Antitrust Writing Awards 2016 - Institute of Competition Law

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Antitrust Writing Awards 2016 - Institute of Competition Law
Antitrust Writing
Awards & Ranking
2013
Washington DC, 9 April 2013
www.awards.concurrences.com
JURY
The 2013 Jury comprised the Board, the Academic and Business Steering Committees, the Editorial Committee and the
Readers. Each of these contributed to the selection process. The Editorial Committee of the Institute of Competition Law
selected a pool of around 100 articles based on Steering Committees members’ suggestions. Then, both the Steering
Committees members and the Readers made a short-list of the most interesting articles. The Board members finally selected
the award-winning articles among the short-lists provided by the Steering Committees and the readers.
Board
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
Julie BRILL,
Commissioner, Federal Trade
Commission
Alexander ITALIANER,
Director General, DG COMP,
European Commission
Frédéric JENNY,
Chairman, OECD Competition
Committee
William E. KOVACIC,
Law School Professor and
Director, George Washington
University Competition Law Center
Bruno LASSERRE,
President, French Competition
Authority and Chairman European
Competition Network
Academic Steering Committee
Christian BOVET, Geneva University
Daniel CRANE, University of Michigan Law School
s Harry FIRST, New York University
s Eleanor FOX, New York University
s Michal S. GAL, University of Haifa
s Andrew GAVIL, Howard University School of Law, Washington DC
s David GERBER, Kent College of Law, Chicago University
s Laurence IDOT, University of Panthéon-Assas, Paris II
s Clifford A. JONES, University of Florida
s John B. KIRKWOOD, Seattle University Law School
s Ioannis LIANOS, University College London
s John E. LOPATKA, Penn State Law University
s Janusz ORDOVER, New York University
s Nicolas PETIT, Institute for European Legal Studies, Liege
s Howard SHELANSKI, Georgetown University
s Daniel SOKOL, University of Florida
s Andreas STEPHAN, University of East Anglia
s Florian WAGNER-VON PAPP, University College London
s Wouter P.J. WILS, King’s College London
s Joshua WRIGHT, George Mason University
s
s
Business Steering Committee
Editorial Committee
s
Paul ANDRES, Antitrust Counsel, Nestlé
s
Jean-Yves ART, Deputy General Counsel, Microsoft
Nicolas CHARBIT, Chief Editor, Concurrences
and e-Competitions
s
Vanessa CAPRANO-CHAUVIN, Legal Director, Teva
s
Olaf CHRISTIANSEN, Senior Vice-President, Bertelsmann
Elisa RAMUNDO, Managing Editor, the Institute
of Competition Law
s
Laurent GEELHAND, General Counsel, Michelin
s
Wolfgang HECKENBERGER, Chief Counsel
Competition, Siemens
s
Fanny MEJANE, Deputy Chief Editor, Concurrences
s
Anna CHEHTOVA, Senior Editor - Attorney, US FTC
s
Mathew HEIM, General Counsel, Qualcomm
s
Cory HAYLEY-JOHNSON, US Associate Editor
s
Julia HOLTZ, Competition Director, Google
s
Maly OP-COURTAIGNE, US Associate Editor
s
Susan JONES, Head Corporate Legal Antitrust, Novartis
s
Abigail SLATER, US Associate Editor
Attorney US FTC
s
Gabriel MCGANN, Chief Antitrust Counsel, Coca-Cola
s
James MURRAY, Associate General Counsel & Chief Antitrust
Counsel, Intel
s
Libby RUTHERFORD, Vice President and General Counsel for
Global Compliance and Go-To-Market,
Procter & Gamble
s
Vanessa TURNER, General Counsel, Visa Europe
s
Suzanne E. WACHSSTOCK, VP & Chief Antitrust Counsel,
American Express
s
Mark WITHENER, Senior Competition Counsel,
General Electric
s
Gary ZANFAGNA, Chief Antitrust Counsel, Honeywell
CONTENTS
Awards
2
Ranking
12
Reception & Dinner
14
Press report
16
Testimonials
17
Rules
19
Organizers
20
FOREWORD
Bill Kovacic
Nicolas Charbit
George Washington University
Competition Law Center
Institute of Competition Law
Concurrences / e-Competitions
T
he Antitrust Writing Awards’ goal is to promote antitrust
scholarship and competition advocacy by recognizing and
awarding the best articles published in the antitrust law and law
& economics fields in the last 12 months.
The Awards feature two different categories of articles: Academic
and Business. The Academic Articles category comprises articles
published in academic journals, whereas the Business Articles
category features articles published in professional magazines
or newsletters.
The articles have been selected by a jury and by readers. The 2013
jury consisted of a Board - Alexander Italianer, Julie Brill, Fred Jenny,
Bill Kovacic, and Bruno Lasserre - an Academic and a Business
Steering Committees composed of leading academics and counsels.
Readers contributed to the selection process by voting for articles.
We are most thankful to the jury members who spent valuable time
to read and review the 100 selected articles and to our sponsors
who made these Awards possible.
This 2013 edition of the Awards also features a Ranking of
30 newsletters and other professional antitrust publications. Whereas
the Articles Awards reward individual articles, the Newsletters Ranking
rewards antitrust newsletters considered overall. The aim of this Ranking
is to provide practitioners with a useful description and ranking.
In the wake of Chairman Lasserre’s own words, we will continue
working to promote quality articles in the antitrust field and to favor
the cooperation at play between antitrust publications to ensure the
greatest circulation of academic and professional expertise.
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 1
PART I
AWARDS WINNING ARTICLES
ACADEMIC ARTICLES
1. BEST GENERAL ANTITRUST ARTICLE
RECIDIVISM IN EU ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT:
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
WOUTER P.J. WILS
> World Competition, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2012
R
ecidivism has in the last few years attracted much
attention and controversy in the context of EU antitrust
enforcement.
In the conclusions of their study, published in 2005, of appeals
against decisions of the European Commission in cartel
cases, Christopher Harding and Alun Gibbs identified an
“awesome level of recidivism on the part of major companies
who appear as usual suspects in the world of business
cartels. In short this suggests a confirmed culture of business
delinquency.” In 2006, the European Commission revised its
Guidelines for setting fines in antitrust cases. One of three
main changes was that repeat offenders would be fined more
than in the past: the European Commission now takes into
account not only its own previous decisions, but also those
by the competition authorities of the EU Member States
applying EU antitrust law; the increase of the fine on account
of recidivism may be up to 100 %; and each prior infringement
will justify an increase of the fine.[...]
Noteworthy is also that some national competition authorities
in EU Member States that have adopted fining guidelines more
recently have chosen not to follow the example of the European
Commission’s 2006 Fining Guidelines, opting instead for a
lower maximum increase of fines on account of recidivism and
stricter conditions as to what instances of recidivism are taken
into account.
