Court File No.: 36162 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON

Court File No.: 36162
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO)
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Appellant
- AND HAMIDREZA SAFARZADEH-MARKHALI
Respondent
- AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,
BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION,
CRIMINAL LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION (ONTARIO),
WEST COAST PRISON JUSTICE SOCIETY,
JOHN HOWARD SOCIETY OF CANADA, AND
ABORIGINAL LEGAL SERVICES TORONTO INC.
Interveners
FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER
BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION
(Pursuant to Rules 37 and 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)
_____________________________________________________________________________
STOCKWOODS LLP
77 King Street West, Suite 4130
Toronto, Ontario M5K 1H1
FASKEN MARTINEAU DUMOULIN LLP
55 Metcalfe St., Suite 1300
Ottawa, ON K1P 6L5
Nader R. Hasan
Gerald Chan
Justin Safayeni
Tiffany O’Hearn Davies
T: 416-593-7200
F: 416-593-9345
E: [email protected]
Yael Wexler
T: 613- 236-3882
F: 613- 230-6423
E: [email protected]
Counsel for the Intervener,
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
ORIGINAL TO:
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
The Registrar
301 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0J1
COPIES TO:
Attorney General of Ontario
720 Bay Street, 10th Floor
Toronto, Ontario M7A 2S9
Burke-Robertson, LLP
441 MacLaren Street, Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 2H3
Roger A. Pinnock
T: 416-326-4575
F: 416-326-4656
E: [email protected]
Robert E. Houston, Q.C.
T: 613-236-9665
F: 613-235-4430
E: [email protected]
Counsel for the Appellant,
Her Majesty the Queen
Agent for the Appellant,
Her Majesty the Queen
Presser Barristers
6 Adelaide Street East, 5th Floor
Toronto, Ontario M5C 1H6
Supreme Advocacy LLP
340 Gilmour Street, Suite 100
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0R3
Jill R. Presser
Andrew Menchynski
T: 416-586-0330
F: 416-977-8513
E: [email protected]
Marie-France Major
T: 613-695-8855
F: 613-695-8580
E: [email protected]
Counsel for the Respondent,
Hamidreza Safarzadeh-Markhali
Agent for the Respondent,
Hamidreza Safarzadeh-Markhali
Attorney General of Canada
Centennial House
301-310 Broadway Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3C 0S6
Attorney General of Canada
50 O’Connor Street, Suite 500, Room 557
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H8
Sharlene Telles-Langdon
Kathryn Hucal
T: 204-983-0862
F: 204-984-8495
E: [email protected]
Christopher M. Rupar
T: 613-670-6290
F: 613-954-1920
E: [email protected]
Counsel for the Intervener,
The Attorney General of Canada
Agent for the Intervener,
The Attorney General of Canada
Russel Silverstein & Associate
100-116 Simcoe Street
Toronto, Ontario M5H 4E2
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
2600-160 Elgin Street
P.O. Box. 446, Stn. A.
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1C3
Russell Silverstein
Ingrid Grant
T: 416-977-5334
F: 416-596-2597
E: [email protected]
Matthew Estabrooks
T: 613-233-1781
F: 613-563-9869
E: [email protected]
Counsel for the Intervener,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)
Agent for the Intervener,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)
Polley Faith LLP
80 Richmond Street West
Suite 1300, The Victory Building
Toronto, Ontario M5H 2A4
Conway Baxter Wilson LLP
1111 Prince of Wales, Suite 401
Ottawa, Ontario K2C 3T2
Andrew S. Faith
Jeffrey Haylock
T: 416-365-1602
F: 416-365-1601
E: [email protected]
Colin S. Baxter
T: 613-780-2012
F: 613- 688-0271
E: [email protected]
Counsel for the Intervener,
John Howard Society of Canada
Agent for the Intervener,
John Howard Society of Canada
Hunter Litigation Chambers Law
Corporation
2100 - 1040 West Georgia Street
Vancouver, British Columbia V6E 4H1
Greenspon, Brown & Associates
331 Somerset Street West
Ottawa, Ontario K2P 0J8
Greg J. Allen
Kenneth K. Leung
T: 604-891-2400
F: 604-647-4554
E: [email protected]
Marisa E. Victor
T: 613-288-2890
F: 613-288-2896
E: [email protected]
Counsel for the Intervener,
West Coast Prison Justice Society
Agent for the Intervener,
West Coast Prison Justice Society
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto
415 Yonge Street
Suite 803
Toronto, Ontario M5B 2E7
Community Legal Services-Ottawa Carleton
1 Nicholas Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 7B7
Jonathan Rudin
Emily Hill
T: 416-408-4041
F: 416-408-4268
Charles McDonald
T: 613-241-7008
F: 613-241-8680
E: [email protected]
Counsel for the Intervener,
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.
Agent for the Intervener,
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I: STATEMENT OF FACTS
1
PART II: THE BCCLA’S POSITION ON THE QUESTION IN ISSUE
1
PART III: STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
2
I. A Sentence Is Grossly Disproportionate if It Does Not Serve any
Legitimate Sentencing Objective
2
II. Section 719(3.1) Does Not Advance any Legitimate Sentencing Objective
4
A. The Operation and Effects of Section 719(3.1)
5
1. Sentencing Disparities for Identically Situated Offenders
5
2. Tying the Hands of the Sentencing Court
6
3. The Trigger for Section 719(3.1) Is Tied to Socio-Economic Status
6
4. Dis-Incentivizing Accused Persons From Seeking Bail
7
B. These Effects Do Not Advance Any of the Objectives of Sentencing
III. Conclusion: S. 719(3.1) Stands in the Way of Rational Sentencing
7
10
PART IV: SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS
10
PART V: NATURE OF THE ORDER REQUESTED
10
PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
11
PART VII: LEGISLATION CITED
14
1
PART I: STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (the “BCCLA”) accepts the facts as set
out in the parties’ facta and takes no position on disputed facts.
