SCC Court File No. 34641 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

Transcription

S.C.C. Court File No. 34641
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO)
BETWEEN:
ROBERT HRYNIAK
Appellant (Appellant)
- and FRED MAULDIN, DAN MYERS, ROBERT BLOMBERG, THEODORE
LANDKAMMER, LLOYD CHELLI, STEPHEN YEE, MARVIN CLEAIR, CAROLYN
CLEAIR, RICHARD HANNA, DOUGLAS LAIRD, CHARLES IVANS, LYN WHITE and
ATHENA SMITH
Respondents (Respondents)
FACTUM OF THE APPELLANT
Filing Party: ROBERT HRYNIAK
(Pursuant to Rules 35 and 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, S.O.R./2002-156)
McCarthy Tetrault LLP
Suite 5300, Toronto Dominion Bank Tower
Toronto ON M5K 1E6
Cavanagh Williams Conway Baxter LLP
Suite 401, 1111 Prince of Wales Drive
Ottawa ON K2C 3T2
Sarit E. Batner ([email protected])
Brandon Kain ([email protected])
Moya J. Graham ([email protected])
Tel: (416) 362-1812
Fax: (416) 868-0673
Colin S. Baxter ([email protected])
Tel: (613) 780-2016
Fax: (613) 569-8668
Solicitors for the Appellant (Appellant)
(Appellant)
Ottawa Agent for the Appellant
ORIGINAL TO: The Registrar
Supreme Court of Canada
301 Wellington Street
Ottawa, ON K1A OJl
Copies to:
Heydary Hamilton PC
66 Wellington Street West
Suite 4500, P.O. Box 150
Toronto Dominion Bank Tower
Toronto ON M5K 1H1
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP
160 Elgin Street
Suite 2600
Ottawa ON KIP 1C3
Javad Heydary ([email protected])
Henry S. Brown Q.C.
([email protected])
David K. Alderson ([email protected])
Tel: (613) 786-0139
Fax: (613) 563-9869
Tel: (416) 972-9001
Fax: (416) 972-9940
Solicitors for the Respondents (Respondents)
(Respondents)
Ottawa Agent for the Respondents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I— OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Overview
2. Statement of Facts
A. The Summary Judgment Motions
B. The Appeal
1
1
2
2
3
PART II— QUESTIONS IN ISSUE
7
PART III— STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
7
7
11
11
14
14
i. Overview
ii. Prospective Overruling Has Been. Rejected by Provincial Appellate Courts 16
iii. Prospective Overruling Has Not Found Favour In Other Jurisdictions
17
17
a. United Kingdom
19
b. Ireland
19
c. Australia
20
d. New Zealand
20
e. Israel
21
f. United States
23
iv. Academic Commentary Is Critical Of Prospective Overruling
24
v. The Change Would Not Be Incremental
25
vi. The Effects of the Change Would Be Complex
27
3. Prospective Overruling Was Inappropriate Here
28
A. The Respondents Did Not Detrimentally Rely Upon Any Prior Law
31
B. The Prospective Overruling In This Case Was Selective and Unfair
C. The Court Suspended Valid Legislation In Disregard of the Legislature's Role 36
38
D. The Legislative Purposes and Administration of Justice Were Frustrated
1. The Court of Appeal Engaged in Prospective Overruling
2. There Is No Jurisdiction to Prospectively Overrule in Private Law Cases
A. This Court Has Already Decided the Issue
B. There Are No Compelling Reasons to Change the Law
PART IV— SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS
39
PART V— ORDER SOUGHT
39
PART VI— TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1
PART VII— STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND RULES
7
PART I—OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
Overview
1.
The issue in this case is whether a court can clearly articulate a new private law principle but
decline to apply it to the case before it. This appeal requires the Court to answer that question and
determine the scope of the doctrine of "prospective overruling" in Canada.
2.
In this case the Ontario Court of Appeal heard five appeals together and released a joint
decision in which it promulgated a new test for summary judgment – the full appreciation test under newly-amended Rule 20 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.
The Court of Appeal found that in this case, applying the new full appreciation test,
"undoubtedly" a trial was required. Instead of ordering a trial, the Court of Appeal proceeded to
confirm a final summary judgment of civil fraud made against Mr. Hryniak on a paper record and
without a "full appreciation" of the facts and issues in the case. Its rationale was that the Motion
Judge did not have the benefit of its newly stated full appreciation test. However, in the companion
appeals, the Court of Appeal did apply the new full appreciation test. Indeed, the Court of Appeal has
not declined to apply the new test in any other summary judgment appeals from cases also decided
when the law was unsettled.
4.
In short, the Court of Appeal engaged in prospective overruling, a practice which was rejected
by this Court in Friedmann and Imperial Tobacco. Appellate courts and writers in Canada and
abroad have concluded that prospective overruling is inimical to the judicial function, which requires
that courts apply the law to adjudicate concrete disputes, not legislate new rules for the future.
5.
Moreover, prospective overruling is especially inappropriate here. The chief rationales for
prospective overruling, including a litigant's reliance on prior established law, do not apply. By
applying the full appreciation test to other similarly-situated litigants, the Court of Appeal
prospectively overruled in a way that was arbitrary, unfair and contrary to the rule of law. The Court
effectively suspended a valid procedural rule in relation to Mr. Hryniak alone.
6.
For these reasons, Mr. Hryniak requests that the appeal be allowed, summary judgment be set
aside and the matter be remitted for a trial on the merits.
2
2.
Statement of Facts
A.
7.
The Summary Judgment Motions
In 2008, the Respondents moved for a summary judgment against Mr. Hryniak and two other
Defendants (the "Mauldin Action"), alleging that he committed the tort of civil fraud in relation to
certain investments. In another action, a separate plaintiff, Bruno Appliance and Furniture, Inc.
("Bruno"), brought a concurrent summary judgment motion against the same Defendants (the "Bruno
Action").
8.
The two motions were brought before but heard after the January 1, 2010 amendments to
Rule 20 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The Court of Appeal described the relevant :2010
amendments this way:
As recommended by Mr. Osborne, a motion court judge was granted the power to weigh the
evidence, evaluate credibility, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. The
wording of rule 20.04(2.1), which confers these powers, indicates that they may be used for
the purpose of determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. ...2
9.
The Respondents agreed that the newly-amended Rule 20 controlled their motion for
summary judgment. The Motion Judge noted, consistent with the law, that the 2010 amendments are
procedural in nature and thus apply retrospectively.3
10.
The motions were extremely complex. As summarized by the Court of Appeal:
The motions were heard together. Eighteen witnesses filed affidavits on the motions. Crossexaminations took three weeks. The motion record consisted of 28 volumes of evidence.
Oral argument - which took place in 2010 - took four days!'
11.
The Motion Judge produced a 58-page, 269-paragraph decision that reads like reasons after a
trial.5 He granted summary judgment to the Respondents only against Mr. Hryniak, permitting the
Appliance v. Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2010 ONSC 5490, at para. 47 ("Motion Decision").
2 Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, 2011 ONCA 764 ("Appeal Decision"), at paras. 30-31, emphasis
added.
3 Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. v. Ontario (2010), 101 O.R. (3d) 277 (S.C.J.) at para. 27 ("Since this is a procedural
enactment, it is presumed to apply immediately, unless a contrary intention is evinced from the legislation. I agree with
the AGC that there is no such contrary intention expressed in the legislation, nor any transitional rules which apply to
Rule 20 so as to rebut the presumption of immediate effect"); Motion Decision, para. 53 (and 62).
4 Appeal Decision, para. 117, emphasis added.
1 Bruno
3
case against the remaining Defendants to proceed to trial, even though no finding of fraud had
previously been made on a contested summary judgment motion.6 In doing so, the Motion Judge
made extensive use of the new fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04(2.1):
Insofar as Mr. Hryniak is concerned the forensic machinery of a trial is not required. I have
sifted, with the assistance of all counsel, through the evidence. The significant record allows
me to evaluate the credibility of, among others, Mr. Hryniak and Mr. Mauldin. It allows me
to draw inferences from the evidence which, in my view, are reasonable. Insofar as Mr.
Hryniak is concerned a very clear picture has emerged.
To put it very simply, I do not believe Mr. Ilryniak. ...7
B.
12.
The Appeal
Mr. Hryniak appealed the summary judgment rulings in both the Mauldin and Bruno Actions.
The central issue on appeal was whether it was in the interests of justice for the Actions to be decided
by summary judgment.
13.
The Court of Appeal heard Mr. Hryniak's appeals together with appeals in three other actions,
and released a single decision in respect of all five. In doing so, the Court of Appeal was constituted
as a five judge panel, and invited submissions from five amicus curiae. It made clear that the test it
proposed marked a "new departure and a fresh approach" to this issue, which had attracted
"conflicting jurisprudence" and "various interpretive approaches" from the courts to date:
By the time these appeals were argued, a well-developed body of jurisprudence from the
Superior Court of Justice under the new Rule 20 was already in place... We have carefully
reviewed and considered the conflicting jurisprudence from the Superior Court. However,
we have chosen not to comment on the relative merits of the various interpretative
approaches found in this body of case law because our decision marks a new departure and
a fresh approach to the interpretation and application of the amended Rule 20.8
Appeal Decision, para. 118. See in particular paras. 63-145 of the Motion Decision.
6 Motion Decision, para. 142. vide Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 S.C.R. 23 at para. 94 ("as
noted in McDougall 'context is all important and a judge should not be unmindful, where appropriate, of inherent
probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences' ... [A] third party must establish
that the statutory exemption applies on the balance of probabilities. However, what evidence will be required to reach
that standard will be affected by the nature of the proposition the third party seeks to establish and the particular
context of the case").
7 Motion Decision, paras. 138-139, emphasis added.
8 Appeal Decision, para. 35, emphasis added.
5
-4
14.
In articulating its new approach, the Court of Appeal held there are three type of cases in
which summary judgment will be appropriate.9 The first type of case, where the parties agree
summary judgment is appropriate, is irrelevant here. Regarding the second and third types of cases,
the Court held that a motion judge may not make use of the new Rule 20.04(2.1) powers (to weigh
evidence, evaluate credibility, and draw inferences from the evidence) until after concluding that a
trial is unnecessary for a "full appreciation" of the evidence and issues in the case:
Finally, we observe that it is not necessary for a motion judge to try to categorize the type of
case in question. In particular, the latter two classes of cases we described are not 1:o be
viewed as discrete compartments. For example, a statement of claim may include a cause of
action that the motion judge finds has no chance of success with or without using the powers
in rule 20.04(2.1). And the same claim may assert another cause of action that the motion
judge is satisfied raises issues that can safely be decided using the rule 20.04(2.1) powers
because the full appreciation test is met. The important element of the analysis under the
amended Rule 20 is that, before using the powers in rule 20.04(2.1) to weigh evidence,
evaluate credibility, and draw reasonable inferences, the motion judge must apply the full
appreciation test in order to be satisfied that the interest of justice does not require that these
powers be exercised only at a tria1.1°
15.
While the Court of Appeal then purported to apply these principles to the appeals before it,11
it refused to apply them to Mr. Hryniak. Instead, the Court concluded that summary judgment should
be upheld against Mr. Hryniak in the Mauldin Action after using the new Rule 20.04(2.1) powers,
even though the "full appreciation" test was not met.12
16.
The Court recognized that the Mauldin Action had all the hallmarks of a case that requires a
trial:
However, both the Mauldin group action and the Bruno action bear all the hallmarks ofthe
type of actions in which, generally speaking, the full appreciation of the evidence and
issues can only be achieved at trial:
* The motion record is voluminous - 28 volumes of evidence together with additional
evidence filed on the motions themselves;
* Many witnesses gave evidence - 18 witnesses filed affidavits, and crossexaminations on those affidavits took three weeks;
Appeal Decision, paras. 40-44.
1° Appeal Decision, paras. 75 (and 2-3, 5, 17, 23, 27, 29, 31, 36, 43-45, 50, 54-55, 57, 111, 218, 253 and 255), emphasis
added.
11 Appeal Decision, para. 76. See also para. 8 ("we will apply these principles to the five appeals before the court").
12 The Court held that summary judgment should not granted against Mr. Hryniak in the Bruno action.
9
5
* Different theories of liability were advanced against each of the defendants;
* Numerous findings of fact were required to decide these motions;
*Credibility determinations lay at the heart of these disputes, and the evidence of the
major 'witnesses - Mauldin, Bruno, Hryniak and Peebles - conflicted on key issues;
and
* Assessing credibility was made more difficult by the near absence of reliable
documentary yardsticks.13
17.
The Court of Appeal then held that "going forward", cases such as the Mauldin Action do
require a trial, since the Mauldin Action "undoubtedly" did not meet the full appreciation test:
We therefore conclude that, going forward, cases such as the Mauldin group action and the
Bruno action require a trial. They should not be decided by summary judgment.
Undoubtedly, if the motion judge had had the benefit of these reasons he would have sent
both actions on to trial. ...14
18.
The Court of Appeal nonetheless found that it would not be desirable to set aside summary
judgment against Mr. Hryniak in the Mauldin Action, since the Motion Judge made his ruling at a
time when the law was unsettled and was made without the benefit of the new test:
Undoubtedly, if the motion judge had had the benefit of these reasons he would have sent
both actions on to trial. But the motion judge did not have the benefit of these reasons, and
especially did not have the benefit of the newly-stated full appreciation test. Instead, he
decided these motions when the jurisprudence under the amended Rule 20 was unsettled,
and opinions differed on the scope and purpose of the powers conferred by rule 20.04(2.1).
As an appellate court, we now have to decide what to do with these two summary judgments.
One obvious approach is to set aside the judgments on the simple ground that cases of this
nature should not be resolved summarily. However, we do not think this is a desirable
approach. It is not a desirable approach because it fails to give effect to the reality of what
is before us - a decision reached after a careful scrutiny of an extensive record, written at a
time when the law was unsettled. In the light of these particular circumstances, we are
prepared to look beyond the characteristics of these actions that would otherwise preclude
summary judgment to determine if the motion judge was nonetheless correct in granting
partial summary judgment.15
Appeal Decision, paras. 147-148, emphasis added.
14 Appeal Decision, paras. 152-153, emphasis added.
13
6
19.
The Court of Appeal made clear that its decision not to overturn summary judgment in the
Mauldin Action was not based upon any exception to the full appreciation test. Rather, it was based
upon the Court's decision to refrain from applying the new test at all:
In taking this approach, however, we wish to be clear that we are not creating a new type of
case that is amenable to summary judgment, nor are we creating an exception to the
principles we have laid out above. The court's decision to scrutinize the judgments in this
case is a product of the unusual circumstances in which they arose.16
20.
Like the Motion Judge below, the Court of Appeal then proceeded to use the new Rule
20.04(2.1) powers, which it held may only be used where the full appreciation test is met, to uphold
the summary judgment:
Having reviewed the extensive evidentiary record, we conclude that it firmly supports the
motion judge's determination that Hryniak committed the tort of civil fraud against the
Mauldin group. Hryniak's defence to this action simply has no credibility. ...
[T]o us, the veracity of his contention that he had a legitimate trading program turns on
whether one could give any .credence to his claim that Pribble stole the Mauldin group's
funds. We think the motion judge was entitled to reject Hryniak's claim of misappropriation.
It defies credulity...
... The incredulity of his evidence strongly supports the motion judge's finding...
In the light of the blatant incredulity of Hryniak's evidence, we are not persuaded that we
should interfere with the summary judgment granted in favour of the Mauldin group. ... 17
21.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Hryniak's appeal against the Respondents in
the Mauldin Action and upheld summary judgment despite acknowledging summary judgment would
undoubtedly not be granted under the new full appreciation test. It evaluated credibility, weighed
evidence and drew factual inferences to uphold a serious finding of civil fraud against Mr. Hryniak
on a paper record, all the while admitting that a trial was necessary for it to fully appreciate the
evidence and issues posed in his case, and was therefore required in the interests of justice. The
Court's decision is remarkable in that it suspended the application of the full appreciation test to Mr.
Appeal Decision, para. 155, underlining in original, bolding and italics added.
17 Appeal Decision, paras. 156 and 162-165 (and 118, 131 and 147-148), emphasis added.
16
-7
Hryniak but applied the test to other three appeals before it,18 including in one instance to overturn
summary judgment against a defendant.19
22.
In the end, Mr. Hryniak alone was denied the benefit of his success and the law.
PART II—QUESTIONS IN ISSUE
23.
This appeal raises three issues:
(a)
Did the Court of Appeal engage in prospective overruling when granting summary
judgment against Mr. Hryniak?
(b)
Do courts possess the discretion to prospectively overrule in private law cases?
(c)
If courts can prospectively overrule in private law cases, was it appropriate for the
Court of Appeal to do so in this case?
PART III—STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
1.
The Court of Appeal Engaged in Prospective Overruling
24.
The traditional position in Canada and in most common law jurisdictions is that judicial
decisions operate both prospectively and retrospectively. This means that courts must apply a new
legal rule to the case in which it is announced, and then to all pending and future cases regardless of
when their facts arose (though not retroactively, i.e., to cases already finally determined and removed
from the judicial system20). As Friedland observes:
Judicial lawmaking traditionally operates both prospectively (like legislation) to affect future
transactions and retrospectively (unlike most legislation) to affect past transactions. The
tradition has been a long one. As Holmes J. once said, 'Judicial decisions have had
retrospective operation for near a thousand years.'"21
18
Appeal Decision, paras. 111, 219, 253, 260 and 262-63.
19
Appeal Decision, paras. 253, 260 and 262-263.
Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at 756-757; R. v. Wigman, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 246 at 257258; R. v. Sarson, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 223 at para. 26; Ontario (Minister of Finance) v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.
of Canada (2009), 309 D.L.R. (0) 490 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 53.
20
L. Friedland, "Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking" (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 170 at 170, emphasis added.
vide: Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993); and Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City
Council, [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (H.L.) at 378, per Lord Goff.
21 M.
8
25.
The principle was originally based upon Blackstone's declaratory theory of the common law,
explained by this Court in Hislop:
...Mhe declaratory approach is derived from Blackstone's famous aphorism that judges do
not create law but merely discover it: W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
(1765), vol. 1, at pp. 69-70. It reflects a traditional and widespread understanding of the
role of the judiciary in a democratic state governed by strong principles of separation of
powers between courts, legislatures and executives. In this perspective, courts grant
retroactive relief applying existing law or rediscovered rules which are deemed to have
always existed. On the other hand, legislators fashion new laws for the future.22
26.
The declaratory theory is no longer viewed as literal truth.23 However, as the U.K. Supreme
Court recently observed, it remains a pragmatic tool for promoting fairness and adaptability in the
common law:
... The declaratory theory "does not presume the existence of an ideal system of the
common law, which the judges from time to time reveal in their decisions. ... But it does
mean that, when judges state what the law is, their decisions do .... have a retrospective
effect" - in the sense that the law as stated "will, generally speaking, be applicable not only to
the case coming before [them] but, as part of the common law, to other comparable cases
which come before the courts, whenever the events which are the subject of those cases":
Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln CC [1999] 2 AC 349, 378G-H, per Lord Goff. The
declaratory theory is a pragmatic tool, essential when cases can only come before the court
"some time, perhaps some years" after the relevant events occurred, and when "the law
[must] be applied equally to all, and yet be capable of organic change" (p 379A)....24
27.
Indeed, this principle is fundamental to the Canadian system of justice. In Edwards, the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated:
It appears the principle has become so elementary that most courts now readily apply it
without making reference to it and perhaps without even recognizing that they are using it.
In all of the cases cited above, there is no mention by the courts that they are giving
retrospective application to the common law. It may be taken that, in keeping with the
attitude of the English and Canadian courts generally, the courts in these cases assumed that
Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at para. 84, emphasis added.
23 Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at para. 85.
24 Durham v. BAI (Run off) Ltd. (In Scheme of Arrangement), [2012] 1 W.L.R. 867 (U.K.S.C.) at para. 70 (and 76 and
90), emphasis added. vide: James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991), per Scalia J.; and P.J.
Mishkin, "Foreward: The High Court, the Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law" (1965)79 Harv. L. Rev. 56
at 59-60.
22
9
the retrospective principle is so basic and inherent in the law that it may be applied without
mention or acknowledgment.25
28.
The Appeal Decision did not retrospectively apply the full appreciation test to dispose of the
Mauldin Action. The Court of Appeal:
(a)
articulated the full appreciation test, which is required to be met as a prerequisite to
the use of the Rule 20.04(2.1) powers, as a new legal rule, calling it a "new departure
and a fresh approach";26
(b)
recognized that the Mauldin Action "undoubtedly" did not meet the full appreciation
test;27
(c)
nonetheless used the Rule 20.04(2.1) powers to uphold summary judgment against
Mr. Hryniak, not because it found the Mauldin Action engaged any "exception" to the
full appreciation test,28 but because the Motion Judge had done the same thing
without the "benefit" of the new test at a time when the law was "unsettled";29 and
(d)
stated that "going forward", the full appreciation test required that cases like the
Mauldin Action proceed to tria1.3°
29.
The Court of Appeal therefore engaged in prospective overruling, which occurs when a court
articulates a substantial change to the law, but then declines to apply that change to the litigation
before it and/or to other litigation involving pre-existing facts.31 The concept was explained by Lord
Nichols in Spectrum this way:
Prospective overruling takes several different forms. In its simplest form prospective
overruling involves a court giving a ruling of the character sought by the bank in the present
case. Prospective overruling of this simple or "pure" type has the effect that the court ruling
25
26
27
28
29
30
Edward v. Edward Estate (1987), 39 D.L.R. (4th) 654 at 661-662, emphasis added.
Appeal Decision, para. 35.
M. L. Friedland, "Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking" (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 170 at 173-174 ("The
technique is sometimes referred to in the literature as 'prospective overruling', but, of course, it is much wider than the
actual overruling of a case and encompasses any substantial change from what had previously been considered to be
the law").
31
- 10has an exclusively prospective effect. The ruling applies only to transactions or happenings
occurring after the date of the court decision. All transactions entered into, or events
occurring, before that date continue to be governed by the law as it was conceived to be
before the court gave its ruling.
Other forms ofprospective overruling are more limited and "selective" in their departure
from the normal effect of court decisions. The ruling in its operation may be prospective and,
additionally, retrospective in its effect as between the parties to the case in which the ruling is
given. Or the ruling may be prospective and, additionally, retrospective as between the
parties in the case in which the ruling was given and also as between the parties in any other
cases already pending before the courts. There are other variations on the same theme. i2
30.
Indeed, the Court of Appeal not only prospectively overruled in relation to Mr. Hryniak, it did
so selectively as well. This occurred in two ways.
31.
First, the Court of Appeal did not suspend the application of the full appreciation test in all
cases involving facts pre-dating the new rule or its decision. To the contrary, since the Appeal
Decision the Court of Appeal has applied the full appreciation test in multiple appeals from summary
judgment decisions rendered before the new test was articulated, when the law was unsettled.33 In
Caton, for instance, the Court allowed the appeal based on the full appreciation test, despite having
found the very same "unusual" circumstances it said prevented its application to Mr. Hryniak's
appeal:
The motion judge did not have the benefit of this court's decision in Combined Air
Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, 2011 ONCA 764. This was the type of case where the
application of the full appreciation test required that there be a trial. The case turned to a
substantial degree on credibility and there were several important facts in dispute.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment is set aside and the motion for summary
judgment on liability is dismissed.34
32.
Second, the Court of Appeal did not even decide that the full appreciation test should be
applied prospectively in relation to the other parties before it in the Appeal Decision itself. It applied
In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 9-10, emphasis added.
See, e.g.: Byfield v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2012 ONCA 49, [2012] O.J. No. 320 (QL) at paras. 5, 7 and 9; Baglow v.
Smith (2012), 294 O.A.C. 24 (C.A.) at paras. 25-26, 34-35 and 39; and Rudderham v. Folkes, 2012 ONCA 603, [2012]
O.J. No. 4281 (QL) at para. 1.
34 Caton v. Devecseri Estate, 2012 ONCA 6, [2012] O.J. No. 84 (QL) at paras. 1 and 3, emphasis added.
32
33
the full appreciation test to the three cases on appeal other than Mr. Hryniak' s cases,35 and therefore
treated litigants who were similarly-situated in the same proceedings differently.
33.
The Court of Appeal's decision in cases such as Caton demonstrates the intention to apply the
full appreciation test retrospectively, requiring that motions for summary judgment be dismissed in
all cases in which the test is not met. The Caton decision underscores the truly exceptional treatment
of Mr. Hryniak's case in the Mauldin Action.
34.
The Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to dispose of Mr. Hryniak's appeal in this way. As
discussed below, this Court has already determined that judges cannot prospectively overrule in
private law disputes, and there is no compelling reason to depart from this position. Further, even if
the Court were to recognize a limited discretion to prospectively overrule in private law cases, there
could be no justification for applying that power in the way the Court of Appeal did here.
2.
There Is No Jurisdiction to Prospectively Overrule in Private Law Cases
A.
35.
This Court Has Already Decided the Issue
This Court has consistently held that judicial changes in the private law operate
retrospectively. In Imperial Tobacco, a case involving the constitutional validity of retroactive
legislation, Major J. affirmed that changes in the common law "always" have retrospective effect,
and illustrated his point by reference to the classic private law decision of Donoghue v. Stevenson:
...Mjevelopments in the common law have always had retroactive and retrospective effect.
