Rapports nationaux - AIDP | Association Internationale De Droit Pénal

Transcription

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL / INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PENAL LAW
REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHO PENAL
78e année - nouvelle série
3er et 4ème trimestres 2007 (CD ROM Annexe)
SOMMAIRE / CONTENTS / ÍNDICE
Rapports nationaux / National Reports / Informes nacionales
Austria, Ernst Eugen Fabrizy ______________________________________________________________ 3
Belgique, Frank Verbruggen & Philip Traest__________________________________________________ 13
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Almir Maljević_____________________________________________________ 41
Brésil, Rodrigo de Souza Costa ___________________________________________________________ 57
Croatia, Igor Bojanić ____________________________________________________________________ 67
España, Carlos Martínez-Buján Pérez ______________________________________________________ 83
Finland, Raimo Lahti & Ritva Sahavirta ____________________________________________________ 101
France, Carole Girault__________________________________________________________________ 117
Germany, Bettina Weisser ______________________________________________________________ 141
Guinée, Mamadou Alioune Drame ________________________________________________________ 169
Hungary, Krisztina Karsai & Réka Végvári __________________________________________________ 175
Italy, Francesco Viganò ________________________________________________________________ 189
Japan, Soichiro Shimada _______________________________________________________________ 205
Netherlands, M.M. Dolman ________________________________________________________ 213
Polonia, Barbara Kunicka-Michalska ______________________________________________________ 247
Roumanie, George Antoniu & Florin Streteanu ______________________________________________ 257
Sweden, Petter Asp ___________________________________________________________________ 273
Taiwan, Huei-ting Huang / Marietta Sze-Chie Fa / Yu-Hsiu Hsu _________________________________ 281
Turkey, Duygun Yarsuvat & Köksal Bayraktar _______________________________________________ 291
RIDP/IRPL, vol.78, 2007 / 3-4 (CD-ROM Annexe)
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Preparatory Colloquium of the XVIII International Congress of Penal Law
A Coruña (Spain), 5-8 September 2007
Section I – General criminal law
“The expanding forms of preparation and participation”
AUSTRIA*
Ernst Eugen FABRIZY
A) General questions:
1. Individuation of the manifestations of the phenomenon of globalization at an internal penal level:
Due to various international legal instruments Austria has been got to amend its substantial criminal
law several times, although from national point of view no reason had appeared. To comply with
international requirements the Austrian Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) has been blown up by complicated regulations of low practical importance, especially concerning preparatory acts.
2. General outlining of the general judicial system of preparatory acts and of participation in your
system:
2.1. Preparatory acts:
2.1.1. Limits with reference to attempt:
Attempt is defined in section 15 paragraph 2 Penal Code: Due to this definition an offence is considered attempted as soon as the offender puts his decision to commit the offence or have another person
commit it into practice by taking an action immediately preceding the commission of the offence.
Thus the action immediately preceding the commission of the offence is the limit of the preparatory
act, which is not punishable in principle. After this action the punishable attempt begins.
2.1.2 Punishable preparatory acts (and/or conspiracy?):
Since preparatory acts are not punishable in principle, preparatory offences must be constituted by law
particularly. In this way preparation of certain crimes is set up an own offence. One part of these preparatory crimes build the group of the organizational offences, to which conspiracy (section 277 Penal
Code), criminal association (section 278 Penal Code), criminal organization (section 278 a Penal
Code), terrorist association (section 278 b Penal Code) and armed association (section 279 Penal
Code) belong.
2.1.3 Field of applicability (general/specific for certain offences):
All preparatory crimes (also the organizational offences) are applicable only to certain (serious) offences.
2.1.4 Applicable punishments: a comparison with the punishments applicable to the offences committed:
Punishment for preparatory offences is generally lower than for the crime intended.
2.2. Participation:
2.2.1. Treatment of the acting in concert of individuals in the commission of the offence (categories
of the criminal, instigation, cooperation, complicity...):
The base of punishability for participation in a criminal offence is section 12 Penal Code which says:
A criminal offence is committed not only by the immediate perpetrator that commits the criminal
*
Important notice: this text is the last original version of the national report sent by the author. The Review has
not assured any editorial revision of it.
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Preparatory Colloquium A Coruña (Spain), September 2007
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offence but also by anybody who incites another person to commit the offence or who contributes to
its perpetration in any other way.
So the law recognizes beside the immediate perpetrator the instigator and the supporter (who practices
aiding and abetting). Each of these participants in a criminal offence is treated as perpetrator. Complicity is regarded as immediate commission of the crime.
2.2.2. Regulation and sanction of the acts of participation:
Since every participant is treated as perpetrator (see supra), he is subject to the same range of punishment like the immediate perpetrator by law; differences in fault are taken into account just at the assessment of penalty.
3. Preparation and participation in relation to terrorism and other very serious forms of crime:
3.1. Does it exist, in your juridical regulations, explicit prescriptive definitions of “terrorism” and of
other very serious crimes? Are they complying or harmonized with the internationally established
definitions (for example, with the Framework Decision of the European Union of 2002 against terrorism or with the UNO Convention of 2000 against multi-national organized crime)?
Complying with the Framework Decision of the European Union of 2002 against terrorism the Austrian legislator set up a definition of terrorist offences in section 278 c Penal Code.
3.2. What are the constitutive (or differential) elements of these specific offences with regard to common offences? The objective element (actus reus)? The subjective element (mens rea)?
The definition of terrorist offences in section 278 c paragraph 1 Penal Code consists of three elements:
first of a list of (common) crimes which can be committed in a terrorist way; second of (additional)
objective elements which convert a common crime to a terrorist offence; third of additional subjective
elements.
The (common) crimes which can be committed in a terrorist way are: murder (section 75 Penal Code),
bodily injuries under sections 84 to 87 Penal Code, extortionate kidnapping (section 102 Penal Code),
gross intimidation (section 106 Penal Code), dangerous threat (section 107 paragraph 2 Penal Code),
gross damage to property (section 126 Penal Code) and damaging of data (section 126 a Penal Code)
if thereby a danger to the life of an other person or a danger to the property of an other person to a
large extent can be caused, intentional offences of dangerousness to public safety (sections 169, 171,
173, 175, 176, 177a, 177b, 178 Penal Code) or intentional infringement of environment (section 180
Penal Code), hijacking (section 185 Penal Code), intentional danger to the safety of aviation (section
186 Penal Code) and the criminal offences punishable under section 50 of the Weapons Act 1996 and
section 7 of the War Material Act.
The objective elements which convert a common crime to a terrorist offence is the aptitude for causing a severe interference with the public life or such an interference for a longer time or for causing a
severe damage to the economic life.
The subjective elements of a terrorist offence are the intent to intimidate the people in a serious manner or to force public authorities or an international organization to an action, permission or omission
or to convulse or destroy the politic, constitutional, economic or social basic structures of a state or an
international organization.
3.3. In Particular, does the incriminating or aggravating rule explicitly state that the perpetrator be
acting in the pursuit of a specific intent (having a terrorist or subversive character, or concerning the
aims of the criminal organization)?
See answer to point A.3.2., last paragraph.
A) Characteristics of the expansion of the forms of preparation and participation
1. Has there been an expansion of the forms of preparation and participation (for example, concerning
offences in the matter of terrorism and other forms of very serious crime)?
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Yes.
1.1 Are the mere preparatory acts, such as the agreement or incitement not followed by the commission of the crime, punished as separate offences of conspiracy?
An agreement upon the concerted commission of a murder (section 75 Penal Code), an extortionate
kidnapping (section 102 Penal Code), a handing over of a person to a foreign power (section 103
Penal Code), a slave trade (section 104), a robbery (section 142 Penal Code), a criminal act dangerous
to public safety according to sections 169, 171, 173, 176, 185 or 186 Penal Code, a transborder trafficking in prostitutes (section 217 Penal Code) or a criminal act according to sections 28 paragraph 2
to 5 or 31 paragraph 2 Narcotic Substances Act is punished as conspiracy under section 277 Penal
Code.
Due to the “functional unitarian perpetratorship” laid down in the regulation of participation in section
12 Penal Code (see answer to point A.2.2.1.), the incitement of an other person to commit any (also a
petty) offence is punished as the crime itself. If the instigated person does not commit the crime, the
instigator is hold liable for the attempted offence in form of instigation.
1.2 More particularly, are there specific indictments (and, if so, when have they been introduced)
punishing separately such specific activities (as the recruitment, the training, the making or possession
of falsified documents, the making, possession or purchasing of explosive substances or of weapons
etc.), that take place prior to the actual carrying out of the acts of terrorism or of the criminal plan?
The preparation of an individual terrorist act according to an agreement upon its concerted commission is punished as conspiracy under section 277 Penal Code. The actus reus of this crime is the
agreement, not the single preparatory measure. See answer to point B.1.1., paragraph 1.
Preparatory measures (as recruitment and training of terrorists, providing with false documents, explosives or weapons) for not individualized terrorist acts may be punishable as participation in a terrorist
association under section 278 b paragraph 2 Penal Code. See answer to point B.3. The provision has
been introduced by the Penal Law Amending Act 2002.
Counterfeiting and falsifying of documents is generally punishable under section 223 Penal Code.
Section 224 Penal Code provides for a higher punishment, if the crime is committed in relation to a
document published by a public authority. Receiving, obtaining, transporting, transferring to another
person or possession of such a document is punished under section 224 a Penal Code. The latter provision has been introduced by the Penal Law Amending Act 2004.
Independent of a terrorist aim, lining up or leading an armed association, recruiting or training members for the fight, equipping it with arms or means of transportation or communication, providing it
with financial resources or supporting it otherwise in a considerable way constitute the crime of armed
association (section 279 Penal Code).
Acquisition, possession and getting somebody else hold of weapons, ammunition or other combat
equipment with the intent to equip a larger number of people for fight is punishable as the crime of
accumulation of combat equipment (section 280 Penal Code).
Financing of terrorism constitutes an own crime (section 278 d Penal Code) introduced by the Penal
Law Amending Act 2002.
1.3 Do more preparatory and/or accessory offences, in respect of the commission of these offences,
exist?
Like mentioned under point A.2.1.2., the organizational offences of criminal association (section 278
Penal Code) and criminal organization (section 278 a Penal Code) could be of relevance in this context.
Pursuant to section 278 paragraph 1 Penal Code a person who founds a criminal association or participates in such an organization as member is to be sentenced. Paragraph 2 gives a definition of the
criminal association: Such an association is an union planned for a longer time of more than two per-
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sons aiming the commitment of one or more crimes by one or more members of the association, other
considerable acts of violence against life and limb, not only petty damages to property, thefts or frauds
or misdemeanours under sections 104 a (trafficking in human beings), 165 (money laundering), 177 b
(illicit handling of nuclear material or radioactive substances), 223 to 239 (counterfeiting and falsification of documents and money etc), 241 a to 241 g (counterfeiting and falsification of payment instruments etc), 304 (passive corruption) or 307 Penal Code (active corruption) or under sections 104
(smuggling of aliens) or 105 (aiding or abetting illicit residence) of the Aliens Act. Paragraph 3 explains the meaning of participation as a member: As member participates in a criminal association
who commits a criminal offence within the scope of its criminal orientation or participates in its activities by providing for information or assets or in another way with the awareness that he promotes
thereby the association or its criminal acts.
Pursuant to Section 278 a Penal Code the crime of criminal organization commits, whoever establishes an association of a considerable number of persons, intended to last a longer period of time and
similar to an enterprise, or who participates in such an association as a member, if the association is
oriented, even if not exclusively, towards the repeated and planned commission of grave offences
against life and limb, freedom, or property, or of grave offences relating to the sexual exploitation of
human beings, smuggling of aliens, illegal trafficking in military weapons, nuclear and radioactive
material, dangerous waste, counterfeit money or drugs, and aims at profits on a high scale or at considerable influence on politics or economy and undertakes to corrupt, or intimidate, others, or to particularly screen itself against prosecution measures.
1.4. Are there cases where the same individual can be indicted and punished for the commission of
one of these preparatory acts (for example, «recruitment») and also for the commission of one of the
offences representing the «final aim» (for example, «commission of an act of terrorism»)? and, possibly, also for the offence of association or participation in a terrorist or criminal group pursuing the
same aim (infra, B.3)?
Conspiracy (section 277 Penal Code; see answer to point B.1.1.) is only punishable if the crime agreed
on is not attempted; otherwise the conspirators are punished only because of the attempted or committed crime they agreed on.
All other organizational offences like criminal association (section 278 Penal Code), criminal organization (section 278 a Penal Code), terrorist association (section 278 b Penal Code) and armed association (section 279 Penal Code) are punishable in addition to the crimes at which the association aims.
For example a perpetrator can be punished as well for participation in a terrorist association as well
for murder committed by him as member of the group.
1.5. Are there regulations or special conditions for the penal relevance of the attempt in these fields of
crime? Which substantive or differentiating elements (concerning the objective or subjective element
of the offence) do they possibly present if compared to the ones of the attempt for corresponding
common offences?
There are no special regulations for attempt in these fields of crime.
2. Are there special regulations or conditions for the penal relevance of the participation in the offence
or for the punishment of complicity in these fields of crime?
There are no special regulations for participation or complicity in these fields of crime.
2.1. What are their constituent or differential elements in respect of those concerning the objective and
subjective element of the complicity provided in common or corresponding offences?
At first see answer to point A.2.2.1.
The general regulation of participation is applicable on all offences. Due to the definition of participation in section 12 Penal Code the scope of participation is very wide: It comprises anybody who incites another person to commit the offence or who contributes to its perpetration in any other way
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(objective element). As subjective element the participator must act with the same mens rea required
for the immediate perpetrator by law.
Accomplices – who are regarded as immediate perpetrators – must accomplish the actus reus together.
Each has to act with the mens rea required by the penal provision applied.
2.2. Are mere agreement or mere incitation (conspiracy) not followed by the commission of the offence in anyway punishable as separate offences or, possibly, as conspiracy? Or are they punishable
only in the case of terrorist offences and other very serious crimes?
An agreement upon the concerted commission of one of the serious crimes mentioned in section 277
Penal Code (see answer to point B.1.1., paragraph 1) is punishable as conspiracy.
The incitement of an other person to commit any (also a petty) offence is punished as the crime itself.
If the instigated person does not commit the crime, the instigator is hold liable for the attempted offence in form of instigation (confer answer to point B.1.1., paragraph 2).
2.3. Does there exist at a procedural level (or through the indictment itself) a form of presumption or
of simplification of the evidence of participation?
Austrian law does not provide for a presumption or simplification of evidence for participation.
2.4. Is there an explicit punishment for preparatory or collateral conduct, such as support, assistance,
«external» help (on the part of non-associated individuals or through adequate social contributions, for
example, on the part of a lawyer, a doctor...) to the activities and associations constituting very serious
crime, or to individual associated?
A special penal regulation for preparatory or collateral conduct to the activities and associations constituting very serious crime does not exist. Due to the wide scope of the definition of participation in
section 12 Penal Code (confer answers to points A.2.2.1. and B.2.1.) the least causal help to commit
an (also petty) offence is punishable as participation in the crime. Even moral support suffices to establish criminal responsibility.
Participation is possible in every offence, also in conspiracy and in the organizational crimes of criminal associations, criminal organizations, terrorist associations and armed associations (confer answer
to point A.2.1.2.).
3. Is there a separate offence for «terrorist» association or organization or group, or for an organization addicted to very serious crime, with respect to the conspiracy or mere complicity in such crimes?
Or are common offences (if the case, aggravated) for criminal association applied?
The Penal Law Amending Act 2002 has introduced a penal provision concerning terrorist associations
(section 278 b Penal Code). See infra. As to the definition of terrorism in section 278 c Penal Code
paragraph 1 see answers to point A.3.
Apart from this regulation section 278 c paragraph 2 provides for a more severe punishment for a
terrorist offence (see answer to point B.6., paragraph 4).
Furthermore section 278 a Penal Code penalizes the criminal organization and section 278 Penal Code
the criminal association. See also answer to point B.1.3.
3.1. If specific offences exist, how are these criminal associations identified? Does this identification
depend upon the status of the individuals involved, by his/her/their inclusion in lists drawn up by the
government authorities, or in similar lists, or by (material and/or moral) elements described in abstract
terms by the law?
Section 278 b paragraph 3 Penal Code gives a definition of terrorist association: According to that a
terrorist association is an union planned for a longer time of more than two persons aiming the commitment of one or more terrorist criminal offences (section 278c Penal Code; see answer to point
A.3.2.) by one or more members of the association.
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The definition of criminal organization is to be found in section 278 a Penal Code: According to that
the association must be intended to last a longer period of time, must be similar to an enterprise and
must be oriented, even if not exclusively, towards the repeated and planned commission of grave
offences against life and limb, freedom, or property, or of grave offences relating to the sexual exploitation of human beings, smuggling of aliens, illegal trafficking in military weapons, nuclear and radioactive material, dangerous waste, counterfeit money or drugs, aim at profits on a high scale or at
considerable influence on politics or economy and undertake to corrupt, or intimidate, others, or to
particularly screen itself against prosecution measures (confer answer to point B.1.3., paragraph 2).
The definition of criminal association is given by section 278 paragraph 2 Penal Code: According to
that a criminal association is an union planned for a longer time of more than two persons aiming the
commitment of one or more crimes (that are all offences provided for a punishment exceeding three
years of imprisonment) by one or more members of the association, other considerable acts of violence against life and limb, not only petty damages to property, thefts or frauds or misdemeanours
under sections 104 a (trafficking in human beings), 165 (money laundering), 177 b (illicit handling of
nuclear material or radioactive substances), 223 to 239 (counterfeiting and falsification of documents
and money etc), 241 a to 241 g (counterfeiting and falsification of payment instruments etc), 304
(passive corruption) or 307 Penal Code (active corruption) or under sections 104 (smuggling of aliens)
or 105 (aiding or abetting illicit residence) of the Aliens Act. Paragraph 3 explains the meaning of
participation as a member: As member participates in a criminal association who commits a criminal
offence within the scope of its criminal orientation or participates in its activities by providing for
information or assets or in another way with the awareness that he promotes thereby the association or
its criminal acts (confer answer to point B.1.3., paragraph 2).
3.2. What are the requirements constituting and/or characterizing a terrorist or criminal association or
group (a certain number of participants, organizing requirements, distribution of roles, stability or
terms of the organization or of the group, nature of the criminal plan, specific purposes pursued etc.)?
See answer to point B.3.1.
3.3. Is there a difference in sentencing between the mere participation and other more aggravating
conduct (such as the constitution, the organization, the direction etc.)? Are there specific rules or conditions concerning the responsibility of members or leaders of the association for the commission of
offences representing the purpose of the criminal association if they did not take an active part in the
commission of the offence?
Section 278 b paragraph 1 and 2 Penal Code provides for different punishment of the leaders of and
the participators in a terrorist association: A person who leads a terrorist association is to be sentenced
to imprisonment from five to fifteen years. If the terrorist association confines itself to threaten with
terrorist offences, the punishment shall be reduced to imprisonment from one year to ten years. The
same punishment is provided for a person who participates in a terrorist association as member.
Sections 278 a (criminal organization) and 278 (criminal association) Penal Code penalize the foundation of and the participation in the respective unions, but do not distinguish between the functions in
punishment. Section 278 a Penal Code provides for a term of six month to five years imprisonment
and section 278 for imprisonment up to three years.
4. Are the provisions and sanctions concerning the (penal or non-penal) liability of entities (legal
persons), if they are in general provided in your national law, also applicable to the commission of
acts of terrorism or other very serious crimes? What is the relationship between such regulations and
the criminal indictment of a terrorist or criminal association or group (subsidiary, alternative, cumulative etc.)?
The rules of criminal responsibility of legal persons and entities apply also on terrorist associations
and criminal organizations, if the perpetrator (miss)uses the institution of a legal person or entity. In
addition to the punishment of individuals because of the crime of terrorist association (section 278 b
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Penal Code) or the crime of criminal organization (section 278 a Penal Code) the punishment of the
legal person or entity is provided for compelling, if the legal requirements are met. Individual responsibility and responsibility of legal persons and entities are independent from each other.
5. Are theres specific indictments for conduct consisting of the expression and/or dissemination of
thought or opinions linked to terrorism, distinguishable from the possible penal relevance of the instigation to commit acts of terrorism or by other forms of moral participation or by assisting another to
commit such acts?
Yes.
5.1. In particular, are glorification, ideological proselytism, the publication and circulation of papers
and other matters, also audio-visual and on the internet, propaganda etc. linked to terrorism, separately
punished?
Such behavior may be punishable under section 282 Penal Code on encouraging and approving of
criminal offences.
5.2. What are the objective and subjective elements required for the liability of each of such acts to be
punished? When are they consummated?
Section 282 Penal Code contains two different provisions:
Paragraph 1 penalizes the encouragement of criminal offences. To set up punishability, the encouragement must be issued by publication, by broadcasting or in an other way open to the public at large.
The provision is only applicable, if the requirements of participation in (especially – also attempted –
incitement to) an individual crime (see answer to point B.2.1.) are not met.
Paragraph 2 penalizes the approving of an intentional committed crime which can be sentenced by a
prison term exceeding one year by publication, by broadcasting or in an other way open to the public
at large. Moreover the approval must be done in a manner suitable for outraging public opinion or for
inciting to commit such a crime.
5.3. What is their sentence, as compared with the one provided for other acts of terrorism and/or corresponding common offences?
The sanction for both offences under Section 282 Penal Code is imprisonment up to two years. That is
much less than provided for acts of terrorism.
5.4. What are their relationships and which problems may arise with respect to freedom of thought,
freedom of opinion and expression, protected by international Charters and by democratic Constitutions?
The regulations of section 282 Penal Code do not seem to interfere with the freedoms of thought,
opinion and expression. Since sentences according to this provision are very rare, the question has
never been put in practice.
6. Is there a difference in the sentencing of anticipated forms of preparation and participation? What is
their nature and measure (from the point of view of the type and term of the applicable penalties, of
possible supplementary penalties or measures, of the criteria to be applied, of possible specific regulations derogating common law)?
Since every participant in a criminal offence is treated as perpetrator (see answer to point A.2.2.1.), he
is subject to the same range of punishment like the immediate perpetrator; differences in fault are
taken into account just at the assessment of penalty (see answer to point A.2.2.2.).
The punishment for preparatory crimes is much lower than for the offences concerned: For conspiracy
(section 277 Penal Code) imprisonment from six months to five years, for criminal association (section 278 Penal Code) imprisonment up to three years, for criminal organization (section 278 a Penal
Code) imprisonment from six months to five years, for leading a terrorist association (section 278 b
Penal Code) imprisonment from five to fifteen years, for leading a terrorist association which confines
itself to threaten with terrorist offences and for participation in a terrorist association as member im-
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prisonment from one to ten years, for armed association (section 279 Penal Code) and for accumulation of combat equipment (section 280 Penal Code) imprisonment up to three years, for financing of
terrorism (section 278 d Penal Code) imprisonment from six months to five years.
Irrespective of the conviction of an individual confiscation of profits (section 20 Penal Code) and
forfeiture of assets which are subject to the power of a criminal organization or a terrorist association
or which were made available or collected as a means to finance terrorism (section 20 b Penal Code)
can be imposed, if the legal requirements are met.
Specific regulations derogating ordinary law do not exist. But in cases of a common crime committed
in a terrorist way (see answer to point A.3.2.) the applicable sentence for the respective offence can be
raised by half, up to the maximum of 20 years imprisonment (section 278 c paragraph 2 Penal Code).
6.1. Is the enforcement of the above-mentioned penal indictments, what is the importance of the withdrawal from and/or a possible compensation, or of reconciliation with the victim/victims?
Reconciliation with the victim and paying compensation to the victim may be mitigating circumstances at the assessment of penalty.
Diversion is possible in cases of conspiracy (section 277 Penal Code), criminal association (section
278 Penal Code), criminal organization (section 278 a Penal Code), financing of terrorism (section
278 d Penal Code), armed association (section 279 Penal Code) and accumulation of combat equipment (section 280 Penal Code), but – owing to the higher range of punishment - not in cases of terrorist association (section 278 b Penal Code).
Considering the conditions for diversion (section 90 a Code of Penal Procedure) that the fault of the
suspect must not be regarded as grave and punishment must not appear indicated in order to prevent
the suspect from committing punishable acts or to counteract that other persons commit punishable
acts, a withdrawal from prosecution for setting a divertive measure seems unlikely in the mentioned
cases in practice.
6.2. Are there peculiarities concerning the actual enforcement of the penalty and of the sanctions or
measures, particularly taking into account prison treatment and possible restrictions or conditions for
the granting of prison benefits or other institutes in favor of prisoners?
Such peculiarities do not seem to exist. It must be added that Austria had not been hit by a terrorist act
for a longer time.
C) Other questions
1. Are there specific preventive measures or other instruments having a non-penal nature to combat
terrorist and very serious criminal activities and associations? In particular, if non-nationals are involved?
Apart from the regulation of the due diligence duties for credit and financial institutions to combat
money laundering and financing of terrorism, specific preventive measures to combat terrorism and
very serious criminal activities do not exist.
2. What is the importance of the role of victims in the formulation and enforcement of the abovementioned penal indictments?
Law does not assign a specific role to the victim of a terrorist act.
D) Reform proposals
1. Are there recent doctrinal or jurisprudential stances concerning the expansion of the forms of preparation and participation that might raise problems of compatibility with the fundamental rights acknowledged by international Charters and Conventions, as well as by the national Constitutions?
Compatibility of the above mentioned regulations of participation and preparation with the fundamental rights of the Austrian Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights (which is part of
the Austrian Constitution) had never been challenged seriously.
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2. Are there requests as to the revision or modification of the provisions considered? What is their
nature? Which basic needs are they taking into account?
There is no discussion on the mentioned provisions going on.
3. Are there legislative reforms under discussion or in preparation?
No.
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Colloque Préparatoire du XVIIIème Congrès International de Droit Pénal
La Corogne (Espagne) 5-8 septembre 2007
Section I- Droit pénal général
« L’élargissement des formes de préparation et de participation »
BELGIQUE*
Frank VERBRUGGEN** / Philip TRAEST ***
A) Questions générales
2. Grandes lignes du régime juridique général des actes préparatoires et de la participation en droit
pénal belge
1
2.1. Actes préparatoires
Préjudice effectif. En principe, la théorie classique du droit pénal belge exige qu’il y ait un préjudice
effectif avant qu’un acte ne soit punissable. De préférence, ce préjudice concerne directement un bien
concret, comme l’intégrité physique d’une personne ou la dégradation d’un bien matériel d’autrui.
Aussi le droit pénal traditionnel est-il principalement axé sur les actions (ou délits de commission), et
non pas sur les inactions (ou délits d’omission). Il faut que l’ordre social soit effectivement et de manière intolérable enfreint pour que l’Etat protecteur intervienne et que la ‘machinerie pénale’ soit mise
en marche. La question de la punition ne se pose normalement que postérieurement aux actes répréhensibles.
Risque de préjudice et la tentative. Dès l’introduction du code pénal belge en 1867, il était cependant
clair qu’il existait des cas où l’Etat ne pouvait attendre à ce qu’une infraction soit effectivement
consommée. Le risque que certains actes précédant à l’infraction consommée contenaient en germe
pour l’ordre social était simplement trop important, même si ces actes ne conduisaient finalement pas
à une infraction achevée. Ceci était particulièrement le cas là où l’accomplissement de l’infraction
échouait à cause de circonstances complètement étrangères à la volonté de l’auteur, d’où
l’introduction de la figure de la tentative. La tentative rend certains actes punissables avant même que
l’infraction envisagée ne soit réalisée.
Actes préparatoires. Les actes préparatoires en soi ne sont pas punissables sous le régime de la tentative en droit pénal belge. Nonobstant, ils peuvent l’être en tant qu’infractions autonomes, circonstances aggravantes d’une autre infraction ou sous le régime de la participation. En plus, ils sont susceptibles d’être inclus dans l’incrimination d’autres infractions, telles que l’association de malfaiteurs ou,
de date plus récente, l’organisation criminelle et l’organisation terroriste.
2.1.1. Délimitation par rapport à la tentative
Introduction. Le droit pénal belge distingue entre les actes préparatoires et les actes de commencement
d’exécution donnant lieu à la tentative punissable. Comme les premiers sont définis par rapport aux
*
Attention: Le texte publié constitue la dernière version originale du rapport national envoyé par l’auteur, sans
révision éditoriale de la part de la Revue.
**
Professeur. Institute de Droit Pénal. K.U.Leuven
***
Hoogleraar Vakgroep Strafrecht en Criminologie, Universiteit Gent.
1
Ce paragraphe est une reprise succincte et adaptée de deux autres rapports nationaux: F. Verbruggen, “Strafbare
voorbereidingshandelingen in België: autopsie zonder lijk”, in Nederlands-Vlaamse Vereniging voor Strafrecht
(éd.), Voorbereidingshandelingen in het strafrecht, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2004, (9) 30-53; F. Verbruggen et C. Fijnaut, “The Criminal Justice System Facing the Challenge of Organised Crime”, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal. Colloque préparatoire Naples 18-20 septembre 1997, 1997, (627) 656-659.
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derniers, nous commencerons par expliquer le régime de la tentative avant de délimiter le champ
d’application des actes préparatoires.
Fondement juridique. La tentative punissable est définie à l’article 51 C.P. comme « la résolution de
commettre un crime ou un délit [qui] a été manifestée par des actes extérieurs qui forment un commencement d'exécution de ce crime ou de ce délit, et qui n'ont été suspendus ou n'ont manqué leur
effet que par des circonstances indépendantes de la volonté de l'auteur. »
Elément moral de la tentative. Une première constatation est que la tentative n’est pas une infraction
autonome, mais plutôt une modalité d’une certaine infraction, que ce soit un crime ou un délit. La
tentative à une contravention n’est en principe pas punissable, sauf disposition contraire dans une loi
spéciale. Il ne suffit donc pas de constater que l’agent voulait commettre une infraction quelconque,
sans pouvoir la déterminer. En effet, il faut que ses actes démontrent clairement l’intention de commettre un crime ou un délit particulier, c’est-à-dire que l’auteur se trouvait nettement sur la trajectoire
du crime ou du délit (inter criminis). La tentative exige donc un élément moral propre, dont on dirait
2
que c’est un type de dol spécial (ou un élément moral proche du dol spécial ). Il faut notamment
l’intention de commettre un crime ou délit particulier.
Cet élément moral explique d’emblée pourquoi les actes préparatoires échappent au champ
d’application de la tentative : ces actes ne mènent pas indubitablement à une infraction déterminée ou
à une infraction tout court. Ils sont, en d’autres mots, encore multi-interprétables. Par exemple, quelqu’un qui s’achète un grand couteau, n’a pas pour autant l’intention de tuer quelqu’un. La conclusion
contraire aurait des conséquences inacceptables du point de vue des libertés individuelles.
Dol éventuel. Il est moins certain que le dol éventuel suffise comme élément moral à la tentative. Par
dol éventuel, on comprend l’hypothèse où l’auteur veut délibérément accomplir ou omettre un certain
acte prescrit par la loi, même s’il se rend compte que cet acte pourrait avoir des conséquences en principe indésirables. En persévérant dans son intention criminelle, il accepte néanmoins que ces consé3
quences éventuelles se produisent. D’après Haus, suivi par Hennau et Verhaegen, le dol éventuel est
4
5
irréconciliable avec l’idée même de la tentative . On retrouve cette opinion chez d’autres auteurs .
Cependant, on pourrait se demander si telle prise de position va tellement de soi. Si le dol éventuel (ou
dol indirect) est assimilé au dol direct pour l’infraction consommée, pourquoi ne serait-ce pas possible
pour la tentative ? On constate d’ailleurs que le dol éventuel pour une infraction consommée est fréquemment (voire, des fois, trop facilement) accepté par la jurisprudence. Or, est-ce que l’élément
moral requis pour la tentative n’est pas intrinsèquement lié à celui de l’infraction projetée?
Néanmoins, l’irréconciliabilité du dol éventuel avec la figure de la tentative pourrait s’expliquer par la
même raison qui exclut également les actes préparatoires : il faut que l’intention de commettre un
crime ou un délit certain soit bien claire. Si l’intention de l’auteur est incertaine ou équivoque, on ne
peut admettre que le juge assimile le dol éventuel au dol direct. D’ailleurs, la preuve de la résolution
criminelle de l’auteur n’apparaîtra que des actes de commencement d’exécution, tandis que les actes
préparatoires sont par définition trop équivoques pour en déduire une intention de commettre une
infraction déterminée, a fortiori pour conclure si l’agent en a accepté toutes les conséquences. Finalement, à cela s’ajoute que la tentative est déjà une extension de la pénalisation, qu’il faut interpréter et
appliquer de façon stricte.
2
D. Kiganahé, « Réflexions autour du ‘commencement’ de la tentative punissable en droit pénal », in Y. Poullet
et H. Vuye, Liber amicorum Jean du Jardin, Antwerpen – Deurne, Kluwer, 2001, (215) 221.
3
F Verbruggen et R. Verstraeten, Strafrecht & strafprocesrecht voor bachelors, I, Antwerpen, Kluwer, nr. 189.
4
Ch. Henneau et J. Verhaegen, Droit pénal général, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 3e éd., 2003, nos 197 et 353, qui y font
référence à J.J. Haus, Principes généraux de droit pénal belge, t. 1, Gand, Swinnen, 1879, no. 433bis et no. 315 :
« Dans aucun cas, on ne peut admettre une tentative du crime que l’agent a voulu éventuellement, mais qui n’a
pas eu lieu ».
5
D. Kiganahé, o.c., p. 221 et les références qu’il fait à cet endroit.
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Infractions non intentionnelles. Une autre conséquence découlant du fait que la figure de la tentative
requiert un dol spécial/l’intention de commettre une infraction spécifique, consiste en ce que la tentative à une infraction non intentionnelle est exclue. Il en va de même des infractions qualifiées par leurs
conséquences non intentionnelles, telle l’infraction de coups et blessures volontaires entraînant la mort
sans intention (art. 401 C.P.).
Commencement d’exécution. La résolution ou intention criminelle n’est cependant pas l’unique élément constitutif de la tentative punissable. Suivant les principes de base du droit pénal belge,
l’intention en soi n’est punissable que si elle s’extériorise par des actes matériels. Pour qu’il y ait lieu
de tentative punissable, il faut donc en outre un commencement d’exécution de l’infraction envisagée.
Les actes préparatoires, par contre, ne sont considérés comme constitutifs de la tentative punissable.
Le commencement d’exécution étant l’élément déclenchant la pénalité, cette notion n’a cependant pas
été définie par le législateur. Celui-ci a abandonné cette tâche difficile à la jurisprudence. Quoique
celle-ci décide au cas par cas, elle a néanmoins pu distiller quelques critères de délimitation pour distinguer les actes de commencement d’exécution des actes préparatoires. Ces critères sont la résultante
de deux théories opposées, l’une objective, l’autre subjective.
6
Théorie objective. Selon la théorie objective , seul importe l’acte extérieur pour identifier le commencement d’exécution, l’intention de l’auteur n’est pas prise en compte. Le courant le plus extrême de
cette théorie considère qu’il n’y a que commencement d’exécution dès que l’auteur commet un acte
constituant un élément constitutif de l’infraction envisagée. Il faut donc que l’infraction se soit déjà en
partie réalisée. Une telle conception restrictive limite évidemment de manière considérable le domaine
d’application de la tentative : tout acte qui ne constitue pas d’élément constitutif de l’infraction sera
qualifié d’acte préparatoire et restera, par voie de conséquence, impuni.
Une variante moins poussée de la théorie objective définit le commencement d’exécution comme la
mise en œuvre des moyens dont l’auteur dispose pour réaliser son projet criminel. La phase préparatoire précédera la mise en œuvre et restera confinée au rassemblement de ces moyens. Le désavantage
de cette variante de la théorie objective est qu’elle ne tient toujours pas compte de l’intention de
l’auteur. Ainsi, il se peut que certains actes de mise œuvre soient mal interprétés. Kiganahé utilise
l’exemple de quelqu’un qui accroche une échelle contre une maison. Celui-ci met en œuvre le moyen
(l’échelle) rassemblé, mais son acte n’est pas nécessairement l’extériorisation de l’intention criminelle
7
d’entrer dans cette maison pour y voler des objets.
Théorie subjective. La théorie subjective, au contraire, met l’accent principal sur la résolution criminelle de l’auteur, et donc sur le danger potentiel que celui-ci présente pour la société. Tout acte qui
exprime l’intention irrévocable de l’agent de commettre un crime ou un délit déterminé, impliquera le
commencement d’exécution de l’infraction. Le problème de cette conception se pose sur le point de
l’interprétation des actes accomplis par l’agent. A partir de quand un acte extérieur est-il suffisamment
révélateur de la volonté irrévocable de commettre une infraction ? Par ailleurs, telle conception limite,
voire exclut l’existence d’actes préparatoires non punissables dès que l’agent a commis un acte considéré comme l’expression de son intention criminelle. De même, les possibilités de désistement seront
considérablement limitées.
Désistement. Conformément à la théorie classique du droit pénal belge, qui attachait beaucoup
d’importance à la volonté souveraine de l’individu, le législateur a prévu à l’article 51 C.P. la possibilité de désistement. Par ce, le législateur voulait de toute évidence éviter que l’iter criminis devienne
une rue à sens unique. L’agent qui commence à exécuter l’infraction envisagée, mais qui, de par sa
propre volonté, décide de rebrousser chemin et de s’abstenir de tout acte d’exécution ultérieur, jouit de
l’impunité pour l’infraction envisagée. Si, à ce stade, il a cependant déjà commis d’autres infractions,
c’est-à-dire que ses actes d’exécution constituent en soi une ou plusieurs infractions, il pourra néan6
7
D. Kiganahé, o.c., p. 225-226.
D. Kiganahé, o.c., p. 226.
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moins être poursuivi pour ces actes-ci. Le but de cette possibilité de désistement est préventif et
conforme à l’idée de base subjacente au régime de la tentative : celui qui abandonne volontairement
8
son projet criminel, ne constitue plus de risque pour la société et ne mérite plus à être puni .
Cela étant dit, la jurisprudence belge se montre en général très sévère dans l’appréciation du caractère
volontaire du désistement. Contrairement à la formulation de l’article 51 C.P., elle juge que toute
intervention d’un élément étranger à la volonté de l’auteur annule la possibilité de désistement, même
si la cause principale de l’échec de l’infraction était de toute évidence la décision de l’auteur de ne pas
mener à bout son projet criminel. Prenons l’exemple de l’agresseur qui est complètement décontenancé par les cris hystériques poussés par la caissière et qui renonce ensuite à son hold-up. Le non accomplissement du hold-up sera alors considéré comme une infraction manquée, soit une tentative
punissable.
Théorie intermédiaire. Etant donné que tant la théorie objective que la théorie subjective représentent
des inconvénients significatifs, une théorie intermédiaire s’est développée entre-temps. Celle-ci tient
compte de l’intention criminelle de l’auteur pour évaluer le caractère univoque de ses actes. C’est à
partir de cette conception intermédiaire, soutenue par la majorité de la doctrine, que la jurisprudence a
pu dégager quelques critères de délimitation.
Critère de l’univocité circonstancielle. Un premier critère, déjà annoncé dans ce qui précède, consiste
en la théorie de l’univocité circonstancielle, ou le teste dénommé res ipsa loquitur. Autant qu’un acte
extérieur est encore multi-interprétable, c’est-à-dire qu’il peut être l’expression de plusieurs intentions
non nécessairement criminelles, ou du moins, qu’il n’est pas encore orienté vers une seule infraction
identifiable, on se trouve dans la phase de préparation, qui, en principe, reste impunie. Ce n’est que si
l’acte devient univoque, indiquant une infraction bien précise, que l’on entre dans la phase
d’exécution et que l’auteur devient punissable. Afin d’interpréter tel acte, il faut donc prendre en
compte toutes les circonstances qui peuvent constituer l’expression de l’intention criminelle de
l’auteur, telles que les aveux, les témoignages de tiers, le fait de trouver (a posteriori) le butin provenant présumément d’autres délits, ou encore le passé criminel de l’auteur.
Critère de la proximité. Un autre critère, qui ne peut cependant être complètement séparé du précédent, est celui de la proximité. Plus un acte réalisé par l’auteur est proche de la réalisation (d’un élément constitutif) de l’infraction envisagée, plus il est probable qu’il s’agisse d’un acte de commencement d’exécution. Cependant, il est tout aussi vrai que, plus un acte se rapproche de la réalisation de
l’infraction même, plus il sera univoque. Les deux critères représentent donc des points de convergence.
Evaluation des critères du commencement d’exécution. Les deux critères mentionnés/brièvement
élaborés donnent au juge du fond une certaine marge d’appréciation. Car, comme souvent en matière
de preuve, la délimitation du commencement d’exécution consiste en une interprétation subjective
d’éléments extérieurs, objectifs. Plus l’accent est déplacé vers l’intention criminelle, plus
l’interprétation des éléments objectifs pour la preuve de l’élément moral, domaine réservé du juge du
fond, s’ouvre à la spéculation. Sur ce point, la doctrine belge ne craint, de toute évidence, pas de recourir à la méthode de ‘Hineininterpretierung’. (Exemple : tekst 2004, p. 38)
La question de délimitation sera donc tranchée au cas par cas, et la réponse différera selon l’infraction
envisagée. La Cour de Cassation n’exerce qu’un contrôle marginal sur la décision du juge du fond et
encore uniquement à condition que la défense ait conclu sur ce point. Le cas échéant, la Cour examine
si le juge du fond a pu légalement déduire des faits et comportements, qu’il constate de manière souveraine, le commencement d’exécution de l’infraction envisagée.
8
Cf. F. Tulkens et M. van de Kerchove, Introduction au droit pénal. Aspects juridiques et criminologiques, Wolters Kluwer Belgium, 2005, p. 360-361, citant à J.J. Haus, « Rapport fait à la commission de la Chambre », in
J.S.G. Nypels, Législation criminelle de la Belgique ou Commentaire et complément du code pénal belge, t. 1,
Bruxelles, Bruylant – Christophe, n° 196, p. 89.
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Désistement.
Infraction impossible. ?
2.1.2. Actes préparatoires punissables (et/ou conspiracy) ?
Actes préparatoires. De l’exposé précédent, il ressort clairement que, en droit pénal belge, les actes
préparatoires se définissent par la négative. Ce sont des actes extérieurs qui sont susceptibles
d’exprimer l’intention de commettre une certaine infraction, sans pour autant être suffisamment univoques pour en déduire avec certitude que l’agent a vraiment commencé l’exécution de l’infraction
envisagée. Ce n’est que si ces actes constituent l’expression indubitable de la résolution criminelle de
l’auteur, qu’ils seront qualifiés d’actes de commencement d’exécution et qu’on entre dans le domaine
de la tentative punissable.
Cela étant dit, rien n’exclut que les actes préparatoires sont qualifiés d’infractions autonomes dans la
loi. Il se peut donc que l’auteur qui a accompli des actes préparant l’infraction envisagée, mais inachevée, ait néanmoins déjà commis des infractions par le seul fait de ses actes préparatoires (cf. supra,
désistement).
Exception traditionnelle : la conspiracy ou le complot. [REFERENCES texte 2004 p. 46-47) La partie
générale du code pénal belge (Livre I) ne contient pas de dispositions concernant la conspiracy ou le
complot, soit le fait de commettre une infraction en complicité avec quelqu’un d’autre. Nonobstant, le
législateur en a fait une infraction autonome lorsque le complot consiste en commettre un certain
nombre d’infractions, surtout de nature politique. Ces dispositions se trouvent dans la partie spéciale
9
du code pénal belge (Livre II).
L’article 110 C.P. dispose qu’ « [i]l y a complot dès que la résolution d’agir a été arrêtée entre plu10
sieurs personnes » . Le complot constitue donc une infraction à participation nécessaire, requérant la
participation de plusieurs personnes (cf. infra, PhT ?). Concrètement, il s’agit d’infractions envisageant un attentat contre la vie du Roi, de l’héritier présomptif du Royaume, des membres de la famille
royale et des ministres exerçant les pouvoirs constitutionnels du Roi (art. 106, 107, 108 et 109 C.P.).
De même, le complot contre la sécurité externe (art. 115, 123bis et 123quater C.P.) et interne (art. 124
11
et 125 C.P.) de l’Etat , et la coalition de fonctionnaires (art. 233 C.P.) sont incriminés de façon autonome.
L’accord des conspirateurs de participer à des actes prescrits par la loi est décisif. Il n’est pas dispen12
sable qu’ils se soient également mis d’accord sur les modalités de l’exécution . Il suffit qu’ils aient la
13
résolution de commettre une desdites infractions (art. 106 ss. C.P.). Il faut donc le dol (déterminé).
Est-ce que cela signifie que ces infractions sanctionnent la seule idée conspiratrice, contrairement au
14
principe du droit pénal cogitationis poenam nemo patitur (personne ne sera puni pour une mauvaise
pensée) ? Aucunement. La doctrine a vite souligné que ce n’est pas la simple pensée conspiratrice, ni
même son expression, mais la concertation entre les personnes impliquées en vu de la préparation et
l’exécution du complot. C’est donc la situation matérielle qui suit l’idée conspiratrice, le premier pas
15
extériorisé vers l’exécution de l’attentat qui est punissable.
D’une lecture a contrario des toutes ces dispositions, il faut conclure que les actes visés par ces articles
ne constituent point des actes d’exécution, mais plutôt des actes préparatoires qui, sans incrimination
explicite, ne seraient punissables. Dans quelques cas, le législateur conçoit même des actes matériels
9
Noot 166.
Noot 167.
11
Noot 168.
12
Noot 170.
13
Noot 171.
14
D. Kiganahé, o.c., 222. + noot 172.
15
Noot 173.
10
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punissables antérieurs aux actes préparatoires (p. ex. art. 106, 107 et 109 C.P. qui prévoient une peine
plus lourde pour les actes préparatoires).
La conséquence logique de la pénalisation de certains actes de conspiration est l’impossibilité de retrait ou désistement. En effet, en cas de conspiracy, la volonté individuelle est remplacée par une volonté collective sur laquelle l’individu n’a plus d’emprise. Ainsi, l’iter criminis devient une « rue à
sens unique » pour certaines infractions graves. Même ceux qui, après le premier pas vers l’infraction,
16
décident de « sauter de la voiture roulante », ne pourront plus bénéficier de l’impunité , car la voiture
continuera sa trajectoire vers l’infraction convenue. Une fois que l’iter criminis est devenu une rue à
sens unique, qu’une ligne décisive a été franchie, l’infraction de complot est considérée achevée. Tout
au plus, les « sauteurs » pourront invoquer leur abandon du projet criminel comme une circonstance
atténuante.
Autre exception : les infractions ‘consensuelles’. Un autre type d’infractions, que personne n’associe
normalement à la conspiracy, y ressemble pourtant beaucoup: il s’agit des infractions de type consensuel. Tandis que, en cas de complot, l’accord concerne l’intention de commettre une infraction grave
telle qu’un attentat contre la vie du Roi, l’accord d’une infraction consensuelle peut porter sur presque
tout. Souvent l’accord porte sur une transaction commerciale prescrite par la loi. Un exemple classique est la corruption d’une personne qui exerce une fonction publique : l’acceptation par le fonctionnaire de l’offre du corrupteur accomplit l’infraction de corruption. Peu importe si les deux ‘cocontrac17
tants’ reviennent par après sur leurs pas . Comme le complot, les infractions consensuelles sont en
effet achevées dès l’accord entre deux ou plusieurs personnes. La raison en est que le simple accord
constitue en germe déjà un risque de préjudice, même si aucun préjudice effectif n’a encore été causé.
Pourquoi incriminer l’accord entre plusieurs personnes, alors que le législateur ne se préoccupe pas
des actes préparatoires des individus ? Parce que l’accord avec d’autres personnes crée une solidarité,
18
renforce les esprits et bloque/empêche dans une certaine mesure le retour en arrière . Le risque
émane donc de l’élément collectif.
En plus, le risque de préjudice concerne un grand nombre d’intérêts généraux et difficilement identifiables, comme par exemple la santé publique, l’environnement, la concurrence loyale, etc. Vu que le
lien de causalité entre le comportement et le préjudice sera difficile à établir dans de tels cas de figure,
le législateur a choisi, comme il l’a d’ailleurs fait pour le complot (cf. supra), d’éliminer le préjudice
effectif comme élément constitutif de ces infractions.
L’infraction étant consommée à partir de l’accord des partenaires, le désistement devient inconcevable. Mais est-ce qu’il en va de même si les négociations précédant l’accord échouent ? Celles-ci pourraient être considérées comme de véritables actes préparatoires, qui resteront donc impunis. Par
contre, la tentative serait bel et bien possible, certainement si l’infraction commencée est un crime. La
question sera donc, à nouveau, quels actes sont interprétés comme préparatoires et lesquels comme un
commencement d’exécution. En cas de négociations, la proximité de l’accord jouera sans doute un
rôle non négligeable.
Infractions autonomes de type préventif ou de mise en danger. A part ces exceptions traditionnelles, le
droit pénal belge pénalise les actes préparatoires parfois comme des infractions autonomes. Ces actes
ont en commun qu’ils mettent en péril certains biens juridiques ou valeurs fondamentales que le législateur pénal considère trop importants pour attendre le commencement d’exécution avant
d’intervenir. En les incriminant de façon autonome, le législateur veut en effet éviter que le préjudice
16
Cf. Noot 174.
Noot 177.
18
A. DE NAUW, Strafbaarheid van voorbereidingshandelingen, een preadvies, Vereniging voor de vergelijkende studie van het recht van België en Nederland, Zwolle – Antwerpen, Tjeenk Willink – De Sikkel, 1982, 86.
(= Noot 175)
17
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potentiel se réalise, comme quoi ces infractions, appelées infractions de mise en danger ou délits19
obstacles , ont nettement un but préventif.
On en trouve d’anciens exemples qui nous paraissent aujourd’hui peut-être folkloriques, comme le fait
de provoquer quelqu’un en duel (ancien art. 423 C.P.), le fait d’insulter/injurier quelqu’un en public
parce qu’il a refusé une invitation au duel (ancien art. 424 C.P.), la proposition de commettre ou participer à un crime punissable d’une peine de détention ou réclusion à perpétuité ou de réclusion de dix à
quinze ans ou plus, même si la proposition n’est pas acceptée (le cas du tueur à gages qui s’offre, loi
20
du 7 juillet 1875 ), ou encore la provocation publique à des crimes ou à certains délits, sans qu’elle
soit suivie d’effet (délit introduit en pleine période de perturbations sociales par la loi du 25 mars
21
1891 ). Les deux dernières infractions existent toujours.
Des exemples plus courants sont sans doute le faux en écritures et l’usage de faux (art. 193 ss. C.P.).
La production d’un faux ne cause en soi pas de préjudice. Ce n’est que si ce faux est utilisé que le bien
juridique protégé, notamment la foi publique s’attachant à certaines écritures, sera nui. Le faux en
écritures est donc un acte préparatoire par excellence. Sur le plan de la punition, le faux en écritures
équivaut pourtant l’usage de faux (ou plutôt, à l’envers, d’après le texte de la loi, art. 197 C.P.), ce qui
va à l’encontre du principe de proportionnalité, selon lequel la peine doit être corrélative au préjudice
causé. Dans la pratique, on constate d’ailleurs fréquemment que le ministère public poursuit à la fois
pour faux en écritures et usage de faux, ne fût-ce que pour éviter la prescription. D’autres exemples du
même style sont la contrefaçon de clefs (art. 488 C.P.), la fabrication ou détention d’explosifs (art. 6
22
de la loi du 28 mars 1956) ou la détention d’armes (art. 8 et 23 de la nouvelle loi sur les armes du 8
juin 2006).
A côté de ces infractions de mise en danger, bon nombre d’infractions consommées (le préjudice a
donc été porté au bien protégé par la disposition enfreinte) peuvent constituer, le cas échéant, un acte
préparatoire d’une autre infraction plus grave. Prenons l’exemple de quelqu’un qui vole une voiture
afin de commettre quelques semaines plus tard un hold-up. Si ce vol ne témoigne pas indubitablement
de l’intention de commettre le hold-up, il ne constitue pas un acte de commencement d’exécution à
l’égard du hold-up. Néanmoins, le parquet pourra sans problème poursuivre pour l’infraction de vol.
Un autre exemple analogue est celui de la destruction d’une clôture (art. 545 C.P.), précédant le vol.
Circonstances aggravantes. Dans d’autres cas de figure, les actes préparatoires peuvent constituer des
circonstances aggravantes d’une autre infraction. Il en est ainsi du vol (le cas échéant à l’aide de vio23
lence) avec escalade, effraction ou fausses clés (art. 467 et art. 471 C.P.).
Association de malfaiteurs. L’association de malfaiteurs concerne « toute association formée dans le
but d’attenter aux personnes ou aux propriétés », c’est « un crime ou un délit, qui existe par le seul fait
de l’organisation de la bande » (art. 322 C.P.). Il s’agit donc d’un groupe de personnes, avec une organisation plus ou moins durable, qui s’est constitué dans le but de commettre un ou plusieurs attentats contre des individus ou des propriétés. Ces attentats doivent être incriminés comme crime ou délit.
Ces deux caractéristiques constituent du coup les points de différence les plus importants avec la
conspiracy, notamment la stabilité du groupe et les infractions envisagées (catégorie bien plus large
que dans le cas du complot où l’infraction envisagée doit revêtir un caractère intrinsèquement politique ou menacer l’ordre public).
Il suffit donc de se réunir autour d’un projet criminel pour être punissable. Car le législateur a estimé
le danger émanant d’une telle association suffisamment important pour l’incriminer dès qu’elle ac19
Ch. Hennau et J. Verhaegen, o.c., p. 61 ss. et n° 182.
Noot 179.
21
Noot 184.
22
Tekst 1997 noot 88 => Van den Wyngaert 2006.
23
D. Kiganahé, o.c., 223.
20
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quiert une certaine stabilité. On voit ressurgir la logique du collectif. Il n’y a donc point besoin d’une
infraction consommée ou un acte de commencement d’exécution, ni même d’un acte préparatoire.
D’où il faut conclure que les actes préparatoires commis par les membres de l’association sont donc
punissables sous l’incrimination d’association de malfaiteurs. Pour les membres de l’association, il
leur suffit d’être d’adhérer de manière consciente et volontaire à l’association. Il ne faut même pas
être impliqué dans les infractions envisagées (cf. infra, adhésion à une organisation criminelle). Hennau et Verhaegen parlent à ce sujet d’une « imputabilité automatique des crimes commis par le groupe
aux différents membres de ce groupe, quelle que soit la part matérielle et morale effectivement prise
24
par le membres dans la réalisation de ces crimes » .
Si l’un des membres participe effectivement à une des infractions projetées, il y aura concours de
plusieurs infractions, notamment l’adhésion à une association de malfaiteurs et l’infraction concrète
dont il est l’auteur ou à laquelle il a participé. Les actes préparatoires tomberont alors soit sous la
qualification de l’adhésion à l’association, soit sous le régime de la participation (cf. infra, + PhT,
A.2.2).
Il y a cependant une échappatoire : la cause d’excuse absolutoire de l’article 326 C.P. Celle-ci donne
l’impunité à celui qui dénonce aux autorités l’existence de l’organisation et les noms des chefs de file
ou d’autres membres qui occupent une fonction d’une certaine responsabilité, à condition qu’au moment de la dénonciation aucune tentative à une infraction faisant l’objet de l’association n’ait eu lieu,
ni aucun commencement de poursuites.
Participation. Finalement, les actes préparatoires peuvent également être punissables sous le régime de
la participation. Lorsqu’une personne participe à une infraction (délit ou crime) commise par autrui,
ses actes seront punissables s’ils tombent sous l’un des cas de figure prévus aux articles 66 et 67 C.P.,
indépendamment du fait qu’ils sont des actes de commencement d’exécution ou des actes préparatoires. Il suffit que l’auteur principal accomplisse l’infraction ou, du moins, qu’il passe à un acte de
commencement d’exécution (dans quel cas on parle de participation à une tentative), pour que le coauteur ou complice soit, lui aussi, punissable.
2.1.3. Champ d’application (général/spécifique pour certaines infractions)
Tentative et participation. Comme nous venons de le dire, le champ d’application de la tentative inclut
tout crime. Pour les délits, il faut une disposition légale admettant la tentative. Les contraventions sont
en principe inconciliables avec l’idée de tentative, mais rien n’exclut que le législateur se décide à
rendre possible la tentative pour une contravention donnée. Les actes préparatoires sont par définition
exclus du champ d’application de la tentative, étant donné que celle-ci requiert un commencement
d’exécution.
Pour ce qui est de la participation, il faut que l’auteur d’un acte préparatoire participe à un crime ou un
délit et que l’auteur principal accomplisse, sinon au moins tente de commettre l’infraction projetée. La
participation sera punissable si la tentative l’est. Des actes préparant une contravention ne tombent pas
dans le domaine de la participation, étant donné que la participation à une contravention n’est pas
punissable, sauf disposition contraire dans une loi spéciale.
Actes préparatoires sous les autres régimes. Au cas où l’acte préparatoire est incriminé en tant
qu’infraction autonome, il faut regarder le champ d’application de l’infraction concernée.
Sous l’incrimination d’association de malfaiteurs, les actes préparatoires sont en principe punissables,
pourvu que les éléments constitutifs de l’association soient réunis (organisations relativement stable,
intention criminelle visant un délit ou un crime et adhésion consciente et volontaire).
2.1.4. Peines applicables : comparaison avec les peines applicables aux infractions réalisées
Tentative à un crime. La tentative à un crime est toujours punissable, ainsi en dispose l’article 52 C.P.
La peine applicable est celle immédiatement inférieure à la peine applicable à l’infraction consommée,
24
Ch. Hennau et J. Verhaegen, o.c., n° 325.
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selon une échelle de peines inscrite aux articles 80 (crimes de droit commun) et 81 (crimes politiques)
C.P.
Tentative à un délit. D’après l’article 53 C.P. la tentative à un délit n’est punissable que lorsque la loi
le prévoit explicitement. Si tel est le cas, la loi doit également prévoir la peine applicable. En générale,
celle-ci est moins sévère que la peine applicable au délit réalisé, mais le législateur peut en décider
autrement. Ainsi, …exemple Dans certains cas, la peine sur la tentative est égale à celle sur le délit
achevé. Exemple …
Tentative à une contravention. La tentative à une contravention n’est en règle générale pas punissable,
sauf dispositions légales contraires (qui sont plutôt rares). Cela s’explique par l’idée de base derrière
la figure de la tentative en droit pénal belge : la tentative est une extension de la pénalisation créée
pour protéger l’ordre public contre la dangerosité de ceux qui ont commencé l’exécution d’une infraction grave, mais qui y échouent pour des raisons indépendantes de leur volonté. Les contraventions
sont les infractions les moins graves en droit pénal belge et ne justifient pas une telle extension de la
pénalisation.
Principe de proportionnalité. En général, la tentative, si punissable, sera donc punie moins sévèrement
que l’infraction réalisée. L’explication de cette punition moins sévère réside dans le principe de proportionnalité : la sévérité de la sanction est corrélative à l’importance du préjudice apporté au bien
juridique protégé. En cas de tentative, l’auteur n’a de toute évidence pas encore causé le même préjudice qu’en cas d’infraction consommée.