PART II: THE BCCLA’S POSITION ON THE QUESTION IN ISSUE
2.
Section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code1 creates a sub-class of offenders who are punished
more harshly than similarly situated offenders. This additional punishment does not flow from
the offender’s moral blameworthiness, but is triggered by a decision of the bail court made when
little is known about the offender, her/his circumstances, or the offence.
Disadvantaged
minorities and the poor will overwhelmingly comprise the sub-class affected by s. 719(3.1).
3.
In the present case, the Court of Appeal for Ontario struck down s. 719(3.1) on the
ground that it violated s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 The Court held
that the impugned provision violates the requirement of proportionality of process in sentencing
and results in grossly disproportionate sentences. In so doing, the Court held that proportionality
of process (as distinct from proportionality in the result) is not only a principle of sentencing, but
also a principle of fundamental justice protected by s. 7 of the Charter. 3
4.
Although the BCCLA agrees that proportionality of process is a principle of fundamental
justice, the BCCLA confines its submissions to the issue of whether s. 719(3.1) is grossly
disproportionate under s. 7 of the Charter.
5.
Under the well-established jurisprudence of this Court, a punishment is grossly
disproportionate if it serves none of the legitimate objectives of sentencing reflected in s. 718 of
the Criminal Code.4
Section 719(3.1) serves none of these legitimate objectives.
To the
contrary, it creates a structural impediment against proportionate sentencing, which undermines
the purposes and principles of sentencing and, in reasonable hypothetical cases, will result in
grossly disproportionate sentences.
1
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 718.1.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11.
3
R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2014 ONCA 627 (Book of Authorities (“BA”), Tab 32).
4
R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at p. 1068, citing Professor Tarnopolsky, “Just Deserts or Cruel and Unusual
Punishment? Where Do We Look for Guidance?” (1978) 10 Ottawa L. Rev. 1 (BA, Tab 33).
2
2
PART III: STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
I.
6.
A SENTENCE IS GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE
LEGITIMATE SENTENCING OBJECTIVE
IF
IT DOES NOT SERVE
ANY
The case law under ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter identifies various ways to measure “gross
disproportionality”.5 The Respondent’s submissions on gross disproportionality focus on the
disconnect between the objectives of the Truth in Sentencing Act6 (“TISA”) and the means
chosen by Parliament as reflected in s. 719(3.1).7
We focus on another aspect of gross
disproportionality: a sentence — or a process leading to a sentence — will be grossly
disproportionate if it serves none of the legitimate objectives of sentencing. This measure of
gross disproportionality is closely tied to the related concepts of “arbitrariness” and “rational
connection” (between ends and means). 8 Accordingly, unless a sentencing provision is rationally
connected to the objectives of sentencing, it violates ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.
7.
Under s. 718 of the Criminal Code, Parliament has identified a series of legitimate
sentencing objectives that reflect the utilitarian goals of sentencing. Denunciation (s. 718(a))
posits that a sentence should communicate society’s condemnation of the offence committed.9
General and specific deterrence (s. 718(b)) mean that the sentence can be used to discourage the
offender and others from engaging in similar criminal conduct.10 The goal of separation ((s.
718(c)) is to separate offenders from society where it is necessary to protect the community.11
Rehabilitation (s. 718(d)) is premised on the notion that an offender can be cured of criminal
tendencies, and mandates individualized sentences fit for the offender. 12 The objectives of
reparations (s. 718(e)) and providing a sense of responsibility in the offenders (s. 718(f))
5
The same standard of gross disproportionality applies under both ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter: R. v. Malmo-Levine,
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 160 (BA, Tab 21).
6
Truth in Sentencing Act, S.C. 2009, c. 29.
7
See Respondent Factum, paras. 62-67.
8
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para. 83 (a law is arbitrary where there is “no rational
connection between the object of the law and the limit it imposes on life, liberty or security of the person)”; see also
Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3 at para. 85 (Ont. C.A.).
9
Clayton Ruby, Gerald Chan, & Nader R. Hasan, Sentencing, 8th ed (Toronto: Lexis, 2012), at §1.18 (BA, Tab 46);
R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 81 (BA, Tab 23).
10
Ruby, supra note 9 at §1.21 (BA, Tab 46); R. v. (B.W.); N.(B.V.), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941, at para. 2 (BA, Tab 7).
11
Ruby, supra note 9, at §1.41 (BA, Tab 46).
12
Ibid., at §1.45 and 1.46 (BA, Tab 46).
3
introduce restorative justice into the principles of sentencing, and address the implications of the
impugned conduct on the offender and the community at large.13
8.
Some of these objectives — such as rehabilitation or the restorative justice principles —
may push a sentence in a downward direction, 14 whereas other objectives — such as general
deterrence and denunciation — might push a sentence upward.
The appellate courts have
offered guidance on how to weigh these sometimes competing sentencing objectives. In some
cases, such as for a youthful first-time offender, rehabilitation and individual deterrence are the
primary concerns, while denunciation and general deterrence have little or no role to play. 15 In
other cases, such as those involving firearms, denunciation and general deterrence may play a
greater role.16 A sentencing court has considerable discretion in how it chooses to apply the
sentencing objectives in s. 718, and is ordinarily constrained only by the fundamental principle
of proportionality. 17 Despite that discretion, a sentence must promote at least one of the
legitimate objectives of sentencing set out in s. 718.18
9.
If a sentence does not promote at least one of the legitimate purposes of sentencing, then
it is not only disproportionate, but also grossly disproportionate, and thus constitutes a violation
of ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter. This is well-established constitutional doctrine. In R. v. Smith, for
instance, this Court held that a sentence will be grossly disproportionate if, among other things, it
“has no value in the sense of some social purpose such as reformation, rehabilitation, deterrence
or retribution.”19 In R. v. Latimer, similar reasoning led to a different result: this Court rejected
a constitutional challenge to the 10-year parole ineligibility period for second-degree murder
because the ineligibility period was “consistent with” the sentencing objective of denunciation.