On the other hand, it has been observed that the European
Commission has not made full use of the possibilities offered
by its 2006 Fining Guidelines, increasing in practice fines by
50 % in case of one prior infringement, 60 % in case of two
prior infringements, 90 % in case of three prior infringements,
and 100 % in case of four prior infringements, far below the
100 %, 200 %, 300 % and 400 % limits set out in the 2006
Fining Guidelines.
John Connor has claimed to have identified, on the basis of
his own statistics on the incidence of recidivism, compared
with the decisions taken by the European Commission in
application of the 2006 Fining Guidelines, a “large number of
defendants convicted under the new guidelines that received
2 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
no recidivism penalty when they clearly qualified for such. […]
More generally, John Connor has claimed, on the basis of his
(world-wide) statistics for international cartels during the last
two decades, that “recidivism appears to be increasing rapidly,
both in number and relative to all corporate cartelists. […] This
observation seems to justify a continuation of policies that
impose brutally higher fines and other effective sanctions on
cartel recidivists.”
This paper first clarifies the concept of recidivism (Chapter II),
and then analyses the treatment of recidivism as an aggravating
circumstance for the setting of fines (Chapter III), the interplay
between recidivism and leniency (Chapter
Julie Brill, FTC
IV), and the difficulty of drawing concluJoshua Wright,
George Mason University -FTC sions as to the overall effectiveness of EU
antitrust enforcement from the observed
Ewoud Sakkers, DG COMP
(for W. P. J. Wils)
incidence of recidivism (Chapter V).
ACADEMIC ARTICLES
2. BEST ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES ARTICLE
MOVING BEYOND CARICATURE
AND CHARACTERIZATION: THE MODERN
RULE OF REASON IN PRACTICE
ANDREW I. GAVIL
> Southern California Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 3, 2012
T
he “rule of reason” endorsed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in its 1911 decision dissolving the Standard
Oil trust has been variously denigrated by critics as
“unstructured,” “full blown,” “uncertain,” and costly to
administer in all its forms. This article challenges that
conventional wisdom as dated. It argues that the rule of
reason has evolved considerably since Standard Oil,
largely due to the Court’s progression away from per se
rules and undemanding burdens of proof, in favor of a
structured analytical framework that focuses on evidence
of anticompetitive effect and efficiency. While lower courts
differ somewhat in their approaches, many cases are
decided largely at the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment stages and the modern rule of reason works
generally well to sort the strong from the weak claims.
Nevertheless, despite this considerable progress, criticism
of the rule of reason persists. Ironically, today’s critic
yearns for the certainty of the per se era, but at the other
end of the spectrum: they advocate for per se legal
standards and easy to apply filters that would more readily
terminate weak or allegedly “frivolous” cases, even though
defendants prevail at the motion to dismiss or summary
judgment stage of antitrust litigation the overwhelming
percentage of the time. The discourse is dominated by
easily exaggerated claims of “false positives.” Little
concern is expressed for the potentiality of an increased
incidence of “false negatives” or for the costs of obtaining
an imagined degree of economic certainty.
substitute for better and more cost-effective approaches
to resolving antitrust cases.
One solution can be found in thoughtful use of abbreviated analysis, sometimes referred to as the “quick look.”
The article retraces the intellectual history of the quick
look and concludes that the prevalent view today that the
quick look can only be invoked based on evidence of
“actual anticompetitive effect” is misguided. Abbreviated
analysis was the brain child of relatively more conservative
commentators and enforcers concerned with the costs
of antitrust decision-making. It was designed to permit
courts to more readily reach reliable conclusions about
the likely effects of conduct based on an assessment of
basic market facts, informed by economic reasoning. This
approach, which traces its origins to Professor Philip
Areeda’s suggestion that sometimes the rule of reason
can be applied in the “twinkling of an eye,” warrants our
renewed attention. A more symmetrical evaluation of the
plausibility of harms and efficiencies might aid the resolution of
many cases that do not warrant in-depth assessments of measurable effects and benefits. The
Julie Brill, FTC
often theoretical benefit of added certainty may
Eleanor Fox, NYU
Andrew Gavil, FTC simply not be worth the additional cost.
When these arguments are unpacked, however, they turn
out to be directed in significant part at the U.S. antitrust
system. The combination of antitrust specific incentives
to suit, such as treble damages and attorneys’ fees, and
system characteristics such as broad discovery, class
actions, and jury trials, are derided as a “toxic cocktail”
that brings defendants to their knees and promotes
coerced settlements, which in term further encourage
weak cases. Although these arguments are exaggerated,
they are not without some merit. They also may suggest,
however, that adjustments to antitrust doctrine are a poor
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 3
ACADEMIC ARTICLES
3. BEST UNILATERAL CONDUCT ARTICLE
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
OF ACCESS DENIALS
SUSAN A. CREIGHTON AND JONATHAN M. JACOBSON
> World Competition: Law & Economics Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2012
S
usan Creighton’s and Douglas Ginsburg, NYU
Jonathan Jacobson’s “25 Jonathan Jacobson,
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
Years of Access Denials”
was written for the twenty-fifth anniversary of Antitrust
magazine. It tracks developments in denial of access cases
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act from Aspen in 1985
forward. The primary focus is on what several courts since
Aspen have held to be a requirement – that the denial of
access to the defendant’s facilities represent a reversal of
a previously-profitable course of dealing. The article
explains that any such requirement would be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Otter Tail, the
holding of which has never been questioned, and with
sound antitrust policy. Firms will be reluctant to commence
dealing with potential rivals – and so will forego economically efficient relationships – if, as a legal consequence,
they are barred by antitrust laws from terminating those
relationships. The threat of deterring efficient arrangements
is especially acute when one considers how easy it is for
a plaintiff to assert a narrow market definition in which the
defendant could be argued to have a dominant position.
Because of the high value that antitrust places correctly on
a firm’s ability to choose with whom it will deal, the better
focus is not on prior dealings but on whether the refusal to
deal would make economic sense without the elimination
or marginalization of a competitive constraint. Termination
of a previously-profitable business arrangement may be
relevant to that calculation, but should not be determinative.
4 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
ACADEMIC ARTICLES
4. BEST MERGERS ARTICLE
MERGER ENFORCEMENT ACROSS
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES
HOWARD SHELANSKI, JESSE SOLOMON, AND RONAN P. HARTY
> Concurrences N° 2-2012, n°45073, May 2012
B
ill Kovacic has written persuasively that the
political rhetoric of antitrust has often been at
odds with what the antitrust agencies have
actually done and with any meaningful assessment of
their performance. This article follows Kovacic by
analyzing data from the FTC’s and the DOJ’s review of
mergers over thirty years, from 1981 through 2010, for
correlations to shifts in political administration.