Actuellement, cette punition proportionnelle et relativement légère est un des critiques à l’égard du
régime de la tentative et certaines incriminations autonomes d’actes préparatoires, comme … Il faut
cependant souligner que d’autres infractions autonomes, telle que le faux en écritures et l’usage de
faux, sont déjà pourvues de lourdes peines (de cinq à dix ans de réclusion pour les personnes privées,
de dix à quinze ans de réclusion pour les fonctionnaires ou officiers publics).
Ces dernières années, le législateur semble aller à la rencontre de cette critique. Aussi la tendance
législative est-elle de quitter la logique de la théorie classique du droit pénal avec son principe de
proportionnalité et de remédier au (soi-disant) désavantage de sanctions trop laxistes par l’introduction
de nouvelles infractions, telles que l’organisation criminelle et terroriste, toutes pourvues de lourdes
sanctions (cf. infra, PhT).
On peut cependant se demander si l’introduction de nouvelles infractions et l’alourdissement des peines était la seule option, voire nécessaire. On aurait également pu choisir l’introduction de nouvelles
circonstances aggravantes ou une modification de l’article 65, al. 1er C.P. Celui-ci dispose qu’en cas
de délit collectif (c’est-à-dire le concours d’infractions de nature identique ou divergente qui sont la
25
réalisation d’un même projet criminel ), seule la peine la plus forte sera prononcée. L’article 65, al.
1er C.P. a donc un effet absorbant et entraîne que l’auteur qui par exemple commet un vol avec plusieurs circonstances aggravantes (p. ex. vol commis à plusieurs personnes, pendant la nuit, avec effraction et violence) n’a plus rien à perdre en continuant son iter criminis vers le hold-up, étant donné
qu’il risque à ce stade déjà la peine maximale. La loi pénale perd ainsi une partie importante de son
effet effrayant, à quoi de nouvelles infractions avec des peines lourdes ne sauront remédier.
Actes préparatoires. Comme on a largement souligné, les actes préparatoires ne sont pas punissables
sous le régime de la tentative.
S’ils entrent cependant dans le champ d’application de la participation, il faut à nouveau distinguer
entre participation à un crime et celle à un délit. En cas de crime, les actes préparatoires seront punis
de la peine immédiatement inférieure à celle qui seraient imposées si le complice ou coauteur subirait
s’il avait réalisé le crime. Comme pour la tentative à un crime, la peine immédiatement inférieure est
déterminée à l’aide de l’échelle de peines qu’on trouve aux articles 80 et 81 C.P. (art. 69, al. 1er C.P.).
25
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Par contre, dans l’hypothèse où les actes préparatoires constituent une participation à la réalisation
d’un délit, l’auteur de ces actes pourra encourir au maximum les deux tiers de la peine applicable s’il
avait commis le délit principal lui-même (art. 69, al. 2 C.P.).
Par ailleurs, si les actes préparatoires sont punissables comme infractions autonomes ou en faisant
partie d’une infraction plus vaste telle que la ‘conspiracy’ ou l’association de malfaiteurs, on appliques les peines que la loi prévoit pour ces infractions.
Participation
La question de la participation criminelle est réglée par les articles 66, 67 et 69 du Code Pénal. Il est
important de remarquer que le Code pénal belge date de 1867 et que le livre I, qui traite les questions
fondamentales du droit pénal général, n’a jamais fait l’objet d’une réforme globale.
La date de 1867 explique également que les textes actuels qui règlent la participation ne tiennent pas
compte des nouvelles formes de criminalité, comme par exemple la criminalité organisée et le terrorisme. En effet, le Code Pénal de 1867 a considéré la participation comme un élément qui se rattache à
26
un fait incriminé par la loi et non pas comme une infraction en elle-même . Le point de départ du
législateur de 1867 était clairement l’hypothèse d’une infraction commise par une personne. La participation était prévue pour les situations dans lesquelles l’auteur principal recevait une aide quelconque
d’une autre personne. Sous certaines conditions, cette dernière personne pourrait être punie. Le caractère punissable de la participation de cette personne reposait sur le caractère punissable de l’infraction
principale. Cet approche constitue donc la théorie de l’emprunt de criminalité, qui reste jusqu’à nos
jours le fondement de la participation criminelle.
Il importe néanmoins d’analyser de plus près les conditions de la participation, les catégories de participants et le traitement de ces personnes en droit pénal belge.
En droit belge, on admet généralement que trois conditions doivent être réunies pour accepter la présence d’une participation criminelle.
Il importe de noter que la théorie de l’emprunt de criminalité et la matière de la participation criminelle est en grande partie l’œuvre de la doctrine juridique. Sur base des articles mentionnés, c’est-àdire les articles 66, 67 et 69 du Code pénal, la doctrine juridique et la jurisprudence ont construit la
théorie de la participation criminelle.
La première condition évidente consiste en l’existence d’une infraction principale. En effet, pour être
punissable, les actes de participation doivent se rattacher à une infraction.
La théorie de l’emprunt de criminalité, acceptée en droit belge signifie qu’un acte de participation à un
certain fait ne peut avoir un caractère punissable au sens de la loi pénale que si le fait auquel on coopère constitue une infraction en droit pénal belge. En effet, les actes de participation sont des modalités d’exécution d’une infraction et ne constituent en eux-mêmes pas des infractions. Il n’est pourtant
pas exclu qu’un acte de participation à un délit constitue en lui-même un délit. Ceci pourrait
s’imaginer par exemple lors de la rédaction d’un document faux en vue de commettre une escroquerie.
La rédaction du document en question constitue évidemment le crime de faux en écriture mais en
même temps un acte de participation à l’escroquerie.
L’infraction principale doit en principe être consommée. Toutefois, la jurisprudence admet que la
participation à la tentative est punissable dès lors que les conditions de la tentative et de la participa27
tion sont réunies. En revanche, la tentative de participation n’est pas punissable .
Le deuxième élément de la participation criminelle constitue dans la matérialité des faits.
Il n’y a que participation criminelle à condition qu’un acte de participation, prévu par la loi soit exécuté.
26
27
F. TULKENS & M. VAN DE KERCHOVE, Introduction au droit pénal, Brussel, Story-Scientia, 1997, 328.
S. Tulkens en M. Van de Kerckhove, o.c., 333.
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Un acte de participation ne sera punissable que s’il rentre dans une des hypothèses limitativement
28
énumérées par le texte, ces conditions étant à la fois nécessaires et suffisantes .
Le code pénal répartit les formes de la participation en deux catégories : les actes d’auteur (auteur et
co-auteur) et les actes de complicité.
La loi suppose que les auteurs et les co-auteurs coopèrent directement à l’infraction tandis que dans
l’hypothèse d’une complicité, il y a aide et assistance utiles. Bien que la différence entre la catégorie
des auteurs et des co-auteurs d’une part et des complices d’autre part repose sur un critère clair et que
ces deux catégories de participants sont sanctionnées pénalement d’une autre manière, on constate en
pratique que le ministère public poursuit les participants presque toujours en tant que auteurs ou coauteurs et presque jamais en tant que complices. Ces circonstances n’interdisent le juge évidemment
pas de juger quelqu’un comme simple complice. Le caractère nécessaire de l’aide qui est apportée par
le participant à l’infraction doit être jugé in concreto.
La participation criminelle requiert également en principe un acte positif. En droit belge, il n’existe
pas de participation par abstention. La seule exception à ces principes constitue l’abstention dite
« qualifiée » qui est considérée par la jurisprudence belge comme une abstention qui peut être assimilée à un acte positif.
La jurisprudence admet qu’une abstention peut constituer un acte de participation en deux circonstances.
Premièrement, une abstention peut être considérée comme un acte de participation si cette abstention
constitue en réalité un encouragement à la commission de l’infraction en question. Ensuite, si
l’abstention constitue en même temps une violation d’une obligation contractuelle ou légale d’agir,
cette abstention peut être également considérée comme équivalent à un acte positif de participation.
On doit distinguer de ces deux hypothèses la situation où quelqu’un est simplement un spectateur
passif d’une infraction ou qui obtient après la commission de l’infraction d’une manière ou d’une
autre un certain avantage. Ces deux dernières circonstances ne constituent pas un acte de participation,
bien que la première hypothèse puisse dans certains cas être considérée comme étant le délit de nonassistance à personne en danger. La jurisprudence belge offre beaucoup d’exemples de cette abstention, dite coupable et encourageante.
Ces exemples constituent par exemple un inculpé qui avait selon les juges une certaine autorité sur son
ami beaucoup plus jeune et qui savait que ce dernier était en train de commettre un incendie.
Cette « abstention encourageante » est également admise dans le domaine de la criminalité
d’entreprise. La Cour de cassation a admis qu’un inculpé, administrateur délégué sur papier, peut être
considéré comme un co-auteur s’il apparaît que l’inculpé a omis d’exécuter la surveillance nécessaire
et s’il apparaît que l’inculpé, par son abstention qualifiée a rendu possible la commission des faits29.
La violation d’une obligation contractuelle pourrait être acceptée dans le cas d’un surveillant de nuit
qui laisse délibérément une porte ouverte et contribue à sa manière à la réalisation de l’infraction de
vol.
Un exemple d’une obligation légale à agir constitue par exemple les articles 155 et 156 du Code Pénal
qui obligent les officiers publics à faire cesser une détention illégale. On constate dans la jurisprudence récente une tendance à élargir le concept de participation criminelle spécifiquement en faisant
plus d’usage de la participation par abstention.
Enfin, la participation requiert un acte antérieur ou concomitant, ce qui écarte la participation à une
intervention postérieure à l’infraction.
28
29
Cass., 15 mai 1985, Pas., I, p. 1153.
Cass., 29 avril 2003, Pas., 2003, nr. 269.
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Cette condition connaît cependant deux exceptions. D’abord, si l’aide est promise avant l’exécution
30
matérielle de l’infraction pour la faciliter, il y a participation criminelle .
La deuxième exception à cette règle est contenue dans l’article 67, 4e alinéa du Code pénal qui admet
la participation criminelle des personnes qui ont, avec connaissance, aidé ou assisté l’auteur ou les coauteurs du crime ou du délit dans les faits qui l’ont préparés ou facilités, ou dans ceux qui l’ont
consommé. La jurisprudence accepte généralement que cette dernière possibilité d’une participation
criminelle post factum ne concerne que le délit de vol et des personnes qui emportent une chose qui a
31
été volée par l’auteur .
L’aide ou l’assistance qui est moins essentielle et qui n’a dès lors aucun caractère nécessaire est considérée comme le fondement de la complicité. Selon l’article 67 du Code pénal, l’aide matérielle, qui
constitue la complicité peut être le fait de donner des instructions pour commettre le crime ou le délit,
la procuration d’armes, d’instruments ou de tout autre moyen qui a servi au crime ou au délit et l’aide
ou l’assistance hors le cas prévu par le paragraphe 3 de l’article 66, c’est-à-dire hors le cas de l’aide
nécessaire. Pour faire la différence entre une aide utile et une aide nécessaire, le juge de fait peut se
servir du critère dit de l’éloignement, c’est-à-dire s’il apparaît qu’il s’agit des actes qui se situent du
point de vue temporel et en espace assez loin du délit. Cependant, il est clair que la détermination du
caractère nécessaire ou simplement utile d’une assistance à la commission d’une infraction est une
question de fait. Plus spécifiquement, en ce qui concerne les affaires de criminalité grave et organisée
et des infractions terroristes, il est clair que des actes de participation, bien qu’ils sont situés loin de
l’infraction principale, auront probablement un caractère nécessaire et pourront dès lors être considérés comme un acte de coaction et non pas de complicité.
La troisième condition de la participation criminelle constitue en la volonté de s’associer au même
crime ou délit. En effet, la participation criminelle exige un élément moral, à savoir l’intention de
32
s’associer à l’exécution d’une infraction à la suite d’un accord criminel avec les autres participants .
Pour qu’il y ait participation criminelle, il faut que l’agent ait connaissance du caractère délictueux de
33
l’acte principal et qu’il ait l’intention de s’y associer, de le provoquer ou de le favoriser . La Cour de
cassation belge exige que le participant ait connaissance du fait qu’il coopère à un certain délit ou à un
certain crime et qu’il suffit que le participant ait connaissance de toutes les circonstances qui donnent
34
au fait auquel il coopère le caractère d’un certain crime ou d’un certain délit . L’absence de cette
connaissance exclut toute participation criminelle. Il n’est cependant pas requis que le participant
serait au courant de tous les détails de l’infraction en question. Il n’est par exemple aucunement nécessaire que le participant ait connaissance du lieu ou du moment exact où l’infraction principale
serait commise, ni au détriment de quelle personne cette infraction serait commise. L’exigence de
connaissance du caractère punissable de l’infraction à laquelle on coopère doit donc être interprétée
d’une manière raisonnable.
Le participant doit avoir l’intention de coopérer à l’infraction principale mais cette intention du participant peut être distinguée de l’intention criminelle de l’auteur principal. Un accord tacite est possible
35
et suffisant . Le juge de fait sera obligé d’indiquer les circonstances spécifiques sur base desquelles il
conclut à l’existence de l’accord entre co-auteurs et auteurs principaux.
Une forme spécifique de participation criminelle constitue dans l’instigation à la commission d’un
crime ou d’un délit.
30
M. Chatelle, « Deelneming post factum » o.c., 55.
Cass., 12 mai 2004, R.G. P.04.0672.F.
32
J. Constant, Traité élémentaire de droit pénal, I, p. 323, n°. 243.
33
Cass., 9 décembre 1986, Pas., 1987, I, p. 437.
34
Cass., 16 décembre 2003, Cass., 10 mai 2005, R.G. P.05.0122.N ; Cass., 7 septembre 2005, R.G. P.05.0348.F.
35
Cass., 5 octobre 2005, R.G. p.05.0444.F.
31
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La provocation individuelle et directe à la commission d’un crime ou d’un délit est punie par l’article
66, 4e alinéa du Code pénal.
La provocation individuelle et directe est punissable à condition qu’elle soit réalisée par des moyens
mentionnés dans l’article 66, c’est-à-dire par des dons, promesses, menaces, abus d’autorité ou de
pouvoir, machinations ou artifices coupables.
Cette forme de provocation doit être individuelle, ce qui n’exclut pas qu’elle soit réalisée à l’attention
de plusieurs personnes, dont une passe à la commission de l’infraction. La provocation doit aussi être
spécifique, c’est-à-dire dirigée vers un crime ou un délit spécifique. Enfin, il doit y avoir une relation
causale entre la provocation et la commission du délit. Il est clair que cette dernière condition sera
probablement difficile à prouver.
La provocation publique est punie par l’article 66, 5e alinéa du Code pénal. Cette provocation est
dirigée par définition à un groupe indéfini de plusieurs personnes. La loi fait une différence entre la
provocation collective par des discours tenus dans des réunions ou dans des lieux publics d’une part et
la provocation par des écrits, des imprimés des images ou emblèmes quelconques d’autre part.
L’énumération des moyens de provocation publique est extrêmement large, ce qui prouve que le législateur a voulu punir la provocation publique plus sévèrement.
Il est clair que la criminalisation de la provocation collective est une nécessité et qu’on doit en même
temps préserver la liberté d’expression. La jurisprudence belge a jugé que l’article 66 du Code pénal,
qui punit la provocation collective peut être considéré comme une loi au sens de l’article 10, 2e alinéa
de la Convention Européenne des droits de l’homme, sur base duquel la liberté d’expression peut être
36
limitée . Il est vrai que la question devient plus difficile si par exemple certaines personnes défendent
en public des crimes ou des délits qui ont déjà été commis et si cette défense publique pourrait être
considérée par certaines personnes comme une provocation collective à la commission de délits ou de
crimes semblables.
Enfin on doit mentionner la loi du 7 juillet 1875 contenant des dispositions pénales contre les offres
ou propositions de commettre certains crimes et la loi du 25 mars 1891 portant répression de la provocation à commettre des crimes et des délits. Il s’agit dans ces deux cas de situations où l’offre, la provocation ou la proposition n’a pas été suivie d’une infraction réelle. L’article 66, 4e et 5e alinéas, qui
punissent la provocation individuelle et collective requiert par contre toujours que l’infraction a réellement été commise.
En ce qui concerne la sanction des actes de participation, la loi belge est assez claire.
Les co-auteurs au sens de l’article 66 du Code Pénal seront punis comme les auteurs.
Il s’ensuit que le juge pénal, pour punir les co-auteurs d’un crime ou d’un délit, possède la même
marge d’appréciation que celle qui s’applique aux auteurs principaux du délit.
En ce qui concerne les complices, l’article 69 du Code Pénal fait une distinction entre les complices
d’un crime et ceux d’un délit. Les complices d’un crime seront punis de la peine qui, conformément
aux articles 80 et 81 du Code pénal est immédiatement inférieure à celle qu’ils encourraient s’ils
étaient auteurs de ces crimes. Par exemple, si le crime est puni d’un l’emprisonnement de 10 à 15 ans
le complice sera puni d’un emprisonnement de cinq à dix ans ou d’une peine d’emprisonnement d’au
moins six mois.
S’il s’agit d’un délit, la peine encourue par les complices n’excédera pas les deux tiers de celle qui lui
serait appliquée s’il était auteur de ce délit.
La loi pénale belge contient dans l’article 137, §1 du Code pénal une définition normative d’acte de
terrorisme. L’article 137, §1 dispose en effet que constitue une infraction terroriste l’infraction prévue
aux paragraphes 2 et 3 du même article qui, de par sa nature ou son contexte, peut porter gravement
atteinte à un pays ou à une organisation internationale et est commise intentionnellement dans le but
36
Bruxelles, 2 mai 2002, J.LM.B., 2003, 71-78.
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d’intimider gravement une population ou de contraindre indument des pouvoirs publics ou une organisation internationale à accomplir ou à s’abstenir d’accomplir un acte, ou de gravement déstabiliser ou
détruire des structures fondamentales politiques, constitutionnelles, économiques ou sociales d’un
pays ou d’une organisation internationale.
Le législateur belge a clairement indiqué sa volonté d’assurer la transposition le plus fidèle possible de
la décision-cadre de l’Union Européenne du 13 juin 2002 en allant ni en -deçà, ni au-delà de ce qu’elle
37
impose .
La loi du 19 décembre 2003 a introduit dans le Code pénal belge deux catégories d’infraction, d’une
part les infractions terroristes proprement dites, d’autre part les infractions relatives à un groupe terroriste.
En ce qui concerne l’élément matériel, la loi belge établit une distinction entre deux catégories de
faits, selon qu’il faisait déjà l’objet d’une infraction, incrimination spécifique en droit belge, ou non.
L’article 137, §2 du Code pénal belge énumère des infractions, qui existent déjà en droit belge mais
qui seront considérées comme des infractions terroristes lorsque les éléments intentionnels et contextuels, repris au §1 de l’article 137 seront prouvés.
Il s’agit entre autres de l’homicide volontaire ou des coups et blessures volontaires visés aux articles
393 à 404 du Code pénal. Egalement l’enlèvement figure dans l’énumération de cette catégorie
d’infraction.
D’autre part, le §3 de l’article 137 énumère des infractions nouvelles, qui n’existaient pas dans l’ordre
pénal belge et qui seront considérées comme des infractions terroristes. Il s’agit entre autres de la
destruction ou de la dégradation massive ou la provocation d’une inondation, d’une infrastructure,
d’un système de transport, d’une propriété publique ou privée ayant pour effet de mettre en danger des
vies humaines ou de produire des pertes économiques considérables, autres que celles visées au §2.
La peine pour les infractions terroristes de la première catégorie est décrite à l’article 138 du Code
pénal belge. La circonstance que cette infraction existante constitue une infraction terroriste donnera
lieu à l’application d’une circonstance aggravante, selon l’échelle prévue à l’article 138 du Code pénal
belge.
En ce qui concerne l’élément moral des infractions terroristes on doit distinguer trois intentions alternatives. En premier lieu il s’agit de l’intention d’intimider gravement une population. Ensuite la
deuxième intention alternative consiste à contraindre indument des pouvoirs publics ou une organisation internationale à accomplir ou à s’abstenir d’accomplir un acte tandis que la troisième forme
d’intention est celle qui consiste à vouloir gravement déstabiliser ou détruire des structures fondamentales, politiques, constitutionnelles, économiques ou sociales d’un pays ou d’une organisation internationale.
En plus, un élément dit contextuel est également requis, c’est-à-dire que l’infraction, de par sa nature
ou son contexte peut porter gravement atteinte à un pays ou à une organisation internationale.
Le caractère imprécis et vague de cet élément contextuel a été critiqué. La Cour d’arbitrage a néanmoins jugé par son arrêt du 13 juillet 2005 (arrêt n°125/2005, Moniteur Belge du 3 août 2005) que les
articles 137 du Code pénal et suivants sont suffisamment précis pour permettre au citoyen de savoir
dans quelles circonstances et sous quelles conditions un acte spécifique est considéré comme une
infraction pénale.
Une autre catégorie d’infractions terroristes concerne les infractions qui concernent la participation à
un groupe terroriste.
37
D. Flore, « La loi du 19 décembre 2003 relative aux infractions terroristes », in « Questions d’actualité de droit
pénal et de procédure pénale », Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2005, p. 209 et svtes.
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La loi belge reprend à l’article 139 du Code pénal la définition contenue dans la décision-cadre de
l’Union Européenne. Constitue un groupe terroriste l’association structurée de plus de deux personnes,
établi dans le temps, et qui agit de façon concertée en vue de commettre des infractions terroristes
visées à l’article 137.
La loi belge dispose spécifiquement - en fait superflu - qu’une organisation dont l’objet réel est exclusivement d’ordre philosophique, syndicale, philanthropique, philosophique ou religieux ou qui poursuit exclusivement tout autre but légitime ne peut être considérée comme un groupe terroriste.
La loi belge incrimine deux formes de participation aux groupes terroristes, c’est-à-dire la simple
participation et la direction.
La simple participation est punissable sur base de l’article 140, §1 du Code pénal tandis que le §2 du
même article punit la direction d’un groupe terroriste.
La participation à des infractions terroristes ou à une infraction qui est liée à un groupe terroriste est
en fait réglée par les conditions générales de la participation criminelle, comme décrites plus haut.
En effet une personne qui participe à une infraction terroriste doit avoir l’intention et la connaissance
du fait qu’il participe, d’une manière décrite aux articles 66 ou 67 du Code pénal à une infraction
terroriste.
En ce qui concerne la participation à une activité d’un groupe terroriste la loi requiert seulement la
connaissance du fait que cette participation contribue à commettre un crime ou un délit du groupe
terroriste. Cette dernière condition est explicitement posée à l’article 140, §1er du Code pénal.
Il ne paraît cependant pas acquis que la personne ait eu connaissance du fait qu’elle contribuait à la
préparation d’une infraction terroriste particulière. Il suffit qu’elle ait su qu’elle contribuait à un crime
38
ou délit quelconque planifié par le groupe terroriste .
En plus, la participation à un groupe terroriste est punissable même si l’infraction terroriste n’aurait
pas été effectivement commise.
L’article 141 incrimine une autre forme de participation à un groupe criminel, c’est-à-dire le financement individuel d’un groupe terroriste. L’article 141 dispose que toute personne qui, hors les cas prévus à l’article 140, fournit les moyens matériels, y compris une aide financière en vue de la commission d’une infraction terroriste visée à l’article 137 sera punie de peine criminelle.
La plus grande différence entre les articles 140 et 141 réside dans le fait que l’aide financière, visée à
l’article 141 ne doit pas nécessairement être portée à un groupe terroriste. Il suffit que l’aide financière
ou matérielle ait été fournie à n’importe quelle personne, à condition que cette aide ait été fournie en
vue de la commission d’une infraction terroriste.
La loi du 19 décembre 2003, qui a introduit les dispositions en matière de terrorisme, est entrée en
vigueur en droit belge le 8 janvier 2004.
En ce qui concerne la criminalité organisée, la loi belge du 10 janvier 1999 introduit dans le Code
pénal les articles 324bis et 324ter.
Ces articles ont été modifiés légèrement par la loi du 10 août 2005 (Moniteur Belge du 12 septembre
2005), qui a adopté pleinement dans le droit pénal belge la définition de l’organisation criminelle,
comme établie dans la Convention des Nations Unies de 2000 contre la criminalité organisée transnationale.
Constitue en effet selon l’article 324bis du Code pénal une organisation criminelle, l’association structurée de plus de deux personnes établie dans le temps, en vue de commettre de façon concertée, des
crimes et délits punissables d’un emprisonnement de trois ans ou d’une peine plus grave, pour obtenir
directement ou indirectement des avantages patrimoniaux.
38
D. Flore, o.c., p. 218.
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Avant l’adoption de la loi du 10 août 2005, la définition de l’organisation criminelle contenait une
référence au modus operandi, c’est-à-dire l’utilisation de l’intimidation, des menaces, de la violence,
des manœuvres frauduleuses ou la corruption ou le recours à des structures commerciales ou autres
pour dissimuler ou faciliter la réalisation des infractions.
Cette référence au modus operandi, qui ne figurait pas dans la définition adoptée par les Nations
Unies, a bel et bien été abolie par la loi du 10 août 2005. Le législateur belge introduit cette référence
au modus operandi dans la définition du délit de faire partie d’une organisation criminelle.
En effet, l’article 324ter du Code pénal établit quatre infractions qui concernent l’organisation criminelle. La première infraction concerne le fait de faire partie sciemment et volontairement d’une organisation criminelle, qui emploie les méthodes mentionnées comme l’intimidation etc.
Il est clair que, selon le texte du §1er de l’article 324ter, le participant à une organisation criminelle
n’est que punissable s’il sait que l’organisation criminelle en question utilise un des moyens mentionnés dans cet article.
Les trois autres infractions qui concernent l’organisation criminelle ne requièrent pas l’emploi du
modus operandi susmentionné.
En effet, l’article 324ter distingue trois autres infractions qui concernent l’organisation criminelle :
− La participation à la préparation ou à la réalisation de toute activité licite de l’organisation criminelle alors que la personne sait que sa participation contribue aux objectifs de l’organisation criminelle ;
− La participation à toute prise de décision dans le cadre des activités de l’organisation criminelle
alors que cette personne sait que sa participation contribue aux objectifs de celle-ci,
− L’infraction d’être un dirigeant de l’organisation criminelle.
Ces trois infractions ne requièrent aucunement que la personne en question est au courant du fait que
l’organisation criminelle utilise l’intimidation, la menace, la violence ou d’autres moyens quelconques.
Par contre, cette personne doit être au courant du fait qu’il existe une organisation criminelle, ce qui
signifie que cette personne doit savoir que cette organisation possède bel et bien tous les caractères
d’une organisation criminelle, entre autres le but d’obtenir directement ou indirectement des avantages
patrimoniaux.
En ce qui concerne le terrorisme et les autres formes très graves de criminalité, on peut donc conclure
que, en ce qui concerne l’auteur principal, l’infraction requiert en effet explicitement que l’auteur
agisse en poursuivant une finalité spécifique.
En ce qui concerne les infractions terroristes, il s’agit ici d’éléments intentionnels et d’éléments
contextuels, précités, tandis qu’en ce qui concerne l’organisation criminelle l’auteur doit au moins être
au courant qu’il fait partie d’une organisation criminelle ou qu’il fournit une aide essentielle à cette
organisation criminelle ce qui signifie qu’il doit être au courant de l’existence d’une organisation
criminelle, y inclus le but d’obtenir directement ou indirectement des avantages patrimoniaux.
En ce qui concerne le participant à ces délits, on peut conclure qu’en général, les règles de la participation criminelle, comme contenues aux articles 66 et 67 du Code pénal, s’appliquent aux infractions
terroristes et les infractions qui concernent les autres formes très graves de criminalité.
En droit belge, il n’y a pas de règles ou des conditions spéciales pour la prise en compte pénale de la
participation au délit ou pour la punition de la complicité dans les domaines de terrorisme ou de criminalité organisée.
En effet, on ne doit pas se laisser tromper par l’emploi du mot participation.
En ce qui concerne le terrorisme, il y a d’une part les infractions terroristes, décrites à l’article 137 du
Code pénal. Les règles générales de la participation criminelle s’appliquent ici.
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D’autre part, il y a les infractions qui concernent le groupe terroriste. Dans ce cadre, l’article 140 du
Code pénal belge punit toute personne qui participe à une activité d’un groupe terroriste y compris par
la fourniture d’informations ou de moyens matériels au groupe terroriste ou par toute forme de financement d’une activité du groupe terroriste. Cette forme de participation à une activité du groupe terroriste constitue un délit autonome. Il est vrai que dans certains cas, l’activité, décrite au 1er paragraphe
de l’article 140 du Code pénal constituera en même temps un acte de participation dans le sens des
articles 66 et 67 du Code pénal à une infraction terroriste, décrite à l’article 137 du Code pénal.
Dans l’hypothèse où le délit de participation à un groupe terroriste constituerait en même temps un
acte de participation au sens des articles 66 et 67 du Code pénal à l’infraction terroriste elle-même,
l’article 65 du Code pénal s’appliquera et seule la peine la plus grave sera appliquée.
En ce qui concerne l’organisation criminelle, les délits décrits à l’article 324ter du Code pénal constituent des délits autonomes.
Il est clair que là aussi, il n’est pas impossible que l’infraction de faire partie de l’organisation criminelle ou la participation à toute prise de décision dans le cadre de l’organisation criminelle constituerait en même temps un acte de participation conformément aux articles 66 et 67 du Code pénal à une
infraction spécifique commise par l’organisation criminelle.
Dans cette hypothèse l’article 65 du Code pénal s’applique également.
On peut donc déduire de ce qui précède que les dispositions concernant le terrorisme et l’organisation
criminelle ont bel et bien renforcé les règles de la participation contenues au livre I du Code pénal par
l’instauration dans les articles 140 et 324ter du Code pénal des incriminations autonomes qui concernent la participation d’une manière ou d’une autre à une infraction terroriste, un groupe terroriste ou
une organisation criminelle.
Le simple accord ou la simple incitation non suivi de la commission du délit n’est en principe pas
punissable comme délit autonome.
Néanmoins, on droit remarquer que la participation à une activité d’un groupe terroriste ou le délit de
faire partie d’une organisation criminelle ne requiert aucunement que le groupe terroriste ou
l’organisation criminelle a commis effectivement une infraction spécifique. Il suffit que la personne
participe à une activité d’un groupe terroriste, par exemple dans la forme d’une aide financière, sans
qu’une infraction terroriste ait été effectivement commise.
Cette réalité n’est pas en soi la conséquence de la théorie générale de la participation criminelle mais
du fait que, en matière de terrorisme et de criminalité organisée, le législateur belge a introduit des
incriminations spécifiques en ce domaine.
La punition explicite de conduites antérieures ou collatérales, comme celle de soutien, d’assistance ou
d’aide externe n’est pas prévue explicitement en ce qui concerne les infractions terroristes.
Néanmoins les règles générales de la participation criminelle, contenues dans les articles 66 et 67 du
Code pénal permettent la punition d’une personne qui fournit une aide externe, comme par exemple
un avocat, à condition que cette personne répond aux exigences des articles 66 et 67 du Code pénal.
Ceci implique que cette personne doit savoir qu’elle contribue à une infraction pénale et qu’elle a
l’intention de porter une aide à cette infraction spécifique.
En ce qui concerne l’organisation criminelle, le §2 de l’article 324ter dispose explicitement que toute
personne qui participe à la préparation ou à la réalisation de toute activité licite d’une organisation
criminelle est punissable. En effet il était nécessaire de prévoir cette incrimination puisque les articles
66 et 67 du Code pénal, qui contiennent les règles générales de la participation criminelle, ne concernent que l’aide à une infraction pénale. Il peut donc être conclu qu’une personne, chaque fois qu’elle
fournit une aide ou assistance, même légale en soi, à une infraction pénale en général et une infraction
en matière de terrorisme ou d’organisation criminelle en particulier, est punissable sur base de la théorie générale de la participation criminelle. Le législateur belge a estimé qu’il n’était pas nécessaire de
prévoir des dispositions spécifiques en cette matière.
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Depuis l’adoption de la loi du 4 mai 1999, entrée en vigueur le 2 juillet 1999, les personnes morales (à
l’exception de l’Etat fédéral et les régions) sont pénalement responsables d’infractions qui sont intrinsèquement liées à la réalisation de leur objet ou à la défense de leurs intérêts, ou de celles dont les faits
concrets démontrent qu’elles ont été commises pour leur compte.
L’article 5 du Code pénal belge, qui règle en général la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales
connaît un régime spécifique en ce qui concerne les infractions où la responsabilité de la personne
morale est engagée exclusivement en raison de l’intervention d’une personne physique identifiée, au
quel cas seule la personne qui a commis la faute la plus grave peut être condamnée. Cependant,
l’article 5 du Code pénal dispose que, si la personne physique a commis la faute sciemment et volontairement, elle peut être condamnée en même temps que la personne morale responsable. Puisque les
infractions en matière de terrorisme et de criminalité organisée seront en règle générale des infractions
qui seront commises sciemment et volontairement, on peut en déduire que les personnes morales
pourront être considérées comme étant responsables de ces infractions sous les mêmes conditions que
des personnes physiques.
Les dispositions en matière de terrorisme et de criminalité organisée ne changent rien aux dispositions
relatives à la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales. Les règles générales s’appliquent.
On peut donc en déduire qu’une personne morale peut être considérée comme pénalement responsable
d’une infraction terroriste ou d’une infraction en matière d’organisation criminelle. On peut supposer
qu’en pratique surtout les incriminations en matière d’organisation criminelle pourront s’appliquer
aux personnes morales.
Le groupe terroriste, bien que ce soit possible, sera rarement organisé sous la forme d’une personne
morale.
Il n’y a aucun rapport spécifique entre cette réglementation et l’infraction pénale de l’association ou
du groupe terroriste ou criminel. Les dispositions qui concernent la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales peuvent dès lors être appliquées d’une manière cumulative avec les dispositions qui
concernent l’infraction terroriste ou l’organisation criminelle.
En effet d’après l’article 5 du Code pénal, toutes les infractions pénales peuvent en théorie être commises par une personne morale.
En droit belge il n’existe pas d’incriminations spécifiques de conduite consistant en l’expression et/ou
la diffusion de la pensée et l’opinion liée au terrorisme.
D’autre part, il y a deux incriminations qui, sans être liées spécifiquement aux actes de terrorisme
peuvent être considérées comme punissant certaines conduites consistant en l’expression et la diffusion de la pensée et de l’opinion.
D’une part il y a la provocation collective, décrite à l’article 66, dernier alinéa du Code pénal qui punit
en tant qu’auteur du délit ceux qui, soit par des discours tenus dans des réunions ou dans des lieux
publics, soit par des écrits, des imprimés, des images ou emblèmes quelconques auront provoqué
directement à commettre des crimes et des délits.
Cette incrimination de provocation collective suppose que le crime ou le délit en question a été commis.
Ce concept de provocation collective est applicable à tous les crimes et délits du Code pénal et des lois
spéciales.
Il s’ensuit que cette provocation collective est également applicable aux infractions terroristes, décrites à l’article 137 du Code pénal et les infractions d’appartenance ou de soutien à un groupe terroriste,
décrites à l’article 140 du Code pénal.
Il apparaît de l’article 66, dernier alinéa du Code pénal que les moyens qui doivent être employés pour
constituer cette provocation collective sont formulés et énumérés d’une manière extrêmement large.
Lors des discussions sur le Code pénal de 1867 diverses personnes ont mis en garde le législateur
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39
contre cette énumération très large . Il est clair qu’une application très large de ce concept de provocation collective pourrait être considérée comme une dérogation à la liberté d’expression, garantie par
l’article 10 de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme. La Cour d’appel de Bruxelles a déjà
jugé que l’article 66, dernier alinéa du Code pénal peut bel et bien être considéré comme une loi au
sens de l’article 10, 2ème alinéa de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme sur base de
laquelle une expression ou une opinion peut être limitée pour autant qu’il soit nécessaire dans un état
de droit démocratique et pour autant que cette limitation du droit fondamental d’expression sert à la
40
prévention d’infractions . Cette affaire concernait des incidents lors d’un conflit social en 1997.
Il est clair qu’il pourrait y avoir un problème lorsque des personnes défendent en public des crimes et
des délits qui ont déjà été commis. Il n’est pas exclu qu’une défense publique d’un crime déjà commis
pourrait être considérée comme une provocation collective à la commission d’autres délits semblables.
D’autre part la provocation collective au sens de l’article 66 du Code pénal requiert que la provocation
concerne une infraction spécifique.
Si la provocation collective est restée sans résultat l’article 66 du Code pénal n’est pas applicable.
Dans ce cas cependant, il peut être fait usage de la loi du 25 mars 1891 portant répression de la provocation à commettre des crimes et des délits.
Ce qui a été dit plus haut concernant la relation de cette incrimination avec l’article 10 de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme s’applique également ici.
Il en résulte qu’en particulier, l’apologie, le prosélytisme idéologique, la propagande, etc. en lien avec
le terrorisme ne peuvent être punis que sur base du concept de la provocation publique ou sur base de
la loi de 1891, si la provocation est restée sans résultat. Une incrimination en ce sens spécifiquement
dans le domaine du terrorisme n’existe pas. Il n’est cependant pas exclu que d’autres incriminations,
par exemple sur base de la loi contre le racisme de 1981 pourront dans certains cas être employées si
des personnes diffuseraient des opinions ou des pensées liées au terrorisme et qui inciteraient possiblement des personnes à commettre des actes terroristes.
B) Caractéristiques de l’élargissement des formes de préparation et de participation
1. Y a-t-il eu un élargissement des formes de préparation et de participation (par exemple, concernant
41
les délits en matière de terrorisme ou d’autres formes très sérieuses de criminalité) ?
Introduction. Il ressort de l’exposé précédent (cf. A.2.1. et A.2.2.) que tant le régime classique de la
tentative que celui de la participation présentent un certain nombre de désavantages. Ceux-ci sont
ressentis de façon plus aiguë dans la lutte contre la criminalité organisée et le terrorisme.
Ainsi, la tentative requiert impérativement le commencement d’exécution. Or, en cas de criminalité
organisée et terrorisme, les risques émanant d’actes de commencement d’exécution, voire des actes
préparatoires, sont trop élevés pour attendre à ce qu’ils se produisent. Pensons par exemple aux dangers liés à l’utilisation d’armes de destruction massive, voire aux risques imprévisibles qui peuvent
surgir lorsque des instruments de la vie quotidienne (tels que certains liquides dans le bagage à main
dans un avion ou l’avion même) se transforment en véritables armes de destruction massive, pour
autant qu’ils tombent aux mains de gens avec de mauvaises intentions. Les autorités ne devraient-elles
pas pouvoir intervenir plus tôt, au moment où ces gens commencent à planifier leur projet criminel ou,
au moins, dès qu’ils commencent à rassembler les moyens nécessaires à son exécution? Le fait
d’attendre trop longtemps pourrait en tout cas avoir des conséquences néfastes, alors qu’à l’Etat, il lui
39
Les Novelles. Droit pénal. I2., p. 132, n°3983.
Bruxelles, 2 mai 2002, J.L.M.B., 2003, p. 71 à 78.
41
Ce paragraphe est largement inspiré de F. Verbruggen, “Strafbare voorbereidingshandelingen in België: autopsie zonder lijk”, l.c., (8) 98-114 et 130-162; F. Verbruggen et C. Fijnault, “The Criminal Justice System Facing
the Challenge of Organised Crime”, l.c., (627) 658-659 et 644-646.
40
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incombe une responsabilité de protéger ses citoyens (p. ex. art. 2 CEDH). La question d’un élargissement de la pénalité se voit ainsi posée.
Néanmoins, le simple élargissement de la pénalité ne suffirait sans doute pas à résoudre le problème
dans sa totalité. Afin de pouvoir réagir efficacement contre les infractions de criminalité organisée et
de terrorisme dès qu’elles se sont constituées en germe, il est impérieux que les autorités chargées de
la recherche puissent mettre la main sur l’information nécessaire dès le tout début du projet criminel.
Elles ont donc besoin de pouvoir se servir de méthodes particulières de recherche (telles que les écoutes téléphoniques, l’observation, l’infiltration, etc.). Celles-ci étaient cependant restreintes aux crimes.
Il fallait donc également un élargissement sur ce point-ci.
Un autre désavantage du régime de la tentative est les peines relativement légères. Rappelons que la
peine maximale pour une tentative de crime est en principe immédiatement inférieure à celle sanctionnant le crime consommé (art. 52 C.P.) et que la peine pour une tentative de délit sera, selon le cas,
soit inférieure, soit égale à la peine à celle pour le délit s’il aurait été accompli. Conformément au
principe de proportionnalité, une tentative devrait en effet être pénalisée moins lourdement qu’une
infraction accomplie. Or, le législateur semble aujourd’hui moins convaincu de la valeur du principe
de proportionnalité.
La participation, de son côté, est caractérisée par d’autres ‘défauts’, principalement liés à l’élément
moral qui est requis au chef du coauteur ou complice, à savoir l’intention consciente de participer à la
réalisation d’une infraction principale. Or, la preuve de cet élément moral sera dans certains cas difficile, voire systématiquement impossible. Tel sera en première instance le cas pour les chefs de file ou
dirigeants, qui veillent à ne pas donner des ordres directs aux auteurs principaux de l’infraction, que ce
soit par l’entremise d’un homme de paille, ou à travers une structure hiérarchisée à plusieurs niveaux
favorisant l’initiative propre aux niveaux inférieurs. En conséquence, le lien causal entre leurs ordres
et l’infraction principale ne pourra souvent pas être établi. Un problème semblable se pose pour les
personnes qui, agissant dans le cadre du circuit légal, offrent légalement de l’aide logistique, technique ou financière aux ‘vrais’ délinquants. Pour eux, il sera plus difficile encore que pour les chefs de
file de fournir la preuve de l’intention consciente de ces personnes de participer à une infraction déterminée. Il est cependant capital de pouvoir court-circuiter l’aide du monde légal aux organisations
criminelles et terroristes.
D’autres problèmes relatifs à la participation traditionnelle surgissent plutôt sur le plan procédural, tels
que l’éparpillement de juridictions et de magistrats compétents lorsqu’une organisation criminelle a
commis plusieurs infractions géographiquement dispersées. (cf. A.2.2.)
Autant de raisons donc qui ont motivé le législateur belge, faisant face aux défis de la criminalité
organisée et du terrorisme, à intervenir. Son intervention ne s’est pourtant pas traduite par une adaptation des régimes existants de la tentative et la participation. Au contraire, ceux-ci sont restés intactes.
Le législateur a préféré d’introduire de nouvelles infractions, quoiqu’elles ne soient peut-être pas si
neuves que ça (cf. loi sur les stupéfiants, association de malfaiteurs, infra). Il s’agit de l’adhésion ou
‘participation’ à une organisation criminelle (art. 324ter C.P.), la ‘participation’ à un groupe terroriste
42
(art. 140 à 141 C.P.), ou une longue liste d’infractions terroristes (art. 137 C.P.). Dénominateur
commun de ces infractions : on y avance de manière considérable le début de la phase pénale/punissable.
1.1 Les simples actes préparatoires, tels que l’incitation ou la provocation non suivie de la réalisation
du délit, sont-ils punis comme délit autonome ou éventuellement en tant que conspiracy ?
- Les actes préparatoires n’étant pas punissables sous le régime de la tentative, ils peuvent bien sûr
être incriminés comme des infractions autonomes. Ainsi, la proposition à autrui de commettre ou de
participer à un crime punissable de la détention ou réclusion à perpétuité ou de la réclusion de dix à
42
On verra cependant que, contrairement aux apparences, le terme ‘participation’ ne renvoie pas à la participation
légale décrite ci-dessus (cf. A.2.2, PhT).
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quinze ans ou plus, est un délit (loi du 7 juillet 1875). Il en va de même de la provocation publique,
sans effet, à commettre des crimes ou certains délits (loi du 25 mars 1891). Cf. A.2.1.1. et 2.1.2.
- Par ailleurs, les actes préparatoires sont susceptibles d’être punissables sous le régime de la participation, s’ils rentrent dans une des catégories d’actes de participation punissables. La provocation individuelle à un crime ou un délit rentre dans le champ d’application de l’article 66, al. 4 C.P., tandis que
la provocation par des moyens publics à des crimes ou délits est couverte par l’article 66, al. 5 C.P.Cf.
A.2.2.1., PhT.
1.2 En particulier, existe-t-il des incriminations spécifiques – et, éventuellement, quand ont-elles été
introduites – qui punissent de manière autonome des activités spécifiques, tels que l’enrôlement,
l’entraînement, la fabrication ou la possession de faux documents, la fabrication, la possession ou
l’acquisition d’explosifs ou d’armes, etc., qui interviennent en amont de l’exécution effective d’actes
terroristes ou de la réalisation du dessein criminel ?
Infractions autonomes préexistantes. Pour les infractions autonomes de type préventif telles que le
faux en écritures, la fabrication et/ou détention illégale d’explosifs ou d’armes, nous renvoyons à la
section A.2.1.2.
Association de malfaiteurs. Nous faisons également référence à l’infraction d’association de malfaiteurs (A.2.1.2.).
Introduction de nouvelles infractions. Récemment le législateur belge a introduit deux séries
d’infractions adressant de façon explicite le problème de la criminalité grave et organisée, et celui du
terrorisme. Il s’agit d’une part des infractions terroristes (art. 137 à 141ter C.P., introduits par la loi du
19 décembre 2003), et d’autre part les infractions relatives à l’organisation criminelle (art. 324bis à
324ter C.P., introduits par la loi du 10 janvier 1999 et modifiés par la loi du 10 août 2005) (cf. infra,
B.3. PhT). Cependant, il est remarquable qu’à aucune de ces occasions, la question des actes préparatoires n’ait été vraiment débattue, ni d’ailleurs celle du commencement d’exécution. Nulle part le
législateur n’a indiqué quels éléments doivent être pris en compte pour indiquer l’intention criminelle
ou terroriste des individus ou des groupes. En plus, le législateur n’a pas explicitement introduit de
nouvelles incriminations autonomes d’actes préparatoires. C’était par contre son objectif explicite de
les incriminer à travers les nouvelles infractions.
En effet, ces deux interventions législatives ont manifestement eu le but d’avancer le début de la phase
punissable/moment où on entre dans les conditions de la pénalité. Ainsi, le législateur a nettement
choisi une approche préventive. L’infraction à l’article 324ter C.P. le montre bien : le seul fait de faire
partie d’une organisation criminelle (qui est définie à l’article précédent) suffit pour être punissable,
même si le membre en question n’a pas eu l’intention de commettre une infraction dans le cadre de
cette organisation, voire d’y participer (art. 324bis, § 1 C.P.). De même, celui qui ‘participe’ à la préparation ou l’exécution d’une activité licite, alors qu’il sait que sa participation contribue aux objectifs
de l’organisation, est punissable (art. 324ter C.P.).
Il faut en conclure que les actes préparatoires rentrent dans le domaine d’application de ces nouvelles
infractions, incluant donc des actes tels que l’enrôlement, l’entraînement, etc. Le législateur n’a pas
énumérés les actes préparatoires qui sont punissables, sans doute parce que telle liste entraînerait le
risque d’en oublier. Il sera partant au juge pénal de décider si un accusé remplit les conditions de la
pénalité. D’autres actes préparatoires, tels que la fabrication, possession, acquisition ou fourniture
d’explosifs ou d’armes nucléaires, la capture de moyens de transports ou la menace de réaliser une
infraction terroriste, ont été qualifiés d’infraction terroriste à l’article 137 C.P.
Par voie de conséquence, le problème crucial qui se pose pour les nouvelles infractions ne sera plus de
délimiter les actes de commencement d’exécution des actes préparatoires, comme il était nécessaire
pour la tentative punissable, mais la question de preuve qui se pose en amont de ces actes: comment
définit-on l’adhésion et la participation à une organisation criminelle ou à un groupe terroriste? Quel
acte suffit pour être affilié à une organisation criminelle ? Et surtout, quand est-ce qu’on parle d’une
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activité dans le cadre d’une organisation criminelle ou d’un groupe terroriste ? C’est là que le bât
blesse, puisque le législateur est demeuré extrêmement vague sur ces points-là. Pourtant, la question
est cruciale : une fois que cette preuve est fournie, tout désistement devient impossible, ou plutôt,
n’aura plus de répercussions sur la question de la pénalité. Il se peut pourtant que le juge en tienne
compte lors de la détermination de la peine, car l’adhésion et/ou participation au collectif s’est accomplie. Comme il était déjà le cas pour le complot et l’association de malfaiteurs (cf. A.2.1.2.), l’iter
criminis devient, sous l’influence de la logique collective, une rue à sens unique.
1.3 Existe-t-il d’autres incriminations préparatoires et/ou accessoires par rapport à la commission de
ces délits ?
D’une part, toutes les infractions autonomes que nous venons de décrire dans ce qui précède (cf.
A.2.1.2.) continuent à exister. Certaines d’entre elles, telles que le faux en écriture (art. 193 ss. C.P.),
43
le vol (avec circonstances aggravantes, art. 461 ss. C.P.) et l’extorsion (art. 470 ss. C.P.) n’ont délibérément pas été reprises dans la liste d’infractions terroristes établie à l’article 137, § 2 et § 3 C.P.
Dans l’exposé des motifs auprès de cette loi, le législateur avait en effet souligné que certains actes
préparatoires visés par la décision-cadre de l’Union européenne étaient déjà des infractions autonomes
en droit pénal belge. Il voulait donc éviter une double incrimination des mêmes faits. On peut cependant se demander si le législateur a vraiment atteint son objectif, car, à part les infractions autonomes
qu’on vient de mentionner, bon nombre d’autres infractions qui peuvent constituer un acte ou une
infraction préparatoire à l’égard d’une infraction ultérieure, ont bel et bien été reprises dans la liste de
l’article 137 C.P. Telle est d’ailleurs la conséquence logique de la technique législative mise en œuvre
lors de la rédaction de l’article 137 C.P. Le législateur a uniquement repris des infractions préexistantes en y ajoutant une intention spéciale, notamment l’intention terroriste. Les nouvelles infractions
terroristes fonctionnent en quelque sorte comme des circonstances aggravantes, même si cela n’est pas
tout à fait correct d’un point de vue strict. Il est donc fort probable qu’un seul comportement est punissable sous deux incriminations légales (concours d’infractions).
En conclusion, les nouvelles infractions terroristes et de l’organisation criminelle n’excluent donc
aucunement les infractions autonomes incriminant certains actes préparatoires. Au contraire, bon
nombre d’entre eux ont simplement été repris, soit comme infraction terroriste, soit comme élément
constitutif de l’adhésion ou la participation à une organisation criminelle ou un groupe terroriste (cf.
B.1.2).
1.4 Existe-t-il des cas dans lesquels un même individu peut être poursuivi et puni en raison de la réalisation d’un de ces actes préparatoires (par exemple le « recrutement ») et aussi en raison de la réalisation d’un des délits qui en représentent le « but » (par exemple « exécution d’un acte de terrorisme ») ? Et, éventuellement, aussi pour le délit d’association ou d’appartenance à un groupe terroriste ou criminel qui poursuit le même but (infra, B-3) ?
Cf. B.1.1. et B.1.2.
Pour ce qui est des actes préparatoires étant des infractions autonomes, il est tout à fait concevable que
quelqu’un commet l’acte préparatoire (p. ex. un vol d’une voiture) et qu’il commet l’infraction faisant
l’objet de la préparation (p. ex. il met la voiture à la disposition du groupe terroriste qui l’utilisera pour
commettre un autre vol). Il y aura alors concours idéal d’infractions (dans notre exemple, vol et participation à un groupe terroriste). Cela aura des répercussions sur la peine imposée (cf. infra, B.6).
Pour les actes préparatoires qui sont incriminés comme élément constitutif d’une/ que sous une infraction de type collectif (adhésion et/ou participation à une organisation criminelle ou un groupe terroriste), il ne sera bien sûr pas possible de poursuivre un individu pour deux infractions différentes, étant
donné que l’acte préparatoire est un élément matériel constitutif de l’infraction collective. Nonobstant,
si quelqu’un commet en même temps l’infraction de participation à un groupe terroriste (il donne p.
ex. des leçons de pilotage à d’autres membres du groupe) et une infraction terroriste (il participe p. ex.
43
Parl. St. Kamer 2003-04, n° 51-0258/001, p. 7-8.
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à une prise d’otages pour revendiquer la libération de membres de son groupe terroriste), il pourra
bien évidemment être poursuivi pour ces deux infractions.
La nouvelle législation connaît cependant quelques lacunes. Par exemple, celui qui rassemble des
outils pour commettre lui-même une infraction terroriste, passe entre les mailles du filet, car l’article
141 C.P. n’envisage pas cette situation-ci, mais uniquement celle où quelqu’un fournit des moyens
pour que quelqu’un d’autre puisse commettre une infraction terroriste. La seule solution pour combler
cette lacune, à l’état actuel de la législation, est de retomber sur les règles de la tentative et la participation.
1.5 Est-ce qu’il y a des règles ou des conditions spéciales pour la prise en compte pénale de la tentative dans ces domaines de criminalité ? Quels éléments constitutifs ou différentiels (concernant
l’élément matériel ou moral du délit) présentent-elles éventuellement par rapport à celles de la tentative des délits communs correspondants ?
Dans l’exposé précédent (cf. B.1.2), on a déjà souligné que le législateur belge n’a pas apporté de
modification au régime traditionnel de la tentative, ni à celui de la participation au moment de pénaliser l’organisation criminelle et le groupe terroriste. Par contre, il a rendu les actes préparatoires punissables en créant de nouvelles infractions, avec un champ d’application vaste, tant au niveau temporel
que matériel. N’empêche que, dans l’hypothèse où les éléments constitutifs des nouvelles incriminations ne seraient pas suffisamment établis, il faut retomber sur les régimes inchangés de la tentative et
de la participation (cf. exemple donné sous B.1.4).
Cf. A.3. et B.3. (PhT)
6. Un traitement différent des formes antérieures de préparation et de participation est-il prévu en
termes de sanction? Et de quelle nature ou dans quelle mesure ? (tant du point de vue qualitatif que
quantitatif des peines applicables, d’éventuelle sanctions ou mesures accessoires, des critères à utiliser
en la matière, d’éventuelles règles spécifiques dérogatoires au droit commun).
44
Introduction
Peines principales. Il est clair que les nouvelles infractions sont pourvues de sanctions nettement plus
sévères que l’association de malfaiteurs et les infractions de droit commun qui ont été reprises dans
l’article 137 C.P. Cela est d’autant plus vrai pour les chefs de file ou dirigeants, qui pourront encourir
des sanctions criminelles. Ces peines ont été introduites dans le but d’être plus effrayantes que les
peines pour les infractions existantes, le législateur étant convaincu que, d’une part, le danger de la
criminalité organisée et le terrorisme pour la société est tellement menaçant qu’il faut des peines plus
dissuasives, et d’autre part, que cet effet dissuasif émane nécessairement de peines plus élevées.
Concrètement, l’adhésion à une organisation criminelle sera punissable d’un an à trois ans
d’emprisonnement et/ou d’une amende de cent euros à cinq mille euros (x 5, 5 pour les opdécimes)
(art. 324ter, § 1 C.P.). La participation à l’organisation criminelle peut être sanctionnée des mêmes
peines pour les membres ordinaires (art. 324ter, § 2 C.P.), alors que des personnes qui participent à
une prise de position dans le cadre des activités de l’organisation peuvent être condamnées à la réclusion de cinq à dix ans et/ou à une amende de cinq cent euros à cent mille euros (art. 324ter, § 3 C.P.),
et les dirigeants même à la réclusion de dix à quinze ans et une amende de mille euros à deux cent
mille euros (art. 324ter, § 4 C.P.).
La participation à une activité d’un groupe terroriste peut être punie de la réclusion de cinq à dix ans
et une amende de cent à cinq mille euros (art. 140, § 1 C.P.), augmentée à la réclusion de quinze à
vingt ans et une amende de mille à deux cent mille euros pour les chefs de file (art. 140, § 2 C.P.).
L’aide matérielle ou financière contribuant à une infraction terroriste commise par une autre personne
est sanctionnée de la réclusion de cinq à dix ans et une amende de cent à cinq mille euros (art. 141
44
Ce paragraphe est en grande partie inspiré de F. Verbruggen, “Strafbare voorbereidingshandelingen in België:
autopsie zonder lijk”, l.c., (8) 142-162.
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C.P.). Les infractions terroristes sont toutes punies d’une peine d’emprisonnement ou de réclusion, les
amendes étant remplacées par l’emprisonnement, et les peines varient entre un an à trois ans
d’emprisonnement et la réclusion à perpétuité (art. 138 C.P.).
Cependant, on peut se demander si tel alourdissement des peines est en réalité vraiment efficace. Le
législateur semble avoir oublié les effets/le jeu de l’article 65 C.P. Rappelons-nous, cet article dispose
45
que, en cas de concours idéal d’infractions, seule la peine la plus forte . Dans la pratique, il y aura en
effet fréquemment des cas de concours d’infractions, puisque, pour constater l’existence d’une organisation criminelle (et, dans une moindre mesure, d’un groupe terroriste), il faut quand même souvent
qu’une infraction ait déjà eu lieu. Or, pour l’organisation criminelle, telle infraction devra obligatoirement être sanctionnée dans la loi de trois ans d’emprisonnement ou plus (art. 324bis al. 1 C.P.).
Dans de tels cas, la peine pour l’adhésion ou la participation à une organisation criminelle sera donc
absorbée par celle sanctionnant l’infraction commise dans le cadre de l’organisation, en principe censée être moins sérieuse que l’existence de l’organisation criminelle. (Les seules exceptions seront
probablement le cas de récidive d’adhésion ou de participation à l’organisation criminelle ou le cas où
un dirigeant de l’organisation criminelle ou du groupe terroriste est poursuivi, parce que ces cas sont
assortis d’un alourdissement des peines supplémentaire.) Ainsi, tous les efforts du législateur de créer
des peines plus effrayantes semblent complètement manquer leur but.
Il aurait sans doute été préférable de modifier l’article 65 C.P., qui ne semble plus adapté aux besoins
du droit pénal contemporain. A notre avis, il serait en effet une bonne idée de rendre possible un
cumul limité des peines, comme en cas de concours matériel d’infractions (art. 58 à 62 C.P.).
En deuxième lieu, il nous paraît que le législateur aurait mieux fait d’introduire de nouvelles circonstances aggravantes au lieu de créer de nouvelles infractions. Car, si on étudie celles-ci de plus près, on
constate que les infractions concernant l’organisation criminelle sont en fait de simples avatars de
l’association de malfaiteurs. Les infractions terroristes, pour leur part, sont des reprises d’infractions
préexistantes, commises avec une intention terroriste (cf. supra, …). Telle intervention législative
aurait été plus simple et plus conséquente.