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead recently explained this point in In re Spectrum Plus Ltd, [2005]
3 W.L.R. 58, [2005] UKHL 41, at para. 7:
A court ruling which changes the law from what it was previously thought to be
operates retrospectively as well as prospectively. The ruling will have a retrospective
effect so far as the parties to the particular dispute are concerned, as occurred with
the manufacturer of the ginger beer in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. When
Mr Stevenson manufactured and bottled and sold his ginger beer the law on
manufacturers' liability as generally understood may have been as stated by the
majority of the Second Division of the Court of Session and the minority of their
Lordships in that case. But in the claim Mrs Donoghue brought against Mr Stevenson
his legal obligations fell to be decided in accordance with Lord Atkin's famous
statements. Further, because of the doctrine of precedent the same would be true of
everyone else whose case thereafter came before a court. Their rights and obligations
35
Appeal Decision, at paras. 111, 219, 253, 260 and 262-263.
-12would be decided according to the law as enunciated by the majority of the House
of Lords in that case even though the relevant events occurred before that decision
was given.36
36.
Major J. also provided the following description of the judicial function in Canada:
The primary role of the judiciary is to interpret and apply the law, whether procedural or
substantive, to the cases brought before it. It is to hear and weigh, in accordance with the
law, evidence that is relevant to the legal issues confronted by it, and to award to the parties
before it the available remedies.
...[T]he judiciary's role in developing the law is a relatively limited one. "[I]n a
constitutional democracy such as ours it is the legislature and not the courts which has the
major responsibility for law reform": Salituro, at p. 670.
It follows that the judiciary's role is not, as the appellants seem to submit, to apply only the
law of which it approves. Nor is it to decide cases with a view simply to what the judiciary
(rather than the law) deems fair or pertinent. — 37
37.
This focus upon the application of the law to the adjudication of concrete disputes, rather than
the development of the law for the future, is evident in Friedmann, where this Court disclaimed any
prospective overruling jurisdiction when resolving a private law claim. In Friedmann, the plaintiff
mortgagee brought an action against the beneficial owners of the corporate mortgagor, who defended
on the basis that they were undisclosed principals, and thus could not be sued on the mortgage since
the corporate mortgagor had executed it under seal (the "sealed contract rule"). Bastarache J.
affirmed the dismissal of the action because of the sealed contract rule. Even though he agreed with
the plaintiff that the historical rationale for the rule was no longer socially relevant,38 Bastarache J.
found it would be unfair to those who had relied upon the rule to abolish it, since such a judicial
change would be necessarily retrospective. Rather than solving this problem of reliance by holding
that the Court could change the rule prospectively, Bastarache J. found that the appeal must be
dismissed, since the "only" body with the power to effect a prospective change in the common law
was the Legislature:
... To avoid uncertainty and any unfairness to those parties who have structured their
commercial relationships in accordance with the sealed contract rule, any change to the law
36
37
38
British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 at para. 72, emphasis added.
British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 at para. 50-52, emphasis added.
Friedmann Equity Developments Inc. v. Final Note Inc., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 842 at para. 45.
-13should operate prospectively. Only the Legislature has the power to create a prospective
change in the law.39
38.
This Court has recognized a similar principle in criminal cases as wel1.4°
39.
The only area in which this Court has limited the retrospective effect of new legal rules is in
the constitutional context, as occurred recently in Hislop. The Hislop Court declined to grant fully
retroactive relief, in the form of damages, back to the 1985 enactment of s. 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, where it found that certain provisions of the Canada Pension Plan
violated section 15 and were invalid,41 stating:
... When the Court is declaring the law as it has existed, then the Blackstonian approach is
appropriate and retroactive relief should be granted. On the other hand, when a court is
developing new law within the broad confines of the Constitution, it may be appropriate to
limit the retroactive effect of its judgment.42
40.
Hislop did not, however, consider Friedmann and Imperial Tobacco, nor suggest that this
jurisdiction to grant prospective relief also exists in relation to private law disputes.43 Instead, it
emphasized several unique features of constitutional litigation which make prospective orders
appropriate, including: (1) the need to avoid "legal vacuums" and "chaos" when invalidating
legislation; (2) the disruption that retrospective rulings can have upon government programs and
budgets; and (3) the special status of the Constitution as a "living tree" whose content itself changes
44
over time, contrary to the Blackstonian paradigm.
41.
The focus upon the constitutional law context in Hislop is particularly evident from the test
for prospective rulings crafted by the majority, which involves several factors, only one of which fairness to the litigants — would apply without modification in private law cases:
Friedmann Equity Developments Inc. v. Final Note Inc., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 842 at para. 51, emphasis added.
40 R. v. Wigman, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 246 at 257 and 261; R. v. B. (KG.), [1993]. 1 S.C.R. 740 at 777-778 and 782; R. v.
Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 at 1354, 1393 and 1415-1416.
41 The Court in Hislop did, however, refuse to temporarily suspend its declaration of the invalidity of the CPP provisions,
and found that in the absence of these provisions, the CPP entitled the claimants to limited retroactive damages in the
period between August 1999-2000: see Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at paras. 121 and 134.
42 Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at para. 93, emphasis added.
43 K. Mason, "Prospective Overruling" (1989) 63 Aust. L.J. 526 at 530 ("significant policy arguments can be mounted
against the device... [which] have particular significance in non-constitutional cases"). vide M. L. Friedland,
"Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking" (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 170 at 171 and 190.
44 Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at paras. 90, 94-95 and 101-102.
39
-14The question is no longer the legitimacy of prospective remedies, but rather when, why and
how judges may rule prospectively or restrict the retroactive effect of their decisions in
constitutional matters. The key question becomes the nature and effect of the legal change at
issue in order to determine whether a prospective remedy is appropriate. The legitimacy of its
use turns on the answer to this question.
... A substantial change in the law is necessary, not sufficient, to justify purely prospective
remedies. Hence, we must now turn to what else must be considered once legal change has
been established.
Although the list of such factors should not be considered as closed, some of them appear
more clearly compelling. They may include reasonable or in good faith reliance by
governments... or the fairness of the limitation of the retroactivity of the remedy to the
litigants. Courts ought also consider whether a retroactive remedy would unduly interfere
with the constitutional role of legislatures and democratic governments in the allocation of
public resources ... .45
42.
Accordingly, the position in Canada is settled: courts have no jurisdiction to prospectively
overrule in private law cases. The Court of Appeal erred by exercising such a power here. This was
confirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal itself in Progressive, a decision rendered in 2009 but not
referred to in the Appeal Decision, where an entirely different panel stated:
[W]hile the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized various forms of prospective
lawmaking in constitutional cases such as Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 429, the case relied on by the trial judge, that court, as recently as 2000, rejected
prospective judicial lawmaking in the private law context. In Friedmann Equity
Developments Inc. v. Final Note Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 842...
Bastarache J. implicitly rejected prospective overruling as a means of avoiding the
unfairness and uncertainty that would be created by the judicial abolition of the common law
sealed contract rule. This aspect of the decision in Friedmann Equity, although the subject of
criticism, is consistent with a strong body of judicial authority that has rejected prospective
46
judicial lawmaking as inimical to the role of the judiciary.. .
B.
There Are No Compelling Reasons to Change the Law
i.
43.
Overview
The Court of Appeal did not deal with this Court's pronouncements in Friedmann and
Imperial Tobacco in its decision to recognize a prospective overruling power in private law cases.
Indeed, the Appeal Decision does not refer to any case on prospective overruling. It is wellCanada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at paras. 96 and 99-100, emphasis added.
46 Ontario (Minister of Finance) v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. of Canada (2009), 309 D.L.R. (4th) 490 (Ont.
C.A.) at paras. 55-56, emphasis added.
45
•
-15established that this Court will not depart from its own precedents unless there are "compelling
reasons" to do so.47 As Rothstein J. said recently in Craig:
[O]verturning a precedent of this Court is a step not to be lightly undertaken. This is
especially so when the precedent represents the considered views of firm majorities...
• [T]he Court must be satisfied based on compelling reasons that the precedent was
wrongly decided and should be overruled. ...
Courts must proceed with caution when deciding to overrule a prior decision. ... 48
44.
In Friedmann itself, this Court identified some of the factors it will consider when deciding
whether such "compelling reasons" exist:
I]t is necessary to understand the principles which govern judicial reform of the common
law. In the past, this Court has considered the conditions which must be present to effect a
change in the common law in several cases... From these cases, some general principles have
emerged. A change in the common law must be necessary to keep the common law in step
with the evolution of society (see, e.g., Salituro, at p. 670; Bow Valley, at para. 93), to clarify
a legal principle (see Vetrovec, at p. 819), or to resolve an inconsistency (see Jobidon, at p.
733). In addition, the change should be incremental, and its consequences must be capable
of assessment.
In the recent case of Robinson, Lamer C.J., for a majority of the Court, relied onfivefactors
to justify the reversal of an earlier decision of the Court in MacAskill v. The King, [1931]
S.C.R. 330. These factors were [1] the existence of previous dissenting opinions in this
Court, [2J a trend in the provincial appellate courts to departfrom the principles adopted in
the original decision, [31 criticism of the case or the adoption of a contrary rule in other
jurisdictions, [4] doctrinal criticism of the case and its foundations, and [5] inconsistency
of the case with other decisions. While they are not prerequisites for a change in the common
law, these factors help to identify compelling reasons for reform. On the other hand, courts
will not intervene where the proposed change will have complex and far-reaching effects,
setting the law on an unknown course whose ramifications cannot be accurately
measured...49
45.
There are no compelling reasons to overrule Friedmann and Imperial Tobacco, and hold that
prospective overruling is possible in private law disputes. The principle that judicial decisions
operate retrospectivity is not out of step with the evolution of society, in need of clarification, or
burdened by inconsistency. To the contrary, it is a clear and foundational precept that has stood the
R. v. Henry, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 at para. 44.
48 Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, [2012] S.C.J. No 43 (QL) at paras. 24-26, emphasis added.
49 Friedmann Equity Developments Inc. v. Final Note Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 842 at paras. 42-43, emphasis added. vide: R.
v. B. (KG.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 at 778; and Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, [2012] S.C.J. No 43 (QL) at paras. 24-31.
47
- 16test of time. Indeed, Holmes J. observed in Kuhn that "ffludicial decisions have had retrospective
operation for near a thousand years".5° Further, as discussed below:
(a)
the provincial appellate courts have not recognized private law prospective
overruling;
(b)
the appellate courts of other jurisdictions have either declined to recognize private
law prospective overruling, or have limited it to such exceptional situations as to be
of no more than theoretical value;
(c)
there is a wealth of academic commentary criticizing prospective overruling;
(d)
such a change would not be incremental, but would alter Canada's constitutional
arrangements and the nature of judging in the common law; and
(e)
the effects of such a change would be extremely complex and difficult to measure, as
illustrated by the U.S. experience with prospective overruling.
ii.
46.
Prospective Overruling Has Been Rejected by Provincial Appellate
Courts
The retrospectivity of non-constitutional judicial decisions has been affirmed many times by
Canada's provincial appellate courts,51 including by the Ontario Court of Appeal itself in the
Progressive case quoted above.52 Thus, in Edward, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated:
Any exercise of prospective overruling in a Canadian court would be a dramatic deviation
from the norm in both Canada and England. The use of such a technique first requires
extensive study as to its possible effects and the overwhelming overhaul it may cause to the
present Canadian justice system. Consideration of such a change in technique should perhaps
be left to another forum, and until such a change takes place, the principle to apply in
Saskatchewan is one of retrospective application of the common law.53
v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910), per Holmes J., dissenting on other grounds. vide Harper v.
Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993).
51 See, e.g.: R. v. Lloyd (1986), 17 O.A.C. 86 (C.A.) at para. 4; Stewart v. Stewart (1997), 145 D.L.R. (4th) 228 (B.C.C.A.)
at paras. 20 and 23; T.L.B. v. R.E.C., [2000] 11 W.W.R. 436 (Man. C.A.) at paras. 90-92, leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 663; Gallant v. Roman Catholic Episcopal Corp. for Labrador/Diocese of Labrador CitySchefferville (2001), 200 D.L.R. (4th) 643 (Nfld. C.A.) at paras. 17-22; R. v. Christmas (2003), 216 N.S.R. (2d) 131
(C.A.) at para. 4; Hladky v. Alberta (2005), 363 A.R. 375 (C.A.) at para. 10.
C.A.).
53
Edward v. Edward Estate (1987), 39 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (C.A.) at 664, emphasis added.
5° Kuhn
-1747.
Similarly, in Michalski, the Manitoba Court of Appeal held:
... Traditionally, the judgments of the courts have been given retrospective effect, even in
those cases where a significant change in the law has taken place. In an article, Prospective
and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking, by M.L. Friedland, (1974), 24 University of Toronto
Law Journal 170, the author argues that it might be desirable for judges, at least in certain
cases, to order that their decisions operate prospectively only. But the author also recognizes
that the proposal he advances is contrary to a tide of lawmaking tradition in England and
Canada... This article was written before the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. As in the United States, where the practice would appear to be more common,
there may be a sound basis to deal with constitutional rights, particularly when the rights of
accused persons are expanded, on a prospective basis. But there is still no ground swell of
civil cases where the courts have purported to initiate a change in the law, but apply it only to
future cases. Indeed, counsel for the plaintiffs can point to no such case other than one
emanating from the United States Supreme Court.54
iii.
Prospective Overruling Has Not Found Favour In Other Jurisdictions
a.
48.
United Kingdom
The English courts have also traditionally refused to accept the possibility of prospective
overruling.55 In Birmingham Corp., Lord Reid, joined in by the majority of Law Lords, stated:
... We cannot say that the law was one thing yesterday but is to be something different
tomorrow. If we decide that the rule as to the date of the notice to treat is wrong we must
decide that it always has been wrong, and that would mean that in many completed
transactions owners have received too little compensation. But that often happens when an
existing decision is reversed. ...56
49.
Thus, in Kleinwort Benson, the House of Lords held that the pronouncement of a new judicial
rule meant that parties who paid money under the old rule could obtain restitution of that payment,
since it was made under a "mistake of law". Lord Goff, delivering the leading judgment, said:
[W]e all know that in reality, in the common law as in equity, the law is the subject of
development by the judges - normally, of course, by appellate judges. ... The recognition that
this is what actually happens requires, however, that we should look at the declaratory
54 Michalski v. Olson, [1998] 3 W.W.R. 37 (Man. C.A.) at para. 16, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1998] S.C.C.A.
No. 12, emphasis added.
55 D. & F. Estates Ltd. v. Church Commissioners for England, [1989] A.C. 177 (H.L.) at 193 (and 210-211 and 217)
("our jurisprudence knows nothing of the American doctrine of 'prospective overruling"); Hindcastle Ltd. v. Barbara
Attenborough Associates Ltd., [1997] A.C. 70 (H.L.) at 95 (and 79) ("Prospective overruling is not yet a principle
known in English law").
56 Birmingham Corp. v. West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association Inc., [1970] A.C. 874 (H.L.) at 898-899 (and 908 and
913), emphasis added.
-18theory ofjudicial decision with open eyes and reinterpret it in the light of the way in which
all judges, common law and equity, actually decide cases today.
It is in this context that we have to reinterpret the declaratory theory of judicial decision. We
can see that, in fact, it does not presume the existence of an ideal system of the common
law, which the judges from time to time reveal in their decisions. The historical theory of
judicial decision, though it may in the past have served its purpose, was indeed a fiction. But
it does mean that, when the judges state what the law is, their decisions do, in the sense I
have described, have a retrospective effect. That is, I believe, inevitable. It is inevitable in
relation to the particular case before the court, in which the events must have occurred
some time, perhaps some years, before the judge's decision is made. But it is also inevitable
in relation to other cases in which the law as so stated will in future fall to be applied. I
must confess that I cannot imagine how a common law system, or indeed any legal system,
can operate otherwise if the law is be applied equally to all and yet be capable of organic
change. ... The only alternative, as I see it, is to adopt a system of prospective overruling.
But such a system, although it has occasionally been adopted elsewhere with, I understand,
somewhat controversial results, has no place in our legal system. I wish to add that I do not
regard the declaratory theory of judicial decision, as I have described it, as an aberration of
the common law. Since I regard it as an inevitable attribute of judicial decision-making,
some such theory must, I imagine, be applied in civil law countries, as in common law
countries; ...5 7
50.
In Spectrum Plus, the majority of the House of Lords did adopt a "never say never" approach
to prospective overruling.58 However, the Law Lords did not prospectively overrule in Spectrum
Plus itself, but only signalled that they may be willing to exercise this jurisdiction where "compelled"
to do so in a "highly unusual" and "wholly exceptional" case.59 As Lord Nicholls stated:
... There could be cases where a decision on an issue of law, whether common law or statute
law, was unavoidable but the decision would have such gravely unfair and disruptive
consequences for past transactions or happenings that this House would be compelled to
depart from the normal principles relating to the retrospective and prospective effect of court
decisions.
I turn to the present case. In my view it is miles away from the exceptional category in
which alone prospective overruling would be legitimate. ... 60
57 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council, [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (H.L.) at 377-379 (and 358-359, 393, 398-401 and
410-411), emphasis added.
58 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 41, 45 and 126.
59 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 40-41, 43, 71-74 and 126..
69 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 40 and 43, emphasis added.
-1951.
Two of the Law Lords in Spectrum Plus would have also denied any ability to prospectively
overrule in relation to matters of statutory interpretation, as the Court of Appeal did here.61
52.
Since, the ruling in Spectrum, the House of Lords and U.K. Supreme Court have issued
several decisions which affirm that judicial alterations of the common law generally operate
retrospectively,62 and have declined to prospectively overrule when asked to do so.63 In the end, as
Juratowitch concludes, "despite sporadic interest in the technique, no English court has ever really
done it, as Lord Hope pointed out in Spectrum".64
b.
53.
Ireland
The Supreme Court of Ireland has also recognized that non-constitutional judicial decisions
operate retrospectively. In Governor of Arbour Hill Prison, Murray C.J. said:
Judicial decisions which set a precedent in law do have retrospective effect. First of all the
case which decides the point applies it retrospectively in the case being decided because
obviously the wrong being remedied occurred before the case was brought. ... This is the
common law position.65
c.
54.
Australia
The experience of the Australian courts is particularly instructive. In Ha, the High Court of
Australia decisively rejected any jurisdiction to engage in prospective overruling at all:
The Court was invited, if it should come to that conclusion, to overrule the franchise cases
prospectively, leaving the authority of those cases unaffected for a period of 12 months. This
Court has no power to overrule cases prospectively. A hallmark of the judicial process has
long been the making of binding declarations of rights and obligations arising from the
operation of the law upon past events or conduct. The adjudication of existing rights and
In re Spectrum Plus Ltd (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 45 and 125-127.
62 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [2007] 1 A.C. 558 (H.L.) at paras. 23, 30-31,
72, 145 and 161; AXA General Insurance Ltd. v. HMAdvocate, [2012] 1 A.C. 868 at paras. 65, 76, 79, 92, 121 and 177;
Durham v. BAI (Run off) Ltd (In Scheme of Arrangement), [2012] 1 W.L.R. 867 (U.K.S.C.) at paras. 70, 76 and 90; Test
Claimants in the Fl I Group Litigation v. Revenue and Customs Comrs, [2012] 2 W.L.R. 1149 (U.K.S.C.) at paras. 20,
167, 176, 201 and 221.
63 Cadder v. HMAdvocate, [2010] 1 W.L.R. 2601 (U.K.S.C.) at paras. 58-62, 65, 101 and 107-110.
64 B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 202.
65 A. v. Governor of Arbour Hill Prison, [2006] 4 I.R. 88 (Sup. Ct.) at 116, emphasis added. vide: Murphy v. Attorney
General, [1982] I.R. 241 (Sup. Ct.) at 314, per Henchy J. ("To take but two examples, both from a non-constitutional
context, where a judicial decision is overruled by a later one as being bad law, the overruling operates retrospectively,
but not so as to affect matters that in the interval between the two decisions became res judicatae in the course of
operating the bad law"); and Cadder v. HMAdvocate, [2010] 1 W.L.R. 2601 (U.K.S.C.) at para. 101.
61
-20obligations as distinct from the creation of rights and obligations distinguishes the judicial
power from non judicial power. Prospective overruling is thus inconsistent with judicial
power on the simple ground that the new regime that would be ushered in when the
overruling took effect would alter existing rights and obligations. If an earlier case is
erroneous and it is necessary to overrule it, it would be a perversion of judicial power to
maintain in force that which is acknowledged not to be the law. .. 66
d.
55.
New Zealand
In Chamberlains, the majority of the Supreme Court of New Zealand declined to resolve
whether prospective overruling was available. Tellingly, the Court did not prospectively overrule in
that case, but said it would only exercise such a power, if at all, in "extraordinary" circumstances.67
e.
56.
Israel
The Supreme Court of Israel has also taken the position that judicial decisions normally have
retrospective effect. In Solel Boneh, President Barak for the majority stated:
The fundamental premise is that a new judicial ruling acts both retrospectively and
prospectively (see HCJ 221/86 Kanfi v. National Labour Court, at p. 480). Justice Holmes
rightly said that 'Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand
years' (in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., at p. 372). This is the position with regard to the
development of the law within the framework of the common law, and it is also the position
where case law interprets a legislative provision (a constitution, statute, regulation), or fills a
lacuna in it...68
57.
While President Barak was prepared to accept the possibility of prospective overruling in
cases where the retrospective application of a new legal rule may "seriously harm someone who
relied on it", he also observed that such cases would be "in the natural course of events, not many",
and that even where such a case arose, the Court would have to be satisfied that no other legal
doctrine was capable of protecting the litigant's reliance interest (e.g., the de facto doctrine).69 As
well, President Barak observed that "sometimes there will be a basis for giving retrospective validity
66
Ha v. New South Wales (1997), 189 C.L.R. 465 (H.C.A.) at 503-504 (and 466 and 516), emphasis added.
Chamberlains v. Lai, [2006] N.Z.S.C. 70 at para. 95.
68 Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate ofAlhamid, [2006] 1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 5, emphasis
added.
69 Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate ofAlhamid, [2006] 1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.) at paras. 18-19.
67
-21 to new case law even if this harms the reliance interest"." In Solel Boneh itself, the Supreme Court
declined to prospectively overrule.
f.
58.
United States
The U.S. Supreme Court traditionally viewed prospective overruling as inappropriate,7I but
later concluded that there was no constitutional impediment to it.72 Influenced by the legal realist
movement, it rejected Blackstone's declaratory theory, and experimented with prospective overruling
extensively in a series of cases in the 1960's and 1970'S.73 The high-water mark of its private law
prospective overruling jurisprudence was Chevron, where it articulated the following test:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either
by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied... or by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.... Second, it has
been stressed that "we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the
prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective
operation will further or retard its operation." ... Finally, we have weighed the inequity
imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for
avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity."74
59.
The Court also identified similar standards for when a new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure should be given prospective effect:
... The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by
the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the
new standards. — 75
60.
However, this approach did not last.
Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate of Alhamid, [2006] 1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 22.
71 Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1924).
72 Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-366 (1932); Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374-375 (1940); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622, 627-628 and
footnote 3 (1965).
73 See Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993), per Scalia J., concurring ("Prospective
decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis. It was formulated in the
heyday of legal realism and promoted as a `techniqu[e] of judicial lawmaking' in general, and more specifically as a
means of making it easier to overrule prior precedent").
74 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971).
75 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
70
-2261.
In the context of criminal cases, the U.S. Supreme Court retreated to the view that "new rules
always have retroactive application to criminal cases on direct review",76 with the question of
pro spectivity only being relevant to the collateral review on habeas corpus of criminal cases already
finally decided (where the issue is not the retrospective effect of the new rule at all, but rather its
retroactive effect).77 The Court's decision to overturn its prior jurisprudence was motivated by the
fact that its criminal prospective overruling test "proved difficult to apply in a consistent, coherent
way" and "'produced strikingly divergent results' ... that many saw as 'incompatible' and
`inconsistent' ".78 The Court also acknowledged the "veritable field day" that commentators had with
its old position, "with much of the discussion being 'more than mildly negative'".79 Finally, the
Court held that prospective overruling "violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication", and is
"an assertion that our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation".8°
62.
In the context of civil cases, the Court drew upon this criminal jurisprudence and rejected any
power to render selectively prospective judgments, i.e., those in which the new rule is applied to the
litigants in the case where the rule is announced, but not to other cases involving prior facts.81
Finding that "[t]he applicability of rules of law is not to be switched on and off according to
individual hardship",82 the Court said in Harper:
[W]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the
controlling interpretation of federal law, and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases
still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or
postdate our announcement of the rule. ...83
76 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634 (1993). vide Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95
(1993).
77 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). There is no comparable jurisdiction to give judicial decisions retroactive
effect in final criminal cases in Canada (i.e., cases no longer in the judicial system), given the doctrine of res judicata: see
R. v. Sarson, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 223 at para. 26.
78 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (2011).
79 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302-303 (1989). vide Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 103
(1993), per Scalia J., concurring.
8° Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-323 (and 328) (1987). vide United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 546-548,
554-556 and 562 (1982).
81 'James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752
(1995).
82 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991), per Souter J.
83 Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993), emphasis added.
- 23 63.
Further, even as to "pure" prospective judgments, i.e., those in which the new rule is not even
applied to the litigants in the case where the new rule is announced, the Court has since questioned
the "continuing validity of Chevron Oil after Harper".84 In Landgraf, the Court stated:
... In 1974, our doctrine on judicial retroactivity involved a substantial measure of discretion,
guided by equitable standards resembling the Bradley "manifest injustice" test itself. See
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-356, 30 L.Ed.2d 296
(1971); ... While it was accurate in 1974 to say that a new rule announced in a judicial
decision was only presumptively applicable to pending cases, we have since established a
firm rule of retroactivity. See Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 S.Ct.
2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d
649 (1987).85
64.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the early U.S. cases permitting private law prospective
overruling have been cited by several Canadian appellate courts without being adopted:86 Thus, in
T.L. B. , a five-member panel of the Manitoba Court of Appeal said:
This Court declined to follow the Chevron Oil Company v. Huson decision in Michalski v.
Olson et al. (1997), 123 Man.R. (2d) 101. In that case, my colleague Justice Huband, writing
for the Court, observed that in England and Canada, the judgments of the courts have
traditionally been given retrospective effect and that the Chevron Oil Company case "'was
unique in its circumstances" (at para. 18).87
iv.
65.
Academic Commentary Is Critical Of Prospective Overruling
The academic community has also not united in support of prospective overruling. Instead,
numerous well-respected commentators have recommended that the technique be rejected.88
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184-185 (1995).
85 Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 279, footnote 32 (1994), emphasis added. vide C. Sampford,
Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 211 ("[t]he majority opinion in Harper
seems to invalidate pure prospectivity"). See also M.P. Harrington, "Forward: The Dual Dichotomy of Retroactive
Lawmaking" (1997) 3 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 19 at 23.
86 R. v. Lloyd (1986), 17 O.A.C. 86 (C.A.) at para. 4; Edward v. Edward Estate (1987), 39 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (C.A.) at 662,
664; Stewart v. Stewart (1997), 145 D.L.R. (4th) 228 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 22; Michalski v. Olson, [1998] 3 W.W.R. 37
(Man. C.A.) at paras. 16-17, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 12; Gallant v. Roman Catholic
Episcopal Corp. for Labrador/Diocese of Labrador City-Schefferville (2001), 200 D.L.R. (4th) 643 (Nfld. C.A.) at paras.
17-18 and 22.
87 T.L.B. v. R.E.C., [2000] 11 W.W.R. 436 (Man. C.A.) at para. 91 (and 90), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2000]
S.C.C.A. No. 663, emphasis added.
88
P.J. Mishkin, "Foreward: The High Court, the Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law" (1965) 79 Harv. L.
Rev. 56 at 102; P. Weiler, "Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making" (1970) 48 Can. Bar. Rev. 1 at 29-33; Lord Reid,
"The Judge as Law Maker" (1972) 12 J.S.P.T.L. 22 at 23; P.B. Hasler, "Retroactivity Rethought: The Hidden Costs"
84
-24v.
66.
The Change Would Not Be Incremental
It is frequently observed that "this Court has limited itself to changes in the common law to
those which are 'slow and incremental' rather than 'major and far-reaching'".89 However, a finding
that courts possess the power to prospectively overrule in private law case would not be "slow and
incremental"; to the contrary, it would "fundamentally alter the nature of judging in the common
law".9° There are several reasons why this is so.
67.
First, such a power would upset Canada's constitutional arrangements, by altering the
judicial function described in Imperial Tobacco above,91 and creating a conflict between the
legislature and the courts.92 As the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal said in Edward:
... In my respectful view, the most cogent reason for rejecting this technique is the
necessity for our courts to maintain their independent, neutral and non-legislative role. The
practice of giving prospective effect to law is endemic to legislatures. By deciding an
existing case under the old rule but warning that future cases will be decided under anew rule
now being announced, a court is really usurping the function of the legislature.93
(1972) 24 Maine L. Rev. 1 at 32-34; M.D.A. Freeman, "Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law-Making and Prospective
Overruling" (1973) C.L.P. 166 at 200-207; Lord Devlin, "Judges and Lawmakers" (1976) 39 Mod. L. Rev. 1 at 11; L.
Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 at 392; W.V. Schaefer, "Prospective
Rulings: Two Perspectives" (1982) Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 at 22-23; M.P. Harrington, "Forward: The Dual Dichotomy of
Retroactive Lawmaking" (1997)3 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 19 at 23-24; J.M. Finnis, "The Fairy Tale's Moral" (1999)
115 L.Q,R. 170 at 172-175; K. Roosevelt, "A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative
Retroactivity" (1999) 31 Conn. L. Rev. 1075 at 1078-1079, 1081, 1117-1118 and 1136-1137; J.A. Coutts, "The
Retrospective Operation of Judicial Decisions" (2001) 65(1) J. Crim. L. 59 at 61; B.S. Shannon, "The Retroactive and
Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions" (2003) 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 811 at 874-876; B. Juratowitch,
Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 217-218; G. Ghatan, "The Incentive Problem
With Prospective Overruling: A Critique of the Practice" (2010) 45 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 179.
89 R. v. B. (KG.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 at 776. vide: Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750 at 760; and R. v. Salituro,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 at 670.
90
Ontario (Minister of Finance) v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. of Canada (2009), 95 O.R. (3d) 219 (C.A.) at
para. 59, emphasis added. vide B.S. Shannon, "The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions"
(2003) 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 811 at 836-845.
91 B.S. Shannon, "The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions" (2003)26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
811 at 838-842; B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 210 and 217.
92 Ha v. New South Wales (1997), 189 C.L.R. 465 (H.C.A.) at 503-504; Chamberlains v. Lai, [2006] N.Z.S.C. 70 at
paras. 131 and 133, per Tipping J.; Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at para. 85; W. Friedman, "Limits of
Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling" (1966)29 Mod. L. Rev. 593 at 595; B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and
the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 210-211.
93 Edward v. Edward Estate (1987), 39 D.L.R. (0) 654 (C.A.) at 663-664, emphasis added. vide In re Spectrum Plus Ltd.
(In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at para. 28, per Lord Nicholls.
- 25 68.
Second, such a power would make serious inroads upon the rule of law, which requires that
"justice is rendered in a manner that is not arbitrary".94 As Lord Nicholls said in Spectrum:
... it would introduce an arbitrary element into the law. The ability to obtain an effective
remedy could depend upon which of several challenges reaches the House of Lords first.
Even if everyone who had already commenced proceedings was given the benefit of the court
ruling there would still be scope for discrimination: there would be discrimination between
those who knew they might have a claim and started proceeding post-haste and those, lacking
proper advice, who were unaware they might have a claim.95
69.
Third, prospective overruling would dramatically alter the way that litigants interact with the
courts. The Ontario Court of Appeal recognized this in Progressive Casualty:
... The unsuccessful party could almost always argue that it proceeded on a reasonable
interpretation of the statute and should, therefore, despite losing the statutory interpretation
battle, not suffer the consequences of an adverse ruling. To accept this argument would be to
fundamentally alter the nature of judging in the common law. 96
vi.
70.
The Effects of the Change Would Be Complex
This Court will also decline to change the common law where it could produce unforeseen,
complex or problematic consequences.97 The introduction of a prospective overruling power in
private law cases would have several such effects.
71.
First, prospective overruling would hinder the quality and development of the law, since it
would remove the incentive for litigants — particularly non-institutional ones like Mr. Hryniak — to
challenge existing legal rules.98 This was referred to as a "compelling" objection of "substance" by
Lord Nicholls in Spectrum:
94
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (A.G.), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19 at para. 1. vide British Columbia v. Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 at para. 58.
95 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 26-27 (and 39), emphasis added. vide:
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537-538 (1991), per Souter J.; and B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity
and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 211-214 and 217.
96
para. 59, emphasis added.
97 Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750 at 760-761; R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 at 670; Bow Valley Husky
(Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210 at paras. 97 and 114; Friedmann Equity
Developments Inc. v. Final Note Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 842 at paras. 42-43.
98
Chamberlains v. Lai, [2006] N.Z.S.C. 70 at para. 145, per Tipping J.; Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. v.
Estate of Alhamid, [2006] 1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 8; P.J. Mishkin, "Foreward: The High Court, the Great Writ
and the Due Process of Time and Law" (1965) 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56 at 60-61; P. Weiler, "Legal Values and Judicial
-26... In civil cases 'pure' prospective overruling would hinder the development of the law by
discouraging claimants from challenging a prevailing view of the law.99
72.
Second, prospective overruling would undermine the principle of stare decisis by causing
courts to embrace new legal principles too readily. In Solel Boneh, President Barak identified this as
one of the "decisive" reasons for the retrospectivity principle:
... First, it is argued that the ability to give only prospective validity to a new case law ruling
that overrules its predecessor releases the judge from the constraints that limit his discretion
as to whether to depart from a previous case law ruling or not. According to this approach,
the retrospectivity of the case law ruling acts as a barrier against too great a departure from
the previous law. When this barrier is removed, there is a fear that the proper framework may
be undermined, and that there will be too many departures from previous case law
rulings.. , 100
73.
Third, prospective overruling would result in a denial of natural justice to the litigants and
other interested parties. As Freeman notes:
... A further difficulty is that of representation. Rational decision-making depends upon
counsel providing the court with arguments and evidence. But overt law-making in the form
of prospective overruling may have nothing to do with the adjudication of the dispute. The
judge may not, therefore, hear argument from counsel relevant to the task that the judge has
set himself Counsel, on the other hand, not knowing that a judge has it in mind to legislate
prospectively does not know what evidence and what type of argumentation to present. His
client is, in effect, robbed of participation in the decision-making process. Further, since
prospective overruling may affect interests wider than those represented in a case, it follows
that some of those whose rights and duties are radically changed are denied representation.
Courts are not legislatures but where they perform legislative activities it is of the essence
of democracy that all concerned be given the opportunity to make adequate
representation.101
Decision-Making" (1970) 48 Can. Bar. Rev. 1 at 30; M.D.A. Freeman, "Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law-Making
and Prospective Overruling" (1973) C.L.P. 166 at 202-203; B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2008) at 210; G. Ghatan, "The Incentive Problem With Prospective Overruling: A Critique of the
Practice" (2010) 45 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 179.
99 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at para. 27 (and 39), per Lord Nicholls, emphasis
added.
1°° Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate ofAlhamid, [2006] 1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 8 (and 11),
emphasis added. vide: P.J. Mishkin, "Foreward: The High Court, the Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law"
(1965) 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56 at 72-73; Lord Devlin, "Judges and Lawmakers" (1976) 39 Mod. L. Rev. 1 at 10-11; and B.
Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 211 and 217.
1°1 M.D.A. Freeman, "Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law-Making and Prospective Overruling" (1973) C.L.P. 166 at
206, emphasis added. vide: P. Weiler, "Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making" (1970) 48 Can. Bar. Rev. 1 at 30;
and L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 353 at 392.
-2774.
Fourth, prospective overruling could lead to a loss of public confidence in the judiciary.102
In Edward, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal accepted the following commentary:
It is our view that prospective overruling in whichever of its forms should not be introduced
in England. It would encourage judicial law reform. It would not enable adjudication to
operate as the sort of collaborative process which earlier in this chapter it was suggested it is.
It would distort our expectations of the judicial role. We must ask ourselves why it is that
the public accepts judicial decisions even when they do not agree with them. The answer may
lie in a perception of adjudication as an objective process. Confidence may recede at the
point where the courts are not seen as adjudicative agencies but as legislators. The
introduction of prospective overruling would be a step in that direction.103
75.
Fifth, the "strikingly divergent results"104 witnessed in the U.S. experience with prospective
overruling demonstrate that such a power would introduce new and intolerable inconsistencies into
the private law. It was precisely because of this that the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned its
experiment with prospective overruling in Harper.
76.
Accordingly, to the extent that private law prospective overruling should be recognized at all,
it should be left to Parliament.105 As the B.C. Court of Appeal said in Stewart:
... The better view may well be that, if anything is to be done in that direction, it should be
done by legislation. There is reason to fear that any statute which attempted to regulate the
106
retrospective effect of all decisions would prove intolerably complex. ...
3.
Prospective Overruling Was Inappropriate Here
77.
Assuming, arguendo, that prospective overruling is possible in the private law context at all,
the Court of Appeal erred in exercising that power here. This is evident from the following factors
102 Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate of Alhamid, [2006] 1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.) at paras. 8 and 11;
P.J. Mishkin, "Foreward: The High Court, the Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law" (1965) 79 Harv. L. Rev.
56 at 62-70; P. Weiler, "Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making" (1970) 48 Can. Bar. Rev. 1 at 30-32; B.S. Shannon,
"The Retroactive and Prospective Application ofJudicial Decisions" (2003) 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 811 at 871-874.
Edward v. Edward Estate (1987), 39 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (C.A.) at 664, emphasis added.
104 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (2011). vide: P.B. Hasler, "Retroactivity Rethought: The Hidden Costs"
(1972) 24 Maine L. Rev. 1 at 33; M. L. Friedland, "Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking" (1974) 24
U.T.L.J. 170 at 174-175; and B.S. Shannon, "The Retroactive and Prospective Application ofJudicial Decisions" (2003)
26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 811 at 865.
105 Jones v. Secretary of State for Social Services, [1972] A.C. 944 (H.L.) at 1026-1027; Solel Boneh Building and
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate of Alhamid, [2006] 1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 8.
1°6 Stewart v. Stewart (1997), 145 D.L.R. (4th) 228 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 23, emphasis added. vide Edward v. Edward Estate
(1987), 39 D.L.R. (41h) 654 (C.A.) at 664.
103
-28that courts have proposed to identify the "exceptional" cases in which prospective overruling may be
appropriate:1°7
(a)
there was no detrimental reliance by the Respondents upon any settled summary
judgment test under the amended Rule 20 prior to the Appeal Decision;
(b)
the failure to apply the full appreciation test in the Mauldin appeal was selective and
unfair to Mr. Hryniak;
(c)
the Court of Appeal did not respect the Legislature's role, since it suspended the
meaning of valid legislation in relation to Mr. Hryniak; and
(d)
the result in the Mauldin Action does not advance, but instead frustrates, both the
purposes of the amended Rule 20 and the administration of justice.1°8
A.
78.
The Respondents Did Not Detrimentally Rely Upon Any Prior Law
Virtually all of the courts prepared to allow prospective overruling have emphasized the
litigants' reliance upon the prior law as a central factor in the exercise of this discretion.109 In Hislop,
this Court identified reliance as one of the most "clearly compelling" factors in determining whether
prospective overruling is appropriate, stating that "[a] careful consideration of reliance interests is
critical to the analytical process".110 Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal said in Progressive:
If available at all, the possibility of a prospective overruling of a prior decision should be
considered only if the party seeking that ruling demonstrates a clear and detrimental reliance
on the prior authority. ...111
107 Ontario (Minister of Finance) v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. of Canada (2009), 309 D.L.R. (4111) 490 (Ont.
C.A.) at para. 57 ("even those who advocate for prospective judicial lawmaking see it as very much the exception to the
general rule that judge-made law is retrospective").
1°8 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971); Canada (A.G.)
v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at para. 100.
109
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 185, 191 and 199 (1990); In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In
Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 40 and 73; Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate of
Alhamid, [2006] 1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 18; Chamberlains v. Lai, [2006] N.Z.S.C. 70 at para. 140, per Tipping
J.
H° Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at paras. 100, 101 and 103.
111
para. 58, emphasis added.
-2979.
There are three reasons why this reliance factor did not militate in favour of prospective
overruling here.
80.
First, as to the old Rule 20, the Respondents could not have relied upon the law under it,
since they agreed that the amended Rule 20 should govern their motions, and both the Court of
Appeal and the Motion Judge acknowledged that the motions, if brought under the old Rule 20,
would fail.112 Further, as to the amended Rule 20, there was no test for summary judgment under it
that was settled prior to the Appeal Decision. Instead, as the Court of Appeal itself observed, the
existing jurisprudence — all of which was developed by lower courts — was "conflicting" and given to
"various interpretive approaches", such that the Motion Judge granted summary judgment at a time
when the law was "unsettled".113
81.
In these circumstances, considerations of reliance did not warrant the prospective application
of the new full appreciation test.114 In Hislop, the government's reliance was only found sufficient to
justify prospective overruling because that reliance was upon a decision of this Court:
... Where the government's reliance on the unconstitutional law was reasonable because it
was relying on this Court's jurisprudence, it will be less likely that a right to retroactive relief
will flow from a subsequent declaration of invalidity of the unconstitutional law.115
82.
By contrast, in Spectrum, the House of Lords decided that prospective overruling was
inappropriate there since the reliance was upon a decision of a lower court:
I turn to the present case. In my view it is miles away from the exceptional category in which
alone prospective overruling would be legitimate. No doubt over the years the clearing banks,
including the respondent bank, have to some extent relied upon the Siebe Gorman decision
when formulating and using their standard forms of charges on book debts. But banks and
others who lend money on the security of charges on a company's undertaking are
sophisticated operators. There is no reason to suppose this decision lulled them into a false
sense of security. Siebe Gorman was a first instance decision. It cannot have been regarded
as definitively settling the law in this field. ...
"2 Appeal Decision, para. 147.
113 Appeal Decision, paras. 35 and 153-154.
114 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 662-664 (1987); Chambelains v. Lai, [2007] 2 N.Z.L.R. 7 (Sup. Ct.) at
paras. 143-144, per Tipping J.; B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1921) at 147-148; J.E. Fisch, "Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach" (1997) 110 Harv. L. Rev.
1056 at 1108-1110.
115 Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at para. 114 (and 110-112), emphasis added.
-30... I can see no good reason for postponing the effect of the overruling of Siebe Gorman. If
Siebe Gorman had been a decision of this House and therefore, subject to subsequent
legislative intervention or to an overruling of the decision pursuant to the 1966 Practice
Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234, a decision that settled the law with
finality, I think your Lordships would have need to hesitate long before overruling. But the
rulings of lower courts on points of law do not settle the law with finality. They never have
done. ...116
83.
Similarly, in Solel Boneh, the Supreme Court of Israel observed:
[I]t cannot be said that there is a reliance interest that is worthy of protection... if the old
case law ruling did not in practice create any real reliance, or if the reliance was
unreasonable, or if it should not be given any significant weight in view of the issue under
discussion and the nature of that reliance... Examples of this situation can be found in the
following situations: the previous case law was not a decision of the Supreme Court; the
previous case law was unclear, and it has been interpreted in different ways; the previous
case law was accompanied by opposition and proposed changes; in several °biter
statements judges have expressed reservations concerning the previous case law; the previous
case law was riot known to the parties; the parties relied on the old law but each took the
risks that it might be changed... In these situations and in many others, anyone who relies on
the previous case law takes a risk and it is therefore possible to give the new case law
retrospective validity....'"
84.
Second, the reasonableness of any "reliance" placed by the Respondents upon the prior law is
undermined by the fact that this was an issue of legislative interpretation. As stated in Progressive:
The Fund proceeded as it did because it did not regard itself as an "insurer" for the purpose of
the Dispute Regulation. This was a reasonable, although ultimately wrong, interpretation of
the Dispute Regulation. I do not think that an erroneous, albeit reasonable, interpretation of a
statute or a regulation justifies giving a judicial decision prospective effect only. Most
debates about statutory interpretation that reach an appellate court pit two reasonable but
conflicting interpretations against each other. ...118
85.
Third, the concept of reliance relates to substantive rights, not the law of motions
procedure.I19 The Respondents would not have placed any reliance upon the prior summary
judgment law when making their investments; no party entering into a transaction does so in reliance
upon the test they must meet to obtain summary judgment if the transaction fails and they sue.
In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 43 and 122, emphasis added.
Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate of Alhamid, [2006] 1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 18,
emphasis added.
C.A.) at para. 59, emphasis added. vide U.S. v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 294-295 (1970).
119 C. Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 220.
116
117
-31Further, this Court has held that there is no vested right to procedure. Even in the context of
legislation — which unlike judicial rules is presumed not to apply retrospectively — procedural
amendments are still applied on a retrospective basis. As stated by this Court:
At common law, procedural legislation presumptively applies immediately and generally to
both pending and future acts. As Sullivan, supra, discusses at p. 582, the presumption of
immediate application has been characterized in a number of ways: that there is no vested
right in procedure; that the effect of a procedural change is deemed beneficial for all; that
procedural provisions are an exception to the presumption against retrospectivity; and that
procedural provisions are ordinarily intended to have immediate effect. ... 120
86.
Thus, in Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to give a new rule relating to the
arbitrability of disputes non-retrospective effect under the Chevron test, noting that "resort to the
arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the substantive rights afforded to
petitioners under the Securities Act".12I
87.
Indeed, the Decision in this case creates the absurd result that the amendments to Rule 20
apply retrospectively,122 but the common law "full appreciation test" by which amended Rule 20 is
itself to be applied does not. That is directly contrary to the purpose of s. 52 of the Legislation Act,
2006:
52. (1) This section applies,
(c) if an Act or regulation is amended.
(4) The procedure established by the new or amended Act or regulation shall be followed,
with necessary modifications, in proceedings in relation to matters that happened before the
replacement or amendment.123
B.
88.
The Prospective Overruling In This Case Was Selective and Unfair
The fairness or inequity to the litigants in applying the new law without retrospective effect is
a critical factor.124 In this case, the prospective overruling engaged in by the Court of Appeal was
unfair to Mr. Hryniak for several reasons.
Re Application Under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 at para. 62 (and 57, 66 and 107), emphasis
added.
121 Rodriguez De Quijas v. Sharson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-486 (1989), emphasis added.
122 Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. v. Ontario (2010), 101 O.R. (3d) 277 (S.C.J.) at paras. 19 and 27-28; Onex Corp. v.
American Home Assurance (2009), 100 O.R. (3d) 313 (S.C.J.) at paras. 3-17.
123 Emphasis added.
120
- 32 89.
First, as discussed above at paragraphs 31-33, the Court of Appeal refused to apply the full
appreciation test to Mr. Hryniak, but has since applied that test in many other appeals from summary
judgment rulings rendered prior to the Appeal Decision, such as Caton. It is fundamentally unjust
that the defendants in those subsequent appeals should be allowed the benefit of the full appreciation
test, while Mr. Hryniak, who was the appellant in the very decision where that test was articulated, is
not. Even in constitutional cases where this Court applies prospective overruling, it will still grant
the benefit of the new rule to the litigants before it, like Mr. Hryniak, and only withhold it from nonparties, like the defendants in those subsequent appeals:
... In the rare cases in which this Court makes a prospective ruling, it has always allowed
the party bringing the case to take advantage of the finding of unconstitutionality: see, e.g.,
R. v. Brydges, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190; R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 117.125
90.
Indeed, the form of "selective" prospectivity applied by the Court of Appeal here appears to
be unknown to any legal system. Most forms of selective prospectivity still apply the new rule in the
case where the rule is announced; usually the only question is whether that rule should also be
applied to litigants in other cases based on pre-existing facts.126 In Stovall, for instance, the U.S.
Supreme Court, when declining to give a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure either
retroactive or retrospective operation in relation to other cases, stated:
... We recognize that Wade and Gilbert are, therefore, the only victims of pretrial
confrontations in the absence of their counsel to have the benefit of the rules established in
their cases. That they must be given that benefit is, however, an unavoidable consequence
of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not stand as mere dictum. Sound policies
of decision-making, rooted in the command of Article III of the Constitution that we resolve
issues solely in concrete cases or controversies, and in the possible effect upon the incentive
of counsel to advance contentions requiring a change in the law, militate against denying
Wade and Gilbert the benefit of today's decisions. Inequity arguably results from according
the benefit of a new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other
litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue.
124 Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971); Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at paras. 100,
106-107, 111 and 116.
125
Reference re Remuneration ofJudges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para. 20,
emphasis added. vide Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405 at paras. 75-76.
In re Spectrum Plus (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at para. 10, per Lord Nicholls; B. Jurato witch,
Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 212.
126
- 33 But we regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant
cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making.127
91.
Similarly, in Chamberlains, Tipping J. held:
...[A]ny limitation of retrospective effect should not usually affect the parties to the case in
hand. The party who succeeds in getting the law changed should be entitled to the benefit of
that success. ... Exempting the immediate parties from any general non-retrospective
operation is itself somewhat arbitrary, but that small degree of arbitrariness must be accepted
in the interests of the law as a whole. To do otherwise, as Lord Nicholls said, would stultify
the common law method by making a successful challenge to the existing law of no benefit
to the successful litigant. I28
92.
Further, several courts have held that selective prospective overruling in any form is
discriminatory and contrary to the rule of law.129 In Spectrum, Lord Nicholls stated:
... Whatever its faults the retrospective application of court rulings is straightforward.
Prospective overruling creates problems of discrimination. Born out of a laudable wish to
mitigate the seeming unfairness of a retrospective change in the law, prospective overruling
can beget unfairness of its own.
