice. Revenge has no place in reorganization
process. This is a condition of re-establishment of gendarme’s legality and
authority in all their field of interventions. The process is slow, difficult, and far
from being always successful. Some gendarmes had completely freed from the
formal structures23.
In official speeches, vengeance – or the exceptional character of procedures –
shall be mobilized as needed. This is one of the huge ambiguity of the
gendarmeries restructuration. Authorities call for Revenge and exceptional
6
Gendarmic Purges after WWII
__________________________________________________________________
punition for traitors24, and try in the same time to insert reorganization into legal
and normal process. The gap between speeches and practices exists. It offers a
possibility to meet need of Justice/Revenge, need of gendarmes implication into
reorganization process, without compromising gendarmerie’s participation in
State’s life. At the end of purges procedures, only a minority of policemen, well
identified are actually punished and publicly denounced. This confirms the
patriotism of the remaining institutions25. The purge procedures didn’t
fundamentally change the institution's traditional values. Although subject is
nuanced in the specific Occupation context, immediately and fully follow orders
remained a major characteristic of the gendarme ideal. In all the institutions, the
Liberation saw a strong reaffirmation of the importance of such behaviour. Order is
always a priority, and the necessity is to avoid an excessive disruptions of
gendarmeries.
Inside the institutions, soldiers claim against attacks and procedures they
endure. By refusing exceptional perspective about War and purges, they appear
like victims of personal conflicts and professional competition26. The defence
strategy is ‘normalizing’ and denies any need for justice, revenge or punishment.
Because they have correctly and effectively done their job during and before
WWII, they are now the subject of complaints. The gendarmes’s purpose is to
discredit their critics by presenting them as jealousy, frustration, of offenders who
hope to revenge a previous conviction. Revenge is here (to be served) cold and far
away from any political considerations.
5. To conclude: Revenge and transitional/wartime justice
Revenge is, at the end of WWII, plural into European police institutions. Due to
specific context of Occupations, and due to specific role played by gendarmes in
each of occupied territories, it takes a political and extraordinary meaning.
Ordinary Justice is not enough, official institutions are insufficient to repair the
harm done by gendarmes to the Nations. Each one want to participate to German
defeat, to punish the traitors, to take revenge against collaborators of German
armies. In liberated Europe, many gendarmes are now considered as traitors
because they exercised their missions in occupied territories. To strengthen a
breakdown with occupied gendarmerie, Revenge is also mobilized into gendarme’s
official speeches. It’s a way to legitimate their policing against Resistance
competition. For some gendarmes, Revenge is also necessary against colleagues
who have benefited the war for their career, or break the fundamental values they
believe for the institutions.
If Revenge is claimed and sometimes put into practice by Resistants, Civilians
of gendarmes, it is firmly opposed by the official authorities. Revenge, as wish of
private justice is dangerous for survival of gendarmeries. At the end of the War,
Revenge rimes with violence. All attacks against gendarmes constitute a major
threat to democratic transition: they compete with the state monopoly of violence ;
Jonas Campion
7
__________________________________________________________________
they refuse the central authority; they challenge the unifying and national Justice.
The refusal of this situation is obvious. That is why the gendarmeries are a priority
during the Liberations by a massive retooling (weapons, cars, materials), human
action, purges, and a work of valorisation and homage.
This phenomenon is transnational. Challenges and responses to Revenge
against gendarmes are identical from one country to another. Despite the different
experiences of War lived in France, Belgium and the Netherlands 27, they fit here
into the logic of the operation and regulation of modern society more than a
national perspective. In the understanding of justice/revenge around gendarmeries,
job function takes priority over national elements.
This brief overview of gendarmeries during wartime helps the understanding of
Justice and private competition of State functions in contemporary society.
Through its missions, the study of the gendarmerie is particularly interesting to
understand the stakes of these transition process. We hope to have provided food
for further thought about this.
Notes
1
On the European gendarmeries, see Arnaud-Dominique Houte, Le métier de gendarme national au XIXe siècle (Rennes:
PUR, 2010); Jean-Noël Luc, ed., Soldats de la loi. La gendarmerie au 20e siècle (Paris: PUPS, 2010). See also Clive
Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Cyrille
Fijnaut, De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Politie. Een staatinstelling in de maalstroom van de geschiedenis
(Amsterdam: Boom, 2007); Jos Smeets, De Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Politie. Verdeelheid en eenheid in het
rijkspolitieapparaat (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007).