Finalement, on peut se poser la question si l’alourdissement des peines pour les nouvelles infractions
est réconciliable avec les principes de légalité et de proportionnalité. D’un côté, les incriminations
sont tellement larges, surtout dans le cas de l’adhésion à une organisation criminelle (art. 324ter C.P.),
qu’elles n’offrent guère de protection contre l’arbitraire de l’Etat. D’un autre, on constate une différence gigantesque entre les peines principales minimales et maximales. Ainsi, le juge pourra par
exemple condamner un chef de file d’une organisation criminelle (art. 324ter, § 4 C.P.) à une amende
minimale de vingt-six euros (x 5, 5 pour le opdécimes), après correctionnalisation en raison de circonstances atténuantes, ou bien aux peines maximales comprenant la réclusion de vingt ans, une
amende de deux cent mille euros (x 5, 5), l’interdiction de tous les droits pour une durée de dix ans, la
confiscation spéciale des avantages patrimoniaux (sans plafond !) et une interdiction professionnelle
de dix ans.
Ce qui plus est, le principe de proportionnalité est complètement bafoué. D’un seul trait, le législateur
a voulu protéger un bien aussi vaste et abstrait que l’ordre public. En conséquence, la simple adhésion
à une organisation criminelle est pénalisée de la même manière que les crimes les plus atroces qui
pourront être commis dans le cadre d’une telle organisation, alors que, dans le premier cas de figure,
le préjudice pour l’ordre public reste encore tout à fait hypothétique. Une fois qu’on est membre d’une
organisation criminelle, le désistement n’est plus possible. Le membre n’a donc plus de raison pour ne
45
La question de la peine la plus forte est partiellement résolue par l’article 63 C.P. (« La peine la plus forte est
celle dont la durée est la plus longue. »). La Cour de cassation a élaboré à partir de cet article toute une théorie,
tenant compte des peines minimales si les peines maximales sont égales, voire des peines accessoires, si les peines principales sont également identiques. Cette théorie est entre-temps devenue classique, si ce n’était que la
Cour constitutionnelle a récemment rendu des arrêts qui semblent contredire la théorie de la Cour de cassation.
Verwijzing naar FV, Themis, 2007.
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pas continuer son chemin criminel. Cette évolution du droit pénal va complètement à l’encontre de la
logique subjacente à la tentative et la participation.
Peines accessoires. Pour ce qui est des peines accessoires, par contre, les nouvelles infractions font en
général appel aux dispositions de droit commun. Il en va ainsi de la confiscation spéciale des éventuels objets et produits de l’infraction, et surtout des avantages patrimoniaux tirés des infractions (art.
42 à 43bis C.P.). La confiscation peut également être prononcée pour des biens qui se trouvent à
l’étranger (art. 43ter C.P.).
Pour les membres d’une organisation criminelle, s’y ajoute l’interdiction professionnelle (arrêté royal
46
n° 22 du 24 octobre 1934 ). Cette peine accessoire (avant la loi du 2 juin 1998 encore une mesure de
sécurité) est facultative et peut être imposée pour une période de trois ans à dix ans. En conséquence,
le condamné ne pourra plus remplir « personnellement ou par interposition de personne, les fonctions
d’administrateur, de commissaire ou de gérant dans une société par actions, une société privée à responsabilité limitée ou une société coopérative » (art. 1 de l’A.R. n° 22).
Au cas où un membre d’une organisation criminelle ou d’un groupe terroriste est effectivement
condamné à une peine de réclusion (art. 324ter, §§ 3 et 4 C.P. et art. 140 et 141 C.P.), ce qui suppose
que ni la chambre de mise en accusation ni la Cour d’assises n’a retenu des circonstances atténuantes,
il sera également condamné à la destitution selon l’article 19 C.P. Il sera donc privé des titres, grades,
fonctions, emplois et offices publics dont il est éventuellement revêtu au moment de la condamnation.
Finalement, ceux qui sont accusés d’adhésion ou de participation à une organisation criminelle, peuvent encourir l’interdiction de certains ou tous les droits énumérés à l’article 31 C.P. et ce pour une
durée de cinq ans à dix ans (art. 325 C.P. ; art. 33 C.P.). Avant l’introduction de l’organisation criminelle en tant que sujet de droit, telle interdiction était déjà possible pour les membres d’une association de malfaiteurs. Cette peine accessoire produira ses effets à partir du jour où la décision de sa
condamnation devient définitive, mais elle ne sera exécutée qu’après que le condamné a subi, le cas
échéant, sa peine d’emprisonnement.
En conclusion, l’alourdissement systématique des peines pour les infractions relatives à la criminalité
organisée et le terrorisme reste donc largement confiné aux peines principales. Sur le plan de peines
accessoires, les règles de droit commun sont applicables, à l’exception peut-être de l’interdiction professionnelle et l’interdiction de certains droits, pour lesquelles le législateur a dû insérer une disposition spéciale. Il ne faut cependant pas exagérer ces exceptions, étant donné que ces peines accessoires
ne sont point du tout exceptionnelles pour les infractions de droit commun.
On fait également référence à la partie sous B.3.3. (PhT).
6.1. Quelle importance à, dans l’application des incriminations pénales susmentionnées, le désistement et/ou l’éventuel dédommagement, l’activité réparatrice, voire la réconciliation avec la victime ?
Organisation criminelle. En principe, le désistement est exclu, tant pour l’infraction d’adhésion que
pour la ’participation’ à une organisation criminelle. Dès qu’on « fait sciemment et volontairement
partie » de l’organisation criminelle, on a déjà accompli l’infraction d’adhésion. Le retour en arrière
n’est dès lors plus possible.
Il en va de même de l’infraction de ‘participation’ à l’organisation, pour laquelle il suffit de commettre une quelconque activité licite. La question est de savoir quand on ‘participe’. Le texte de la loi
reste silencieux sur ce point (cf. supra, B.1.2). Il se peut donc, pour ainsi dire, qu’on commette déjà
une infraction en conduisant un chef de file au lieu d’une réunion ou en allumant la lumière dans la
salle de réunion. De toute évidence, il n’est pas nécessaire de commettre un acte de commencement
d’exécution.
Quoique le désistement soit devenu impossible, il existe toutefois une échappatoire : la cause d’excuse
absolutoire de l’article 326 C.P. Cette cause donne l’impunité à celui qui dénonce aux autorités
46
M.B., 27 octobre 1934, à plusieurs reprises modifié.
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Belgique
l’existence de l’organisation et les noms des chefs de file ou d’autres membres qui occupent une fonction d’une certaine responsabilité, à condition qu’au moment de la dénonciation aucune tentative à une
infraction faisant l’objet de l’organisation n’ait eu lieu, ni aucun commencement de poursuites. Quoique le membre de l’organisation soit donc coupable de l’infraction d’adhésion ou de participation, il
n’en sera finalement pas puni. Cette cause d’excuse absolutoire existait déjà pour les membres d’une
association de malfaiteurs (cf. A.2.1.2.).
Infractions terroristes. Quoique la simple adhésion à un groupe terroriste ne soit pas punissable, le
désistement devient tout aussi impossible dès qu’on participe à une quelconque activité du groupe, ou
qu’on lui fournit de l’aide matérielle ou financière, qui contribue aux infractions faisant l’objet du
groupe ou à des infractions terroristes de l’article 137 C.P. La loi ne requiert pas d’acte de commencement d’exécution, un acte préparatoire suffit.
Rôle de la réconciliation avec la victime. Le code pénal belge ne prévoit pas de règles générales formalisant l’impact de la réconciliation avec la victime. Son impact est laissé à l’appréciation du juge du
fond, qui peut en tenir compte lorsqu’il détermine les peines qu’il va imposer au condamné.
Néanmoins, on peut se demander quel en sera le rôle dans le cas d’infractions relatives à la criminalité
organisée et au terrorisme si le but de ces infractions n’est pas tellement la protection des victimes
individuelles, mais plutôt l’ordre public dans sa totalité. En plus, rappelons-nous qu’il ne faut pas
avoir causé un préjudice effectif pour être punissable sous ces incriminations.
Place de la médiation pénale ? On pourrait se demander si les règles de la médiation pénale, prévues à
l’article 216ter C.I.C., sont applicables aux nouvelles infractions. La médiation pénale a été introduite
47
« en 1994 comme un mode d’extinction de l’action publique pour des faits de petite délinquance » .
Il faut cependant relativiser « faits de petite délinquance », car la médiation, comme règlement judiciaire alternatif, est possible pour tout fait dont le procureur du Roi estime qu’il ne sera pas puni d’une
peine d’emprisonnement supérieure à deux ans. En principe, le seuil de pénalité n’exclut donc pas son
applicabilité aux nouvelles infractions.
Il convient cependant de faire quelques remarques à ce sujet. Tout d’abord, la criminalité grave et
organisée, et certainement le terrorisme, sont considérées des points prioritaires sur l’agenda de la
politique criminelle, tant au niveau national qu’international. Il serait donc bizarre de leur appliquer un
mode de règlement alternatif qui est une faveur offerte aux délinquants ‘ordinaires’ qui ont commis
des infractions plutôt insignifiantes ou, du moins, pas prioritaires. Par ailleurs, une des conditions
légales pour la médiation requiert que l’auteur dédommage sa victime. Or, comment peut-on remplir
telle condition si aucun préjudice n’a été porté ? Il ne paraît donc pas très probable que la médiation
pénale soit appliquée aux nouvelles infractions.
6.2. Y a-t-il des particularités relatives à l’exécution effective de la peine et des sanctions ou mesures,
en particulier en ce qui concerne le régime carcéral, et des limitations ou des conditions particulières
pour bénéficier de mesures d’aménagement de la peine ou autres institutions favorables au condamné ?
- L’exécution des peines imposées passe par les règles de droit commun. Il n’existe pas de régime
spécial pour les terroristes ou membres d’une organisation criminelle.
- Cependant, il est de principe en Belgique que le régime carcéral peut être individualisé, c’est-à-dire
dans les limites de ce qui est techniquement et pratiquement possible. On peut donc tenir compte de la
dangerosité du détenu, par exemple en lui interdisant de quitter sa cellule, même pour les repas et aux
heures de promenade, en limitant le nombre de visites, en lui soumettant plus fréquemment à des
fouilles, etc.
Il y a eu des cas où le président de la cour de première instance, siégeant en référé, a décidé qu’un
régime particulier devait être adapté parce que le traitement n’était pas justifié dans le cas du détenu.
47
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Belgique
La nouvelle loi de base sur le système pénitentiaire les droits des détenus, dont seulement quelques
articles sont déjà entrés en vigueur, probablement augmentera sérieusement le nombre des recours aux
tribunaux.
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA*
Almir MALJEVIĆ **
1. Short overview of the latest criminal law reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina1
Until the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 90ties criminal legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) consisted of the Criminal Code of SFRY (Official
gazette of the SFRY, No. 44/76, 36/77, 34/84, 37/8 4, 74/87, 57/89, 3/90 and 45/90) and Criminal
Code of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official gazette of the Social Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 16/77, 32/84, 19/86, 40/87, 41/87, 33/89, 2/90 and 24/91). As provisions
of the General part, as well as those provisions of the Special part related to criminal offences under
jurisdiction of the SFRY (state level) were contained in the Criminal Code of SFRY only, and were to
be applied in all former socialist republics, at the moment of re-gaining its independence, BiH lacked
some very important pieces of criminal legislation. Due to difficulties for the Assembly of BiH to
gather and define a new law the Presidency of BiH imposed a Regulation with the Legal Power of a
Law on Ratification of the Criminal Code of SFRY (Official gazette of Republic of BiH, No. 2/92) as
a republic law, which, later on, Assembly of BiH officially ratified by means of Law on Confirmation
of Regulations with the Power of a Law (Official gazette of Republic of BiH, No. 13/94).
Since 1992, primarily due to the war, the process of criminal law reform in BiH occurred separately in
different parts of BiH’s territory. The Dayton Peace Agreement2 (DPA) brought the war to an end in
1995 and defined a very complex, inefficient and complicated administrative and territorial state structure. From 1995 forward, BiH consisted of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) that are afforded a very high level of autonomy in exercising
their constitutionally defined powers, including criminal legislation reforms. FBiH, the bigger entity,
is further decentralized as it is divided into ten separate cantons, each with its own assembly and constitution. Another separate administrative and territorial unit is represented by Brčko District of BiH
(BDBiH) with a separate legal system including a separate criminal justice system.
Although rooted in the criminal law of the former SFRY, 3 the three assemblies took different paths
for progress and harmonization of the criminal law with the international standards. However, with the
*
**
LL M in Criminal Law, Senior lecturer of criminal law at the Faculty of Criminal Justice Sciences, University
of Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Doctoral student at the International Max-Planck Research School for
Comparative Criminal Law, Freiburg i. Br. (Germany).
1
This sub-heading draws upon Maljević, Participation in Crime, pp. 3-4.
2
DPA is concluded in Dayton USA and signed in Paris, France in December 1995. It is also known as General
Framework Agreement for Peace.
3
It should be noted here that the criminal legislations of Serbia and Croatia were part of the criminal legislation
of SFRY as well. Therefore, court decisions of these countries were, and to some extent still are, used in the
practice of courts in BiH. Because of that, and when necessary, it will be referred to Croatia’s and Serbia’s court
decisions in this report too.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
“assistance” of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) of the International Community in BiH, 4
uncoordinated reforms stopped in January 2003 when BiH, as a state, finally passed the Criminal
Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina5 (CCBiH) and the Code of Criminal Procedure of Bosnia and Herzegovina6 (CCPBiH), as the codes that are to be applied to the whole territory of BiH. Many new and
modified legal solutions introduced by these laws urged for an immediate harmonization of existing
respective criminal codes of FBiH, RS and BDBiH which, fortunately, happened only a few months
after.7
2. Factors influencing criminal legislation reform in BiH
In addition to the overall situation within the criminal justice system of BiH, which can be described
as chaos, disorganisation, lack of co-ordination and co-operation, all caused by the war, several factors
played an important role in reforming criminal legislation of the country. First of all, a transitional
period, which brought obvious and significant socio-economic changes in the country, as well as new
socio-economic relationships and values, called for a transition of criminal legislation as well. Secondly, solutions contained in the criminal legislation of BiH were dating from mid 70ties and it was
evident that those needed to be updated with modern tendencies prevailing in both contemporary
criminal law theory and legislation.8 Thirdly, and probably most importantly, BiH integrated the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols in its constitution as the integral part of national legislation which is to be applied directly in BiH
with power over all other laws.9 By doing so, BiH introduced the need to harmonise its legislation
with guarantees for internationally recognised human rights standards. Fourthly, new forms of criminal behaviour, characterised by involvement of criminal collectives that are operating not only within
the borders of BiH but internationally as well, highly sophisticated modus operandi of criminal operations, increased use of both violence and corruption, organising criminal activities on both licit and
illicit markets as well as the latest terrorist attacks played an important role as well. These new forms
of criminal activities on one side and the fact that BiH is striving to wider European and international
integrations and is becoming a party to numerous international legal instruments requiring introduction of new legal solutions for addressing these newly emerging threats (such as terrorism) on the
other, called for the need to provide for harmonisation of definitions of criminal activities and efficient
conduct of investigation and prosecution10 of crimes which lie within the competence of BiH.11 All
4
OHR actually, in the exercise of his powers, on January 24th 2003, issued the decisions enacting Criminal Code
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Code of Criminal Procedure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See www.ohr.int.
5
Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of BiH, No. 3/03., changed/amended in No. 32/03,
37/03, 56/04, 61/04, 30/05, 53/06, 55/06, 32/07.
6
Code of Criminal Procedure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of BiH, No. 3/03, changed/amended
in No. 32/03, 36/03, 26/04, 63/04, 13/05, 48/05, 46/06, 76/06, 29/07, 32/07, 53/07, 76/07.
7
Criminal Code of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of FBiH, No. 36/03; Code of Criminal Procedure of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of FBiH, No. 35/03; Criminal Code of
Republika Srpska, Official Gazette of RS, No. 49/03; Code of Criminal Procedure of Republika Srpska, Official
Gazette of RS, No. 50/03; Criminal Code of Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of
BDBiH, No. 10/03; Code of Criminal Procedure of Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of
BDBiH, No. 10/03.
8
Compare, Vijeće Evrope/Evropska Komisija, Komentari, p. 13.
9
The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina Article II 2.: The rights and freedoms set forth in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law. Full text of the constitution in English is
available at http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.pdf (29.05.07.).
10
Concise overview of the newly introduced special investigative techniques is to be found in Maljević et al,
Harmonisation of the Criminal Legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
11
See Decision enacting the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, www.ohr.int.
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these factors seem to have played a very important role in re-shaping criminal legislation of the country and it is in this light that the solutions presented in this report should be seen and understood.
3. General outline of preparation, attempt, participation
The CCBiH deals with both different forms of participation in crime and different stages of the commission of a crime in both its General and Special part. Issues related to differentiation between coperpetrators and accomplices, as well as mens rea requirements for different forms of participation
and its reflections on punishment, and the issue of criminal attempt are discussed within the General
part, whereas the issues of special forms of participation, crime committed within a group, organised
group or conspiracy in particular as well as criminal preparatory acts are described within the Special
part.
4. Preparation of a criminal offence12
Preparation of a criminal offence has been only exceptionally punishable in BiH until the latest criminal law reform. Namely, according to the criminal legislation of the former SFRY, as well as to the
criminal legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the dissolution of the SFRY, provision on preparation of a criminal offence was contained within the General part of criminal code. This provision
clearly defined that intentional preparatory activities directed towards commission of a criminal offence are to be punishable only if and when criminal code prescribes so.13 As an example of preparatory activities the codes were defining14 obtaining or adjusting means needed for the commission of a
criminal offence, removing obstacles to the commission of a criminal offence, agreeing, planning or
organizing with others commission of a criminal offence as well as other activities by which one is
preparing direct commission of a criminal offence. The list of offences for which preparatory activities were explicitly punishable was very short. These criminal offences were actually offences against
the constitutional order and those included offences such as terrorism15 and espionage.16
With the latest reform, however, punishment for preparing a criminal offence has been considerably
extended. The provision on preparing a criminal offence is moved from the general part of the criminal code to the special part and placed together with the provisions defining conspiracy, association
for the purpose of commission of a criminal offence and organised crime. According to the CCBiH, 17
whoever procures or prepares means for the commission of a criminal offence or removes obstacles to
the commission of a criminal offence or engages in any other activity that creates conditions for a
direct perpetration, but is not a substantive part of the act of perpetration of a criminal offence prescribed by the law of BiH, for which a punishment of imprisonment of three years or a more severe
punishment may be imposed, unless a heavier punishment is foreseen for preparation of a particular
criminal offence, shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.18
Bearing in mind that there are only less than ten criminal offences for which three years of imprisonment or more severe punishment can not be imposed than it is obvious that this provision relates to
almost all criminal offences defined by the CCBiH.19 Therefore, it can be concluded that, although
placed in the special part of the CCBiH, provision on preparatory acts does not represent a new criminal offence but rather the integral part of, and extended punishment for earlier stages of almost all
12
CCBiH, Article 248.
See e.g. Criminal Code of the SFRY, Article 18.; See also Criminal Code of the FBiH (1998), Article 19.
14
See e.g. Criminal Code of the SFRY, Article 18.3.; See also Criminal Code of the FBiH (1998), Article 19.2.
15
Criminal Code of the SFRY, Article 125.; Criminal Code of the FBiH (1998), Article 146.
16
Criminal Code of the SFRY, Article 127.; Criminal Code of the FBiH (1998), Article 147.
17
CCBiH, Article 248.
18
It should be noted here that agreeing with others to commit a crime is not considered to be a general preparatory activity any more; rather it is considered a special criminal offence of conspiracy as defined in the CCBiH
Article 247.
19
Vijeće Evrope/Evropska Komisija, Komentari, p. 798.
13
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criminal offences defined by the CCBiH. As such, preparatory activities (delicta preparata) are in the
subsidiary relationship to criminal offences to which they relate to. It furthermore means that preparatory activities in BiH have no autonomous status and once the prepared offence(s) is/are committed a
perpetrator will be punished for the committed offence(s) only and not for concurrence of offences of
preparation(s) and committed offence(s) s/he prepared beforehand.20 It is very important to note that a
person can be punished for preparatory activities if s/he engages in any activity that creates conditions
for a direct perpetration of a criminal offence. This, extremely extensive formulation, gives ground for
processing individuals for almost any activity that can be related to the perpetration of offences. Practically, it means that the Court of BiH could convict a person of preparing terrorism if the state prosecutor’s office manages to prove that e.g. recruitment of bombers the defendant performed or the training he offered to future terrorists created conditions for a direct perpetration of a criminal offence for
which, should it be committed, imprisonment of three years or more severe penalty could be imposed.
This is a very powerful legal instrument in the hands of law enforcement agencies and its scope and
potential for application are yet to be discovered.
As for the differentiation from attempt, as the stage which starts with performing an act of commission of an offence as defined by the CCBiH, it is obvious from the definition given above that preparatory activities are in no way to represent a substantive part of the act of perpetration of a criminal
offence prescribed by the CCBiH. Preparatory activities are creating conditions for direct perpetration
of an offence; hence they take place before the commission of an offence starts. Of course, it is sometimes very difficult to decide if one activity is only “creating conditions for” or represents a “start of”
the commission of an offence. Whether one activity is to be found a substantive part of the act of
perpetration (i.e. a start of the commission) or just a preparative activity is a questio facti and no specific rules about this distinction exist in BiH;21 rather, every situation has to be analysed in detail in
order the decision to be made.
Preparatory activities are punishable by fine or up to three years of imprisonment. If this potential
sentence is to be compared with the sentences prescribed for criminal offences for which preparations
are punishable, than it should be noted that BiH applies a system of so-called relatively determined
sentences. I.e. the penalties are prescribed either by prescribing a maximum of the sentence (e.g. whoever ….will be punished by imprisonment not exceeding 3 years), 22 or a minimum of the sentence
(e.g. whoever….will be punished by not less than 3 years of imprisonment), 23 or sentencing range
(e.g. whoever … will be punished by imprisonment for a term between one and ten years).24 It furthermore means that, depending on the facts of the case, hypothetically, a person who prepared commission of a criminal offence could be sentenced just as severely (for preparing offences punishable
by imprisonment not exceeding 3 years) or less severely than s/he would have been punished had s/he
committed the prepared offence (for all other offences) her/himself.
5. Participation in crime25
The BiH legal system differentiates between perpetrators (incl. co-perpetrators) on one side and accomplices (instigators and abettors) on the other (dualistic approach). The main characteristic of this
approach is that it allows for differentiation of forms of participation based on their qualitative contribution to the commission of an offence, and creates a solid basis for individualisation of their criminal
liability and punishment. Criminal liability of accomplices is of an accessorial nature. It means that
existence of accomplices is possible only if a perpetrator or co-perpetrator committed an offence,
punishable attempt or punishable preparatory activities. It does not depend on the nature and degree of
20
Compare, Ibid. p. 798.
Compare, Ibid. pp. 154-157.
22
E.g. CCBiH, Article 240 – Disclosure of Identity of a Protected Witness.
23
E.g. CCBiH, Article 201 – Terrorism.
24
E.g. CCBiH, Article 205 – Counterfeiting money or Article 209 – Money laundering.
25
This sub-heading draws upon Maljević, Participation in crime, pp. 8-16.
21
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a perpetrator’s criminal liability but on the perpetrator having entered punishable zone. Therefore, it
can be said that BiH’s criminal law accepts limited accessorial nature of criminal liability of accomplices.26
5.1. Perpetrators and co-perpetrators
The CCBiH does not define direct perpetrators as it is understood that a direct perpetrator is a person
who fulfils both objective and subjective elements of an offence defined by the CCBiH. The only
form of perpetration that the CCBiH does define is co-perpetration.27 Co-perpetrators are two or more
persons who, by participating in the perpetration of a criminal offence or by undertaking some other
act by which a decisive contribution has been made to its perpetration, have jointly perpetrated a
criminal offence.28 According to this definition, which resembles the power over an offence theory, 29
in order someone to be qualified as a co-perpetrator there are several objective and subjective conditions that have to be fulfilled.
Objectively, a co-perpetrator has to participate in the commission of a crime by performing an act of
commission of a crime as defined by the CCBiH or by undertaking some other act (not defined by the
CCBiH) by which the co-perpetrator decisively contributed to the commission of that offence. Theoretically, it is not doubtful that co-perpetrator is whoever participates in performing an act of commission (or any act of commission for offences that can be committed by performing several acts alternatively) as it is defined by the CCBiH or whoever, at least partially, participates in performing an act of
commission of an offence. It is, however, sometimes very difficult to say whether some other act is to
be considered legally as equal to an act of commission of an offence or, in other words, if that other
act, which is not defined by the CCBiH, decisively contributes to the commission of an offence and is
hence to be qualified as co-perpetratorship.30 In other words, it might be difficult sometimes to differentiate between this form of co-perpetratorship and abetting. It is accepted in the criminal law theory31
in BiH that an other act, objectively, has to have an important, decisive role for the perpetration of a
criminal offence but, at the same time, that criminal offence can not be committed without the acts of
other co-perpetrators; ergo their (functional) power over the offence is joint and they will all be held
liable for that criminal offence as co-perpetrators.32 Basically, that other act is qualitatively different
from abetting as it is contributing to an offence significantly more than simple abetting. According to
some authors33 this “other” act has to contribute to the commission of an offence just as much as that
of a direct perpetrator.
As far as subjective elements of co-perpetratorship are concerned co-perpetrators have to be aware
that they are committing an offence with other co-perpetrators. They do not have to know their coperpetrators personally, 34 neither do they have to have a plan35 nor an agreement36 beforehand as
26
The only exception in this regard is so-called unsuccessful instigation. It is a situation in which an instigator
intentionally incites another to perpetrate a criminal offence, for which imprisonment for a term of three years or
a more severe punishment is prescribed by law, but the instigated person does not even attempt to commit that
crime. In that case, the instigator can be held criminally liable and punished for an attempt, despite the fact that
the criminal offence he was instigating on has not even been attempted. See CCBiH, Article 30.2.
27
Maljević, Participation in crime, p. 8.
28
CCBiH, Article 29.
29
30
31
32
Maljević, Participation in crime, p. 9 (quoting omitted).
33
Bačić, Kazneno pravo, p. 309.
34
35
Vijeće Evrope/Evropska komisija, Komentari, p. 177.
36
This approach is confirmed by Supreme Court of Serbia in its decision VSS, Kzz 42/01. Cited in Izbor sudske
prakse, Glosarijum, 12/2003, p. 41.
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some co-perpetrators may join in the commission of an offence in the later stages of criminal activities.37 Should, however, two persons get involved in the commission of a criminal offence without
being conscious of acting in concert with each other, than they would not be considered as coperpetrators but separate (parallel) perpetrators.38
Co-perpetrators are criminally liable within the limits of their intent as well as within the limits of
their negligence. Although joint acting presupposes intent, the CCBiH defines that negligent coperpetratorship is punishable as well.39 Therefore this provision should be understood in a way that
negligent co-perpetratorship is punishable when a criminal offence resulted in more severe consequences than originally embraced with the co-perpetrators’ intent but are embraced with their negligence.40
As far as the sentencing of co-perpetrators is concerned, all co-perpetrators are to be punished by a
sentence prescribed for an offence committed. Individual sentence imposed on each co-perpetrator
will depend on numerous circumstances defined by the CCBiH Article 48. These circumstances include the purpose of punishment as well as those having bearing on the magnitude of punishment
(mitigating and aggravating circumstances), and, in particular: the degree of criminal liability, the
motives for perpetrating the offence or participating in an offence, the degree of danger or injury to
the protected object, the circumstances in which the offence was perpetrated, the past conduct of the
perpetrator or a participant, his/her personal situation and his/her conduct after the perpetration of the
criminal offence, as well as other circumstances related to the personality of the perpetrator or the
participant.
5.2. Instigators
Although the CCBiH uses very few words to describe an instigator, 41 it is widely accepted in the
criminal law theory in the region that an instigator is any person who intentionally provokes or
strengthens someone’s decision for commission of a criminal offence and, as a result of instigation,
the instigated person commits the criminal offence.42 Therefore, it can be said that the main precondition for instigation is that perpetrator has not made a firm decision to commit a crime, 43 but her/his
decision appears or becomes firm only after one or more instigative acts have been performed. Had a
perpetrator already made a decision to commit a crime at the time when an instigator performed instigative acts, it would not have been possible to talk about instigation (so-called omnimodo facturus). In
that case, and depending on other circumstances of the case, one might be qualified as an abettor.44
The CCBiH does not specify acts of instigation so it should be understood that act of instigation is any
act that can cause two main consequences of instigation.45 The first consequence of instigation is to
provoke or solidify a decision to commit a crime and the second consequence is the commission of a
crime. Practice and criminal law theory in BiH have provided us with some examples of instigative
acts and those are: begging (praying), persuading, presenting the benefits of the commission of an
offence, giving or promising gifts, threatening, abuse of power, giving orders, getting someone or
37
Srzentić et al., Komentar, p. 130.
Compare Maljević, Participation in crime, p. 10.
39
CCBiH, Article 32.1.
40
Srzentić et al., Komentar, p. 132.
41
CCBiH, Article 30.: An instigator is whoever intentionally incites another person to perpetrate a criminal offence.
42
See e.g. Frank, Kazneno pravo, p. 103; Živanović, Osnovi, p. 80; Compare Čubinski, Naučni i praktični komentar, pp. 107-114.
43
S/he either did not make a decision or her/his decision was not firm.
44
Compare Vijeće Evrope/Evropska Komisija, Komentari, p. 182.
45
Zlatarić/Damaška, Rječnik, p. 226.
38
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keeping her/him in misconception of facts or law, giving advice, placing bets, persuading someone
that a criminal offence will not be detected etc.46
Instigation can be direct or indirect (successive, or instigation on instigation47 or chain instigation48).
Indirect instigation exists when instigation is performed via a third person or several intermediaries. In
this case the initial instigator, as well as all intermediaries, will be held criminally liable for instigating
the committed offence even if they knew only the following intermediary and if a perpetrator committed the offence all instigators were intentionally instigating on.49
Instigation has to be directed towards an identifiable perpetrator. It means that a perpetrator does not
have to be individually defined and known to an instigator. It is both sufficient and necessary that an
instigator knows a circle of people that are somehow identifiable (space wise, business wise, ideologically, etc.) and that one of them is a potential perpetrator. Should it not be the case, i.e. should instigation be directed towards an unidentifiable perpetrator these acts can not be qualified as instigation.
Exceptionally, these acts could be qualified as some special criminal offence.50
If an instigator intentionally performed instigation but his acts did not result in provoking or strengthening someone’s decision to commit a crime, or they did but the offence was not committed in furtherance of that decision for whatever reason, 51 the instigator will be held liable for an unsuccessful
instigation, provided that s/he was instigating the commission of an offence for which a punishment of
imprisonment for a term of three years or a more severe penalty is prescribed by law.52 Since there are
no consequences of instigation, it is seen as an attempted instigation and that instigator is to be punished as if the offence which he was instigating was actually attempted. It furthermore means that the
instigator shall be punished within the limits of the punishment prescribed for that criminal offence on
which he was instigating, but the punishment may also be reduced.53
Instigation is punishable only if it is performed with intent (dolus directus or dolus eventualis). It
means that an instigator’s awareness has to be twofold: s/he has to be aware of the fact that s/he is
provoking or strengthening a perpetrator’s decision to commit a crime and of the important elements54
of the criminal offence that the perpetrator will commit.
Concerning the punishment of instigators, they are to be punished just as if they committed the offence themselves.55 If, however, an instigator, by performing one or more instigative acts, caused more
than one criminal offence to be committed, s/he would be held criminally liable for concurrence of
46
Vijeće Evrope/Evropska komisija, Komentari, p. 183. Cited from Maljević, Participation in crime, p. 12.
Živanović, Osnovi, p. 250.
48
Bačić, Kazneno pravo, p. 334.; Horvatić/Novoselec, Kazneno pravo, p. 350.
49
50
CCBiH, Article 176.: Organising a Group of People and Instigating the Perpetration of Genocide, Crimes
against Humanity and War Crimes.
51
Most commonly quoted reasons in theory (e.g. Pavišić/Veić, Komentar, p. 162) are: refusal to commit a crime,
giving up (regardless to reason), and prevention of commission by third party or commission of some other criminal offence, different from the one on which the perpetrator was instigated. Cited from Maljević, Participation
in crime, p. 13.
52
53
54
In one case Supreme Court of Yugoslavia (VSJ Kž. 1/73) decided that instigation on murder exists although the
instigator did not specify which member of the family has to be killed. It means that the instigator does not have
to be aware of all the elements. Cited in Vijeće Evrope/Evropska komisija, Komentari, p. 184.
55
47
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instigations and her/his punishment would be defined in accordance with the rules of punishment for
concurrence of criminal offences.56
5.3. Abettors
Abetting is to be understood as all acts by which, to whatever extent, an abettor intentionally (either
dolus directus or dolus eventualis), but non-decisively, contributes to the commission of an offence. In
order for someone to be qualified as an abettor in the commission of an offence the perpetrator must
already have made a firm decision to commit a crime57 and an abettor must not be involved in the acts
of commission of an offence as they are defined by the CCBiH, nor must he perform acts by which
s/he will decisively contribute to the commission of an offence.58 Abetting usually consists of59 giving
advices or instructions as to how to perpetrate a criminal offence, supplying a perpetrator with means
for perpetrating a criminal offence, removing obstacles to the perpetration of a criminal offence, and
promising, prior to the perpetration of a criminal offence, to conceal a criminal offence, to hide a
perpetrator, the means used for perpetrating a criminal offence, traces of a criminal offence, or proceeds acquired by perpetration of a criminal offence.
Objectively, acts of abetting are nothing else but acts of preparation for the commission of an offence
performed by someone who is not a perpetrator (e.g. obtaining means needed for the commission of
an offence, removing obstacles to the commission of an offence, etc.) or acts by which someone
makes the commission of an offence easier for a perpetrator.60 Therefore, it is clear that the timeframe
within which an abettor can take part in the commission of an offence is very wide – from the moment
when a perpetrator decides to commit a crime all the way to the moment when a criminal offence is
formally and materially completed.61 Of course, if acts that are abetting by their nature were performed after an offence had already been committed (auxilium post delictum), hence are not contributing to the commission of the offence, those acts could not be qualified as abetting but most probably
as separate criminal offences.62
Abetting can be performed directly or indirectly. Abetting is direct if there are no intermediaries between an abettor and a perpetrator. Should there be one or more intermediaries between the two, it
will be indirect abetting. An abettor is to be punished by the sentence prescribed by the CCBiH for the
offence committed as if s/he her/himself committed that offence but the sentence may also be reduced.63 If s/he, however, contributes to the commission of one criminal offence by performing several acts of abetting it will be qualified as continued abetting. If, on the other hand, a person contributes to the commission of more than one offence by performing one or more acts of abetting it will be
qualified as concurrence of abetting in which case his sentence would be defined in accordance with
the CCBiH Article 53.
56
CCBiH, Article 53.1.: “If the perpetrator, by a single action or by several actions, has perpetrated several criminal offences, for which he is tried at the same time, the court shall first assess the punishment for each of the
offences separately, and then proceed with imposing a compound punishment of imprisonment, long-term imprisonment or a compound fine for all the offences taken together.” This article would be applied to an instigator
and an abettor accordingly. Cited from Maljević, Participation in crime, p. 12.
57
Otherwise s/he is more likely to be an instigator.
58
Otherwise s/he is more likely to be a co-perpetrator or an abettor, depending on the nature of the acts performed.
59
CCBiH Article 31.2.
60
61
In the case of Violating the Protection Granted to Bearers of Truce Flags committed by preventing flag bearers
from returning, abetting can be performed as long as the flag bearers are prevented from returning.
62
The examples might be offences defined in CCBiH Article 232 and Article 233. Compare Horvatić/Novoselec,
Kazneno pravo, p. 353.
63
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In order for abetting to be punishable, a perpetrator has to either commit a crime, a punishable attempt
or punishable preparations to the commission of a crime and the abetting itself must be intentional. It
means that the abettor’s intent has to embrace: a) that her/his abetting is or will contribute to the
commission of an offence; and b) the main characteristics of that offence. This means that in cases of
indirect abetting, neither initial abettor nor all intermediaries have to know who will perpetrate the
offence and they do not have to know all the particularities of the offence. At the same time, the perpetrator does not have to know that someone is helping him to commit a crime.64
6. Terrorism
The CCBiH Article 201.1 defines terrorism as follows: whoever perpetrates a terrorist act with the
aim of seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities, government of another state or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing
any act, or with the aim of seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of another state or international organisation, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not less than three years.65 A terrorist act, in
terms of this Article, 66 means one of the following intentional acts which, given its nature or its context, may cause serious damage to a state or international organisation:
a) Attack upon person’s life, which may cause death;
b) Attack upon the physical integrity of a person;
c) Unlawful confinement of, keeping confined or in some other manner depriving another of the freedom of movement, or restricting it in some way, with the aim to force him or some other person to
do or to omit or to bear something (kidnapping) or taking of hostages;
d) Causing a great damage to facility of Bosnia and Herzegovina, facility of government of another
state or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to
endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
e) Kidnapping of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
f) Manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply, use of or training for the use of weapons,
explosives, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or radioactive material, as well as research
into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons or radioactive material;
g) Releasing dangerous substances, or causing fire, explosion or floods the effect of which is to endanger human life;
h) Interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource
the effect of which is to endanger human life;
i) Threatening to perpetrate any of the acts referred to in items a) to h) of this paragraph.
It is absolutely clear that the definition presented above draws upon the definitions of terrorism and
terrorist acts contained in the Article 1.1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on
64
It means that a perpetrator of terrorism can be punished by up to 20 years of imprisonment. See CCBiH Article
42.1. If, however, the death of one or more people resulted from perpetration of the criminal offence referred to in
the CCBiH Article 201.1., the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not less than five years
(CCBiH Article 201.2.); If in the course of the perpetration of the criminal offence referred to in the CCBiH
Article 201.1. the perpetrator intentionally deprived another person of his/her life, s/he shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not less than ten years or long-term imprisonment (CCBiH Article 201.3.). Long term
imprisonment is the imprisonment for a term of twenty to forty-five years and it can be exceptionally imposed in
accordance with the CCBiH Article 42.
66
CCBiH Article 201.4.(a)-(i).
65
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combating terrorism.67 It is also clear that by committing some terrorist acts as defined above a person
actually commits some other criminal offences defined by criminal law as well (e.g. homicide or some
offences against general safety of people and property). However, due to the very specific aim as
defined in the CCBiH Article 201.1., that person will not be indicted, tried and sentenced for concurrence of offences but for terrorism as a specific criminal offence only (due to the lex specialis derogat
legi generali principle). As for the specific aim, it does not mean that this aim has to be achieved in
order terrorism to be committed and perpetrators indicted, tried and punished for terrorism. This specific aim, however, does have to be proved in order someone to be sentenced for terrorism.
Separate criminal offence contained in the CCBiH is the offence of Funding Terrorist Activities defined in the Article 202. According to this article, whoever by any means, directly or indirectly, provides or collects funds with the aim that they should be used or knowing that they are to be used, in
full or in part, in order to perpetrate:
a) A criminal offence referred to in Article 191 (Taking of Hostages), 192 (Endangering Internationally Protected Persons), 194 (Illicit Procurement and Disposal of Nuclear Material), 196 (Piracy),
197 (Hijacking an Aircraft or a Ship), 198 (Endangering the Safety of Air Traffic and Maritime
Navigation), 199 (Destruction and Removal of Signal Devices Utilised for Safety of the Air Traffic),
200 (Misuse of Telecommunication Signals) and 201 (Terrorism) of this Code; or
b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person
not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel the authorities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina or any other government or an international organisation to perform or to abstain from
performing any act, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term between one and ten years.
The wording of this offence clearly indicates the wording of the Article 2.1 of the International convention for the suppression of financing terrorism.68
7. Conspiracy to Perpetrate a Criminal Offence
According to the CCBiH69 conspiracy is committing whoever agrees with another to perpetrate a
criminal offence prescribed by the law of BiH, for which a punishment of imprisonment of three years
or a more severe punishment may be imposed, unless a heavier punishment is foreseen for conspiracy
of a particular criminal offence, shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding
one year. Commentators in BiH70 are of the opinion that this criminal offence represents nothing more
than a form of preparatory activities whose content is a criminal agreement. It is punishable if the
agreed offence is one for which imprisonment of three years or more severe penalty can be imposed.
As such, it is actually a norm of a general character and represents an integral part of all the offences
defined by the CCBiH that fulfill this criterion (3 years).
As a preparatory activity, conspiracy is in the criminal law of BiH of a subsidiary nature in relation to
the offence two or more persons agreed to commit. It means that should the agreed offence be committed conspirators will not be indicted, tried and sentenced for both conspiracy and the committed
offence but, based on the rule lex primaria derogat legi subsidiarae, only for the primary offence
which is the agreed and, later on, committed one. In other words, if two persons conspire to commit
terrorism and, in the furtherance of their agreement, commit one or more terrorist acts having the
intent required for terrorism they will be indicted, tried and convicted for terrorism and not for the
concurrence of offences of conspiracy to commit terrorism and terrorism. If, however, several persons
conspired to commit terrorism but only one actually commits that criminal offence and others refrain
67
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, Official Journal L 164, 22.06.2002.
This convention is ratified by BiH on 26th of March 2003 and published in the Official Gazette of Bosnia and
Herzegovina – International agreements, Nr. 3/03.
69
CCBiH Article 247.
70
68
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from doing anything (do not even act as accomplices), it is only the perpetrator of a terrorist act who
will be indicted, tried and sentenced for terrorism whereas all the others will be held criminally liable
only for conspiracy to commit terrorism.71
8. Associating for the Purpose of Perpetrating Criminal Offences
Another separate offence which is to be seen as a preparatory activity in its nature is the offence of
associating for the purpose of perpetrating criminal offences.72 This offence commits whoever organises a group of people or otherwise associates three or more persons with the aim of perpetrating
criminal offences prescribed by the law of BiH, for which a punishment of imprisonment of three
years or a more severe punishment may be imposed, unless a heavier punishment is foreseen for such
organising or associating for the purpose of perpetrating a particular criminal offence. Punishment
prescribed for this criminal offence is imprisonment for a term between six months and five years.
This preparatory activity, however, is in its nature a criminal offence sui generis (as opposed to conspiracy and general preparatory activities which are only delicta preparata) and it is not subsidiary to
the offences a group of people or any three or more associated persons commit. On the contrary,
should they commit any of the offences for which imprisonment of three years or more sever penalty
can be imposed the organiser will be indicted, tried and sentenced for the concurrence of offences
defined in the Article 249 and respective offences the people s/he associated committed.73
At the same time, whoever becomes a member of the group of people or an association referred to
above shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.74 Commentators
in BiH refrain from taking a stand on the nature of this offence so it is not clear if a court would define
membership in this sort of group or association as a delictum sui generis or as a mere delicta preparata. This would be of practical importance in cases where someone became a member in the group of
people or an association that commits a criminal offence and in addition to being a member contributed to the commission of the offence in some other way (e.g. like an instigator). However, up until
now this question remained unanswered both by the CCBiH and commentators in BiH.
A member of the group/association, who exposes such a group/association prior to having perpetrated
criminal offence within the group/association or for its sake, may be released from punishment.75 At
the same time, the organiser who prevents the perpetration of the criminal offences for which he organised a group of people or in other way associated three or more persons, by exposing the group or
association shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, but may be
released from punishment.76
9. Organising a criminal group and membership in an organised criminal group77
Another special prohibitive norm related to situations in which more than one person participated in
the commission of a crime is to be seen in provisions related to organized criminal group, organization
of organized criminal group and membership in an organized criminal group.
An organised criminal group is defined in BiH as a structured group of at least three or more persons,
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of perpetrating one or more criminal
offences, for which a punishment of imprisonment of three years or more may be imposed under the
laws of BiH.78 This definition is very important in relation to a criminal offence named “Organised
71
See Vijeće Evrope/Evropska Komisija, Komentari, p. 797.
CCBiH Article 249.
73
Compare Vijeće Evrope/Evropska Komisija, Komentari, p. 799.
74
CCBiH Article 249.2.
75
76
77
This sub-heading draws upon Maljević, Participation in crime, pp. 24-6.
78
72
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crime”79 defined within the CCBiH in which the organisation of an organised criminal group, as well
as membership in such a group, is criminalised.
Punishment is prescribed for all those that organise or direct an organised criminal group which, by
joint action, perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate a criminal offence prescribed by the law of BiH.80
Organising a group is understood as a complex of different activities directed towards connecting
people for performing joint criminal activities. According to the criminal law doctrine81 in BiH, neither the form of association of members nor internal organisational structure is relevant for this offence. It also is not important if the process of organising is completed or not. An important element,
however, is that the group’s purpose is the commission of offences and that the group committed at
least one criminal offence. It furthermore means that if the group gets discovered before its members
commit or attempt a crime, the organiser(s) will be punished for associating for the purpose of the
commission of an offence.82
Organisers are to be held liable for organising a group as well as for all offences that stemmed out of
the plan of the group.83 S/he does not have to know all members of her/his group nor does s/he have to
know total number of members.84
When it comes to membership in an organised criminal group it is interesting to note that the CCBiH
criminalised membership in an organised criminal group very widely.85 Namely, membership is
criminalised in any organised criminal group which by joint action perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate criminal offence prescribed by the law of BiH. Although neither the criminal law doctrine in
BiH, nor courts, developed a clear approach to issues of membership in organised criminal groups, the
author is of the opinion that a person is to be considered a member of an organised criminal group if
s/he knows the main criminal goals/aims of the group and accepts them as her/his own; s/he should be
aware of her/his role and duties within the group. When it comes to knowledge of goals, it should be
stressed that a member does not have to be aware of all the individual goals/aims and plans as s/he can
join the group at any stage of its establishment/organisation and it would be irrational to expect that all
members are aware of all the criminal goals and plans.86
It should also be noted that the CCBiH prescribes punishment by imprisonment for a minimum of 1
year for mere membership. However, should any of the members commit a crime the CCBiH takes a
different approach to membership, depending on the severity of the offence committed. Namely, it
differentiates between members who commit criminal offences for which punishment of imprisonment of 3 years can be imposed by law and those who commit less serious offences. The differentiation is made in a way that the law prescribes a minimum imprisonment sentence of 5 years for the first
category of members and 3 for the latter. If any of the members do commit a crime, than there will be
no concurrence of offences with mere membership as the lex primaria derogat legi subsidiariae principle will be applied. In this case, becoming a member is seen as a preparatory activity to commission
of the offence and it is derogated by primary offence.87
10. Criminal liability of legal persons
79
CCBiH, Article 250.
81
82
CCBiH, Article, 249.1.
83
84
Maljević, Odredbe, p. 139.
85
86
Maljević, Odredbe, p. 138.
87
The same approach is taken by Vijeće Evrope/Evropska komisija, Komentari, p. 804; See also Srzentić et al.
Komentar, p. 771.
80
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The latest criminal law reform in BiH introduced another novelty – criminal liability of legal persons.88 Both foreign and domestic legal entity/person will be considered liable for a criminal offence
perpetrated in the name of, for account of or for the benefit of the legal person:89
- When the purpose of the criminal offence is arising from the conclusion, order or permission of its
managerial or supervisory bodies; or
- When its managerial or supervisory bodies have influenced the perpetrator or enabled him to perpetrate the criminal offence; or
- When a legal person disposes of illegally obtained property gain or uses objects acquired in the
criminal offence; or
- When its managerial or supervisory bodies failed to carry out due supervision over the legality of
work of the employees.
It is interesting to note here that the CCBiH does not limit criminal liability of legal entities to specific
criminal offences nor does it limit it to specific categories of criminal offences. In other words, a legal
entity will be held criminally liable for any criminal offence prescribed by law of BiH committed in
the name of, for account of or for the benefit of the legal person, provided that one of four alternatively introduced involvements of either managerial or supervisory bodies or the legal person itself is
fulfilled.
According to the CCBiH Article 125.1., legal entity shall be liable for a criminal offence even when
the perpetrator himself/herself is not criminally liable for the perpetrated criminal offence. Criminal
liability of a legal entity, however, does not exclude criminal liability of a perpetrator nor does it exclude criminal liability of those responsible within the legal entity (managers, supervisors, directors
etc) for the offences committed in the name of, for account of or for the benefit of the legal person.90
In cases where more than one legal entity participated in the commission of a criminal offence, all
legal entities will be held criminally liable as if they were the only ones committing that particular
criminal offence.91
In cases where a perpetrator did not complete the offence, 92 hence committed only an attempt, legal
entity can be held liable only if the CCBiH prescribes punishment for that particular attempt. The
legal entity shall in that case be punished by the sentence prescribed for that criminal offence but, due
to the fact that it is only attempted criminal offence, may be punished less severely. Legal entity might
also be punished less severely in case it’s managerial or supervisory body has willingly reported on
the perpetration of a criminal offence.93 If, however, the managerial or supervisory bodies of the legal
entity have prevented the perpetrator from completing the commenced criminal offence, the legal
entity may be released from punishment.94 The same effect (potential release from punishment) can
cause managerial or supervisory body which, following the perpetration of a criminal offence, decides
to return the illegally obtained material gain or to remove the caused harmful consequences or to reveal to law enforcement agencies the information concerning the grounds for holding other legal entities responsible.
In principle, criminal offences committed by a legal entity can be committed only intentionally. However, in cases where managerial or supervisory bodies failed to carry out due supervision over the
88
CCBiH, Chapter XIV, Articles 122-144.
CCBiH Article 124.
90
91
CCBiH Article 129.
92
CCBiH Article 127.
93
94
89
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legality of work of the employees legal entity can commit a criminal offence out of negligence. In that
case the legal entity can be punished less severely.95
Sanctions that can be imposed on legal entities are:
- Fines;96
- Seizure of property;97
- Dissolution of the legal person;98
- Security measures (Publication of judgement; Ban on performing a certain economic activity);99
- Suspended sentence.100
As legal entities can be criminally liable for literally all criminal offences defined by the law of BiH,
CCBiH envisages certain adjustments of sanctions that are originally, in the CCBiH, prescribed for
physical persons. In doing so the CCBiH defines:101
(1) For criminal offences for which a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years is
prescribed, a legal person shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding 850.000 KM or not exceeding
ten times the amount of the damage caused or material gain acquired through the perpetration of a
criminal offence. (2) For criminal offences for which imprisonment for a term not less than three years
is prescribed, a legal person shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding 2.500.000 KM or not exceeding twenty times the amount of the damage caused or material gain acquired through the perpetration
of a criminal offence. (3) For criminal offences for which imprisonment for a term of five years or
more is prescribed, to a legal person a property seizure punishment may be imposed instead of a fine.
(4) For criminal offences referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, to a legal person a punishment of
dissolution of the legal person may be imposed instead of the fine, under the requirements referred to
in Article 134 (Dissolution of a Legal Person) of the CCBiH.
When deciding on punishment for a legal entity, in addition to the general rules defined by the Article
48 (see above) of the CCBiH, courts have to take into account the economic power of the legal entity
as well. Additionally, when imposing a fine for criminal offences for which, in addition to a fine also
a property seizure punishment is imposed, courts can not impose punishment exceeding a half of the
amount of the legal entity’s property.102
It goes without saying, all the material gain that a legal entity may have gained through the commission of a criminal offence will be confiscated from that legal person.103
11. Concluding remarks
It is obvious that the last criminal law reform, caused by both the transitional period and new forms of
criminal behaviours, brought some new legal solutions into the criminal legislation of the country. By
introducing new criminal offences, such as conspiracy to commit a crime or by criminalising mere
membership in criminal organisations and even in less organised groups or associations, the lawmaker
in BiH significantly expanded prosecutors’ possibilities of bringing suspects to a court as well as
courts’ possibilities to convict those individuals that would, should traditional legal solutions still have
been in place, stayed outside of the scope of the ample criminal law net. The same effect is achieved
95
CCBiH Article 132.
97
CCBiH Article 133.
98
CCBiH Article 134.
99
CCBiH Article 137-139.
100
CCBiH Article 136.
101
CCBiH Article 144.
102
CCBiH Article 135.
103
CCBiH Article 140.
96
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by expanding the application scope of the provisions related to criminal preparatory activities. If,
however, all these expansions will be used, to which extent and how successfully, is yet to be seen.
This short overview of the legislation in force, without going too much into details of some legal solutions, indicated some potential problems and unsolved issues.
The following example might serve to illustrate the statement given above. A, B, and C met by accident in a pub, started discussion about the foreign policy of BiH. They decided they did not like it and
they would commit terrorism by performing a terrorist attack on the building of the Presidency in
order to demonstrate their disagreements with it. They agreed that B will, together with C obtain explosives for the terrorist act and that C will be the one to actually carry out their criminal intentions,
whereas A would do nothing. They neither formed a group nor an association nor a criminal organisation; they just wanted to commit this one and only criminal offence. In this simplified case, A (who
did not have an intention required for an instigator or that can not be proved) can be indicted for conspiracy to commit terrorism, B can be indicted for abetting C in the commission of the terrorist attack
and C can be indicted for committing terrorism. As a consequence, A is to face sentence not exceeding 1 year of imprisonment (CCBiH Article 247 in connection with CCBiH Article 201.); B is to face
the sentence of at least 3 years of imprisonment but, as an abettor can be punished less severely
(CCBiH Article 31.1. in connection with CCBiH Article 201.); and C, depending on the facts of the
consequences he caused, punishment of at least 3 years and up to 45 years of imprisonment (CCBiH
Article 201.). Practically, sentences imposed on the trio are likely to vary much more than their actual
contribution to the commission of the offence is. The question here is: is that the intention of the lawmakers or not?
Legal practice in BiH is yet to be faced with this and similar questions related to very complex situations caused by offences committed by more than one person.
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Zagreb 1999.
Srzentić, Nikola (ed.), Komentar Krivičnog zakona Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije
[Commentary of the Criminal Code of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. Savremena administracija. Beograd 1978.
Srzentić, Nikola/Stajić, Aleksandar/Lazarević Ljubiša Nikola, Krivično pravo SFRJ. Opšti deo, Petnaesto izdanje [Criminal law of the SFRY. General Part, 15th edition]. Savremena administracija.
Beograd 1988.
Vijeće Evrope/Evropska komisija, Komentari krivičnih/kaznenih zakona u Bosni I Hercegovini, Vijeće Evrope/Evropska komisija [Commentaries of the Criminal Codes in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Council of Europe/European Commission]. Sarajevo 2005.
Zlatarić, Bogdan, Krivični zakonik u praktičnoj primjeni, I. svezak [Criminal Code in Practical Implementation, I. notebook]. Narodne novine. Zagreb 1956.
Zlatarić, Bogdan/Damaška, Mirjan, Rječnik krivičnog prava i postupka [Dictionary of Criminal Law
and Criminal Procedure Law]. Zagreb 1966.
Živanović, Toma, Osnovi krivičnog prava. Opšti deo [Basics of Criminal Law. General Part]. Beograd
1910.
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La Corogne ( Espagne) 5-8 septembre 2007
Section I - Droit pénal général
BRÉSIL*
Rodrigo de SOUZA COSTA**
Le Droit Pénal brésilien vit une situation spéciale face à une criminalité particulièrement dangereuse,
surtout quand aux hypothèses de terrorisme et de crime organisé. Tout cela est, le résultat dúne politique pénale dirigée, essentiellement, vers la criminalité de masse et plus encore vers celle, de la criminalité de violence.
En ce qui concerne le terrorisme, il n'existe pas de registre récent de mouvement terroriste sur le territoire brésilien, ce qui limite l'incidence de ce genre de phénomène dans notre législation. Quand à ce
qui concerne la criminalité organisée, malgré le fait, du Brésil avoir une loi qui traite du thème et
d'avoir ratifié la Convention de Palerme des Nations Unies, il n'existe pas de pénalisation directe de ce
genre d'association, Même si des conduites semblables sont punies.
Sans aucun doute, on sáperçoit que la politique pénale de l'État brésilien pointe en direction du trafic
de drogues et des activités exercées par ces groupes. Peut-être, par le fait, de posséder une plus grande
visibilité, ce genre de criminalité, ainsi que la criminalité violente de masse, constituent la principale
cible d'élaboration législative.
La dynamique concernant les actes préparatoires, initialement, s'agissant dúne tentative, est disposée
dans l'article 14, II et l'alinéa unique du Code Pénal Brésilien. Il est entendu, comme la réalisation
incomplète de la structure typique, obtenant une importance pénale seulement après le début des actes
d'exécution. Dans le Droit Brésilien, la tentative est punie non pas comme un crime indépendant, mais
comme un crime subordonné. Spécifiquement, fonctionnant comme cause de la diminution de la
peine, qui est appliquée de manière reliée au modèle de base, pouvant réduire la peine de 1/3 à 2/3.
Il est de se constater que, pour la configuration de la tentative, il est nécessaire le début des actes
d'exécution, de la non occurrence survenant du résultat par des circonstances étrangères à la volonté
de l'agent et d'une action frauduleuse.
On observe une conception objective concernant la tentative, punissable en raison de la menace de
blessure provoquée au bien juridique pénalement protégé, respectant la punition exclusive de conduites représentées, par la blessure ou menace de blessure, au bien juridique protégé.
Il est important de remarquer que le Droit Brésilien accueille la structure du crime impossible (Art. 17,
CP), en ne punissant pas la tentative quand, par impropriété absolue de l'objet ou de l'absolue inefficacité du moyen, est impossible láccomplissement du crime.
La punition d'actes préparatoires est, en thèse, rejetée par le Droit originaire. L'article 31 du Code
Pénal est clair en disant que les actes seulement sont punissables, généralement, si le crime, au moins,
commence à être réalisé. Malgré la difficulté d´établir parfois la différenciation entre des actes préparatoires et des actes d'exécution, il est adopté la doctrine du critère objectif, considérant acte d'exécu-
*
**
Professeur assistant de Droit Pénal de l'École de Droit Rio de la Fondation Getúlio Vargas (FGV) et doctorant
en Droit par l'Université de l'État de Rio de Janeiro et par l'Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour.
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tion, tout ce qui initie l'action désapprouvée prévue dans la loi, étant l'acte préparatoire qui le rend
1
possible, mais ne constituant pas l'exécution .
Il est facile de sápercevoir que, étant donné le critère adopté au Brésil, la distinction se produira, cas
par cas, conformément la norme prohibitive décrite par la loi.
Malgré le fait de la règle générale, être celle de l'interdiction de l'accusation d'actes préparatoires, le
Droit Brésilien, excepte, sans aucun critère évident, la punition indépendante de certains de ces actes.
Tel fait se produit, par exemple, dans les crimes de falsification, spécifiquement pour celui de la falsification de la monnaie (Art. 289, CP), qui a, dans l'acte préparatoire de posséder les instruments pour
la falsification de la monnaie, la conduite sanctionnée indépendamment (Art. 291, CP). En outre, elle
punit également le port et la possession illégale d'armes à feu et de munitions (Art. 12 et 14 de la Loi
10826/03), en caractérisant les actes préparatoires des crimes d´homicides, vols, extorsions par enlèvement, entre autres.
Il est notable la constitution des dits crimes contre la paix publique, titre qui englobe les crimes de
l'article 286, 287 et 288, CP.
Initialement, sévères, sont les critiques faites à la formulation de ce bien juridique. Il y a ceux qui le
désignent comme fiction législative. Telle formule est semblable à celle adoptée dans dáutres ordres
juridiques pour la punition d'un sans nombres d'actes préparatoires sous la prétendue protection
2
3
quélle soit de l'ordre public , de l'ordre juridique, de la paix juridique ou de la paix publique, comme
fait le Droit Brésilien.