This is most marked in criminal cases, where 'pure' prospective overruling would leave a
successful defendant languishing in prison. 'Selective' prospective overruling avoids this
consequence but it could see a successful defendant freed while others in like case stayed in
prison. In civil cases 'pure' prospective overruling would hinder the development of the law
by discouraging claimants from challenging a prevailing view of the law. 'Selective'
overruling, if only the successful claimant benefits from the change, is likely to mean that
persons in like case are treated differently. Further, it would introduce an arbitrary element
into the law. The ability to obtain an effective remedy could depend upon which of several
challenges reaches the House of Lords first. Even if everyone who had already commenced
proceedings was given the benefit of the court ruling there would still be scope for
discrimination: there would be discrimination between those who knew they might have a
claim and started proceeding post-haste and those, lacking proper advice, who were
unaware they might have a claim.130
93.
And in Harper, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
127 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300-301 (1967), emphasis added. vide: Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255,
footnote 24 (1969); and P. Weiler, "Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making" (1970) 48 Can. Bar. Rev. I at 32-33.
128 Chamberlains v. Lai, [2006] N.Z.S.C. 70 at para. 145 (and 134, 140 152-154), per Tipping J., emphasis added.
129 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537-538 (1991) ("selective prospectivity also breaches the
principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, afundamental component of stare decisis and
the rule of law generally"). vide: P. Weiler, "Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making" (1970)48 Can. Bar. Rev. 1 at
30; B.S. Shannon, "The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions" (2003) 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 811 at 866; C. Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 220; and
B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 211-214 and 217.
13° In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 26-27 (and 39), emphasis added.
- 34 ... Mindful of the "basic norms of constitutional adjudication" that animated our view of
retroactivity in the criminal context, id., at 322, 107 S.Ct., at 712, we now prohibit the
erection of selective temporal barriers to the application of federal law in noncriminal cases.
In both civil and criminal cases, we can scarcely permit "the substantive law [to] shift and
spring" according to "the particular equities of [individual parties 7 claims" of actual
reliance on an old rule and of harm from a retroactive application of the new rule. ... Our
approach to retroactivity heeds the admonition that "[t]he Court has no more constitutional
authority in civil cases than in criminal cases to disregard current law or to treat similarly
situated litigants differently." -131
94.
Second, the prospective overruling here was also selective in that the Court of Appeal applied
the new test to the other three appeals before it in the same Appeal Decision. The Court of Appeal
offered no explanation or even acknowledgment of this discrepancy, which is in direct violation of:
...the principle of universality [that] requires appellate courts to ensure that the same legal
rules are applied in similar situations ... Thus, while the primary role of trial courts is to
resolve individual disputes based on the facts before them and settled law, the primary role of
appellate courts is to delineate and refine legal rules and ensure their universal
application .132
95.
Even in the United States, where selective prospective overruling was allowed for a time, the
courts declined to give retrospective effect to a new rule for only one of several litigants before it. In
Molitor, for instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a prospective rule should be given
retrospective effect not only in relation to the appellant, whose appeal had been brought as a test case
for several litigants injured in the same accident, but also in relation to the remaining litigants in that
accident.133 Similarly, in Eicher, the Supreme Court of Minnesota gave a prospective rule
retrospective effect both in relation to the actual litigant before it, and in relation to another litigant
whose appeal would have been consolidated with that of the actual litigant, but which was not owing
to a delay in filing her brief.I34 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin summarized the effect of these
decisions in Jepsen, where it held that a prospective rule enunciated in an earlier case should be given
retrospective effect in three consolidated actions each based on events occurring prior to the earlier
case, even though only one of the three actions had been commenced prior to the earlier case:
131 Harper
v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993), emphasis added.
Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 at para. 9, emphasis added.
133 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 24 I11.2d 467, 470 (1962).
134 Eicher v. Jones, 173 N.W. 2d 427, 429-430 (1970).
132
-35As for the Laux and Mellin actions, although they were commenced after Jepson, Koback
and Harmann, we believe that within the context of this case the right of action accruing to
one party as the result of a particular accident should be available to all similarly situated
parties regardless of when the actions, otherwise timely, were commenced in relation to each
other. It is a basic tenet of our judicial system that individuals similarly situated should be
treated similarly. Harmann, supra, at 384; 382 N.W.2d at 679. See generally Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 24 I11.2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145 (1962) (multiple
plaintiffs from same accident entitled to prospective appellate ruling even though only one
plaintiff brought the appeal as a "test case").135
96.
Third, this is not a case where Mr. Hryniak may still benefit from the Court of Appeal's
decision to accept his arguments about the full appreciation test in the abstract. Unless that test is
applied to dismiss the summary judgment against him, he will have gained only a Pyrrhic victory.
As held in Hislop:
...M. v. H. was not a case like Miron where limiting the retroactive effect of the s. 52(1)
remedy would have granted the "successful" claimant a hollow victory. In contrast, a
purely prospective remedy in M. v. H. was not meaningless. M v. H resulted in wide-scale
amendments to federal and provincial legislation across the country to extend government
benefits to same-sex couples. Equally important, M v. H. helped usher in a new era of
understanding of the equal human dignity of same-sex couples. One could not say that M. v.
H. granted those litigants only a Pyrrhic victory. I36
97.
Fourth, the following comments of this Court in Hislop are also instructive:
In Miron, it would not have been appropriate for the Court to limit the retroactive effect of
the remedy and grant a purely prospective remedy. ...
...McLachlin J. noted that the distinction based on marital status was unreasonable, even at
the time the impugned legislation was enacted (para. 173). Because the Legislature ought to
have known that the vehicle insurance legislation was out of step with a modern
understanding of "spouse", it could not reasonably exclude common law spouses from
insurance coverage.137
98.
Similar to Miron, the law applied here by the Court of Appeal was unreasonable, since it
required use of the extensive fact-finding powers in Rule 20.04(2.1) absent a full appreciation of the
evidence and issues in the case. Doing so contradicted Rule 20.04(2.1), and resulted in a final
judgment against Mr. Hryniak in fraud based on a paper record that could not provide a safe
lepsen v. Stilen, 133 'Wis. 2d 35, 40-41 (1986), emphasis added.
136 Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at paras. 104, 106 and 116, emphasis added.
137 Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at paras. 104 and 106, underlining in original, bolding and italics
added.
135
-36understanding of the facts and issues. That is contrary to fundamental notions of justice, and is the
very reason why the Court of Appeal articulated the full appreciation test in the first place.
C.
99.
The Court Suspended Valid Legislation In Disregard of the Legislature's Role
In Hislop, this Court suggested that interference "with the constitutional role of legislatures
and democratic governments" is also a factor to be considered before prospectively overruling,138
100.
Where, as here, the prospective overruling involves a judicial interpretation of valid
legislation, there is a particular disregard for the Legislature's role.139 A court which declines to
apply its new interpretation of legislation to the facts before it is either suspending the application of
the meaning of the legislation — something which judges have no power to do — or it is giving the
legislation a judge-made meaning for the future different from the legislative meaning it applies to
the immediate case. The problems associated with this were emphasized in Spectrum by Lord Scott:
But where the issue is as to the meaning of and effect that should be given to a statutory
provision on which the rights of the litigating individuals turn, different considerations come
into play. It may be a function of judges incrementally to develop the common law, but it is a
duty of judges faithfully to interpret and apply the statutory law. This duty applies as much
to the "always speaking" statute as to other statutes. The notion that a judge could decide
what a statute meant and required and then announce that the effect of the ruling would
be postponed for some period or other seems to me inconsistent with that duty. It is for
Parliament, not judges, to decide when statutes are to come into effect. It is for judges to
interpret and apply the statutes. Where interpretation and application of a statute is the issue,
a prospective ruling would absent legislative authority... appear to constitute an improper
usurpation by the judiciary of the role of the legislature.
... [I] find myself unable to visualise circumstances in which it would be properfor a court,
having reached a conclusion as to the correct meaning of a statute, to decline to apply to the
case in hand the statute thus construed. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights 1688 declared that
"... the pretended power of suspending of laws or the execution of laws by regall
authority without consent of Parliament is Megan."
It is probably right that the exercise of judicial authority is not caught by the reference to
"regall authority" in the Bill of Rights but your Lordships in this House exercise an appellate
jurisdiction deriving from the Queen in Council and if the promoters of the Bill of Rights in
1688 had been asked whether there was a power in the House of Lords to suspend laws
Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at paras. 100, 107 and 117.
139 K. Roosevelt, "A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity" (1999) 31 Conn. L.
Rev. 1075 at 1076; M. Arden, "Prospective Overruling" 2004) 120 L.Q.R. 7 at 11; B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the
Common Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) at 215.
138
- 37 without the consent of Parliament I do not think it is difficult to guess what their answer
would have been.140
101.
Lord Nicholls in Spectrum also found this to be a problem of "particular substance":
...[T]he interpretation the court gives an Act of Parliament is the meaning which, in legal
concept, the statute has borne from the very day it went onto the statute book. So, it is said,
when your Lordships' House rules that a previous decision on the interpretation of a statutory
provision was wrong, there is no question of the House changing the law. The House is doing
no more than correcting] an error of interpretation. Thus, there should be no question of the
House overruling the previous decision with prospective effect only. If the House were to
take that course it would be sanctioning the continuing misapplication of the statute so far
as existing transactions or past events are concerned. The House, it is said, has no power to
do this. Statutes express the intention of Parliament. The courts must give effect to that
intention from the date the legislation came into force. The House, acting in its judicial
capacity, must give effect to the statute and it must do so in accordance with what it considers
is the proper interpretation of the statute. The House has no suspensive power in this regard.
141
102.
These comments in Spectrum were emphasized by the Court of Appeal in Progressive. 142
103.
Unlike the Constitution, ordinary legislation like the Rules of Civil Procedure is not a "living
tree".143 Its meaning does not change over time; only judicial interpretations of it do. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeal had no authority to suspend what it determined to be the true meaning of
amended Rule 20 in relation to Mr. Hryniak. In doing so, the Court arrogated to itself the legislative
powers of the Civil Rules Committee under s. 66 of the Courts of Justice Act, which specifically
declined to make the Rule 20 amendments prospective. Further, even that Committee cannot make
any rules of procedure unless they are "[s]ubject to the approval of the Attorney General", of which
there was none here.
140 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at paras. 125-126 (and 45 and 127), emphasis
added.
141 In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.) at para. 38 (and 39), emphasis added.
142 Ontario (Minister of Finance) v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. of Canada (2009), 309 D.L.R. (0)490 (Ont.
C.A.) at para. 57.
143 Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at paras. 94-95.
-38D.
104.
The Legislative Purposes and Administration of Justice Were Frustrated
Courts will also look to whether prospective overruling would advance the purposes of the
new legal rule.144 Indeed, some U.S. courts have said that this is the "foremost" factor in determining
whether a new rule should be given prospective application.145 The issue of whether prospective
overruling in that case would benefit the administration of justice has also been found relevant.I46
105.
In this case, the Court of Appeal itself recognized that resolving the Mauldin Action through
summary judgment would be contrary to the purposes of amended Rule 20:
The partial resolution of these two actions by way of summary judgment did not promote
the values underlying the amended Rule 20: better access to justice, proportionality and
costs savings. In a real sense the summary disposition had the opposite effect, as the length
of time taken to bring and argue the motions and the plaintiffs' bill of costs tellingly illustrate.
The motions, launched in 2008, were argued over four days in May and June 2010 and finally
decided in October 2010 - in short, close to three years from beginning to end. At the
conclusion of the motions, the plaintiffs submitted a bill of costs for $1.7 million. Moreover,
any efficiency achieved by the summary judgments was severely attenuated by the motion
judge's decision that a trial was needed to determine Peebles' liability.147
106.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal did not merely disregard the Legislature's role when
granting summary judgment against Mr. Hryniak, it frustrated the Legislature's purposes in enacting
the Rule 20 amendments as well. Its decision to do so was also inimical to the values underlying the
administration of justice itself, such as access to justice. Indeed, applying the new law to Mr.
Hryniak, a defendant, would not have denied any party access to justice; it would merely have
ensured that this case was adjudicated in the venue where it was fair and just for all: at a trial.
107.
The Court of Appeal even frustrated the purpose of the full appreciation test, which was to
ensure that the Rule 20.04(2.1) fact-finding powers are only used where a trial is unnecessary in the
"interest of justice".I48 By granting summary judgment against Mr. Hiyniak through use of those
powers, while at the same time acknowledging that a trial was necessary for it to fully appreciate the
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971); Canada (A.G.) v. Hyslop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 at para. 98.
145 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969).
146 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
148
144
-39evidence and issues in his case, the Court upheld a serious and final finding of fraud against Mr.
Hryniak that by its own admission was not based upon a just and fair adjudication of the case.149
PART IV—SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS
108.
Mr. Hryniak submits that he is entitled to costs.
PART V—ORDER SOUGHT
109.
Mr. Hryniak respectfully requests that the appeal be allowed, and the order granting summary
judgment against him be overturned.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of November, 2012.
Sarit E. Batner
Brandon Kain
149
Appeal Decision, paras. 37, 46, 53, 148 and 152.
PART VI-TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case
Paragraph(s)
referred to in
memorandum of
argument
A. v. Governor of Arbour Hill Prison, [2006] 4 I.R. 88 (Sup. Ct.).
53
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
78
AXA General Insurance Ltd. v. HMAdvocate, [2012] 1 A.C. 868.
52
Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. v. Ontario (2010), 101 O.R. (3d) 277 (S.C.J.).
9, 87
Baglow v. Smith (2012), 294 O.A.C. 24 (C.A.).
31
Birmingham Corp. v. West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association Inc.,
[1970] A.C. 874 (H.L.).
48
Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd.,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210.
70
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
61
British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473.
4, 35, 36, 40, 43,
45, 67, 68
Byfield v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2012 ONCA 49, [2012] O.J. No. 320
(QL)•
31
Cadder v. HMAdvocate, [2010] 1 W.L.R. 2601 (U.K.S.C.).
52, 53
Canada (A.G.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429.
25, 26, 39, 40,
41, 67, 77, 78,
81, 88, 96, 97,
99, 103, 104
Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, [2012] S.C.J. No. 43 (QL).
43, 44
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (A.G.), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 19.
68
Caton v. Devecseri Estate, 2012 ONCA 6, [2012] O.J. No. 84 (QL).
31, 33, 89
Chamberlains v. Lai, [2006] N.Z.S.C. 70.
55, 67, 71, 78, 91
2
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
58, 63, 77, 86,
88, 104
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940).
58
D. & F. Estates Ltd. v. Church Commissioners for England, [1989] A.C.
177 (H.L.).
48
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
61, 75
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
90, 104
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,
[2007] 1 A.C. 558 (H.L.).
52
Durham v. BAI (Run off) Ltd. (In Scheme of Arrangement), [2012] 1
W.L.R. 867 (U.K.S.C.).
26, 52
Edward v. Edward Estate (1987), 39 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (C.A.).
27, 46, 64, 67,
74, 76
Eicher v. Jones, 173 N.W. 2d 427 (1970).
95
Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29 (1924).
58
Friedmann Equity Developments Inc. v. Final Note Inc., [2000] 1 S.C.R.
842.
4, 37, 40, 43, 44,
45, 70
Gallant v. Roman Catholic Episcopal Corp. for Labrador/Diocese of
Labrador City-Schefferville (2001), 200 D.L.R. (4th) 643 (Nfld. C.A.).
46, 63
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
81
Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S.
358 (1932).
58
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
61
Ha v. New South Wales (1997), 189 C.L.R. 465 (H.C.A.).
54, 67
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
24, 45, 58, 61,
62, 63, 75, 93
Hindcastle Ltd. v. Barbara Attenborough Associates Ltd., [1997] A.C. 70
(H.L.).
48
3
Hladky v. Alberta (2005), 363 A.R. 375 (C.A.).
46
Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235.
94
In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (In Liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680 (H.L.).
29, 50, 51, 52,
68, 71, 78, 82,
90, 92, 100, 101,
102
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
26, 62, 68, 92
Jepsen v. Stilen, 133 Wis. 2d 35 (1986).
95
Jones v. Secretary of State for Social Services, [1972] A.C. 944 (H.L.).
76
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council, [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (H.L.).
24, 49
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910).
45
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
63
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
71
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405.
89
Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health), [2012] 1 S.C.R. 23.
11
Michalski v. Olson, [1998] 3 W.W.R. 37 (Man. C.A.), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 12.
47, 64
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 24 Il1.2d 467 (1962).
95
Murphy v. Attorney General, [1982] I.R. 241 (Sup. Ct.).
53
Onex Corp. v. American Home Assurance (2009), 100 O.R. (3d) 313
(S.C.J.).
87
Ontario (Minister of Finance) v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. of
Canada (2009), 309 D.L.R. (4th) 490 (Ont. C.A.).
24, 42, 46, 66,
69, 77, 78, 84,
102
R. v. B. (KG.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740.
38, 44, 66, 88
R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
38
R. v. Christmas, (2003), 216 N.S.R. (2d) 131 (C.A.).
46
R. v. Henry, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609.
43
4
R. v. Lloyd (1986), 17 O.A.C. 86 (C.A.).
46, 64
R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654.
66, 70
R. v. Sarson, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 223.
24, 61
R. v. Wigman, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 246.
24, 38
Re Application Under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] 2 S.C.R.
248.
85
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince
Edward Island, []998] 1 S.C.R. 3.
89
Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
24
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
62
Rodriguez De Quijas v. Sharson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989).
86
Rudderham v. Folkes, 2012 ONCA 603, [2012] O.J. No. 4281 (QL).
32
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
83
Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate of Alhamid, [2006] 56, 57, 71, 72,
1 Isr. L.R. 201 (Sup. Ct.).
74, 76, 78, 83
Stewart v. Stewart (1997), 145 D.L.R. (4th) 228 (B.C.C.A.).
46, 64, 76
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
59, 77, 90, 104
T.L.B. v. R.E.C., [2000] 11 W.W.R. 436 (Man. C.A.), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 663.
46, 64
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
61
Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v. Revenue and Customs
Comrs, [2012] 2 W.L.R. 1149 (U.K.S.C.).
52
U.S. v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286 (1970).
84
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
61
Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750.
66, 70
B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1921).
81
-5
B. Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2008).
52, 65, 67, 68,
71, 72, 90, 92,
100
B.S. Shannon, "The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial
Decisions" (2003) 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 811.
65
C. Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006).
63
G. Ghatan, "The Incentive Problem With Prospective Overruling: A
Critique of the Practice" (2010) 45 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 179.
65
J.A. Coutts, "The Retrospective Operation of Judicial Decisions" (2001)
65(1) J. Crim. L. 59.
65
J.E. Fisch, "Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach"
(1997) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1056.
81
J.M. Finnis, "The Fairy Tale's Moral" (1999) 115 L.Q.R. 170.
65
K. Mason, "Prospective Overruling" (1989) 63 Aust. L.J. 526.
40
K. Roosevelt, "A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of
Adjudicative Retroactivity" (1999) 31 Conn. L. Rev. 1075.
65, 100
L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv. L.
Rev. 353.
65, 73
Lord Devlin, "Judges and Lawmakers" (1976) 39 Mod. L. Rev. 1.
65, 72
Lord Reid, "The Judge as Law Maker" (1972) 12 J.S.P.T.L. 22.
65
M. Arden, "Prospective Overruling" 2004) 120 L.Q.R. 7.
100
M.D.A. Freeman, "Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law-Making and
Prospective Overruling" (1973) C.L.P. 166.
65, 71, 73
M. L. Friedland, "Prospective and Retrospective Judicial Lawmaking"
(1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 170.
24, 29, 40, 75
M.P. Harrington, "Foreword: The Dual Dichotomy of Retroactive
Lawmaking" (1997) 3 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 19.
63, 65
P. Weiler, "Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making" (1970) 48 Can.
Bar. Rev. 1.
65, 71, 73, 74,
90, 92
P.B. Hasler, "Retroactivity Rethought: The Hidden Costs" (1972) 24
Maine L. Rev. 1.
65, 75
P.J. Mishkin, "Foreward: The High Court, the Great Writ and the Due
Process of Time and Law" (1965) 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56.
26, 65, 71, 72, 74
W. Friedman, "Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective
Overruling" (1966) 29 Mod. L. Rev. 593.
67
W.V. Schaefer, "Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives" (1982) Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1.
65
7
PART VII-STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND RULES
Courts" of Justice Act - R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194
Page 1 of 17
Courts of Justice Act
R.R.O. 1990, REGULATION 194
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Consolidation Period: From July 1, 2012 to the e-Laws currency date.
Last amendment: 0. Reg. 55/12.
This is the English version of a bilingual regulation.