We analyze historical trends from one administration to
the next with regard to five metrics: (1) agency budgeting,
(2) the number of transactions reported under the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, (3)
requests for and grants of early termination of the waiting
period, (4) the issuance of second requests by the
agencies, and (5) transaction challenges brought by the
agencies.
These data demonstrate some interesting, and at times
counterintuitive, relationships between specific administrations and merger review and enforcement activity. On
a more granular level, these data also demonstrate some
trends regarding how merger review and enforcement
statistics have been sensitive to change over from one
agency chief to the next within administrations. By some
measures, enforcement activity appears to decline
during Republican administrations and increase during
Democratic governments. At the same time, there are
other measures that contradict that pattern. Our analysis
therefore supports Kovacic’s skepticism about any
simple relationship between antitrust enforcement and
political administration and reinforces his call for moving
beyond activity measures in judging the success of an
administration’s antitrust policies.
James Keyte, Skadden Arps
Jesse Solomon, Davis Polk
Howard Shelanski, FTC
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 5
ACADEMIC ARTICLES
5. BEST ECONOMICS ARTICLE
LOYALTY REBATES
AND THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS
HANS ZENGER
> Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 717-768, 2012
T
Julie Brill, FTC
Hans Zenger, CRA
Bill Kovacic, GWULS
6 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
he degree of divergence between U.S. and
European case law on the proper legal treatment
of loyalty rebates is larger than in almost any
other field of international antitrust law. Whereas U.S.
jurisprudence has traditionally considered loyalty rebates
to be a pro-competitive business practice, the Court of
Justice of the European Union has repeatedly held that
loyalty rebates are an illegal means of distorting competition. This article challenges the Community Courts’
conviction that loyalty rebates do not constitute competition on the merits and claims the opposite. The adoption
of loyalty rebates is a direct consequence and a vital
expression of the competitive process. The need for
different forms of loyalty rebates naturally emerges from
the diverse market conditions that prevail in different
industries, which explains the widespread use of diverse
loyalty rebates in business practice. It is the heterogeneity
of commercial pressures that dominant firms are facing
which determines the competitive structure and size of
their rebates. By suppressing competition in rebates,
orthodox legal doctrine in Europe has distorted the
competitive process in a variety of global markets and
thereby caused significant harm to competition and
consumers. Since loyalty rebates are an efficient and
healthy form of competition, plaintiffs and competition
authorities that allege anti-competitive foreclosure as a
result of loyalty rebates should generally carry the burden
of proving the existence of a restriction of competition.
The Court’s prevailing interpretation of Article 102 TFEU,
by contrast, is bound to punish successful innovators
and to protect less effective rivals from the inconveniences of the competitive process.
BUSINESS ARTICLES
1. BEST GENERAL ANTITRUST ARTICLE
ANALYSIS OF POLICY STATEMENT
OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY
REGARDING ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS
ROBERT E. BLOCH AND SCOTT P. PERLMAN
> Mayer Brown, Antitrust and Competition, 2012
U
nder the Affordable Care Act, health care providers are
encouraged to form accountable care organizations
(ACOs) to manage and coordinate care for purposes of
the Medicare Shared Savings Program. The ACOs formed for
Medicare also are likely to be used by providers to contract with
commercial payers, and represent an important opportunity for
providers to work together to improve the quality of care while
also reducing health care costs. However, increased provider
consolidation also raises the risk that ACOs will be able to
exercise market power in the form of higher rates to commercial
payers and patients. In an effort to balance these considerations,
in October 2011, the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice issued a Statement on
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program (Policy Statement) to “ensure that health care providers
have the antitrust clarity and guidance to form procompetitive
ACOs that participate in both the Medicare and commercial
markets.” This article describes the Policy Statement, including
its reliance on clinical integration criteria set by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid, the Policy Statement’s safe harbor
provisions, and guidance to parties forming ACOs that fall
outside the safe harbors. The article also discusses the manner
in which the Policy Statement departs from the agencies’ 1996
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care to
encourage the formation of ACOs, and whether those changes
increase the risk that ACOs will have anticompetitive effects.
Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC
James Muray, Intel
Scott Perlman, Mayer Brown
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 7
BUSINESS ARTICLES
2. BEST ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES ARTICLE
ANTITRUST LITIGATION:
ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS HELD
BY REGULATORY AUTHORITIES
TOM K. CASSELS, KEITH R. JONES, RICHARD PIKE, AND FRANCESCA RICHMOND
> Baker & McKenzie Client Alert, April 2012
T
om Cassels, Keith Jones, Richard Pike and
Francesca Richmond from Baker & McKenzie’s
Antitrust Litigation team in London are the
authors of Antitrust Litigation: Access to Documents Held
by Regulatory Authorities, winner of the Business
category Anticompetitive Practices section. The article is
one of a series produced by this team on the topic. It
describes an April 2012 judgment handed down by the
English High Court that addressed whether documents
submitted by decision addressees as part of the
European Commission’s leniency process should be
disclosed in a private action for damages. The article also
comments on the European Commission’s position on
whether such documents should be disclosed and the
submissions made by the European Commission to the
English High Court as well as to the courts of other
Member States and in the U.S. on this issue.
Claimant access to documents has been subject to
litigation in a number of EU Member States. The possibility that leniency documents might be disclosed has
created real tension between regulators’ desire not to
8 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
inhibit future leniency
applications and the
need for claimants to be
able to obtain information in order to establish
that an infringement has occurred that has caused them
damage. The European Commission has indicated that
it intends to address this tension by announcing its own
proposals on the interplay between private antirust
actions and leniency programs. These proposals are
likely to protect documents created specifically to
support applications for leniency, but that protection is
not likely to extend to other documents submitted with
the application.
Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC
Julia Holtz, Google
Francesca Richmond, Baker & McKenzie
Tom Cassels, Baker & McKenzie
The potential for claimants to obtain information from
regulatory authorities and varying approaches in different
jurisdictions to disclosure as between parties calls for a
joined up litigation strategy when bringing or defending
a multi-jurisdictional antitrust damages claim.