Il ne ságit en fait que dúne formule de punir des actes préparatoires, intégrés dans les crimes d'incitation publique au crime (Art. 286, CP), de faire l´ apologie du crime ou dún acte criminel (Art. 287,
CP) et groupe ou association criminelle (Art. 288, CP).
Dans ces cas, est punie la conduite, de qui, stimule publiquement la pratique du crime, fait l'éloge
publique de lácte criminel, dún coupable de crime ou s'associe à au moins trois autres personnes
pour la pratique de crimes.
Il néxiste aucune formulation générique qui puisse être comparée au concept de conspiration, mais,
sans aucun doute, le genre de groupe ou dássociation criminelle est le plus utilisé par la jurisprudence
nationale se traitant d'actes préparatoires punissables.
Les peines réservées aux actes préparatoires punissables sont, en règle générale, bien moins graves, si
comparées à ceux des infractions commises. La plus grave des peines, en générale, peut être trouvée
dans l'accusation du transport d'armes de feu, dútilisation exclusive des Forces Armées, pouvant
varier de trois à six années de réclusion.
En relation au concours de personnes, surtout des responsables, le Droit Brésilien définit la Théorie de
la Maîtrise de lácte en prévoyant comme auteur, aussi bien celui qui exécute le noyau interdit dans la
norme pénale, ainsi que celui qui planifie ou de nímporte quelle manière possède le domaine fonctionnel de lácte. Il faut remarquer que la catégorie d'auteur immédiat, s'inclut également parmi celles
prévues par notre législation.
Concernant la participation, la doctrine met en avant l'existence de deux formes: la participation morale et la participation matérielle.
La participation morale peut être divisée en deux espèces : l'induction et l'instigation. Quand à la participation matérielle elle est entendue sous forme de complicité.
1
FRAGOSO, Heleno Cláudio. Leçons de Droit Pénal - Partie Générale. Rio de Janeiro : Basochien, p. 241.
SOLER, Sebastian. Derecho Pénal Argentin. Volume IV, Buenos Aires : Typographique Argentine. 1967, p.
537 à 539.
3
VON LISZT, Franz. Traité de Droit Pénal, Volume II. Trad. José Hygino Duarte Poirier. Rio de Janeiro : F.
Briquiet et C., 1899, p. 187 et 188.
2
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La loi ne différencie pas la responsabilité de la participation, étant telle tâche, de la doctrine. Elle
définit de manière générale la théorie de la participation accesoire, s'aidant, une fois de plus, du
concept du domaine fonctionnel de lácte.
Il faut noter que dans le Droit brésilien, il n'existe pas de différence, au moins en principe, de punition
pour l'auteur et pour le participant, s'affiliant à la législation originaire du monisme. Dans l'article 29
du CP, est dit, que celui qui sous peu importe la forme, offre son concours pour le crime, aura sa peine
rajoutées à celles déjà formulée, dans la mesure de sa culpabilité. Ainsi, au premier abord, la punition
du participant va se différencier de celle de l'auteur, exclusivement en raison des circonstances de
caractère subjectif en possession de chacun, principalement la culpabilité.
Néanmoins, l'alinéa premier du même article 29 prévoit une réduction de peine, d'un sixième à un
tiers, en cas de participation de moindre importance.
Il néxiste pas un critère qui détermine quand la participation sera considérée de moindre importance,
laissant au juge tel choix.
Il faut noter quíl est prédéterminant pour la punition de la conduite de participation, que le responsable, au moins, débute les actes d'exécution.
Il ný a pas dans le Droit brésilien des images qui se rapprochent du terrorisme. Il est curieux de
sápercevoir que la Constitution de la République, dans son article 5, XLIII, CF, fait mention au terrorisme et que dans la législation originale, il n'y a aucune définition que ce soit sur le terrorisme ou sur
4
les actes terroristes. Il y a également la mention du terrorisme comme crime hideux , sans que se produise, néanmoins une définition. La seule accusation législative existante est de la Loi n. 7, 170/83,
5
connue comme la Loi de Sécurité Nationale, qui mentionne dans son article 20 , sans définir, l'expression ‘actes de terrorisme’.
Il faut souligner que telle loi est originaire de la période autoritaire quand le Brésil a vécu sous le joug
des gouvernements militaires. Malgré le fait de ne pas avoir été, encore révoquée, la jurisprudence ný
fait plus appel.
Concernant la criminalité organisée, depuis la Partie Spéciale du Code Pénal, éditée en 1940, il existe
l'accusation de l'association de criminels, semblable à l'Associazione per Delinquere italien, connue
6
comme crime de groupe ou bande . Dans le cas en vue, est punissable la simple association criminelle, comme crime indépendant, dès que réalisé pour plus de trois personnes, avec líntention de
commettre des crimes, étant la peine aggravée si la bande est armée. Il est notoire que telle image ne
correspond pas directement à de la criminalité organisée, mais est une criminalité plus ample que la
même pourrait être inclue, cela car, malgré le fait de posséder une loi qui entrevoit le phénomène
criminel organisé, il néxiste aucune définition sur la signification de ce terme.
Le 3 mai 1995, a été promulguée la Loi n. 9.034, qui dispose sur les méthodes à être adoptée dans le
combat au crime organisé sur le territoire brésilien. Il suit dans ce cas le modèle adopté par le législateur italien, internationalement connu "Opération Mains Propre", s'utilisant d'éléments du dénommé
Droit Pénal de l’émergence, se limitant la loi à mentionner des instruments dénquêtes et de procès
pour traiter avec ce type de criminalité.
4
Telle catégorie de crimes, apportée par la Loi n° 8, 072/90 sera mentionnée ultérieurement.
Art. 20 - Dévaster, piller, extorquer, voler, enlévement, maintenir en prison privée, incendier, détruire, provoquer léxplosion, pratiquer l´ attentat personnel ou lácte de terrorisme, par inconformisme politique ou pour
lóbtention de fonds destinés à la manutention d'organisations politiques clandestines ou subversives. Peine :
réclusion, de 3 à 10 ans.
Alinéa unique - Si de fait, il y a la blessure corporelle grave, la peine est doublée ; si il y a mort, la peine peut être
jusqu'a triplé.
6
Art. 288 : "S'associer plus de 3 (trois) personnes, dans groupe ou troupeau, pour la fin de decommettre des
crimes : Peine de 1 (um) à 3 (trois) ans de réclusion."
5
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Brésil
Malgré, que le Brésil à promulgué à la Convention des Nations Unies contre le crime organisé trans7
8
national de 2000 , ainsi que sur les protocoles supplémentaires , il n'existe pas une catégorie juridique
qui englobe génériquement le crime organisé.
Néanmoins, l'ordre juridique brésilien possède quelques catégories qui traitent de crimes de haute
gravité, comme la punition au trafic de drogues, d'armes et de personnes, de pornographie infantile et
de blanchissement d'argent.
La punition au trafic de drogues se produit dans l'article 33 de la Loi n° 11, 343/06 et sápplique à
quiconque qui importe, exporte, envoie, prépare, produit, fabrique, achète, vend, met en vente, offre,
avoir en dépôt, transporte, apporte, garde, prescrit, donne, livre ou fournit pour la consommation des
drogues, même que gratuitement, sans autorisation ou en désaccord avec la détermination légale ou
réglementaire, étant menacé d´ une peine de réclusion de 5 (cinq) à 15 (quinze) ans et au paiement de
500, 00 (cinq cents) à 1.500, 00 Réais (mille et cinq cents) par jours de peine.
Il faut noter qu'une série d'autres conduites sont équivalentes à celle-là, comme de celui plante, sème
ou cultive, fabrique des stupéfiants, utilise des dépôts de propriété personnelle pour le trafic de drogues, entre autres.
En ce qui concerne, le trafic humain, le Brésil, depuis la réforme promue par la Loi n° 11, 106/05, a
incorporé la punition au trafic, interne et international, humain. Telles accusations sont présentes dans
les articles 231 et 231-A, punissant la conduite de celui qui promeut, réalise l'intermédiation ou facilite léntrée dans le territoire national, de personnes, rentrent dans le pays pour exercer la prostitution
et à la sortie du pays, pour l'exercer à l'étranger. En outre, est punit aussi l'action de celui qui promeut,
réalise l'intermédiation ou facilite à l'intérieur du territoire brésilien, le recrutement, le transport, le
transfert, le logement ou l'accueil de personnes qui viennent exercer la prostitution. Les peines peuvent varier de trois à douze ans de réclusion.
Le trafic d'armes, aussi bien interne comme international est aussi puni par la Loi n.10, 826/03, dans
leurs articles 17 et 18, avec des peines qui varient de quatre à huit ans de réclusion, pouvant souffrir
des accroissement allant à la moitié de la peine, si l'arme de feu, l'accessoire ou les munitions sont
d'utilisation interdite ou limitée, ou si le crime est commis par des agents qui ont láutorisation pour le
port dárme à feu.
Il y a aussi, la prévision légale, qui punit la pornographie infantile, dans l'article 241 de la Loi n.
8.069/90, avec une peine qui peut aller de deux à huit ans de réclusion si le responsable, présente,
produit, vend, divulgue ou publie de la pornographie infantile, même par l'Internet, ainsi que si le
même, agence, facilite ou sert díntermédiaire pour la participation de l'adolescent dans ce type d'activité, ayant ou pas l'intention d´ obtenir du profit.
Le blanchissement d'argent, activité typique de la criminalité organisée, est prévu par la Loi n.
9.613/98 qui punit cette espèce de criminalité dans son article 1°, avec des peines qui varient de trois à
dix ans de réclusion et une amende.
Un autre élément fortement présent dans l'ordre juridique brésilien est la catégorie des dits, crimes
hideux, institués par la Loi n. 8072/90, que pourraient être compris comme des crimes de haute gravité. Telle loi réserve un traitement pénal plus dur pour ces crimes comme des difficultés dans la progression de régime et plus de temps d'accomplissement de peine pour lóbtention de la liberté conditionnelle.
Il n'existe aucun critère pour la sélection de telle espèce de crimes. La plupart déntre eux sont caractérisés par láction violente, comme l'homicide qualifié, l'extorsion moyennant lénlèvement, le brigandage, n'ayant une quelconque différence de ces crimes et de ceux appelés de criminalité commune.
Plus précisément, il semble être la criminalité commune, la cible de ce diplôme légal, ce qui se perçoit
7
8
Par le Décret 5.015/2004.
Par le Décret 5, 016/2004, 5, 017/2004 et DLG 36/2006.
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Brésil
au vu que l'élection des délits est réalisée de manière discrétionnaire par le législateur, sans l'exigence
que se poursuive quelconque finalité spécifique.
Il est constaté les derniers temps, une tendance dans le Droit Pénal brésilien, accompagnant ce qui
semble être une tendance mondiale, une expansion en ce qui concerne la punition aux actes préparatoires, sans que l'exécution du crime soit réalisée. Tel fait se produit à partir de l'utilisation d'accusations de danger abstrait sans que cela, néanmoins, tel élargissement ait pour cible des crimes de haute
gravité, comme lón peut voir dans des crimes comme ceux de la possession et le port illégal d'arme à
feu ou de munitions (arts. 12, 14 et 16 de la Loi n. 10.826/03).
D'un autre côté, il n'y eut quelconque changement expressif en ce qui concerne les formes de responsabilité et participation. Dans ce domaine, le seul fait digne de note a été la tentative d'utilisation par le
Ministère Public de l'État de São Paulo de la théorie de la domination de l'organisation, cherchant la
responsabilisation pénale des présumés chefs d'un groupe pour une séquence d'actes de violences qui
9
se sont abattus sur cet état .
Il existe dans le Droit Brésilien, en revenant aux actes préparatoires, à un sans nombre d'accusations
qui punissent l'incitation publique au crime (Art. 286, CP), l'apologie au crime ou au criminel (Art.
287, CP) sans que soit nécessaire la pratique de quelconque crime après, en n'exigeant pas que la
conduite criminelle stimulée ou élogieuse soit de haute gravité.
Il y a prévision spécifique de l'induction ou línstigation à l'utilisation de drogues, punie par l'article
33, §2° de la Loi n° 11, 343/06 avec une peine de détention de 1 (un) à 3 (trois) ans et une amende de
100 (cent) à 300 (trois cents) Réais par jour dámende.
En plus de cela, il y a longtemps que le Droit Brésilien incrimine des conduites comme la falsification
et l'utilisation de documents faux (Arts. 297, 298, 299 et 304 CP) ainsi que les délits de simple association.
Encore une fois, la Loi de Drogues mérite une attention spéciale, par le fait de punir des actes préparatoires de façon générale, comme láction de celui qui fabrique, achète, utilise, transporte, offre, vend,
distribue, délivre à nímporte quel titre, possède, garde ou fournit, même gratuitement, machines,
appareil, instrument ou quelconque objet destiné à la fabrication, à la préparation, à la production ou à
la transformation de drogues, sans autorisation ou en désaccord avec la détermination légale ou réglementaire avec la peine sévère de réclusion, de 3 (trois) à 10 (dix) ans et au paiement de 1.200
(mille et deux cents) à 2.000 (deux mille)Réais par jours dámende.
En particulier, il faut noter au fait, que depuis l'édition de la partie spéciale du CP, c'est-à-dire, en
1940, la punition au groupe criminel est réalisée par l'article 288, étant suffisant que trois personnes
s'associent dans le but de pratiquer des crimes. Ici, se différencie la punition à ce crime du dénommé,
concours éventuelle de personnes, exigeant que le groupe ait les caractéristiques de stabilité et de
permanence pour que puisse séffectuer la punition. La forme aggravée qui ici est présentée, dit respect exclusivement au groupe armé, qui fait que la peine passe de 1 à 3 ans de réclusion au double.
L'année passée, avec la réforme de la Loi de Drogues, un des grands foyers de crimes qui essayent
d'être atteints par l'État brésilien, a vu une modification dans la discipline afférente à l'association de
personnes dans le but de pratiquer le trafic de drogues (Art. 35 de la Loi n. 11.343/06), passant d´ une
peine de réclusion, de 3 (trois) à 10 (dix) ans, et au paiement de 700 (sept cents) à 1.200 (mille et deux
cents) Réais par jour dámende. Dans ce cas spécifique d'association, l'exigence est plus légère, vu que
sont nécessaires seulement deux personnes et la punition se donne même quand le concours sera éventuel, c'est-à-dire, pour la pratique d'un seul crime.
Comme mentionné au début, le trafic de drogues est une des espèces de crime le plus visé par la politique pénale brésilienne. Soit en ce qui concerne la configuration spécifique de l'association pour le
trafic, soit dans la configuration de l'association pénale en général, ne sont pas définis et clairs les
9
Il faut noter que le procés, n'est pas arrivé encore à une sentence.
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Brésil
éléments qui permettent de différencier telles espèces de groupes du concours éventuel de personnes.
Nímporte quel moyen de preuve considérée valable pourra être utilisé par le juge qui, s'utilisant du
principe de la libre conviction motivée, réalisera telle distinction.
Il faut remarquer que le Code Pénal brésilien a, dans sa partie générale, un article (Art. 62, CP) qui
prévoit comme des aggravations génériques des situations spécifiques pour le concours de personnes,
surtout quand le sujet : I - promeut ou organise la coopération dans le crime ou dirige l'activité des
autres agent; II - contraint ou induit autrui à l'exécution matérielle du crime; III - incite ou détermine à
commettre un crime quelqu'un sous son autorité ou non-punissable en vertu de la condition ou à la
qualité personnelle; et IV - exécute le crime ou y participe, moyennant paiement ou la promesse du
tel.
Il se constate également, quíl n'existe pas de punition plus grande prévue si l'agent, outre de planifier
en tant que chef de bande, prend partie dans l'exécution du délit. Ce que peut se produire est le juge
considérer l'imputé possesseur de plus grande culpabilité et, donc, augmenter l'application de la peine.
En thèse, il n'est pas possible, dans le Droit Brésilien, que líndividu soit puni par l'acte préparatoire et
le crime qui se réalise postérieurement, vu que tels crimes sont, en règle générale, subsidiaires et,
donc, punissables, seulement si la conduite principale n'arrive pas à se réaliser. Néanmoins, telle formulation est exclusivement doctrinale, ce qui permet que part de la jurisprudence applique la double
accusation en alléguant, dans synthèse, de sa possibilité, quand des biens juridiques distincts ont été
violés ou que l'acte préparatoire possède une potentialité de lésions supérieures à celles faites au type
principal.
Au niveau processif il n'y a aucune présomption qui facilite la preuve de la participation dans ces
crimes. La loi brésilienne qui traite des organisations pénales (Loi n. 9.034/95) est d'empreinte essentiellement processive. Elle établit des formes dénquêtes, qui flexibilisent la récolte de preuve, quand
l'infraction est commise par des associations pénales, permettant lútilisation dágents infiltrés, action
policière contrôlée (l'intervention policière est retardée, même devant le flagrant délit, pour un moment postérieur plus efficace pour la formation de preuves et fournissement d´ informations), capture
et interception environnementale, téléphonique et fin des secrets bancaire, fiscal, parmi dáutres.
Il néxiste aucune prévision spécifique pour la pénalisation des nommées actions neutres, ni dans ce
qui se rapporte spécifiquement à l'activité terroriste ou criminelle organisée. Il advient que la punition
de la participation, dans le Droit brésilien, se produit, dès que l'agent poursuive le même objectif pénal
que ceux qui font partie de groupe, même que son action soit isolément licite. En outre, deux accusations se détachent.
La première est de la dénommée faveur personnelle (art. 348 CP). Ici est punit celui qui aide l'auteur
de crime à se soustraire de l'action d'autorité publique. La peine peut varier de quinze jours à six mois
de détention et une amende, ne punissant pas celui qui prête aide si le même est ascendant, descendant, conjoint ou frère du criminel.
Il y a aussi la faveur réelle (Art. 349 CP) qui punit celui qui, excepté des cas de co-auteur, soit de
10
recel (Art. 180 CP), prête aide au criminel avec l'objectif de garantir l'avantage du crime, avec la
peine de détention d'un a six mois.
Quand à la responsabilité pénale des personnes juridiques, l´ application est très restreinte au Brésil.
Celle-ci est possible seulement si relatif aux délits dénvironnements, prévus par la Loi n. 9.605/98,
qui ont une grande difficulté d'application par l'absence de règles spécifiques et claires que ce soit
d'imputation pénale ou soit de nature processive pour ces hypothèses. Dans ces cas, les sanctions peuvent être une amende, la suspension partielle ou totale des activités de la personne juridique,
línterdiction temporaire d'établissement, œuvre ou activité, línterdiction de séngager avec le Pou10
Se produit le recel quand le sujet acquiert, reçoit, transporte, conduit ou occulte, en bénéfice propre ou non,
dúne chose quíl sait être produit de crime, ou influence une personne honnête, à láchat, à la réception ou le
cacher.
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Brésil
voir Public, ainsi que dóbtenir de lui des bénéfices, l'obligation de soutenir des programmes et des
projets dénvironnements, léxécution d'œuvres de récupération de secteurs dégradés, manutention
11
d'espaces publics , parmi autres. Il est possible également, la liquidation forcée de la personne juridique, ainsi que le saisie de son patrimoine, dès qu'elle soit constituée ou utilisée, prépondérantement,
12
pour la pratique de faveur ou l'occultation de crime dénvironnement .
La forme le plus commune d'atteindre des personnes juridiques, quand celles-ci sont utilisées avec des
fins criminelles, est à travers le saisie de leurs biens. Cela peut se produire de formes variées et non
seulement dans les cas de crimes de haute gravité. Ceci, car le Code Pénal brésilien prévoit dans son
article 91, comme effet de la condamnation pénale, la perte en faveur de l'Union Fédérale, des instruments du crime à partir du moment que ce soient des objets dont la fabrication, aliénation, utilisation,
port ou détention, constitue un crime, ainsi que du produit du crime et de quelconques biens ou valeurs constitués des gains gagné avec la pratique de l'acte criminel. En outre, ils existent des dispositions spécifiques, comme celui de la Loi de Drogues, qui prévoit dans ses articles 60, 61, 62, 63 et 64
la procédure pour la saisie de biens, quíl soient particuliers ou de sociétés, quand utilisés pour la
pratique de crimes prévus par cette loi.
En ce qui concerne la propagande ou l'incitation de crimes, surtout du terrorisme, il n'existe pas
dáccusation spécifique. Comme déjà mentionné, il existe des accusations génériques, comme l'apolo13
gie au crime et l'incitation au crime, mais il des accusations qui, malgré le fait de ne pas être spécifiquement de la propagande terroriste, peuvent subsidiairement être utilisées, comme celles traitant des
crimes de racisme, prévus dans la Loi n. 7.716/89. Dans son article 20, est incriminée l'incitation,
l'induction ou la pratique de la discrimination ou le préjugé de race, la couleur, l'ethnie, la religion ou
14
15
la nationalité et punissant aussi si le crime est commis avec des fins de divulgation nazi ou par
16
l'intermédiaire de médias ou publication .
Il faut souligner que lÍnternet est considérée, moyen de communication habile à la configuration des
délits qui ont besoin dúne présence pour offenser, se consommant quand une autre prend connaissance des informations présentées.
Il faut constater que la liberté d'expression et d'opinion est établie aussi bien dans une série de conventions internationales desquelles le Brésil est signataire que dans le propre texte de sa Constitution
Fédérale (Art. 5 IV, IX, CF). Il arrive que, dans le même article, à son incise XLI, la Constitution
prévoit la nécessité de punition à quelconque discrimination offensive aux droits et libertés fondamentales, dont s'extrait la possibilité de respect à la liberté d'expression et dópinion, dès que limitée par la
condition de ne pas attenter contre droit et libertés fondamentales.
En ce qui concerne les formes de repentir, il existe quatre hypothèses, comme des possibilités légales
variées, qui peuvent intervenir dans l'application de la peine.
Le désistement volontaire et le repentir efficace, prévus par l'article 15 du CP, exempte l'agent de
peine, permettant l'accusation pour les actes jusqu'à alors pratiqués, dès que líndividu abandonne,
volontairement, de continuer dans l'exécution ou évite, la consommation du lácte.
En outre, il y a le repentir postérieur, prévu par l'article 16 du CP, qui permet une réduction de un à
deux tiers, si l'agent avant le début de l'action pénale, effectue la réparation des dommages.
11
Arts. 21. 22 et 23 de la Loi n° 9.605/98.
Arts. 24 de la Loi n° 9.605/98.
13
Si de tels faits se produisent par la presse, ils sont punis avec une détention maximum d'une année, à travers
l'article 19 de la Loi n° 5.250/67.
14
Peine de réclusion de deux à cinq ans et amende.
15
Art. 20. §1° de la Loi n° 7.716/89.
16
Art. 20. §2° de la Loi n° 7.716/89.
12
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Brésil
Finalement, sont nombreux dans l'ordre juridique brésilien, des dispositifs concernant la délation pri17
mée. À titre d'exemple, la même être trouvée dans des prévisions concernant le lavage d'argent ,
18
19
léxtorsion par kidnapping , le trafic de drogues , ainsi que dans la Loi n. 9.807/99, pouvant tel fait
impliquer dans la réduction de peine de un à deux tiers, l´hypothèse la plus commune, soit dans
20
l'exemption de peine .
Pour les crimes de haute gravité prévus dans l'ordre juridique brésilien, nommés de crimes hideux,
comme déjà mentionné, il existe des restrictions variées soit dans son application, soit dans l'accomplissement de la peine privée de liberté. Ceci parce que, initialement, la progression de régime est
rendue plus difficile, devant celui qui a pratiqué un crime hideux, accomplir, en règle générale, 2/5 de
la peine si primaire ou 3/5, si récidivant, au lieu de 1/6, comme réalisé de manière générale.
Il faut remarquer que le régime initial d'accomplissement de la peine est fermé, tandis que pour les
autres accusations lón peut varier du la semi-ouvert et ouvert. Il est interdit aussi la concession d'amnistie, la grâce et pardon, ainsi que de caution, étant possible la concession de liberté provisoire par le
magistrat sans la caution.
Le délai d'une certaine modalité de prison processive, nommée de prison temporaire et possible seulement au cours de l'enquête policière, est augmenté de cinq jours, renouvelable pour plus cinq, dans
les hypothèses habituelles, pour trente jours, renouvelable pour plus trente, dans le cas de crime hideux.
Il est aussi est plus difficile la concession de la liberté conditionnelle, vu que celle-ci est seulement
possible si l'agent accomplit 2/3 de la peine, au lieu de 1/3 ou de la moitié, dans les cas communs.
Un instrument de nature extra-pénale se détache quand il s'agit de crimes pratiqués par des étrangers,
tellement courant dans ces espèces de criminalité. Après la procédure pénale et l'accomplissement de
la peine, est possible l'expulsion de l'étranger qui pratique un crime au Brésil, à travers un décret signé
par le Président de la République. Tel institut, discipliné dans les articles 65 à 75 de la Loi n. 6.815/80,
a son origine dans le droit brésilien lui-même, ayant été créé au début du XX siècle, ayant, originalement, comme cible les immigrés italiens anarchiques. L'expulsion est indépendant du crime pratiqué,
seulement ne pouvant être appliquée si celle-ci implique léxtradition, inadmissible par la loi brésilienne, quand l'étranger à un conjoint brésilien, de qui il ne soit pas séparé ou divorcé depuis plus de
cinq ans, ou quand l'étranger un fils brésilien prouvant quíl est sous sa garde ou de lui dépende économiquement.
Il faut remarquer que la jurisprudence brésilienne, plus précisément le Suprême Tribunal Fédéral
affronte, des récentes et continuelles questions qui impliquent les crimes de danger abstrait, la formulation préférée quand à la classification des types d'actes préparatoires. Les positionnements du STF
sont en train de se modifier, au vu que au moins sept de ses onze intégrants ont été substitués en vertu
de cas de retraite dans les quatre dernières années. Il faut détacher le positionnement adopté, surtout
dans le jugement de RHC 81057/SP, où le tribunal a considéré atypique le transport d'arme de feu
sans munitions, pour être un type de danger abstrait, donc sans potentialité de lésions. Il faut souligner
17
Art. 41 de la Loi n° 11.343/06.
Art. 159. §4°.
19
Art. 1°, §5° de la Loi n° 9.613/98.
20
Art. 13. Pourra le juge, d'office ou à la pétition des parties, accorder le pardon judiciaire et la conséquente
extinction de la pénalité à l'accusé qui, étant primaire, ait collaboré effectivement et volontairement avec
lénquête et la procédure pénale, à partir du moment que de cette collaboration ait résulté :
I - l'identification des autres coauteurs ou des participants de l'action pénale ;
II - la localisation de la victime avec son intégrité physique préservée ;
III - la récupération totale ou partielle du produit du crime.
Alinéa unique. La concession du pardon judiciaire prendra en compte la personnalité du bénéficié et la nature,
circonstances, gravité et répercussion sociale du fait criminel.
18
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que tel fait ne signifie pas que STF rejette cette espèce de criminalité, car comme il peut être observé
dans le jugement, encore non terminé, du HC 90075/SC qui traite de látypique du transport de munitions, n'a pas été le même de la compréhension des ministres.
Il existe plusieurs propositions de réforme en cours, dans le parlement brésilien, surtout en ce qui
concerne l'accusation spécifique du terrorisme et de la criminalité organisée.
21
Il est possible d´énumérer un vaste nombre de projets de loi qui créent le type pénal du terrorisme,
ainsi que dáutres qui exemplifient la criminalité organisée, quelques-uns avec des options absolument
22
distinctes . Il faut souligner qu’aucune de ces modifications trouve quelque soutien populaire, doctrinaire ou de jurisprudence.
21
Des projets de Loi n° 140/2007, 7622/2006, 149/2003, 6764/2002 et 2423/1989.
Comme, par exemple, s'observent dans l'Avant-projet de Loi publié dans le DOu du 25 mars de 1998, sections
I, p. 1-11, laquelle prétend modifier le CP, exemplifiant, dans le Titre VIII (des crimes contre la Paix Publique),
le délit d'organisation pénale :
"Art. 278. Constituer, deux ou plusieurs personnes, une organisation, compromettant ou essayant de compromettre, moyennant la menace, la corruption, la fraude ou la violence, l'efficacité de la performance d'agents publics,
dans le but de commettre des crimes.
Peine - Réclusion de quatre à huit ans.
Alinéa unique. La peine est réduite de la moitié, si l'organisation a pour finalité la pratique de la contravention
pénale;"
Ou alors Projeto de Lei 3.731, de 1997 (du Sénat Fédéral - PLS n. 97/96). "Art. 1er. - Cette loi définit et réglemente les moyens de preuve et les procédures dénquêtes destinées à la prévention et à la répression des crimes
pratiqués par des organisations criminelles.
Alinéa unique. Est considéré organisation criminelle, pour des effets de cette loi, l'association de trois ou plusieurs personnes, dans la forme de l'article 288 du Décret-loi 2.848, du 7 décembre 1940 (Code Pénal), à fin de
commettre les crimes suivants :
I - Homicide frauduleux (art. 121, rubrique et § 2ème, du Code Pénal) ;
II - Trafic de stupéfiants (art.12 de la Loi 6.368, du 21 octobre 1976) ;
III - Extorsion (art. 158, rubrique et alinéas, du Code Pénal) ;
IV - Extorsion par enlévement (art. 159, rubrique et alinéas, du Code Pénal)
V - Contrebande et détournement (art. 334, rubrique et alinéas, du Code Pénal)
VI - Trafic de femmes (art. 231, rubrique et alinéas, du Code Pénal) ;
VII - Trafic international d'enfants (art. 239 de la Loi 8.069, du 13 juillet 1990) ;
VIII - Crimes contre le système financier national (Loi 7.492, du 16 juin 1986) ;
IX - Crimes contre l'ordre tributaire (Loi 8.137, du 27 décembre 1990) ;
X - Crimes contre l'ordre econômica et les relations de consommation (Loi 8.137, du 27 décembre de 1990, et de
Loi 8.176, du 8 février 1991) ;
XI – Fausse monnaie (art. 289, rubrique et alinéas, du Code Pénal) ;
XII - Détournement frauduleux (art. 312, rubrique et § 1er, du Code Pénal)."
22
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CROATIA*
Igor BOJANIĆ**
A) General questions
1. Globalization of the society at different levels has undoubtedly influenced the globalization of
criminal activities in recent years. Facing the challenge of new appearance forms of offences (organized crime, terrorism and other serious offences) and meeting the obligations deriving from numerous
international conventions, Croatian legislator has, within the frames of substantive criminal law, been
putting effort to find the most appropriate solutions which should, among other things, facilitate the
cooperation among states in fighting the above mentioned criminal offences. Such effort is reflected in
forming certain criminal offences, often transnational ones, as stated in Chapter XIII of the Criminal
1
Code that refers to criminal offences against values protected by international law. These are: recruiting mercenaries (Art. 167b of the CC), international terrorism (Art. 169 of the CC), endangering the
safety of internationally protected persons (Art. 170 of the CC), taking of hostages (Art. 171 of the
CC), misuse of nuclear materials (Art. 172 of the CC ), abuse of narcotic drugs (Art. 173 of the CC),
racial and other discrimination (Art. 174 of the CC), trafficking in persons and slavery (Art. 175 of the
CC), illegal transfer of persons across the state border (Art. 177 of the CC), international prostitution
(Art. 178 of the CC), hijacking an aircraft or a ship (Art. 179 of the CC), and endangering the safety of
international air traffic and maritime navigation (Art. 181 of the CC). This can refer to a number of
other criminal offences that are according to the dominant protected legal interests included in other
chapters of the CC and can according to their appearance forms be connected with organized crime.
These are precisely the offences that are listed by the Law on Office for the Fight against Corruption
2
and Organized Crime, by which in the Republic of Croatia the Office was founded as a separate
State Attorney Office competent in preventing, prosecuting and fighting criminal offences of organized crime and corruption offences that are often connected with various manifestations of organized
crime. The Authority of the Office for specific criminal offences is regulated in Art. 21 of the mentioned Law. This provision reads: « (1) The Office conducts affairs of the State Attorney Office in
cases of criminal offences as follows: 1. malpractice in compulsory settlement or bankruptcy proceedings in Art. 283 paragraphs 2 and 3 of the CC, unfair competition in foreign trade operation in Art.
289 paragraph 2 of the CC, abuse in performing governmental duties in Art. 338 of the CC, illegal
intercession in Art. 343 of the CC, accepting a bribe in Art. 347 of the CC, accepting a bribe in business in Art. 294a of the CC, 2. unlawful deprivation of freedom in Art. 124 paragraph 3 of the CC,
kidnapping in Art. 125 of the CC, coercion in Art. 128 paragraph 2 of the CC, trafficking in persons
and slavery in Art. 175 paragraph 3 of the CC, illegal transfer of persons across the state border in Art.
177 paragraph 3 of the CC, robbery in Art. 218 paragraph 2 of the CC, extortion in Art. 234 paragraph
*
**
Igor Bojanić, S.J.D., Associated Professor of Criminal Law at Josip Juraj Strossmayer University, Faculty of
Law in Osijek.
1
Criminal Code, The Official Gazette 110/97, 27/98, 50/00, 129/00, 51/01, 111/03, 190/03, 105/04, 84/05, 71/06
(hereafter CC).
2
Law on Office for the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime, The Official Gazette 88/01, 12/02, 33/05.
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2 of the CC, blackmail in Art. 235 paragraph 2 of the CC, money laundering in Art. 279 paragraph 3
of the CC and illegal debt collection in Art. 330 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the CC, if theses offences are
committed by a group of people (Art. 89 paragraph 22 of the CC) or a criminal organization, 3. abuse
of narcotic drugs in Art. 173 paragraph 3 of the CC, 4. associating for the purpose of committing a
criminal offences in Art. 333 of the CC, including all criminal offences committed by this group of
people or the organization of criminals except criminal offences against the Republic of Croatia and
the armed forces, 5. committed in connection with the acts of a group or criminal organization for
which imprisonment for more than three years is determined, and the criminal offence is committed in
the area of one or more states or makes a significant part of its preparation or planning committed in
another state. (2) The Office is also competent for conducting the proceedings against the organizer of
the group or criminal organization for committing criminal offences of pandering in Art. 195 paragraph 2 of the CC, illicit trade in gold in Art. 290 paragraph 2 of the CC and avoiding customs control
in Art. 298 paragraph 2 of the CC. (3) The Office is also competent for criminal offences of money
laundering in Art. 279 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CC, obstruction of evidence in Art. 304 paragraphs 1
and 2 of the CC, duress against officials engaged in the administration of justice in Art. 309 of the CC,
obstructing an official in the performance of official duty in Art. 317 of the CC, attacking an official
in Art. 318 of the CC as well as criminal offence of disclosing the identity of the protected witness in
Art. 305a of the CC if these offences are committed in connection with the criminal offences from
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.»
Main questions that emerge at the level of substantive criminal law concerning mentioned criminal
offences are the following: forming constitutive elements of particular criminal offences in accordance
with the contents of particular international conventions (whereby an important role is played by the
nullum crimen sine lege certa demand, regulation of prerequisites for punishment of preparatory acts,
extension of general provisions on participating of more persons in committing a criminal offence by
separate criminal offences (punishment of associating for the purpose of committing a criminal offences, subsequent assistance to the perpetrator or harsher punishment if the perpetrator commits a
criminal offence as a member of a group or of a criminal organization ) and prescribing punishments
adequate to seriousness of different manifestations of particular criminal offences. It is important
therefore to set the right measure when adjusting the requirements for efficient prevention and repression of criminal activities with the aspiration for adherence of basic principles of criminal law and
3
principles of protection of basic human rights.
2. In principle the preparatory acts in Croatian criminal law are not punishable. They are taken with an
aim to enable or make the perpetration of a criminal offence easier and they are not the fulfillment of a
constitutive elements of particular criminal offence. The most common forms of preparatory acts are
the providing of the means for perpetration of criminal offence, obstacles elimination, agreeing upon
and planning perpetration of a criminal offence. In case of participation of more persons in committing a criminal offence such preparatory acts are considered as aiding and abetting. In general part of
the CC there are no separate provisions on preparatory acts but, nevertheless, the Croatian legislator
has moved away from their principled unpunishability, regulating them as non-autonomous or
autonomous criminal offences. As for participation of more persons in committing a criminal offence,
from provisions of the general part of the CC (art. 35 – 37 of the CC) it is clear that Croatian criminal
law tends to the so called dualistic model which is characterized by a clear distinction between the
perpetrators and accomplices. Further on in the text the term participation or complicity will be referred to participation in wider terms which covers perpetrators on the one hand (direct perpetrator,
co-perpetrators and perpetrator by means) and accomplices (participants in narrower terms) which
include instigators and aides and abettors. The theory of the power (hegemony, control) over an act
(Tatherrschaftslehre) has been explicitly accepted as a distinctive criterion. The issues of participation
3
Cf. Kurtović, Organized criminality-criminal justice issues of liability (guilt) and sanctions, Croatian journal for
criminal law and practice (hereafter CJCLP) 2/1998, pp. 725 ff.
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are in a special part of the CC mostly expressed in the provisions referring to organized crime, terrorism and other serious criminal offences that as autonomous offences prescribe associating for the
purpose of committing criminal offences, aiding the perpetrator after having committed a criminal
offence (different variants including money laundering, as well) or it appears that with a number of
offences the perpetration within a group or criminal organization is a aggravating circumstance (circumstance because of which the law prescribes more severe punishment).
2.1. Preparatory acts
According to the Croatian CC attempt is not punishable for all criminal offences. Attempt is punishable only in case of intentional criminal offence for which a punishment of five years of imprisonment
or a more serious penalty can be imposed, while the attempt of minor offence is punishable only if the
law in a special part of the CC expressly provides for the punishment for a particular offence (Art. 33
paragraph 1 of the CC). Since preparatory acts are in principle not punishable, the question when the
perpetrator passes from preparatory act into attempt is of great practical value. Determining the beginning of an attempt in practice mostly does not prepare greater difficulties but it must be stated that in
some cases it is justifiable to assume that the perpetrator had started with an attempt although the
committed offence, if we look at it isolated, is a preparatory act. The subject is the implementation of
the so called individual-objective theory according to which the perpetrator is assumed to have started
committing an offence at the moment when he undertakes the act that formally does not constitute the
realization of the elements of a particular crime if according to his idea (plan) it is so closely connected with the realization of the constituent fact that he need not undertake any preparatory acts in
the meantime. Perpetrator's plan (individual constituent) on the one hand, as well as immediate temporal and spatial connection of such a conceived preparatory act and the act of perpetration (objective
4
constituent) on the other hand are taken into consideration. So is, for example, planting explosive
device at the garage entrance with intention to be activated by the victim when entering the garage by
car considered attempted murder (The Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, I Kž-733/94, CJCLP
1/1995, p. 218) whereas this would be unpunishable preparatory act if the perpetrator planted explosive device in such a way that he had to activate it at a specific moment.
While prescribing punishability of preparatory acts the Croatian legislator has used two approaches.
With a certain number of criminal offences preparatory acts are prescribed as non-autonomous criminal offences or delicta preparata whereas with some other the preparatory acts are for their particular
danger prescribed as autonomous offences or delicta sui generis. Difference between these two types
of criminal offences is important for the question of the possibility of their attempt. With nonautonomous offences attempt is not possible because it has already been covered by the notion of
preparation whereas with autonomous offences of preparation the attempt is possible although it need
not be punishable (punishment depends on the gravity of the offence). With non-autonomous offences
of preparation their concurrence with attempt or completed criminal offence is not punishable since
the preparation of such an offence is merely the so called transitory delict and as such it is unpunishable prior act (apparent concurrence). With delicta sui generis concurrence with other offences is
possible although apparent concurrence should not be excluded. Opinions are divided on the issue.
However, careful judgment of the actual situation is necessary.
In the first place punishability of preparatory acts as non-autonomous criminal offences is prescribed
for political criminal offences (criminal offences against the Republic of Croatia) that in their nature
require earlier criminal law intervention since any delay could effect political changes which would
make punishability harder or even completely impossible. Thus according to Art. 153 of the CC
(preparation of criminal offences against the Republic of Croatia) whoever procures or ensures the
operation of means for perpetration of criminal offence, removes obstacles, makes a plan or agrees
with others or undertakes other actions that create conditions for the direct perpetration of the criminal
4
Cf. Novoselec, General Part of Criminal Law, Zagreb, 2007, pp. 304 ff.
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offences against the Republic of Croatia shall be punished by imprisonment for one to five years. The
same technique of prescribing punishability of preparatory acts and the same punishment frame is
applied by the legislator in Art. 187a paragraph 1 of the CC that refers to preparation of criminal offences against the values protected by international law (international terrorism inclusive), but in a
separate paragraph (Art. 187a paragraph 2 of the CC) it prescribes punishment as well (also imprisonment for one to five years) for the person that supplies or collects financial means for which he is
aware that they will be completely or partially used for perpetration of criminal offences the preparation of which is punishable.
Punishment of particular preparatory acts as delicta sui generis are conducts that the legislator prescribed as autonomous criminal offences because of their particular danger, since they can be preparatory acts for perpetration of various criminal offences. Such are, for example, criminal offences of
associating for the purpose of committing criminal offences (Art. 333 of the CC), making, supplying,
possessing or providing means of forging documents (Art. 314 of the CC), making and supplying
weapons and instruments intended for the perpetration of a criminal offence (Art. 334 of the CC) or
agreement to commit a criminal offence (Art. 332 of the CC).
In comparison to the prescribed punishments for completed (or attempted) criminal offences, penal
frames prescribed for preparatory acts are generally milder, which is understandable in reference to
the stage of perpetration of a criminal offence. We should differentiate non-autonomous from
autonomous criminal offences of preparation. For example, for the most serious form of criminal
offence of international terrorism (Art. 169 paragraph 3 of the CC) the imprisonment for not less than
5
ten years or long-term imprisonment is prescribed, whereas for preparation of this same criminal
offence the law prescribes the imprisonment for one to five years. By association for the purpose of
committing a criminal offence the organizer is prescribed imprisonment for not less than three years,
which means from three to fifteen years of imprisonment. In comparison to the most serious form of
committed criminal offence of international terrorism this is a milder penal frame but in comparison to
the basic form (Art. 169 paragraph 1 of the CC ), for which the imprisonment for not less than five
years (from five to fifteen years) is prescribed, the difference is only in the prescribed special minimum. But this is only an exception since when comparing other penal frames for preparatory acts and
attempted/completed criminal offences significant difference can be noticed.
2.2. Participation (complicity)
As already mentioned the Croatian CC accepts a dualistic model of legal regulation of participation of
more persons in the commission of the offence in which we differentiate between the perpetrators and
accomplices. However, this distinction in the CC is realized in a special way. Art. 35 of the CC, under
the title The Single Perpetrator and Accomplices, reads: « (1) The single perpetrator is a person who
commits a criminal offence by his own act or omission or through another person. (2) Accomplices
are: the co-perpetrators, the instigator and the aide or abettor. (3) Co-perpetrators of a criminal offence
are two or more persons who, on the basis of a joint decision, commit a criminal offence in such a way
that each of them participates in the perpetration or, in some other way, substantially contributes to the
perpetration of a criminal offence. (4) The instigator and aide or abettor are accomplices who, without
control over the perpetration of a criminal offence, contribute to its perpetration by instigation or by
aiding and abetting. » The cited article makes it obvious first of all that the use of the term the single
perpetrator completely inadequate for perpetration by means since this legal figure by the nature of
things includes participation of at least two persons (a perpetrator by means and means by which a
person from the background realizes his criminal goals). Furthermore, the term of accomplices unnec5
Not less than ten years means the penal frame from ten to fifteen years since as special maximum of the prescribed punishment a general maximum is applied which is in Croatian criminal law according to Art. 53 paragraph 1
of the CC, imprisonment for the term of fifteen years. Long-term imprisonment for the term of twenty to forty
years can by way of an exception be prescribed for the most serious and most dangerous forms of serious criminal offences.
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essarily includes co-perpetrators who by the traditional comprehension of the dualistic model are
always considered perpetrators. Qualitative difference between co-perpetrators and accomplices (instigator and aide or abettor) is obvious from paragraph 4 in which neither instigator or aide or abettor
have power over an act, from which argumentum a contrario is derived that co-perpetrators do have
that power. Significant contribution to perpetration of criminal offence in a different way in legal
definition of co-perpetrators refers to acts of co-perpetrators out of constitutive elements of criminal
offence and they must be differentiated from mere aiding and abetting acts. The mentioned disadvantages can easily be eliminated: as for the perpetration the term «single» should be deleted and coperpetrators let out from the term of accomplices. The doctrine of power over an act which has been
taken over from German criminal law dogmatic enables clear signification of central (key) roles in the
perpetration of offences. When it comes to organized crime and organizers of criminal associations
this doctrine can be applied through the legal figure of perpetration by means based on organized
6
apparatus of power or through co-perpetration in cases of intensive participation at preparatory stage.
Dualistic concept of complicity is characterized by accessorial liability of aides and abettors and instigators. To become liable as accomplice the perpetrator needs to enter the punishable stage of criminal
offence and commit an unlawful act (so called limited accessoryship). Exception to this principle
presents the liability for unsuccessful instigation that refers to all cases in which instigator committed
an act of instigation but the instigated has not committed punishable attempt. Unsuccessful instigation
is punishable only when attempt is punishable (Art. 37 paragraph 2 of the CC). Since in case of attempt punishment can be mitigated, such possibility applies to unsuccessful instigation. In case of
inadequate attempt of instigation (situation when the instigated has already reached the decision of
perpetration of a criminal offence) the court may remit the punishment for the perpetrator (Art. 37
paragraph 3 of the CC). Instigation and aiding are punishable if committed with an intent. The same
penal scope is applied both for instigators and perpetrators whereas there is a possibility of mitigating
the punishment in case of aiding and abetting (Art. 38 paragraph 1 of the CC). For the possibility of
mitigating the punishment for aiding and abetting the distinction between co-perpetrators and aides
and abettors is practically the most important one. The Law quotes typical examples of aiding and
abetting: giving advice or instructions on how to commit a criminal offence, providing the perpetrator
with the means for the perpetration of a criminal offence, giving an advance promise to conceal the
existence of a criminal offence, the perpetrator, or the means by which the criminal offence was committed, as well as concealing the traces of a criminal offence or the objects procured by the criminal
offence (Art. 38 paragraph 2 of the CC). Unsuccessful aiding is not punishable. Each co-perpetrator
shall be liable in accordance with his intent or negligence, while the instigator and the aide and abettor
shall be liable in accordance with their intent. ( Art. 36 paragraph 1 of the CC). An accomplice who
voluntarily prevents the perpetration of a criminal offence shall have his punishment remitted (Art. 36
paragraph 4 of the CC). This is a situation of voluntary abandonment of accomplices.
3. Preparation and participation in relation to terrorism and other very serious forms of crime
3.1. When it comes to terrorism the Republic of Croatia is a party in numerous conventions of the
United Nations (among others of the International Convention For the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism of 1999) and the process of ratification of the International Convention on Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005 is underway. At regional level Croatia is a party in the European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1977. It ratified the Protocol by which the European
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (2003) is amended which will come into force after it is
ratified by all parties of the convention of 1977. In May 2005 the Republic of Croatia signed the
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism by which states undertake to incriminate in their legislation some new criminal offences such as terrorism apologia, terrorists' recruitment
and training. In the process of harmonizing the legislation with acquis communautaire the Council of
Europe Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism of 2002 needs to be underlined.
6
Cf. Bojanić, Perpetration As a Power Over an Act, Zagreb, 2003, pp. 138-139.
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Croatian criminal law does not deal with terrorism as global manifestation but only one segment of its
7
manifestation and that is terrorist act, terrorist criminal offence. Chapter XIII of the CC prescribes a
number of criminal offences by which different manifestation forms of international terrorism are
incriminated: international terrorism (Art. 169 of the CC), endangering the safety of internationally
protected persons (Art.170 of the definition of terrorism is important for the Republic of Croatia. The
CC novel of 2004 Art. 169 of the CC (international terrorism) is in its content harmonized with the tee
CC), taking of hostages (Art. 171 of the CC), misuse of nuclear materials (Art. 172 of the CC), hijacking an aircraft or a ship (Art.179 of the CC), endangering the safety of international air traffic and
maritime navigation (Art. 181 of the CC). Central criminal offence with elements of terrorism is international terrorism in Art. 169 of the CC. Legal provision on this criminal offence reads as follows:
«(1) Whoever, with an aim to cause serious intimidation of the population, force a foreign state or
international organization to do, not to do or suffer something, or seriously endangers basic constitutional, politic or economic values of a foreign state or international organization commits criminal
offence referred to in Art. 170-172, 179 and 181 of this Law or causes explosion or fire or, by some
generally dangerous act or device endangers people or property or kidnaps a person or commits some
other act of violence that can seriously harm a foreign state or international organization shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five years. (2) Whoever seriously threatens to commit a
criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, shall be punished by imprisonment for one
to five years. (3) If the perpetrator, in the course of the perpetration of the criminal offence referred to
in paragraph 1 of this Article, intentionally kills one or more persons, he shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten years or by long-term imprisonment. (4) If, by criminal offence referred
to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the death of one or more persons or extensive destruction is caused,
the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten years. (5) In order to initiate
criminal proceedings for the criminal offence referred to in this Article, an approval from the State
Attorney of the Republic of Croatia is required.»
When it comes to organized crime it is necessary to point out the legal definition of a criminal organization from Art. 89 paragraph 23 of the CC: «A criminal organization is a structured association of at
least three persons existing in the course of a certain period and acting with the common aim of committing one or more criminal offences for the purpose of direct or indirect financial and other material
gain or with an aim to realize and keep supervision over certain economic and other activities, and
these criminal offences for which imprisonment for not less than four years or harsher punishment
may be imposed. The criminal organization is the basis of the notion of organized crime». This provision is significant for the interpretation of a number of incriminations from the special part of the CC
in which criminal offences committed within a criminal organization appear as an aggravating circumstance, or for criminal offences of association for the purpose of committing criminal offences.
The notion of criminal organization has been harmonized with the content of the United Nation Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
3.2. The act of perpetration of international terrorism criminal offences involves first of all the perpetration of particular criminal offences in Chapter XIII (endangering the safety of internationally protected persons, taking of hostages, misuse of nuclear materials, hijacking an aircraft or a ship and
endangering the safety of international air traffic and maritime navigation). International terrorism
differs from these criminal offences so that the aim of the perpetrator's act is to cause serious intimidation with the population, force foreign state or international organization to particular actions (to do,
not to do or suffer something), or seriously endanger basic constitutional, politic or economic values
of a foreign state or international organization. According to such subjective feature criminal offence
of international terrorism differs from the criminal offence of anti-state terrorism in Art. 141 of the CC
7
See Derenčinović, in: Separate Part of the Criminal Law (ed. by Novoselec), Zagreb, 2007, pp. 142 ff. For the
most acceptable definition of international terrorism on international law level see Degan/Pavičić, International
Criminal Law, Rijeka 2005, p. 221.
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in which the aim of the perpetrator is to endanger the constitutional order or security of the Republic
8
of Croatia.
Act with a particular aim (special intent) makes this criminal offence different from criminal offence
of endangering by generally dangerous act or generally dangerous device in Art. 263 of the CC. Alternatively from the standpoint of the perpetration act for criminal offence of international terrorism is
liable whoever causes explosion or fire, kidnaps some person or commits some other violent act that
can cause harm to a foreign state or international organization. In spite of different objective and subjective features of the offence the legislator has dealt with both anti-state and international terrorism
by the same concept. The threat of commission of theses criminal offences, punishable preparatory
acts as non-autonomous criminal offences, associating for the purpose of perpetration of these criminal offences and subsequent aiding to the perpetrator of the criminal offence have been regulated
separately. The difference is only in the prescribed punishment for the organizer when it comes to
associating for the purpose of perpetration of these criminal offences: for anti-state terrorism penal
scope is from one to eight years, and for international terrorism not less than three years i.e. from three
to fifteen years of imprisonment. In the same way, including the prescribed punishment, more serious
forms of these criminal offences have been determined: cases when the perpetrator of the basic offence kills one or more persons intentionally, and when the perpetration of the basic criminal offence
causes death of one or more persons or a serious damage. The letter speaks for the liability for more
serious consequence that must include perpetrator's negligence. Legal practice so far has dealt with
9
only the offence of anti-state terrorism mostly such as setting explosive devices at public places.
3.3. Act with a specific intent (aim) in international terrorism is a subjective element of the unlawfulness of an act and it needs to be discerned from the intent as a form of guilt; an intent must include
consciousness of all objective features of criminal offence (intellectual constituent of an intent) and
willingness to do so or at least consent to do it (volitional constituent of an intent). This special intent
distinguishes terrorism from organized crime although there are many similarities between them, as
well. Organized criminal associations are characterized by a typical act for illegal material gain.
B) Characteristics of the expansion of the forms of preparation and participation
1. As it has already been mentioned, with particular criminal offences against the values protected by
international law (including criminal offences with elements of terrorism) preparatory acts are punishable as delicta preparata or non-autonomous criminal offences of preparation by which the conditions
are created for direct perpetration of the criminal offence. Separately incriminated is the supply and
collecting of financial means for perpetration of these criminal offences (Art. 187a of the CC). In case
of the transfer to a higher stage of perpetration the concurrence of preparatory acts and committed
criminal offence is excluded.
Other ways of punishment for preparatory acts are not strictly connected with the perpetration of terrorist criminal offences. These are e.g. manufacturing, supplying, possessing, selling or providing of
instruments of forgery (criminal offence against the safety of payment and business operations in Art.
10
277 of the CC), manufacturing, supplying, possessing, selling or providing of instruments of for8
In this criminal offence objective features are determined in a different way. Art. 141 of the CC reads: «Whoever, with an aim to endanger the constitutional order or the security of the Republic of Croatia, causes an explosion, fire, or by a generally dangerous act or device imperils the lives of people or endangers property or kidnaps
a person, or commits some other act of violence within the territory of the Republic of Croatia or against its citizens, thus causing a feeling of personal insecurity in citizens, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
5 years.»
9
More on criminal offence of anti-state terrorism see Kurtović, in: Special Part of the Criminal Law (ed. by Novoselec), Zagreb, 2007, pp. 83-84, 95-97.
10
Article 277 of the CC: «(1) Whoever manufactures, supplies, possesses, sells or provides instruments for counterfeiting value tokens issued pursuant to regulations shall be punished by a fine or by imprisonment not exceeding one year. (2) Whoever manufactures, supplies, possesses, sells or provides instruments for counterfeiting
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11
gery (criminal offence against authenticity of documents in Art. 314 of the CC), making and supplying weapons and instruments intended for the perpetration of a criminal offence (criminal offence
12
against public order in Art. 334 of the CC) or agreement to commit a criminal offence (criminal
13
offence against public order in Art. 332 of the CC) . These are autonomous criminal offences of
preparation for which a question can be put if the perpetrator is liable for that offence or concurrence
with other criminal offences exists. Thus, agreement to commit a criminal offence in Art. 332 of the
CC keeps its autonomy only under the condition that perpetrators do not transfer into the realization of
the agreed offence, since in that case agreement gains non-autonomous or subsidiary nature in comparison to the offence that is in preparation (apparent concurrence).
Among autonomous criminal offences of preparation we sort out recruitment of mercenaries in Art.
14
167b of the CC which was introduced by a novel in 2004 The content of this provision, however,
does not suffice to meet the requirements of the Council of Europe Convention on Prevention of Terrorism in 2005 in reference to incrimination of the recruitment of terrorists as autonomous criminal
offence. The special part of the CC does not provide either for particular provisions on instigating
terrorist acts. Herein the provisions of the general part of the CC on instigation ( including the unsuccessful instigation) are applied.
It is important to point out that Art. 169 paragraph 2 of the CC (international terrorism) prescribes
imprisonment for one to five years whoever seriously threatens with perpetration of a criminal offence
of international terrorism. In this way criminal law protection from terrorism has been transferred into
the earlier stage than that of direct perpetration of a criminal offence.
There are no special provisions on an attempted terrorist criminal offences. Here the rules of the general part of the CC on punishability of an attempt are applied. An attempt is unpunishable if for the
concrete offence imprisonment for five years and more cannot be inflicted. Punishability of an attempt
in lesser criminal offences must be separately prescribed in the special part of the CC.
Associating for the purpose to commit criminal offences is of particular significance when it comes to
preparatory acts as autonomous criminal offences. Such criminal offence is of dual nature: on the one
hand it is a preparatory act sui generis, and on the other hand it is a form of extension of general provisions of the CC on complicity.
2. As for special provisions in reference to participation of more persons in perpetration of criminal
offences in special part of the CC it must be emphasized that they neither modify not derogate the
provisions of the general part of the CC but supplement them, taking into consideration extreme danger of the offences connected with organized crime, terrorism and other serious criminal offences.
Criminal offences with which the perpetration of the criminal offence within a group or criminal organization is an aggravating circumstance are numerous: unlawful deprivation of freedom (Art. 124,
money or securities issued pursuant to regulations shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to five
years. (3) The instruments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be forfeited.»
11
This criminal offence commits whoever «makes, supplies, possesses, sells or provides means or data for forging documents». The prescribed punishment is a fine or imprisonment not exceeding three years.
12
Article 334 paragraph 1 of the CC reads: «Whoever makes, supplies or enables another to obtain weapons,
explosive substances or the means needed for their production, or poisons which knows to be intended for the
perpetration of a criminal offence, shall be punished by imprisonment for three months to three years.»
13
Criminal offence of agreement to commit a criminal offence commits «whoever agrees with another to commit
a serious criminal offence for which, according to the law, imprisonment for three years or more severe punishment my be imposed». The prescribed punishment is a fine or imprisonment not exceeding three years.
14
This provision reads as follows: « (1) Whoever, in violation of the rules of international law, recruits, uses,
pays or enables mercenaries for combat or common act of violence aimed at overthrowing the government, subversion of territorial integrity of the state or endangering its system, shall be punished by imprisonment for one to
eight years. (2) Whoever as a mercenary, for the purpose of material gain, takes part in combat or common act of
violence, shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to five years.»
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paragraph 3 of the CC), kidnapping (Art. 125, paragraph 2 of the CC), coercion (Art. 128, paragraph 2
of the CC), threat (Art. 129, paragraph 3 of the CC), trafficking in persons and slavery (Art. 175,
paragraph 3 of the CC), illegal transfer of persons across the state border (Art. 177, paragraph 3 of the
CC), robbery (Art. 218, paragraph 2 of the CC), larceny by coercion ( Art. 219, paragraph 2 of the
CC), extortion (Art. 234, paragraph 2 of the CC), blackmail (Art. 235, paragraph 2 of the CC), money
laundering (Art 279, paragraph 3 of the CC), self-help (Art. 329, paragraph 2 of the CC), and illegal
debt collection (Art. 330, paragraph 4 of the CC).