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
GENERAL MATTERS
Rule
1
2
3
4
4.1
Citation, Application and Interpretation
Non-Compliance with the Rules
Time
Court Documents
Duty of Expert
5
6
6.1
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
PARTIES AND JOINDER
Joinder of Claims and Parties
Consolidation or Hearing Together
Separate Hearings
Parties under Disability
Partnerships and Sole Proprietorships
Estates and Trusts
Representation Order
Transfer or Transmission of Interest
Class Proceedings and Other Representative Proceedings
Intervention
13.1
14
15
COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
Place of Commencement and Hearing or Trial
Originating Process
Representation by Lawyer
16
17
18
SERVICE
Service of Documents
Service outside Ontario
Time for Delivery of Statement of Defence
19
20
21
22
23
24
24.1
DISPOSITION WITHOUT TRIAL
Default Proceedings
Summary Judgment
Determination of an Issue Before Trial
Special Case
Discontinuance and Withdrawal
Dismissal of Action for Delay
Mandatory Mediation
25
26
27
PLEADINGS
Pleadings in an Action
Amendment of Pleadings
Counterclaim
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws_regs_900194_e.htm
11/16/12
Courts of Justice Act - R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194
28
29
Crossclaim
Third Party Claim
29.1
29.2
30
30.1
31
32
33
DISCOVERY
Discovery Plan
Proportionality in Discovery
Discovery of Documents
Deemed Undertaking
Examination for Discovery
Inspection of Property
Medical Examination of Parties
36
EXAMINATIONS OUT OF COURT
Procedure on Oral Examinations
Procedure on Examination for Discovery by Written
Questions
Taking Evidence Before Trial
37
38
39
MOTIONS AND APPLICATIONS
Motions — Jurisdiction and Procedure
Applications — Jurisdiction and Procedure
Evidence on Motions and Applications
34
35
40
41
42
43
44
45
Page 2 of 17
PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS IN PENDING
LITIGATION
Interlocutory Injunction or Mandatory Order
Appointment of Receiver
Certificate of Pending Litigation
Interpleader
Interim Recovery of Personal Property
Interim Preservation of Property
46
47
48
49
50
51
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURES
Place of Trial
Jury Notice
Listing for Trial
Offer to Settle
Pre-Trial Conference
Admissions
52
53
Trial Procedure
Evidence at Trial
54
55
REFERENCES
Directing a Reference
Procedure on a Reference
56
57
58
COSTS
Security for Costs
Costs of Proceedings
Assessment of Costs
59
60
ORDERS
Orders
Enforcement of Orders
61
62
APPEALS
Appeals to an Appellate Court
Appeals from Interlocutory Orders and Other Appeals to a
TRIALS
11/16/12
63
Page 3 of 17
Judge
Stay Pending Appeal
PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
Mortgage Actions
Proceedings for Administration
Partition Proceedings
Proceedings Concerning the Estates of Minors
Proceedings for Judicial Review
Payment into and out of Court
Reciprocal Enforcement of United Kingdom Judgments
Estates — Non-Contentious Proceedings
Estates — Contentious Proceedings
Mandatory Mediation — Estates, Trusts and Substitute
Decisions
Simplified Procedure
76
77
Civil Case Management
TABLE OF FORMS
TARIFF A Lawyers' Fees and Disbursements Allowable Under
Rules 57.01 and 58.05
TARIFF C Lawyers' Costs Allowed on Passing of Accounts
without a Hearing
64
65
66
67
68
72
73
74
75
75.1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GENERAL MATTERS
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.08.1
1.09
RULE 1 CITATION, APPLICATION AND
INTERPRETATION
Citation
Application of Rules
Definitions
Interpretation
Orders on Terms
Forms
Practice Directions
Telephone and Video Conferences
Video Conference — References Under the Solicitors
Act
Communications out of Court
RULE 2 NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES
Effect of Non-Compliance
2.01
Attacking Irregularity
2.02
Court May Dispense with Compliance
2.03
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
4.01
4.02
4.02.1
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.05.1
4.06
RULE 3 TIME
Computation
Extension or Abridgment
When Proceedings May be Heard
Timetables
RULE 4 COURT DOCUMENTS
Format
Contents
Bilingual Documents
Certified Copies of Court Documents
Notice to be Given in Writing or Electronically
Issuing and Filing of Documents
Electronic Documents
Affidavits
11/16/12
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
4.11
Binding of Documents
Requisition
Transcripts
Transmission of Documents
Notice of Constitutional Question
4.1.01
RULE 4.1 DUTY OF EXPERT
Duty of Expert
Page 4 of 17
PARTIES AND JOINDER
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
RULE 5 JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND PARTIES
Joinder of Claims
Joinder of Parties
Joinder of Necessary Parties
Misjoinder, Non-Joinder and Parties Incorrectly Named
Relief against Joinder
RULE 6 CONSOLIDATION OR HEARING TOGETHER
Where Order May be Made
6.01
Discretion of Presiding Judge
6.02
6.1.01
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.07.1
7.08
7.09
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
9.01
9.02
9.03
10.01
10.02
10.03
RULE 6.1 SEPARATE HEARINGS
Separate Hearings
RULE 7 PARTIES UNDER DISABILITY
Representation by Litigation Guardian
Litigation Guardian for Plaintiff or Applicant
Litigation Guardian for Defendant or Respondent
Representation of Persons under Disability
Powers and Duties of Litigation Guardian
Removal or Substitution of Litigation Guardian
Noting Party under Disability in Default
Discontinuance by or Against Party under Disability
Approval of Settlement
Money to be Paid into Court
RULE 8 PARTNERSHIPS AND SOLE
PROPRIETORSHIPS
Partnerships
Defence
Notice to Alleged Partner where Enforcement Sought
against Partner
Person Defending Separately
Disclosure of Partners
Enforcement of Order
Sole Proprietorships
RULE 9 ESTATES AND TRUSTS
Proceedings by or against Executor, Administrator or
Trustee
Proceeding against Estate that has no Executor or
Administrator
Remedial Provisions
RULE 10 REPRESENTATION ORDER
Representation of an Interested Person who cannot be
Ascertained
Representation of a Deceased Person
Relief from Binding Effect of Order
11/16/12
Page 5 of 17
RULE 11 TRANSFER OR TRANSMISSION OF
INTEREST
Effect of Transfer or Transmission
11.01
11.02
Order to Continue
Failure to Obtain Order to Continue Action
11.03
RULE 12 CLASS PROCEEDINGS AND OTHER
REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Definitions
12.01
Title of Proceeding
12.02
Discovery of Class Members
12.03
12.04
Costs
Contents of Judgments and Orders
12.05
Leave to Appeal
12.06
Proceeding against Representative Defendant
12.07
Proceeding by Unincorporated Association or Trade
12.08
Union
RULE 13 INTERVENTION
Leave to Intervene as Added Party
Leave to Intervene as Friend of the Court
Leave to Intervene in Divisional Court or Court of
Appeal
13.01
13.02
13.03
COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
RULE 13.1 PLACE OF COMMENCEMENT AND
HEARING OR TRIAL
Place of Commencement
13.1.01
Transfer
13.1.02
14.01
14.02
14.03
14.03.1
14.05
14.06
14.07
14.08
14.09
14.10
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.04
15.05
15.06
15.07
RULE 14 ORIGINATING PROCESS
How Proceedings Commenced
Proceedings by Action as General Rule
Actions - By Statement of Claim or Notice of Action
Ordinary and Simplified Procedure
Applications - By Notice of Application
Title of Proceeding
How Originating Process Issued
Time for Service in Actions
Striking out or Amending
Dismissal of Action where Defendant Pays Claim
RULE 15 REPRESENTATION BY LAWYER
Where Lawyer is Required
Notice of Authority to Commence Proceeding
Change in Representation by Party
Motion by Lawyer for Removal as Lawyer of Record
Duty of Lawyer of Record
Where a Lawyer of Record has Ceased to Practise
Lawyer from Another Province
SERVICE
16.01
16.02
16.03
16.04
RULE 16 SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS
General Rules for Manner of Service
Personal Service
Alternatives to Personal Service
Substituted Service or Dispensing with Service
11/16/12
16.05
16.06
16.07
16.08
16.09
17.01
17.02
17.03
17.04
17.05
17.06
Page 6 of 17
Service on Lawyer of Record
Service by Mail
Where Document does not Reach Person Served
Validating Service
Proof of Service
RULE 17 SERVICE OUTSIDE ONTARIO
Definition
Service outside Ontario without Leave
Service outside Ontario with Leave
Additional Requirements for Service outside Ontario
Manner of Service outside Ontario
Motion to Set Aside Service outside Ontario
RULE 18 TIME FOR DELIVERY OF STATEMENT OF
DEFENCE
Time for Delivery of Statement of Defence
18.01
Notice of Intent to Defend
18.02
DISPOSITION WITHOUT TRIAL
19.01
19.02
19.03
19.04
19.05
19.06
19.07
19.08
19.09
RULE 19 DEFAULT PROCEEDINGS
Noting Default
Consequences of Noting Default
Setting Aside the Noting of Default
By Signing Default Judgment
By Motion for Judgment
Facts Must Entitle Plaintiff to Judgment
Effect of Default Judgment
Setting Aside Default Judgment
Application to Counterclaims, Crossclaims and Third
Party Claims
20.01
20.02
20.03
20.04
20.05
20.06
20.07
20.08
20.09
RULE 20 SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Where Available
Evidence on Motion
Factums Required
Disposition of Motion
Where Trial is Necessary
Costs Sanctions for Improper Use of Rule
Effect of Summary Judgment
Stay of Execution
Party Claims
RULE 21 DETERMINATION OF AN ISSUE BEFORE
TRIAL
Where Available
21.01
Motion to be Made Promptly
21.02
Factums Required
21.03
22.01
22.02
22.03
22.04
22.05
RULE 22 SPECIAL CASE
Where Available
Factums Required
Removal into Court of Appeal
Form of Special Case
Hearing of Special Case
RULE 23 DISCONTINUANCE AND WITHDRAWAL
Discontinuance by Plaintiff
23.01
Effect of Discontinuance on Counterclaim
23.02
11/16/12
23.03
23.04
23.05
23.06
23.07
Page 7 of 17
Effect of Discontinuance on Crossclaim or Third Party
Claim
Effect of Discontinuance on Subsequent Action
Costs of Discontinuance, Deemed Dismissal
Withdrawal by Defendant
Party Claims
RULE 24 DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR DELAY
24.01
Where Available
24.02
Notice Where Plaintiff under Disability
24.02.1
Notice of Order
24.03
Effect of Dismissal on Counterclaim
24.04
Effect of Dismissal on Crossclaim or Third Party Claim
24.05
Effect on Subsequent Action
24.05.1
Costs of Dismissal, Deemed Dismissal
24.06
Party Claims
24.1.01
24.1.02
24.1.03
24.1.04
24.1.05
24.1.06
24.1.07
24.1.08
24.1.09
24.1.10
24.1.11
24.1.12
24.1.13
24.1.14
24.1.15
24.1.16
RULE 24.1 MANDATORY MEDIATION
Purpose
Nature of Mediation
Definitions
Application
Exemption from Mediation
Mediation Co-ordinator
Local Mediation Committees
Mediators
Mediation Session
Procedure before Mediation Session
Attendance at Mediation Session
Failure to Attend
Non-Compliance
Confidentiality
Outcome of Mediation
Consent Order for Additional Mediation Session
PLEADINGS
25.01
25.02
25.03
25.04
25.05
25.06
25.07
25.08
25.09
25.10
25.11
RULE 25 PLEADINGS IN AN ACTION
Pleadings Required or Permitted
Form of Pleadings
Service of Pleadings
Time For Delivery of Pleadings
Close of Pleadings
Rules of Pleading — Applicable to All Pleadings
Rules of Pleading — Applicable to Defences
Where a Reply is Necessary
Rules of Pleading — Applicable to Replies
Particulars
Striking Out a Pleading or Other Document
26.01
26.02
26.03
26.04
26.05
26.06
RULE 26 AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS
General Power of Court
When Amendments May be Made
How Amendments Made
Service of Amended Pleading
Responding to an Amended Pleading
Amendment at Trial
27.01
RULE 27 COUNTERCLAIM
Where Available
11/16/12
27.02
27.03
27.04
27.05
27.06
27.07
27.08
27.09
27.10
28.01
28.02
28.03
28.04
28.05
28.06
28.07
28.08
28.09
28.10
28.11
29.01
29.02
29.03
29.04
29.05
29.06
29.07
29,08
29.09
29.10
29.11
29.12
29.13
29.14
Page 8 of 17
Statement of Defence and Counterclaim
Counterclaim to be Issued where Defendant to
Counterclaim not already Party to Main Action
Time for Delivery or Service of Defence and
Counterclaim
Time for Delivery of Defence to Counterclaim
Time for Delivery of Reply to Defence to Counterclaim
Amending Defence to Add Counterclaim
Trial of Counterclaim
Disposition of Counterclaim
Party Claims
RULE 28 CROSSCLAIM
Where Available
Statement of Defence and Crossclaim
Amending Defence to Add Crossclaim
Time for Delivery of Statement of Defence and
Crossclaim
Time for Delivery of Defence to Crossclaim
Contents of Defence to Crossclaim
Effect of Default of Defence to Crossclaim
Time for Delivery of Reply to Defence to Crossclaim
Trial of Crossclaim
Prejudice or Delay to Plaintiff
Application to Counterclaims and Third Party Claims
RULE 29 THIRD PARTY CLAIM
Where Available
Time for Third Party Claim
Third Party Defence
Reply to Third Party Defence
Defence of Main Action by Third Party
Effect of Third Party Defence
Effect of Default of Third Party
Trial of Third Party Claim
Prejudice or Delay to Plaintiff
Third Party Directions
Fourth and Subsequent Party Claims
Application to Fourth and Subsequent Party Claims
Application to Counterclaims and Crossclaims
File Number
DISCOVERY
29.1.01
29.1.02
29.1.03
29.1.04
29.1.05
RULE 29.1 DISCOVERY PLAN
Non-Application of Rule
Definition
Discovery Plan
Duty to Update Plan
Failure to Agree to Plan
RULE 29.2 PROPORTIONALITY IN DISCOVERY
Definition
29.2.01
Application
29.2.02
29.2.03
Considerations
30.01
30.02
30.03
30.04
RULE 30 DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS
Interpretation
Scope of Documentary Discovery
Affidavit of Documents
Inspection of Documents
http://vvww.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws_regs_900194_e.htm
11/16/12
30.05
30.06
30.07
30.08
30.09
30.10
30.11
30.1.01
Page 9 of 17
Disclosure or Production not Admission of Relevance
Where Affidavit Incomplete or Privilege Improperly
Claimed
Documents or Errors Subsequently Discovered
Effect of Failure to Disclose or Produce for Inspection
Privileged Document Not to be Used Without Leave
Production from Non-Parties With Leave
Document Deposited for Safe Keeping
RULE 30.1 DEEMED UNDERTAKING
Application
RULE 31 EXAMINATION FOR DISCOVERY
31.01
Definition
31.02
Form of Examination
31.03
Who May Examine and be Examined
When Examination may be Initiated
31.04
Oral Examination by More Than One Party
31.05
31.05.1
Time Limit
Scope of Examination
31.06
Failure to Answer on Discovery
31.07
31.08
Effect of Lawyer Answering
31.09
Information Subsequently Obtained
Discovery of Non-Parties with Leave
31.10
Use of Examination for Discovery at Trial
31.11
32.01
RULE 32 INSPECTION OF PROPERTY
Order for Inspection
RULE 33 MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF PARTIES
Motion for Medical Examination
33.01
Order for Examination
33.02
Dispute as to Scope of Examination
33.03
Provision of Information to Party Obtaining Order
33.04
Who May Attend on Examination
33.05
Medical Reports
33.06
Penalty for Failure to Comply
33.07
Examination by Consent
33.08
EXAMINATIONS OUT OF COURT
RULE 34 PROCEDURE ON ORAL EXAMINATIONS
Application of the Rule
34.01
Before Whom to be Held
34.02
Place of Examination
34.03
How Attendance Required
34.04
Notice of Time and Place
34.05
Examinations on Consent
34.06
Where Person to be Examined Resides outside Ontario
34.07
Person to be Examined to be Sworn
34.08
34.09
Interpreter
Production of Documents on Examination
34.10
Re-Examination
34.11
34.12
Objections and Rulings
Improper Conduct of Examination
34.14
Sanctions for Default or Misconduct by Person to be
34.15
Examined
34.16
Examination to be Recorded
Typewritten Transcript
34.17
Filing of Transcript
34.18
Videotaping or Other Recording of Examination
34.19
11/16/12
Page 10 of 17
RULE 35 I'ROCEDURE ON EXAMINATION FOR
DISCOVERY BY WRITTEN QUESTIONS
Questions
35.01
35.02
Answers
Objections
35.03
35.04
Failure to Answer
Improper Conduct of Examination
35.05
Filing Questions and Answers
35.06
RULE 36 TAKING EVIDENCE BEFORE TRIAL
36.01
Where Available
Procedure
36.02
36.03
Examinations outside Ontario
Use at Trial
36.04
MOTIONS AND APPLICATIONS
RULE 37 MOTIONS - JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE
Notice of Motion
37.01
Jurisdiction to Hear a Motion
37.02
Place of Hearing of Motions
37.03
Motions - To Whom to be Made
37.04
Hearing Date for Motions
37.05
Content of Notice
37.06
Service of Notice
37.07
Filing of Notice of Motion
37.08
Abandoned Motions
37.09
Material for Use on Motions
37.10
Confirmation of Motion
37.10.1
Hearing in Absence of Public
37.11
Hearing Without Oral Argument
37.12.1
37.13
Setting Aside, Varying or Amending Orders
37.14
Motions in a Complicated Proceeding or Series of
37.15
Proceedings
Prohibiting Motions without Leave
37.16
Motion Before Commencement of Proceeding
37.17
RULE 38 APPLICATIONS - JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE
38.01
Applications - To Whom to be Made
38.02
Place and Date of Hearing
38.03
Content of Notice
38.04
Issuing of Notice
38.05
Service of Notice
38.06
Notice of Appearance
38.07
Abandoned Applications
38.08
Material for Use on Application
38.09
Confirmation of Application
38.09.1
Disposition of Application
38.10
Setting Aside Judgment on Application Made Without
38.11
Notice
39.01
39.02
39.03
39.04
RULE 39 EVIDENCE ON MOTIONS AND
APPLICATIONS
Evidence by Affidavit
Evidence by Cross-Examination on Affidavit
Evidence by Examination of a Witness
Evidence by Examination for Discovery
11/16/12
Page 11 of 17
PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS IN PENDING
LITIGATION
RULE 40 INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION OR
MANDATORY ORDER
40.01
How Obtained
40.02
Where Motion Made Without Notice
40.03
Undertaking
40.04
Factums Required
41.01
41.02
41.03
41.04
41.05
41.06
RULE 41 APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER
Definition
How Obtained
Form of Order
Reference of Conduct of Receivership
Directions
Discharge
RULE 42 CERTIFICATE OF PENDING LITIGATION
Issuing of Certificate
42.01
42.02
Discharge of Certificate
43.01
43.02
43.03
43.04
RULE 43 INTERPLEADER
General
Where Available
How Obtained
Disposition
RULE 44 INTERIM RECOVERY OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY
44.01
Motion for Interim Order
Order to Contain Description and Value of Property
44.02
44.03
44.04
Condition and Form of Security
Setting Aside Order
44.05
Release of Security
44.06
Duty of Sheriff
44.07
Where Defendant Prevents Recovery
44.08
RULE 45 INTERIM PRESERVATION OF PROPERTY
Interim Order for Preservation or Sale
45.01
Specific Fund
45.02
Recovery of Personal Property Held as Security
45.03
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURES
46.01
RULE 46 PLACE OF TRIAL
County Where Proceeding Commenced or Transferred
47.01
47.02
RULE 47 JURY NOTICE
Actions to be Tried With a Jury
Striking Out Jury Notice
48.01
48.02
48.03
48.04
48.05
RULE 48 LISTING FOR TRIAL
When and by Whom Action May be Set Down for Trial
How Action is Set Down for Trial
Trial Record
Consequences of Setting Down or Consent
11/16/12
48.06
48.07
48.08
48.09
48.10
48.11
48.12
48.13
48.14
48.15
49.01
49.02
49.03
49.04
49.05
49.06
49.07
49.08
49.09
49.10
49.11
49.12
49.13
49.14
50.01
50.02
50.03
50.04
50.05
50.06
50.07
50.08
50.09
50.10
50.11
50.12
51.01
51.02
51.03
51.04
51.05
51.06
Page 12 of 17
Placing Undefended Action on Trial List
Placing Defended Action on Trial List
Consequences of Action Being Placed on Trial List
Separate Trial Lists
Separate Speedy Trial List
Actions Traversed or Remaining on List at Conclusion
of Sitting
Actions Struck Off Trial List
Duty to Inform Registrar of Settlement
Action Not on Trial List
Action Abandoned
RULE 49 OFFER TO SETTLE
Definitions
Where Available
Time for Making Offer
Withdrawal or Expiry of Offer
Effect of Offer
Disclosure of Offer to Court
Acceptance of Offer
Parties under Disability
Failure to Comply with Accepted Offer
Costs Consequences of Failure to Accept
Multiple Defendants
Offer to Contribute
Discretion of Court
Party Claims
RULE 50 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
Purpose
Pre-Trial Conferences for Actions
Pre-Trial Conferences for Applications
Materials to be Filed
Attendance
Matters to be Considered
Powers
Pre-Trial Conference Report
No Disclosure
Pre-Trial Judge not to Preside at Hearing
Documents to be Made Available
Costs of Pre-Trial Conference
RULE 51 ADMISSIONS
Interpretation
Request to Admit Fact or Document
Effect of Request to Admit
Costs on Refusal to Admit
Withdrawal of Admission
Order Based on Admission of Fact or Document
TRIALS
52.01
52.02
52.03
52.04
52.05
52.06
52.07
RULE 52 TRIAL PROCEDURE
Failure to Attend at Trial
Adjournment of Trial
Court Appointed Experts
Exhibits
View by Judge or Jury
Exclusion of Witnesses
Order of Presentation in Jury Trials
11/16/12
52.08
52.09
52.10
53.01
53.02
53.03
53.04
53.05
53.06
53.07
53.08
53.09
53.10
Page 13 of 17
Disagreement of the Jury
Recording Jury Verdict
Failure to Prove a Fact or Document
RULE 53 EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
Evidence by Witnesses
Evidence by Affidavit
Expert Witnesses
Compelling Attendance at Trial
Interprovincial Subpoena
Compelling Attendance of Witness in Custody
Calling Adverse Party as Witness
Evidence Admissible only with Leave
Calculation of Awards for Future Pecuniary Damages
Prejudgment Interest Rate for Non-Pecuniary Damages
REFERENCES
54.01
54.02
54.03
54.04
54.05
54.06
54.07
54.08
54.09
54.10
55.01
55.02
55.03
55.04
55.05
55.06
55.07
RULE 54 DIRECTING A REFERENCE
Application of Rules 54 and 55
Where Reference May be Directed
To Whom Reference May be Directed
Order Directing a Reference
Motions on a Reference
Report on Reference
Report Must be Confirmed
Confirmation on Motion where Report Back Required
Confirmation by Passage of Time where Report Back
not Required
Referee Unable to Continue or Complete Reference
RULE 55 PROCEDURE ON A REFERENCE
General Provisions for Conduct of Reference
Procedure on a Reference Generally
Procedure to Ascertain Interested Persons and Verify
Claims
Procedure on Taking of Accounts
Direction for Payment of Money
Reference for Conduct of Sale
Reference to Appoint Guardian or Receiver
COSTS
56.01
56.02
56.03
56.04
56.05
56.06
56.07
56.08
56.09
57.01
57.02
57.03
57.04
57.05
RULE 56 SECURITY FOR COSTS
Where Available
Declaration of Plaintiff's or Applicant's Place of
Residence
Motion for Security
Amount and Form of Security and Time for Furnishing
Form and Effect of Order
Default of Plaintiff or Applicant
Amount May be Varied
Notice of Compliance
Security for Costs as Term of Relief
RULE 57 COSTS OF PROCEEDINGS
General Principles
Directions to Assessment Officer
Costs of a Motion
Costs on Settlement
Costs where Action Brought in Wrong Court
11/16/12
57.06
57.07
58.01
58.02
58.03
58.04
58.05
58.06
58.07
58.08
58.09
58.10
58.11
58.12
58.13
Page 14 of 17
Costs of Litigation Guardian
Liability of Lawyer for Costs
RULE 58 ASSESSMENT OF COSTS
General
Who May Assess Costs
Assessment at Instance of Party Entitled
Assessment at Instance of Party Liable
Assessment in Accordance with Tariffs
Factors to be Considered on Assessment
Costs of Abandoned Proceeding
Costs of Particular Proceedings
Certificate of Assessment
Objections to Assessment
Appeal from Assessment
Costs of a Sheriff
Costs Fixed by Registrar
ORDERS
59.01
59.02
59.03
59.04
59.05
59.06
59.07
RULE 59 ORDERS
Effective Date
Endorsement by Judge or Officer
Preparation and Form of Order
Signing Orders
Entry of Order
Amending, Setting Aside or Varying Order
Satisfaction of Order
RULE 60 ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS
Definitions
Enforcement of Order for Payment or Recovery of
Money
Enforcement of Order for Possession of Land
60.03
Enforcement of Order for Recovery of Personal
60.04
Property
Enforcement of Order to Do or Abstain From Doing any
60.05
Act
Enforcement by or against a Person Not a Party
60.06
Writ of Seizure and Sale
60.07
Warrant Issued by Minister of Finance
60.07.1
Garnishment
60.08
Writ of Sequestration
60.09
60.10
Writ of Possession
60.11
Contempt Order
Failure to Comply with Interlocutory Order
60.12
Dispute of Ownership of Property Seized by Sheriff
60.13
Sheriff's Report on Execution of Writ
60.14
Removal or Withdrawal of Writ from Sheriff's File
60.15
Duty of Person Filing Writ with Sheriff
60.16
Motion for Directions
60.17
Examination in Aid of Execution
60.18
Costs of Enforcement
60.19
60.01
60.02
APPEALS
RULE 61 APPEALS TO AN APPELLATE COURT
61.01
Definition
61.02
61.03
Motion for Leave to Appeal to Divisional Court
Motion for Leave to Appeal to Court of Appeal
61.03.1
Commencement of Appeals
61.04
11/16/12
61.05
61.06
61.07
61.08
61.09
61.10
61.10.1
61.11
61.12
61.13
61.13.1
61.14
61.15
61.16
Page 15 of 17
Certificate or Agreement Respecting Evidence
Security for Costs of Appeal
Cross-Appeals
Amendment of Notice of Appeal or Cross-Appeal
Perfecting Appeals
Appeal Book and Compendium
Exhibit Book
Appellant's Factum
Respondent's Factum and Compendium
Dismissal for Delay
Failure to Obtain Order to Continue Appeal
Abandoned Appeals
Cross-Appeal where Appeal Dismissed for Delay or
Abandoned
Motions in Appellate Court
RULE 62 APPEALS FROM INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERS AND OTHER APPEALS TO A JUDGE
Procedure on Appeal
62.01
Motion for Leave to Appeal
62.02
63.01
63.02
63.03
RULE 63 STAY PENDING APPEAL
Automatic Stay on Delivery of Notice of Appeal
Stay by Order
Effect of Stay
PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
64.01
64.02
64.03
64.04
64.05
64.06
RULE 64 MORTGAGE ACTIONS
Definition
Default Judgment with Reference
Foreclosure Actions
Sale Actions
Redemption Actions
Procedure on Mortgage References Generally
RULE 65 PROCEEDINGS FOR ADMINISTRATION
Where Available
65.01
Where a Reference is Directed
65.02
66.01
66.02
66.03
RULE 66 PARTITION PROCEEDINGS
Where Available
Form of Judgment
Proceeds of Sale
RULE 67 PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE
ESTATES OF MINORS
How Commenced
67.01
Affidavit in Support
67.02
Where Consent Required
67.03
RULE 68 PROCEEDINGS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
How Commenced
68.01
Applicable Procedure
68.02
Hearing Date in Divisional Court
68.03
Application Records and Factums
68.04
Certificate of Perfection
68.05
68.06
Dismissal for Delay
RULE 72 PAYMENT INTO AND OUT OF COURT
11/16/12
72.01
72.02
72.03
72.04
72.05
Page 16 of 17
Definitions
Payment into Court
Payment out of Court
Discharge of a Mortgage
Stop Order
RULE 73 RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED
KINGDOM JUDGMENTS
Definitions
73.01
Application for Registration of Judgment
73.02
Enforcement of Judgment
73.03
RULE 74 ESTATES - NON-CONTENTIOUS
PROCEEDINGS
74.01
Definitions
74.02
Deposit of Wills and Codicils for Safekeeping
Request for Notice of Commencement of Proceeding
74.03
Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee With a
74.04
Will
74.05
Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee Without a