13
Ibid., at §3.237 (BA, Tab 46).
The Attorney General of Canada argues that s. 719(3.1) serves the goal of rehabilitation by ensuring that
recidivists serve longer prison sentences and receive rehabilitative programming. However, this Court has held that
imprisonment does not advance rehabilitation: R. v. Gladue,[1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at paras. 54-57 (BA, Tab 13); R. v.
Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 20 (BA, Tab 30); see also, Ruby, supra note 9, at §1.46, 1.49 and 1.50-1.55
(BA, Tab 46).
15
R. v. Priest, [1996] O.J. No. 3369, at para. 17(Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 29); R. v. Brown, 2015 ONCA 361, at para.5
(BA, Tab 6); R. v. Thurairajah, 2008 ONCA 91, at paras. 41-42 (BA, Tab 37); R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, at para.
55 (BA, Tab 16).
16
R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677, at para. 198, aff’d 2015 SCC 15 (BA, Tab 26).
17
Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 718.1; R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 42 (BA, Tab 25).
18
Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 718 (“…imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following
objectives…” (emphasis added)).
19
Smith, supra note 4, at p. 1068 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 33).
14
4
Given the basis for the Court’s holding, the sentence would presumably have been
unconstitutional if it was not consistent with at least one of the Code’s sentencing objectives.20
10.
In other words, if a punishment is not rationally connected to any of the goals of
sentencing, then it serves no legitimate purpose. It is therefore arbitrary and gratuitous. A
gratuitous punishment is the sine qua non of a grossly disproportionate punishment.
11.
A rational connection between a sentencing objective and the punishment is a necessary,
but not sufficient, prerequisite for a law to pass constitutional muster. Even where such a
rational connection is made out, a sentence will still be grossly disproportionate if it is grossly
excessive in relation to what would have otherwise been a proportionate sentence.21
12.
The rational connection test is generally a low bar. This is because certain sentencing
objectives (i.e., general deterrence and denunciation) are rationally connected to most sentences
— even exceedingly long ones. For example, a twenty-year prison sentence for a parking ticket
is rationally connected to the goal of general deterrence and denunciation (indeed, what better
way to send a strong denunciatory message that society abhors parking violations?).22
13.
This does not, however, render the rational connection test meaningless. This test forces
the parties and the Court to articulate the applicable sentencing objectives and explain how the
sentence will promote at least one of them. This analytical exercise may reveal that a provision
does not promote any of the legitimate objectives of sentencing. In such rare cases, any increase
in punishment due to the provision is gratuitous and violates ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.
II.
14.
SECTION 719(3.1) DOES NOT ADVANCE ANY LEGITIMATE SENTENCING OBJECTIVE
Although it is rare for a sentencing provision not to be rationally connected to at least one
of the objectives of sentencing, s. 719(3.1) is one such provision. It triggers a cascading set of
consequences that serves to aggravate sentences for no legitimate sentencing purpose.
20
R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 86 (BA, Tab 19); see also R. v. Wiles, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 895, at para. 9
(BA, Tab 40); R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at p. 337 (BA, Tab 20); R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para.
44 (BA, Tab 24).
21
See R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, at paras. 40, 45 (BA, Tab 26); Smith, supra note 4, at pp. 1071, 1073 (S.C.C.) (BA,
Tab 33).
22
Applying similar reasoning, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the death penalty as well as “three
strikes laws”: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 186-187 (1976) (BA, Tab 3) (upholding death penalty statute on
the ground that it is rationally connected to the goal of general deterrence); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, at 2830 (2003) (BA, Tab 2) (upholding sentence of life without parole for 25 years for property offence).
5
A. The Operation and Effects of Section 719(3.1)
15.
Section 719(3.1) creates an automatic tax on the sentence for anyone who is denied bail
“primarily because of a previous conviction” (which is very different from simply providing that
a previous conviction is an aggravating factor).23 It provides that offenders who are detained
pending trial because of a previous criminal conviction are ineligible to receive enhanced 1.5:1
pre-trial custody credit at sentencing.24 Section 515(9.1) requires that the bail court endorse the
record to reflect that bail was denied primarily because of a criminal conviction, thereby
triggering the application of s. 719(3.1) in the event that the accused is convicted.25
16.
As a result, s. 719(3.1) ties the offender’s sentence to a decision made by the bail court
and augments an offender’s sentence for reasons that are unconnected to the factors that typically
determine sentencing — i.e., the offence, the circumstances of the offence, and mitigating and
aggravating factors that go to the offender’s moral blameworthiness.26
This increase in
punishment does not advance any of the legitimate objectives of sentencing. Instead, it leads to
the following four consequences, which are fundamentally at odds with sentencing principles.
1. Sentencing Disparities for Identically Situated Offenders
17.
Section 719(3.1) creates sentencing disparities for offenders who are otherwise identical
in terms of moral blameworthiness. It increases the sentence for offenders who receive a s.
515(9.1) endorsement by denying them the enhanced credit that they might otherwise receive —
regardless of the fact that such offenders suffer the same consequences from pre-trial custody as
those who remain eligible for enhanced credit.27
18.
As the Court of Appeal for Ontario demonstrated with numerical examples, 28 this
structural impediment will mean that two identical offenders, with identical criminal records,
who commit an identical offence, could spend significantly different overall amounts of time in
23
Criminal Code, supra, note 1, s. 719(3.1).
Ibid., s. 719(3.1).
25
Ibid., s. 515(9.1).
26
Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at paras. 90-101 (Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 32).
27
Those consequences are that pre-trial custody time does not count towards parole eligibility and statutory release,
and local detention centres do not provide educational, retraining or rehabilitation programs to accused persons in
pre-trial custody: see R. v. Summers, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, at para. 22 (BA, Tab 36).
28
Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at paras. 92-93 (Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 32).
24
6
custody if one of them has a s. 515(9.1) endorsement entered by the bail court. This disparity is
not due to any difference in moral blameworthiness; it arises solely because of s. 719(3.1).