15
With one of the manifestations of criminal offence of abuse of narcotic drugs instead of perpetration
of a criminal offence within a group or criminal organization the legislator has marked as aggravating
circumstance the perpetration of an offence by ''more persons who conspire to commit such offences
or the perpetrator of this criminal offence has organized a network of resellers or dealers'' ( Art. 173,
paragraph 3 of the CC). Such a formulation of aggravating circumstance has been criticized since the
definition of '' more people'' given by the law, Art. 89 paragraph 20 of the CC assumes at least two and
more persons. It is, namely, not clear why is the perpetration of that offence not connected to the ac16
tion of the criminal organization. The prescribed punishment for the most serious form of abuse of
narcotic drugs is imprisonment for not less than 5 years or long-term imprisonment. The resellers' and
dealers' network organizer can be liable for concurrence offence under Art. 173 paragraph 3 of the CC
with the criminal offence of associating with a purpose to commit criminal offences under Art. 333
paragraph 2. Network organizing presupposes relatively tighter connection between the organizer on
the one hand and resellers and dealers on the other.
Art. 173 paragraph 5 of the CC prescribes punishability of inducement as autonomous criminal offence: inducing someone else to use a narcotic drug. According to the accessorial liability of instiga17
tion this participating act of mere use of narcotic drugs would not be punishable.
Literature emphasizes that perpetration of an offence within a group or criminal organization should
be taken into consideration as aggravating circumstance for some other criminal offences that are
typical of organized crime: corruption (Art. 343, 347, 348 of the CC), taking of hostages (Art. 171 of
the CC), international prostitution (Art. 178 of the CC), fraud (Art. 224 of the CC), concealing (Art.
236 and 301 of the CC), counterfeiting of money, securities and value tokens (Art. 274 and 276 of the
18
CC) and forgery of documents (Art. 311 of the CC).
As an autonomous criminal offence Art 187 b of the CC prescribes the subsequent aid to the perpetrator of a criminal offence with some criminal offences against the values protected by international law
(including terrorist criminal offences). The offence concerns concealing, supplying with food, clothes,
money and shelter to the perpetrator in another way to prevent his uncovering and arrest. The prescribed punishment is imprisonment for six months to three years (Art. 187b paragraph 1 of the CC).
This punishment is not inflicted upon the person whose spouse is the perpetrator, a person with whom
the perpetrator lives in a common-law marriage, blood relations in the first line, brother or sister,
adopter or adoptee and their spouses or person who live with them in a common-law marriage (Art.
187b, paragraph 2 of the CC). It is about a special form of criminal offence of aiding the perpetrator
after the committed criminal offence in Art. 301 of the CC for which imprisonment for three months
to three years is prescribed. The difference in reference to the basic form of the offence is only in a
higher special minimum.
15
Unauthorized manufacturing, processing, selling or offering for sale or buying, keeping or transferring for the
purpose of reselling or buying or some other way of unauthorized putting into circulation substances or preparations which are by regulation proclaimed to be narcotic drugs under Art. 173, paragraph 2 of the CC.
16
Cf. Bačić, in: Bačić/Pavlović, Criminal Law, Special part, Zagreb, 2001, p. 279.
17
Cf. Turković, in: Special part of the Criminal Law (ed. by Novoselec), Zagreb, 2007, p. 131.
18
The same as note 16, p. 463.
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3. Associating for the purpose of committing a criminal offences is regulated by Art. 333 of the CC:
«(1) Whoever organizes a group of people or in some other way connects three or more persons in
joint action with an aim to commit a serious criminal offence for which, according to the law, imprisonment for three years or more severe punishment may be imposed shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to five years. (2) Whoever organizes a criminal organization or manages it shall
be punished by imprisonment for one to eight years. (3) A member of the group referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by a fine or by imprisonment not exceeding three years. (4) A
member of the group referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be punished by imprisonment for
six months to five years. (5) If a member of a group or a criminal organization uncovers such a group
or criminal organization prior to committing a criminal offence as a member of it or for it, the court
may remit his punishment ».
The act of perpetration under Art. 333 paragraphs 1 and 2 is the organization of a group or criminal
organization (lesser and more serious form of associating for the purpose of committing a criminal
offence). By Art. 89 paragraph 22 of the CC «a group of people is made out of at least three persons
connected for the purpose of permanent and temporary perpetration of criminal offences where each
of these persons has his share in the perpetration of an offence. « In regard of the formulation of Art.
333 the notion of a group under Art. 89 paragraph 22 of the CC is considered inadequate in its part
where it requires that members of the group should take their share in the perpetration of a criminal
offence because this leads to the conclusion that the legislator did not have in mind this criminal offence but exclusively situations in which the perpetration of offences within a group appears as an
aggravating circumstance. The realization of conditions under Art. 89 paragraph 22 of the CC is unthinkable prior to the perpetration of an offence. The law, further on, makes the group and persons
connected in some other way equal but remained inconsistent in this case because these persons are
19
not mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4. The notion of a group matches the earlier traditional notion of
a ''gang'' which understood continual and higher level of organized association of more persons (at
least three) for the purpose of common perpetration of criminal offences that are not defined in details
in advance. Between the notion of the group and legal figure of co-perpetrators there exists a difference in content because co-perpetrators do not require the element of continuity (permanent or temporary perpetration of criminal offences). The highest level or form of criminal association according to
the CC is criminal organization as defined in Art. 89.
General features of the notion of organized crime (that must be cumulatively fulfilled) are common
action of at least three persons aimed at perpetration of serious criminal offences with an aim of material gain or power. Besides these features, further features of organized crime in Croatian literature are
found as follows: a) each of the persons in crime structure has prior defined task or role, b) activities
are planned for longer or indefinite period of time, c) action under application of one or more forms of
internal control and discipline, d) transnationality e) applying violence or other methods of intimidation, f) applying economic and business structure ( activities), g) participating in concealing illegal
gain and h) influence on politics, media, executive and judicial authorities or economic-social circumstances.
The members of the group or criminal organization were required to accept the goals and organizational elements of associating so that for their liability animus sociandi is required, i.e. the consciousness of and acceptance of group aims. The structure of a criminal organization is usually marked by
the fact that members have lower or the lowest status. A key (dominant) figure is the organizer who
directs the entire activity of the association and who in the hierarchy is the supreme cohesive power in
inner relationships. The issue important in practice is if concurrence of associating for the purpose of
committing criminal offences and criminal offences deriving from such associating is possible. This
criminal offence is not of subsidiary significance. That means that perpetration of criminal offences
within a group or criminal organization does not exclude punishability of the organizer and members
19
Cf. Cvitanović, in: Special part of the Criminal Law (ed. by Novoselec), Zagreb, 2007, p. 392.
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for the mere associating and membership (see e.g. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia,
Kzz-10/99, concurrence of fraud under Art. 224 and all forms of association from Art. 333 of the CC).
More complex is the problem in cases when circumstances that adequate criminal offences committed
within a group or criminal organization represents the aggravated form of criminal offence or the
description of aggravating circumstances applies adequate synonymous formulation (e.g. abuse of
narcotic drugs in Art. 173 paragraph 3 of the CC). In principle such aggravated forms exclude concurrence of criminal offences of associating with criminal offence committed within a group or criminal
organization because this could mean that perpetrator is punished twice for associating (The Supreme
Court of the Republic of Croatia, I Kž-1050/03, Choice of Decisions 2/2004, p. 166). But some of the
aggravated forms of criminal offences in certain circumstances could though be in concurrence with
criminal offences of associating, depending on the prescribed penal scope. First of all this refers to
more serious form of associating under Art. 333 paragraph 2 of the CC for which relatively severe
punishment is prescribed so that concurrence of that form of associating with criminal offences where
perpetration as criminal organization is an aggravating circumstance is possible if lesser punishment is
20
prescribed for these offences. It is necessary in every single case to compare penal frame prescribed
for the aggravating form of criminal offence with the one that court disposes with in the case of concurrence of criminal offence of associating for the purpose of committing a criminal offence and basic
form of criminal offence committed in a group or criminal organization. If for such concurrence a
higher penal frame is reached than for the aggravated form it would be unjustifiable to punish only the
aggravated form which in that case could mean that the aggravated form is advantageous for the perpetrator, which certainly is not ratio legis. In this case it would be right to take concurrence of aggravating form of criminal offence committed in a group or criminal organization and criminal offence of
associating for the purpose to commit criminal offences. The opposite is advisable if for the described
concurrence a lower framework is reached than for the aggravated form because in that case the aggravated for itself ensures the desired aggravation of penalty. The application of concurrence would
21
be excessive.
Among possible perpetrators of a criminal offence in Art. 333 of the CC the legislator has not included individuals who are not members of a group or criminal organization though they support
(occasionally or continuously) its activity by multipurpose logistic support. Their activities can be
22
legally marked as aiding and abetting within the very association organization.
The possibility for the punishment to be remitted is connected with a legal figure of so called active
repentance. The valid solution in Art. 333 paragraph 5 of the CC is considered insufficient since the
stimulative measure in form of obligatory remission is connected only with the conduct of the group
members or members of the criminal organization who still has not committed any criminal offence. It
is emphasized that remission is possible in case that a group or organization is dissolve prior to the
perpetration of some criminal offence or in case when a member voluntarily leaves, uncovers the
preparation of the perpetration of criminal offence on time etc. Besides, it is criticized that no special
privileges are foreseen for the organizer, since he can most strongly affect that the group or criminal
23
organization seize their activities.
Article 187 of the CC regulates associating for the purpose of committing criminal offences against
the values protected by international law: « (1) Whoever organizes a group of people or in some other
way connects three or more persons in common action for the purpose of committing the criminal
20
Ibid., pp. 392-394.
Cf. Novoselec, Organized crime – issues of criminal justice incriminations of illicit conducts, CJCLP 2/1998, p.
776.
22
Thus, e.g. Bačić, the same as note 16, p. 462, who suggests solutions based on Swiss and German model.
23
Ibid., p. 463.
21
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24
offences referred to in Articles 156, 158, 159, 160, 169-172, 174, 179 and 181 of this Code shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than 3 years. (2) Whoever becomes a member of the group
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to five
years. (3) The perpetrator of the criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article who, by
timely uncovering the group, prevents the perpetration of the criminal offences referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to three years, but the punishment may also be remitted. (4) The punishment shall be remitted for a member of the group who
uncovers the group prior to having committed the criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article.»
Criminal offences with elements of terrorism have been covered by the mentioned provision. Without
a separate provision the associating for perpetration of these criminal offences would be punishable
according to Art. 333 of the CC but by prescribing a separate criminal offence the legislator wished to
emphasize special danger of associating for perpetration of criminal offences from Chapter XIII. This
criminal offence is a special form of offence from Art. 333 of the CC. It has a character of autonomous criminal offence of preparation and is independent of the criminal offence that derives from it.
Therefore the concurrence of criminal offence of associating for the purpose of committing criminal
offences from Chapter XIII and criminal offences committed within an organized group of people e.g.
international terrorism from Art. 169 of the CC is possible. Punishable is only intentional associating.
The perpetrator must be aware that associating came into being for the purpose of perpetration some
25
of the criminal offences mentioned in Art. 187 paragraph 1 of the CC.
4. Criminal liability of legal persons in the Republic of Croatia is regulated by the Law on Liability of
26
Legal Persons for Criminal Offences which came into force on 25 March, 2004. It determines the
prerequisites of punishability, criminal-law sanctions and criminal procedure for criminal offences of
legal persons. It prescribes subsidiary application of the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Act and
Law on Office for Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime (Art. 2). The model of derivative liability of the legal person from the guilt of the liable person, from which logically the model of cumulative liability of the individual and legal person derives. According to Art 3 paragraph 1 of the mentioned Law «legal person shall be punished for the criminal offences of the liable person if this harms
some duties of the legal person or by which the legal person realized or should have realized illegal
gain for itself or others». The Law does not limit the circle of criminal offences for which legal person
27
can be punished but it is still limited by the conditions of Art. 3 paragraph 1. Legal persons can
commit severe criminal offences especially in the field of economic crime. The participation in organized crime and terrorism should not be excluded. The punishment of dissolving a legal person, according to Art. 12, can be inflicted if the legal person had been founded for the reason of committing
criminal offences or it used its activities mostly to perpetrate criminal offences. These prerequisites
indicate that that punishment aims at criminal organizations or groups to whom the status of a legal
28
person serves only as a facade.
5. The Croatian CC does not include any special provisions on glorification of terrorism, ideological
proselytism or other ways to bring the ideas on perpetration of terrorist criminal offences approachable to the public.
24
It is about the following criminal offences: genocide, war crimes (against the civilian population, the wounded
and sick and prisoners of war), international terrorism, endangering the safety of internationally protected persons, taking of hostages, misuse of nuclear materials, racial and other discrimination, hijacking an aircraft or a
ship, and endangering the safety of international air traffic and maritime navigation.
25
Cf. Derenčinović, in: Special part of Criminal Law (ed. by Novoselec), Zagreb, 2007, p. 143.
26
Law on Liability of Legal Persons for Criminal Offences, The Official Gazette 151/03.
27
More on that Đurđević, Comments on the Law on Liability of Legal Persons for Criminal Offences, Zagreb,
2005, pp. 33-42.
28
Cf. Novoselec, the same as note 4, p. 522.
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The CC, however, incriminates particular conducts that can be influential on perpetration of different
criminal offences, including terrorism. Some parts of the legal provision on criminal offence of racial
and other discrimination from Art. 174 paragraphs 3 and 4 of the CC should be pointed out and read
as follows: « (3) Whoever with an aim to spread racial, religious, sexual, national, ethnic hatred or
hatred based on the color of the skin of sexual orientation or other features, or with an aim to humiliate, publicly expresses or spreads the ideas of superiority and inferiority on the basis of one race, ethnic or religious community, sex, nations or idea of the superiority of one race over another on the
basis of the color of the skin, sexual orientation or other features shall be punished by imprisonment
for three months to five years. (4) Whoever with an aim referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article
through computer system or some other way makes accessible to public materials by which the criminal offence of genocide or crime against humanity is denied, diminished, approved of or justified,
shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to three years.» This does not eliminate the issue of
criminalization of terrorism apologia de lege ferenda.
The issue is a delicate one when it comes to if and how to punish public call to perpetration (yet indefinite) terrorist criminal offences (public provocation) or general provision on instigation (including
the possibility of punishment for unsuccessful instigation) will suffice. The obligation to solve this
problem stands before the Republic of Croatia regarding the fact that it signed the Council of Europe
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005. It is necessary to set clear criteria under which
the state has right to limit the freedom of expression in fighting terrorism. The starting point should,
first of all, be the possibility of limitation the rights to freedom of expression according to Art. 10 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and take into
consideration the past practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The use of offensive language
in criticizing authorities does not necessarily mean call to terrorism or other violence.
6. Prescribed penal scope for criminal offence of international terrorism is undoubtedly severe. It
stands to reason considering the danger of terrorist criminal offences. The basic form of the offence
from Art.169 paragraph 1 of the CC framed as an endangering delict is prescribed by the penal scope
of imprisonment for five to fifteen years which is prescribed for murder (Art. 90 of the CC). Up to the
last novel of the CC of 2006 a special minimum of the prescribed imprisonment for international terrorism had been three years. The aggravated form in Art. 169 paragraph 3 of the CC (when by the
perpetration of the basic offence of international terrorism the perpetrator kills one or more persons
intentionally) is prescribed by alternative penal scope of imprisonment for ten to fifteen years or longterm imprisonment for twenty to forty years. This corresponds to prescribed punishment for aggravated murder in Art. 91 of the CC.
The prescribed severity of the punishment was significantly increased by the novel of 2006 for international terrorism with severe consequences that must be covered by perpetrator's negligence from
Art. 169 paragraph 4 of the CC (when perpetration of the basic offence causes death of one or more
persons or severe destruction). Instead of the up-to-then scope of imprisonment for five to fifteen
years the novel has doubled a special minimum so that the currently prescribed punishment is impris29
onment for ten to fifteen years. The comparison of penal scopes prescribed for association for the
purpose of committing terrorist criminal offences in Art. 187 of the CC (for an organizer and members
of the association) as an autonomous criminal offence and penal scopes prescribed for the preparation
of terrorist criminal offences (preparatory acts as non-autonomous criminal offences ) shows that
29
Increasing the severeness of the repression prescribed by the law is the basic feature of the mentioned novel.
With a relatively great number of criminal offences special minimums of prescribed punishments have increased
and legal provisions on punishment mitigation are changed in a way that current mitigation possibilities are limited. Repression increase by which the idea of retribution and the so called positive general prevention are brought
to the fore is justified, besides others, by the research results of the penal policy of Croatian courts which show
that inflicted penalties stand at the lower third of the prescribed penal scopes. Cf. Bojanić/Mrčela, The Purpose of
Punishment in the Context of the 6th Novel of the Criminal Code, CJCLP 2/2006, pp. 431-449.
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threat by punishment for members of the association (imprisonment for six months to five years) and
undertaking preparatory acts by which conditions are set for direct perpetration of a criminal offence
(imprisonment for one to five years) are almost identical. Within the criminal offence of associating in
purpose of committing the criminal offences the prescribed penal scope for organizers stands out
significantly: imprisonment for three to fifteen years. By acting so the legislator has clearly indicated
who is considered to be the central figure of the action that is characterized as international terrorism.
This could bring up discussion on whether this is exaggerated concerning the stage of preparation and
that the participation of the organizer at this stage does not exclude concurrence with subsequently
committed offences. The question of (dis)proportion of prescribed punishments for activities realized
at preparatory stage is significant for assessment of whether in a particular legal system the features of
30
so called criminal law for enemies (Feindstrafrecht) exist. As for the range of penal scope it can be
noted that the requirements for punishment determination are met to lesser extent whereas the principle of individualization of punishing are met to greater extent, which in these cases is necessary, especially in reference to the possibilities of participation of more organizers at different hierarchical levels.
6.1. Possible privileges for organizers and members of the association in cases of the so called active
repentance and application of general regulations on voluntary abandonment of participants have been
previously discussed. Perpetrator's conduct after having committed the criminal offence is one of the
circumstances that are taken into consideration when inflicting the punishment as aggravating or mitigating. Referring to this the Croatian Criminal Code in Art 56 paragraph 2 emphasizes the relation
towards the injured party and compensation for damage caused by criminal offence. In this context
possible perpetrator's conciliation with the victim or compensation for the damage can have the significance of mitigating circumstance which within other relevant circumstances for inflicting the punishment will influence that the punishment within the range of prescribed penal scope reaches a special minimum.
6.2. As for the enforcement of imprisonment it is to be pointed out that in Croatian Enforcement
Criminal Law no special provisions exist that would in any way restrict the rights of prisoners who
committed a terrorist act ( under different conditions and in a different manner than for the perpetrators of other serious criminal offences).
C) Other questions
1. In the Republic of Croatia no special regulations exist on preventive non-penal measures for suppression of terrorism. There are general regulations of preventive character that can contribute to prevention of all criminal offences even the most serious ones e.g. asylum law, acquiring citizenship,
movement and residence of foreign citizens etc.
2. The state has a special responsibility towards victims of terrorism for playing the role of the main
target of terrorist attacks and being the recipient of the messages forwarded through violence over
instrumentalized indirect victims unlike other criminal offences with elements of violence (e.g. murder or rape). In 2005 the Republic of Croatia passed the Law on Responsibility For the Damage
31
Caused by Terrorist Acts and Public Protests. The European Convention on the Compensation of
Victims of Violent Crimes was signed on 7 April, 2005. Main responsibility of the state for the victims of terrorist attacks is not dominant in social solidarity but in correction of omission by the state.
The state is responsible for the damage inflicted upon the victims because it has not taken all necessary measures to prevent such a terrorist attack and the damage done.
30
Cf. Jakobs, Bürgerstrafrecht und Feindstrafrecht, Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung Strafrecht, 3/2004, p. 88
et seq. For the critic of criminal law for enemies from the position of criminal law adjusted to the human being
but not to the enemy without elementary human rights, in the recent literature see e.g. Ambos, Feindstrafrecht,
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, 1/2006, pp. 3-30.
31
Law on Responsibility for the Damage Caused by Terrorist Acts and Public Protests, Official Gazette 117/03.
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The protection of victims is extremely manifested when it comes to the criminal offence of trafficking
in persons and slavery (Art. 175 of the CC) since the victims of this criminal offence are more vulner32
33
34
able than others and need more help. The Law on Foreign Citizens and the Law on Asylum
make the basis on which the victims of trafficking are granted temporary residence permit, and the
35
36
Law on Social Protection facilitates aid for the victims. The Law on Protection of Witnesses enables that special protection is granted to the persons who as witnesses testify in criminal procedure
and by giving their statements help to suppress organized crime.
D) Reform Proposals
In the Republic of Croatia there have not been special doctrinal or jurisprudential stances which could
raise the problem of compatibility of penal provisions on preparatory acts and participation in very
serious criminal offences with the protection of fundamental human rights acknowledged in international legal documents and the Croatian constitution. Although there is a need for further harmonizing
Croatian criminal legislation with international conventions related to terrorism (e.g. recruitment and
training of terrorists, regulation of terrorist apology), concrete reform suggestions have not been made
neither are they discussed in the parliament.
E) Final Remarks
Terrorist attacks endanger and harm fundamental human rights but state reaction to these attacks can
also bear such features. Any overstressing of the need to build up the system of national (collective)
security is a threat to the concept of human rights and is therefore in the atmosphere of «global war
against terrorism by all means» necessary to set the right measure in order to ensure this security and
37
respect of fundamental human rights. Situation de lege lata shows that punishment of preparatory
acts and relatively broad circle of participants are saved only for the most severe criminal offences and
in this sense Croatian substantive criminal law has succeeded to a satisfactory extent in balancing the
undisputable need for suppression and prevention of these criminal offences, realization of the basic
principles of criminal law (criminal law intervention as ultima ratio societatis, the principle of determination of criminal offences and sanctions, the principle of individual culpability, the principle of
38
individualization and proportionality of punishment etc.) and the request for respect of fundamental
human rights. It is expected that the Croatian legislator will act in the same way de lege ferenda.
32
Cf. Turković, in: Special Part of the Criminal Code (ed. by Novoselec), Zagreb, 2007, pp. 140.
Law on Foreign Citizens, The Official Gazette 109/03.
34
Law on Asylum, The Official Gazette 103/03.
35
Law on Social Protection, The Official Gazette 27/01, 59/01, 82/01.
36
Law on Protection of Witnesses, The Official Gazette 163/03.
37
Cf. Derenčinović, Mankind in the 21st Century Faced With the Threat of International Terrorism, in Essays on
Terrorism and Antiterrorism, Zagreb, 2005, p. 348.
38
For an instructive review and standpoints related to problem of realisation of the most mentioned principles on
international level in the recent literature see e.g. Weigend, The Universal Terrorist, The International Community
Grappling with a Definition, Journal of International Criminal Justice 4/2006, pp. 912-932.
33
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Coloquio Preparatorio del XVIII Congreso Internacional de Derecho Penal
A Coruña (España), 5-8 septiembre 2007
Sección I - Derecho penal. Parte General
“La expansión de las formas preparatorias y de participación”
ESPAÑA*
Carlos MARTÍNEZ-BUJÁN PÉREZ**
A.Cuestiones generales
1. Repaso de las manifestaciones del fenómeno de la globalización a nivel penal interno
En el Código español tales manifestaciones pueden verse especialmente en los siguientes delitos:
delitos relativos a la prostitución y a la corrupción de menores (artículos 187 y ss.), blanqueo de bienes (artículos 301 ss.), tráfico ilegal de trabajadores (artículos 312 y s.), tráfico ilegal de personas
(artículo 318 bis), tráfico ilegal de drogas (artículos 368 y ss.), tenencia de armas (artículos 563 y ss.)
y terrorismo (artículos 571 y ss.).
2. Grandes líneas del régimen jurídico general de los actos preparatorios y de la participación
2.1. Actos preparatorios:
2.1.1. Delimitación respecto de la tentativa
La delimitación entre actos preparatorios y tentativa se sitúa en el inicio de la ejecución del delito, de
conformidad con lo que se dispone en la definición de tentativa en el artículo 16-1 del Código: “Hay
tentativa cuando el sujeto da principio a la ejecución del delito directamente por hechos exteriores
practicando todos o parte de los actos que objetivamente deberían producir el resultado…”.
Por tanto, la línea de delimitación entre actos preparatorios y actos ejecutivos debe trazarse a partir de
la tipicidad, en atención a lo cual el problema de la determinación del principio de la ejecución se
convierte en realidad en el problema de determinar el comienzo de la acción típica definida en la Parte
especial.
Ahora bien, usualmente se admite en doctrina y jurisprudencia la denominada concepción declarativa,
conforme a la cual el comienzo de la acción típica puede tener lugar aunque no se hayan realizado los
actos descritos inmediatamente en el tipo, siendo suficiente que se hayan llevado a cabo otros que
estén ligados a ellos indisolublemente en una unidad de acción.
2.1.2. Actos preparatorios punibles
En los arts. 17 y 18 del Código se regulan tres actos preparatorios genéricos: la conspiración, proposición y provocación para delinquir.
“La conspiración existe cuando dos o más personas se conciertan para la ejecución de un delito y
resuelven ejecutarlo” (art. 17-1).
“La proposición existe cuando el que ha resuelto cometer un delito invita a otra u otras personas a
ejecutarlo” (art. 17-2).
“La provocación existe cuando directamente se incita por medio de la imprenta, la radiodifusión o
cualquier otro medio de eficacia semejante, que facilite la publicidad, o ante una concurrencia de
personas, a la perpetración de un delito” (art. 18-1).
*
Nota importante : El texto publicado es la última versión original del Informe nacional enviado por el autor, sin
que se haya podido someter a revisión editorial por parte de la Revue.
**
Catedrático de Derecho penal. Facultad de Derecho. Universidad de A Coruña.
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Dentro del propio art. 18-1 se incluye la apología, que se considera, por tanto, “como una forma de
provocación”, y “sólo será delictiva si por su naturaleza y circunstancias constituye una incitación
directa a cometer un delito”. Por lo demás, existe una definición legal de apología a los efectos del
Código penal: “la exposición, ante una concurrencia de personas o por cualquier otro medio de difusión, de ideas o doctrinas que ensalcen el crimen o enaltezcan a su autor”.
2.1.3. Campo de aplicación
Los actos preparatorios punibles sólo se castigan en los casos en que el Código penal lo prevea expresamente en la Parte especial (cfr. art. 17-3 para la conspiración y la proposición, y art. 18-2 para la
provocación), previsión que se circunscribe a determinadas figuras de delito en las que la importancia
de los bienes jurídicos justifica un adelantamiento de la línea de intervención penal, como v. gr., sucede en el homicidio (art. 141), en las lesiones dolosas (art. 151) o en las detenciones ilegales (art. 168).
En el ámbito de los delitos relacionados con el fenómeno de la globalización, los actos preparatorios
se castigan en el delito de blanqueo de bienes (art. 304), en el de tráfico de drogas (art. 373), en el de
asociaciones ilícitas (art. 519) y en el de terrorismo (art. 579).
Con todo, y sin perjuicio de lo anterior hay que tener en cuenta además que en algunas figuras delictivas de la Parte especial se tipifican expresamente como delitos autónomos actos preparatorios específicos, en los cuales no hay un efectivo peligro para el bien jurídico y en los que materialmente no cabe
identificar, por tanto, un principio de ejecución. Así sucede, v. gr., en el tipo del art. 270-3, en el que
se castigan hechos que constituyen simples conductas preparatorias de ataque a los derechos de propiedad intelectual y que, de no estar expresamente previstas, serían actos preparatorios impunes:
“quien fabrique, importe, ponga en circulación o tenga cualquier medio específicamente destinado a
facilitar…”. Y algo análogo cabe predicar de algunas de las conductas tipificadas en el delito del art.
273-1, en materia de propiedad industrial.
Por último, en el caso de la provocación existe una previsión específica que permite que este acto
preparatorio “se castigue como inducción” cuando “a la provocación hubiese seguido la perpetración
del delito” (art. 18-2, párrafo 2º).
2.1.4. Penas aplicables
La conspiración, la proposición y la provocación para delinquir se castigan en todos los casos con una
pena inferior en uno o dos grados a la señalada para el correspondiente delito consumado.
Según dispone el art. 70-1-2ª, “la pena inferior en grado se formará partiendo de la cifra mínima señalada para el delito de que se trate y deduciendo de ésta la mitad de su cuantía, constituyendo el resultado de tal deducción su límite mínimo”.
2.2. Participación:
2.2.1. Tratamiento del concurso de personas en la comisión de la infracción
El art. 27 del Código señala que “son responsables criminalmente de los delitos y faltas los autores y
los cómplices”.
La categoría del autor en sentido estricto aparece recogida en el párrafo 1º del art. 28, incluyendo
explícitamente la coautoría y la autoría mediata: “son autores quienes realizan el hecho por sí solos,
conjuntamente o por medio de otro del que se sirven como instrumento”.
Pero además en el párrafo 2º del propio art. 28 se incluyen dos formas de participación en el hecho
realizado por otro: la inducción y la cooperación necesaria. Ahora bien, la peculiaridad del Código
español reside en “considerar” como autores a los inductores y a los cooperadores necesarios: “También serán considerados autores: a) Los que inducen directamente a otro u otros a ejecutarlo.-b) Los
que cooperen a la ejecución del hecho con actos anteriores o simultáneos”.
En suma, el Código español emplea, pues, en dos sentidos diferentes la palabra “autor”: en un sentido
estricto, que coincide con el concepto doctrinal del que realiza el hecho como propio; en un sentido
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amplio, que incluye a partícipes especialmente importantes en el hecho de otro (el inductor y el cooperador necesario).
La complicidad se regula en el art. 29: “Son cómplices los que, no hallándose comprendidos en el
artículo anterior (scil., los cooperadores necesarios) cooperan a la ejecución del hecho con actos anteriores o simultáneos”.
En el Código español existe además una regulación específica de la autoría y la participación en los
casos en que los delitos y faltas “se cometan utilizando medios o soportes de difusión mecánicos” (art.
30).
Y existe también una cláusula de extensión de la autoría en el caso de las actuaciones en lugar de otro
en los supuestos de delitos especiales propios (art. 31).
2.2.2. Régimen y sanción de los actos de participación
Al inductor y al cooperador necesario se les impone la misma pena que al autor en sentido estricto
(cfr. arts. 28 y 61). En concreto, el art. 61 dispone: “Cuando la Ley establece una pena, se entiende
que la impone a los autores de la infracción consumada”.
Al cómplice se le impone “la pena inferior en grado a la fijada por la Ley para los autores del mismo
delito” (art. 63).
Sobre la “pena inferior en grado”, vid. supra 2.1.4.
3. Preparación y participación en relación con el terrorismo y otras formas muy graves de criminalidad:
3.1. ¿Existen en su ordenamiento jurídico definiciones normativas y categorías específicas de actos de
“terrorismo” y de otras formas muy graves de criminalidad? ¿Son conformes o están armonizadas con
las definiciones internacionales?
No existe en el Ordenamiento español una definición expresa de terrorismo. Esta ausencia de definición no resulta inconstitucional, dado que, según ha declarado el Tribunal Constitucional, la legislación española se inserta en un Ordenamiento que proporciona datos suficientes para la determinación
clara y precisa de la noción de terrorismo, lo cual satisface el principio de tipicidad penal (Sentencia
89/1993, de 12 de marzo).
Por tanto, el concepto dogmático, jurídico-penal, de terrorismo debe obtenerse mediante una interpretación sistemática de la regulación que lleva a cabo el Código penal (en la sección 2ª del capítulo V
del título XXII del libro II, cuya rúbrica es “De los delitos de terrorismo”, arts. 571 ss.) y de su desarrollo jurisprudencial.
De esta regulación se infiere que el elemento conceptual básico es un elemento teleológico o finalístico: “la finalidad de subvertir el orden constitucional o alterar gravemente la paz pública”.
3.2. ¿Cómo se presentan y distinguen los elementos constitutivos (o diferenciales) de estos delitos
específicos respecto de los delitos comunes? ¿En cuanto al tipo objetivo? ¿En cuento al dolo, elementos subjetivos del injusto?
Según se puede inferir ya de la respuesta a la pregunta anterior, el elemento constitutivo (o diferencial) de los delitos de terrorismo respecto de los delitos comunes reside en la presencia de un elemento
subjetivo del injusto, integrado por la citada “finalidad de subvertir el orden constitucional o alterar
gravemente la paz pública”.
3.3. En particular, ¿la norma que tipifica la infracción o la circunstancia agravante exige de manera
explícita que el autor actúe persiguiendo una finalidad específica?
En efecto, la norma básica en materia de terrorismo, esto es, el tipo básico relativo a la comisión de
actos “perteneciendo a” o “colaborando con banda armada”, contenido en el art. 571, incluye explícitamente la aludida “finalidad de subvertir el orden constitucional o alterar gravemente la paz pública”.
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Los restantes delitos (tipos derivados) se remiten al citado art. 571 a los efectos de exigir también este
elemento subjetivo del injusto (cfr. arts. 572 a 576).
Asimismo, el delito definido en el art. 577 (doctrinalmente calificado como “terrorismo urbano” o
“terrorismo individual”, puesto que se caracteriza por que el sujeto activo no pertenece a banda armada o a organización terrorista) requiere la mencionada “finalidad de subvertir el orden constitucional o
alterar gravemente la paz pública”.
B) Características de la expansión de las formas de preparación y de participación
1. ¿Se ha dado una expansión de las formas de preparación y de participación (por ejemplo, en cuanto
a los delitos de terrorismo u otras formas muy graves de criminalidad)?
Sí, en el sentido que se explica en las respuestas a las preguntas que se enumeran a continuación.
1.1. Los simples actos preparatorios, como la incitación o la provocación no seguida de la realización
del delito, ¿se castigan como delito autónomo o, eventualmente, por la vía de la conspiracy?
Según se señaló ya supra en la pregunta A-2.1.3., el terrorismo es efectivamente una de las figuras
delictivas en las que se castigan los actos preparatorios, y, entre ellos, la provocación. En concreto, el
art. 579 castiga “la conspiración, la proposición y la provocación para cometer los delitos de terrorismo previstos en los artículos 571 a 578”, y lo hace con “la pena inferior en uno o dos grados a la que
corresponda, respectivamente, a los hechos previstos en los artículos anteriores”.
Con todo, conviene subrayar que el Código español contiene dos clases de lo que vulgarmente podemos denominar “incitación”, esto es, la “proposición para delinquir”, de un lado, y la “provocación
para delinquir”, de otro.
En concreto, según la definición del art. 17-2, “la proposición existe cuando el que ha resuelto cometer un delito invita a otra u otras personas a ejecutarlo”. Según el art. 18-1, “la provocación existe
cuando directamente se incita por medio de la imprenta, la radiodifusión o cualquier otro medio de
eficacia semejante, que facilite la publicidad, o ante una concurrencia de personas, a la perpetración de
un delito”.
Por lo demás, hay que recordar que en materia de terrorismo es aplicable también la norma general
contenida en el art. 18-2, párrafo 2º, en virtud de la cual cuando “a la provocación hubiese seguido la
perpetración del delito” el hecho “se castigará como inducción”.
1.2. ¿Existen, en particular, incriminaciones específicas –y, eventualmente, cuando se hayan introducido- que castigan de manera autónoma actividades específicas como el reclutamiento, el entrenamiento, la fabricación o la posesión de documentos falsos, la fabricación, la posesión o la adquisición
de explosivos o de armas, etc. que se producen adicionalmente a la ejecución efectiva de actos de
terrorismo o realización del objetivo criminal?
En la sección dedicada a los delitos de terrorismo existen dos incriminaciones específicas de estas
características.
a) La primera de ellas se incluye en el art. 573 y va referida a “armas o municiones”, así como a “sustancias o aparatos explosivos, inflamables, incendiarios o asfixiantes, o sus componentes”.
En el caso de “armas o municiones” se tipifica la actividad de “depósito”, que es una conducta que
aparece definida en el art. 567, en el que se distingue entre “depósito de armas de guerra” y “depósito
de armas químicas o biológicas”, de un lado, y “depósito de armas de fuego reglamentadas”, de otro
lado. Las acciones que se tipifican son, respectivamente, “la fabricación, la comercialización (comprendiendo tanto la adquisición como la venta) y la tenencia”, de un lado, y “la fabricación, la comercialización o reunión de cinco o más de dichas armas”, de otro lado.
En el caso de “sustancias o aparatos explosivos, inflamables, incendiarios o asfixiantes, o sus componentes” se tipifican las conductas de “tenencia, depósito, fabricación, tráfico, transporte o suministro
de cualquier forma, y la mera colocación o empleo de tales sustancias o de los medios o artificios
adecuados”.
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Este artículo 573 se aplica cuando los hechos citados “sean cometidos por quienes pertenezcan, actúen
al servicio o colaboren con las bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas descritos en los
artículos 571 y 572”.
b) La segunda incriminación específica se incluye en el art. 574, que dispone: “Los que perteneciendo,
actuando al servicio o colaborando con bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas, cometan
cualquier otra infracción con alguna de las finalidades expresadas en el artículo 571, serán castigados
con la pena señalada al delito o falta ejecutados en su mitad superior”.
Se trata, pues, de una norma que permite imponer una pena agravada a cualquier delito tipificado en la
Parte especial del Código penal, siempre que su realización hubiese sido acompañada por el citado
elemento subjetivo del injusto característico del delito de terrorismo: “la finalidad de subvertir el orden constitucional o alterar gravemente la paz pública”.
Pues bien, con respecto a ello, hay que mencionar la norma descrita en el art. 400, incluida en el título
XVIII, relativo a las falsedades. En dicho artículo se indica: “La fabricación o tenencia de útiles, materiales, instrumentos, sustancias, máquinas, programas de ordenador o aparatos, específicamente
destinados a la comisión de los delitos descritos en los capítulos anteriores, se castigarán con la pena
señalada en cada caso para los autores”.
Así las cosas, la puesta en relación del art. 574 con el art. 400 posibilita castigar con pena agravada las
conductas de fabricación o posesión de toda clase de aparatos destinados a la comisión de cualquiera
de los delitos de falsedad (de moneda, de efectos timbrados o de documentos).
La anticipación de la línea de punibilidad y la exasperación de la pena no pueden ser más significativas: por una parte, el art. 400 permite imponer las penas previstas para los autores de un delito de
falsedad a quien realiza un acto meramente preparatorio (fabricación o la tenencia), acto que, de no
existir este precepto específico, resultaría impune; por otra parte, el art. 574 le asigna la pena “en su
mitad superior”, cuando concurra el elemento finalístico o teleológico propio del terrorismo.
1.3. ¿Existen otras tipificaciones de formas preparatorias y/o accesorias en relación con la comisión de
estos delitos?
Efectivamente, existe otro precepto en el Código que, de forma análoga a lo que sucede en el art. 574,
recurre a la técnica de agravar la comisión de delitos comunes (en este caso los delitos contra el patrimonio), siempre que concurra un ánimo de favorecer las finalidades de las organizaciones terroristas.
Se trata del art. 575, que dice: “Los que, con el fin de allegar fondos a las bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas señalados anteriormente, o con el propósito de favorecer sus finalidades,
atentaren contra el patrimonio, serán castigados con la pena superior en grado a la que correspondiere
por el delito cometido, sin perjuicio de las que proceda imponer conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo
siguiente por el acto de colaboración”.
Con respecto a este inciso final (“sin perjuicio de …”), conviene resaltar que el legislador español
admite expresamente el concurso de delitos entre esta figura del art. 575 y la figura contenida en el art.
576, en el que se tipifica el delito de colaboración con banda armada, al que me referiré infra en al
apartado B-2.
Aquí baste con subrayar que la admisión del concurso de delitos entre la figura del art. 575 y la del
576 supone una vulneración del principio non bis in idem, puesto que si la voluntad de favorecer las
finalidades de las organizaciones terroristas forma parte del contenido de injusto de la figura patrimonial agravada del art. 575, ello obedece a que la infracción patrimonial que se comete supone ya un
acto de colaboración.
1.4. ¿Hay casos en los que un mismo individuo puede ser perseguido y castigado en razón de la realización de uno de los actos preparatorios (por ejemplo, el “reclutamiento”) y también en razón de la
realización de uno de los delitos a los que el acto preparatorio sirve (por ejemplo, “ejecución de un
acto de terrorismo”)? Y, eventualmente, ¿también por el delito de asociación o de pertenencia a un
grupo terrorista o criminal que persiguen el mismo fin (infra B-3)?.
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No existe en el Código español un delito de “reclutamiento”. Sí existe, en cambio, un delito de asociación ilícita referida a “bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas” (art. 515-2º), al que me
referiré infra en el apartado B-3.
Con respecto a este último delito, hay que reconocer que la doctrina y jurisprudencia dominantes
admiten efectivamente que un mismo individuo pueda ser castigado por el delito de pertenencia a un
grupo terrorista del art. 515 y además por el acto de terrorismo (de los arts. 571 y ss.) que lleve a cabo.
La asociación ilícita es autónoma e independiente del delito o delitos que a través de ella se cometan,
en virtud de lo cual siempre cabrá apreciar un concurso de delitos.
1.5. ¿Hay reglas o condiciones especiales para la toma en consideración, en el plano penal, de la tentativa en estos ámbitos de la criminalidad?
No hay reglas especiales en materia de tentativa.
2. ¿Hay reglas o condiciones especiales para la toma en consideración, en el plano penal, de la participación en el delito o para la sanción de la complicidad en estos campos de la criminalidad?
No hay reglas especiales propiamente dichas en materia de participación, diferentes de las reglas generales previstas para los delitos comunes.
Lo que sí existe es un delito autónomo de colaboración con banda armada u organización terrorista,
tipificado en el art. 576, que supone elevar a la categoría de delito independiente lo que materialmente
son actos de cooperación necesaria o complicidad con tales organizaciones. Expondré su contenido
infra en el apartado B-2.4.
También existe, según indiqué anteriormente, una norma especial que castiga la conspiración, la proposición y la provocación para delinquir, incluida en el art. 579. A ella me refiero a continuación en el
apartado B-2.2.
2.1.
No procede.
2.2. El simple acuerdo o la simple incitación no seguida de la comisión del delito ¿son punibles como
delitos autónomos o eventualmente como conspiracy? ¿en todo caso, o sólo en los delitos terroristas u
otras formas muy graves de criminalidad?
Como ya apunté supra en el apartado B.1.1., el terrorismo es una de las figuras delictivas en las que se
castigan los actos preparatorios (art. 579), en concreto, “la conspiración, la proposición y la provocación para cometer los delitos de terrorismo previstos en los artículos 571 a 578”.
Por tanto, el “simple acuerdo” será punible en la medida en que exista una “conspiración para delinquir”, cuyo concepto se halla en el art. 17-1 del Código: “La conspiración existe cuando dos o más
personas se conciertan para la ejecución de un delito y resuelven ejecutarlo”.
Por su parte, la “simple incitación no seguida de la comisión del delito” será punible en la medida en
que suponga una “proposición para delinquir” o una “provocación para delinquir”. Según la definición
del art. 17-2, “la proposición existe cuando el que ha resuelto cometer un delito invita a otra u otras
personas a ejecutarlo”. Según el art. 18-1, “la provocación existe cuando directamente se incita por
medio de la imprenta, la radiodifusión o cualquier otro medio de eficacia semejante, que facilite la
publicidad, o ante una concurrencia de personas, a la perpetración de un delito”.
Como ya señalé supra en el apartado A-2.1.2., los actos preparatorios punibles sólo se castigan en los
casos en que el Código penal lo prevea expresamente en la Parte especial, previsión que se circunscribe a determinadas figuras de delito en las que la importancia de los bienes jurídicos justifica un adelantamiento de la línea de intervención penal.
2.3. ¿Existen a nivel procesal (o a través de la propia tipificación) formas de presunción o de simplificación de la prueba de la participación?
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No existen en el ámbito procesal formas de presunción o de simplificación de la prueba de la participación.
Lo único que debe ser destacado en este punto es que, desde la perspectiva sustantiva, el art. 576 tipifica como delito autónomo de colaboración con banda armada (castigado con penas muy severas) una
amplísima gama de conductas de participación, que pueden consistir en actos de cooperación necesaria o de simple complicidad.
A este delito del art. 576 me refiero a continuación en el siguiente apartado.
2.4. ¿Se prevé la punición explícita de las conductas previas o colaterales, como el apoyo, asistencia,
ayuda “externa” (por parte de personas no asociadas o a través de contribuciones socialmente adecuadas, por ejemplo por parte de un abogado, médico…) en las actividades y asociaciones constitutivas
de formas muy graves de criminalidad o respecto de los autores individuales?
El citado art. 576 castiga como delito autónomo, con pena de prisión de cinco a diez años y multa, a
quien “lleve a cabo, recabe o facilite, cualquier acto de colaboración con las actividades o las finalidades de una banda armada, organización o grupo terrorista” (apartado 1).
En el apartado 2 del referido precepto el legislador ofrece una enumeración, puramente ejemplificativa, de actos de colaboración, dado que finaliza con una cláusula general que extiende esta caracterización a “cualquier otra forma equivalente de cooperación, ayuda o mediación, económica o de otro
género, con las actividades de las citadas bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas”. Los
actos de colaboración que se mencionan expresamente a título de ejemplo son: “la información o
vigilancia de personas, bienes o instalaciones; la construcción, el acondicionamiento, la cesión o la
utilización de alojamientos o depósitos; la ocultación o traslado de personas vinculadas a las bandas
armadas organizaciones o grupos terroristas; la organización de prácticas de entrenamiento o la asistencia a ellas”.
La doctrina ha criticado la extraordinaria amplitud del precepto, que no respeta el principio de seguridad y certeza jurídicas. Eso sí, hay coincidencia en interpretar que queda excluido de este delito el
simple apoyo o respaldo moral.
Por lo demás, hay que tener en cuenta que el delito del art. 576 es, obviamente, aplicable a sujetos que
no pertenecen a la organización criminal, dado que éstos quedan englobados en el delito de asociación
ilegal del art. 515.
Por último, además del art. 576, cabe mencionar el delito del art. 577, al que ya se aludió supra en el
apartado A.3.3., doctrinalmente calificado como “terrorismo urbano” o “terrorismo individual”, que
castiga la comisión de determinados delitos comunes (como, v.gr., homicidio, lesiones, detenciones
ilegales), si van acompañados de alguna de las finalidades que se citan, como señaladamente la “finalidad de subvertir el orden constitucional o alterar gravemente la paz pública”.
3. ¿Existe una infracción de asociación, de organización o grupo “terrorista”, o consagrada a formas
muy graves de criminalidad, aplicable con autonomía respecto del simple acuerdo o concurso en tales
delitos? O bien ¿se aplican las infracciones comunes en materia de asociación criminal, eventualmente
agravadas?
Existe un delito de asociaciones ilícitas en el art. 515. Dentro de él se incluye expresamente el supuesto específico de “las bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas” (nº 2º), supuesto que se
castiga con penas también específicas (en el art. 516), diferentes de las previstas para las restantes
asociaciones ilícitas.
3.1. Si existen infracciones específicas, ¿cómo se identifican esas asociaciones delictivas? ¿Depende,
por ejemplo, de la calidad de los partícipes, de su inscripción en listas predeterminadas a nivel gubernativo u otros, o bien de elementos (objetivos o subjetivos) descritos de manera abstracta por la norma
que tipifica la infracción?
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El Código español no contiene concepto alguno de “bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas”.
La doctrina y la jurisprudencia han ido perfilando tales conceptos, en el sentido que se expone en el
apartado siguiente.
3.2. ¿Cuáles son las condiciones constitutivas y/o especializantes de la asociación calificada de esta
manera?
Con respecto a las “bandas armadas”, doctrina y jurisprudencia mencionan las siguientes notas características: organización, permanencia, número suficientemente relevante de miembros, posesión de
armas de fuego o sustancias o aparatos explosivos o inflamables (en cantidad semejante a la requerida
para el delito de depósito del art. 567) y finalidad de subvertir la seguridad interior del Estado.
Con relación a “las organizaciones o grupos terroristas”, se suele indicar que por tales hay que entender aquellas que tienen por finalidad la realización de “actos terroristas”. Y el concepto de “actos
terroristas” se acostumbra a definir mediante las siguientes notas: 1) actos graves ejecutados por medios especialmente violentos, aptos para producir terror en la población; 2) actos que comportan, al
menos, un peligro para la vida, la integridad o la salud de las personas; 3) actos que tratan de influir
ilegalmente en las tomas de decisión sobre asuntos políticos a través de la amenaza de repetición de
los actos; 4) actos que se hallan dirigidos a subvertir el orden político constituido.
3.3. ¿Hay una diferencia de trato en términos de sanción entre la simple participación y otras conductas más cualificadas (como la constitución, la organización, la dirección, etc.)? ¿Hay reglas o condiciones específicas en cuanto a la responsabilidad de los miembros o de los dirigentes de la asociación
por la ejecución de los delitos cuya realización constituye el objetivo de la asociación delictiva, si no
han participado materialmente en la ejecución?
En cuanto a la primera pregunta, el art. 516 establece un trato diferenciado a efectos de pena entre, por
una parte, “promotores y directores de las bandas armadas y organizaciones terroristas”, así como
“directores de cualquiera de sus grupos” (prisión de ocho a catorce años e inhabilitación de ocho a
quince años), y, por otra parte, simples “integrantes de las citadas organizaciones” (prisión de seis a
doce años e inhabilitación de seis a catorce años).
En cuanto a la segunda pregunta, no existen reglas específicas de esta índole. Por tanto, rigen las reglas generales en materia de autoría y de participación (vid. supra A.2.2.).
4. Las disposiciones y sanciones relativas a la responsabilidad (penal u otra) de las personas jurídicas,
prevista eventualmente por su orden jurídico, ¿se aplican también a la comisión de delitos en materia
de terrorismo y otras formas muy graves de criminalidad? ¿Cuál es la relación entre esta reglamentación y la infracción penal de la asociación o grupo terrorista o criminal (subsidiaria, alternativa, acumulativa, etc.)?
No existe en Derecho español la responsabilidad penal, propiamente dicha, de las personas jurídicas.
El Código español no asigna penas a las personas jurídicas y se limita a fijar para ellas unas medidas,
incluidas con carácter general en el art. 129, entre las denominadas consecuencias accesorias. Estas
medidas se podrán imponer (con carácter potestativo) por el juez o tribunal en los supuestos en que el
Código lo prevea en la Parte especial.
Y precisamente en el art. 520 se dispone que “los jueces o tribunales, en los supuestos previstos en el
artículo 515, acordarán la disolución de la asociación ilícita y, en su caso, cualquier otra de las consecuencias accesorias del artículo 129 de este Código”.
El art. 520 se aplica, pues, a cualquier asociación ilícita de las enumeradas en el art. 515, entre las que
se incluyen –como vimos- “las bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas” (nº 2º). Por tanto,
en tal caso se impondrá la medida de “disolución de la asociación”, sin perjuicio de poder imponer
también alguna de las mencionadas en el art. 129, si fuese procedente.
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Estas consecuencias accesorias no poseen en rigor la naturaleza de verdaderas penas, pero sí cabe
afirmar que son genuinas medidas propias del Derecho penal y no meramente administrativas, en
atención a sus fines preventivos (“estarán orientadas a prevenir la continuidad en la actividad delictiva”, según indica el art. 129) y al órgano judicial que las impone.
Por lo demás, estas consecuencias accesorias (concebidas, pues, como consecuencias accesorias a las
penas) se añaden a las penas que proceda imponer a las personas físicas por el delito de asociación
ilícita.
5. ¿Existen incriminaciones específicas de conductas consistentes en la expresión y/o difusión de ideas
u opiniones relativas al terrorismo, que puedan distinguirse del eventual delito de incitación a la comisión de delitos terroristas o de las otras formas de participación moral o de complicidad en el marco de
estos delitos?
Sí, en el art. 578 se incrimina específicamente un delito de enaltecimiento o justificación de los delitos
de terrorismo, según explico a continuación.
5.1. En particular, la apología, el proselitismo ideológico, la publicación y la difusión de escritos y de
material, entre otros audiovisual o por Internet, la propaganda, etc., ligada al terrorismo, ¿son objeto
de incriminaciones autónomas?
El citado art. 578 castiga “el enaltecimiento o la justificación por cualquier medio de expresión pública o difusión de los delitos comprendidos en los artículos 571 a 577 [scil., los delitos de terrorismo] de
este Código o de quienes hayan participado en su ejecución, o la realización de actos que entrañen
descrédito, menosprecio o humillación de las víctimas de los delitos terroristas o de sus familiares”.
5.2. ¿Cuáles son los elementos típicos objetivos y en materia de dolo y elementos subjetivos del injusto exigidos para que cada uno de estos delitos sea punible? ¿Cuándo se produce la consumación?
El Código español ofrece en el art. 578 un concepto extensivo de apología que contradice abiertamente la regulación de la Parte general, dado que en el art. 18 la apología se define simplemente como “la
exposición … de ideas o doctrinas que ensalcen el crimen o enaltezcan a su autor” y únicamente se
considera delictiva cuando constituye una genuina “forma de provocación” al delito (en el sentido
definido en el art. 18-1: vid. supra A.2.1) “y si por su naturaleza y circunstancias constituye una incitación directa a cometer un delito”.
Frente a esta caracterización general, el art. 578 se contenta con la simple conducta de enaltecer o
justificar los actos terroristas, aunque no exista incitación alguna a cometer un futuro delito.
Por otra parte, obsérvese que el precepto abarca además otra modalidad delictiva diferente: la de realizar actos que entrañen descrédito, menosprecio o humillación de las víctimas.
En ambas figuras delictivas del art. 578 se trata tipos de mera actividad, que no requieren más elementos típicos que los mencionados, ni más elementos objetivos ni tampoco elementos subjetivos. Se
consuman con la realización de la acción de enaltecer o justificar el terrorismo o, en su caso, la de
humillar o menospreciar a las víctimas.
5.3. ¿Qué tratamiento les es aplicable en materia de sanciones, y en comparación con el de otros delitos terroristas y/u otros delitos comunes correspondientes?
Al tratarse de un delito autónomo, la infracción contenida en el art. 578 prevé sus propias sanciones,
sin remisión a norma penal alguna. En concreto, castiga las referidas conductas con la pena de prisión
de uno a dos años. Además el juez podrá (potestativamente) imponer alguna de las medidas privativas
de derechos que se prevén en el art. 57: privación del derecho a residir en determinados lugares, prohibición de aproximarse a la víctima o de comunicarse con ella.
Por otra parte, dada su naturaleza jurídica, el delito del art. 578 puede entrar en concurso de delitos
con cualquiera de los delitos de asociación ilícita o de terrorismo mencionados en los apartados anteriores.
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Puede entrar incluso en concurso de delitos con el delito del art. 510 que castiga con la pena de prisión
de uno a tres años y multa a “los que provocaren a la discriminación, al odio o a la violencia contra
grupos o asociaciones, por motivos racistas, antisemitas u otros referentes a la ideología, religión o
creencias, situación familiar, la pertenencia de sus miembros a una etnia o raza, su origen nacional, su
sexo, orientación sexual, enfermedad o minusvalía”.
5.4. ¿Qué relación tienen y qué problemas pueden suscitar en cuanto a la libertad de opinión y expresión, protegidas por las Cartas internacionales y las constituciones democráticas?
La doctrina dominante critica el tenor literal del art. 578, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la primera
modalidad delictiva (enaltecimiento o justificación del terrorismo), dado que se trata de una evidente
limitación a la libertad de expresión. Un sector doctrinal considera incluso que dicha modalidad debería ser considerada contraria a la Constitución. Y, de hecho, el Tribunal Constitucional español declaró en algunas sentencias la inconstitucionalidad de castigar penalmente el elogio o la defensa de ideas
o la expresión de ideas subjetivas sobre acontecimientos históricos o actuales, en atención a lo cual el
Código penal de 1995 definió restrictivamente la apología en el precepto general del art. 18 en el
sentido ya expuesto. Sin embargo, el Tribunal Constitucional no ha declarado la inconstitucionalidad
del delito del art. 578.
Se critica también la segunda modalidad delictiva (descrédito, menosprecio o humillación de las víctimas), aunque en este caso se reconoce que existe un bien jurídico autónomo digno de protección,
como es la dignidad de las víctimas del terrorismo. Con todo, se objeta que el tipo está redactado con
gran amplitud y que, por ello, debe propugnarse una interpretación restrictiva.
6. ¿Se prevé un tratamiento diferente de las anteriores formas de preparación y de participación en
cuanto a la sanción? ¿Y de qué clase o en qué medida? (tanto desde un punto de vista cualitativo como
cuantitativo de las penas aplicables, eventuales sanciones o medidas accesorias, criterios a utilizar en
la materia, eventuales reglas específicas derogatorias del derecho común)
Las sanciones previstas para las infracciones delictivas de preparación y participación fueron ya expuestas en los apartados anteriores, al describir cada una de las figuras delictivas.
Resumiendo lo ya reflejado en tales apartados, cabe destacar lo siguiente:
a) En lo que atañe a la conspiración, la proposición y la provocación para cometer delitos de terrorismo, el art. 579-1 castiga tales actos con la pena inferior en uno o dos grados a la que correspondería
imponer a los respectivos delitos consumados. Esta regla es la misma que se contiene en el Código
para castigar los restantes supuestos de actos preparatorios, en los casos en que la ley penal expresamente lo prevea.
b) En lo que concierne a las restantes figuras delictivas en las que se tipifican materialmente formas de
preparación y de participación, hay que tener en cuenta que existen dos modalidades diferentes de
tipificación:
1) En unos casos, se trata de delitos plenamente autónomos, que no se remiten a delitos comunes,
como es el delito de depósito de armas o municiones del art. 573 (castigado con una pena de prisión
de seis a diez años), el delito de colaboración con banda armada u organización terrorista del art. 576
(castigado con una pena de prisión de cinco a diez años y multa) o, en fin, el delito de delito de asociaciones ilícitas del art. 515-2º (castigado con las penas específicas del art. 516, ya señaladas más
arriba).
2) En otros casos, la técnica de tipificación consiste en imponer una pena agravada a delitos comunes
tipificados previamente en la Parte especial del Código penal, siempre que concurra un ánimo de
favorecer las finalidades de las organizaciones terroristas. Esto es lo que sucede con el delito del art.
574, en el que “la finalidad de subvertir el orden constitucional o alterar gravemente la paz pública”
permite imponer “la pena señalada al delito o falta ejecutados (scil., de la clase que sea) en su mitad
superior”, cuando este delito o falta hubiesen sido ejecutados por un sujeto que “pertenezca, actúe al
servicio o colabore con bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas”. Y esto es lo que sucede
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también con el delito del art. 575, en el que “el fin de allegar fondos a las bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas señalados anteriormente” o “el propósito de favorecer sus finalidades”
permite castigar los delitos patrimoniales que se realicen “con la pena superior en grado a la que correspondiere por el delito cometido”, sin perjuicio de las penas que proceda imponer por el delito
autónomo de colaboración del art. 576.
Al margen de lo anterior, existe una regla agravatoria específica aplicable a todos los delitos de terrorismo en el art. 579-2, según la cual, a las penas que correspondan conforme a los artículos anteriores,
añade la “pena de inhabilitación absoluta por un tiempo superior entre seis y veinte años al de la duración de la pena de privación de libertad impuesta, en su caso, en la sentencia, atendiendo proporcionalmente a la gravedad del delito, el número de los cometidos y a las circunstancias que concurran en
el delincuente”.