Will
74.05.1
Certificate of Appointment of Foreign Estate Trustee's
Nominee as Estate Trustee Without a Will
Certificate of Appointment of Succeeding Estate
74.06
Trustee With a Will
Certificate of Appointment of Succeeding Estate
74.07
Trustee Without a Will
Confirmation by Resealing of Appointment of Estate
74.08
Trustee With or Without a Will
Certificate of Ancillary Appointment of Estate Trustee
74.09
With a Will
Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee during
74.10
Litigation
Bonds
74.11
General Procedure on Applications for Certificates of
74.12
Appointment of Estate Trustees
Deposit Equal to Tax
74.13
Issuing Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee
74.14
Orders for Assistance
74.15
74.16
Passing of Estate Accounts
74.17
Form of Accounts
Application to Pass Accounts
74.18
RULE 75 ESTATES -CONTENTIOUS PROCEEDINGS
75.01
Formal Proof of Testamentary Instrument
75.02
Proof of Lost or Destroyed Will
Objection to Issuing Certificate of Appointment
75.03
Revocation of Certificate of Appointment
75.04
75.05
Return of Certificate
75.06
Application or Motion for Directions
Procedure Where Statement of Claim Served
75.07
75.07.1
Submission of Rights to Court
Claims Against an Estate
75.08
75.09
Lawyer of Record
RULE 75.1 MANDATORY MEDIATION - ESTATES,
TRUSTS AND SUBSTITUTE DECISIONS
75.1.02
Scope
Definitions
75.1.03
Exemption From Mediation
75.1.04
75.1.05
Directions for Conduct of Mediation
75.1.06
Mediators
75.1.07
Choice of Mediator
http ://www. e-laws gov . on. ca/html/regs/engl i sh/el aws_regs900194_e. htm
11/16/12
75.1.08
75.1.09
75.1.10
75.1.11
75.1.12
75.1.13
76.01
76.02
76.03
76.04
76.05
76.08
76.09
76.10
76.11
76.12
76.13
77.01
77.02
77.03
77.04
77.05
77.06
77.07
77.08
77.09
Page 17 of 17
Procedure Before Mediation Session
Attendance at Mediation Session
Remedy for Non-Compliance
Confidentiality
Outcome of Mediation
Consent Order for Additional Mediation Session
RULE 76 SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE
Application of Rule
Availability of Simplified Procedure
Affidavit of Documents
No Written Discovery, Cross-Examination on an
Affidavit or Examination of a Witness
Motions
Settlement Discussion and Documentary Disclosure
How Defended Action is Set Down for Trial or
Summary Trial
Pre-Trial Conference
Placing Defended Action on Trial List
Summary Trial
Costs Consequences
RULE 77 CIVIL CASE MANAGEMENT
Purpose and General Principles
Application
Definitions
Case Management Powers
Assignment for Case Management
Assignment to Individual Management by a Judge
Motions
Case Conference
Transition
http://wvvw.e-laws.gov.on.ea/html/regs/english/elaws_regs_900194_e.htm
11/16/12
Page 1 of 3
DEFINITIONS
1.03 (1) In these rules, unless the context requires otherwise,
"action" means a proceeding that is not an application and includes a proceeding commenced
by,
(a) statement of claim,
(b) notice of action,
(c) counterclaim,
(d) crossclaim, or
(e) third or subsequent party claim; ("action")
"appellant" means a person who brings an appeal; ("appelant")
"appellate court" means the Court.of Appeal or the Divisional Court, as the circumstances
require; ("tribunal d'appel")
"applicant" means a person who makes an application; ("requerant")
"application" means a proceeding commenced by notice of application; ("requ'ete")
"county" includes a district, a regional or district municipality, and the City of Toronto;
("comte")
"court" means the court in which a proceeding is pending and, in the case of a proceeding in
the Superior Court of Justice, includes,
(a) a master having jurisdiction to hear motions under Rule 37, and
(b) a case management master; ("tribunal")
"defendant" means a person against whom an action is commenced; ("defendeur")
"deliver" means serve and file with proof of service, and "delivery" has a corresponding
meaning; ("remettre", "remise")
"disability", where used in respect of a person, means that the person is,
(a) a minor,
(b) mentally incapable within the meaning of section 6 or 45 of the Substitute Decisions
Act, 1992 in respect of an issue in the proceeding, whether the person has a guardian
or not, or
(c) an absentee within the meaning of the Absentees Act; ("incapable", "incapacite")
"discovery" means discovery of documents, examination for discovery, inspection of property
and medical examination of a party as provided under Rules 30 to 33; ("enquete
prealable")
"document" includes data and information in electronic form; ("document")
"electronic" includes created, recorded, transmitted or stored in digital form or in other
intangible form by electronic, magnetic or optical means or by any other means that has
capabilities for creation, recording, transmission or storage similar to those means, and
"electronically" has a corresponding meaning; ("electronique", "par voie electronique")
11/16/12
Page 2 of 3
"hearing" means the hearing of an application, motion, reference, appeal or assessment of
costs, or a trial; ("audience")
"holiday" means,
(a) any Saturday or Sunday,
(b) New Year's Day,
(b.1) Family Day,
(c) Good Friday,
(d) Easter Monday,
(e) Victoria Day,
(f) Canada Day,
(g) Civic Holiday,
(h) Labour Day,
(i) Thanksgiving Day,
(j) Remembrance Day,
(k) Christmas Day,
(1) Boxing Day, and
(m) any special holiday proclaimed by the Governor General or the Lieutenant Governor,
and where New Year's Day, Canada Day or Remembrance Day falls on a Saturday or
Sunday, the following Monday is a holiday, and where Christmas Day falls on a Saturday
or Sunday, the following Monday and Tuesday are holidays, and where Christmas Day
falls on a Friday, the following Monday is a holiday; ("jour ferie")
"judge" means a judge of the court; ("juge")
"judgment" means a decision that finally disposes of an application or action on its merits and
includes a judgment entered in consequence of the default of a party; ("jugement")
"lawyer" means a person authorized under the Law Society Act to practise law in Ontario;
("avocat")
"lawyer's office" means the office of the lawyer of record as set out in the last document filed
by him or her; ("bureau de l'avocat")
"motion" means a motion in a proceeding or an intended proceeding; ("motion")
"moving party" means a person who makes a motion; ("auteur de la motion")
"order" includes a judgment; ("ordonnance")
"originating process" means a document whose issuing commences a proceeding under these
rules, and includes,
(a) a statement of claim,
(b) a notice of action,
(c) a notice of application,
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/englishielaws_regs_900194_e.htm
11/16/12
Page 3 of 3
(d) an application for a certificate of appointment of an estate trustee,
(e) a counterclaim against a person who is not already a party to the main action, and
(f) a third or subsequent party claim,
but does not include a counterclaim that is only against persons who are parties to the main
action, a crossclaim or a notice of motion; ("acte introductif d'instance")
"partial indemnity costs" mean costs awarded in accordance with Part I of Tariff A, and "on a
partial indemnity basis" has a corresponding meaning; ("d6pens d'indemnisation
partielle")
"person" includes a party to a proceeding; ("personne")
"plaintiff' means a person who commences an action; ("demandeur")
"proceeding" means an action or application; ("instance")
"referee" means the person to whom a reference in a proceeding is directed; ("arbitre")
"registrar" means the Registrar of the Divisional Court or Court of Appeal, or a local registrar
of the Superior Court of Justice, .as the circumstances require; ("greffier")
"respondent" means a person against whom an application is made or an appeal is brought, as
the circumstances require; ("intime")
"responding party" means a person against whom a motion is made; ("partie intimee")
"statute" includes a statute passed by the Parliament of Canada; ("loi")
"substantial indemnity costs" mean costs awarded in an amount that is 1.5 times what would
otherwise be awarded in accordance with Part I of Tariff A, and "on a substantial
indemnity basis" has a corresponding meaning; ("depens d'indemnisation substantielle")
"timetable" means a schedule for the completion of one or more steps required to advance the
proceeding (including delivery of affidavits of documents, examinations under oath,
where available, or motions), established by order of the court or by written agreement of
the parties that is not contrary to an order. ("calendrier")
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 1.03; 0. Reg. 535/92, s. 2; 0. Reg. 484/94, s. 2; 0. Reg. 69/95, s. 1;
0. Reg. 442/97, s. 1; 0. Reg. 570/98, s. 1; 0. Reg. 292/99, s. 1 (2); 0. Reg. 427/01, s. 1 (1);
0. Reg. 284/01, s. 2; 0. Reg. 14/04, s. 1 (1); 0. Reg. 131/04, s. 2; 0. Reg. 42/05, s. 1; 0. Reg.
260/05, s. 1; 0. Reg. 575/07, s. 7; 0. Reg. 438/08, ss. 1, 66.
(2) Revoked: 0. Reg. 14/04, s. 1 (2).
11/16/12
Page 1 of 4
RULE 20SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHERE AVAILABLE
To Plaintiff
20.01 (1) A plaintiff may, after the defendant has delivered a statement of defence or
served a notice of motion, move with supporting affidavit material or other evidence for
summary judgment on all or part of the claim in the statement of claim. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194,
r. 20.01 (1).
(2) The plaintiff may move, without notice, for leave to serve a notice of motion for
summary judgment together with the statement of claim, and leave may be given where special
urgency is shown, subject to such directions as are just. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.01 (2).
To Defendant
(3) A defendant may, after delivering a statement of defence, move with supporting
affidavit material or other evidence for summary judgment dismissing all or part of the claim in
the statement of claim. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.01 (3).
EVIDENCE ON MOTION
20.02 (1) An affidavit for use on a motion for summary judgment may be made on
information and belief as provided in subrule 39.01 (4), but, on the hearing of the motion, the
court may, if appropriate, draw an adverse inference from the failure of a party to provide the
evidence of any person having personal knowledge of contested facts. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 12.
(2) In response to affidavit material or other evidence supporting a motion for summary
judgment, a responding party may not rest solely on the allegations or denials in the party's
pleadings, but must set out, in affidavit material or other evidence, specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 12.
FACTUMS REQUIRED
20.03 (1) On a rnotion for summary judgment, each party shall serve on every other party
to the motion a factum consisting of a concise argument stating the facts and law relied on by the
party. 0. Reg. 14/04, s. 14.
(2) The moving party's factum shall be served and filed with proof of service in the court
office where the motion is to be heard at least seven days before the hearing. 0. Reg. 394/09, s. 4.
(3) The responding party's factum shall be served and filed with proof of service in the
court office where the motion is to be heard at least four days before the hearing. 0. Reg. 394/09,
s. 4.
(4) Revoked: 0. Reg. 394/09, s. 4.
DISPOSITION OF MOTION
General
20.04 (1) Revoked: 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (1).
(2) The court shall grant summary judgment if,
11/16/12
Page 2 of 4
(a) the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a
claim or defence; or
(b) the parties agree to have all or part of the claim determined by a summary judgment
and the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to grant summary judgment. 0. Reg.
284/01, s. 6; 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (2).
Powers
(2.1) In determining under clause (2) (a) whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial,
the court shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties and, if the determination is being
made by a judge, the judge may exercise any of the following powers for the purpose, unless it is
in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial:
1. Weighing the evidence.
2. Evaluating the credibility of a deponent.
3. Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (3).
Oral Evidence (Mini-Trial)
(2.2) A judge may, for the purposes of exercising any of the powers set out in subrule
(2.1), order that oral evidence be presented by one or more parties, with or without time limits on
its presentation. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (3).
Only Genuine Issue Is Amount
(3) Where the court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is the amount to which the
moving party is entitled, the court may order a trial of that issue or grant judgment with a
reference to determine the amount. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.04 (3); 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 13 (4).
Only Genuine Issue Is Question Of Law
(4) Where the court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is a question of law, the court
may determine the question and grant judgment accordingly, but where the motion is made to a
master, it shall be adjourned to be heard by a judge. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.04 (4); 0. Reg.
438/08, s. 13 (4).
Only Claim Is For An Accounting
(5) Where the plaintiff is the moving party and claims an accounting and the defendant
fails to satisfy the court that there is a preliminary issue to be tried, the court may grant judgment
on the claim with a reference to take the accounts. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.04 (5).
WHERE TRIAL IS NECESSARY
Powers of Court
20.05 (1) Where summary judgment is refused or is granted only in part, the court may
make an order specifying what material facts are not in dispute and defining the issues to be tried,
and order that the action proceed to trial expeditiously. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 14.
Directions and Terms
(2) If an action is ordered to proceed to trial under subrule (1), the court may give such
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws_regs900194_e.htm
11/16/12
Courts of Justice Act - R .R.O. 1990, Reg. 194
Page 3 of 4
directions or impose such terms as are just, including an order,
(a) that each party deliver, within a specified time, an affidavit of documents in
accordance with the court's directions;
(b) that any motions be brought within a specified time;
(c) that a statement setting out what material facts are not in dispute be filed within ,a
specified time;
(d) that examinations for discovery be conducted in accordance with a discovery plan
established by the court, which may set a schedule for examinations and impose such
limits on the right of discovery as are just, including a limit on the scope of discovery
to matters not covered by the affidavits or any other evidence filed on the motion and
any cross-examinations on them;
(e) that a discovery plan agreed to by the parties under Rule 29.1 (discovery plan) be
amended;
(f) that the affidavits or any other evidence filed on the motion and any cross-examinations
on them may be used at trial in the same manner as an examination for discovery;
(g) that any examination of a person under Rule 36 (taking evidence before trial) be
subject to a time limit;
(h) that a party deliver, within a specified time, a written summary of the anticipated
evidence of a witness;
(i) that any oral examination of a witness at trial be subject to a time limit;
(j) that the evidence of a witness be given in whole or in part by affidavit;
(k) that any experts engaged by or on behalf of the parties in relation to the action meet on
a without prejudice basis in order to identify the issues on which the experts agree and
the issues on which they do not agree, to attempt to clarify and resolve any issues that
are the subject of disagreement and to prepare a joint statement setting out the areas of
agreement and any areas of disagreement and the reasons for it if, in the opinion of the
court, the cost or time savings or other benefits that may be achieved from the meeting
are proportionate to the amounts at stake or the importance of the issues involved in
the case and,
(i) there is a reasonable prospect for agreement on some or all of the issues, or
(ii) the rationale for opposing expert opinions is unknown and clarification on areas
of disagreement would assist the parties or the court;
(1) that each of the parties deliver a concise summary of his or her opening statement;
(m) that the parties appear before the court by a specified date, at which appearance the
court may make any order that may be made under this subrule;
(n) that the action be set down for trial on a particular date or on a particular trial list,
subject to the direction of the regional senior judge;
(o) for payment into court of all or part of the claim; and
(p) for security for costs. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 14.
Specified Facts
11/16/12
Page 4 of 4
(3) At the trial, any facts specified under subrule (1) or clause (2) (c) shall be deemed to be
established unless the trial judge orders otherwise to prevent injustice. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 14.
Order re Affidavit Evidence
(4) In deciding whether to make an order under clause (2) (j), the fact that an adverse party
may reasonably require the attendance of the deponent at trial for cross-examination is a relevant
consideration. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 14.
Order re Experts, Costs
(5) If an order is made under clause (2) (k), each party shall bear his or her own costs.
0. Reg. 438/08, s. 14.
Failure to Comply with Order
(6) Where a party fails to comply with an order under clause (2) (o) for payment into court
or under clause (2) (p) for security for costs, the court on motion of the opposite party may
dismiss the action, strike out the statement of defence or make such other order as is just. 0. Reg.
438/08, s. 14.
(7) Where on a motion under subrule (6) the statement of defence is struck out, the
defendant shall be deemed to be noted in default. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 14.
COSTS SANCTIONS FOR IMPROPER USE OF RULE
20.06 The court may fix and order payment of the costs of a motion for summary judgment
by a party on a substantial indemnity basis if,
(a) the party acted unreasonably by making or responding to the motion; or
(b) the party acted in bad faith for the purpose of delay. 0. Reg. 438/08, s. 14.
EFFECT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
20.07 A plaintiff who obtains summary judgment may proceed against the same defendant
for any other relief. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.07.
STAY OF EXECUTION
20.08 Where it appears that the enforcement of a summary judgment ought to be stayed
pending the determination of any other issue in the action or a counterclaim, crossclaim or third
party claim, the court may so order on such terms as are just. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.08.
APPLICATION TO COUNTERCLAIMS, CROSSCLAIMS AND THIRD PARTY
CLAIMS
20.09 Rules 20.01 to 20.08 apply, with necessary modifications, to counterclaims,
crossclaims and third party claims. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 20.09.
11/16/12
tribunaux judiciaires (Loi sur les) - R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194
Page 1 of 20
Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires
R.R.O. 1990, REGLEMENT 194
REGLES DE PROCEDURE CIVILE
Periode de codification : Du le r juillet 2012 a la date a laquelle Lois-en-ligne est a lour.
Derniere modification : Regl. de l'Ont. 55/12.
Le texte suivant est la version francaise d'un reglement bilingue.
SOMMAIRE
DISPOSITIONS GENERALES
Regle
1
2
3
4
4.1
5
6
6.1
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Mention, champ d'application et interpretation
Inobservation des regles
Delais
Documents de procedure
Obligation de l'expert
PARTIES ET JONCTIONS
Jonction des demandes et des parties
Reunion ou instruction simultande des instances
Audiences distinctes
Parties incapables
Societes en nom collectif et entreprises a proprietaire unique
Successions et fiducies
Representation
Transfert ou transmission d'interet
Recours collectifs
Intervention
INTRODUCTION DE L'INSTANCE
13.1 Lieu de l'introduction et de I'audience ou du proces
Acte introductif d'instance
14
Representation par avocat
15
16
17
18
SIGNIFICATION
Signification de documents
Signification en dehors de l'Ontario
Delai de remise de la defense
19
20
21
22
23
24
24.1
REGLEMENT SANS INSTRUCTION
Defaut
Jugement sommaire
Decision d'une question avant l'instruction
Exposé de cause
Desistements et retraits
Rejet de ('action pour cause de retard
Mediation obligatoire
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194_f.htm
11/16/12
25
26
27
28
29
Page 2 of 20
PROCEDURE ECRITE
Procedure &rite dans l'action
Modification des actes de procedure
Demande reconventionnelle
Demande entre defendeurs
Mise en cause
ENQUETE PREALABLE
29.1 Plan d'enquete prealable
29.2 Proportionnalite dans Penquete prealable
30
Communication des documents
30.1 Presomption d'engagement
31
Interrogatoire prealable
32
Inspection de biens
33
Examen medical des parties
34
35
36
INTERROGATOIRES HORS LA PRESENCE
DU TRIBUNAL
Procedure de I'interrogatoire oral
Procedure de I'interrogatoire prealable par ecrit
Obtention de depositions avant ('instruction
37
38
39
MOTIONS ET REQUETES
Motions — Competence et procedure
RequOtes — Competence et procedure
Administration de la preuve dans les motions et les requetes
40
41
42
43
44
45
PROTECTION DES DROITS PENDANT LE LITIGE
Injonction ou ordonnance de faire interlocutoire
Nomination d'un sequestre
Certificat d'affaire en instance
Interpleader
Restitution provisoire de biens meubles
Conservation provisoire de biens
46
47
48
49
50
51
PROCEDURES PREPARATOIRES AU PROCES
Lieu du proces
Convocation du jury
Inscription de l'action au role
Offre de transaction
Conference preparatoire au proces
Aveux
52
53
INSTRUCTION
Procedure d'instruction
Preuve au proces
54
55
RENVOIS
Ordonnance de renvoi
Procedure de renvoi
56
DEPENS
Cautionnement pour &pens
http://vvww.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/frenchielaws_regs_900194_f.htm
11/16/12
58
Page 3 of 20
Depens afferents aux instances
Liquidation des &pens
ORDONNANCES
59 Ordonnances
60
Execution fore&
61
62
63
APPELS
Appels devant un tribunal d'appel
Appels des ordonnances interlocutoires et autres appels devant
un juge
Sursis de l'ordonnance port& en appel
CAS PARTICULIERS
Action hypothecaire
64
Instance relative a l'administration d'une succession
65
66
Instance relative au partage d'un bien-fonds
67
Instance relative au patrimoine d'un mineur
Instance relative a la revision judiciaire
68
72
Consignation et versement des sommes consignees
Execution reciproque de jugements rendus au Royaume-Uni
73
Successions — Instances non contentieuses
74
Successions — Instances contentieuses
75
75.1 Mediation obligatoire — successions, fiducies et decisions
prises au nom d'autrui
Procedure simplifiee
76
Gestion des causes civiles
77
LISTE DES FORMULES
FORMULES
TARIF A Honoraires des avocats et debours admissibles en vertu des
regles 57.01 et 58.05
TARIF C Dopens des avocats adjuges lors de ('approbation des
comptes sans audience
TABLE DES MATIERES
DISPOSITIONS GENERALES
REGLE I MENTION, CHAMP D'APPLICATION ET
INTERPRETATION
Mention
1.01
Champ d'application
1.02
Definitions
1.03
Principes d'interpretation
1.04
Ordonnances sous conditions
1.05
1.06
Formules
Directives de pratique
1.07
Conferences telephoniques et videoconferences
1.08
Projet pilote de videoconference — Renvois prevus par la
1.08.1
Loi sur les procureurs
Communications extrajudiciaires
1.09
2.01
2.02
REGLE 2 INOBSERVATION DES REGLES
Effet de l'inobservation
Contestation de la regularite
11/16/12
2.03
Dispense du tribunal
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
REGLE 3 DELAIS
Computation des delais
Prorogation ou abregement des &Nis
Audition des instances
Calendriers
4.01
4.02
4.02.1
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.05.1
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
4.11
REGLE 4 DOCUMENTS DE PROCEDURE
Presentation
Contenu
Documents bilingues
Copie certifiee conforme des documents
Avis donnes par ecrit ou par voie electronique
Delivrance et depot des documents
Documents electroniques
Affidavits
Reliure des documents
Requisition
Transcriptions
Transmission des documents
Avis d'une question constitutionnelle
4.1.01
REGLE 4.1 OBLIGATION DE L'EXPERT
Obligation de l'expert
Page 4 of 20
PARTIES ET JONCTIONS
REGLE 5 JONCTION DES DEMANDES ET DES PARTIES
Jonction des demandes
5.01
Jonction des parties
5.02
Jonction des parties essentielles
5.03
Jonction erronde, defaut de jonction et designation
5.04
incorrecte des parties
Dispense de jonction
5.05
REGLE 6 REUNION OU INSTRUCTION SIMULTANEE
DES INSTANCES
Cas ou une ordonnance peut etre rendue
6.01
Pouvoir discretionnaire du juge qui preside l'instruction
6.02
6.1.01
REGLE 6.1 AUDIENCES DISTINCTES
Audiences distinctes
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.07.1
7.08
REGLE 7 PARTIES INCAPABLES
Representation par un tuteur a l'instance
Tuteur a l'instance du demandeur ou du requerant
Tuteur a l'instance d'un defendeur ou d'un intime
Representation d'un incapable
Pouvoirs et obligations du tuteur a l'instance
Revocation ou substitution du tuteur a l'instance
Constatation du defaut de la partie incapable
Desistement par ou contre la partie incapable
Homologation d'une transaction
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194 J.htm
11/16/12
7.09
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
9.01
9.02
9.03
10.01
10.02
10.03
Page 5 of 20
Consignation des sommes d'argent payables au tribunal
REGLE 8 SOCIETES EN NOM COLLECTIF ET
ENTREPRISES A PROPRIETAIRE UNIQUE
Sociotes en nom collectif
Defense
Avis au pretendu associe en vue d'une execution fore&
contre lui
Personne qui presente une defense separee
Divulgation des associes
Execution fore&
Entreprises a proprietaire unique
REGLE 9 SUCCESSIONS ET FIDUCIES
Instance introduite par ou contre un executeur
testamentaire, l'administrateur d'une succession ou un
fiduciaire
Instance introduite contre une succession sans executeur
testamentaire ni administrateur
Correctifs
REGLE 10 REPRESENTATION
Representation d'un interesse non identifiable
Representation d'un defunt
Liberation de l'ordonnance
REGLE 11 TRANSFERT OU TRANSMISSION D'INTERET
Effet du transfert ou de la transmission
11.01
Ordonnance de continuation
11.02
Defaut d'obtenir une ordonnance de continuation
11.03
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07
12.08
REGLE 12 RECOURS COLLECTIFS
Definitions
Intitule de l'instance
Interrogatoire des membres d'un groupe