BUSINESS ARTICLES
3. BEST UNILATERAL CONDUCT ARTICLE
THE CURIOUS CASE OF COMPULSORY
LICENSING IN INDIA
NAVAL SATARAWALA CHOPRA AND DINOO MUTHAPPA
> Competition Law International, Vol. 8 No. 2, August 2012
I
n March 2012, the Indian Patents Authority granted
the first compulsory license under Indian patent law in
Natco v. Bayer, to Bayer’s patented anti-cancer drug
‘sorafenib tosylate.’ A compulsory license for the
manufacture and sale of sorafenib tosylate was granted
to Natco for the balance term of Bayer’s patent, subject
to the payment of a royalty of six per cent of the net sales
of the drug to Bayer
‘The Curious Case of Compulsory Licensing in India’
discusses the Natco v. Bayer decision and considers the
possibility of India’s competition authority, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), issuing a compulsory
license on similar grounds, in the event a dominant holder
of intellectual property (IP) rights refuses to voluntarily
license its IP.
The article discusses the European Union (EU) and
American approaches to non-merger compulsory
licensing under competition law, and the approach and
enforcement priorities of the CCI under abuse of
dominance cases in India is also outlined.
In the EU and the U.S., it is only after a careful comparative analysis between the need to encourage innovation
and the goal of promoting and fostering competition that
a compulsory licensing remedy is issued in exceptional
cases. Under the provisions of India’s competition legislation, the Competition Act, 2002, a compulsory license
to remedy an abusive refusal-to-license appears to be
within the CCI’s ambit. Though competition law is a tool
used for the attainment of economic freedom and
prosperity in the developed economies of the EU and the
U.S., in the Indian context and in light of the previous
decisions of the CCI, the authors find that competition
law in India may be motivated by other considerations,
including access to healthcare.
especially circumspect in
the exercise of such
authority and also caution
against the CCI becoming
a price regulator. If
competition intervention is used to remedy social inequity
rather than to ensure a competitive market place,
pharmaceutical companies may find great risk in
operating in India and this may adversely impact foreign
investment in this sector. The article therefore recommends that compulsory licensing as a remedy to anticompetitive conduct should only be used where there
are over-arching contraventions of competition law and
alternative remedies are insufficient, and where the
interests in favor of a licensee are so strong, they trump
any harm that could be caused to the innovation incentives of IP holders.
Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC
Paul Andres, Nestlé
Naval Satarawala Chopra,
Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A Shroff
Given that the test for establishing a refusal-to-license
abuse and the corresponding grant of a compulsory
license remedy is subject to strict scrutiny in jurisdictions
overseas, the authors recommend that the CCI be
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 9
BUSINESS ARTICLES
4. BEST MERGERS ARTICLE
ANTITRUST ANALYSES OF PATENT
ACQUISITIONS—QUID NOVI?
DAVID M. MAIORANA, GEOFFREY D. OLIVER, AND AUSRA O. DELUARD
> Jones Day Publications, May 2012
T
he article uses the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
and European Commission (Commission) review of
the Google/Motorola Mobility patent acquisition,
along with the DOJ review of the Apple-Microsoft-RIM/
Nortel Networks and Apple/Novell patent acquisitions
(collectively, the ‘2012 Patent Acquisitions’), to explore the
application of traditional theories of horizontal and vertical
merger review to the acquisition of patent portfolios. The
article argues that the analysis of the acquisition of patent
portfolios is similar to that of the acquisition of any other
assets, with a few minor differences to account for the
specific nature of intellectual property rights.
Specifically, antitrust agencies will apply a traditional
horizontal analysis to consider the degree of direct competition between IP rights held by an acquiring firm and the
IP rights being acquired to determine whether the acquisition would substantially lessen competition between
alternative technologies. One of the clearest examples was
the Federal Trade Commission’s analysis and remedy in
connection with the formation of the Montedison/Shell joint
venture in the 1990’s. Most polypropylene plants licensed
technology either from Montedison or from Shell as inputs
to their production. To prevent the joint venture from
controlling both of the two leading technologies, the FTC
required Shell to divest both tangible and intangible assets.
Horizontal analysis is potentially relevant to every acquisition of patents, even though it was not discussed by the
DOJ or the Commission in connection with the 2012
Patent Acquisitions.
The antitrust agencies will also apply a vertical analysis to
patent acquisitions. This considers whether the combination of upstream inputs—intellectual property rights over
technology—with downstream operations would change
the ability or incentives of the IP owner to exclude competitors in the downstream business from access to the
technology and, if so, whether the effect would be to hinder
the ability of competitors to compete in the downstream
business. The risk of such foreclosure may be particularly
high if the intellectual property in question consists of
10 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
standard-essential patents. This was the focus of the
analysis of both the DOJ and the Commission in the 2012
Patent Acquisitions.
The article examines the agencies’ conclusion that the
2012 Patent Acquisitions were unlikely to harm competition. The article notes that the DOJ’s reliance in part on
Apple’s licensing commitments was consistent with U.S.
agencies’ willingness to rely on licensing remedies in IP
acquisitions. Although Google’s licensing commitments
were more ambiguous, both the DOJ and the Commission
concluded that the acquisition was unlikely to change
Motorola Mobility’s licensing practices or competitors’
access to standards-essential patents. The article
concludes that the agencies are likely to apply this analytical framework to consideration of future IP acquisitions.
Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC
Ron Stern, General Electric
David Maiorana, Jones Day
BUSINESS ARTICLES
5. BEST ECONOMICS ARTICLE
SPONSORED ENTRY
ALAN OVERD
> CRA Competition Memo, January 2012
S
ome mergers materially reduce the choice of
suppliers available to customers. When this
happens, how much weight should competition
authorities give to the potential for customers to sponsor
new entry? The possibility of customers sponsoring new
entry as a means of countering adverse merger effects is
often cited, but the conditions under which such a defense
is likely to be convincing are limited. Two recent cases
investigated by the UK Competition Commission (CC) give
an insight into the circumstances in which sponsored entry
arguments are likely to be successful. In one case (BATS/
Chi-X), it was concluded that the threat of customers
sponsoring a new entrant was so potent that the merged
firm would have no incentive to raise prices. In the other
(Kerry/Headland), customers were found to have shifted
significant volumes to alternative suppliers following a
completed transaction which raised substantial competition concerns. The CC cleared both deals without conditions.
The two cases analyzed in the article show that competition authorities are willing to consider sponsored entry
arguments provided the economic analysis demonstrates
that the impact is likely, timely and sufficient to counter a
potential substantial lessening of competition resulting from
a merger. In one case, the potential entry remained
hypothetical, but modelling work, the views of customers
and market precedents were relied upon to show that if
the merged entity’s offering did deteriorate, sponsored
entry would be likely to produce a viable rival. In the other
case, the fact that the transaction was completed allowed
an assessment to be carried out of customers’ ability to
shift volume to previously smaller market participants at
prices consistent with pre-merger levels.
Sponsored entry differs from standard buyer power
arguments in an important respect. It can be argued that
countervailing buyer power arguments have a weakness
in that large customers may be able to protect themselves
from the potentially anti-competitive effects of a merger but
the impact on smaller customers could still be significant.