2. Tying the Hands of the Sentencing Court
19.
Not only does s. 719(3.1) bind the sentencing court’s hands, but it does so based on a
decision made at a time when very little is known about the offender, her/his circumstances, or
the offence. These are the very factors that ordinarily (and should) drive sentencing outcomes. 29
20.
It is one thing to adjust a sentence upward or downward where the sentencing court has
the benefit of a record of facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt (after a full trial or a Gardiner
hearing).30 But s. 713(3.1) binds a sentencing court’s discretion — based on factors that may not
even be related to moral blameworthiness — at a time where little of the factual record is known.
There will surely be instances where, if the bail court knew everything the sentencing court
eventually came to know about the offender and the circumstances of the offence, the bail court
would not have denied bail and triggered the application of s. 719(3.1).
3. The Trigger for Section 719(3.1) Is Tied to Socio-Economic Status
21.
Further, denial of bail is often linked to factors that have nothing to do with issues that
matter on sentencing, such as the offender’s moral blameworthiness. In the ordinary case, the
bail court may detain an accused pending trial only if the Crown has justified detention on
primary grounds (risk of flight), secondary grounds (risk of committing a criminal offence while
on bail) or tertiary grounds (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice). 31
22.
For many accuseds, the Crown will have at least some concern under these grounds.
Such concerns, however, are typically mitigated by having a surety and a plan of release. Those
offenders with a support system (i.e., family or friends who can pledge money, serve as sureties,
or provide accommodations) tend to obtain bail. By contrast, those without a support system are
29
Gary Trotter, The Law of Bail In Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2015), pp. 9-11-9-12 (BA, Tab 45); R. v.
Kovich, 2013 MBPC 68, at paras. 38-40, 50 (BA, Tab 18); R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2012 ONCJ 494, at para. 19
(BA, Tab 31); Ruby, supra note 9, at § 2.13-2.14 (BA. Tab 46).
30
See R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368, at pp. 405, 414-7 (BA, Tab 12) (proof beyond reasonable doubt of
aggravating facts).
31
Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 515(10); R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, at para. 4 (BA, Tab 14); R. v. St-Cloud,
2015 SCC 27, at paras. 1-2 (BA, Tab 35).
7
more likely to be detained pending trial. It is no surprise, then, that the poor and members of
disadvantaged groups are more likely than other Canadians to be detained pending trial. 32
23.
The denial of bail is already partly a function of poverty and pre-existing socio-economic
disadvantage. Under s. 719(3.1), this injustice is compounded by making it count against the
accused first at the bail hearing, and then again at the sentencing phase.
4. Dis-Incentivizing Accused Persons From Seeking Bail
24.
Another pernicious collateral consequence of s. 719(3.1) is that it serves as a powerful
disincentive against seeking bail. While accused persons are constitutionally entitled to a bail
hearing under s. 11(e) of the Charter, they face a difficult dilemma. If they seek and obtain bail,
then all is well. But if bail is denied and the bail court endorses the record pursuant to s.
515(9.1) (thereby triggering s. 719(3.1)), then the accused will be punished more harshly upon
conviction than they otherwise would have been, because they will no longer be eligible for
enhanced pre-trial custody credit. This disincentive will lead some people who might otherwise
have obtained bail to instead waive their constitutional right to a bail hearing and remain in pretrial custody rather than risk receiving the Scarlet Letter of the s. 515(9.1) endorsement.33
25.
All accused persons have the right to a bail hearing. But the effect of s. 719(3.1)) is to
disincentivize a subclass of accused persons from seeking bail, thereby increasing the number of
people who spend time in pre-trial custody.34 Disadvantaged groups will feel the sting of this
disincentive more severely because, as noted above, members of these groups are less likely to
succeed in obtaining bail and are therefore more likely to receive a s. 515(9.1) endorsement.
B. These Effects Do Not Advance Any of the Objectives of Sentencing
26.
The above-described consequences flowing from the operation of s. 719(3.1) result in
sentences over and above what would otherwise be a proportionate sentence in reasonably
foreseeable cases. This arbitrary and inflationary effect does not serve any of the legitimate
purposes of punishment. Where an upward adjustment in sentence is not rationally connected to
any legitimate purpose of punishment, it is gratuitous and thus grossly disproportionate.
32
See Summers, supra note 27, at paras. 66-67 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 36) (noting that “Aboriginal people are more
likely to be denied bail, and make up a disproportionate share of the population in remand custody”); Trotter, supra
note 29, pp. 9-18; 1-55 (BA, Tab 45).
33
See Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at para. 95 (Ont. C.A.)(BA, Tab 32).
34
Trotter, supra note 29, p. 9-12 (BA, Tab 45).
8
27.
Section 719(3.1) does not promote rehabilitation or the restorative justice principles
enshrined in s. 718. In fact, it undermines these goals by limiting the sentencing court’s ability to
take them into account in crafting proportionate sentences. Although s. 718(c) suggests that
separating the offender from society may be a legitimate goal of sentencing, it also makes clear
that separation is a legitimate goal only where a court finds that incarceration is necessary.35
Section 719(3.1) undermines that discretion.
28.
Section 719(3.1) lengthens the sentences of a sub-class of offenders, thereby rendering
punishment harsher for that group of offenders. The goals most often associated with harsh
criminal sanctions are general deterrence and denunciation. 36 As noted above, even a lengthy
mandatory minimum is more connected to these sentencing objectives than s. 719(3.1).37 A
mandatory minimum sentence sends a denunciatory message that even the “best offender” (i.e.,
at the low end of moral blameworthiness) for a given offence must serve time in custody. To the
extent that general deterrence actually works (a matter disputed by social science evidence),38
would-be offenders are likely to be deterred by the presence of a mandatory minimum sentence.
29.