Depens
Contenu des jugements et ordonnances
Autorisation d'interjeter appel
Instance contre le representant des defendeurs
Instance introduite par une association sans personnalite
morale ou un syndicat
13.01
13.02
13.03
REGLE 13 INTERVENTION
Autorisation d'intervenir en qualite de partie jointe
Autorisation d'intervenir a titre d'intervenant benevole
Autorisation d'intervenir a la Cour divisionnaire ou a la
Cour d'appel
INTRODUCTION DE L'INSTANCE
REGLE 13.1 LIEU DE L'INTRODUCTION ET DE
L'AUDIENCE OU DU PROCES
Lieu d'introduction
13.1.01
Transfert
13.1.02
11/16/12
Page 6 of 20
REGLE 14 ACTE INTRODUCTIF D'INSTANCE
Mode d'introduction d'une instance
Mode ordinaire d'introduction d'une instance
Introduction de l'action par une declaration ou un avis
d'action
14.03.1
Procedures ordinaire et simplifiee
14.05
Introduction de la requete par avis de requete
14.06
Intitule de ]'instance
14.07
Mode de delivrance de I'acte introductif d'instance
14.08
Ddlais de signification des actions
14.09
Radiation ou modification
14.10
Rejet de l'action en raison du paiement de la demande par
le defendeur
14.01
14.02
14.03
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.04
15.05
15.06
15.07
REGLE 15 REPRESENTATION PAR AVOCAT
Cas ou un avocat est necessaire
Avis relatif a la decision ou au pouvoir d'introduire une
instance
Constitution d'un nouvel avocat par une partie
Motion de l'avocat demandant sa revocation en qualito
d'avocat commis au dossier
Obligations de l'avocat commis au dossier
Avocat commis au dossier qui abandonne la pratique du
droit
Avocat d'une autre province
SIGNIFICATION
16.01
16.02
16.03
16.04
16.05
16.06
16.07
16.08
16.09
17.01
17.02
17.03
17.04
17.05
17.06
18.01
18.02
REGLE 16 SIGNIFICATION DE DOCUMENTS
Regles generales concernant les modes de signification
Signification a personne
Autres modes de signification directe
Signification indirecte ou dispense de signification
Signification a l'avocat commis au dossier
Signification par la poste
Non-reception du document
Validation de la signification
Preuve de la signification
REGLE 17 SIGNIFICATION EN DEHORS DE
L'ONTARIO
Definition
Signification en dehors de l'Ontario sans autorisation du
tribunal
Signification en dehors de l'Ontario avec ]'autorisation du
tribunal
Autres conditions a la signification en dehors de l'Ontario
Mode de signification en dehors de l'Ontario
Motion en annulation d'une signification en dehors de
l'Ontario
REGLE 18 DELAI DE REMISE DE LA DEFENSE
Delai de remise de la defense
Avis d'intention de presenter une defense
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194f.htm
11/16/12
Page 7 of 20
REGLEMENT SANS INSTRUCTION
19.01
19.02
19.03
19.04
19.05
19.06
19.07
19.08
19.09
20.01
20.02
20.03
20.04
20.05
20.06
20.07
20.08
20.09
REGLE 19 DEFAUT
Constatation du defaut
Consequences de la constatation du defaut
Annulation de la constatation du defaut
Consignation d'un jugement par defaut
Jugement obtenu par voie de motion
Les faits doivent fonder un jugement en faveur du
demandeur
Effet du jugement par defaut
Annulation du jugement par defaut
Application aux demandes reconventionnelles, aux
demandes entre defendeurs et aux mises en cause
REGLE 20 JUGEMENT SOMMAIRE
Applicabilite
Preuves a l'appui d'une motion
Memoires requis
Decision sur la motion
Necessite d'une instruction
Condamnation aux &pens pour usage abusif de la regle
Effet du jugement sommaire
Sursis d'execution
REGLE 21 DECISION D'UNE QUESTION AVANT
L'INSTRUCTION
Applicabilite
21.01
Obligation de diligence
21.02
Mernoires requis
21.03
22.01
22.02
22.03
22.04
22.05
23.01
23.02
23.03
23.04
23.05
23.06
23.07
REGLE 22 EXPOSE DE CAUSE
Applicabilite
Memoire requis
Exposé de cause defere a la Cour d'appel
Forme de l'expose de cause
Audition de l'expose de cause
REGLE 23 DESISTEMENTS ET RETRAITS
Desistement par le demandeur
Effet du desistement sur la demande reconventionnelle
Effet du desistement sur la demande entre defendeurs ou la
mise en cause
Effet du desistement sur une action subsequente
Depens du desistement, demande entre defendeurs ou mise
en cause reputee rejetee
Retrait par le defendeur
REGLE 24 REJET DE L'ACTION POUR CAUSE DE
RETARD
11/16/12
tribunaux judiciaires (Lai sur les) - R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194
24.01
24.02
24.02.1
24.03
24.04
24.05
24.05.1
24.06
24.1.01
24.1.02
24.1.03
24.1.04
24.1.05
24.1.06
24.1.07
24.1.08
24.1.09
24.1.10
24.1.11
24.1.12
24.1.13
24.1.14
24.1.15
24.1.16
Page 8 of 20
Applicabilite
Demandeur incapable
Avis d'ordonnance
Effet du rejet sur la demande reconventionnelle
Effet du rejet sur la demande entre defendeurs ou la mise
en cause
Effet sur une action subsequente
Depens du rejet, demande entre defendeurs ou mise en
cause reputee rejetee
REGLE 24.1 MEDIATION OBLIGATOIRE
Objet
Nature de la mediation
Definitions
Champ d'application
Exemption de la mediation
Coordonnateur de la mediation
Comites locaux de mediation
Mediateurs
Séance de mediation
Procedure precedant la seance de mediation
Presence a la séance de mediation
Defaut de se presenter
Defaut de se conformer
Confidentialite
Resultat de la mediation
Ordonnance sur consentement en vue d'une séance de
mediation supplementaire
PROCEDURE ECRITE
REGLE 25 PROCEDURE ECRITE DANS L'ACTION
25.01
Actes de procedure requis ou permis
Forme des actes de procedure
25.02
Signification des actes de procedure
25.03
Delais pour la remise des actes de procedure
25.04
Cloture de la procedure &rite
25.05
Regles applicables a tous les actes de procedure
25.06
Regles applicables a la defense
25.07
Cas ou une reponse est necessaire
25.08
Regles applicables a la reponse
25.09
25.10
Precisions
Radiation d'un acte de procedure ou d'un autre document
25.11
26.01
26.02
26.03
26.04
26.05
26.06
REGLE 26 MODIFICATION DES ACTES DE
PROCEDURE
Pouvoir general du tribunal
Moment d'apporter des modifications
Procedure de modification
Signification des actes de procedure modifies
Reponse a un acte de procedure modifie
Modification a ('instruction
REGLE 27 DEMANDE RECONVENTIONNELLE
http://vvww.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194_f.htm
11/16/12
27.01
27.02
27.03
27.04
27.05
27.06
27.07
27.08
27.09
27.10
28.01
28.02
28.03
28.04
28.05
28.06
28.07
28.08
28.09
28.10
28.11
29.01
29.02
29.03
29.04
29.05
29.06
29.07
29.08
29.09
29.10
29.11
29.12
29.13
29.14
Page 9 of 20
Applicabilite
Defense et demande reconventionnelle
Delivrance de Ia demande reconventionnelle dans le cas oil
le defendeur reconventionnel n'est pas déjà partie
]'action principale
Mai pour la remise ou la signification de la defense et
demande reconventionnelle
Delai pour la remise de la defense reconventionnelle
Mai pour la remise de la reponse reconventionnelle
Modification de la defense pour ajouter la demande
reconventionnelle
Instruction de la demande reconventionnelle
Decision sur la demande reconventionnelle
REGLE 28 DEMANDE ENTRE DEFENDEURS
Applicabilite
Defense et demande entre defendeurs
Modification de la defense pour ajouter Ia demande entre
defendeurs
Delai pour la remise de la defense et demande entre
defendeurs
Mai pour la remise de la defense a la demande entre
defendeurs
Contenu de la defense a la demande entre defendeurs
Effet du defaut de remettre une defense a la demande entre
defendeurs
Mai pour la remise de la reponse a la defense a la
demande entre defendeurs
Instruction de la demande entre defendeurs
Prejudice ou retard cause au demandeur
Application aux demandes reconventionnelles et aux mises
en cause
REGLE 29 MISE EN CAUSE
Applicabilite
Mai pour la mise en cause
Defense a la mise en cause
Reponse a la defense a la mise en cause
Contestation de ]'action principale par le tiers mis en cause
Effet de la defense a la mise en cause
Effet du defaut du tiers mis en cause
Instruction de la mise en cause
Prejudice ou retard cause au demandeur
Directives concernant la mise en cause
Mises en cause subsequentes
Application aux mises en cause subsequentes
Application aux demandes reconventionnelles et aux
demandes entre defendeurs
Numero de dossier
ENQUETE PREALABLE
29.1.01
29.1.02
REGLE 29.1 PLAN D'ENQUETE PREALABLE
Non-application
Definition
11/16/12
29.1.03
29.1.04
29.1.05
Page 10 of 20
Plan d'enquete prdalable
Obligation de mettre le plan A jour
Defaut de convenir d'un plan
REGLE 29.2 PROPORTIONNALITE DANS L'ENQUETE
PREALABLE
29.2.01
Definition
29.2.02
Application
29.2.03
Questions a examiner
REGLE 30 COMMUNICATION DES DOCUMENTS
Definition
30.01
30.02
Port& de la communication des documents
30.03
Affidavit de documents
Examen des documents
30.04
30.05
Effets de la divulgation ou de la production d'un document
sur sa pertinence
Affidavit incomplet ou pretention au privilege non fondee
30.06
Erreurs ou documents decouverts ulterieurement
30.07
30.08
Effet du defaut de divulguer des documents ou de les
produire a des fins d'examen
Interdiction d'utiliser un document privilegie
30.09
Production d'un document exigee d'un tiers avec
30.10
autorisation
Depot aupres du greffier
30.11
REGLE 30.1 PRESOMPTION D'ENGAGEMENT
Champ d'application
30.1.01
31.01
31.02
31.03
31.04
31.05
31.05.1
31.06
31.07
31.08
31.09
31.10
31.11
32.01
REGLE 31 INTERROGATOIRE PREALABLE
Definition
Forme de l'interrogatoire
Qui peut interroger ou etre interroge
Moment d'entamer l'interrogatoire
Interrogatoire oral par plusieurs parties
Duree maximale de l'interrogatoire
Port& de l'interrogatoire
Defaut de repondre lors de Penquete prealable
Effet des reponses de l'avocat
Renseignement obtenu ulterieurement
Interrogatoire de tiers avec autorisation
Utilisation de l'interrogatoire prealable a ('instruction
REGLE 32 INSPECTION DE BIENS
Ordonnance d'inspection
REGLE 33 EXAMEN MEDICAL DES PARTIES
Motion pour examen medical
Ordonnance d'examen
Differend relatif A la port& de l'examen
Renseignements a fournir a la partie qui obtient
l'ordonnance
Personnes presentes a l'examen
33.05
33.06
Rapports medicaux
33.07
Sanction en cas d'inobservation
33.01
33.02
33.03
33.04
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/frenchielaws_regs_900194_fhtm
11/16/12
33.08
Page 11 of 20
Examen avec consentement
INTERROGATOIRES HORS LA PRESENCE DU
TRIBUNAL
REGLE 34 PROCEDURE DE L'INTERROGATOIRE
ORAL
34.01
Application de la regle
34.02
Personnes devant lesquelles se deroule l'interrogatoire
34.03
Lieu de l'interrogatoire
34.04
Convocation a l'interrogatoire
34.05
Avis de la date, de l'heure et du lieu de l'interrogatoire
34.06
Interrogatoire avec consentement
34.07
Cas on la personne qui doit etre interrogee reside en dehors
de l'Ontario
34.08
Serment
34.09
Interprete
Production de documents a l'interrogatoire
34.10
34.11
Reinterrogatoire
Objections et decisions
34.12
Deroulement irregulier de l'interrogatoire
34.14
Sanctions en cas de defaut ou d'inconduite de la personne
34.15
devant etre interrogee
Consignation de l'interrogatoire
34.16
Transcription dactylographide
34.17
DepOt de la transcription
34.18
Bande magnetoscopique ou enregistrement
34.19
REGLE 35 PROCEDURE DE L'INTERROGATOIRE
PREALABLE PAR ECRIT
35.01
Questions
35.02
Reponses
Objections
35.03
Defaut de repondre
35.04
Deroulement irregulier de l'interrogatoire
35.05
Depot des questions et des reponses
35.06
REGLE 36 OBTENTION DE DEPOSITIONS AVANT
L'INSTRUCTION
Applicabilite
36.01
36.02
Procedure
Interrogatoires en dehors de l'Ontario
36.03
36.04
Utilisation des depositions a l'instruction
MOTIONS ET REQUETES
37.01
37.02
37.03
37.04
37.05
37.06
37.07
REGLE 37 MOTIONS - COMPETENCE ET
PROCEDURE
Avis de motion
Competence pour connaltre d'une motion
Lieu de l'audition des motions
Motions - Personnes devant lesquelles elles doivent etre
presentees
Date d'audience des motions
Contenu de l'avis
Signification de l'avis
11/16/12
37.08
37.09
37.10
37.10.1
37.11
37.12.1
37,13
37.14
37.15
37.16
37.17
Page 12 of 20
Depot de l'avis de motion
Desistement
Documents requis pour les motions
Confirmation de la motion
Huis clos
Audience sur pieces
Decision
Annulation ou modification d'ordonnances
Motions presentees dans une instance compliquee ou dans
une serie d'instances
Interdiction de presenter des motions sans autorisation du
tribunal
Motion precedant l'introduction de l'instance
REGLE 38 REQUETES - COMPETENCE ET
PROCEDURE
38.01
Champ d'application de la regle
38.02
Requetes - Personne devant laquelle elles doivent etre
presentees
38.03
Date et lieu de l'audience
38.04
Contenu de l'avis
38.05
Delivrance de l'avis
38.06
Signification de l'avis
Avis de comparution
38.07
Desistement
38.08
Documents requis pour les requetes
38.09
Confirmation de la requete
38.09.1
Decision
38.10
Annulation du jugement rendu a la suite d'une requete
38.11
introduite sans preavis
REGLE 39 ADMINISTRATION DE LA PREUVE DANS
LES MOTIONS ET LES REQUETES
Preuve par affidavit
39.01
Preuve etablie par be contre-interrogatoire du deposant de
39.02
('affidavit
Preuve par interrogatoire d'un temoin
39.03
Preuve etablie par interrogatoire prealable
39.04
PROTECTION DES DROITS PENDANT LE LITIGE
REGLE 40 INJONCTION OU ORDONNANCE DE FAIRE
INTERLOCUTOIRE
Obtention
40.01
Motion sans preavis
40.02
Engagement
40.03
40.04
Memoires requis
41.01
41.02
41.03
41.04
41.05
41.06
REGLE 41 NOMINATION D'UN SEQUESTRE
Definition
Obtention
Forme de I'ordonnance
Renvoi des questions relatives a la gestion par be sequestre
Directives
Liberation
11/16/12
Page 13 of 20
REGLE 42 CERTIFICAT D'AFFAIRE EN INSTANCE
42.01
Delivrance du certificat
42.02
Mainlevee du certificat
43.01
43.02
43.03
43.04
REGLE 43 INTERPLEADER
Dispositions generates
Applicabilite
Obtention
Decision
REGLE 44 RESTITUTION PROVISOIRE DE BIENS
MEUBLES
44.01
Motion visant a obtenir une ordonnance provisoire
Description et valeur des biens dans l'ordonnance
44.02
Decision
44.03
44.04
Condition et forme de la garantie
Annulation de l'ordonnance
44.05
44.06
Levee de la garantie
Obligations du sherif
44.07
Biens soustraits
44.08
REGLE 45 CONSERVATION PROVISOIRE DE BIENS
Ordonnance provisoire de conservation ou de vente
45.01
Fonds determine
45.02
Revendication de biens meubles constituant une stirete
45.03
PROCEDURES PREPARATOIRES AU PROCES
46.01
REGLE 46 LIEU DU PROCES
Comte dans lequel ('instance est introduite ou transferee
47.01
47.02
REGLE 47 CONVOCATION DU JURY
Proces devant jury
Annulation de la convocation du jury
REGLE 48 INSCRIPTION DE L'ACTION AU ROLE
Qui peut inscrire l'action pour instruction et a quel moment
48.01
Mode d'inscription d'une action pour instruction
48.02
Dossier d'instruction
48.03
Consequences de l'inscription pour instruction ou du
48.04
consentement a l'inscription au role
Inscription au role d'une action non contest&
48.05
Inscription au role d'une action contest&
48.06
Consequences de l'inscription au role de l'action
48.07
48.08
Roles distincts
Actions devant etre instruites sans Mai
48.09
Actions reportees ou qui demeurent inscrites au role a la
48.10
fin de la session
Actions radides du role
48.11
Obligation d'informer le greffier d'une transaction
48.12
48.13
Action non inscrite au role
48.14
Desistement d'action
48.15
11/16/12
49.01
49.02
49.03
49.04
49.05
49.06
49.07
49.08
49.09
49.10
49.11
49.12
49,13
49.14
Page 14 of 20
REGLE 49 OFFRE DE TRANSACTION
Definitions
Applicabilite
Quand peut se faire l'offre
Retrait ou expiration de l'offre
Effet de l'offre
Divulgation de l'offre au tribunal
Acceptation de l'offre
Parties incapables
Defaut de se conformer a une offre accept&
Depens en cas de defaut d'acceptation
Pluralite de defendeurs
Offre de contribution
Pouvoir discretionnaire du tribunal
REGLE 50 CONFERENCE PREPARATOIRE AU PROCES
50.01
Objet
Conferences preparatoires au proces - actions
50.02
Conferences preparatoires au proces - requetes
50.03
50.04
Pieces a deposer
50.05
Presence
Questions a prendre en compte
50.06
Pouvoirs
50.07
Rapport sur la conference preparatoire au proces
50.08
Divulgation interdite
50.09
Deux juges differents
50.10
50.11
Acces aux documents
Depens de la conference preparatoire au proces
50.12
51.01
51.02
51.03
51.04
51.05
51.06
REGLE 51 AVEUX
Definition
Demande d'aveux relatifs a un fait ou a un document
Effet de la demande d'aveux
Depens en cas de refus
Retractation de I'aveu
Ordonnance fond& sur la veracite d'un fait ou d'un
document
INSTRUCTION
52.01
52.02
52.03
52.04
52.05
52.06
52.07
52.08
52.09
52.10
REGLE 52 PROCEDURE D'INSTRUCTION
Defaut de se presenter a l'instruction
Ajournement de l'instruction
Experts designes par le tribunal
Pieces
Inspection par le juge ou le jury
Exclusion de temoins
Ordre des presentations dans les proces devant jury
Defaut d'unanimite du jury
Inscription du verdict du jury
Defaut d'etablir ('existence d'un fait ou d'un document
http://vvww.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194_f.htm
11/16/12
53.01
53.02
53.03
53.04
53.05
53.06
53.07
53.08
53.09
53.10
Page 15 of 20
REGLE 53 PREUVE AU PROCES
Preuve par temoins
Preuve par affidavit
Temoignages d'experts
Mode d'assignation des temoins
Assignation interprovinciale
Mode d'assignation d'un temoin detenu
Appel a tdmoigner d'une partie opposee
Preuve admissible sur autorisation seulement
Calcul des indemnites adjugees pour pertes pecuniaires
futures
Taux d'intera anterieur au jugement pour pertes non
pecuniaires
RENVOIS
54.01
54.02
54.03
54.04
54.05
54.06
54.07
54.08
54.09
54.10
55.01
55.02
55.03
55.04
55.05
55.06
55.07
REGLE 54 ORDONNANCE DE RENVOI
Champ d'application des Regles 54 et 55
Cas de renvoi
A qui adresser le renvoi
Ordonnance de renvoi
Motions presentees dans un renvoi
Rapport de l'arbitre
Confirmation obligatoire
Motion en confirmation
Confirmation par deoulement du temps
Poursuite ou conclusion du renvoi
REGLE 55 PROCEDURE DE RENVOI
Dispositions generales relatives au deroulement d'un
renvoi
Procedure ordinaire d'un renvoi
Procedure d'identification des personnes interessees et de
verification des demandes
Procedure de reddition de comptes
Directives concernant le paiement d'une somme d'argent
Renvoi pour la tenue d'une vente
Renvoi pour la designation d'un tuteur ou d'un sequestre
DEPENS
56.01
56.02
56.03
56.04
56.05
56.06
56.07
56.08
56.09
REGLE 56 CAUTIONNEMENT POUR DEPENS
Applicabilite
Declaration du lieu de residence du demandeur ou du
requerant
Motion visant a obtenir un cautionnement
Montant et forme du cautionnement et delai
Forme et effet de l'ordonnance
Defaut du demandeur ou du requerant
Modification du montant
Avis d'observation de l'ordonnance
Cautionnement exige a titre de condition a l'obtention
d'une mesure de redressement
11/16/12
Page 16 of 20
REGLE 57 DEPENS AFFERENTS AUX INSTANCES
57.01
Principes generaux
57.02
Directives au liquidateur des &pens
57.03
Depens d'une motion
57.04
Depens en cas de transaction
57.05
Depens de ]'action introduite devant un tribunal mal choisi
57.06
Depens du tuteur a ]'instance
57.07
Responsabilite de l'avocat quant aux &pens
58.01
58.02
58.03
58.04
58.05
58,06
58.07
58.08
58.09
58.10
58.11
58.12
58.13
REGLE 58 LIQUIDATION DES DEPENS
Dispositions generales
Qui peut liquider les &pens
Liquidation des &pens a la dem•ande de la partie qui y a
droit
Liquidation a la demande de la partie condamnde a payer
les &pens
Liquidation conforme aux tarifs
Facteurs a prendre en consideration lors de la liquidation
Depens d'une instance en cas de desistement
Depens de certaines instances
Certificat de liquidation
Objections A la liquidation
Appel d'une liquidation
Depens du sherif
Depens fixes par le greffier
ORDONNANCES
59.01
59.02
59.03
59.04
59.05
59.06
59.07
60.01
60.02
60.03
60.04
60.05
60.06
60.07
60.07.1
60.08
60.09
60.10
60.11
60.12
REGLE 59 ORDONNANCES
Date de prise d'effet
Inscription par le juge ou l'officier de justice
Redaction et forme de l'ordonnance
Signature des ordonnances
Inscription de l'ordonnance
Modification ou annulation de l'ordonnance
Execution de l'ordonnance
REGLE 60 EXECUTION FORCEE
Definitions
Execution fore& d'une ordonnance de paiement ou de
recouvrement d'une somme d'argent
Execution forcee d'une ordonnance de mise en possession
d'un Bien-fonds
Execution forcee d'une ordonnance de restitution de biens
meubles
Execution fore& d'une ordonnance de faire ou de ne pas
faire
Execution forcee par ou contre un tiers
Bref de saisie-execution
Mandat decerne par le ministre des Finances
Saisie-arret
Bref de mise sous sequestre judiciaire
Bref de mise en possession
Ordonnance pour outrage
Defaut de se conformer a une ordonnance interlocutoire
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/frenehielaws_regs_900194f.htm
11/16/12
60.13
60.14
60.15
60.16
60.17
60.18
60.19
Page 17 of 20
Contestation du droit de propriete des biens saisis par le
sherif
Rapport du sherif sur l'execution du bref
Enlevement ou retrait des brefs des dossiers du sherif
Obligations de la personne qui depose un bref aupres d'un
sherif
Motion en vue d'obtenir des directives
Interrogatoire a l'appui de l'execution fore&
Depens de l'execution fore&
APPELS
REGLE 61 APPELS DEVANT UN TRIBUNAL D'APPEL
61.01
Definition
61.02
Motion en autorisation d'interjeter appel devant la Cour
61.03
divisionnaire
Motion en autorisation d'interjeter appel devant la Cour
61.03.1
d'appel
Introduction des appels
61.04
Certificat ou accord relatif a la preuve
61.05
Cautionnement pour &pens d'un appel
61.06
Appels incidents
61.07
Modification de l'avis d'appel ou de l'avis d'appel incident
61.08
Mise en etat des appels
61.09
Cahier et recueil d'appel
61.10
Dossier des pieces
61.10.1
Memoire de l'appelant
61.11
Memoire et recueil de Pintime
61.12
Rejet pour cause de retard
61.13
Defaut d'obtenir une ordonnance de continuation de
61.13.1
l'appel
Desistement de l'appel
61.14
Appels incidents aux appels rejetes ou ayant fait l'objet
61.15
d'un desistement
Motions presentees dans un appel
61.16
REGLE 62 APPELS DES ORDONNANCES
INTERLOCUTOIRES ET AUTRES APPELS DEVANT UN
JUGE
Procedure d'appel
62.01
Motion en autorisation d'interjeter appel
62.02
REGLE 63 SURSIS DE L'ORDONNANCE PORTEE EN
APPEL
Sursis
de
plein
droit
sur remise de l'avis d'appel
63.01
Sursis
par
ordonnance
63.02
Consequences du sursis
63.03
CAS PARTICULIERS
64.01
64.02
64.03
64.04
REGLE 64 ACTION HYPOTHECAIRE
Definition
Jugement par defaut avec renvoi
Actions en forclusion
Actions pour vente
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194.1.htm
11/16/12
64.05
64.06
65.01
65.02
Page 18 of 20
Actions de rachat
Procedure generale des renvois en matiere hypothecaire
REGLE 65 INSTANCE RELATIVE A
L'ADMINISTRATION D'UNE SUCCESSION
Applicabilitd
Cas de renvoi
REGLE 66 INSTANCE RELATIVE AU PARTAGE
D'UN BIEN-FONDS
66.01
Applicabilite
66.02
Forme du jugement
66.03
Produit de la vente
REGLE 67 INSTANCE RELATIVE AU PATRIMOINE
D'UN MINEUR
Introduction de l'instance
67.01
Affidavit a I'appui
67.02
67.03
Consentement requis
REGLE 68 INSTANCE RELATIVE A LA REVISION
JUDICIAIRE
Introduction de l'instance
68.01
Procedure applicable
68.02
Date de l'audience en Cour divisionnaire
68.03
Dossiers de requete et memoires
68.04
Certificat d'etat de cause
68.05
Rejet pour cause de retard
68.06
REGLE 72 CONSIGNATION ET VERSEMENT DES
SOMMES CONSIGNEES
Definitions
72.01
Consignation
72.02
Versement de la somme d'argent consignee
72.03
Mainlevee d'une hypotheque
72.04
Ordonnance de gel
72.05
REGLE 73 EXECUTION RECIPROQUE DE JUGEMENTS
RENDUS AU ROYAUME-UNI
Definitions
73.01
Requete en vue de faire enregistrer le jugement
. 73.02
Execution du jugement
73.03
REGLE 74 SUCCESSIONS — INSTANCES NON
CONTENTIEUSES
Definitions
74.01
Depot des testaments et des codicilles
74.02
Demande d'avis d'introduction d'instance
74.03
Certificat de nomination a titre de fiduciaire de la
74.04
succession testamentaire
74.05
succession non testamentaire
Certificat de nomination de la personne designee par le
74.05.1
fiduciaire de la succession etrangere a titre de fiduciaire de
la succession non testamentaire
Certificat de nomination a titre de nouveau fiduciaire de la
74.06
http://wvvw.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194_f.htm
11/16/12
74.07
74.08
74.09
74.10
74.11
74.12
74.13
74.14
74.15
74.16
74.17
74.18
75.01
75.02
75.03
75.04
75.05
75.06
75.07
75.07.1
75,08
75.09
Page 19 of 20
Certificat de nomination a titre de nouveau fiduciaire de la
succession non testamentaire
Confirmation, par reapposition de sceau, de la nomination
d'un fiduciaire de la succession testamentaire ou non
testamentaire
Certificat de nomination auxiliaire a titre de fiduciaire de la
succession pour la durde du litige
Cautionnements
Procedure generale regissant les requetes en vue d'obtenir
des certificats de nomination a titre de fiduciaires de
succession
Depot dgal a Pimp&
Delivrance du certificat de nomination a titre de fiduciaire
de la succession
Ordonnances appuyant l'exercice de certains droits
Reddition des comptes de la succession
Mode de presentation des comptes
Requete en approbation des comptes
REGLE 75 SUCCESSIONS — INSTANCES
CONTENTIEUSES
Preuve formelle d'un instrument testamentaire
Preuve d'un testament perdu ou detruit
Opposition A la ddlivrance d'un certificat de nomination
Revocation du certificat de nomination
Retour du certificat
Requete ou motion en vue d'obtenir des directives
Procedure applicable dans le cas ou une declaration est
signifiee
Soumission de droits au tribunal
Reclamations presentees contre une succession
Avocat commis au dossier
REGLE 75.1 MEDIATION OBLIGATOIRE SUCCESSIONS, FIDUCIES ET DECISIONS PRISES AU
NOM D'AUTRUI
75.1.02
Champ d'application
75.1.03
Definitions
75.1.04
Exemption de la mediation
Directives relatives a la conduite de la mediation
75.1.05
75.1.06
Mediateurs
75.1.07
Choix du mddiateur
Procedure avant la séance de mediation
75.1.08
Presence a la séance de mediation
75.1.09
75.1.10
Recours en cas de defaut de se conformer
75.1.11
Confidentialite
75.1.12
Resultat de la mediation
Ordonnance sur consentement en vue d'une séance de
75.1.13
mediation suppldmentaire
76.01
76.02
76.03
REGLE 76 PROCEDURE SIMPLIFIEE
Champ d'application de la Regle
Applicabilitd de la procedure simplifide
Affidavit de documents
11/16/12
76.04
76.10
76.11
76.12
76.13
Enquete prealable &rite, contre-interrogatoire sur un
affidavit ou interrogatoire d'un temoin interdits
Motions
Discussion en vue d'une transaction et divulgation de
documents
Mode d'inscription d'une action contest& pour instruction
ou instruction sommaire
Conference preparatoire au proces
Inscription au role d'une action contest&
Instruction sommaire
Consequences relatives aux &pens
77.01
77.02
77.03
77.04
77.05
77.06
77.07
77.08
77.09
REGLE 77 GESTION DES CAUSES CIVILES
Objet et principes generaux
Champ d'application
Definitions
Pouvoirs : gestion de la cause
Affectation a la gestion des causes
Affectation a la gestion individuelle des causes par un juge
Motions
Conference relative a la cause
Dispositions transitoires
76.05
76.08
76.09
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/frenclVelaws_regs_900194_f.htm
Page 20 of 20
11/16/12
Page 1 of 4
DEFINITIONS
1.03 (1) A moms que le contexte n'indique autrement, les definitions qui suivent
s'appliquent aux presentes regles.