Sponsored entry, in contrast, leads to the emergence of a
new market participant whose output is likely to be
available to customers regardless of size. That said,
sponsored entry—like buyer power arguments in general—
is only likely to be convincing in a minority of cases. It
requires a number of stringent conditions to be met in order
for it to be deemed to be sufficient to prevent a substantial lessening of competition. However, these recent cases
show that competition authorities are willing to consider
sponsored entry as a credible defense when these conditions are met.
Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC
Hans Zenger (for Alan Overd), CRA
Jean-Yves Art, Microsoft
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 11
PART II
RANKING
30 newsletters and other professional antitrust publications
have been reviewed by the Institute’s Editorial Board in order
to provide practitioners with a useful description and ranking.
WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA
USED TO RANK?
Professional antitrust publications include newsletters, blogs,
client briefs, memoranda, and even webinars accompanied
by written presentations freely made available on the internet.
Whereas the Articles Awards reward individual articles, the
Newsletters Ranking rewards antitrust newsletters considered overall.
Antitrust professional publications are ranked
according to 7 criteria:
s
Country coverage
s
Case coverage
s
Website’s accessibility
WHY A RANKING?
s
Innovation
The quality and usefulness of antitrust newsletters and other
professional publications vary greatly. Even though all this is going
in the right direction due to increased competition between firms
and also between university competition law centers, users’ ability
to read or browse such publications is limited. There are just too
many of these publications and too many similarities between
them for users to effectively assess what is worth reading or
watching.
s
Readership
s
Counsels’ Choice
s
Articles shortlisted or nominated for the Antitrust
Writing Awards
The assessment of the above categories is
based on a combination of objective and subjective criteria, together with individual interviews.
Ranking such publications is intended to guide users on which
publications they should read or view first, depending what they
are looking for.
GLOBAL RANKING
The Global Ranking of the Antitrust professional publications is based on the 7 rankings below.
1
CLEARY GOTTLIEB
6
JONES DAY
2
SKADDEN ARPS
7
BAKER & MCKENZIE
3
ALLEN & OVERY
8
CLIFFORD CHANCE
4
NORTON ROSE
9
FRESHFIELDS
5
WHITE & CASE
10 MAYER BROWN
RANKING BY
COUNTRY COVERAGE
RANKING BY
CASE COVERAGE
This ranking is based on the number of jurisdictions
addressed in the 2012 publications of each firm.
This ranking is based on the number of cases
covered in the 2012 publications of each firm.
1
ALLEN & OVERY
16
O’MELVENY
1
ALLEN & OVERY
16
PROSKAUER
2
CLIFFORD CHANCE
17
GIBSON DUNN
2
NORTON ROSE
17
SHEARMAN STERLING
3
JONES DAY
18
WINSTON & STRAWN
3
HERBERT SMITH
18
COVINGTON
4
HOGAN LOVELLS
19
DAVIS POLK
4
WEIL GOTSHAL
19
BAKER BOTTS
5
LATHAM WATKINS
20
MCDERMOTT
5
CLIFFORD CHANCE
20
MCDERMOTT
6
NORTON ROSE
21
WEIL GOTSHAL
6
JONES DAY
21
FRESHFIELDS
7
BAKER & MCKENZIE
22
ARNOLD & PORTER
7
ARNOLD & PORTER
22
GIBSON DUNN
8
HERBERT SMITH
23
COVINGTON
8
SKADDEN ARPS
23
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
9
SHEARMAN STERLING
24
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
9
HOGAN LOVELLS
24
WINSTON & STRAWN
10
FRESHFIELDS
25
PROSKAUER
10
LATHAM WATKINS
25
SIDLEY AUSTIN
11
WHITE & CASE
26
SIDLEY AUSTIN
11
CLEARY GOTTLIEB
26
MAYER BROWN
12
LINKLATERS
27
PAUL WEISS
12
LINKLATERS
27
SULLIVAN CROMWELL
13
CLEARY GOTTLIEB
28
SULLIVAN CROMWELL
13
PAUL WEISS
28
BAKER & MCKENZIE
14
SKADDEN ARPS
29
WILMERHALE
14
WHITE & CASE
29
WILMERHALE
15
MAYER BROWN
30
BAKER BOTTS
15
O’MELVENY
30
DAVIS POLK
12 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
RANKING BY
ACCESSIBILITY
RANKING BY
COUNSELS’ CHOICE
This ranking is based on objective criteria (pdf/html/print
publications, access to archives…) and subjective criteria
(design, search engine features…).
This ranking is based on counsels’ choice of their favorite
professional publication (based on a questionnaire sent
to at least 3,500 counsels).
1
WHITE & CASE
16
WILMERHALE
1
SKADDEN ARPS
16
SIDLEY AUSTIN
2
BAKER & MCKENZIE
17
LATHAM WATKINS
2
WHITE & CASE
17
MCDERMOTT
3
SIDLEY AUSTIN
18
O’MELVENY
3
CLEARY GOTTLIEB
18
LATHAM WATKINS
4
PROSKAUER
19
ARNOLD & PORTER
4
FRESHFIELDS
19
SHEARMAN STERLING
5
SULLIVAN CROMWELL
20
GIBSON DUNN
5
LINKLATERS
20
PROSKAUER
6
JONES DAY
21
FRESHFIELDS
6
NORTON ROSE
21
DAVIS POLK
7
CLEARY GOTTLIEB
22
SKADDEN ARPS
7
JONES DAY
22
WILMERHALE
8
CLIFFORD CHANCE
23
DAVIS POLK
8
HOGAN LOVELLS
23
SULLIVAN CROMWELL
9
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
24
WINSTON & STRAWN
9
ALLEN & OVERY
24
O’MELVENY
10
NORTON ROSE
25
PAUL WEISS
10
BAKER & MCKENZIE
25
ARNOLD & PORTER
11
MAYER BROWN
26
HERBERT SMITH
11
MAYER BROWN
26
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
12
MCDERMOTT
27
HOGAN LOVELLS
12
COVINGTON
27
HERBERT SMITH
13
SHEARMAN STERLING
28
LINKLATERS
13
GIBSON DUNN
28
WINSTON & STRAWN
14
ALLEN & OVERY
29
WEIL GOTSHAL
14
CLIFFORD CHANCE
29
BAKER BOTTS
15
COVINGTON
30
BAKER BOTTS
15
WEIL GOTSHAL
30
PAUL WEISS
RANKING BY INNOVATION
RANKING BY READERSHIP
This ranking is based on the presence of innovative
antitrust professional materials found on the firms
websites (e-books, blogs, webinars etc.).
This ranking is based on the number of counsels having
acknowledged that they receive the surveyed publications
(based on a questionnaire sent to at least 3,500 counsels).