By contrast, s. 719(3.1) does not even promote denunciation or general deterrence. The
message is so unclear and heavily qualified as to be devoid of any meaning, much less a
denunciatory one. Even the most sophisticated would-be offender is unlikely to understand that
if you (1) have a criminal record, and (2) are charged with a criminal offence, and (3) fail to
satisfy the bail court that you should be released on bail pending trial, and (4) the bail court
endorses the record pursuant to s. 515(9.1), and (5) you are ultimately convicted of the offence,
and (6) there is a mandatory minimum at play (thereby precluding the trial judge from adjusting
35
Criminal Code, supra, note 1, s. 718(c); Ruby, supra note 9, § 13.1 (BA, Tab 46); Proulx, supra note 14, at para.
17 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 30); Gladue, supra note 14, at para. 40 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 13).
36
See R. v. Beauchamp, 2015 ONCA 260, at para. 261 (BA, Tab 5); R. c. Mantha, 2001 CarswellQue 3858, at paras.
143-44 (Que. C.A.)(BA, Tab 22); R. v. Bates, [2000] O.J. No. 2558 (Ont. C.A.)(BA, Tab 4); Thurairajah, supra
note 15, at para. 41 (Ont. C.A.)(BA, Tab 37); R. v. Wells, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207, at para. 44 (BA, Tab 39).
37
Nur, supra note 21, at para. 115 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 27); R. v. Wust, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455, at para. 21 (BA, Tab 41);
Morrisey, supra note 20, at paras. 44-45, 55 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 24).
38
See generally, Ruby, supra note 9, § 1.25-1.34 (BA, Tab 46); Anthony N. Doob & Carla Cesaroni, “The Political
Attractiveness of Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2001), 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 287, at p. 291 (BA, Tab 43); Travis
Pratt et al, “The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis” in Kristie Blevins, Francis Cullen and
John Wright, eds., Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2006) 367,
at pp. 367-370, 383-385 (BA, Tab 44); Nur, supra note 16, at paras. 113-115 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 27); Proulx, supra
note 14, para. 107 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 30); R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582, at para. 159-160, leave to S.C.C.
refused [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 491 (BA, Tab 9); R. v. H. (C.N.), [2002] O.J. No. 4918, at para. 35 (Ont. C.A.)(BA,
Tab 15); But see R. v. Song, 2009 ONCA 896, at paras. 7-10 (BA, Tab 34); R. v. Tran, 2010 ABCA 317, at para. 12
(BA, Tab 38).
9
the sentence downward to properly reflect proportionality), then you will be punished more
harshly than someone who is equally as blameworthy as you.
This message is dense,
convoluted, and ultimately incomprehensible for any would-be offender.
30.
Similarly, the principle of general deterrence presumes that individuals make rational
decisions based on perceived consequences.39 From the perspective of the criminally accused,
the cascading set of qualifications required to trigger s. 719(3.1) renders its consequences far too
remote to be meaningful. The effect of s. 719(3.1) is not a clear consequence that flows
automatically from unlawful conduct; rather, it is a hidden consequence that creeps up on
offenders, particularly those worst-equipped to deal with the hidden collateral consequences of
our sentencing regime. 40
31.
Neither s. 719(3.1), nor the TISA as a whole, appear to be aimed at promoting any of the
s. 718 objectives. The Appellant’s factum does not suggest that s. 719(3.1) advances any valid
sentencing objective, nor was the Court below able to identify any such objective. Rather, the
Court below found that the purpose of s. 719(3.1) (and TISA as a whole) was to reduce the
availability of enhanced credit and thereby disincentivize accused persons from prolonging time
spent in pre-sentence custody.41
Even this objective, as the Court of Appeal explained, is
unrelated to the means chosen in s. 719(3.1).42 As this Court determined in R. v. Summers,
enhanced credit is not some windfall available to offenders who drag on proceedings; rather, it is
a necessary correction to account for lost remission and harsh pre-trial conditions. 43
32.
In any event, even if there were a rational connection between the goal (disincentivizing
offenders from delay) and the means chosen to achieve that goal (s. 719(3.1)), this is not enough
for s. 719(3.1) to pass constitutional muster. Parliament has broad discretion to pass legislation
to incentivize and disincentivize all manner of behaviour. But where the purpose or effect of
legislation is to increase a sentence for offenders or a class of offenders, then that legislation
must, at a bare minimum, promote a legitimate sentencing objective.
39
Pratt, supra note 38, at p. 367 (BA, Tab 44); Ruby, supra note 9, § 1.35 (BA, Tab 46); Katelyn Carr, “An
Argument Against Using General Deterrence as a Factor in Criminal Sentencing” (2013-2014), 44 Cumb. L. Rev.
249, at pp. 255-256 (BA, Tab 42).
40
Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at paras. 94-96 (Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 32).
41
Ibid, at para. 54.
42
Ibid., at paras. 112-114.
43
Summers, supra note 27, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 36).
10
III.
CONCLUSION: S. 719(3.1) STANDS IN THE WAY OF RATIONAL SENTENCING
33.
Similar offenders should be sentenced similarly, except to the extent that they are
different.44 This idea is the Golden Thread that runs through our law of sentencing, and it reflects
the principles of proportionality, parity and individualization.45 The differences that justify
disparate sentences are the aggravating and mitigating factors, which go to moral
blameworthiness and reflect Parliament’s judgment as to the relative seriousness of the offence.46
34.
Section 719(3.1) creates an artificial, arbitrary and automatic tax on sentence for someone
whose personal circumstances prevented them from getting bail. As a result, the poor and others
suffering from a socio-economic disadvantage will bear the brunt of s. 719(3.1), for reasons that
will often have nothing to do with factors that ought to matter at sentencing. The Appellant
attempts to downplay the pernicious effects of s. 719(3.1) as “a natural by-product of our bail
system….”47 To the contrary, s. 719(3.1) creates an unnatural by-product by inflating sentences
in a manner that is divorced from moral blameworthiness, targets the poor and the vulnerable,
and leads to grossly disproportionate sentences unmoored from the legitimate objectives of
sentencing. Section 719(3.1) creates distinctions where there should be no difference.
PART IV: SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS
35.