2
On this question, see Jonas Campion, “Le rétablissement de la légalité policière après la Seconde Guerre mondiale: les
gendarmeries belge, française et la Koninklijke Marechaussee néerlandaise” (PhD. Diss., UCL/Paris IV Sorbonne, 2009).
3
Jonas Campion, Emmanuel Chevet, “Quand (dés)obéir rime avec trahir : pratiques professionnelles des gendarmes
'occupés' durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale”, in La trahison de l’adultère au crime politique, ed. Claude Javeau and
Sébastien Schehr (Paris: Berg International, 2010), 96-108.
4
See the Penal Codes and all the changes in legislation during the War. Peter Romijn, Snel, Streng en Rechtvaardig.
Politiek beleid inzake de bestraffing en reclassering van ‘foute’ Nederlanders (Amsterdam: Olympus, 2002); Marc-Olivier
Baruch, ed., Une poignée de misérables, l'épuration de la société française après la Seconde Guerre mondiale (Paris:
Fayard, 2003) and Luc Huyse, Steven Dhondt, La répression des collaborations. 1942-1952. Un passé toujours présent,
(Bruxelles: CRISP, 1993).
5
Campion, Le rétablissement de la légalité policière après la Seconde Guerre mondiale…
6
Bruxelles, CEGES, Services du Premier minister. Archives des commissions d’enquête sur l’attitude des fonctionnaires
pendant l’Occupation 1944-1950, AA 1326, n°214, note from Information minister to Prime minister, 20/09/1943.
7
‘If you go on with your work, you’ll die’. La Haye, NA 2.09.09, n°65259, file Feenstra, waarschuwing, 18/10/1943.
8
Vincennes, SHD-DGN, 1A 206, n°2189, letter to director of the French Gendarmerie, 05/05/1946.
9
Without taking into account the discourses of purged gendarmes, claiming to be victims of hate, personal revenge,
jealousy or resentment. For example, Vincennes, SHD-DGN, 1A 212, n°2326, report from maréchal des logis Chef H.,
09/03/1947 or Cfr. Infra.
10
Bruxelles, Police fédérale-DGP, file maréchal des logis T., letter from T. to ‘commandant de corps’, 04/02/1945.
11
See the ‘comité directeur du Front National de Résistance de Gendarmerie de l’île de France et de l’Orléanais’ in the
barracks of Paris Region in augustus 1944. Vincennes, SHD-DGN, 1A 190, n°179, file Chef-d’escadron G., ‘notices
individuelles modèle n°1’, 10/11/1944.
12
Vincennes, SHD-DGN, 1A 53, report from Chef-d’escadron Gérardin, 23/09/1944.
13
Vincennes, SHD-DGN, 62E 66, R/2 brigade de Boudringhien, note n°579/2, 11/12/1944.
14
Bruxelles, SHP, file adjudant A., letter from lieutenant Vilain to commandant Burton, 07/09/1944.
15
See Geoffroy Warner, La crise politique belge de novembre 1944 : un coup d’État manqué ?. In Courrier Hebdomadaire
du CRISP, n°978, 1978 or José Gotovitch, Du rouge au tricolore: résistance et parti communiste (Bruxelles: Labor, 1992);
Philippe Buton, La joie douloureuse. La Libération de la France, (Bruxelles: Complexe, 2004).
16
Bruxelles, SHP, file maréchal des logis H., ‘rapport du service des enquêtes’, 04/11/1947.
17
See, for example, the belgian case related to homicides. Xavier Rousseaux, Toon Vrints, Frédéric Vesentini, “Violence
and Wars. Measuring Homicide in Belgium (1900-1950)”, in Violence in Europe. Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives, ed. Sophie Body-Gendrot and Peter Spierenburg (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 177-205.
18
Vincennes, SHD-DGN, 1A 484, letter from lieutenant-colonel Girard to War minister, 21/10/1944.
19
Jonas Campion, “Les sanctions des gendarmes au titre de l’épuration: légitimations plurielles pour une institution étatique
(1944-1948)”, in La sanction judiciaire dans l’espace belge (13e – 20e siècles), ed. Marie-Amélie Bourguignon, Bernard
Dauven and Xavier Rousseaux (Louvain-la-Neuve: PUL, forthcoming in 2011).
20
La Haye, NA 2.13.25, n°1515, sectie I Militair Gezag, rapport n°5580, 11/08/1945.
21
Campion, Le rétablissement de la légalité policière après la Seconde Guerre mondiale…
22
François Dieu, La gendarmerie, secrets d’un corps (Bruxelles: Complexe, 2002).