1
ARNOLD & PORTER
16
GIBSON DUNN
1
SKADDEN ARPS
16
COVINGTON
2
BAKER & MCKENZIE
17
HOGAN LOVELLS
2
CLEARY GOTTLIEB
17
MCDERMOTT
3
NORTON ROSE
18
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
3
WHITE & CASE
18
WEIL GOTSHAL
4
WINSTON & STRAWN
19
LATHAM WATKINS
4
NORTON ROSE
19
BAKER & MCKENZIE
5
FRESHFIELDS
20
LINKLATERS
5
FRESHFIELDS
20
WILMERHALE
6
CLEARY GOTTLIEB
21
MAYER BROWN
6
HOGAN LOVELLS
21
SHEARMAN STERLING
7
CLIFFORD CHANCE
22
MCDERMOTT
7
CLIFFORD CHANCE
22
PROSKAUER
8
WHITE & CASE
23
O’MELVENY
8
ALLEN & OVERY
23
DAVIS POLK
9
JONES DAY
24
PAUL WEISS
9
MAYER BROWN
24
PAUL WEISS
10
SKADDEN ARPS
25
PROSKAUER
10
SIDLEY AUSTIN
25
BAKER BOTTS
11
ALLEN & OVERY
26
SHEARMAN STERLING
11
JONES DAY
26
O’MELVENY
12
COVINGTON
27
SIDLEY AUSTIN
12
LATHAM WATKINS
27
SULLIVAN CROMWELL
13
DAVIS POLK
28
SULLIVAN CROMWELL
13
GIBSON DUNN
28
HERBERT SMITH
14
HERBERT SMITH
29
WEIL GOTSHAL
14
LINKLATERS
29
WINSTON & STRAWN
15
WILMERHALE
30
BAKER BOTTS
15
ARNOLD & PORTER
30
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
RANKING BY BEST BUSINESS ARTICLES
This Ranking is based on the Antitrust Writing Awards Business articles.
Articles considered in this ranking are: shortlisted, nominated and winning-awards articles.
SHORTLISTED
NOMINATED
WINNERS
CLIFFORD CHANCE
ALLEN & OVERY
BAKER & MCKENZIE
FRESHFIELDS
CLEARY GOTTLIEB
DAVIS POLK
HERBERT SMITH
MCDERMOTT
JONES DAY
HOGAN LOVELLS
O’MELVENY
MAYER BROWN
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
SKADDEN ARPS
NORTON ROSE
PROSKAUER
SHEARMAN STERLING
WHITE & CASE
WILMERHALE
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 13
RECEPTION
& DINNER
America’s Health Insurance Plans
Japan Fair Trade Commission
Bertelsmann
Mexican Federal Competition
Commission
Bureau de la Concurrence - Canada
CADE
Colombian Competition Authority
Corning
DC District Court
Ericsson
Estée Lauder
European Commission
General Electric
George Mason University
George Washington University
Law School
Google
Microsoft
Nestle
New York University
1
Novartis
NY State Office Attorney General
Qualcomm
RIM
Sandisk
Square
UK Office of Fair Trading
US Federal Trade Commission
Yale University
Intel
2
3
14 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
4
5
8
1 Ron Stern, General Electric
2 Joshua Wright,
George Mason University - FTC,
George Cary, CGSH,
Andrew Gavil, FTC
3 Maurits Dolmans, CGSH,
Peter Carney, White & Case,
Mark Gidley, White & Case,
Alden Abbott, RIM
4 Peter Carney, White & Case,
Steve Harris, Baker & McKenzie,
Shweta Shroff Chopra,
Amarchand & Mangaldas
& Suresh A Shroff & Co
6
7
5 Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC,
Eleanor Fox, NYU
6 Howard Shelanski, FTC
7 Richard Steuer, Mayer Brown,
Marcos Paulo Verissimo, CADE
8 Douglas Ginsburg, NYU
9 Bill Kovacic, GWU
10 Robert Hubbard,
NY State Attorney General,
Abigail Slater, FTC,
Julie Brill, FTC
9
10
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 15
PRESS REPORT
FTC COMMISSIONER SEES INCREASED
FOCUS ON ‘PAY-FOR-DELAY’
IF HIGH COURT SIDES WITH AGENCY
LEAH NYLEN
> MLex, 9 Apr. 2013 [21.55 EST]
W
ashington -- If the US Supreme Court sides
with the Federal Trade Commission and rules
that payments from branded to generic drug
makers to delay entry of cheaper drugs are automatically
suspect under antitrust laws, the agency will likely step
up its enforcement in the area, a commissioner said.
The nation’s highest court heard arguments last month on
the legality of socalled «pay-for-delay» agreements, where
a branded drug maker pays to keep a generic from entry
the market. Oral arguments in that case - which pitted the
FTC against Solvay along with generic Par, Paddock and
Actavis, formerly known as Watson - shed «scant light»
on whether the court will hold the payment presumptively
unlawful or go with a more lenient standard proffered by
some courts to base the legality on the so-called ‘scope
of the patent’ test, FTC Commissioner Julie Brill said.
The most lenient test generally would allow the payments
if the litigation wasn’t a sham, the patent wasn’t obtained
by fraud and and the agreement doesn’t keep the generic
out beyond the length of the patent.
«I expect, depending on the outcome of the case, we will
see increased activity on the reverse payment issue,» Brill
said, speaking at an event* in Washington Tuesday night.
«Time will tell.»
The FTC has long opposed the payments as anticompetitive, saying they deny consumers access to cheaper
drugs.
* «Antitrust Writing Awards 2013.» Concurrences and George Washigton University
Law School. Washington, DC. April 9, 2013.
IN BRIEF
If the US Supreme Court sides with the Federal Trade
Commission and rules that payments from branded to
generic drug makers to delay entry of cheaper drugs are
automatically suspect under antitrust laws, the agency will
likely step up its enforcement in the area, a commissioner
said.
FTC Commissioner Julie Brill
16 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
TESTIMONIALS
BOARD
ACADEMIC STEERING
The Antitrust Writing Awards are
a unique opportunity to read some of the best
academic and business articles of the year.
I thoroughly enjoyed the different perspectives
on antitrust that each article provided, as well
as the well-crafted arguments put forward
by their talented writers"
The awards ceremony was a rewarding
event in more ways than one. It was a pleasure
to see these outstanding authors from all over
the world and to hear a synthesis of their work
which has contributed so much to the law and
it’s practice.”
COMMITTEE
Eleanor Fox, Professor, New York University
Alexander Italianer, Director General,
European Commission, DG COMP
By recognizing superior writing in academia
and practice, the Antitrust Writing Awards
enhance the indispensable intellectual
infrastructure of our field.”