Finalmente, el art. 580 prevé que en los delitos de terrorismo “la condena de un juez o tribunal extranjero será equiparada a las sentencias de los jueces o tribunales españoles a los efectos de aplicación de
la agravante de reincidencia”.
6.1. ¿Qué importancia tiene en la aplicación de las incriminaciones penales mencionadas el desistimiento y/o la eventual indemnización, la actividad reparadora, o bien la reconciliación con la víctima?
El art. 579-3 contiene una norma específica en materia de arrepentimiento activo aplicable a todos los
delitos de terrorismo. Es una norma que otorga al juez la facultad de rebajar la pena de tales delitos
(“podrán imponer la pena inferior en uno o dos grados a la señalada para el delito de que se trate”)
cuando concurran varios requisitos: “cuando el sujeto haya abandonado voluntariamente sus actividades delictivas y se presente a las autoridades confesando los hechos en los que haya participado y
además colabore activamente con éstas para impedir la producción del delito o coadyuve eficazmente
a la obtención de pruebas decisivas para la identificación o captura de otros responsables o para impedir la actuación o el desarrollo de bandas armadas, organizaciones o grupos terroristas a los que haya
pertenecido o con los que haya colaborado”.
A través de este precepto se otorga relevancia, pues, a conductas de arrepentimiento posteriores a la
consumación del delito. No se trata, por tanto, de un desistimiento, sino de un arrepentimiento activo
posterior a la consumación. En este sentido, cabe hablar de una causa parcial de levantamiento o de
anulación de la pena.
No hay otras circunstancias específicas de atenuación. No obstante, puede ser aplicada –como a cualquier otro delito- la circunstancia atenuante genérica definida en el art. 21-5ª: “haber procedido el
culpable a reparar el daño ocasionado a la víctima, o disminuir sus efectos, en cualquier momento del
procedimiento y con anterioridad a la celebración del acto del juicio oral”.
Tampoco hay reglas específicas en materia de desistimiento voluntario de consumar el delito. Por
consiguiente, rige la regla general del art. 16-2, que concede eficacia cuando “se desiste de la ejecución ya iniciada o se impide la producción del resultado”, “sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad en que
se pudiera haber incurrido por los actos ejecutados, si éstos fueren ya constitutivos de otro delito o
falta”.
6.2. ¿Hay cuestiones particulares relativas a la ejecución efectiva de la pena y de las sanciones o medidas, en particular, en lo concerniente al régimen penitenciario, y limitaciones o condiciones particulares para beneficiarse de medidas de aplicación de la pena u otras instituciones favorables al condenado?
Sí. En la Parte general del Código penal existen diversas reglas especiales para la aplicación de las
penas en materia de terrorismo, así como para la concesión de la libertad condicional.
1) En cuanto a lo primero, el art. 76-1-d) establece un límite máximo de cumplimiento efectivo de la
condena de cuarenta años para los delitos de terrorismo “cuando el sujeto haya sido condenado por
dos o más delitos de terrorismo de la sección segunda del capítulo V del título XXII del libro II de este
Código y alguno de ellos esté castigado por la ley con pena de prisión superior a veinte años”. Dentro
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de los supuestos excepcionales de límite máximo de cumplimiento con relación a la regla general (que
es de veinte años), el supuesto del terrorismo es el más gravoso.
Además, según se dispone en los apartados 1 y 2 del art. 78, en el caso descrito en el art. 76-1-d), el
tribunal deberá (preceptivamente) “acordar que los beneficios penitenciarios, los permisos de salida, la
clasificación en tercer grado y el cómputo de tiempo para la libertad condicional se refieran a la totalidad de las penas impuestas en las sentencias”, cuando “la pena a cumplir resulte inferior a la mitad de
la suma total de las impuestas”.
Asimismo, en el apartado 3 del art. 78 se señala que, aunque el juez puede decidir “la aplicación del
régimen general de cumplimiento” de la condena (sin concurre una serie de requisitos que se enumeran), en los delitos de terrorismo o en los delitos cometidos en el seno de organizaciones criminales,
“y atendiendo a la suma total de las penas impuestas, la anterior posibilidad sólo será aplicable: a) al
tercer grado penitenciario, cuando quede por cumplir una quinta parte del límite máximo de cumplimiento de la condena; b) a la libertad condicional, cuando quede por cumplir una octava parte del
límite máximo de cumplimiento de la condena”.
Finalmente, tanto los delitos de terrorismo como los delitos cometidos en el seno de organizaciones
criminales quedan exceptuados de la posibilidad (que concede el art. 36-2-párrafo 2º del código penal)
de acceder al tercer grado penitenciario en los casos de penas de prisión de duración superior a los
cinco años, aunque no se hubiese cumplido la mitad de la pena impuesta. Esta posibilidad se reconoce
con carácter general a todos los demás delitos siempre que el juez de vigilancia así lo admita “previo
pronóstico individualizado y favorable de reinserción social”.
Por otra parte, a la regulación contenida en el Código penal que se acaba de exponer hay que añadir la
previsión incluida en el art. 102-5 del Reglamento penitenciario (Real Decreto 190/1996), según el
cual se clasificarán en el primer grado penitenciario a los reclusos que pertenezcan a organizaciones
delictivas o a bandas armadas, “mientras no muestren signos inequívocos de haberse sustraído a la
disciplina interna de dichas organizaciones o bandas”.
2) En cuanto a la concesión de la libertad condicional propiamente dicha, el art. 90 incluye una disposición específica, referente a los delitos de terrorismo y a los delitos cometidos en el seno de organizaciones criminales, para entender que se cumple el requisito del “pronóstico de reinserción social”.
Existirá este pronóstico “cuando el penado muestre signos inequívocos de haber abandonado los fines
y los medios de la actividad terrorista y además haya colaborado activamente con las autoridades, bien
para impedir la producción de otros delitos por parte de la banda armada, organización o grupo terrorista, bien para atenuar los efectos de su delito, bien para la identificación, captura y procesamiento de
responsables de delitos terroristas, para obtener pruebas o para impedir la actuación o el desarrollo de
las organizaciones o asociaciones a las que haya pertenecido o con las que haya colaborado, lo que
podrá acreditarse mediante una declaración expresa de repudio de sus actividades delictivas y de
abandono de la violencia y una petición expresa de perdón a las víctimas de su delito, así como por los
informes técnicos que acrediten que el preso está realmente desvinculado de la organización terrorista
y del entorno y actividades de asociaciones y colectivos ilegales que la rodean y su colaboración con
las autoridades”.
Por otra parte, el apartado 1 del art. 91 excluye los delitos de terrorismo del régimen privilegiado de
concesión de libertad condicional que en determinados casos el juez de vigilancia puede conceder
cuando el recluso hubiese cumplido sólo las dos terceras partes de su condena (en lugar de las tres
cuartas partes que el art. 90 prevé con carácter general). Asimismo, en el apartado 2 del art. 91 se
dispone que los condenados por delitos de terrorismo tampoco podrán obtener el ulterior beneficio en
la concesión de la libertad condicional, consistente en adelantarla hasta un plazo máximo de noventa
días por cada año transcurrido de cumplimiento efectivo de condena, cuando se hubiese extinguido la
mitad de la condena y se hubiesen cumplido otros requisitos que se enumeran en el precepto.
Por último, los delitos de terrorismo están sometidos también a un régimen especial en materia de
revocación de la libertad condicional. En los apartados 2 y 3 del art. 93 se señala que en caso de revo-
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cación de la libertad condicional el penado reingresará en prisión en el período o grado penitenciario
que corresponda y “cumplirá el tiempo que reste de cumplimiento de la condena con pérdida del tiempo pasado en libertad condicional”. De este modo, se prevé un régimen más gravoso que el general, en
el cual no se pierde el tiempo pasado en libertad condicional (art. 93-1).
3) Al margen de todo lo anterior, existe una Circular de la Dirección general de Instituciones penitenciarias nº 21/1996, de 16 de diciembre, sobre régimen y seguridad y el régimen de cumplimiento derivado de la normativa “FIES”, que establece que los presos terroristas pasan a formar parte del Fichero
de Internos de Especial Seguimiento (FIES), merced al cual se les restringen determinados derechos.
Y hay que tener en cuenta que el régimen especial de cumplimiento de la pena privativa de libertad de
los condenados por delitos de terrorismo es doblemente restrictivo, en la medida en que, dentro de la
Base de datos “FIES”, estos reclusos se incluyen en un fichero específico, previsto para Bandas armadas (los “FIES 3. BA.”). El sistema “FIES” supone la aplicación de unas condiciones de cumplimiento
de la pena privativa de libertad que son mucho más restrictivas que las previstas en el régimen de
ejecución de la pena que por su grado de tratamiento le correspondería al recluso. En concreto, el
sistema “FIES” permite el permanente control y observación directa de todas las comunicaciones
orales, escritas y telefónicas del recluso, con el fin de que la Administración penitenciaria pueda contar con una valiosa información para investigar a bandas armadas en el interior de la cárcel y posibilitar su persecución judicial (vid. además infra la crítica que se expone en el apartado D-1)
C) Otras cuestiones
1. ¿Existen medidas de prevención u otros instrumentos de naturaleza no penal para luchar contra las
actividades y las asociaciones terroristas y otras formas muy graves de criminalidad? En particular,
¿en el caso de extranjeros?
Fuera del ámbito penal cabe destacar la Ley Orgánica 6/2002, de 27 de junio, de Partidos Políticos, en
la que se establece un procedimiento judicial de ilegalización de un partido por dar un apoyo político
real y efectivo a la violencia o el terrorismo, con independencia del procedimiento que se prevé en el
Código penal para disolver las asociaciones ilícitas por las causas expresadas en sus artículos 515 y
520.
En concreto, en el artículo 9 de dicha Ley se enumeran de forma muy pormenorizada las conductas
que pueden dar lugar a la declaración de ilegalidad de un partido político, en la medida en que persiguen deteriorar o destruir el régimen de libertades o imposibilitar o eliminar el sistema democrático.
Y, en este sentido, hay que resaltar el contenido del apartado 4 de dicho artículo, en el que se dispone
que “para apreciar y valorar las actividades a que se refiere el presente artículo y la continuidad o
repetición de las mismas a lo largo de la trayectoria de un partido político, aunque el mismo haya
cambiado de denominación, se tendrán en cuenta las resoluciones, documentos y comunicados del
partido, de sus órganos y de sus Grupos parlamentarios y municipales, el desarrollo de sus actos públicos y convocatorias ciudadanas, las manifestaciones, actuaciones y compromisos públicos de sus
dirigentes y de los miembros de sus Grupos parlamentarios y municipales, las propuestas formuladas
en el seno de las instituciones o al margen de las mismas, así como las actitudes significativamente
repetidas de sus afiliados o candidatos”.
2. ¿Qué importancia tiene en la formulación y en la aplicación de las incriminaciones penales mencionadas la cuestión de las víctimas?
-La conducta de realizar actos que entrañen descrédito, menosprecio o humillación de las víctimas de
los delitos terroristas o de sus familiares constituye el delito del art. 578 (vid. supra B-5.1 y 5.2)
-La “petición expresa de perdón a las víctimas de su delito” representa un medio para acreditar el
“pronóstico de reinserción social”, en cuanto que requisito imprescindible para que se conceda la
libertad condicional en condenas motivadas por delitos de terrorismo o delitos cometidos en el seno de
organizaciones criminales, según se recoge en la disposición específica del art. 90 (vid. supra B-6.2).
D) Propuestas de reforma
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1. ¿Hay recientes tomas de posición doctrinales o jurisprudenciales concernientes a la expansión de
las formas de preparación y de participación que suscitan problemas de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales reconocidos por las Cartas y las Convenciones internacionales, así como por las
Constituciones nacionales?
En el ámbito penal, la doctrina científica ha criticado de forma generalizada la expansión del Derecho
penal en este punto, especialmente la llevada a cabo por las últimas reformas de nuestra legislación
penal. Y ello hasta tal punto que estas reformas se consideran como un conspicuo ejemplo de un Derecho penal del enemigo o un verdadero Derecho penal de la exclusión. Baste con citar la más reciente
e importante obra al respecto: “Derecho penal del enemigo. El discurso penal de la exclusión”, (M.
Cancio Meliá y Carlos Gómez-Jara, coordinadores), Editorial Edisofer, Madrid, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, 2006, en la que se incluyen numerosos trabajos de penalistas españoles, especialistas en la
materia.
En este sentido, especial mención cabe hacer al reciente Manifiesto sobre terrorismo elaborado por el
Grupo de Estudios de Política Criminal (constituido por más de doscientos expertos en Derecho penal,
procedentes de la Magistratura y la Universidad españolas), en el que se comienza criticando la legislación antiterrorista española, como manifestación de “una tendencia autoritaria que a menudo prescinde de la observancia de los más elementales principios del Derecho penal moderno y que lesiona
gravemente las garantías individuales”, subrayando que “en este contexto, España ha sido la primera
nación europea que ha otorgado carta de naturaleza constitucional, en el art. 55, 2 CE, a un Derecho
excepcional o de emergencia que, precisamente por su incardinación en la legislación ordinaria, ha
dejado de serlo”. A ello se añade que “se comprueba fácilmente cómo el calificativo ’terrorista’ presenta una desmedida vis expansiva por cuanto se invoca por el poder para hacer frente a fenómenos y
actitudes de muy distinta naturaleza, en ocasiones de mera disidencia política, y para justificar decisiones político criminales difícilmente compatibles con los valores de libertad y pluralismo que proclama nuestro texto constitucional”.
En particular, se critican los siguientes aspectos de la vigente regulación de los delitos de terrorismo
en el Código penal:
a) No se recoge una definición expresa de terrorismo y se tipifica el denominado terrorismo individual
o no organizado (artículo 577 del Código penal), lo que, unido a que también admite junto a la finalidad política de subversión del orden constitucional la más indeterminada de alterar gravemente la paz
pública, supone una grave distorsión del concepto mismo de este fenómeno.
b) Se produce una identificación entre autoría y participación, y una identificación entre delito consumado y fases ejecutivas imperfectas o preparatorias, lo que contradice principios básicos del Derecho
penal.
c) Sigue existiendo un delito de colaboración con banda armada (artículo 576 del Código penal), que
pretende sancionar cualquier tipo de conducta de favorecimiento, lo que convierte el precepto en un
instrumento técnico diseñado en buena medida para eludir ciertas dificultades de prueba, pasando a
ser una guía para la incriminación autónoma de conductas que de otro modo constituirían en muchos
casos actos preparatorios o de encubrimiento impunes.
d) Sigue previéndose también un delito de apología (artículo 578 del Código penal), que en su regulación actual, tras la reforma de la LO 7/2000, ha supuesto no sólo la reaparición de la clásica conducta
de apología del terrorismo, en la que se criminalizan meros actos de opinión o disidencia, sino asimismo la introducción de un tipo que, al penar la realización de actos que entrañen descrédito, menosprecio o humillación de las víctimas de delitos terroristas o de sus familiares, incorpora una previsión
legal no sólo discutible en sí misma sino al mismo tiempo productora de un trato desigual en la protección de los diferentes tipos de víctimas.
e) Las penas establecidas para las conductas delictivas de terrorismo rebasan con creces los límites
impuestos por los principios de proporcionalidad y humanidad de las penas. Es el caso, por ejemplo,
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del art. 572, que impone una sanción de 20 a 30 años de prisión en supuestos de resultado muerte, sin
distinguir siquiera entre conductas de asesinato u homicidio. Lo mismo sucede con las penas derivadas de la aplicación de las reglas del concurso de delitos, que podrán llegar hasta los 40 años siempre
que uno de los delitos en concurso tenga prevista pena superior a 20 años. Otro ejemplo viene dado
por la duración de la pena de inhabilitación absoluta, que a tenor del art. 579, 2 podría alcanzar los 60
años de duración, constituyendo el equivalente a una muerte civil.
f) En el ámbito procesal, la existencia de una jurisdicción especial (la Audiencia Nacional, con sede en
Madrid) implica alteraciones de las reglas procesales ordinarias que resultan difícilmente justificables,
cuando no claramente contrarias al texto constitucional. Además, las medidas antiterroristas en este
ámbito suponen una desmedida ampliación de las facultades policiales, lo que se comprueba singularmente en los supuestos de incomunicación de detenidos, registros domiciliarios o suspensión del
derecho al secreto de las comunicaciones. Así, por ejemplo, la posibilidad de restricción del derecho
de defensa, prohibiendo la libre designación de letrado, o la medida de prórroga de la detención policial.
g) En atención a todo ello, el Manifiesto sobre terrorismo elaborado por el Grupo de Estudios de Política Criminal concluye criticando, con carácter general, que en un Estado democrático se siga utilizando la legislación penal contra el adversario político, contra el enemigo del sistema, concepto este
último que ha experimentado una desmedida ampliación, en la que se difuminan las cada vez más
tenues fronteras entre el terrorismo y la disidencia. Pero además, y sobre todo en este ámbito, se olvida con frecuencia que el Derecho penal debe ser el último de los instrumentos de intervención y que,
como se ha puesto de manifiesto en las recientes conferencias internacionales, también y especialmente son necesarias una intervención social, que proscriba las desigualdades, y una intervención política,
que facilite el diálogo, para acabar con la violencia política.
En lo que concierne a la jurisprudencia, cabe destacar una Sentencia de la Audiencia Nacional de 1-32004, en la que se declara nulo un precepto de la Circular 21/1996 (citada supra B.6.2), en el que se
limitaba a tres horas el tiempo de las visitas en el establecimiento penitenciario (frente al régimen
general de seis horas fijado en el Reglamento General Penitenciario).
Fuera del ámbito penal, un sector doctrinal ha criticado (con razón) que algunas previsiones de la Ley
Orgánica 6/2002, de 27 de junio, de Partidos Políticos, (vid. supra C-1), suponen una vulneración del
derecho de participación política, corolario del principio de igualdad ante la ley (consagrado en el
artículo 14 de la Constitución española), desde el momento en que, más allá de la ilegalización del
partido, permite privar de dicho derecho a un ciudadano en su condición de tal, que ni ha sido condenado por sentencia judicial firme a la privación del derecho ni ha sido declarado incapaz por sentencia
judicial. De ahí que se concluya que en este aspecto la citada Ley Orgánica 6/2002 resulta anticonstitucional.
2. ¿Hay demandas de revisión o de modificación de las disposiciones consideradas? ¿En qué dirección
y con qué exigencias fundamentales?
El Grupo de Estudios de Política Criminal, además de presentar el Manifiesto citado en el apartado
anterior y como desarrollo de él, ha elaborado una Alternativa a la actual política criminal sobre terrorismo, a lo largo de los años 2005 y 2006.
La presentación de esta Alternativa se justifica esencialmente a la vista de las profundas reformas
penales llevadas a cabo en el año 2003 (impulsadas por el Gobierno del Partido Popular), que supusieron un importante retroceso en alguno de los decisivos pasos que el Código penal de 1995 había dado
en su proclamado intento de adecuar nuestro sistema legal a las exigencias del modelo constitucional.
La Alternativa abarca no sólo la perspectiva jurídico-penal, en sentido estricto, sino también, como
viene siendo regla en los trabajos del Grupo, la perspectiva penitenciaria y procesal.
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A tal efecto la Propuesta Alternativa se divide en tres partes: 1) una propuesta alternativa a la actual
regulación de los delitos de terrorismo; 2) una propuesta alternativa sobre la ejecución penal en materia de delitos de terrorismo; 3) una propuesta alternativa en materia de instrucción y enjuiciamiento.
1) En lo que atañe a la primera, se propone, ante todo, la necesidad de contar con una definición funcional de terrorismo, en la que se establezca con claridad en qué supuestos cabe hablar de terrorismo y
a qué personas debe ser aplicada. En este sentido, se parte de la base de exigir las dos notas tradicionalmente apuntadas en la doctrina (el elemento teleológico, integrado por la finalidad de subvertir el
orden constitucional o de alterar gravemente la paz pública, y el elemento estructural o elemento organizativo, que exige una violencia política ejercida por una estructura organizada, el grupo terrorista,
que constituye el auténtico sujeto activo del delito), a las que se añade una serie de matizaciones.
A continuación se contiene una detallada propuesta articulada de reforma de los delitos de asociaciones ilícitas (artículos 51 y 516 del Código penal) y de los delitos de terrorismo (artículos 571 a 580),
acompañada de una justificación, cuyo denominador común consiste en una reducción significativa de
las penas con respecto a las actualmente previstas; ello no obstante, se sugiere guardar la necesaria
proporción con las contempladas por los respectivos tipos comunes, lo que, en general y salvo algún
caso concreto, conduce a una propuesta de penas de prisión superiores en un grado.
2) La necesidad de una propuesta alternativa sobre la ejecución penal se explica por el hecho de que la
vigente política criminal española de ejecución penal en materia de delitos de terrorismo y de los
cometidos en el seno de organizaciones criminales constituye un verdadero Derecho penitenciario de
autor y de víctima, que diseña objetivamente una concreta forma de ejecución de las penas privativas
de libertad, de espaldas a las necesidades constitucionales de reinserción social del condenado y a las
necesidades de la víctima de rehacer su vida. En concreto, se trata de un régimen excepcional, que
viola lo establecido en el art. 25 de la Constitución española y en el art. 1 de la Ley Orgánica General
Penitenciaria, y que ni si quiera se adecua a la Decisión Marco del Consejo de la UE, de 13 de junio
de 2002, sobre la lucha contra el terrorismo.
El Grupo de Estudios de Política Criminal es partidario de derogar íntegramente el artículo 78 del
Código penal. Ello no obstante, en la medida en que la Propuesta Alternativa tiene por objeto la ejecución de la pena para delitos de terrorismo -y a efectos estrictamente clarificadores- se limita a proponer modificaciones en los artículos que a ellos se refiere: además del art. 78 del Código penal, los arts.
36.2, 90.1 y 91 del Código penal, los arts. 51.2 y 72.6 de la Ley Orgánica General Penitenciaria y el
art. 102.5.c) del Reglamento Penitenciario.
Asimismo, el Grupo propone la anulación de la Instrucción de la Dirección General de Instituciones
Penitenciarias nº 21/1996, de 16 de diciembre sobre régimen y seguridad y el régimen de cumplimiento derivado de la normativa “FIES”, puesto que vulnera el principio de legalidad (al diseñar un conjunto de restricciones y medidas de control que conforman materialmente un nuevo régimen penitenciario no previsto en la Ley Orgánica General Penitenciaria ni en su Reglamento), desconoce las garantías de ejecución penal (art. 25.2 de la Constitución y el art. 3.2 del Código penal y 2 de la Ley
Orgánica General Penitenciaria, que extienden la reserva de ley hasta la ejecución de la pena privativa
de libertad) y concede un amplio margen de discrecionalidad a la Administración penitenciaria para
que concrete las condiciones de cumplimiento, afectando a los derechos fundamentales de los reclusos.
En particular, se añade que el mencionado objetivo (vid. supra apartado B-6.2) de que la Administración penitenciaria pueda contar con una valiosa información para investigar a bandas armadas en el
interior de la cárcel y posibilitar su persecución judicial es un objetivo que excede de los limitados
fines que a la actividad penitenciaria asigna el art. 1 de la Ley Orgánica General Penitenciaria (resocialización, reeducación, retención y custodia). Es más, aun en el supuesto de que pudiera admitirse
que estos fines estuviesen incluidos en la actividad penitenciaria, las condiciones y garantías para la
restricción de los derechos fundamentales (derecho a la intimidad de comunicaciones con sus familia-
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res o personas específicas) no podrían ser especialmente distintas que las establecidas para los supuestos establecidos en el art. 51 de la Ley Orgánica General Penitenciaria.
3) En lo que concierne a la propuesta alternativa en materia de instrucción y enjuiciamiento, se incluye la modificación de determinados preceptos de la Ley procesal (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal)
encaminada a eliminar la competencia de la jurisdicción especial de la Audiencia Nacional (centralizada en Madrid). A tal efecto, merece ser destacada la propuesta de añadir un párrafo 6 al artículo 14
de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, que quedará redactado como sigue: “La competencia para la
instrucción, enjuiciamiento y ejecución en las causas por delitos de terrorismo corresponderá a los
Juzgados de Instrucción, a los Juzgados de lo Penal, a las Audiencias Provinciales, a los Juzgados de
Menores y a los Juzgados de Vigilancia Penitenciaria comunes, de acuerdo con las reglas establecidas
en los apartados anteriores.” “Los delitos de terrorismo no serán enjuiciados en ningún caso por los
Tribunales del Jurado”.
Esta propuesta se justifica por el hecho de que el funcionamiento de la actual Audiencia Nacional ha
dado lugar a la construcción de un procedimiento excepcional (de emergencia) caracterizado por una
significativa reducción de la intensidad de las garantías procesales propias de un modelo procesal
penal democrático.
3. ¿Hay reformas legales en trámite o en preparación?
No.
E) Consideraciones finales
No procede añadir ulteriores consideraciones a las expuestas en los apartados anteriores.
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Section I - General criminal law
FINLAND*
Raimo LAHTI & Ritva SAHAVIRTA**
1. Individuation of the manifestations of the phenomenon of globalization at an internal penal level
Although Finland, a Nordic country in the periphery of Europe, has so far managed to avoid the phenomenon of terrorism and not experienced the organized crime as a serious threat to its security, the
internationalization and Europeanization of criminal and procedural law has strongly affected its legislation. Traditionally, Finland has been keen on fulfilling its international obligations, either due to the
international conventions ratified by Finland or due to its membership in the Council of Europe since
1990 or due to its membership in the European Union (EU) since 1995.
The Finnish government adopted in 2004 an Action Plan on the internal security. In a recent report
about the implementation of this action plan (2007) it is said that criminal organizations have become
more active in the fields of drug crime and economic crime. The organized crime originated from
Russia and the Baltic countries has made closer contacts and created networks with Finnish criminal
groups. Based on the information gathered by the National Board of Investigation, it is estimated that
at the beginning of 2007 there were c. 1, 000 persons who took actively part in criminal groups. In all,
1
83 criminal groups were recognized, and 33 of them fulfilled the criteria of the EU. According to the
same report, there has been no appreciable increase in the threat of terrorism or the fear of it during
2004–2007.
Already in 1996 the Finnish government initiated an Action Plan aimed at a more effective control of
economic crime and the grey economy, involving wide-scale reform in legislation, regulatory agen2
cies, enforcement practice, and research activities. This Action Plan has been revised four times,
lastly for 2006–2009. It is estimated that economic crime and the grey economy cause annually damage up to 5 billion euros.
Provisions on economic and business crime belonged to the most relevant ones when the Finnish
Penal Code (PC) of 1889 was recodified in 1972–2003 –the general part at the final stage in 2003
3
(Acts Nos. 515–540/2003). The introduction of corporate criminal liability in 1995 can also be understood as a means to enhance the prevention of such crimes that require systematic planning and
*
**
Raimo Lahti, Professor, University of Helsinki): Ritva Sahavirta, State prosecutor, Office of the Prosecutor
General, Finland).
1
Cf. the situation in 1997, Heikinheimo, S., Finlande – Organized crime and responses to it. Revue Internationale
de Droit Pénal (RIDP), 1–2/1998, pp. 327–339.
2
See in more detail Alvesalo, A., The Dynamics of Economic Crime Control. Espoo: The Police College of
Finland, 2003.
3
See already Lahti, R. & Träskman, P.O., Conception et principes du droit pénal economique et des affaires.
RIDP 1–2/1983, pp. 249–274.
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that are mostly committed within enterprises and other economic organizations for obtaining illegal
4
profits (i.e., primarily, economic, business and financial crime).
2. General outlining of the general juridical system of preparatory acts and of participation in our
system
Finland – and other Nordic countries – belon to the civil (statutory) law tradition, although these countries have special features in their legal cultures. The Nordic countries have long common traditions,
many-sided forms of cooperation and partly harmonized laws. Finnish PC in its original form (1889)
followed the models of German and Swedish PCs. In the recodification of the Finnish PC in 1972–
2003 the models of other Nordic PCs and of German PC as well as the criminal law doctrines of these
5
countries were particularly significant.
The ideological change in the 1990s with greater emphasis on constitutional and human rights has had
effects on the Finnish criminal law and procedural law reforms. Two basic legal principles govern the
criminal law reform: the legality principle and the principle of culpability (Schuldprinzip). The first
one has a clear basis in the human rights law and since 1995 in the Finnish Constitution. The legality
principle is also included as a provision in the general part of the revised PC (PC 3:1). As for the legislator the subrule of nullum crimen sine lege certa is especially important: a criminal offence must be
clearly defined in the law.
Traditionally, penal theory has developed principles for limiting the use of criminal law (so-called
criminalization principles). Does a certain behavioral phenomenon harm or endanger the interests of
an individual or society and, if so, is it worth protecting by a criminalization (Strafwürdigkeit)? Because a criminalization should remain as a means of last resort (ultima ratio), the need for the use of
criminal law and its applicability (Strafbedürftigkeit, Straftauglichkeit) should be justified by cogent
reasons.
On the other hand, a criminalization was not necessary regarded as a last resort in the Finnish reform
work, because among the legislative purposes was the idea that the special part of the PC should reflect the striving for social justice: the interests and resources of different social groups should be
taken into account and, therefore, new interests and values in such areas as economic and business
life, labor and environmental sectors, human and drug trafficking and biomedical technology should
be protected. In addition, in the national implementation of criminalizations based on international
obligations the discretionary powers of the legislator are limited by those obligations.
The practical results as manifested in the recodified PC imply colliding interests and values in the
legislative decision-making, in particular the tension between developing criminal law in the spirit of
social justice, dynamic social needs and international solidarity, and at the same time taking into consideration the constitutional and moral limitations in the use of criminal law. A reasonable balance
between these divergent aims was sought in the law drafting, but the enacted laws may also reflect
political compromises.
As for the Finnish PC’s regulation “On attempt and complicity” (Act No. 515/2003, Chapter 5 of the
PC), the complicity provisions follow substantially the model of German PC and the attempt provisions the model of Swedish PC. In the recodification of the PC the complicity provisions were mainly
4
See Riihijärvi, M., Criminal Liability of Corporations – Finland. In: de Doelder, H. & Tiedemann, K., La Criminalisation du Comportement Collectif. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp. 203–233.
5
An unofficial translation of the Penal Code of Finland into English (with the amendments up to 2003) is available
through
internet
from
the
website
of
the
Ministry
of
Justice;
see
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1889/en18890039.pdf. – As to an overview of the Finnish criminal justice,
see Joutsen, M. & Lahti, R. & Pölönen, P., Finland. Criminal justice Systems in Europe and North America.
Helsinki: HEUNI, 2001 (available through internet: http://www.heuni.fi/). As to the basis of the Finnish criminal
law reform, see Lahti, R. & Nuotio, K. (eds.), Criminal Law Theory in Transition. Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers’
Publishing Company, 2002.
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retained such as they had been in force since the enactment of the 1889 PC. Accordingly, the Finnish
provisions (PC 3:3–7) differentiate between principals and co-offenders, on one hand, and inciters
(instigators) and accomplices (abettors), on the other. The indirect principal (commission of an offence through an agent) is also on type of perpetrator, and a new clarifying provision (PC 3:4) was in
2003 added into the Chapter. The penal latitude of an abettor is mitigated. The system of ‘borrowed
criminality’ (Akzessoritätsprinzip) is applied in the participation doctrine; i.e., in both types of participation (instigation or abetting) the liability is of accessorial or derivative nature (see more below, 2.2).
The introduction of corporate criminal liability (Chapter 9 of the PC; Act No. 743/1995) was not the
only reform linked to organizational crime. The criminal liability within legal persons – i.e., the principles governing the allocation of individual criminal responsibility, especially the liability of the
heads of business – was partly regulated in 1995 (Act No. 578/1995), when special provisions on such
liability as to labor and environmental offences were given (PC 47:7; 48:7). A more general provision
on the subject was included in the reformed Chapter on Attempt and Complicity (PC 5:8: “Acting on
behalf of a legal person”). The guidance given in those provisions is rather vague: “in the allocation of
liability due consideration shall be given to the position of that person, the nature and extent of his
duties and competence and also otherwise his participation in the arising and continuation of the situation that is contrary to law”. The provision in the PC 5:8 is, however, clear when prescribing that the
person who exercises actual decision-making power in the legal person (“faktischer Geschäftsführer”)
is to be considered equal to the member of a statutory body or management of a corporation.
In all, the legislator when recodifying of the Finnish PC was cautious in expanding forms of preparation and participation. This caution is explained by the significance of the criminalization principles
and the importance of the principles of legality and culpability (see above). When the Norwegian
scholar Erling Johannes Husabø is critically assessing the new global rules on terrorism, he speaks
about the tendencies of “more ‘pre-activism’ in criminal law” and “more ‘subjectivism’ in criminal
6
law”. The Finnish legislator has generally been reluctant to these ideas in the recodification of the
PC, although the scope of criminalized dangerous behavior (Gefährdungsdelikte) was enlarged in
comparison with traditional criminal law. The Danish scholar Jørn Vestergaard advised Finnish law
drafters to preserve its legal tradition in regulating criminal participation, because it “is in accordance
with important developments in terms of continuously elaborating a doctrine which stresses the principles of lex certa and of penal restraint”. In contrast to Finnish (and German) type of regulation, Danish provisions on the liability for attempt and participation are “rather brief and their scope is somewhat wide and indeterminate”, and the Danish PC is based on an extreme variation of an “Einheit7
stäterbegriff”. Nevertheless, also the Finnish legislator has in the 2000s been compelled to make
exceptions due to Finland’s international (or European) obligations in combating terrorism and organized crime.
The Parliamentary Committees undertook critical examinations on the Government Bills concerning
the participation in the activity of a criminal organization and the terrorist offences. These legislative
proposals led later to the enacted law provisions in PC 17:1a (participation in the activity of a criminal
organization) and PC 34a:2 and 4 (preparation of an offence to be committed with terrorist intent;
promotion of the activity of a terrorist group). The role of the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament is important in evaluating the Government Bill from the point of view of constitutional and human rights law aspects.
Criminalization of the participation in the activity of a criminal organization was regarded as a new
area in Finnish criminal law. In this situation it could not be resorted to the traditional doctrine on
6
Husabø, The Implementation of New Rules on Terrorism through the Pillars of the European Union. In: Husabø, E.J. & Strandbakken, A. (eds.), Harmonization of Criminal Law in Europe. Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2005, pp.
53–78 (73–75).
7
Vestergaard, Criminal Participation in Danish Law. In: Criminal Law Theory in Transition (note 5), pp. 475–
490 (490).
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complicity or to other established concepts of criminal law. Therefore, the principles of lex certa and
of penal restraint were of great significance. The proposals in the Government Bills, which were based
on the EU Joint Action (participation in a criminal organization) and Framework Decision (terrorist
offences) were revised in order to make these new participation provisions more certain and to make
them more equivalent with the traditional complicity doctrine (so that the liability for complicity
should also in these cases be derivative).At the same time it was striven for loyal implementation of
8
those EU instruments.
Valid Finnish law is described in detail in the next chapters (see also the Appendix with relevant pro9
visions in extenso).
Limits with reference to attempt.
Sections 1–2 in Chapter 5 of the Penal Code deal with attempt. The limits between preparatory acts
and attempt are not clearly drawn, because there are no general definitions on preparation or conspiracy in Finnish criminal legislation and the special penal provisions on preparatory acts and conspiracy
are relatively few. When a special provision on preparation or conspiracy is enacted, its constituent
elements are defined separately and the punishability of these acts must always be specifically denoted.
In accordance with PC 5:1.1 an attempt of an offence is punishable only if the attempt has been denoted as punishable in a provision on an intentional offence.
PC 5:1.2 defines the constituent elements of an attempt. An act has reached the stage of an attempt at
an offence when the offender has begun the commission of an offence and brought about the danger
that the offence will be completed. An attempt at an offence is involved also when such a danger is
not caused, but the fact that the danger is not brought about is due only to coincidental reasons. The
statutory definition indicates that the offender must act intentionally and his activity must cause a
concrete danger of the completion of the offence or at least an abstract danger of that. The lastmentioned endangerment criterion is formulated by utilizing a similar Swedish PC-provision on the
attempt.
Before this stage of an attempt an offence can be characterized as preparatory act; preparation covers
the activity which aims at the commission of an offence and which creates conditions for its commission. As mentioned above, these preparatory acts must always be separately defined in special provisions.
According to PC 5:2, an attempt is not punishable if the offender, on his own free will, has withdrawn
from the completion of the offence, or otherwise prevented the consequence referred to in the statutory definition of the offence.
There is no established case law related to preparatory acts or conspiracy with reference to the withdrawal from an attempt or the elimination of the effects of an offence. Preparation of an offence or
conspiracy might be punishable in these cases where attempt is not.
Punishable preparatory acts and conspiracy
As mentioned above, punishable preparatory acts are not very common in Finnish criminal law. Conspiracy is even more rear.
8
Statements of the Constitutional Committee, No. 10/2000 (as for Government Bill No. 183/1999) and No.
48/2002 (Government Bill No. 188/2002).
9
See also generally: Lahti, R., Versuch und Rücktritt bei Beteiligung mehrerer an der Straftat. In: BuureHägglund, K. (ed.), The Finnish National Reports to the Twelfth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law. Helsinki: Universitas Helsingiensis, 1986, pp. 173–188; Hietalahti, O., General Penal Provisions
and Organisational Sanctions against Organised Crime – Finnish Aspects. RIDP 3–4/1997, pp. 773–791; Härkönen, H., Criminal legislation and terrorist groups (Summary). Lakimies 2/2006, pp. 216–235, 334–335 (Helsinki).
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Preparation and conspiracy are punishable in Penal Code in the following cases:
Chapter 11, Section 7 – Preparation of genocide (includes also conspiracy)
Chapter 12, Section 11 – Treasonable conspiracy
Chapter 13, Section 3 – Preparation of high treason
Chapter 15, Section 5 – Attempted incitement to a false statement
Chapter 17, Section 1 a – Participation in the activity of a criminal organization
Chapter 17, Section 5 – Preparation of an armed breach of public order
Chapter 24, Section 7 – Preparation of eavesdropping or illicit observation
Chapter 32, Section 8 – Conspiracy for the commission of aggravated money laundering
Chapter 34, Section 9 – Preparation of an offence involving public danger
Chapter 34 a, Section 2 – Preparation of an offence to be committed with terrorist intent
Chapter 34 a, Section 4 – Promotion of the activity of a terrorist group
Chapter 37, Section 4 – Preparation of counterfeiting
Chapter 37, Section 11 – Preparation of means of payment fraud
Chapter 45, Section 24 – Conspiracy to commit a dangerous military offence
Chapter 50, Section 3 – Preparation of a narcotics offence
Chapter 50, Section 4 – Promotion of a narcotics offence
Field of applicability
Field of application is limited for specifically defined offences in all preparatory acts and conspiracy.
Applicable punishments: a comparison with the punishments applicable to the offences committed.
The penal scales for preparatory acts and conspiracy are more lenient than those for completed or
attempted offences. As a rule, the last ones consume – according to the principles on concurrence of
crimes – preparation and conspiracy.
Participation
Treatment of the acting in concert of individuals in the commission of the offence
Sections 3–8 in Chapter 5 of Penal Code apply to acting in concert of individuals in the commission of
the offence. The provisions in PC 5:3–6 define the different forms of participation:
– PC 5:3 on Complicity (Co-perpetration): If two or more persons have committed an intentional
offence together, each is punishable as an offender.
– PC 5:4 on Commission of an offence through an agent (Mittelbare Täterschaft):
A person is sentenced as an offender if he has committed an intentional offence by using, as an agent,
another person who cannot be punished for said offence due to the lack of criminal responsibility or
intention or due to another reason connected with the conditions for criminal liability.
– PC 5:5 on Instigation: A person who intentionally persuades another person to commit an intentional offence or to make a punishable attempt at such an act is punishable for incitement to the offence as if he was the offender.
– PC 5:6 on Abetting: A person who, before or during the commission of an offence, intentionally
furthers the commission by another of an intentional act or of its punishable attempt, through advice,
action or otherwise, shall be sentenced for abetting on the basis of the same legal provision as the
offender.
Incitement to punishable aiding and abetting is punishable as aiding and abetting.
Sanctions of the acts of participation.
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Instigation is punishable as if it were a completed offence (PC 5:5).
If the offender is convicted as an abettor in an offence, the sentence is determined in accordance with
a mitigated penal latitude. The punishment is at most three fourths of the maximum sentence of imprisonment or fine and at least the minimum sentence provided for the offence may be imposed on the
offender. If the offence is punishable by life imprisonment, the maximum punishment is instead
twelve years of imprisonment and the minimum punishment is two years of imprisonment. (PC 5:6.)
As mentioned above, instigation and abetting are of derivative nature. Accordingly, the same penal
provision is applied to the participant that to the principal offender (although the abettor’s penalty is
reduced). There is a separate provision on the special circumstances related to the person (PC 5:7):
Where a special circumstance vindicates, mitigates or aggravates an act, it applies only to the offender, inciter or abettor to whom the circumstance pertains. An inciter or abettor is not exempted
from penal liability by the fact that he is not affected by a special circumstance related to the person
and that is a basis for the punishability of the act by the offender. The last-mentioned sentence means
that participation in the so-called special offences (Spezialdelikte) is punishable, although (co)perpetration is excluded due to the special characteristics of the authorship.
Definitions of terrorism and of other very serious crimes
There is no special definition of “very serious crime” in the Finnish Penal Code. In many cases the
offences are classified into three categories, and the aggravating or mitigating constituent elements are
then defined in the penal provisions. Accordingly, the categories are following: basic offence, aggravated offence and petty offence. Aggravated offence can always be considered as a very serious
crime. In order to be classified as an aggravated offence, e.g. aggravated assault (PC 21:6) or aggravated theft (PC 28:2), certain prerequisites that are described in law must be fulfilled and the offence
must also be assessed aggravated as a whole. Generally it can be said that punishable preparatory acts
and conspiracy (listed above, 2.1.2) are related to serious crimes.
Definition of a criminal organization was adopted due to international (and EU-based) obligations,
and therefore it is harmonized with the provision of the Palermo Convention of 2000. The new provision is included in Chapter 17, Section 1a(4) of the PC and reads as follows: A criminal organization
is a structured association, established over a period of time, of at least three persons acting in concert
to commit the offences of participation in the activity of a criminal organization.
The definition of a terrorist group is provided by Chapter 34a, Section 6 of the PC. The provisions on
terrorist offences (Chapter 34a) were adopted due to the national implementation of the Framework
Decision (FD) of the EU of 2002 (the whole Chapter 34a is enclosed; see Appendix). Accordingly, the
definitions and the provisions in general in this Chapter 34a of the PC are harmonized with this FD.
The definition in question reads as follows: A terrorist group refers to a structured group of at least
three persons established over a period of time and acting in concert in order to commit offences referred to in PC 34a:1. PC 34a:1 defines the constituent elements of the offences made with terrorist
intent.
It should be noted that in Chapter 34a of the PC terrorism as such has not been defined. Instead of that
the chapter defines the constituent elements of terrorist acts. As for the basic offence (PC 34a:1), there
must be “terrorist intent” as defined in PC 34a:6, and the offender’s activity must be likely to cause
serious harm to a State or an international organization, and his activity must fulfill the criteria of
some of the common crimes listed in PC 34a:1.1. These kinds of terrorist offences could be regarded
as exceptionally aggravated offences (cf. the classification above).
Constituent or differential elements of these specific offences with regard to common offences
The constituent elements concerning terrorist offences and organized crimes are provided in law. In
the following only the most important provisions are dealt with.
Chapter 34a section 6 defines terrorist intent as follows (mens rea):
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If it is offenders intent to
(1) cause serious fear among the population,
(2) unjustifiably force the government of a state or another authority or an international organization
to perform, allow or abstain from performing any act,
(3) unjustifiably overturn or amend the constitution of a state or seriously destabilize the legal order of
a state or cause particularly harm to the state economy or the fundamental social structures of the state
or
(4) cause particularly extensive harm to the finances or other fundamental structures of an international organization.
The intent defined in PC 34a:6 is a type of specific intents and should be better translated as “purposely”. The terrorist offences defined in the Chapter 34a of the PC must be committed with this specific intent.
Chapter 17 section 1a provides (mens rea) that a person can be convicted of participation in the activity of a criminal organization if he commits the crime intentionally with the aim (specific intention) of
committing one or more offences for which the maximum statutory sentence is imprisonment for a
minimum of four years or one or more offences referred to in PC 11:8 (ethnic agitation) or PC 15:9
(threatening a person to be heard in the administration of justice), and if such an offence or its punishable attempt is committed.
With regard to common offences participation in the activity of a criminal organization (17:1a) is
punishable although the offender does not commit a common offence or its attempt by himself. The
section applies when an offender for instance attempts to obtain a criminal organization premises and
someone else in that organization commits an offence (actus reus). Otherwise legally permitted acts
become criminal when they are committed in connection with criminal organization with the specific
intent (see PC 17:1a in extenso in the Appendix). This is also the basic notion of actus reus in the
terrorist offences. An offender acts with the specific intention and in a specified manner that is likely
to cause serious harm to a State or an international organization (see PC 34a:1–8 in extenso in the
Appendix).
See the answer above, 3.2.
B. Characteristics of the expansion of the forms of preparation and participation
1. There has been an expansion of the forms of preparation and participation concerning offences in
the matter of terrorism, organized crime, money laundering and drug trafficking (see above, A.).
Preparatory acts are punished as separate offences when they are criminalized as such and as conspiracy when that is specifically provided in law. See in more detail above, A.
– 1.3. Following list indicates what kinds of preparatory acts have been criminalized in the PC and
when:
Chapter 15, Section 5 – Attempted incitement to a false statement (1998)
Chapter 17, Section 1 a – Participation in the activity of a criminal organization (2003)
Chapter 17, Section 5 – Preparation of an armed breach of public order (1998)
Chapter 24, Section 7 – Preparation of eavesdropping or illicit observation (2000)
Chapter 32, Section 8 – Conspiracy for the commission of aggravated money laundering (2003)
Chapter 34, Section 9 – Preparation of an offence involving public danger (1995)
Chapter 34 a, Section 2 – Preparation of an offence to be committed with terrorist intent (2003)
Chapter 34 a, Section 4 – Promotion of the activity of a terrorist group (2003)
Chapter 37, Section 4 – Preparation of counterfeiting (2001)
Chapter 37, Section 11 – Preparation of means of payment fraud (2003)
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Chapter 50, Section 3 – Preparation of a narcotics offence (1993)
Chapter 50, Section 4 – Promotion of a narcotics offence (1993)
1.4. According to the preparatory works of the PC and the principles on concurrence on crimes, it is
not possible to punish the same individual for the commission of one or more of the preparatory acts
and for the commission of one of the offences representing the final aim.
1.5. There are no regulations or special conditions for the penal relevance of the attempt in the preparatory acts. As mentioned above (A.2.1.1.), an attempt of an offence is punishable only if the attempt has been specifically denoted as punishable.
2. There are no regulations or special conditions for the penal relevance of the participation in the
preparatory acts. Accordingly, the general provisions on complicity (PC 5:3–8) apply, see above
A.2.2.
2.1. See above A.2.2.
2.2. Conspiracy is punishable only when it is specifically provided by law. See the answer above,
A.2.1.2, when conspiracy is punishable according to the PC.
2.3. There is no simplification of the evidence of participation provided by law.
2.4. An explicit punishment for preparatory or collateral conduct to the activities and associations
constituting very serious crime is provide by law only as to the participation in the activity of a criminal organization (PC 17:1a) and terrorist offences (PC, Chapter 34a). See the provisions in extenso in
the Appendix.
3. Promotion of the activity of a terrorist group is criminalized in PC 34a:4 (see Appendix). The provision requires that at least a punishable attempt of a terrorist offence is committed in the activity of
the terrorist group. The provision is not applicable to common offences which are committed within a
terrorist group.
3.1. The special offences are defined in PC 17:1a and PC Chapter 34a, as mentioned above. The
criminal associations are identified by material elements described in abstract terms by law, as mentioned in the answer to A.3.1.
3.2. See the answer to A.3.1 above.
3.3. In the PC Chapter 34a on terrorist offences there is in Section 3 a special provision on directing of
a terrorist group and a special provision on financing of terrorism (PC 34a:5). The penal scale for
these offences is more severe than the penal scale for promotion of a terrorist group (PC 34a:4).
In other cases general provisions on sentencing (PC Chapter 6; Act No. 515/2003) are applicable. One
general ground increasing punishment is that the offence has been committed as a member of a group
organized for serious offences (PC 6:5.2). This ground has been applied very seldom in practice. It is
probable that the courts impose more severe punishments for those who have directed or financed the
group activities than for mere participants who have not an important role in the organization. The
general sentencing principle reads as follows: The sentence shall be determined that it is in just proportion to the harmfulness and dangerousness of the offence, the motives for the act and the other
culpability of the offender manifest in the offence (PC 6:4). It is also a ground increasing punishment
that the criminal activity has been methodical (planned)(PC 6:5.1).
4. Corporate criminal liability was introduced in 1995 (PC Chapter 9; Act No. 743/1995). The liability
of legal entities (corporation, foundation or other legal entity) and the punishment for its implementation (i.e., corporate fine) are applicable when this sanctioning has been specifically provided in the
PC. This type of sanctioning is applicable to participation in the activity of a criminal organization
(PC 17:1a, 24) and to terrorist offences (PC Chapter 34a).
Individual criminal liability and the liability of legal entities are applicable cumulatively. Indictments
for both types of liability are tried independently so that, for example, imposing a corporate fine is
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possible even though the individual offender cannot be identified or for another reason gets unpunished.
5. There are no special provisions on the conduct consisting of the expression and/or dissemination of
thought or opinion linked to terrorism, distinguishable from the possible penal relevance of the instigation (or other forms of participation) to commit acts of terrorism.
However, the provision on public incitement to an offence (PC 17:1; Act No. 563/1998) must also be
taken into account. This provision enlarges the scope of punishable instigation (PC 5:5) in cases where
a person who through the mass media or publicly in a crowd or in a generally published writing or
other presentation exhorts or incites anyone into the commission of an offence, so that the exhortation
or incitement causes a danger of the offence or a punishable attempt being committed or otherwise
clearly endangers public order or security.
6. Because punishing for anticipated forms of preparation is – according to the principles on concurrence of crimes – subsidiary to the liability for participation (and perpetration) in completed or attempted offences, it is reasonable to believe that sentencing for preparatory acts is more lenient than
for participation. There is lack of case-law on this issue.
6.1. In general, a possible compensation to the victim or a reconciliation with the victim may affect
the penal sanctioning into a more lenient direction: in the choice of the type of penal sanction and
sentencing. However, it is questionable whether compensation could have such an effect as to terrorist
offences and organized crime which are serious crimes. A reconciliation is also in practice excluded in
serious crimes, although the preconditions in this respect are quite discretionary (see the Act on Conciliation in Criminal and Certain Civil Cases; Act No. 1015/2005).
6.2. According to the legislation on the enforcement of prison sentences, one of its aims is to guarantee that the enforcement is secure for the society, personnel and inmates. Therefore, for example, in
placing inmates in prisons and their wards the crimes committed and the dangerousness of the offender are taken into account. However, the discretional powers of the authorities are strictly defined
by modern legislation (Acts Nos. 767–788/2005).
C) Other questions
1. There are no specific preventive measures or other instruments having a non-penal nature to combat
terrorist and very serious criminal activities and associations in Finland. However, the prevention of
crime and the intelligence activity among the police tasks belong to the priorities in the Action Plans
of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice (see above, A.1.). In the new Government’s
Action Program (from 15 April 2007) it is said, among other things, that the priorities of the Action
Plan on the internal security should be enlarged to include (i.a.) combating organized crime and terrorism.
Finland joined at the beginning of 2007 the Treaty of Prüm, which was originally signed in 2005 by
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. The Treaty provides for
closer cross-border cooperation of police and judicial authorities in order to better combat terrorism,
cross-border crime, and illegal immigration.
2. Traditionally, the position of the victim has been strong in Finland in two respects. Firstly, the victim has always the right, in criminal proceedings, to present civil demands on the basis of the offence.
The injured party can also bring a charge, if a public prosecutor has decided not to bring charges.
Secondly, Finland was one of the first countries in Europe to adopt a Victim Compensation Act (Act
No. 935/1973). In the new Action Plan on criminal policy for 2007–2011 the Ministry of Justice puts
the improvement of the position of the victim as one of the five priority areas.
D) Reform plans and criticism
As described above (A.2), the Finnish legislator has generally been reluctant to the expanding forms
of preparation and participation. The principles of lex certa and penal restraint have been underlined in
the recodification of the Finnish criminal law.
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Because the pressure towards expanding criminal liability has originated from international and European (EU) obligations in combating terrorism and organized crime, critical voices have often directed
against the legitimacy of those tendencies. When expanding criminal liability there is often too much
reliance on the use of wide criminalizations and deterrent effects of severe punishments and too little
reliance on research and rational consideration what kinds of measures are the most effective in crime
prevention and what is needed in order to secure fair and humane criminal proceedings cross the state
10
borders.
Appendix
Excerpts from the Penal Code of Finland:
Chapter 5 – On attempt and complicity (Act No. 515/2003)
Section 1 – Attempt
(1) An attempt of an offence is punishable only if the attempt has been denoted as punishable in a
provision on an intentional offence.
(2) An act has reached the stage of an attempt at an offence when the offender has begun the commission of an offence and brought about the danger that the offence will be completed. An attempt at an
offence is involved also when such a danger is not caused, but the fact that the danger is not brought
about is due only to coincidental reasons.
(3) In sentencing for an attempt at an offence, chapter 6, section 8, subsections (1) (2), (2) and (4)
apply, unless, pursuant to the criminal provision applicable to the case, the attempt is comparable to a
completed act.
Section 2 – Withdrawal from an attempt and elimination of the effects of an offence by the offender
(1) An attempt is not punishable if the offender, on his/her own free will, has withdrawn from the
completion of the offence, or otherwise prevented the consequence referred to in the statutory definition of the offence.
(2) If the offence involves several accomplices, the offender, the instigator or the abettor is exempted
from liability on the basis of withdrawal from an offence and elimination of the effects of an offence
by the offender only if he/she has succeeded in getting also the other participants to desist withdraw
from completion of the offence or otherwise been able to prevent the consequence referred to in the
statutory definition of the offence or in another manner has eliminated the effects of his/her own actions on the completion of the offence.
(3) In addition to what is provided in subsections 1 and 2, an attempt is not punishable if the offence is
not completed or the consequence referred to in the statutory definition of the offence is not caused for
a reason that is independent of the offender, instigator or abettor, but he/she has voluntarily and seriously attempted to prevent the completion of the offence or the causing of the consequence.
(4) If an attempt, pursuant to subsections 1 through 3, remains unpunishable but at the same time
comprises another, completed, offence, such offence is punishable.
Section 3 – Complicity in an offence
If two or more persons have committed an intentional offence together, each is punishable as an offender.
10
As to critical voices against certain features of the Europeanized criminal law, e.g., Lahti, R., Towards a Rational and Humane Criminal Policy. Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, vol. 1,
2000, pp. 141–155; Nuotio, K., On the Significance of Criminal Justice for a Europe ‘United in Diversity’. In:
Nuotio, K. (ed.), Europe in Search of ‘Meaning and Purpose’. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2004, pp. 171–
211; Melander, S., The implementation of the EU-based criminal law instruments in Finland. In: Hollán, M. (ed.),
Towards More Harmonised Criminal Law in the European Union. Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
2004, pp. 119–141.
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Section 4 – Commission of an offence through an agent
A person is sentenced as an offender if he/she has committed an intentional offence by using, as an
agent, another person who cannot be punished for said offence due to the lack of criminal responsibility or intention or due to another reason connected with the conditions for criminal liability.
Section 5 – Instigation
A person who intentionally persuades another person to commit an intentional offence or to make a
punishable attempt at such an act is punishable for incitement to the offence as if he/she was the offender.
Section 6 – Abetting
(1) A person who, before or during the commission of an offence, intentionally furthers the commission by another of an intentional act or of its punishable attempt, through advice, action or otherwise,
shall be sentenced for abetting on the basis of the same legal provision as the offender. The provisions
of chapter 6, section 8, subsections (1)(3), (2) and (4) apply nonetheless to the sentence.
(2) Incitement to punishable aiding and abetting is punishable as aiding and abetting.
Section 7 – Special circumstances related to the person
(1) Where a special circumstance vindicates, mitigates or aggravates an act, it applies only to the offender, inciter or abettor to whom the circumstance pertains.
(2) An inciter or abettor is not exempted from penal liability by the fact that he/she is not affected by a
special circumstance related to the person and that is a basis for the punishability of the act by the
offender.
Section 8 – Acting on behalf of a legal person
(1) A member of a statutory body or management of a corporation, foundation or other legal person, a
person who exercises actual decision-making power in the legal person or a person who otherwise acts
on its behalf in an employment relationship in the private or public sector or on the basis of a commission may be sentenced for an offence committed in the operations of a legal person, even if he/she
does not fulfill the special conditions stipulated for an offender in the statutory definition of the offence, but the legal person fulfils said conditions.
(2) If the offence has been committed in organized activity that is part of an entrepreneur’s business or
in other organized activity that is comparable to the activity of a legal person, the provisions in subsection 1 on an offence committed in the operations of a legal person correspondingly apply.
(3) The provisions of this section do not apply if different provisions elsewhere apply to the matter.
Chapter 17 - Offences against public order (Act No. 563/1998)
Section 1 a – Participation in the activity of a criminal organization (142/2003)
(1) A person who
(1) by establishing or organizing a criminal organization or by recruiting or attempting to recruit persons for it,
(2) by equipping or attempting to equip a criminal organization with explosives, weapons, ammunition or with materials or equipment intended for their production or with other dangerous supplies or
materials,
(3) by arranging, attempting to arrange or providing a criminal organization training for criminal activity,
(4) by obtaining, attempting to obtain or providing a criminal organization premises or other facilities
needed by it or means of transport or other equipment that is particularly important for the organization,
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(5) by directly or indirectly giving or collecting funds to finance the criminal activity of a criminal
organization,
(6) by managing financial affairs that are important for the criminal organization or by giving financial or legal advice that is particularly important for the organization or
(7) by actively promoting the accomplishment of the aims of a criminal organization in another substantial manner
participates in the activities of a criminal organization with the aim of committing one or more offences for which the maximum statutory sentence is imprisonment for a minimum of four years or one
or more of the offences referred to in chapter 11(8) or chapter 15(9), and if such an offence or its punishable attempt is committed, shall be sentenced for participating in the activity of a criminal organization to a fine or imprisonment for a maximum of two years. (1372/2003)
(2) What is provided above in subsection 1(6) regarding legal advice does not apply to the performance of the duties of legal counsel or representative in connection with the pre-trial investigation or
court proceedings regarding an offence or the enforcement of a sentence.
(3) What is provided in subsection 1 does not apply if an equally or more severe penalty is provided
elsewhere in law for the act.
(4) A criminal organization is defined as a structured association, established over a period of time, of
at least three persons acting in concert to commit the offences referred to in subsection 1.