23
See the case of Commandant Jean, in reality a ‘maréchal des logis’ of Belgian gendarmerie, who took the head of a
Resistance Groupement, implemented a purge politic in the Hainaut, and refused to go back into service. Jambes, Collection
privée du colonel Claessens, doc 208, letter from major Godfroid, 13/10/1944.
24
See Buren, Marechaussee Museum, Collection Marechaussee, doos n°21, MG, Handleing voor Chef van Gemeentelijke
Politiecorpsen en commandante van afdeling der KM, [1945].
25
Vincennes, SHD-DGN 62E 68, R/4 section de Béthune, note n°76/4, 19/04/1945.
26
“L’esprit de vengeance est le trait dominant des attaques dirigées contre les militaires de la 1 ère légion et l’on retrouve
parmi les plaignants un grand nombre d’individus ayant eu maille à partir avec la gendarmerie pour vol ou trafic illicite”.
Vincennes, SHD-DGN, 1D1 16, R/2, note n°3591, 17/08/1945.
27
Furthermore, in each country, differences are great between regions.
Bibliography
Baruch, Marc-Olivier, ed. Une poignée de misérables, l'épuration de la société française après la Seconde Guerre
mondiale. Paris: Fayard, 2003.
Buton, Philippe. La joie douloureuse. La Libération de la France. Bruxelles: Complexe, 2004.
Campion, Jonas. “Le rétablissement de la légalité policière après la Seconde Guerre mondiale : les gendarmeries belge,
française et la Koninklijke Marechaussee néerlandaise”. PhD. Diss., UCL/Paris IV Sorbonne, 2009.
––– ‘Les sanctions des gendarmes au titre de l’épuration: légitimations plurielles pour une institution étatique (1944-1948)’.
In La sanction judiciaire dans l’espace belge (13e – 20e siècles), edited by Marie-Amélie Bourguignon, Bernard Dauven
and Xavier Rousseaux. Louvain-la-Neuve: PUL, forthcoming in 2011.
Campion, Jonas and Chevet, Emmanuel. “Quand (dés)obéir rime avec trahir : pratiques professionnelles des gendarmes
'occupés' durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale”. In La trahison de l’adultère au crime politique, edited by Claude Javeau and
Sébastien Schehr, 96-108. Paris: Berg International, 2010.
Dieu, François. La gendarmerie. Secrets d’un corps. Bruxelles: Complexe, 2002.
Emsley, Clive. Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Fijnaut, Cyrille. De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Politie. Een staatinstelling in de maalstroom van de geschiedenis.
Amsterdam: Boom, 2007.
Gotovitch, José. Du rouge au tricolore : résistance et parti communiste. Bruxelles: Labor, 1992.
Houte, Arnaud-Dominique. Le métier de gendarme national au XIXe siècle. Rennes: PUR, 2010.
Huyse, Luc and Dhondt, Steven. La répression des collaborations. 1942-1952. Un passé toujours present. Bruxelles:
CRISP, 1993.
Luc, Jean-Noël, ed. Soldats de la loi. La gendarmerie au 20e siècle, Paris : PUPS, 2010.
Romijn, Peter. Snel, Streng en Rechtvaardig. Politiek beleid inzake de bestraffing en reclassering van ‘foute’ Nederlanders.
Amsterdam: Olympus, 2002.
Rousseaux, Xavier; Toon, Vrints and Vesentini, Frédéric. “Violence and Wars. Measuring Homicide in Belgium (19001950)”. In Violence in Europe. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Sophie Body-Gendrot and Peter
Spierenburg, 177-205. Berlin: Springer, 2008.
Smeets, Jos. De Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Politie. Verdeelheid en eenheid in het rijkspolitieapparaat. Amsterdam:
Boom, 2007.
Warner, Geoffroy. La crise politique belge de novembre 1944 : un coup d’État manqué?. In Courrier Hebdomadaire du
CRISP, n°978, 1978.
Campion Jonas is Postdoctoral Research Fellow attached to the Centre of Law and Justice History (UCLouvain, Belgium).
He gained his Ph.D. in History at UCLouvain and Paris IV Sorbonne (2009) about European Gendarmeries after the Second
World War. It’ll be published in 2011 by André Versaille Editeur. He’s now working for the research programme ‘Justice
and Society: sociopolitical history of justice administration in Belgium (1795-2005)’, http://www.just-his.be (Interuniversity
Attraction Pole P6/01, Belgian State – Belgian Science Policy) .