The BCCLA does not seek costs and asks that none be awarded against it.
PART V: NATURE OF THE ORDER REQUESTED
36.
The BCCLA respectfully requests leave to present oral argument for no more than 10
minutes at the hearing of this appeal.
All of which is respectfully submitted this 20th day of October, 2015.
___________________________________
NADER R. HASAN / GERALD CHAN / JUSTIN
SAFAYENI / TIFFANY O’HEARN DAVIES
Stockwoods LLP
Counsel for the BCCLA
44
_____________________________
YAEL WEXLER
Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP
Agent for the BCCLA
Criminal Code, supra, note 1, s. 718.2(b); Ruby, supra note 9, § 2.39 (BA, Tab 46); Summers, supra note 27, at
paras. 59-61 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 36); Nur, supra note 21, at para. 41 (S.C.C.)(BA, Tab 27); Morrisey, supra note 20,
at paras. 75-76 (S.C.C.) (BA, Tab 24); Beauchamp, supra note 36, at paras. 276-280 (Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 5); R. v.
Ipeelee, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at paras. 78-79 (BA, Tab 17); R. v. Flowers, 2010 ONCA 129, at paras. 10-11 (BA,
Tab 11); R. v. Courtney, 2012 ONCA 478, at paras. 3-4 (BA, Tab 8).
45
R. v. Pham, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739, at paras. 6-10 (BA, Tab 28); Safarzadeh-Markhali, supra note 3, at paras. 76-80
(Ont. C.A.) (BA, Tab 32).
46
Ruby, supra note 9, at § 5.1 (BA, Tab 46); R. v. Fice, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 742, at paras. 21-22 (BA, Tab 10).
47
Factum of the Appellant, at para. 37.
11
PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Authority Cited
Paragraph(s)
Cases
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331
6
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), 2003 U.S. LEXIS 1952
12
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), 1976 U.S. LEXIS 82
12
R. v. Bates, [2000] O.J. No. 2558
28
R. v. Beauchamp, 2015 ONCA 260, [2015] O.J. 1939
28, 33
R. v. Brown, 2015 ONCA 361, [2015] O.J. No. 2655
8
R. v. (B.W.); N. (B.V.), 2006 SCC 27, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941
7
R. v. Courtney, 2012 ONCA 478, [2012] O.J. No. 3087
33
R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582, [2011] O.J. No. 4022
28
R. v. Fice, 2005 SCC 32, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 742
33
R. v. Flowers, 2010 ONCA 129, [2010] O.J. No. 644
33
R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368
20
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688
8, 27
R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309
21
R. v. H. (C.N.), [2002] O.J. No. 4918
28
R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, [2007] O.J. No. 3395
8
R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433
33
R. v. Kovich, 2013 MBPC 68, [2013] M.J. No. 417
19
R. v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3
9
R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309
9
R. v. Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571
6
12
Authority Cited
Paragraph(s)
R. c. Mantha, 2001 CarswellQue 3858 (Que. C.A.)
28
R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500
7
R. v. Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90
9, 28, 33
R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206
8
R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 91, [2013] O.J. No. 5120
8
R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15
11, 28, 33
R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739
33
R. v. Priest, [1996] O.J. No. 3369
8
R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61
8, 27, 28
R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2012 ONCJ 494, [2012] O.J. No. 3563
19
R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2014 ONCA 627, [2014] O.J. No. 4194
3, 6, 16, 18, 24, 30,
31, 44
R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045
5, 9, 11
R. v. Song, 2009 ONCA 896, [2009] O.J. No. 5319
28
R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27
21
R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575
17, 22, 31, 33
R. v. Thurairajah, 2008 ONCA 91, [2008] O.J. No. 460
8, 28
R. v. Tran, 2010 ABCA 317, [2010] A.J. No. 1224
28
R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207
28
R. v. Wiles, 2005 SCC 84, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 895
9
R. v. Wust, 2000 SCC 18, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455
Secondary Sources
Katelyn Carr, “An Argument Against Using General Deterrence as a 30
Factor in Criminal Sentencing” (2013-2014), 44 Cumb. L. Rev. 249
13
Authority Cited
Paragraph(s)
Anthony N. Doob & Carla Cesaroni, “The Political Attractiveness of 28
Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2001), 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 287
Travis Pratt et al, “The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta- 28, 30
Analysis” in Kristie Blevins, Francis Cullen and John Wright, eds.,
Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory (New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction, 2006) 367
Gary Trotter, The Law of Bail In Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 19, 22, 25
2015)
14
PART VII: LEGISLATION CITED
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c 11
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.
7. Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la
sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté
atteinte à ce droit qu’en conformité avec les
principes de justice fondamentale.
12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected 12. Chacun a droit à la protection contre tous
to any cruel and unusual treatment or traitements ou peines cruels et inusités.
punishment.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is
to contribute, along with crime prevention
initiatives, to respect for the law and the
maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe
society by imposing just sanctions that have
one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
718. Le prononcé des peines a pour objectif
essentiel de contribuer, parallèlement à
d’autres initiatives de prévention du crime, au
respect de la loi et au maintien d’une société
juste, paisible et sûre par l’infliction de
sanctions justes visant un ou plusieurs des
objectifs suivants :
a) dénoncer le comportement illégal;
b) dissuader les délinquants, et quiconque,
(b) to deter the offender and other persons
de commettre des infractions;
from committing offences;
c) isoler, au besoin, les délinquants du reste
(c) to separate offenders from society, where
de la société;
necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to
victims or to the community; and
d) favoriser la réinsertion sociale des
délinquants;
e) assurer la réparation des torts causés aux
victimes ou à la collectivité;
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in
f) susciter la conscience de leurs
offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm
responsabilités
chez
les
délinquants,
done to victims and to the community.
notamment par la reconnaissance du tort qu’ils
ont causé aux victimes et à la collectivité.
15
718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an
offence that involved the abuse of a person
under the age of eighteen years, it shall give
primary consideration to the objectives of
denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.