Chapter 34 a – Terrorist offences (Act No. 17/2003)
Section 1 – Offences made with terrorist intent
(1) A person who, with terrorist intent and in a manner that is likely to cause serious harm to a State or
an international organization
(1) makes an unlawful threat or a false report of a danger shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at
least four months and at most three years,
(2) deliberately causes a danger or commits a deliberate explosives offence or an offence against the
Edged Weapons Act (108/1977) shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at least four months and at
most four years,
(3) commits an aggravated theft or an aggravated theft for temporary use directed against a motor
vehicle suitable for public transport or the transport of goods, sabotage, traffic sabotage, endangerment of health, aggravated damage to property, aggravated firearms offence or an export offence
referred to in the Act on the Export and Transit of Defense Supplies (242/1990) shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for at least four months and at most six years,
(4) violates a ban on chemical weapons, violates a ban on biological weapons or engages in deliberate
aggravated pollution of the environment committed in the manner referred to in chapter 48, section
1(1)(1) shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at least four months and at most eight years,
(5) commits aggravated assault, kidnapping, the taking of a hostage, aggravated sabotage, aggravated
endangerment of health, a nuclear weapon offence or hijacking shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
at least two and at most twelve years,
(6) commits the offence of killing shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at least four and at most
twelve years, or
(7) commits homicide shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at least eight years or for life.
(2) A person who commits murder with terrorist intent shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.
(3) An attempt is punishable.
Section 2 – Preparation of an offence to be committed with terrorist intent
A person who, in order to commit an offence referred to in section 1(1)(2-7) or 1(2),
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(1) agrees with another person or prepares a plan to commit such an offence,
(2) prepares, keeps in his/her possession, acquires, transports, uses or gives to another an explosive, a
chemical or biological weapon or a toxin weapon, a firearm or a dangerous object or substance, or
(3) acquires equipment or materials for the preparation or a nuclear explosive, a chemical or biological
weapon or a toxin weapon or acquires formulas or diagrams for their production, shall be sentenced
for preparation of an offence to be committed with terrorist intent to a fine or to imprisonment for at
most three years.
Section 3 –Directing of a terrorist group
(1) A person who directs a terrorist group, the activity of which has involved the commission of an
offence referred to in section 1(1)(2-7) or the offence referred to in section 1(2) or a punishable attempt at such an offence or the offence referred to in section 2 shall be sentenced for directing of a
terrorist group to imprisonment for at least two and at most twelve years.
(2) A person who directs a terrorist group in the activity of which only the offence referred to in section 1(1)(1) has been committed shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at least four months and at
most six years.
(3) A person who is sentenced for directing of a terrorist group shall also be sentenced for an offence
referred to in section 1 or the punishable attempt of such an offence or an offence referred to in section 2 that he or she has committed or that has been committed in the activity of a terrorist group under his/her direction.
Section 4 – Promotion of the activity of a terrorist group
(1) A person who in order to promote, or aware that his or her activity promotes, the criminal activity
referred to in sections 1 or 2 of a terrorist group
(1) establishes or organizes a terrorist group or recruits or attempts to recruit persons for a terrorist
group,
(2) supplies or seeks to supply a terrorist group with explosives, weapons, ammunition or material or
equipment intended for the preparation of these or with other dangerous objects or material,
(3) implements, seeks to implement or provides training for a terrorist group for criminal activity,
(4) obtains or seeks to obtain or gives to a terrorist group premises or other facilities that it needs or
means of transport or other implements that are especially important from the point of view of the
activity of the group,
(5) obtains or seeks to obtain information which, if transmitted to a terrorist group, would be likely to
cause serious harm to the State or an international organization, or transmits, gives or discloses such
information to a terrorist group,
(6) manages important financial matters for a terrorist group or gives financial or legal advice that is
very important from the point of view of such a group, or
(7) commits an offence referred to in chapter 32, section 1(2)(1) or 1(2)(2),
shall be sentenced, if the offence referred to in section 1 or a punishable attempt at such an offence is
carried out in the activity of the terrorist group, and unless the act is punishable under section 1 or 2 or
unless an equally or more severe punishment is decreed elsewhere in law for it, to promotion of the
activity of a terrorist group to imprisonment for at least four months and at most eight years.
(2) What is provided above in paragraph 6 regarding legal advice does not apply to the performance of
the functions of a legal counsel or attorney in connection with the pre-trial investigation of an offence,
court proceedings or the enforcement of a sentence.
Section 5 – The financing of terrorism
(1) A person who directly or indirectly provides or collects funds in order to finance, or aware that
these shall finance
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(1) the taking of a hostage or hijacking,
(2) sabotage, aggravated sabotage or preparation of an offence of general endangerment that is to be
deemed an offence referred to in the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (Treaty Series 60/2002),
(3) sabotage, traffic sabotage, aggravated sabotage or the preparation of an offence of general endangerment that is to be deemed an offence referred to in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Treaty Series 56/1973), the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Treaty Series 43/1998),
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Act Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(Treaty Series 11/1999) or the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Treaty Series 44/2000),
(4) a nuclear explosives offence, endangerment of health, aggravated endangerment of health, a nuclear energy use offence or other criminalized offence directed at a nuclear weapon or committed
through the use of nuclear material, that is to be deemed an offence referred to in the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Treaty Series 72/1989), or
(5) murder, homicide, killing, aggravated assault, deprivation of liberty, aggravated deprivation of
liberty, kidnapping, taking of a hostage or aggravated disturbance of public peace or the threat of such
an offence, when the act is directed against a person who is referred to in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agents (Treaty Series 63/1978), shall be sentenced for the financing of terrorism to imprisonment for
at least four months and at most eight years.
(2) Also a person who directly or indirectly provides or collects funds in order to finance or aware that
they are used to finance the offences referred to in section 1 shall be sentenced for the financing of
terrorism.
(3) An attempt is punishable.
(4) What is provided in the foregoing in this section does not apply if the offence is punishable as an
offence referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs 1 through 5 or an attempt of such an offence or
complicity in such an offence or, according to sections 1 or two or elsewhere in law a more severe
sentence is provided for it.
Section 6 - Definitions
(1) An offender has a terrorist intent if it is his or her intent to:
(1) cause serious fear among the population,
(2) unjustifiably force the government of a state or another authority or an international organization
to perform, allow or abstain from performing any act,
(3) unjustifiably overturn or amend the constitution of a state or seriously destabilize the legal order of
a state or cause particularly harm to the state economy or the fundamental social structures of the
state, or
(4) cause particularly extensive harm to the finances or other fundamental structures of an international organization.
(2) A terrorist group refers to a structured group of a least three persons established over a period of
time and acting in concert in order to commit offences referred to in section 1.
(3) An international organization refers to an intergovernmental organization or to an organization
which, on the basis of its significance and international recognized position, is comparable to an intergovernmental organization.
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Section 7 – Right of prosecution
The Prosecutor-General decides on the bringing of charges for offences referred to in this chapter. In
so doing the Prosecutor-General shall also designate the person who is to bring the charges.
Section 8 – Corporate criminal liability
(1) The provisions on the criminal liability of legal persons apply to the offences referred to in this
chapter.
(2) The provisions on corporate criminal liability apply also to robbery, aggravated robbery, extortion
or aggravated extortion committed in order to commit an offence referred to in section 1 or section
2(1)(3) of this chapter as well as to forgery or aggravated forgery committed in order to commit the
offence referred to in section 1, paragraph 1, subparagraphs 2-7 or paragraph 2, section 2, paragraph 1,
subparagraph 3 or in section 4 or 5 of this Act.
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Colloque préparatoire du XVIIIème Congrès International de Droit Pénal
FRANCE*
Carole GIRAULT
A) Questions générales
1. Aperçu des manifestations du phénomène de la mondialisation au niveau pénal interne
La mondialisation de la criminalité, qu’elle résulte de l’existence d’organisations criminelles transnationales ou de la multiplication de réseaux terroristes à ramifications internationales, a progressivement incité les Etats à modifier leur droit interne pour répondre à ces formes graves de criminalité. La
pression de la communauté internationale, par le biais de résolutions, de recommandations, de conven1
tions ou de décisions cadres , s’est souvent révélée déterminante en permettant d’accélérer le mouvement d’adaptation des différents systèmes juridiques.
En France, la réaction face au terrorisme résulte néanmoins de la situation interne, la première législation faisant suite à la vague d’attentats terroristes commis sur le territoire français au cours des années
1985 et 1986 par le groupe Action directe. Modifiant le Code de procédure pénale, la loi du 9 septembre 1986 a commencé par établir une liste d’infractions pour les soumettre à un régime procédural
dérogatoire lorsqu’elles sont commises dans le but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par
2
l’intimidation ou la terreur (ancien art. 706-16 CPP) . Depuis cette première intervention législative,
plus de six lois se sont succédé pour étendre le champ de la répression et préciser la procédure applicable. La loi n° 92-686 du 22 juillet 1992 portant réforme des dispositions du Code pénal relatives à la
répression des crimes et délits contre la nation, l’Etat et la paix publique a, dans un premier temps,
inscrit les actes de terrorisme au Livre IV du Code pénal afin de les ériger en infractions autonomes
3
(art. 421-1 et s. CP) . La loi du 22 juillet 1996 tendant à renforcer la répression du terrorisme et des
atteintes aux personnes dépositaires de l’autorité publique, adoptée après les attentats de 1995, a complété les dispositions du Code pénal en allongeant la liste des actes de terrorisme, tandis que la loi du
15 novembre 2001 sur la sécurité quotidienne instituait plusieurs mesures de procédure exceptionnelles maintenues et pérennisées par la loi du 18 mars 2003 pour la sécurité intérieure. Les lois dites
Perben I et II, respectivement du 9 septembre 2002 et du 9 mars 2004, ont eu un apport plus limité sur
le terrorisme, la dernière réforme d’envergure datant de la loi du 23 janvier 2006, examinée selon la
procédure d’urgence après les attentats qui ont marqué l’année 2005 (Londres, Bali, Charm El Cheikh,
*
1
Voir M. Segonds pour l’exemple de la corruption, L’internationalisation de l’incrimination de la corruption, Dr.
Pénal 2006, Et. 12 ; V. Malabat, Les procédés de l’internationalisation du droit pénal, Dr pénal 2006, Et. 17.
2
Crim., 7 mai 1987, Bull. n° 186 : «L’article 706-16 n’institue pas de nouvelles incriminations, mais désigne les
infractions qui, lorsqu’il est constaté qu’elles sont en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant
pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, seront poursuivies, instruites et
jugées selon (des règles particulières) ». La Loi du 9 septembre 1986 a été suivie de la loi n° 87-542 du 16 juillet
1987 autorisant la ratification de la Convention européenne pour la répression du terrorisme.
3
La différence avec le mécanisme précédent est cependant superficielle, l’article 421-1 du Code pénal combinant
une liste d’infractions de droit commun et le mobile d’intimidation pour définir l’acte de terrorisme. Voir notamment M.E. Cartier, Le terrorisme dans le nouveau code pénal français, RSC 1995, p. 225.
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Amman), relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions diverses relatives à la sécurité et
aux contrôles frontaliers.
Pour la criminalité organisée, la réaction du législateur est plus étalée dans le temps, quelques-unes
des dispositions contenues originairement dans le Code pénal de 1810 permettant déjà de poursuivre
la participation à une association de malfaiteurs ou de réprimer les auteurs d’infractions impliquant
une organisation préalable. Le droit pénal spécial apparaissait alors comme l’instrument privilégié de
lutte contre le crime organisé, lequel « recoupe trop de situations pour relever d’une approche uni4
forme » . La réforme du Code pénal, en 1992, offrit l’occasion au législateur de renforcer et de préciser son dispositif en augmentant les pénalités encourues et en étendant la circonstance aggravante de
5
bande organisée . Peu après l’entrée en vigueur de la Convention des Nations Unies contre la crimina6
lité organisée , les parlementaires prirent conscience de la nécessité de cibler davantage cette forme de
criminalité et adoptèrent, à cette fin, la loi n° 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant adaptation de la légi7
slation aux évolutions de la criminalité . Traitant à la fois de la criminalité organisée, de la procédure
d’enquête, d’instruction et de jugement, du mandat d’arrêt européen et du droit pénitentiaire, cette loi
insère un nouveau titre au sein du livre IV du Code de procédure pénale intitulé « De la procédure
applicable à la délinquance et à la criminalité organisée ». Aucune définition n’est cependant précisée,
le législateur préférant, comme il l’avait fait pour le terrorisme en 1986, énumérer une liste
d’infractions pour les soumettre à un régime procédural dérogatoire, soit lorsqu’elles présentent un
certain degré de gravité, soit lorsqu’elles sont commises en bande organisée. La procédure pénale, en
offrant aux autorités de poursuite, d’instruction ou de jugement des moyens exceptionnels, est ainsi
devenue la principale réponse du législateur au phénomène de la criminalité organisée.
Le droit pénal général ne sort pas indemne de cette évolution, la plupart des principes conçus sur le
fondement d’une responsabilité pénale individuelle étant aujourd’hui contournés par les dispositions
du droit pénal spécial susceptibles d’appréhender les activités des organisations criminelles. Sans
remettre en cause le principe d’une responsabilité personnelle, est-il possible d’intégrer à la théorie
8
générale les premiers éléments d’un régime qui pourrait être celui de l’infraction collective ? La
9
cohérence de la réponse pénale, qui semble aujourd’hui trop éclatée et fort peu lisible , parait appeler
une telle évolution. L’adaptation pourrait également devenir un impératif si l’on souhaite éviter que le
régime juridique général relatif à la préparation ou à la participation à l’infraction ne soit constamment
éprouvé par l’apparition de nouvelles formes de criminalité.
2. Le régime juridique général des actes préparatoires et de la participation criminelle
2.1 Les actes préparatoires
4
Y. Mayaud, Les systèmes pénaux à l’épreuve du crime organisé, RIDP 1998, p. 800.
J. Borricand, La criminalité organisée transfrontière : aspects juridiques, in La criminalité organisée, sous la dir.
M. Leclerc, La documentation Française, 1996, p. 153.
6
La Convention des Nations Unies contre la criminalité organisée du 15 novembre 2000, dite Convention de
Palerme, est entrée en vigueur le 29 septembre 2003.
7
JO 10 mars 2004, p. 4567 ; J. Pradel, Le crime organisé après la loi française du 9 mars 2004 dite loi Perben II,
RDPC 2005, p. 133.
8
Cf. Th. Weigend, « A l’avenir, le droit pénal ne sera peut-être plus dirigé contre des individus mais, en revanche, contre des groupements ou des personnes morales. Son point de rattachement ne sera peut-être plus la culpabilité de l’individu mais la responsabilité collective et il n’aura peut-être plus pour objet la dissuasion de
l’individu ou sa réinsertion sociale, mais la destruction des bases économiques d’une organisation. Nous nous
trouvons peut-être devant une ligne historique de partage des eaux. », in Les systèmes pénaux à l’épreuve du
crime organisé, RIDP 1998, p. 490.
9
Voir notamment R. Ottenhof : « L’ensemble fait un peu désordre et la multiplicité des formules, leur chevauchement, ne peut que nuire aux intérêts de la répression », Criminalité organisée et ordre dans la société, Colloque Aix-en-Provence (5-6-7 juin 1996), Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, p. 49.
5
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Les actes préparatoires échappent à la répression non seulement en raison de leur caractère équivoque,
mais aussi parce qu’il convient de favoriser le désistement du délinquant en lui permettant de faire
marche arrière en toute impunité. Au cours du processus criminel, un certain seuil de matérialisation,
10
situé par le droit français au niveau du commencement d’exécution , est donc exigé pour engager la
responsabilité de l’auteur. Le commencement d’exécution, dont la définition relève de la casuistique
11
jurisprudentielle , peut être décrit comme l’acte qui tend directement et immédiatement à la
12
consommation de l’infraction, celle-ci étant entrée dans sa période d’exécution . Si certains arrêts
montrent que de simples actes préparatoires (repérage et visite des lieux) ont parfois pu être assimilés
à un commencement d’exécution, le principe est que la résolution criminelle, comme les actes préparatoires, doivent rester impunis, faute de matérialisation suffisante.
Cependant, le fait que la phase de préparation implique plusieurs participants a toujours permis de
contourner cette règle générale pour mieux déjouer les plans formés par un groupement de person13
nes . Dans cette hypothèse, l’incrimination au stade de la résolution ou des actes préparatoires se
justifie si on raisonne par rapport à la notion d’infraction collective et non plus sur la base d’un comportement individuel. Lorsque plusieurs individus s’associent pour commettre un crime, « une étape
supplémentaire, nécessairement extériorisée, apparaît avant le stade des actes préparatoires : l’entente
14
entre les délinquants » . L’organisation minutieuse qui les entoure donne aux actes préparatoires un
caractère non équivoque.
Enfin, l’argument selon lequel la loi ne doit pas fixer trop tôt le seuil de répression pour encourager
les désistements volontaires avant la commission de l’infraction n’est pas davantage pertinent face à
une criminalité de groupe. Si une place doit être laissée au désistement, c’est pour éviter qu’une infraction cause un trouble à l’ordre public en produisant un résultat dommageable. Or, dans le cas des
groupements, le départ d’un délinquant est un événement rare en raison des pressions ou des représailles qui pourraient s’exercer à son encontre. De plus, le retrait d’un membre n’empêcherait pas
15
l’association criminelle de continuer à exister, ni les crimes projetés d’être exécutés . Le mécanisme
propre aux repentis, qui propose une prime à la délation, constitue à cet égard une alternative
d’efficacité comparable. Pour toutes ces rasions, des infractions telles que le complot, défini comme la
résolution arrêtée entre plusieurs personnes de commettre un attentat lorsque cette résolution est
concrétisée par un ou plusieurs faits matériels (art. 412-2 CP), ou le délit de participation à une association de malfaiteurs, sur lequel nous reviendrons, ont toujours pu être considérés comme des exceptions à l’exigence d’un commencement d’exécution pour déterminer le seuil d’intervention du droit
pénal.
2.2 La participation criminelle
10
Art. 121-5 CP : « La tentative est constituée dès lors que, manifestée par un commencement d’exécution, elle
n’a été suspendue ou n’a manqué son effet qu’en raison de circonstances indépendantes de la volonté de son
auteur ».
11
Voir les critiques de M.-L. Rassat qui fait état du désordre jurisprudentiel, Droit pénal général, 2e éd., Ellipses,
2006, p. 318 et s., ainsi que les observations de Ph. Conte et P. Maistre du Chambon pour lesquels la jurisprudence a « pour seule politique de se fier à l’inspiration du moment sans souci de cohérence », Droit pénal général, n° 333.
12
Crim., 25 octobre 1962 (2 arrêts), Bull. crim. n° 292 et 293, Crim., 18 août 1973, Bull. crim. n° 339, Crim., 15
mai 1979, Bull crim n° 175. Une autre définition, plus subjective, est parfois retenue, le commencement
d’exécution constituant alors un acte qui tend directement au crime ou au délit avec intention de le commettre,
Crim., 5 juillet 1951, Bull. n° 198 ; Crim., 29 décembre 1970, Bull n° 356, Crim., 11 juin 1975, Bull n° 150.
13
En ce sens, voir notamment, J. Pradel, Les règles de fond sur la lutte contre le crime organisé, Revue pénitentiaire, 2006, p. 517.
14
Ch. Dupeyron, L’infraction collective, RSC. 1973, p. 357.
15
C. Girault, Le droit pénal à l’épreuve de l’organisation criminelle, RSC 1998, p. 717.
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Le principe de la responsabilité du fait personnel, consacré par l’article 121-1 du Code pénal, ne fait
pas obstacle à des formes de participation collective à l’infraction dès lors que la part de chacun dans
16
la réalisation du dommage peut être déterminée . Le droit pénal spécial prévoit plusieurs infractions
nécessitant une pluralité de participants, atteignant ainsi des entreprises criminelles collectives, dont
l’association de malfaiteurs constitue le prototype. En droit pénal général, la théorie de la complicité
ainsi que les circonstances aggravantes de réunion ou de bande organisée permettent également
d’appréhender une grande variété de comportements collectifs tout en tenant compte des degrés
d’implication ou de concertation entre les participants.
Reposant sur la théorie de l’emprunt de criminalité, la complicité permet de traiter comme un auteur
celui qui a facilité la préparation ou la consommation d’une infraction en apportant son aide ou son
assistance ou qui a provoqué l’auteur ou lui a donné des instructions pour commettre l’infraction.
L’aide ou l’assistance, constitutives de la première forme de complicité, doivent en principe être antérieures ou concomitantes à la réalisation de l’infraction et résider dans un acte positif. Des tempéraments sont néanmoins admis pour sanctionner l’acte de complicité commis après l’infraction - mais
17
promis avant celle-ci - ou pour atteindre ceux dont l’attitude passive conforte l’auteur principal au
18
moment du passage à l’acte . Dans ces situations particulières, la responsabilité repose sur une
concertation présumée ou implicite.
Quant à l’instigation, qu’il s’agisse de la complicité par provocation ou par instructions, elle vise
l’auteur moral dont la responsabilité, notamment du point de vue criminologique, parait plus directe et
répréhensible. La provocation s’entend en effet d’une véritable pression exercée sur la volonté de
l’individu désigné pour commettre, à titre principal, l’infraction. Alors qu’elle peut être comparée à
une sorte de contrainte ou d’abus d’autorité sur une personne facilement influençable - l’auteur principal n’étant qu’un instrument entre les mains du complice-, le droit pénal général limite le champ
d’application de la répression en exigeant que la provocation soit suivie d’effet. A défaut, ce qui est le
cas lorsque l’auteur principal décide volontairement de ne pas mettre le projet criminel à exécution,
l’instigateur demeure impuni. Ainsi que nous le verrons, la jurisprudence, puis le législateur ont
19
néanmoins eu recours au droit pénal spécial pour limiter la portée de cette solution choquante .
Quelle que soit la forme de complicité, le complice s’expose à une peine identique à celle qu’il aurait
encourue s’il avait été lui-même auteur de l’infraction principale.
La peine normalement encourue est en revanche aggravée lorsque la circonstance de bande organisée
peut être retenue à l’encontre des différents participants. Définie par l’article 132-71 du Code pénal
comme « tout groupement formé ou toute entente établie en vue de la préparation caractérisée par un
ou plusieurs faits matériels d’une ou de plusieurs infractions », la circonstance aggravante de bande
organisée s’analyse « comme la prise en compte, après la commission de l’infraction, de l’existence
20
d’une association de malfaiteurs qui était destinée à commettre cette infraction » . Son champ
d’application, initialement limité au vol et aux destructions, dégradations et détériorations de biens
présentant un danger pour les personnes, a connu une première extension à la suite de la réforme du
Code pénal en 1992, laquelle faisait déjà de la lutte contre la criminalité organisée une véritable priori16
La jurisprudence a cependant trouvé des palliatifs, comme la complicité correspective en cas de violences ou la
notion de « commune imprudence » dans le cas des atteintes involontaires à l’intégrité pour imputer l’infraction à
tous les membres du groupe sans que l’on puisse déterminer avec exactitude la part de chacun dans la production
du dommage.
17
Crim., 21 juin 1978, D. 1979, IR, 37, obs. Puech, Crim., 11 juin 1994, RSC 1995, 343, obs. Bouloc, Crim., 1er
décembre 1998, JCP 1999. 151, obs. Véron.
18
Crim., 19 décembre 1989, D. 1990, 198, note Mayer, RSC 1990, 337, obs. Levasseur et 775, obs. Vitu.
19
La jurisprudence a utilisé la qualification d’association de malfaiteurs, tandis que le législateur a défini une
nouvelle infraction pour punir le mandat criminel même non suivi d’effet. Cf. infra.
20
Circulaire du 14 mai 1993 portant commentaire des dispositions de la partie législative du nouveau Code pénal
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té, extension confirmée par la loi du 9 mars 2004 portant adaptation de la justice aux nouvelles formes
de criminalité. Outre le trafic de drogue (art. 222-35 CP), le proxénétisme (art. 225-8 CP),
l’enlèvement et la séquestration (art. 224-3 CP), l’escroquerie (art. 312-2 CP), le recel (art. 321-2 2),
infractions auxquelles le code pénal a étendu la circonstance aggravante de bande organisée, celle-ci
peut dorénavant accompagner la commission d’homicides volontaires (art. 221-4 CP), de tortures et
d’actes de barbarie (art. 222-4 CP), de corruption de mineurs (art. 227-22 CP), de représentation pornographique de mineurs (art. 227-23 CP), de trafic de fausse monnaie (art. 442-2 CP) ou encore de
nombreuses infractions prévues par des lois particulières, telles que celles portant sur les armes et
munitions. La loi du 9 mars 2004 ne s’est pas contentée d’accroître l’étendue de la notion de bande
organisée, elle a également renforcé sa portée en la dotant d’une nouvelle fonction. Désormais, la
constatation de la circonstance de bande organisée autorise en effet le déclenchement de procédures
dérogatoires au droit commun. Parce qu’elle permet non seulement d’aggraver la répression mais
aussi de justifier la mise en œuvre d’un régime procédural dérogatoire, cette notion devrait faire
l’objet d’une définition rigoureuse. Or, les nombreuses critiques émises lors de l’extension de son
champ d’application ont dénoncé l’imprécision des termes employés par le législateur, imprécision
qui pourrait être de nature à menacer la liberté de réunion ou d’association, voire même la liberté
syndicale, si la bande organisée était appliquée à toute violence commise collectivement lors d’une
21
manifestation publique . Le Conseil constitutionnel, chargé d’examiner ce grief lors de l’examen du
projet de loi portant adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la criminalité, n’a cependant sanctionné
aucune atteinte à la légalité criminelle et a considéré que « la jurisprudence pénale a apporté les précisions complémentaires utiles pour caractériser la circonstance aggravante de bande organisée, laquelle
22
suppose la préméditation des infractions et une organisation structurée de leurs auteurs » . Ce faisant,
le Conseil constitutionnel s’est livré à une interprétation extensive de la notion de légalité, la loi étant
comprise au sens européen du terme, c'est-à-dire comme l’ensemble des textes tels qu’ils sont interprétés par les tribunaux. La jurisprudence appelée en renfort est pourtant peu fournie et aucune grande
ligne directrice ne se dégage vraiment des différents arrêts rendus sur la question. Précisons enfin que
la circulaire d’interprétation renforce le sentiment d’ambiguïté – et donc d’insécurité - en ce qu’elle
semble faire du nombre de participants la distinction essentielle entre la circonstance aggravante de
bande organisée et celle de réunion. Si la distinction s’impose entre ces deux notions, la première
23
justifiant une aggravation plus importante que la seconde , le seuil de concertation nous parait être un
critère plus pertinent que le nombre de participants. La réunion, à la différence de la bande organisée,
peut en effet s’entendre d’une action collective qui n’a pas été organisée. Elle peut être occasionnelle,
voire fortuite, ce qui exclut toute préméditation. En résumé, si chacun s’accorde à dire que la bande
24
organisée menace plus sérieusement l’ordre public que la simple circonstance de réunion , « dans
certains cas l’hésitation restera permise entre la qualification de réunion et celle de bande organi25
sée » . L’ambiguïté, délibérée ou non, sert la lutte contre les formes très graves de criminalité dont le
terrorisme fait partie.
21
JO Sénat, 18 mai 1989, p. 780 ; Y. Mayaud, Le crime organisé, in Le nouveau code pénal, enjeux et perspectives, Dalloz, 1994, p. 66.
22
Décision n° 2004-492 DC du 2 mars 2004, JCP 2004. II. 10048, note Zarka.
23
Le Code pénal postule une distinction nette entre les deux notions, le vol commis par plusieurs personnes agissant en qualité d’auteur ou de complice sans qu’elles constituent une bande organisée étant puni de cinq ans
d’emprisonnement (art. 311-4 1°) tandis que le vol en bande organisée est puni de quinze ans de réclusion criminelle (art. 311-9), cette distinction se retrouvant pour le proxénétisme (art. 225-7 9° et art. 225-8).
24
Selon Y. Mayaud, la complicité et la réunion relèvent d’une délinquance de connivence, laquelle est une délinquance d’entente qui ne franchit pas encore le seuil de l’organisation proprement dite. Il y a ainsi une « donnée de
plus » dans le crime organisé, Les systèmes pénaux à l’épreuve du crime organisé, art. préc., p. 797.
25
J. Pradel, Le crime organisé après la loi française du 9 mars 2004, art. préc., p. 140.
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3. La préparation et la participation par rapport au terrorisme et autres formes très graves de criminalité
Avant de rappeler comment le droit s’est adapté pour mieux appréhender le phénomène de globalisation du crime qui résulte de l’essor du terrorisme international et de la criminalité organisée transnationale, il est nécessaire de préciser ces deux notions en les distinguant. Certes, les liens et les rapprochements entre le terrorisme et le crime organisé ne peuvent être ignorés. Les terroristes sont susceptibles d’utiliser des techniques ou les réseaux relevant du crime organisé, notamment pour financer
leurs activités, tandis que les groupements mafieux n’hésitent pas à recourir à l’intimidation pour
26
27
28
parvenir à leurs fins . Les textes internationaux ou internes encouragent d’ailleurs l’assimilation
en incluant les activités terroristes parmi les actes relevant de la criminalité organisée. Il est vrai, enfin, qu’une procédure dérogatoire au droit commun, éventuellement commune à ces deux phénomènes, s’impose pour des raisons d’efficacité. Cependant, une différence de nature existe entre ces deux
29
formes de criminalité , la finalité poursuivie par les uns ou les autres se révélant déterminante. Le
terrorisme « tend à porter atteinte aux institutions publiques et à contourner par la pression violente les
30
mécanismes habituels de la décision publique interne ou des relations internationales » . Alors qu’il
31
combat ouvertement les pouvoirs établis , les organisations criminelles de type mafieux cherchent
clandestinement à tirer profit des institutions en place pour s’approprier illicitement des biens ou du
32
pouvoir . Cette différence de nature justifie une approche séparée.
La législation française s’est d’abord dotée d’un dispositif de lutte contre le terrorisme. Les infractions
se rapportant à cette forme de criminalité figurent aujourd’hui aux articles 421-1 et suivants du Code
pénal tandis que la procédure applicable relève, du fait de la confusion entre terrorisme et criminalité
organisée, à la fois du Titre XV (art. 706-16 à 706-25-1) et du Titre XXV (art. 706-73 à 706-106) du
Code de procédure pénale.
26
Considérant que les terroristes utilisent les réseaux de la criminalité organisée et tout ce qui relève de
l’économie souterraine pour financer leurs activités, le parquet de Paris a crée une unité de lutte contre le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée, structure permettant que soient réunies dans une même division, les magistrats
du parquet ayant en charge la lutte antiterroriste, mais aussi ceux poursuivant les auteurs d’infractions qui, d’une
manière ou d’une autre, alimentent, facilitent, soutiennent ou masquent l’activité terroriste, Y. Bot, Orientation du
parquet de Paris dans le domaine de la lutte contre le terrorisme, in Terrorisme, victimes et responsabilité pénale
internationale, SOS Attentats, 2003, p. 242.
27
L’ambiguïté est fréquente, voir par exemple l’article 29 du Traité d’Amsterdam qui semble faire du terrorisme
une activité relevant du crime organisé, au même titre que la traite des êtres humains ou le trafic de drogue, assimilation aussitôt démentie par l’article 31 qui invite aux rapprochements des législations nationales quant aux
« éléments constitutifs des infractions pénales et aux sanctions applicables dans le domaine de la criminalité
organisée, du terrorisme et du trafic de drogue ».
28
L’art. 706-73 11° du Code de procédure pénale classe les actes de terrorisme parmi les infractions relevant de
la criminalité organisée.
29
En ce sens, cf J.-L. Bruguière, Le crime organisé, in Le nouveau Code pénal, enjeux et perspectives, préc., p.
71 ; R. Ottenhof, Lignes directrices pour une approche criminologique du terrorisme, RSC 1988, p. 848 ; J. Cédras, Les systèmes pénaux à l’épreuve du crime organisé, RIDP 1999, p. 344.
30
J. Cédras, ibid., p. 347.
31
J.-L. Bruguière : « Il s’agit de contourner, surtout pour le terrorisme extérieur le plus violent, les mécanismes
conventionnels des relations internationales pour obtenir, par la violence, des gains politiques ou diplomatiques »,
préc., p. 72.
32
Cf. Ch. L. Blakesley : « Le crime est souvent utilisé comme moyen pour faire des profits et pour obtenir, préserver et redistribuer ces profits ainsi que le pouvoir, l’influence économique ou l’exploitation des personnes », in
Les systèmes de justice criminelle face au défi du crime organisé, RIDP 1999, p. 35. Sur la notion de profit, voir
aussi J.-Y. Chevallier, Les règles de fond sur la lutte contre la criminalité organisée en droit français, Revue Pénitentiaire, 2006, p. 705.
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Le droit pénal spécial distingue six incriminations au sein du chapitre consacré au terrorisme : l’article
421-1 du Code pénal vise les actes terroristes au sens strict, l’article 421-2 incrimine plus spécialement le terrorisme écologique, l’article 421-2-1 atteint les actes préparatoires à travers l’incrimination
de participation à une association de malfaiteurs à visée terroriste, l’article 421-2-2 traite du financement du terrorisme tandis que l’article 421-2-3 érige en délit le fait ne pouvoir justifier de ses ressources tout en étant en relation avec des terroristes. Les trois dernières infractions sont respectivement
issues des lois du 22 juillet 1996, du 15 novembre 2001 et du 18 mars 2003, ce qui est très révélateur
de la difficulté du législateur à saisir en un seul mouvement la diversité des activités terroristes.
Concernant le cœur du dispositif, à savoir les actes terroristes au sens strict, l’article 421-1 du Code
pénal énumère des infractions de droit commun qui doivent être intentionnellement commises en
relation avec « une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre
public par l’intimidation ou la terreur ». Cette finalité caractérise le dol spécial des infractions de terrorisme, justifie une aggravation des peines normalement encourues, l’allongement de la durée des
prescriptions ainsi que la mise en œuvre d’une procédure dérogatoire au droit commun. Les enjeux de
la qualification étant importants, la délimitation stricte et rigoureuse des actes terroristes constitue une
obligation préalable. Malheureusement, le principe de légalité se trouve quelque peu malmené. Les
infractions de droit commun auxquelles l’article 421-1 renvoie ne sont pas toutes édictées avec suffisamment de précision, le législateur se référant, aux articles 421-1 1°, 2° et 6°, à des intitulés de chapitres ou de sections des Livres II et III du Code pénal -intitulés qui n’ont aucune valeur normative pour étendre les actes de terrorisme à l’ensemble des infractions comprises dans ces divisions (atteintes volontaires à la vie ou à l’intégrité, enlèvement, séquestration, détournement d’aéronefs, de navire,
33
vols, extorsions, dégradations…) . Quant à l’élément moral fédérateur, nous ne pouvons que souli34
gner la tautologie (l’acte de terrorisme est celui qui a pour but de semer la terreur) tout en rappelant
que le Conseil constitutionnel, auquel il était demandé de se prononcer sur la notion jugée trop vague
35
36
« d’entreprise » , n’a pourtant retenu aucune atteinte au principe de légalité des délits et des peines .
Les sanctions prévues, précisément, sont lourdes puisque le plafond des peines encourues a été relevé,
d’un degré ou plus, par rapport à celui qui est prévu pour les infractions de droit commun servant de
référence. Des peines complémentaires d’interdiction des droits civiques, civils et de famille,
l’interdiction d’exercer une fonction publique et l’interdiction de séjour peuvent être prononcées (art.
422-3) ainsi que l’interdiction du territoire français pour les terroristes étrangers (art. 422-4). La
confiscation des biens est quant à elle prévue par l’article 422-6, leur produit étant affecté au fonds de
garantie des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d’autres infractions (article 422-7). Des exemptions ou
réductions de peines permettront éventuellement d’atténuer la rigueur des peines encourues en cas de
dénonciation utile des faits (art. 422-1 et 422-2). La loi du 22 juillet 1996 a enfin modifié l’article 25
du Code civil afin de prévoir la déchéance de la nationalité française des personnes qui, l’ayant ac-
33
Lors des travaux préparatoires du Code pénal, un amendement déposé par Mme N. Catala tendait à insérer dans
la liste des infractions de terrorisme le numéro des articles du code concernés. Cet amendement a cependant été
rejeté. A ce sujet, cf. M.-E. Cartier pour laquelle le renvoi qui est fait par l’article 421-1 1° et 2) à des pans entiers
du nouveau code pénal (chapitres ou sections relatifs à des catégories très générales d’infractions) couvre bien des
incertitudes quant au domaine de la répression, Le terrorisme dans le nouveau code pénal, RSC 1995, p. 225 et s.
Ainsi, la référence très générale aux destructions, dégradations et détériorations ne permet pas de distinguer selon
que ces agissements constituent un danger ou non pour les personnes.
34
Cf. R. Ottenhof, Approche criminologique et victimologique du terrorisme, in Terrorisme, victimes et responsabilité pénale internationale préc., p. 487.
35
Voir notamment J.-P. Marguénaud qui observe que la loi de 1986 a été élaborée « dans un climat
d’improvisation et d’imprécision », La qualification des pénale des actes de terrorisme, RSC 1990, p. 8. Selon la
circulaire d’application de la loi de 1986, la notion d’entreprise est exclusive de toute idée d’improvisation ; elle
suppose des préparatifs, un minimum d’organisation et évoque l’idée de préméditation.
36
Conseil Constitutionnel, décision n° 86-213 DC du 3 septembre 1986.
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quise depuis moins de dix ans, ont été condamnées pour un crime ou un délit constituant un acte de
terrorisme.
37
En dépit de quelques tentatives en ce sens , les notions d’organisation criminelle ou de criminalité
38
organisée n’ont jamais été intégrée ni au droit pénal général ni au droit pénal spécial . Seule la procédure pénale vise explicitement cette forme particulière de délinquance afin de doter les autorités
publiques de moyens d’investigation, de poursuite et de jugement exceptionnels. Le Titre XXV du
Livre IV de Code de procédure pénale, introduit par la loi Perben II du 9 mars 2004 décrit ainsi « la
procédure applicable à la délinquance et à la criminalité organisée ». Cependant, bien avant cette réforme d’envergure, de nombreuses incriminations permettaient déjà d’atteindre les activités relevant
de la criminalité organisée telles que le trafic de stupéfiants, le proxénétisme, le blanchiment,
39
l’extorsion, le recel, etc. . La loi du 9 mars 2004, plutôt que d’imposer une définition générale de la
criminalité organisée, se contente de reprendre la plupart de ces infractions pour les soumettre à un
régime procédural dérogatoire dès lors que leur commission implique en elle-même l’existence d’une
organisation criminelle ou s’accompagne de circonstances aggravantes, telles que la bande organi40
sée . Plus précisément, le législateur, soucieux de respecter le principe de proportionnalité propre à la
procédure pénale, a distingué les formes les plus graves de criminalité organisée, décrites à l’article
41
706-73 du Code de procédure pénale, et pour lesquelles la procédure est entièrement dérogatoire
(infiltration, sonorisation, allongement de la durée de la garde à vue, perquisitions de nuit, interception
37
Lors des débats qui ont précédé le vote de la loi du 13 mai 1996 relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment et le
trafic de stupéfiants, des sénateurs ont exprimé leur désir d’instituer une incrimination introduisant spécifiquement la notion d’organisation criminelle dans le code pénal. Un amendement proposait d’ajouter un article 450-4
ainsi rédigé :
« Constitue une organisation criminelle tout groupement ou entente établis qui :
- par constitution de bande organisée,
- ou par toute atteinte aux personnes, aux biens et à la confiance publique,
- ou par abus, détournement de fonctions électives, ou des pouvoirs que confèrent des activités publiques ou
professionnelles,
a pour but :
- de commettre des crimes et délits,
- ou de réaliser pour soi ou pour autrui des profits et avantages illicites,
- ou de prendre directement ou indirectement le contrôle de tout ou partie d’activités économiques, financières,
commerciales, civiles,
- ou de détourner les règles d’attribution des marchés publics, des aides, subventions et allocations publiques,
nationales, communautaires et internationales. ».
L’amendement a été rejeté par crainte d’une censure du Conseil constitutionnel sur le fondement du principe de la
légalité des délits et des peines. JO Sénat, 18 octobre 1995, p. 1902. Cf. C. Girault, art. préc., p. 715 et s.
38
J. Cédras, art. préc., p. 341.
39
Au lendemain de la réforme du Code pénal, Y. Mayaud concluait que « le crime organisé n’est pas une infraction en soi, mais une expression à laquelle sont associées de nombreuses qualifications », Le crime organisé, in
Le nouveau code pénal, enjeux et perspectives, préc., p. 62.
40
B. de Lamy regrette ce choix car « recourir à une circonstance aggravante laisse penser que le cadre global que
la loi instaure repose sur une différence de degré criminel, alors que seule une différence de nature, traduite par
une qualification autonome, pourrait justifier ces règles exceptionnelles », La loi n° 2004-204 du 9 mars 2004
portant adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la criminalité, D. 2004, p. 1912.
41
La liste exacte des infractions est la suivante : meurtre commis en bande organisée, tortures et actes de barbarie
commis en bande organisée, trafic de stupéfiants, enlèvement et séquestration commis en bande organisée, traite
des êtres humains, proxénétisme, vol en bande organisée, crime d’extorsion, destruction et dégradation de biens
commis en bande organisée, fausse monnaie, actes de terrorisme, délits en matière d’armes et d’explosifs commis
en bande organisée, aide à l’entrée, à la circulation et au séjour irrégulier d’un étranger en France commis en
bande organisée, blanchiment et recel des produits des infractions énumérées, association de malfaiteurs ayant
pour but l’une des infractions énumérées et, depuis la loi du 23 janvier 2006, délit de non-justification de ressources correspondant au train de vie lorsqu’il est commis en relation avec l’une des infractions énumérées.
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téléphonique dès l’enquête de police, gel des avoirs, spécialisation des enquêteurs et des magistrats),
42
des formes les moins caractéristiques, envisagées par l’article 706-74 , qui ne permettent que des
dérogations limitées (compétence des juridictions interrégionales spécialisées).
Bien qu’approuvée par le Conseil constitutionnel au nom du principe de la légalité des délits et des
43
peines , la technique de l’énumération n’est pas à l’abri des critiques, la principale étant qu’elle
44
éprouve la cohérence du dispositif légal , certaines infractions énumérées ne relevant pas nécessai45
46
47
rement d’une criminalité organisée (proxénétisme , fausse monnaie , traite des êtres humains ),
tandis que d’autres semblent avoir été oubliées. Il est ainsi notamment des violences, de l’instigation
visant à commettre un assassinat ou un empoisonnement ou des infractions économiques et financières parmi lesquelles figure la corruption pourtant expressément visée par la Convention de Palerme.
Mais surtout, l’intégration du terrorisme, du trafic de stupéfiants et du proxénétisme, créé des difficultés en termes d’accessibilité de la disposition pertinente dans la mesure où ces catégories
d’infractions bénéficiaient déjà d’un régime dérogatoire qui n’a pas été abrogé ! Ces infractions font
ainsi « l’objet d’un double droit d’exception : celui qui est général et qui résulte des articles 706-73 et
suivants et celui qui est propre au terrorisme (Titre XV), au trafic de stupéfiants (Titre XVI) ou au
48
proxénétisme (Titre XVII) » . Privilégiant l’énumération au lieu d’une définition globale qui aurait
eu sa place en droit pénal général ou spécial, le choix du législateur est également critiquable en ce
qu’il donne l’impression d’une réponse figée, morcelée, et finalement révélatrice de la tendance du
droit moderne à intervenir après coup, sous la pression des évènements le plus spectaculaires et médiatisés.
Paradoxalement, l’intervention du législateur dans le domaine de la criminalité organisée constitue, au
niveau de la technique législative, un véritable retour en arrière. Rappelons en effet que la première
étape du droit français pour lutter contre le terrorisme résidait précisément dans l’insertion de dispositions au sein du Code de procédure pénale sans aucune modification du droit pénal spécial. Prenant en
compte les nombreuses critiques formulées à l’époque, le législateur profita de la réforme du Code
pénal pour définir enfin les actes de terrorisme à l’article 421-1 du Code pénal. Une évolution similaire, mais s’accompagnant d’un effort plus visible de définition, est à souhaiter concernant la crimina-
42
Cet article soumet à la compétence des juridictions interrégionales spécialisées, sans pour autant autoriser des
moyens d’investigation dérogatoires au droit commun, d’autres infractions commises en bande organisée ainsi
que les formes classiques d’association de malfaiteurs.
43
Cons. Const., 2 mars 2004, déc. n° 2004-492 DC, Loi portant adaptation de la justice aux évolutions de la
criminalité. Le Conseil constitutionnel laisse néanmoins une marge d’appréciation importante aux autorités judiciaires concernant le vol commis en bande organisée, cette infraction ne trouvant sa place dans la liste que si elle
présente des éléments de gravité suffisants pour justifier des mesures dérogatoires.
44
En ce sens, cf. E. Verges, La notion de criminalité organisée après la loi du 9 mars 2004, AJ Pénal 2004, p.
184.
45
L’article 706-73 6° CPP vise le proxénétisme aggravé par l’une des circonstances prévues à l’article 225-7 du
Code pénal, lesquelles citent la vulnérabilité de la victime, l’emploi de la violence ou de la contrainte, l’utilisation
d’un réseau de télécommunication…. sans comprendre la circonstance de bande organisée.
46
L’article 442-1 CP relatif à la contrefaçon ou à la falsification de pièces de monnaie, visé par l’article 706-73
CPP, peut être un crime isolé, à la différence de celui résultant de l’article 442-2 qui suppose une organisation et
qui devrait donc être seul visé.
47
L’article 225-4-2 CP, visé par l’article 706-73 CPP, ne comprend pas la bande organisée parmi les circonstances aggravantes qu’il édicte, seul l’article 225-4-3 CP s’y référant.
48
J. Pradel, art. préc., RDPC 2005, p. 139. Voir également B. de Lamy : « La loi vient accentuer le désordre au
sein du livre IV du Code de procédure pénale consacré à « quelques procédures particulières » qui compte désormais 26 titres aussi variés que la criminalité organisée, la pollution des eaux maritimes, la saisine pour avis de la
cour de cassation ou la coopération avec le cour pénale internationale », art. préc., p. 1910.
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49
lité organisée . La définition de l’organisation criminelle pourrait prendre place aux côtés des dispositions générales du Code pénal instituant le mécanisme des repentis ou imposant une différence de
traitement entre les organisateurs de ces réseaux et les simples exécutants. De telles dispositions auraient pour objectif de définir les particularités d’une responsabilité pénale collective et non plus seulement individuelle. En attendant, le délit de participation à une association de malfaiteurs, caractéristique de l’élargissement des formes de participation et de préparation à l’infraction pour toutes les
formes de criminalité grave, continuera à constituer l’incrimination de référence.
1. Le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée ne désignent et n’impliquent ni une activité criminelle
précise, ni des auteurs facilement repérables qui auraient tous le même degré d’implication (le cercle
des complices, partisans ou sympathisants est très extensible). Le droit pénal a toujours pris en compte
cette spécificité, soit en intervenant en amont de la commission d’infractions déterminées, soit en
considérant comme auteurs ou complices des personnes qui soutiennent ou encouragent des réseaux
criminels.
1.1. Les actes préparatoires
50
Fréquemment décrite comme la « pierre angulaire » du système de lutte contre le terrorisme ou la
criminalité organisée, la participation à une association de malfaiteurs permet de contourner les règles
51
de droit pénal général relatives à la tentative et à la complicité . Infraction obstacle, elle se révèle
particulièrement utile pour atteindre les structures d’appui des auteurs d’attentats et prévenir ainsi les
attentats en cours de préparation. Prévue à titre général par l’article 450-1 du Code pénal, cette infraction se décline en de nombreux délits spéciaux qui ont vocation à appréhender plus spécifiquement
certaines formes de criminalité (trafic de stupéfiants, infractions en matière informatique…).
La loi du 22 juillet 1996, anticipant les recommandations faites aux Etats par la décision-cadre de
l’Union européenne relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme a ainsi institué le délit de participation à une
association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste (art. 421-2-1 CP), infraction qui
reprend les éléments de définition de l’article 450-1 tout en autorisant le recours à la procédure dérogatoire propre aux actes de terrorisme. Une peine de dix ans d’emprisonnement et de 225 000 euros
d’amende est prévue à l’encontre du participant, peine portée à vingt ans de réclusion criminelle et à
500 000 euros d’amende lorsque l’auteur a dirigé ou organisé le groupement interdit (art. 421-5 CP).
Depuis la loi du 23 janvier 2006, les pénalités sont encore aggravées lorsque l’association de malfaiteurs a pour objet la préparation soit de un ou plusieurs crimes d’atteintes volontaires à la vie, à
l’intégrité de la personne, d’enlèvement et de séquestration ainsi que de détournement d’aéronef, de
navire ou de tout autre moyen de transport, soit d’une ou plusieurs destructions par substances explosives ou incendiaires et devant être réalisées dans des conditions de temps ou de lieu susceptibles
d’entraîner la mort d’une ou plusieurs personnes, soit l’acte de terrorisme défini à l’article 421-2 lorsqu’il est susceptible d’entraîner la mort d’une ou plusieurs personnes. La participation à une association poursuivant précisément ces objectifs est punie de vingt ans de réclusion criminelle et 350 000
euros d’amende, la direction ou l’organisation du mouvement faisant encourir à son auteur trente ans
de réclusion criminelle et 500 000 euros d’amende (art. 421-6 CP).
49
Selon J. Pradel, la loi du 9 mars 2004 a déjà bâti une « théorie générale du crime organisé », les infractions
liées à la criminalité organisée pouvant se définir comme « des crimes, plus rarement des délits, qui attentent
gravement à nos valeurs Observant que essentielles et qui, dans l’infinie majorité des cas, sont commis par plusieurs individus », RDPC 2005, p. 135 et 141.
50
Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme, 2006, p. 54. Selon le juge antiterroriste J.-L. Bruguière, le délit d’association de malfaiteurs est « une arme légale extrêmement puissante, le
seul moyen de lutter efficacement contre le terrorisme », Le crime organisé, in Le nouveau code pénal, enjeux et
perspectives, préc. p. 73.
51
Crim., 30 avril 1996, Bull. n° 176, RSC 1997, p. 113, note J.-J. Delmas Saint-Hilaire.
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Le principal intérêt d’une telle incrimination est de permettre la poursuite de simples actes préparatoires dès lors qu’il est possible d’identifier un groupement formé ou une entente établie en vue de la
préparation caractérisée par un ou plusieurs faits matériels, soit d’un acte de terrorisme (art. 421-2-1
CP), soit d’un ou plusieurs crimes punis d’au moins cinq ans d’emprisonnement (art. 450-1 CP). Pour
l’application de ce dernier délit applicable à la criminalité organisée, le seuil de gravité des infractions
en cours de préparation a été abaissé à cinq ans d’emprisonnement (au lieu de dix) par la loi du 15 mai
2001 sur les nouvelles régulations économiques. Celle-ci a, dans le même temps, dédoublé le délit en
distinguant au niveau de la répression selon que les infractions en cours de préparation sont punies
d’au moins cinq ans d’emprisonnement (l’auteur encourt cinq ans d’emprisonnement et 75 000 euros
d’amende) ou de dix ans d’emprisonnement (l’auteur encourt 10 ans d’emprisonnement et 150 000
euros d’amende). La préparation d’infractions telles que le blanchiment, le chantage, l’escroquerie,
l’abus de biens sociaux ou certains faux entre dorénavant dans le champ de la répression, ce qui revient à admettre que les actes préparatoires propres au blanchiment, par exemple, sont punissables
alors même que le législateur n’a pas prévu d’incriminer la tentative de ce délit. Renforçant la répression, l’abaissement du seuil de gravité a également le mérite de rejoindre les exigences de la Conven52
tion de Palerme pour laquelle le critère de gravité se situe à partir de quatre ans d’emprisonnement .
L’exigence d’un minimum de matérialisation (découverte d’armes dissimulées, de cagoules, de gants,
de plans ou de photographies prises par les membres du groupement) distingue le délit de participation
à une association de malfaiteurs de la notion anglo-saxonne de conspiracy en vertu de laquelle une
répression encore plus en amont, dès le stade de la résolution criminelle, est possible, solution que le
53
droit français réprouve notamment pour des difficultés d’ordre probatoire . La divergence de conceptions est néanmoins admise par l’article 5 a) i) de la Convention de Palerme qui enjoint aux Etats de
punir au moins l’une des deux formes d’entente. A l’instar de la Convention, le droit français n’exige
54
pas qu’il y ait une hiérarchisation ou une distribution des rôles au sein du groupement, lequel peut
55
d’ailleurs être constitué à partir de deux personnes seulement au lieu de trois selon l’article 2 a) de
56
ladite Convention . Enfin, si le délit d’association en relation avec une entreprise terroriste requiert la
démonstration de cette finalité, le délit général de l’article 450-1 applicable à la criminalité organisée
ne mentionne aucune finalité particulière, silence qui s’explique par l’absence de définition du crime
57
organisé . Il faut souligner que les peines complémentaires encourues pour l’infraction en préparation peuvent être prononcées à l’encontre des membres du groupement, ce qui permet aux juridictions
de prononcer l’interdiction du territoire français si cette peine est prévue pour l’infraction en prépara58
tion (art. 450-5 CP) . Enfin, si l’infraction projetée par le groupement se réalise, le délit-obstacle de
participation à une association de malfaiteurs ne disparaît pas et des poursuites parallèles à celles
52
Art. 2 b) Convention de Palerme.
Cf. J. Cédras, art. préc., p. 349.
54
Tel n’est pas le cas pour la répression du groupe de combat, l’article 431-13 CP le définissant comme « tout
groupement de personnes détenant ou ayant accès à des armes, doté d’une organisation hiérarchisée et susceptible
de troubler l’ordre public ».
55
Crim., 29 octobre 1975, Bull. n° 230, RSC 1973, p. 417.
56
Selon l’article 2 a) de la Convention de Palerme, un groupe organisé est « un groupe structuré de trois personnes ou plus existant depuis un certain temps et agissant de concert dans le but de commettre une ou plusieurs
infractions graves ou infractions établies conformément à la convention pour en tirer, directement ou indirectement, un avantage financier ou un autre avantage matériel ». Cette dernière précision a été voulue pour distinguer
le groupe organisé des terroristes. L’article 2 c) précise qu’il s’agit d’un groupe qui ne s’est pas constitué au
hasard pour commettre immédiatement une infraction.
57
L’article 2 a) de la Convention de Palerme précise que les personnes doivent s’entendre « en vue de commettre
une infraction grave à une fin liée directement ou indirectement à l’obtention d’un avantage financier ou autre
avantage matériel ».
58
Voir Crim., 13 mars 1997, Bull. n° 105, pour la peine complémentaire d’interdiction du territoire français à
l’encontre de malfaiteurs préparant un trafic de stupéfiants.
53
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relatives à l’infraction finalement exécutée ou tentée pourront être intentées contre les différents parti59
cipants .
2. L’élargissement des formes de participation
Il est admis que la pluralité de participants ne doit pas entraîner une dilution des responsabilités. Toute
la difficulté réside dans le fait de savoir si règles traditionnelles applicables aux coauteurs ou aux
complices sont suffisamment adaptées pour saisir avec précision des actes commis aussi bien par des
individus qui, au sein d’un réseau criminel, ont une fonction de dirigeant ou de « cerveau » que par
ceux qui, en bas de l’échelle, ne sont que de simples sympathisants désireux de manifester leur soutien.
2.1 La complicité par instigation
Concernant les dirigeants des organisations criminelles, Monsieur Weigend, rapporteur général de la
section I du colloque préparatoire au XVI Congrès de l’AIDP sur les systèmes pénaux à l’épreuve du
60
crime organisé, s’interrogeait déjà sur les contours de la notion d’instigation . A première vue, celleci semble très utile pour réprimer celui qui reste dans l’ombre et communique aux autres membres du
groupe les orientations ou la stratégie à adopter. Ainsi que nous l’avons vu, la complicité par instiga61
tion (provocation ou instructions) doit cependant être suivie d’effet pour être punissable . Cette règle
offre un recours limité dans le cadre de la criminalité organisée car le dirigeant échappe à la répression
tant que les infractions préparées ne sont ni exécutées ni tentées. Tel sera le cas si la police intervient
trop tôt ou si l’exécutant se désiste spontanément. Bien que cette solution soit particulièrement cho62
quante, le législateur a toujours refusé, notamment pour des difficultés liées à la preuve ,
63
d’incriminer d’une façon générale la provocation non suivie d’effet . Dans un premier temps, la
jurisprudence vint à son secours en retenant la qualification d’association de malfaiteurs pour atteindre
64
le commanditaire d’un crime non exécuté ni même tenté . Alors que cette solution comblait une
lacune, la loi du 9 mars 2004 a intégré un nouvel article dans le code pénal afin de réprimer spécifiquement le mandat criminel. Marquant « la tendance lourde du droit pénal d’incriminer le plus en
65
amont possible du dommage » , l’article 221-5-1 du Code pénal incrimine désormais, par dérogation
aux règles sur la complicité, les offres, promesses ou propositions de dons présents ou avantages quelconques afin de commettre un assassinat ou un empoisonnement alors que ce crime n’est ni commis ni
tenté. L’application d’une telle disposition aux dirigeants d’une organisation criminelle risque cependant d’être délicate dans la mesure où elle fait l’objet d’une double limitation. Le texte ne prévoit en
effet que la provocation à une atteinte volontaire à la vie, ce qui exclut toutes les atteintes aux biens,
59
Crim., 22 janvier 1986, Bull. n° 29, Crim., 3 juillet 1991, Bull. n° 288 ; Crim., 20 novembre 2002, pourvoi n°
02-85930 ; Crim., 10 juillet 2002, pourvoi n° 02-83243. En cas de double déclaration de culpabilité, seules les
peines correspondant à l’infraction la plus grave pourront être prononcées.
60
Th. Weigend : « La qualité d’auteur ou d’instigateur est-elle suffisamment large pour englober la responsabilité
de personnes qui exercent des fonctions de direction ? », in Les systèmes pénaux à l’épreuve du crime organisé,
RIDP 1998, p. 497.
61
Crim., 25 octobre 1962, Bull. n° 292, D. 1963. 221, note Bouzat (Aff. Lacour qui retient l’impunité de
l’instigateur en cas de désistement de l’homme de main).
62
Les projets de révision du Code pénal prévoyaient de sortir l’instigateur du champ d’application de la complicité pour en faire l’auteur d’une infraction autonome. Voir notamment le projet de Code pénal de 1989 qui contenait un article 121-6 : « Est instigateur la personne qui sciemment fait commettre par un tiers les faits incriminés
ou provoque directement un tiers à commettre un crime, lors même qu’en raison de circonstances indépendantes
de la volonté de l’instigateur, la provocation n’est pas suivie d’effet ».
63
Sauf en droit pénal des mineurs, l’article 227-21 CP punissant de cinq ans d’emprisonnement le fait de provoquer des mineurs à commettre des crimes ou des délits.
64
Crim., 30 avril 1996, Bull. n° 176.
65
J. Danet, De la procédure à la répression de la criminalité organisée, ou laquelle est l’instrument de l’autre, AJ
Pénal 2004, p. 192.