The Antitrust Writing Awards represent
a very valuable project that will encourage
and support excellence in antitrust writing.”
David Gerber, Chicago University, Kent College of Law,
Professor
Bill Kovacic, Professor and Director, George Washington
University Competition Law Center
I truly enjoyed taking part in the 2013
Antitrust Writing Awards, which serves an
important function in helping promote quality
articles in the antitrust field. It is also an
illustration of the cooperation at play between
antitrust publications to ensure the greatest
circulation of academic and professional
expertise.”
Bruno Lasserre, President, French Competition Authority
and Chairman, European Competition Network
The Writing Awards have been very
valuable in highlighting antitrust scholarship and
emphasizing the transnational characteristics of
today’s antitrust scholarship. I applaud the
efforts of the Concurrences team!”
Janusz Ordover, Professor, New York University
The writing process provided exposure to
a number of very interesting articles and client
alerts. I applaud Concurrences for bringing
these works to the attention of a broad group
of practitioners.”
Daniel Sokol, Professor, Florida University
BUSINESS STEERING
COMMITTEE
The Antitrust Writing Awards provide a vital
forum for the validation and recognition of
thought-leading scholarship. They accompany
and consecrate the rising prominence and
impact of competition law on the global
economy.”
The Antitrust Writing Awards bring
together the Academic and the Business world
from many countries, contribute to a better
understanding of other legal cultures and
thereby promote the global development
of Competition law.”
Paul Andres, Nestlé
Olaf Christiansen, Bertelsmann
The quality and conciseness of the
Business Articles, as well as the experience and
knowledge which their authors are sharing, are
of great use to corporate lawyers.”
Jean-Yves Art, Microsoft
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 17
TESTIMONIALS
WINNERS & GUESTS
The Concurrences writing awards highlight
outstanding work by practitioners in the area of
competition law and policy and shed valuable
light on ’cutting edge’ topics.”
Alden Abbott, RIM
The Antitrust Writing Awards represent a
perfect mix of academic and business writing
and set the scene for a valuable exchange
among all players in the antitrust arena.”
Anna Rosa Cosi, SanDisk
I was impressed with the diligence with
which the jury reviewed and selected the
publications. This is a valuable exercise that not
only rewards the authors, but also is very helpful
for practitioners. We were honoured to receive
an award for our firm’s alert memoranda and
are grateful to Concurrences for this excellent
initiative.”
Maurits Dolmans, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
As sponsors as well as participants, we are
delighted to play an active role in raising the bar
of antitrust scholarship and the quality of client
publications across the legal community.”
Olivier Fréget, Allen & Overy
We are pleased with the significant
contribution that the Antitrust Writing Awards
program makes to the development and
promotion of antitrust scholarship and practical
business literature.”
I greatly value seeing the list of articles
nominated for a Concurrences award each year
because it invariably brings to my attention
some excellent pieces I would otherwise have
missed.”
Douglas H. Ginsburg, New York University
It was an honor to have our paper
reviewed and considered by such a distinguished panel of luminaries, with such leading
thinkers in both Europe and the United States.
The concept of encouraging excellence in both
academic and more practical writings on
competition is an excellent one, and Concurrences has done a remarkable job in creating a
process for doing so.”
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
The Antitrust Writing Awards represent a
unique initiative to reward pure and applied
research in antitrust. Academics and practitioners making valuable contributions to the
literature see their names recognised and their
work publicized. On a personal front,
I have enjoyed reading some of the papers that
were selected this year, most of which I would
have overlooked absent this initiative.”
Atilano Jorge Padilla, Compass Lexecon
I greatly appreciate our receiving this
award, and the dinner was a great opportunity
to meet and talk with other practitioners and
government enforcement officials.”
Scott P. Perlman, Mayer Brown
J. Mark Gidley, White & Case
This is a great event promoting antitrust
scholarship around the world.”
Hans Zenger, CRA
18 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
RULES
A. Awards
B. Ranking
The aim of the Antitrust Writing Awards is to promote competition
scholarship, and more generally, to contribute to competition advocacy.
Whereas the Awards reward individual articles, the Ranking rewards free
access antitrust professional publications considered overall. The Ranking’s’
goal is to promote competition advocacy by selecting the best of these
publications in order for readers to know what they should read first,
depending what they are looking for.
1. ELIGIBILITY
-
-
Articles eligible must have been published in print or electronic format in
2012 in English. Articles can be co-authored. Authors eligible are individuals.
Articles must be made freely available on the Internet (SSRN, academic
websites...) or on the Awards website for the purpose of these Awards in
order to allow the Jury to vote. Articles are classified in Academic and
Business categories. The Academic category comprises articles published
or accepted for publication in academic peer-reviewed journals, whereas
the Business category comprises articles published in professional
publications, such as newsletters, client briefs, memoranda, blogs. Each of
these categories is sub-divided as follow:
General (including cross-over topics, procedural issues)
Anticompetitive practices (including criminal cartel enforcement, civil federal,
state, and private enforcement, treatment of joint ventures, vertical
restrictions)
Unilateral conducts (including monopolization, attempted monopolization
and invitations to collude)
Mergers (substantive merger analysis, merger enforcement and guidelines)
Economics (including economic theories, models, and statistical tools used
in the antitrust field)
2. SELECTION & VOTING PROCEDURE
The Editorial Committee of the Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking selects
two pools of eligible academic and business articles based on Academic
and Business Steering Committees members’ suggestions. The Steering
Committees members and the readers then each make a short list of
nominated articles. The Board members finally select the award-winning
articles among the nominated articles provided by the Steering Committees
and the readers. The Editorial Committee, the Steering Committees and the
Board members are collectively referred as the Jury. Papers are judged
according to writing, scholarship, originality, practical relevance and the
contribution they make to competition advocacy. There is a winning-award
article for each of the sub-categories mentioned at 1. above, for each of the
Academic and Business categories. However, the Board reserves the right
to award fewer Awards than planned if the articles under consideration do
not meet the high standards of the Awards.