718.01 Le tribunal qui impose une peine pour
une infraction qui constitue un mauvais
traitement à l’égard d’une personne âgée de
moins de dix-huit ans accorde une attention
particulière aux objectifs de dénonciation et de
dissuasion d’un tel comportement.
718.02 When a court imposes a sentence for an
offence under subsection 270(1), section
270.01 or 270.02 or paragraph 423.1(1)(b), the
court shall give primary consideration to the
objectives of denunciation and deterrence of
the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.
718.02 Le tribunal qui impose une peine pour
l’une des infractions prévues au paragraphe
270(1), aux articles 270.01 ou 270.02 ou à
l’alinéa 423.1(1)b) accorde une attention
particulière aux objectifs de dénonciation et de
dissuasion de l’agissement à l’origine de
l’infraction.
718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the 718.1 La peine est proportionnelle à la gravité
gravity of the offence and the degree of de l’infraction et au degré de responsabilité du
délinquant.
responsibility of the offender.
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall 718.2 Le tribunal détermine la peine à infliger
also take into consideration the following compte tenu également des principes suivants :
principles:
(a) la peine devrait être adaptée aux
(a) a sentence should be increased or circonstances aggravantes ou atténuantes liées
reduced to account for any relevant à la perpétration de l’infraction ou à la situation
aggravating or mitigating circumstances du délinquant; sont notamment considérées
relating to the offence or the offender, and, comme des circonstances aggravantes des
without limiting the generality of the éléments de preuve établissant :
foregoing,
que l’infraction est motivée par des préjugés ou
(i) evidence that the offence was de la haine fondés sur des facteurs tels que la
motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la langue,
race, national or ethnic origin, language, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l’âge, la
colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical déficience mentale ou physique ou l’orientation
disability, sexual orientation, or any other sexuelle,
similar factor,
(ii) que l’infraction perpétrée par le
(ii) evidence that the offender, in
committing the offence, abused the offender’s délinquant constitue un mauvais traitement de
son époux ou conjoint de fait,
spouse or common-law partner,
(ii.1) que l’infraction perpétrée par le
(ii.1) evidence that the offender, in
committing the offence, abused a person under délinquant constitue un mauvais traitement à
l’égard d’une personne âgée de moins de dixthe age of eighteen years,
huit ans,
16
(iii) evidence that the offender, in
(iii) que l’infraction perpétrée par le
committing the offence, abused a position of
délinquant constitue un abus de la confiance de
trust or authority in relation to the victim,
la victime ou un abus d’autorité à son égard,
(iii.1) evidence that the offence had a
(iii.1) que l’infraction a eu un effet
significant impact on the victim, considering
their age and other personal circumstances, important sur la victime en raison de son âge et
de tout autre élément de sa situation
including their health and financial situation,
personnelle, notamment sa santé et sa situation
(iv) evidence that the offence was financière,
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of
(iv) que l’infraction a été commise au
or in association with a criminal organization,
profit ou sous la direction d’une organisation
or
criminelle, ou en association avec elle,
(v) evidence that the offence was a
(v) que l’infraction perpétrée par le
terrorism offence shall be deemed to be
délinquant est une infraction de terrorisme;
aggravating circumstances;
b) l’harmonisation des peines, c’est-à-dire
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences
imposed on similar offenders for similar l’infliction de peines semblables à celles
infligées à des délinquants pour des infractions
offences committed in similar circumstances;
semblables commises dans des circonstances
(c) where consecutive sentences are semblables;
imposed, the combined sentence should not be
c) l’obligation d’éviter l’excès de nature ou
unduly long or harsh;
de durée dans l’infliction de peines
(d) an offender should not be deprived of consécutives;
liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be
d) l’obligation, avant d’envisager la
appropriate in the circumstances; and
privation de liberté, d’examiner la possibilité
(e) all available sanctions other than de sanctions moins contraignantes lorsque les
imprisonment that are reasonable in the circonstances le justifient;
circumstances should be considered for all
e) l’examen de toutes les sanctions
offenders, with particular attention to the
substitutives applicables qui sont justifiées
circumstances of aboriginal offenders.
718.21 A court that imposes a sentence on an dans les circonstances, plus particulièrement en
organization shall also take into consideration ce qui concerne les délinquants autochtones.
718.21 Le tribunal détermine la peine à infliger
the following factors:
à toute organisation en tenant compte
également des facteurs suivants:
(a) any advantage realized by
organization as a result of the offence;
the
a) les avantages tirés par l’organisation du
fait de la perpétration de l’infraction;
b) le degré de complexité des préparatifs
(b) the degree of planning involved in
carrying out the offence and the duration and reliés à l’infraction et de l’infraction elle-même
et la période au cours de laquelle elle a été
complexity of the offence;
17
commise;
(c) whether the organization has attempted
c) le fait que l’organisation a tenté de
to conceal its assets, or convert them, in order
to show that it is not able to pay a fine or make dissimuler des éléments d’actif, ou d’en
convertir, afin de se montrer incapable de
restitution;
payer une amende ou d’effectuer une
(d) the impact that the sentence would have restitution;
on the economic viability of the organization
d) l’effet qu’aurait la peine sur la viabilité
and the continued employment of its
économique de l’organisation et le maintien en
employees;
poste de ses employés;
(e) the cost to public authorities of the
e) les frais supportés par les administrations
investigation and prosecution of the offence;
publiques dans le cadre des enquêtes et des
(f) any regulatory penalty imposed on the poursuites relatives à l’infraction;
organization or one of its representatives in
f) l’imposition de pénalités à l’organisation
respect of the conduct that formed the basis of
ou à ses agents à l’égard des agissements à
the offence;
l’origine de l’infraction;
(g) whether the organization was — or any
g) les déclarations de culpabilité ou pénalités
of its representatives who were involved in the
commission of the offence were — convicted dont l’organisation — ou tel de ses agents qui a
of a similar offence or sanctioned by a participé à la perpétration de l’infraction — a
fait l’objet pour des agissements similaires;
regulatory body for similar conduct;
h) l’imposition par l’organisation de
(h) any penalty imposed by the organization
on a representative for their role in the pénalités à ses agents pour leur rôle dans la
perpétration de l’infraction;
commission of the offence;
i) toute restitution ou indemnisation imposée
(i) any restitution that the organization is
ordered to make or any amount that the à l’organisation ou effectuée par elle au profit
organization has paid to a victim of the de la victime;
offence; and
j) l’adoption par l’organisation de mesures
(j) any measures that the organization has en vue de réduire la probabilité qu’elle
taken to reduce the likelihood of it committing commette d’autres infractions.
a subsequent offence.