«acte introductif d'instance» Document par lequel une instance est introduite sous le regime
des presentes regles. S'entend en outre des documents suivants :
a) une declaration;
b) un avis d'action;
c) un avis de requete;
d) une requete en vue d'obtenir un certificat de nomination d'un fiduciaire de la
succession;
e) une demande reconventionnelle contre une personne qui n'est pas déjà partie a l'action
principale;
f) une mise en cause ou une mise en cause subsequente.
La presente definition exclut toutefois une demande reconventionnelle ne visant que des
personnes qui sont déjà parties a l'action principale, une demande entre defendeurs ou un
avis de motion. («originating process»)
«action» L'instance qui n'est pas une requete. S'entend en outre de l'instance introduite par,
selon le cas :
a) une declaration;
b) un avis d'action;
c) une demande reconventionnelle;
d) une demande entre defendeurs;
e) une mise en cause ou une mise en cause subsequente. («action»)
«appelant» Personne qui interjette appel. («appellant»)
«arbitre» Personne qui est saisie d'un renvoi dans une instance. («referee»)
«audience» Audition d'une requete, d'une motion, d'un renvoi, d'un appel ou de la
liquidation des &pens. S'entend en outre d'une instruction. («hearing»)
«auteur de la motion» Personne qui presente une motion. («moving party»)
«avocat» Personne autorisee, en vertu de la Loi sur le Barreau, a pratiquer le droit en Ontario.
(«lawyer»)
«bureau de l'avocat» Le bureau de l'avocat commis au dossier indique dans le dernier
document qu'il a depose. («lawyer's office»)
«calendrier» tcheancier pour la prise d'une ou de plusieurs mesures necessaires au
deroulement de ['instance (notamment la remise des affidavits de documents, les
interrogatoires sous serment, le cas echeant, ou les motions), fixe par une ordonnance du
tribunal ou par un accord ecrit des parties qui n'est pas incompatible avec une
ordonnance. («timetable»)
http://www.e-laws.gov.cm.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194_f.htm
11/16/12
Page 2 of 4
«comte» S'entend en outre d'un district, d'une municipalite regionale ou de district, ou de la
cite de Toronto. («county»)
«defendeur» Personne contre laquelle une action est introduite. («defendant»)
«demandeur» Personne qui introduit une action. («plaintiff»)
«depens d'indemnisation partielle» Depens adjuges conformement a la premiere partie du
tarif A. L'expression «sur une base d'indemnisation partielle» a un sens correspondant.
(«partial indemnity costs»)
«depens d'indemnisation substantielle» Depens adjuges dont le montant est 1,5 fois ce qui
aurait ate adjuge par ailleurs conformement a la premiere partie du tarif A. L'expression
«sur une base d'indemnisation substantielle» a un sens correspondant. («substantial
indemnity costs»)
«document» S'entend en outre des donnees et des renseignements qui se presentent sous
forme electronique. («document»)
«electronique» S'entend notamment de ce qui est cree, enregistre, transmis ou mis en
memoire sous une forme intangible, notamment numerique, par des moyens electroniques,
magnetiques ou optiques ou par d'autres moyens capables de creer, d'enregistrer, de
transmettre ou de mettre en memoire de maniere similaire a ceux-ci. Le terme «par voie
electronique» a un sens correspondant. («electronic», «electronically»)
«enquete prealable» Communication des documents, interrogatoire prealable, inspection des
biens et examen medical d'une partie aux termes des Regles 30 a 33. («discovery»)
«greffier» Le greffier de la Cour divisionnaire ou de la Cour d'appel, ou le greffier local de la
Cour superieure de justice, selon les circonstances. («registrar»)
«incapable» Les personnes suivantes
a) le mineur;
b) l'incapable mental au sens de l'article 6 ou 45 de la Loi de 1992 sur la prise de
decisions au nom d'autrui a regard d'une question dans l'instance, que la personne
ait ou non un tuteur,
c) l' absent au sens de la Loi sur les absents.
Le terme «incapacite» a le meme sens. («disability»)
«instance» Action ou requete. («proceeding»)
«intim& Personne contre laquelle une requete est deposee ou un appel est interjete, selon les
circonstances. («respondent»)
«jour ferie» :
a) le samedi et le dimanche;
b) le jour de l'An;
b.1) le jour de la Famille;
c) le Vendredi saint;
d) le lundi de Piques;
http://www.e-laws.gov. on. ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194_f.htm
11/16/12
Page 3 of 4
e) la fete de Victoria;
0 la fete du Canada;
g) le Congo civique;
h) la fete du Travail;
i) le jour d'Action de Graces;
j) le jour du Souvenir;
k) le jour de Noel;
1) le 26 decembre;
m) le jour proclame tel par le gouverneur general ou le lieutenant-gouverneur.
Si le jour de l'An, la fête du Canada ou le jour du Souvenir tombent un samedi ou un
dimanche, le lundi suivant est jour feria. . Si le jour de Noel tombe un samedi ou un
dimanche, le lundi et le mardi suivants sont jours feries. Si le jour de Noel tombe un
vendredi, le lundi suivant est jour feria.. («holiday»)
«juge» Juge du tribunal. («judge»)
«jugement» Decision qui regle definitivement une requete ou une action sur le fond. S'entend
en outre d'un jug,ement rendu par &Taut. («judgment»)
oloi» S'entend en outre d'une loi federale. («statute»)
«motion» Motion presentee en cours d'instance ou prealablement a l'introduction de
l'instance. («motion»)
«ordonnance» S'entend en outre d'un jugement. («order»)
«partie intimee» Personne contre laquelle une motion est presentee. («responding party»)
«personne» S'entend en outre d'une partie a une instance. («person»)
«remettre» Signifier et deposer avec la preuve de la signification. Le terme «remise» a le
meme sens. («deliver», «delivery»)
«requerant» Personne qui presente une requete. («applicant»)
«requete» Instance introduite par un avis de requete. («application»)
«tribunal» Tribunal devant lequel une instance est en cours. S'il s'agit d'une instance devant
la Cour superieure de justice, s'entend en outre :
a) du protonotaire qui a competence pour entendre les motions aux termes de la Regle 37;
b) du protonotaire chargé de la gestion des causes. («court»)
«tribunal d'appel» La Cour d'appel ou la Cour divisionnaire, selon les circonstances.
(«appellate court»)
R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194, regle 1.03; Regl. de l'Ont. 535/92, art. 2; Regl. de l'Ont. 484/94, art. 2;
Regl. de l'Ont. 69/95, art. 1; Regl. de l'Ont. 442/97, art. 1; Regl. de l'Ont. 570/98, art. 1; Regl.
de l'Ont. 292/99, par. (2); Regl. de l'Ont. 284/01, art. 2; Regl. de l'Ont. 427/01, par. 1 (1);
Regl. de l'Ont. 14/04, par. 1 (1); Regl. de l'Ont. 131/04, art. 2; Regl. de l'Ont. 42/05, art. 1;
Regl. de l'Ont. 260/05, art. 1; Regl. de l'Ont. 575/07, art. 7; Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, art. 1 et 66.
http://vvww.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs900194_f.htm
11/16/12
Page 4 of 4
(2) Abroge : Regl. de 1'Ont. 14/04, par. 1 (2).
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ea/html/regs/french/elaws_regs_900194_f.htm
11/16/12
Page 1 of 5
REGLE 20 JUGEMENT SOMMAIRE
APPLICABILITE
Au demandeur
20.01 (1) Le demandeur peut, apres que le defendeur a remis une defense ou signifie un
avis de motion, demander, par voie de motion, appuyee d'un affidavit ou d'autres elements de
preuve, un jugement sommaire sur la totalite ou une partie de la demande formulae dans la
declaration. R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194, par. 20.01 (1).
(2) Le demandeur peut demander, par voie de motion presentee sans preavis,
l'autorisation de signifier avec la declaration un avis de motion en vue d'obtenir un jugement
sommaire. L'autorisation peut etre accordee en cas d'urgence extraordinaire, sous reserve de
directives justes. R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194, par. 20.01 (2).
Au defendeur
(3) Le defendeur peut, apres avoir remis une defense, demander, par voie de motion
appuyee d'un affidavit ou d'autres elements de preuve, un jugement sommaire rejetant en
totalite ou en partie la demande formulae dans la declaration. R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194, par. 20.01
(3).
PREVVES A L'APPUI D'UNE MOTION
20.02 (1) Dans un affidavit a l'appui d'une motion visant a obtenir un jugement
sommaire, une partie peut faire etat des elements qu'elle tient pour veridiques sur la foi de
renseignements, comme le prevoit le paragraphe 39.01 (4). Toutefois, dans le cas ou la partie ne
fournit pas le temoignage de toute personne ayant une connaissance directe des faits contestes,
le tribunal peut en firer des conclusions defavorables, s'il y a lieu, lors de l'audition de la
motion. Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, art. 12.
(2) Lorsqu'une motion en vue d'obtenir un jugement sommaire est appuyee d'un affidavit
ou d'autres elements de preuve, la partie intim& ne peut pas se contenter uniquement des
allegations ou &negations contenues dans ses actes de procedure. Elle doit preciser, au moyen
d'un affidavit ou d'autres elements de preuve, des faits specifiques indiquant qu'il y a une
veritable question litigieuse necessitant la tenue d'une instruction. Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, art.
12.
MEMOIRES REQU IS
20.03 (1) Dans le cas d'une motion en vue d'obtenir un jugement sommaire, chaque
partie signifie aux autres parties a la motion un memoire comprenant une argumentation concise
exposant les faits et les regles de droit qu'elle invoque. Regl. de l'Ont. 14/04, art. 14.
(2) Le memoire de l'auteur de la motion est signifie et depose, avec la preuve de la
signification, au greffe du tribunal ou la motion doit etre entendue, au moms sept jours avant
l'audience. Regl. de l'Ont. 394/09, art. 4.
(3) Le memoire de la partie intim& est signifie et depose, avec la preuve de la
signification, au greffe du tribunal ou la motion doit etre entendue, au moms quatre jours avant
l'audience. Regl. de l'Ont. 394/09, art. 4.
(4) Abroge : Regl. de l'Ont. 394/09, art. 4.
11/16/12
Page 2 of 5
DECISION SUR LA MOTION
Dispositions generales
20.04 (1) Abroge : Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, par. 13 (1).
(2) Le tribunal rend un jugement sommaire si, selon le cas
a) it est convaincu qu'une demande ou une defense ne souleve pas de veritable question
litigieuse necessitant la tenue d'une instruction;
b) it est convaincu qu'il est approprie de rendre un jugement sommaire et les parties sont
d'accord pour que tout ou partie de la demande soit decide par jugement sommaire.
Regl. de l'Ont. 284/01, art. 6; Regl. de 1'Ont. 438/08, par. 13 (2).
Pouvoirs
(2.1) Lorsqu'il decide, aux termes de l'alinea (2) a), s'il existe une veritable question
litigieuse necessitant la tenue d'une instruction, le tribunal tient compte des elements de preuve
presentes par les parties et, si la decision doit etre rendue par un juge, ce dernier peut, a cette fin,
exercer l'un ou l'autre des pouvoirs suivants, a moins qu'il ne soit dans Pinteret de la justice de
ne les exercer que lors d'un proces
1. Apprecier la preuve.
2. Evaluer la credibilite d'un deposant.
3. Tirer une conclusion raisonnable de la preuve. Regl. de 1'Ont. 438/08, par. 13 (3).
Ternoignage oral (mini-proces)
(2.2) Un juge peut, dans le but d'exercer les pouvoirs prevus au paragraphe (2.1),
ordonner que des temoignages oraux soient presentes par une ou plusieurs parties, avec ou sans
limite de temps pour leur presentation. Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, par. 13 (3).
Si la seule question litigieuse est le montant de la demande
(3) Le tribunal, s'il est convaincu que la seule veritable question litigieuse porte sur le
montant auquel l'auteur de la motion a droit, peut ordonner l' instruction de la question ou rendre
un jugement et ordonner un renvoi afin de fixer le montant. R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194, par. 20.04
(3); Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, par. 13 (4).
Si la'seule question litigieuse est une question de droit
(4) Le tribunal, s'il est convaincu que la seule veritable question litigieuse porte sur une
question de droit, peut trancher cette question et rendre un jugement en consequence. Toutefois,
si la motion est presentee a un protonotaire, elle est deferee a un juge pour audition. R.R.O.
1990, Regl. 194, par. 20.04 (4); Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, par. 13 (4).
Demande de reddition de comptes seulement
(5) Si le demandeur est l'auteur de la motion et qu'il demande une reddition de comptes,
le tribunal peut rendre jugement sur la demande et ordonner un renvoi pour la reddition des
comptes, a moins que le defendeur ne convainque le tribunal qu'une question preliminaire doit
etre instruite. R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194, par. 20.04 (5).
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/french/elaws_regs900194J. htm
11/16/12
Page 3 of 5
NECESSITE D'UNE INSTRUCTION
Pouvoirs du tribunal
20.05 (1) Si le jugement sommaire est refuse ou n'est accorde qu'en partie, le tribunal
peut rendre une ordonnance dans laquelle it precise les faits pertinents qui ne sont pas en litige et
les questions qui doivent 'etre instruites. Il peut egalement ordonner que l'action soit instruite de
facon expeditive. Regl. de 1'Ont. 438/08, art. 14.
Directives et conditions
(2) Le tribunal qui ordonne l'instruction d'une action en vertu du paragraphe (1) peut
donner les directives ou imposer les conditions qu'il estime justes, et ordonner notamment :
a) la remise par chaque partie, dans un delai determine, d'un affidavit de documents
conformement aux directives du tribunal;
b) la presentation des motions dans un delai determine;
c) le depOt, dans un delai determine, d'un exposé des faits pertinents qui ne sont pas en
litige;
d) le deroulement des interrogatoires prealables conformement a un plan d'enquete
prealable etabli par le tribunal, dans lequel un calendrier des interrogatoires peut etre
fixe et des limites au droit a l'interrogatoire prealable qui sont justes peuvent etre
imposees, y compris la limitation de l'enquete prealable a des questions qui n'ont pas
ete traitees dans les affidavits ou les autres elements de preuve presentes a l'appui de
la motion et dans les contre-interrogatoires sur ceux-ci;
e) la modification d'un plan d'enquete prealable convenu par les parties en application de
la Regle 29.1 (plan d'enquete prealable);
f) l'utilisation, a l'instruction, des affidavits ou des autres elements de preuve presentes
l'appui de la motion et des contre-interrogatoires sur ceux-ci comme s'il s'agissait
d' interrogatoires prealables;
g) la limitation de la duree de tout interrogatoire d'une personne prevu a la Regle 36
(obtention de depositions avant l'instruction);
h) la remise par une partie, dans un delai determine, d'un résumé ecrit de la deposition
prevue d'un temoin;
i) la limitation de la duree de tout interrogatoire oral d'un temoin a l'instruction;
j) la presentation par affidavit de tout ou partie de la deposition d'un temoin;
k) la rencontre, sous toutes reserves, des experts engages par les parties ou en leur nom
relativement a l'action pour determiner les questions en litige sur lesquelles ils
s'entendent et celles sur lesquelles ils ne s'entendent pas, pour tenter de clarifier et
regler toute question en litige qui fait l'objet d'un desaccord et pour rediger une
declaration conjointe exposant les sujets d'entente et de desaccord ainsi que les motifs
de ceux-ci, s'il estime que les economies de temps ou d'argent ou les autres avantages
qui peuvent en decouler sont proportionnels aux sommes en jeu ou a l'importance des
questions en litige dans la cause et que, selon le cas :
(i) it y a des perspectives raisonnables d'en arriver a un accord sur une partie ou
11/16/12
Page 4 of 5
l'ensemble des questions en litige,
(ii) le fondement des opinions d'experts contraires est inconnu et qu'une
clarification des questions faisant l'objet d'un desaccord aiderait les parties ou le
tribunal;
1) la remise par chacune des parties d'un résumé concis de sa declaration preliminaire;
m) la comparution des parties devant le tribunal au plus tard a une date determinee,
comparution au cours de laquelle le tribunal peut rendre toute ordonnance qu'autorise
le present paragraphe;
n) l'inscription de l'action pour instruction a une date dorm& ou son inscription a un role
donne, sous reserve des directives du juge principal regional;
o) la consignation de la totalite ou d'une partie de la somme demandee;
p) le versement d'un cautionnement pour &pens. Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, art. 14.
Faits precises
(3) Lors de l'instruction, les faits precises conformement au paragraphe (1) ou a Palinea
(2) c) sont reputes etablis, a moms que le juge du proces n'ordonne autrement afin d'eviter une
injustice. Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, art. 14.
Ordonnance : deposition par affidavit
(4) Lorsqu'il est decide si une ordonnance doit etre rendue en vertu de Palinea (2) j), le
fait qu'une partie opposee peut etre fond& a exiger la presence du deposant a l'instruction pour
le contre-interroger constitue un facteur pertinent. Regl. de 1'Ont. 438/08, art. 14.
Ordonnance : experts, depens
(5) Si une ordonnance est rendue en vertu de l'alinea (2) k), chaque partie paie ses propres
&pens. Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, art. 14.
Defaut de se conformer a l'ordonnance
(6) Si une partie ne se conforme pas a une ordonnance de consignation prevue a l'alinea
(2) o) ou a une ordonnance de cautionnement pour &pens prevue a l'alinea (2) p), le tribunal
peut, sur motion de la partie adverse, rejeter l'action, radier la defense ou rendre une autre
ordonnance juste. Regl. de 1'Ont. 438/08, art. 14.
(7) Si la defense est radiee sur motion presentee en application du paragraphe (6), le
defendeur est repute constate en defaut. Regl. de l'Ont. 438/08, art. 14.
CONDAMNATION AUX DEPENS POUR USAGE ABUSIF DE LA REGLE
20.06 Le tribunal peut fixer les &pens d'une motion visant a obtenir un jugement
sommaire sur une base d'indemnisation substantielle et en ordonner le paiement par une partie
si, selon le cas :
a) la partie a agi deraisonnablement en presentant la motion ou en y repondant;
b) la partie a agi de mauvaise foi dans l'intention de causer des retards. Regl. de l'Ont.
438/08, art. 14.
11/16/12
tribunaux judiciaires (Loi sur les) - R.R.O. 1990, Rea 194
Page 5 of 5
EFFET DU JUGEMENT SOMMAIRE
20.07 Le demandeur qui obtient un jugement sommaire peut poursuivre le meme
defendeur pour d'autres mesures de redressement. R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194, regle 20.07.
SURSIS D'EXECUTION
20.08 Le tribunal, s'il constate qu'il devrait etre sursis a l'execution d'un jugement
sommaire en attendant le reglement d'une autre question en litige dans l'action, d'une demande
reconventionnelle, d'une demande entre defendeurs ou d'une mise en cause, peut ordonner le
sursis a des conditions justes. R.R.O. 1990, Regl. 194, regle 20.08.
APPLICATION AUX DEMANDES RECONVENTIONNELLES, AUX DEMANDES
ENTRE DEFENDEURS ET AUX MISES EN CAUSE
20.09 Les regles 20.01 a 20.08 s'appliquent, avec les modifications necessaires, aux
demandes reconventionnelles, aux demandes entre defendeurs et aux miser en cause. R.R.O.
1990. Regl. 194, regle 20.09.
11/16/12
Court File No. 34641
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE ONTARIO COURT OF
APPEAL)
BETWEEN:
Robert Hryniak
Appellant
(Appellant)
- and Fred Mauldin, Dan Myers, Robert Blomberg,
Theodore Landkammer,
Lloyd Chelli, Stephen Yee, Marvin Cleair, Carolyn
Cleair, Richard Hanna,
Douglas Laird, Charles Ivans, Lyn White And Athena
White
Respondents
(Respondents)
FACTUM OF THE APPELLANT
Filing Party: ROBERT HRYNIAK
McCarthy Tetrault LLP
Suite 5300, Toronto Dominion Bank Tower
Toronto ON M5K 1E6
Sarit E. Batner
Brandon Kain
Moya J. Graham
Tel: (416) 601-7756 Fax: (416) 868-0673
Counsel for the Appellant, Robert Hryniak.
Cavanagh Williams Conway Baxter LLP
401 — 1111 Prince of Wales Drive
Ottawa ON K2C 3T2
Colin S. Baxter
Tel: (613) 780-2016 Fax: (613) 569-8668
Ottawa Agent for the Appellant, Robert Hryniak.
#11870571

SCC Court File No. 34641 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

Transcription

Documents pareils

Une Gomme Un Crayon Un Stylo Un Taille

Les vêtements/La Mode un collant un gilet un haut un jean un

4. L` animal a... Le poisson a . Le cochon d`Inde a . L

les 10 principes fondamentaux de notre projet éducatif the 10 basic

Avec ces chaussures, il ne manque plus aux enfants qu`une

Check yor vocabulary A. 1. During a TV quiz show /game, a

Water Needs - Anglophonie

Find eBook \\ tattoo d`une star

Vocabulaire anglais lié aux vêtements