1. ELIGIBILITY
-
-
-
Antitrust professional publications include newsletters, client briefs,
memoranda, blogs, e-books, and even webinars accompanied by written
presentations made freely available on websites of law firms, economic
consulting firms, universities, etc. Publications eligible must have been
released in print or electronic format in 2012 in English. Authors eligible are
corporate entities. Publications are ranked according to 7 categories:
Country coverage: Ranking based on number of jurisdictions addressed in
the 2012 publications of each firm
Case coverage: Ranking based on number of cases covered in the 2012
publications of each firm
Accessibility: Ranking based on objective criteria (pdf/html/print publications,
access to archives…) and subjective criteria (design, search engine
features…)
Innovation: Ranking based on individual interviews
Readership: Ranking based on number of counsels having acknowledged
that they receive the surveyed publications (based on a questionnaire sent
to 3,500 counsels)
Counsels’ Choice: Ranking based on counsels’ choice of their favorite
professional publication (based on a questionnaire sent to 3,500 counsels)
Winning Business Awards articles
2. SELECTION & VOTING PROCEDURE
The Editorial Committee selects a pool of eligible antitrust professional
publications. The assessment of the above categories is based on a
combination of objective and subjective criteria, together with individual
interviews. For the Readership and Counsels’ Choice rankings, the Editorial
Committee sends a questionnaire to the 3,500 counsels subscribing to
Concurrences Journal and e-Competitions Bulletin. Any in-house counsel
or general counsel dealing with antitrust law is eligible to vote. Firms
considered in the ranking can direct their clients to the online questionnaire
in order to include in the survey their own contacts’ votes. A business e-mail
is requested in order to make sure only counsels vote.
C. Management
The Antitrust Writing Awards & Rankings are managed by the Institute of
Competition Law. The Institute, acting as the event manager, works to ensure
that a sufficient number of quality articles and publications are submitted
and surveyed, checks eligibility and organizes the Awards ceremony.
The 2013 Awards ceremony will take place on Tuesday April 9, the day
before the ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting in Washington DC. Attendance is
on invitation only.
Any unexpected issues will be dealt with by the Editorial Committee of the
Institute of Competition Law.
Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013 - 19
THE ORGANIZERS
Founded in May 2008, based on a generous cy pres award, the mission of the
Competition Law Center is to sponsor research and promote education in the
field of competition law – also known as antitrust law – particularly relating to
issues of international enforcement and the harmonization of national laws
and policies.
Bill Kovacic
George Washington University
Competition Law Center
The center aims, among other things, to:
>
sponsor and conduct legal and empirical research into competition law, including its
private enforcement;
>
organize seminars, symposia, conferences, innovative courses, and public lectures for
judges, executive officials, academics, practicing lawyers, and law students on topics
relating to competition law and its private enforcement;
>
serve as a resource for those seeking to promote private enforcement in competition
laws in the U.S. and abroad; and enhance the skills of current and future private practitioners of competition law.
www.gwu.edu
Concurrences is a print and online quarterly peer-reviewed journal dedicated
to EU and national competitions laws. Launched in 2004 as the flagship of the
Institute of Competition Law the journal provides a forum for both practitioners
and academics to shape national and EU competitions policy. Print and online
versions.
As a publication by an independent publisher, Concurrences enjoys unmatched editorial freedom. The Scientific Committee sets up the Editorial Policy and ensures rigorous peer-review in order to achieve the highest academic standards. The International
Committee actively promotes Concurrences abroad and in the US by organizing conferences, workshops and in-house seminars. Each year, the Concurrences Antitrust
Writing Awards co-organized with GW Competition Center honor outstanding academic and professional publications. Concurrences is also the publisher of «William E.
Kovacic: An Antitrust Tribute, Vol. 1» available on concurrences.com and Amazon.
www.concurrences.com
20 - Antitrust Writing Awards & Ranking 2013
Nicolas Charbit
Institute of Competition Law
Concurrences / e-Competitions
William E. Kovacic
An Antitrust Tribute
Liber Amicorum - Volume I
Description
This Antitrust Tribute is a selection of 31 essays providing an insightful and original look at
volume, mainly covering issues of U.S. and European antitrust law, gathers articles by
prominent authors among Professor Kovacic’s friends and colleagues. It is organized into
two parts. Part I, entitled “An Antitrust Career”, consists of 9 papers that pay tribute to
picture of his scholarship and public enforcement efforts. Part II, entitled “New Frontiers of
Antitrust”, includes 22 articles covering different aspects of competition law, ranging from
cartels in the U.S. and Europe to mergers analysis, private rights of action, antitrust
settlements, etc. The overall result is a collective work that offers the opportunity to look
whose growth Prof. Kovacic has contributed greatly.
Volume II will focus on the international career of William E. Kovacic and on international
and bilateral antitrust issues.
The Editors
Nicolas Charbit, PhD, is the President of the Institute of Competition Law, an independant publisher and Transatlantic think
tank. Elisa Ramundo, LLM, is the Managing Director of the Institute. Anna Chehtova and Abigail Slater work at the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission and have co-edited this Antitrust Tribute in their private capacity.
The Publisher
DETAILS
Publication date: November 2012
Hardcover
Price: $215.00
Shipping & Handling Charges
Domestic orders: $9.50
Export orders: $12.50
Trim Size: 6 X 9 inches
ISBN: 978-1-939007-40-7
Available on amazon.com
e-book
Price: $185.00
ISBN: 978-1-939007-41-4
Available on concurrences.com
ORDER
Subscriber details
Name-First name: ........................................................................................
e-mail: .........................................................................................................
Institution: ...................................................................................................
Street: ..........................................................................................................
City: .............................................................................................................
Zip Code: ....................................................................................................
Country: ..................................................................................................... .
Send your order to
Institute of Competition Law
885 Avenue of the Americas # 32 G
10001 New York NY
www.concurrences.com
[email protected]
Création : Yves Buliard : +33 6 67 29 85 43 - www.ybgraphic.fr
The Institute of Competition Law is the publisher of Concurrences Journal and the e-Competitions Bulletin.
The Institute is based in Paris, Brussels and New York.
www.concurrences.com
Nicolas Charbit
Elisa Ramundo
Anna Chehtova
Abigail Slater
William E. Kovacic
An Antitrust Tribute
Liber Amicorum - Volume I
Alden F. Abbott, Theodore L. Banks, Thomas Barnett, Jean-François Bellis,
William Blumenthal, Rachel Brandenburger, John M. Connor, Adrian Emch,
Joseph Farrell, John Fedele, Andre Fiebig, Harry First, Albert A. Foer,
Andrew I. Gavil, David J. Gerber, Douglas H. Ginsburg, John D. Harkrider,
Stephen Harris, Ronan P. Harty, Roxann E. Henry, Hugh M. Hollman,
Clifford A. Jones, James A. Keyte, Joseph Krauss, Abbott B. Lipsky, Joseph S. Nord,
George L. Priest, James F. Rill, J. Thomas Rosch, Christian M. Rowan,
Seth Sacher, Fiona A. Schaeffer, Kristin Shaffer, Howard A. Shelanski, Joe Sims,
D. Daniel Sokol, Jesse Solomon, John M. Taladay, Theodore Voorhees,
Xiaoye Wang, Spencer Weber Waller, Christine Wilson, Joshua D. Wright

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