730. (1) Where an accused, other than an
organization, pleads guilty to or is found guilty
of an offence, other than an offence for which
a minimum punishment is prescribed by law or
an offence punishable by imprisonment for
fourteen years or for life, the court before
which the accused appears may, if it considers
it to be in the best interests of the accused and
not contrary to the public interest, instead of
730. (1) Le tribunal devant lequel comparaît
l’accusé, autre qu’une organisation, qui plaide
coupable ou est reconnu coupable d’une
infraction pour laquelle la loi ne prescrit pas de
peine minimale ou qui n’est pas punissable
d’un emprisonnement de quatorze ans ou de
l’emprisonnement à perpétuité peut, s’il
considère qu’il y va de l’intérêt véritable de
l’accusé sans nuire à l’intérêt public, au lieu de
18
convicting the accused, by order direct that the
accused be discharged absolutely or on the
conditions prescribed in a probation order
made under subsection 731(2).
le condamner, prescrire par ordonnance qu’il
soit absous inconditionnellement ou aux
conditions prévues dans l’ordonnance rendue
aux termes du paragraphe 731(2).
(2) Subject to Part XVI, where an accused
who has not been taken into custody or who
has been released from custody under or by
virtue of any provision of Part XVI pleads
guilty of or is found guilty of an offence but is
not convicted, the appearance notice, promise
to appear, summons, undertaking or
recognizance issued to or given or entered into
by the accused continues in force, subject to its
terms, until a disposition in respect of the
accused is made under subsection (1) unless, at
the time the accused pleads guilty or is found
guilty, the court, judge or justice orders that the
accused be taken into custody pending such a
disposition.
(2) Sous réserve de la partie XVI, lorsque
l’accusé qui n’a pas été mis sous garde ou qui a
été mis en liberté aux termes ou en vertu de la
partie XVI plaide coupable ou est reconnu
coupable d’une infraction mais n’est pas
condamné, la sommation ou citation à
comparaître à lui délivrée, la promesse de
comparaître ou promesse remise par lui ou
l’engagement contracté par lui demeure en
vigueur, sous réserve de ses dispositions,
jusqu’à ce qu’une décision soit rendue à son
égard en vertu du paragraphe (1) à moins que,
au moment où il plaide coupable ou est
reconnu coupable, le tribunal, le juge ou le juge
de paix n’ordonne qu’il soit mis sous garde en
attendant cette décision.
(3) Where a court directs under subsection
(3) Le délinquant qui est absous en
(1) that an offender be discharged of an
offence, the offender shall be deemed not to conformité avec le paragraphe (1) est réputé ne
have been convicted of the offence except that pas avoir été condamné à l’égard de
l’infraction; toutefois, les règles suivantes
(a) the offender may appeal from the s’appliquent :
determination of guilt as if it were a conviction
a) le délinquant peut interjeter appel du
in respect of the offence;
verdict de culpabilité comme s’il s’agissait
(b) the Attorney General and, in the case d’une condamnation à l’égard de l’infraction à
of summary conviction proceedings, the laquelle se rapporte l’absolution;
informant or the informant’s agent may appeal
b) le procureur général ou, dans le cas de
from the decision of the court not to convict
the offender of the offence as if that decision poursuites sommaires, le dénonciateur ou son
were a judgment or verdict of acquittal of the mandataire peut interjeter appel de la décision
offence or a dismissal of the information du tribunal de ne pas condamner le délinquant
à l’égard de l’infraction à laquelle se rapporte
against the offender; and
l’absolution comme s’il s’agissait d’un
(c) the offender may plead autrefois jugement ou d’un verdict d’acquittement de
convict in respect of any subsequent charge l’infraction ou d’un rejet de l’accusation portée
contre lui;
relating to the offence.
c) le délinquant peut plaider autrefois
(4) Where an offender who is bound by the
conditions of a probation order made at a time convict relativement à toute inculpation
when the offender was directed to be subséquente relative à l’infraction.
discharged under this section is convicted of an
19
offence, including an offence under section
733.1, the court that made the probation order
may, in addition to or in lieu of exercising its
authority under subsection 732.2(5), at any
time when it may take action under that
subsection, revoke the discharge, convict the
offender of the offence to which the discharge
relates and impose any sentence that could
have been imposed if the offender had been
convicted at the time of discharge, and no
appeal lies from a conviction under this
subsection where an appeal was taken from the
order directing that the offender be discharged.
(4) Lorsque le délinquant soumis aux
conditions d’une ordonnance de probation
rendue à une époque où son absolution a été
ordonnée en vertu du présent article est déclaré
coupable d’une infraction, y compris une
infraction visée à l’article 733.1, le tribunal qui
a rendu l’ordonnance de probation peut, en
plus ou au lieu d’exercer le pouvoir que lui
confère le paragraphe 732.2(5), à tout moment
où il peut prendre une mesure en vertu de ce
paragraphe, annuler l’absolution, déclarer le
délinquant coupable de l’infraction à laquelle
se rapporte l’absolution et infliger toute peine
qui aurait pu être infligée s’il avait été déclaré
coupable au moment de son absolution; il ne
peut être interjeté appel d’une déclaration de
culpabilité prononcée en vertu du présent
paragraphe lorsqu’il a été fait appel de
l’ordonnance prescrivant que le délinquant soit
absous.