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domaine de prédilection des réseaux criminels. En outre, il faudra démontrer que le dirigeant connaissait précisément la nature des infractions commises par les différents exécutants, ce qui ne correspond
pas toujours à la réalité.
2.2 La complicité par aide et assistance
Les difficultés liées à la preuve de l’élément moral se retrouvent en bas de l’échelle, non pas à propos
de la responsabilité des hommes de main qui peuvent être poursuivis en tant qu’auteurs des infractions
commises, mais à propos de toutes les personnes gravitant autour d’un réseau criminel. Les participants du XVIe Congrès international de droit pénal se sont déjà demandés si la notion de complicité
par aide et assistance était suffisamment vaste pour englober ceux qui fournissent un soutien logisti66
que sans faire partie de l’association en tant que membre ? Cette question faisait elle-même suite
aux interrogations des jeunes pénalistes concernant la responsabilité du chauffeur de taxi, du livreur
de pizzas ou de l’avocat des différents membres d’un groupement criminel. La question vaut également pour les réseaux terroristes qui bénéficient d’un nombre important de sympathisants, lesquels
n’entreront probablement jamais en contact avec les activistes. Le bon sens impose ici de fixer une
limite à l’élargissement de la responsabilité pénale, limite dont l’élément moral pourrait être l’élément
déterminant. L’extension, par la Cour de cassation, de la théorie de la complicité à l’hypothèse de la
complicité de complicité se révèle ici particulièrement utile. Chargée de se prononcer sur la responsabilité de celui qui aide le complice à mener à bien son projet, la jurisprudence a finalement accepté,
après diverses hésitations, de retenir le complice indirect dans les liens de la prévention dès lors qu’il
avait connaissance du projet criminel et manifestait la volonté de s’y associer. Ainsi, « l’aide ou
l’assistance apportée en connaissance de cause à l’auteur de l’escroquerie, même par l’intermédiaire
67
d’un autre complice, constitue la criminalité incriminée par l’article 121-7 du Code pénal » . La
répression de la complicité de complicité permet de poursuivre tous ceux qui n’ont aucun lien avec les
auteurs principaux, quelle que soit leur motivation (financière, morale, religieuse, etc.), la seule exigence reposant sur la connaissance d’un projet criminel doublée de la volonté de s’y associer pour en
faciliter l’exécution. Tel n’est pas le cas du livreur de pizzas ou du chauffeur de taxi qui se contentent
d’exercer leur métier tout en connaissant ou en se doutant des activités illicites de leurs clients. Les
sympathisants ou les partisans qui offrent leur concours sciemment seront en revanche responsables
soit sur le fondement de la complicité (si l’aide est antérieure ou concomitante à la réalisation de
l’infraction principale), soit sur la base de crimes ou de délits propres au droit pénal spécial (si l’aide
est postérieure à l’infraction) tels que le recel de malfaiteurs, le recel, le blanchiment...
3 Le recours au droit pénal spécial (association de malfaiteurs, non-justification des ressources, financement des activités illicites)
L’élargissement des formes de participation à l’infraction ne repose pas seulement sur l’extension des
règles relatives à la complicité. En droit pénal spécial, des infractions particulièrement larges ou reposant sur une présomption de responsabilité se révèlent également utiles pour appréhender le plus grand
nombre de participants à une activité illicite.
3.1 La participation à une association de malfaiteurs
Selon les conclusions du rapporteur général du précédent colloque préparatoire de l’AIDP sur le crime
organisé, il est plus facile de poursuivre les dirigeants d’une organisation criminelle sur le fondement
du délit de participation de malfaiteurs que sur celui de la complicité par instigation. En effet, il n’est
alors pas nécessaire de prouver que le dirigeant entendait s’associer à telle infraction déterminée. Il
suffit d’établir qu’il aura participé à la planification d’une infraction grave, la sanction étant indépendante de celle qui accompagne la commission des infractions commises par les exécutants. Au niveau
de la répression, une autre distinction doit être faite avec la complicité lorsque l’association de malfai66
Blakesley, art. préc., p. 44
Crim., 15 décembre 2004, Bull. n° 322, D. 2005, 10050, note J.-Y. Maréchal, RPDP 2005, 403, obs. J.-Y.
Chevallier, RSC 2005, 298, obs. G. Vermelle.
67
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teurs poursuit une finalité terroriste. La loi du 9 mars 2004 a en effet permis de saisir avec plus de
finesse le réel degré d’implication de chaque membre, le fait d’organiser ou de diriger un réseau terroriste étant un crime puni de vingt ans de réclusion tandis que la participation est un délit puni de dix
ans d’emprisonnement (art. 421-5 CP).
3.2 La non-justification des ressources
De son côté, la loi du 23 janvier 2006 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme a étendu le recours à des
68
69
présomptions de culpabilité en généralisant les infractions dites d’entourage . Alors que le Code
pénal prévoyait déjà le délit de non justification de ressources pour certaines infractions graves (stupéfiants, proxénétisme, traite des êtres humains, association de malfaiteurs), le nouvel article 321-6
incrimine d’une façon générale « le fait de ne pas pouvoir justifier de ressources correspondant à son
train de vie ou de ne pas pouvoir justifier de l’origine d’un bien détenu, tout en état en relations habituelles avec une ou plusieurs personnes qui soit se livrent à la commission de crime ou de délits punis
d’au moins cinq ans d’emprisonnement et procurant à celles-ci un profit direct ou indirect, soit sont
les victimes d’une de ces infractions ». Les faits sont punis d’une peine de trois ans d’emprisonnement
et de 75 000 euros d’amende, les mêmes peines sanctionnant le fait de faciliter la justification de ressources fictives. Des peines aggravées, portant la répression à sept ans d’emprisonnement et à 200 000
euros d’amende, sont prévues lorsque les infractions commises constituent les crimes ou délits de
traite des êtres humains, d’extorsion ou d’association de malfaiteurs, ou qu’elles constituent les crimes
ou délits de trafic de stupéfiants, y compris en cas de relations habituelles avec une ou plusieurs per70
sonnes faisant usage de stupéfiants .
3.3 Le financement d’activités terroristes
Afin d’atteindre le terrorisme à sa source, la lutte contre le financement des activités terroristes est
devenue une priorité à la suite des attentats du 11 septembre 2001. La loi du 15 novembre 2001 a, sur
ce point, entendu anticiper la décision-cadre de l’Union européenne en instituant au sein du chapitre
relatif aux actes de terrorisme un nouveau délit consistant dans « le fait de financer une entreprise
terroriste en fournissant, en réunissant ou en gérant des fonds, des valeurs ou des biens quelconques
ou en donnant des conseils à cette fin, dans l’intention de voir ces fonds, valeurs ou biens utilisés ou
en sachant qu’ils sont destinés à être utilisés, en tout ou en partie, en vue de commettre l’un quelconque des actes de terrorisme prévus au présent chapitre, indépendamment de la survenance d’un tel
acte » (art. 421-2-2 CP). Une peine de 10 ans d’emprisonnement sanctionne aussi bien le délit
consommé que sa tentative. Les financiers sont donc punissables, même s’ils se contentent de donner
71
des conseils et si les actes de terrorisme ne sont finalement pas exécutés . Le droit pénal français
reconnaissant la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales, il en est de même des banques ou des
organisations internationales impliquées dans le financement du terrorisme.
4. La responsabilité pénale des personnes morales
La mise en œuvre de la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales, telle qu’elle était prévue par le
Code pénal entré en vigueur le 1er mars 1994, était à l’origine limitée par le principe de spécialité. A
la différence des personnes physiques, les personnes morales ne pouvaient être poursuivies que pour
un certain nombre d’infractions limitativement énumérées par le législateur. Cependant, au fil des
réformes, la liste des infractions n’a eu de cesse de s’allonger (allant même jusqu’à comprendre
l’abandon de famille !) de telle façon que la loi du 9 mars 2004 renonça au principe de spécialité pour
68
Les présomptions de culpabilité sont admises par le droit européen dès lors que les droits de la défense sont
préservés, cf CEDH, 7 octobre 1988, Salabiaku c/ France.
69
Sur ce point, cf circulaire du 3 février 2006 CRIM 06-2/G1 ; J. Danet, note préc. p. 193.
70
En contrepartie, les dispositions éparses qui visaient au fil des incriminations le fait de ne pouvoir justifier de
ressources correspondant à son train de vie sont abrogées (art 222-39-1, art 225-4-8, 312-7-1 et 450-2-1).
71
Sur le sujet, voir Desgens-Pasanau, La lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent et le financement du terrorisme :
quels enjeux pour la vie privée de la clientèle bancaire, Gaz. Pal. 2004, 1, doctr., 222.
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72
généraliser cette forme de responsabilité à compter du 31 décembre 2005. Quoi qu’il en soit, les
actes de terrorisme (art. 422-5) et la participation à une association de malfaiteurs faisaient déjà partie
des infractions pour lesquelles la responsabilité de la personne morale était possible, la loi du 9 mars
2004 ayant précisé que les personnes morales impliquées dans une association de malfaiteurs devaient
être assimilées aux personne physiques pour la peine complémentaire de confiscation de tout ou partie
des biens (art. 450-5). Conformément à l’article 10 § 3 de la Convention de Palerme, la responsabilité
de la personne morale peut se cumuler avec celle des personnes physiques qui ont commis l’infraction
pour son compte.
5. La diffusion des idées terroristes et la répression du prosélytisme idéologique
Tout en soulignant que le système juridique actuel permettait déjà de combattre la propagation d’idées
extrémistes, le Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme manifestait la
volonté de mieux appréhender le prosélytisme. Actuellement, l’article 24 de la loi du 29 juillet 1881
sur la liberté de la presse punit de cinq ans d’emprisonnement et de 45 000 euros d’amende le fait de
provoquer directement aux actes de terrorisme prévus par le titre II du Livre IV du Code pénal, ou
d’en faire l’apologie. La provocation, définie comme un acte « tendant à susciter un sentiment
73
d’hostilité ou de rejet envers un groupe de personnes » , doit être faite selon l’un des moyens énumérés à l’article 23, c'est-à-dire soit par des discours, cris ou menaces proférés dans des lieux ou réunions publics, soit par des écrits, imprimés, dessins, gravures, peintures, emblèmes, images ou tout
autre support de l’écrit, de la parole ou de l’image vendus ou distribués, mis en vente ou exposés dans
des lieux ou réunions publics, soit par des placards ou des affiches exposés au regard du public, soit
par tout moyen de communication audiovisuelle. La publicité est donc un élément constitutif du délit
de provocation à des actes de terrorisme.
Parallèlement au dispositif pénal, la loi du 10 janvier 1936 sur les groupes de combat et les milices
privées, modifiée par la loi du 9 septembre 1986, prévoit la possibilité pour le président de la République de dissoudre par décret pris en conseil des ministres les associations ou les groupements de fait se
livrant sur le territoire français, ou à partir de ce territoire à des agissements en vue de provoquer des
actes de terrorisme en France ou à l’Etranger. Des outils adaptés contre les groupements existent donc.
Selon le Livre Blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme, les poursuites
pénales sont plus délicates lorsque la provocation est pratiquée d’individu à individu. Le délit de provocation à des actes de terrorisme étant soumis au régime de la loi de 1881 sur la liberté de la presse,
la prescription de l’action publique est de trois mois et le recours à des procédures de traitement rapide
de la délinquance, telles que la comparution immédiate, est interdit. De plus, l’exigence de publicité
n’étant pas toujours adaptée aux différentes formes de provocation, un élargissement du champ
d’application du délit parait souhaitable.
En attendant, la loi du 9 mars 2004 a préféré innové en prévoyant une infraction obstacle consistant
dans le fait de diffuser par tout moyen des procédés permettant la fabrication d’engins de destruction
de toute nature (art. 322-6-1 CP). La diffusion par la voie d’un réseau de télécommunications permet
de porter la répression de un an d’emprisonnement et 15 euros d’amende à trois ans
d’emprisonnement et 45000 euros d’amende.
Une nouvelle circonstance aggravante, issue de la loi du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans
l’économie numérique a également été instituée afin de réprimer plus sévèrement l’utilisation d’un
moyen de cryptologie pour préparer, commettre ou faciliter la préparation ou la commission d’une
infraction (132-79 CP). L’édiction de pénalités particulièrement adaptées aux formes les plus graves
de criminalité caractérise ainsi la récente évolution du droit pénal.
72
N. Stolowy, La disparition du principe de spécialité dans la mise en cause des personnes morales, JCP 2004. I.
138.
73
Crim. 14 mai 2002, Dr.pénal 2002 comm. 107.
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6. Particularités de la sanction
La loi du 9 septembre 1986 énumérait des infractions de droit commun pour les soumettre à un régime
procédural dérogatoire lorsqu’elles étaient commises à des fins d’intimidation et de terreur, mais ne
prévoyait aucune pénalité spécifique pour sanctionner les auteurs de tels actes. L’aggravation de la
répression, par rapport aux infractions de référence qui ne nécessitent pas la preuve d’une intention
terroriste, résulte de la loi du 22 juillet 1992 portant réforme des dispositions du Code pénal relatives à
la répression des crimes et délits contre la nation, l’Etat et la paix publique. Le droit pénal allie, en la
matière, sévérité et tolérance pour mieux personnaliser la répression.
6-1 La sévérité des peines
Constitutif d’un dol aggravé, le but terroriste requis pour caractériser les actes de terrorisme permet
d’augmenter la pénalité par rapport aux infractions ordinaires. Des peines sévères allant de 15 ans de
réclusion criminelle à la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité sont également prévues pour le terrorisme
écologique, l’association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste et le financement du
terrorisme. Des peines complémentaires comme l’interdiction du territoire pour les auteurs étrangers
(art. 422-4) ou la confiscation des biens -dont les produits sont affectés au fonds d’indemnisation des
victimes-, peuvent enfin être prononcées par les juridictions. Alors que la confiscation ne s’applique
normalement qu’aux biens qui ont servis à commettre l’infraction ou qui en sont le produit, elle peut
être étendue, pour les infractions de terrorisme, de blanchiment et d’association de malfaiteurs, à tout
ou partie des biens des auteurs, quelle qu’en soit la nature, meubles ou immeubles, divis ou indivis (art
324-7, 422-6 et 450-3). Pour le terrorisme, la spécificité de la sanction pénale s’étend enfin à
l’exécution de la peine. La prison étant devenue, selon les observations du Livre Blanc, un lieu de
prosélytisme dangereux, voire « un réservoir d’activistes radicalisés disponibles pour mener des ac74
tions terroristes » , la loi du 23 janvier 2006 a aménagé le traitement carcéral des personnes condamnées pour terrorisme en centralisant l’application des peines au Tribunal de grande instance de Paris.
L’objectif est de faciliter la conduite d’une politique rationnelle de suivi de ces condamnés, quel que
soit leur lieu de détention ou de résidence.
Outre la sévérité des peines encourues et la centralisation du suivi des condamnés, l’existence de mécanismes d’exemption ou de réduction de peine est l’une des particularités les plus marquantes du
dispositif de lutte contre les formes graves de criminalité.
6-2 Le dispositif d’exemption ou de réduction de peine
Censé prévenir la commission de nouvelles infractions et faciliter le démantèlement des réseaux, le
système des repentis, inspiré de la législation italienne et vivement encouragé par le droit internatio75
nal , était initialement limité aux atteintes aux intérêts fondamentaux de la nation (complot et mouvement insurrectionnel), au terrorisme, à la fausse monnaie et à l’association de malfaiteurs. Les travaux parlementaires précédant le vote de la loi du 9 mars 2004 témoignaient de la volonté d’étendre le
dispositif existant à la criminalité organisée76. Finalement, le législateur est allé plus loin en intégrant
la notion de repenti au Livre I du Code pénal. Figurant au sein de « Dispositions communes », le nouvel article 132-78 du Code pénal définit ainsi une hypothèse d’exemption de peine lorsque l’infraction
n’a pas été réalisée et deux autres de réduction de peine lorsque le repenti a seulement permis de limi77
ter les conséquences d’une infraction déjà réalisée . Trois circonstances distinctes permettent donc à
des auteurs ou des complices de bénéficier de la clémence du législateur :
74
Livre Blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme, 2006, p. 55.
Cf. Art. 26 Convention de Palerme, Résolution du conseil de l’UE du 20 décembre 1996 relative aux collaborateurs de justice dans le cadre de la lutte contre la criminalité organisée, art. 6 de la décision-cadre du conseil du
13 juin 2002 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme.
76
Débats parlementaires, AN, séance 21 mai 2003, JOAN n° 46.
77
Voir également l’article 721-3 CPP qui permet de réduire d’un tiers du quantum prononcé la peine des personnes condamnées lorsqu’elles ont accepté de faire des révélations aux autorités administratives ou judiciaires.
75
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- bénéficie d’une exemption de peine celui qui a tenté de commettre un crime ou un délit mais qui a
permis d’éviter sa réalisation et d’identifier les auteurs,
- bénéfice d’une réduction de peine celui qui a commis un crime ou un délit mais qui a permis de faire
cesser l’infraction, d’éviter la réalisation d’un dommage et faciliter l’identification des auteurs et
complices,
- bénéficie également d’une réduction de peine celui qui a commis un crime ou un délit mais qui a
permis d’éviter la réalisation d’une infraction connexe, cette dernière circonstance correspondant
78
particulièrement à l’hypothèse de la criminalité organisée .
Bien qu’ayant intégré la partie générale du Code pénal, le régime des repentis reste soumis à une
condition de spécialité, la loi précisant au cas par cas les infractions pour lesquelles il trouve à
s’appliquer. La dualité de sources entre l’article 132-78 du Code pénal d’une part et les articles propres à chaque infraction d’autre part est ainsi à l’origine d’une première difficulté d’interprétation, les
régimes spéciaux se distinguant le plus souvent du cadre général défini par l’article 132-78. Le manque de cohérence du dispositif législatif concerne également les infractions visées : les infractions
relevant de la criminalité organisée ne bénéficient pas toutes de la tolérance du législateur en cas de
dénonciation tandis que des formes plus classiques de délinquance (assassinat ou empoisonnement)
peuvent en tirer profit. Aucune corrélation n’a effectivement été établie entre le champ d’application
des dispositions sur les repentis et la liste des infractions énumérées à l’article 706-73 du Code de
procédure pénale. Le meurtre en bande organisée, les destructions de biens en bande organisée, l’aide
à l’entrée et au séjour d’un étranger commis en bande organisée ou encore le blanchiment ont ainsi été
exclus du régime des repentis sans que l’on puisse connaître les raisons qui ont guidé cette sélection.
Mais les principales critiques tendent principalement à mettre en cause la pertinence ou la légitimité
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d’un dispositif qui relève d’une logique de négociation et induit un risque de manipulation au mépris
des droits de la défense. Le bénéficiaire doit en effet renoncer à son droit au silence en avouant sa
participation au crime ou au délit. Or la promesse d’une exemption ou d’une réduction de peine peut
faire pression sur sa volonté, circonstance difficilement vérifiable lorsque l’aveu est obtenu au stade
de l’enquête de police sans la présence de l’avocat. La garantie selon laquelle aucune condamnation
ne peut être prononcée sur le seul fondement des déclarations émanant d’un repenti parait insuffisante
80
à lever les doutes résultant de la nouvelle orientation législative . Son effectivité dépendra notamment de la qualité du programme de protection des repentis et de leur famille prévu par l’article 70663-1 du Code de procédure pénale. Ainsi que les articles 24 et 26 de la Convention de Palerme le
préconisent, les repentis et certains de leurs proches peuvent bénéficier, par ordonnance motivée rendue par le président du tribunal de grande instance, d’une identité d’emprunt dont la révélation consti81
tue un délit pénal .
C) Autres questions
82
Complétant la réponse pénale , la loi du 23 janvier 2006 comprend un volet de mesures destinées à
mieux détecter la menace terroriste.
1. Les réponses autres que pénales
78
La circulaire ministérielle 2004-13, G1/02-09. 2004, BO min. just. N° 95, vise « le voleur membre d’une
équipe dite à tiroirs qui dénonce les vols commis en bande organisée différents de ceux auxquels il a participé et
commis par des personnes qui ont été les complices de ses propres coauteurs ».
79
J. Danet, art. préc., p. 195.
80
J. Danet, ibid.
81
S. Detraz, Un aspect de la protection des infiltrés et des repentis : le délit de révélation d’identité, RSC 2006, p.
49.
82
La loi du 23 janvier 2006 modifie, outre le Code pénal et le Code de procédure pénale, le Code des assurances,
le Code de l’aviation civile, le Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile, le Code monétaire et
financier, le Code des postes et télécommunications ainsi que plusieurs lois non codifiées.
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Les principales mesures préventives mises en place par le législateur consistent à renforcer la surveillance des zones sensibles et à accroître la capacité de renseignements des autorités administratives à
l’encontre de certaines personnes.
1.1 La surveillance des lieux
La loi du 23 janvier 2006 étend le réseau de vidéosurveillance mis en place par la loi du 21 janvier
1995 en autorisant le préfet à prescrire ce dispositif, aux fins de prévention du terrorisme, sur tous les
sites constituant des cibles potentielles. Les grands magasins, les lieux de culte, les infrastructures de
transport, les sièges sociaux des grandes entreprises peuvent ainsi être surveillés en permanence,
l’autorisation préfectorale étant prescrite pour une durée de cinq ans renouvelables. Les personnes
morales, y compris privées, peuvent également déployer un système de vidéosurveillance pour la
protection des abords immédiats de leurs bâtiments et installations.
Le législateur a pareillement souhaité renforcer le dispositif de surveillance des véhicules en précisant
la loi du 18 mars 2003 qui avait autorisé la lecture automatique des plaques d’immatriculation aux fins
de vérification au fichier des véhicules volés. Dorénavant autorisée pour prévenir et réprimer le terrorisme, réprimer la criminalité organisée, le vol et le recel de voitures volées, la contrebande et certains
délits douaniers, la lecture systématique ainsi que la prise de photographies des occupants est permise
en tous points appropriés du territoire, en particulier dans les zones frontalières, portuaires ou aéroportuaires ainsi que sur les grands axes de transit national et international. Ce dispositif de surveillance
peut également être mis en œuvre, à titre temporaire, pour la préservation de l’ordre public, à
l’occasion d’évènements particuliers ou de grands rassemblements de personnes. Les renseignements
obtenus sont conservés huit jours, voire un mois en cas de rapprochement positif avec le fichier des
véhicules volés. Le Conseil constitutionnel n’a constaté aucune atteinte au droit à la vie privée en
dépit des vives critiques formulées à l’encontre du dispositif légal, la CNIL, notamment, dénonçant
l’institution d’un nouveau contrôle d’identité à l’insu des intéressés. La prise de photographie des
occupants des véhicules rapproche en effet cette mesure de celles relatives à la surveillance des personnes.
1.2 La surveillance des personnes
Modifiant l’article 78-2 du Code de procédure pénale, la loi du 23 janvier 2006 facilite les contrôles
d’identité systématiques dans les trains internationaux, les contrôles pouvant désormais intervenir
entre la frontière et le premier arrêt se situant au-delà des vingt kilomètres de la frontière (art 78-2
CPP) ou entre le premier arrêt et un arrêt situé dans la limite des cinquante kilomètres suivants sur les
lignes internationales présentant « des caractéristiques particulières de desserte ». La prévention du
terrorisme n’est pas la seule raison d’une extension qui vise aussi à démanteler les réseaux
d’immigration irrégulière.
Faisant suite aux difficiles négociations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union européenne et à la directive
européenne du 29 avril 2004 concernant l’obligation pour les transporteurs de communiquer les données relatives aux passagers, la loi du 23 janvier 2006 oblige également, sous peine d’une amende de
50 000 euros, l’ensemble des transporteurs à transmettre aux services spécialisés dans la prévention
contre le terrorisme les données personnelles relatives aux passagers. Les données figurant sur les
cartes de débarquement et d’embarquement font ainsi l’objet d’un traitement informatisé qui peut être
croisé avec le fichier des personnes recherchées et le système d’information Schengen.
La prévention du terrorisme autorise en outre certains policiers individuellement désignés et dûment
habilités à consulter les fichiers administratifs du Ministère de l’Intérieur (fichier national des immatriculations, permis de conduire, cartes nationales d’identité…) alors que ces consultations étaient
auparavant limitées au cadre judiciaire.
De la même façon, les données de connexion (identification des numéros d’abonnement ou de
connexion, recensement de l’ensemble des numéros d’abonnement ou de connexion d’une personne
désignée, localisation des équipements utilisés, liste des numéros appelés et appelant, durée et date des
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communications), qui jusqu’à présent étaient conservées dans une finalité judiciaire, peuvent être
83
réquisitionnées suivant une procédure proche de celle prévue pour les interceptions de sécurité . Afin
d’éviter des brèches dans ce nouveau dispositif de surveillance, le législateur a assimilé aux opérateurs
de communication électronique toutes les personnes dont l’activité professionnelle ou accessoire est
d’offrir au public une connexion internet. Les fournisseurs d’accès à Internet comme les cybercafés ou
les opérateurs de spots wifi sont donc tenus de conserver les données de connexion parmi lesquelles
figurent celles relatives à l’identification de la personne concernée.
Enfin, sous la pression de la communauté internationale et notamment de la Résolution 1373 du
84
Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies , la loi du 23 janvier 2006 étend la procédure de gel adminis85
tratif des avoirs financiers en supprimant toute considération liée à la nationalité des suspects. Le gel
des avoirs, qui était exclu à l’encontre des résidents communautaires ou français, est désormais opposable aux personnes physiques soupçonnées de faciliter, de participer ou de se livrer à des actes de
terrorisme, aux personnes morales détenues ou contrôlées directement ou indirectement par ces personnes physiques, aux copropriétaires des fonds, instruments et ressources gelées, à toute personne
titulaire d’un compte joint dont l’autre titulaire est une personne propriétaire, nue propriétaire ou usufruitière ayant commis ou tenté de commettre un acte de terrorisme, à tout créancier et à tout tiers
pouvant invoquer des droits sur les fonds, instruments financiers et ressources économiques considé86
rés (art. L. 564-1 Code monétaire et financier ). La décision est prise par le Ministre de l’Economie,
saisi par les services spécialisés dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, sur le fondement de motifs raisonnables permettant de soupçonner ou de penser que les fonds sont liés au terrorisme. Par dérogation au
droit commun, l’arrêté ministériel est exécutoire dès sa publication au journal officiel sans qu’il soit
besoin de le notifier à la personne qui en fait l’objet. La durée du gel est de six mois renouvelables,
aucun délai butoir n’étant fixé. La question de l’atteinte au droit de propriété résultant d’une mesure
de gel qui pourrait se prolonger dans le temps n’a cependant pas été étudiée par le Conseil constitutionnel. Cette lacune est d’autant plus regrettable qu’aucun recours spécifique n’a été institué. Seul un
87
recours pour excès de pouvoir assorti d’un référé suspension pourra donc être intenté afin que le
juge administratif se prononce sur l’existence des motifs raisonnables permettant d’établir un lien avec
un groupement terroriste.
83
L’atteinte à la vie privée est cependant moins directe que dans le cadre des écoutes puisque les réquisitions
administratives ne portent pas sur le contenu des échanges.
84
Si le gel des avoirs est déterminant pour la communauté internationale, le rapporteur français du projet de loi se
montrait plus réservé sur l’efficacité d’un tel procédé et mettait en garde « contre l’idée reçue selon laquelle la
surveillance des flux financiers internationaux serait le meilleur moyen pour lutter contre les réseaux terroristes ».
Sur cette controverse, cf. C. Cutajar, Le gel des avoirs terroristes, nouvel outil de lutte contre le financement du
terrorisme, Bulletin Joly Bourse, N°3, 2006, p. 352.
85
Une procédure judiciaire est prévue par l’article 706-103 CPP qui autorise le juge des libertés et de la détention, sur requête du procureur de la République, à ordonner à titre conservatoire le gel des avoirs dans le cadre
d’une information judiciaire portant sur les infractions liées à la criminalité organisée afin de garantir le recouvrement des amendes encourues ainsi que l’indemnisation des victimes et l’exécution de la confiscation.
86
L’article L. 564-1 CMF dresse une liste limitative des organismes requis, laquelle inclut les établissements du
secteur bancaire, la Banque de France, les entreprises d’assurance, les institutions de prévoyance, les entreprises
d’investissement, les sociétés de gestion d’organismes de placements collectifs… et exclut les expertscomptables, les notaires, les huissiers de justice, les administrateurs et mandataires judiciaires à la liquidation des
entreprises ainsi que les avocats.
87
Selon S. Slama et F. Rolin, il aurait été préférable de faire succéder une mesure provisoire et une mesure définitive, « la première permettant, en urgence, de prononcer le gel des avoirs, la seconde, ex post, de vérifier son
bien fondé au terme d’une procédure garantissant le respect des droits de la défense. L’efficacité n’y aurait pas
perdu, la garantie des droits y aurait gagné », Les libertés dans l’entonnoir de la législation anti-terroriste, AJDA
2006, Act. Lég., p. 982.
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2 Les droits des victimes
Par le biais de la constitution de partie civile, la procédure pénale permet à toutes les victimes
d’infractions pénales d’être reconnues. Depuis la loi du 6 juillet 1990, les victimes d’actes de terrorisme peuvent en outre bénéficier de l’expérience de l’Association SOS Attentats qui, en tant que
personne morale, s’est vue reconnaître la possibilité de se constituer partie civile dans les procédures
relatives à des crimes de terrorisme ou à des délits d’association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une
88
entreprise terroriste (art. 2-9 CPP) . Grâce à la mobilisation des victimes d’attentats regroupés au
sein de cette association, un fonds de garantie a également été institué par la loi du 9 septembre 1986
afin d’assurer une indemnisation déconnectée de la procédure pénale. Ce fonds, dont le financement
est assuré par un prélèvement sur les contrats d’assurance de biens (multirisque habitation, entreprise
et automobile), répare intégralement les dommages résultant des atteintes à la personne subis par les
victimes de terrorisme. L’indemnisation est versée aux victimes d’actes de terrorisme commis sur le
territoire national, aux personnes de nationalité française victimes de ces mêmes actes ainsi qu’à leurs
ayants droit, quelle que soit leur nationalité. En cas de prise d’otages, une indemnisation est versée
aux otages libérés tandis que les familles des otages détenus bénéficient de provisions. Enfin, les dispositions du Code des pensions militaires d’invalidité et des victimes de la guerre ont été étendues aux
victimes du terrorisme, assimilées à des victimes civiles de guerre, ce qui leur permet notamment de
bénéficier de soins gratuits et d’accéder aux hôpitaux militaires.
D) Propositions de réforme
Le phénomène de succession de lois touchant spécifiquement certaines formes de délinquance est à
89
l’origine de nombreuses critiques, les auteurs dénonçant un mélange des genres qui conduit à
90
l’éclatement du droit pénal . L’institution de procédures ou de dispositifs de surveillance dérogatoi91
92
res, telle qu’elle résulte notamment des lois du 9 mars 2004 et du 23 janvier 2006 , a mobilisé les
avocats ainsi que les associations de défense des droits de l’homme qui y ont vu une trop grande atteinte aux libertés individuelles. Très brièvement, les principales critiques dénoncent la généralisation
des réponses d’exception, la perméabilité de certaines distinctions ainsi que le défaut de toute cohérence d’ensemble.
La mise en œuvre d’une répression ciblée consacrant des procédures dérogatoires aurait, en premier
93
lieu, un effet de contagion sur des formes de délinquances plus classiques . La légitimité de la lutte
contre le terrorisme ou la criminalité organisée semble en effet servir de prétexte au législateur pour
94
étendre des règles exceptionnelles au droit commun . Tel est le cas de la loi du 9 mars 2004 qui, en
même temps qu’elle adapte la procédure pénale à la criminalité organisée, modifie la procédure de
88
Sur ce sujet, F. Rudetzki, Etat de la législation en France, le rôle joué par SOS Attentats, in Terrorisme, victimes et responsabilité pénale internationale, préc., p. 231.
89
P.E. Spitz, A propos de la décision du Conseil Constitutionnel n° 96-377 DC du 16 juillet 1996 sur la loi tendant à renforcer la répression du terrorisme, RFDA 1997, p. 538.
90
Voir notamment J. Pradel, Les infractions de terrorisme, D. 1986, p. 40.
91
Pour les critiques et la fronde des avocats concernant la loi du 9 mars 2004, voir notamment R. Badinter, Une
loi de régression, Le nouvel Observateur, 12-18 février 2004, Le Monde, 11 février 2004 où J.-Y. Leborgne,
Président de l’association des avocats pénalistes, dénonce les archaïsmes et les régressions du projet de loi.Voir
également M. Dobkine selon lequel « la loi du 9 mars 2004 organise un état d’exception permanent et afflige les
libertés publiques », note sous Conseil Constitutionnel, 2 mars 2004, décision n° 2004-492 DC, D. 2004, p. 956
92
S. Slama et F. Rolin, Les libertés dans l’entonnoir de la législation anti-terroriste, art. préc., p. 975.
93
L’observation est également valable en droit international puisque sur 57 propositions en matière de lutte antiterroriste présentées au sommet de l’Union européenne des 25 et 26 mars 2004, 27 n’avaient rien à voir avec le
terrorisme et concernaient la délinquance en général, Ph Mary, A propos des similitudes entre « guerre antiterroriste » et « lutte contre la délinquance urbaine », RSC 2006, p. 476.
94
Cf. J. Borricand selon lequel « l’ensemble des règles dérogatoires au droit commun reproduites dans le code de
procédure pénale a tendance a faire tâche d’huile », art. préc., p. 177.
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France
droit commun dans un sens plus répressif. Les perquisitions sans l’assentiment de la personne sont
désormais possibles en matière d’enquête préliminaire, un nouveau cas de flagrance a été défini et la
durée d’une telle enquête peut atteindre quinze jours. Les dispositions ouvrant droit à une exemption
ou à une réduction de peine en cas de collaboration avec les autorités policières ou judiciaires ont
également été généralisées afin de pouvoir être appliquées à une délinquance plus traditionnelle.
Au niveau de la technique législative, des mesures présentées comme exceptionnelles, et donc limitées
dans le temps, sont le plus souvent pérennisées par les lois ultérieures. De la même façon, la méthode
de l’énumération permet au législateur d’ajouter, au fil des réformes, des infractions à la liste initiale,
généralisant ainsi un dispositif qui se voulait limitatif et exceptionnel. L’exemple de la responsabilité
pénale des personnes morales, qui reposait à l’origine sur le principe de spécialité, est à cet égard très
révélateur. Aujourd’hui, nul ne peut prévoir comment évoluera la liste des infractions énumérées à
l’article 706-73 du Code de procédure pénale censée regrouper les infractions liées à la criminalité
organisée, la liste s’étant déjà enrichie d’un nouveau délit (non-justification de ressources correspondant au train de vie) après le vote de la loi du 23 janvier 2006.
En termes de politique criminelle, il est à craindre que les définitions plus ou moins larges des différentes formes de criminalité grave ne permettent enfin de viser d’autres comportements, le réseau de
95
répression ciblée sortant ainsi de ses limites . Il suffit pour s’en convaincre de citer la loi du 22 juillet
1996 qui proposait d’intégrer le délit d’aide à l’entrée et au séjour d’un étranger en situation irrégu96
lière parmi les actes de terrorisme définis à l’article 421-1 du Code pénal . Faute de lien direct entre
97
le terrorisme et l’immigration irrégulière, l’assimilation a été censurée par le Conseil constitutionnel
mais le risque d’amalgames est réapparu avec la loi du 23 janvier 2006 dont le dispositif de prévention
contre le terrorisme contient en réalité de nombreuses dispositions visant à contrôler l’immigration et
98
le déplacement de personnes . De la même façon, lors des travaux précédant l’adoption de la décision-cadre de l’Union européenne relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme, de nombreuses voix ont dénoncé les risques que pouvait entraîner une définition floue des actes de terrorisme, « en particulier
pour les mouvements syndicaux, écologistes et altermondialistes qui réclament des changements parfois radicaux dans la politique actuelle, mais ne font qu’exercer leurs libertés les plus élémentai99
res » . Une définition trop large aurait également pu conduire la France, prétextant d’éventuels recoupements entre les réseaux terroristes et les jeunes des cités, à étendre la répression anti-terroriste
95
Ph. Mary : « Le flou des définitions, la nébuleuse des champs d’intervention et l’exception des dispositifs
créent une insécurité juridique », art. préc., p. 479.
96
Les parlementaires à l’origine de la saisine du Conseil constitutionnel ont dénoncé « la confusion ainsi opérée
entre deux législations, celle sur les étrangers et celle sur le terrorisme, confusion qui, suggérant un lien de causalité, alimente toute sorte de suspicions illégitimes », cf C. Teitgen-Colly et F. Julien-Laferrière, AJDA 1997, p. 89.
97
Le Conseil constitutionnel a censuré l’assimilation du délit d’aide à l’entrée ou au séjour d’un étranger à un
acte de terrorisme tout en faisant remarquer que ce comportement pouvait entrer dans le champ de la répression
de la complicité, du recel de criminel ou encore d’association de malfaiteurs lorsque le lien avec une entreprise
terroriste apparaissait. Cf B. Mercuzot, Lutte contre le terrorisme et constitution, D. 1997, p. 69.
98
S. Slama et F. Rolin, art. préc., p. 976. et D. Bigo qui dénonce « un mécanisme de transfert de légitimité de
l’anti-terrorisme vers d’autres secteurs, crime organisé, migration clandestine, surveillance de l’Internet… »,
L’impact des mesures anti-terroristes sur l’équilibre entre liberté et sécurité et sur la cohésion sociale en France,
in Lutte contre le terrorisme et droits fondamentaux, Némésis, Bruylant, 2002, p. 223.
99
A. Weyembergh, L’impact du 11 septembre sur l’équilibre sécurité/liberté dans l’espace pénal européen, in
Lutte contre le terrorisme et droits fondamentaux, ibid., p. 167. Pour parer ces critique, le 10eme considérant
introductif de la Déclaration indique que « rien dans la présente Décision-cadre ne peut être interprété comme
visant à réduire ou entraver des droits et libertés fondamentales telles que le droit de grève, la liberté de réunion,
d’association ou d’expression, y compris le droit de fonder avec d’autres syndicats et de s’affilier à des syndicats
pour la défense de ses intérêts, et le droit de manifester qui s’y rattache ».
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France
100
aux actes de violences urbaines . Il n’est pas inutile de rappeler que des craintes similaires avaient
également été exprimées à la suite de l’extension de la circonstance aggravante de bande organisée,
notion censée circonscrire le phénomène de la criminalité organisée. Afin d’éviter le risque de dérive
ou de confusion entre différentes formes de délinquances, il appartient peut-être au législateur de
mieux distinguer des infractions dont le seul dénominateur commun semble être la pluralité d’auteurs
agissant de concert.
Un tel exercice serait utile pour éviter aussi un chevauchement entre le droit pénal général et le droit
101
pénal spécial , ce dernier étant trop fréquemment utilisé pour contourner ou pallier les limites du
premier sans qu’une ligne directrice cohérente puisse être mise en avant. Le droit pénal général
s’enrichirait probablement en formulant, à partir des spécificités du droit pénal spécial, les principes
directeurs d’une nouvelle responsabilité collective. Le dispositif des repentis, qui n’a d’intérêt qu’en
cas d’infractions commises à plusieurs, la responsabilité aggravée des dirigeants par rapport à celle
des exécutants ainsi que la fixation du seuil de répression dès le stade des actes préparatoires, pourraient constituer les premiers éléments de cette forme de responsabilité.
Sur le plan de la méthode enfin, la protection des libertés individuelles paraît imposer une meilleure
distinction des actions publiques selon qu’elles poursuivent une finalité préventive ou répressive.
Alors que le Livre blanc sur la Sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme vante l’originalité du système
102
103
français , en précisant qu’elle tient justement au caractère artificiel de la distinction , les défenseurs des droits de l’homme dénoncent la confusion permanente entretenue entre les missions préven104
tives et répressives. Au phénomène de « routinisation des procédures d’exception » , viendrait
105
de plus en plus marqué de la lutte contre le
s’ajouter un « mouvement d’administrativisation »
terrorisme.
En dépit de la succession de lois se donnant pour objet la lutte contre le terrorisme, quelques modifications ont récemment été suggérées par le Livre Blanc sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme. La
réforme souhaitée est mineure puisqu’il s’agirait d’intégrer le délit de provocation à la haine au sein
du Code pénal, ce qui permettrait de supprimer la condition de publicité et de sortir du régime des
infractions de presse. Enfin, une prochaine loi aura pour objet de sécuriser les passeports et les titres
d’identité par le recours à la biométrie digitale afin de mieux contrôler le flux des personnes dangereu106
ses .
E) Considérations finales
En définitive, il est permis de penser que l’ensemble des critiques formulées à l’encontre du dispositif
légal trouve une explication dans le manque de clarté et de cohérence de législations successives,
adoptées pour la plupart de façon précipitée, après coup, sous la pression des évènements et de
107
l’opinion . L’impression générale qui se dégage, aussi bien en droit interne qu’en droit international,
100
Sur ce sujet, voir D. Bigo qui « imagine l’impact que pourrait avoir en France une accusation de terrorisme sur
la base de tels textes européens lors d’un prochain rodéo de voitures dans les banlieues », art. préc. p. 236.
101
A ce sujet, voir Ch. L. Blakesley, RIDP 1998, p. 37.
102
pp. 45 et 53.
103
Voir également les travaux préparatoires de la loi du 23 janvier 2006 au cours desquels le rapporteur auprès de
la Commission des lois de l’Assemblé souligna que « l’originalité du système français tient justement au caractère artificiel de cette distinction », A. Marsaud, rapport n° 2681, commission des lois de l’Assemblé nationale.
104
D. Bigo, art. préc., p. 223.
105
S. Slama et F. Rolin, art. préc., p. 980.
106
Le Livre Blanc note que la sécurisation « devra s’effectuer dans un cadre juridique équilibré, prenant en
compte la protection des libertés individuelles et les exigences de la lutte contre le terrorisme », p. 57.
107
Cf Ph. Mary selon lequel « les politiques criminelles en matière de criminalité organisée ou de terrorisme sont
souvent peu cohérentes et à peine coordonnées, réagissant davantage au coup par coup, sous la pression des évènements. L’urgence apparaît comme le premier dénominateur commun.», art. préc., p. 477.
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France
est celle d’une réponse désordonnée et difficilement accessible à la connaissance faute de lisibilité
108
suffisante . La vertu pédagogique et dissuasive du droit pénal s’en trouve atteinte, ce qui n’est pas
pour déplaire à des criminels organisés, renseignés et prêts à tout pour tirer profit des moindres failles
qui s’offrent à eux. À ce titre, l’institution de procédures dérogatoires pour lutter contre des formes
exceptionnellement dures de criminalité s’impose comme une nécessité. Leur mise en œuvre rencontre d’ailleurs l’approbation des praticiens selon lesquels elles font quotidiennement la preuve de
109
leur efficacité . Le respect des principes d’égalité des justiciables et de proportionnalité des mesures
de contrainte ne s’oppose pas davantage au développement d’un réseau de répression ciblée, le législateur pouvant prévoir « des règles différentes selon les faits, les situations et les personnes auxquelles elles s’appliquent pourvu que ces différences ne procèdent pas de discriminations injustifiées et
110
que soient assurées aux justiciables des garanties égales » . Toutefois, le souci de mettre en avant
une réponse graduée et adaptée à l’ampleur de la menace ne doit pas conduire à négliger la définition
de celle-ci. Avant de se doter d’outils spéciaux, il convient en effet d’établir précisément les spécifici111
tés des formes de criminalité que l’on souhaite combattre . Or, le principe de proportionnalité, sou112
vent présenté comme une garantie suffisante , masque parfois une altération du principe de légalité.
Le risque d’une légalité débridée est alors celui d’une généralisation ou d’une dilution des réseaux de
113
répression ciblée au mépris des libertés chères à un Etat de droit . Face à la globalisation de la criminalité, la globalisation de la répression pourrait s’avérer pire que le mal…
108
En ce sens, voir notamment B. de Lamy selon lequel « le code de procédure pénale n’est plus « qu’un lieu
d’empilement de dispositions législatives adoptées successivement », art. préc., p. 1910.
109
Voir notamment Y. Bot, Orientation du parquet de Paris dans le domaine de la lutte contre le terrorisme, in
Terrorisme, victimes et responsabilité pénale internationale, préc., p. 239. Selon le Livre Blanc sur la sécurité
intérieure face au terrorisme, la spécialisation des magistrats anti-terroristes aurait permis « de développer au fil
du temps, une véritable culture de la lutte anti-terroriste », p. 55.
110
Conseil constitutionnel, décision n° 86-213 DC du 3 septembre 1986.
111
En ce sens, voir notamment A. Weyembergh, art. préc., p. 162.
112
Le Conseil Constitutionnel a validé l’ensemble des mesures de contrainte prévues par le projet de loi Perben II
(9 mars 2004) en considérant qu’elles étaient justifiées par la commission de crimes et de délits d’une gravité et
d’une complexité particulière.
113
R. Ottenhof : « L’altération des modèles de politique criminelle résultant de l’aggravation des peines et de la
diminution des garanties procédurales à l’encontre des terroristes profitent en général plus aux terroristes qu’aux
citoyens protégés, ces derniers risquant de n’en récolter que la banalisation des procédures d’exception », Approche criminologique et victimologique du terrorisme, in Terrorisme, victimes et responsabilité pénale internationale, préc. p. 497.
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GERMANY*
Bettina WEISSER**
A. General Questions
A. 1. Manifestations of the phenomenon of globalization at an internal penal level
In the year 2002, the statutory definition of the offence of § 129 b Strafgesetzbuch (the German Penal
Code, hereinafter “StGB”) “criminal and terrorist associations in foreign countries” was added to the
StGB1. The regulation is connected with §§ 129, 129 a StGB: According to § 129 StGB, the forming
of a criminal association, i.e. an association whose purpose is to commit crimes, is punishable. § 129 a
StGB is a specification of this provision, concerning the forming of terrorist associations2. Their
terrorist background is an aggravating circumstance. In § 129 b StGB, this statutory definition is extended to foreign (criminal3 and) terrorist associations4. This regulation is to guarantee that members
(or supporters5) of foreign terrorist associations in Germany can also be prosecuted.
German law is generally applicable to members of an association if this association is active in a
member state of the EU6. Members of associations active outside the EU can be punished if they
commit an offence on German territory, are German nationals or their victim7 is a German national or
resident8. Members of non-European associations can be prosecuted only with a special authorization
*
**
Dr. Bettina Weisser. Universitaet zu Koeln. Institut fuer auslaendisches und internationales Strafrecht
Albertus-Magnus-Platz. D - 50923 Koeln.
1
34th Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz, 22 August 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl) I 2002, 3390.
2
Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch, 27th ed. 2006 (hereinafter: „Schönke/Schröder“), § 129 a marginal no. 1; Maurach/Schröder/Maiwald, Besonderer Teil II, 9th ed. 2005 (hereinafter:
„Maurach/Schröder/Maiwald, BT II“), § 95 marginal no. 2.
3
Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 129 b marginal no. 4; Maurach/Schröder/Maiwald, BT II,
§ 95 marginal no. 18; Miebach/Schäfer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Volume 2/2, 2005 (hereinafter:
„MK-StGB“), § 129 b marginal no. 8.
4
This rule is often criticized in the literature as too wide and not precise enough, see Kress, Juristische Ausbildung (hereinafter: JA) 2005, 220 at 226; Stein, Goltdammers Archiv für Strafrecht (hereinafter: GA) 2005, pp.
433; Tröndle/Fischer, StGB, 54th ed. 2007 (hereinafter: “Tröndle/Fischer”), § 129 b marginal nos 2, 4.
5
§§ 129 a, b StGB contain punishments not only for members but also for non-members of the association who
support or promote the association, see infra B. 2. 1. This section does also refer to these participants.
6
The place of residence in Germany builds the relation to Germany which is needed for the German prosecution
authorities; see BT-Drucksache 14/8893, 9; Altvater, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (hereinafter: NStZ) 2003, pp.
179 at 180; Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 129 b marginal no. 3; Maurach/Schröder/Maiwald, BT II, § 95 marginal no. 18; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 b marginal nos 9,
11, different opinion: Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 b marginal no. 6.
7
§§ 129, 129 a, 129 b StGB are so-called organizational crimes, whose statutory facts are fulfilled only by the
existence of the organization. Thus they are victim-less crimes. Therefore, only persons affected by other crimes
that can be attributed to the association can be victims (e.g. the victim of a serious bodily injury that had been
realized in the pursuance of the purpose of the association); see Altvater, NStZ 2003, 179 at 181; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 b marginal no. 20.
8
By this, the case is meant that a foreign victim has been violated in Germany – it is not sufficient that the victim
enters Germany after having been violated in a foreign country; BT-Drucksache 14/8893, 9; see hereunto Lenc-
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Germany
of the Federal Ministry of Justice, § 129 b, 3rd to 5th sentence StGB. The authorization can be given for
a crime that has been committed or for the prosecution of future crimes, § 129 b, 4th sentence StGB.
The Ministry shall take into account “whether the efforts of the association infringe the fundamental
values of a state order that respects human dignity or if they violate the peaceful coexistence of peoples, and if they appear, all circumstances considered, as reprehensible”, § 129 b, 5th sentence StGB.
By this clause, liberation movements against governmental suppression in dictatorships can be excluded from prosecution9. This regulation has not only been criticized for vagueness but also because
it makes prosecution depend on a discretionary decision possibly influenced by political considerations10.
By the introduction of § 129 b StGB, Germany fulfilled duties of transformation imposed by the
European Union, such as the Common Measures of the EU Council of December 21, 1998, concerning the punishability of participation in a criminal association in the member states of the European
Union11 and the Common Position of the Council of December 27, 2001, on the struggle against terrorism12 and on the employment of special measures to fight against terrorism13.German legislation
has strongly been influenced by the EU Framework Decision on Terrorism, of June 13, 200214, transformed into German law in December 200315.
§ 129 b StGB is a reaction to the activities of criminal associations in the fields of organized crime
and terrorism that is encroaching upon several countries. Legislation was promoted under the impression of the acts of terrorism of September 11, 2001 in the United States and of April 2002 against
(mostly German) tourists on the Tunisian island of Djerba16.
On August 2, 2006, the European Arrest Warrant Act (“Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz”)17 entered
into force. This act transformed the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant18 into
German law19. The European arrest warrant can replace the complicated traditional extradition proceedings20.
A. 2. The general juridical system of preparatory acts and of participation
A. 2.1. Preparatory Acts
A. 2.1.1. Limits with reference to attempt
kner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 129 b marginal no. 7; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 b
marginal no. 21; critical to the legal regulation Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 b marginal no. 11.
9
Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 b marginal no. 12.
10
v. Bubnoff, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (hereinafter: NJW) 2002, 2672 at 2675; Kress, JA 2005, 220 at
228; Maurach/Schröder/Maiwald, BT II, § 95 marginal no. 19; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 b marginal
nos 24-25; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 b marginal no. 13; favouring though Altvater, NStZ 2003, 179 at 181-182.
11
Abl. EG 1998, no. L 351/1.
12
Abl. EG 2001, no. L 344/90.
13
Abl. EG 2001, no. L 344/93.
14
Abl. EG 2002, no. L 164/4.
15
Transformation Act of December 22, 2003, BGBl I 2003, 2836. See hereunto in detail A. 3.
16
Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 129 b marginal no. 1; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 b marginal
no. 1.
17
Act on the Transformation of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Handling-over
Procedures between the Member States of the European Union of July 20, 2006, BGBl I 2006, 1721-1727.
18
Abl. EG 2002, no. L 1990, 1.
19
This current act is the “second try” of German legislation. In 2004, a (first) act on the European arrest warrant
(BGBl I 2004, 1748) had already been put into force. The Supreme Federal Constitutional Court declared it as
unconstitutional and thus void; see hereunto in detail Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, 2nd ed. 2007 (hereinafter:
“Europäisches Strafrecht”), § 12 marginal nos 38 and following.
20
See in detail Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, § 12 marginal nos 33 et seq. with further references, also to the
critique on the European arrest warrant in the literature.
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Germany
Generally, preparatory acts are free from punishment in German law21. The threshold to punishability
is overstepped only when entering the stage of an attempt. An attempt is, according to § 23 subsection
1 StGB, always punishable if it concerns felonies, concerning misdemeanors only when this is explicitly regulated22. Felonies are unlawful offences that are punishable by at least one year of imprisonment, § 12 section 1 StGB23. Misdemeanors are offences punishable by a minimum penalty of less
than one year or a fine, § 12 subsection 2 StGB.
As for the distinction between a mere preparatory act and a punishable attempt, there are no specific
criteria which allow the exact determination of the beginning of an attempt for all kinds of crime24.
This is due to the fact that crimes with widely differing requirements of their actus reus can be attempted. Moreover, according to § 22 StGB (“Whoever, in accordance with his understanding of the
act, takes an immediate step towards the realization of the elements of the offence, attempts to commit
a crime.”) attempts are to be regarded from the actor’s perspective25. It is therefore not possible to
decide on the beginning of an attempt26 only by considering the outward acts of the perpetrator according to abstract and neutrally measurable criteria (such as the endangerment of legally protected
interests or the partial commission of the actus reus of the crime27).
It can generally be said that taking an immediate step towards the realization of the actus reus marks
the borderline between preparation and attempt. Although this immediate step describes a visible
behavior of the offender28, its categorization as an attempt can only be made on the basis of the offender’s plan29. The offender’s plan30 thus becomes a touchstone for the distinction between preparation and attempt31. The offender’s objectively observable behavior must be evaluated in light of his
subjective plan on how to commit the offence (so-called “mixed subjective-objective method”)32.
21
Jescheck/Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, 5th ed. 1996 (hereinafter: „Jescheck/Weigend“), 523; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil II, 7th ed. 1989 (hereinafter: „AT
II“), § 39 marginal no. 19.
22
So e.g. for the misdemeanour of a simple bodily injury in § 223 subsection 2 StGB or for fraud in § 263 subsection 2 StGB.
23
Cp. only Cramer/Heine,
in: Schönke/Schröder, § 30 marginal no. 10.
24
Hillenkamp, in: Leipziger Kommentar, 1st volume, 11th ed. 2003 (hereinafter: “LK”), § 22 marginal no. 86,
Meyer, GA 2002, 367 at 377; Roxin, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil II, 2003 (hereinafter: “AT II”), § 29 marginal
no. 103; Roxin, Juristische Schulung (hereinafter: „JuS“) 1979, 1 at 4; Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil I, 5th ed. 2004 (hereinafter: „AT“), § 11 marginal no. 42; Tröndle/Fischer, § 22 marginal no. 11;
Weigend, in: Hirsch/Weigend (ed.), Strafrecht und Kriminalpolitik in Japan und Deutschland (hereinafter: „Hirsch/Weigend“), 1989, 113 at 117.
25
Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 40 marginal no. 1.
26
See, in this sense already Wenzel, Das deutsche Strafrecht, 11th ed. 1969, § 24 III 3, 191.
27
The formal-objective theories on the beginning of the attempt that refer to this criterion are outdated by the legal
formulation in § 22 StGB (“takes an immediate step” to the realization of the actus reus of the offence); see Hillenkamp, in: LK, vor § 22 marginal no. 62, § 22 marginal no. 56; Jakobs, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 2nd ed.
1993 (hereinafter: “AT”), 25/26; Roxin AT II, § 29 marginal no. 105.
28
Herzberg, in: MK-StGB, § 22 marginal no. 115.
29
Gropp, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 3rd ed. 2005 (hereinafter: „AT“), § 9 marginal no. 14.
30
The imagination of the perpetrator of his crime exceeds the intention to commit the crime; it includes the
concrete imagination of the on-going of the crime, the complete plan of the crime. See hereunto in detail Hillenkamp, in: Festschrift Roxin, 689 at pp. 701 and 703); Hillenkamp, in: LK, § 22, marginal no. 90; Tröndle/Fischer,
§ 22 marginal no. 8.
31
BGH NStZ-RR 2004, 361 at 362; Gropp, in: Festschrift Gössel, 2002, 175 at pp. 186); Herzberg, in: MK-StGB
§ 22 marginal no. 114; Jescheck/Weigend, 519; Safferling, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft
(hereinafter: ZStW) 118 (2006) 682 at 689, 700); Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT I, § 11, marginal no. 36; Tröndle/Fischer, StGB, 54th ed. 2007, § 22 marginal no. 8.
32
Gropp, AT, § 9 marginal nos 36-37; Hillenkamp, in: LK, § 22 marginal no. 62 and 63; Jescheck/Weigend, 516,
518; Otto, Grundkurs Strafrecht, Allgemeine Strafrechtslehre, 7th ed. 2004, § 18 marginal nos 22 and 23; Roxin,
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Courts33 and the prevailing view in literature34 agree that an attempt begins when the offender, according to his plan, commits an act that is to immediately precede the actus reus of the offence in question.
According to one test, an attempt begins when the actor tells himself “Now I start”35. In case of a nondisturbed proceeding, his behavior would result into the realization of the actus reus of the crime
without any essential steps having to be taken in-between36. That can be the case if a close connection
in time and space to the act of realization37 exists or if, according to the perpetrator’s imagination, the
legally protected interest is already endangered38. The crucial point is the perpetrator’s imagination of
the endangerment – it is irrelevant if an endangerment actually does not exist39.
In case law40, the following are named as examples for classic acts of preparation: the mere visiting41
of or perhaps spying out of the scene of the crime42 and the providing or presenting of tools or other
means needed for the crime (e.g. a copy of a key43or a map of the scene of the future crime)44. Classically problematic cases concerning the demarcation between mere preparation and already punishable
attempt are the cases of extended crime proceedings under participation of the victim, e.g.: The perpetrator puts a bottle of poisoned brandy in a certain place where he hopes that the expected burglars
would go to and drink it and then they would die of the venom45; or the perpetrator manipulates electric conductors and switches in the victim’s house in a way that the next using of the switch would
cause an explosion46. Although in these cases, the perpetrator has done everything to provoke the
successful ending of the crime, he has, according to jurisdiction, not yet reached the stage of a punishJuS 1979, 1 at 3-4; Tröndle/Fischer, § 22 marginal no. 7, Rudolphi, in: SK-StGB (April 1993), § 22 marginal no.
11; Zaczyk, in: Nomos-Kommentar zum StGB, volume 1, 2nd ed. 2005 (hereinafter: „NK-StGB“), § 22 marginal
nos 23 and 24; restrictive: Gropp, in: Festschrift Gössel, 2002, 175 at 186-187, 189).
33
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen (hereinafter: “BGHSt”) 26, 201 at 203; 30, 363 at 364;
31, 10 at pp. 12; 31, 178 at pp. 181; 40, 257 at pp. 268; 43, 177 at 179.
34
Kühl, AT, § 15 marginal no. 58; Tröndle/Fischer, § 22 marginal no. 9; Roxin, AT II § 29 marginal nos 102 and
103; Roxin, in: Festschrift Nishihara, 1998, 157 at 164.
35
“Jetzt geht`s los”: BGHSt 28, 162 at 164; BGH NStZ 1989, pp. 473; BGH StV 1994, 240. Critical on this
criterion Eser, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 22 marginal no. 41; Roxin, AT II, § 29 marginal nos 130 et seq.; also
Weigend, in: Hirsch/Weigend, 113 at 117 note 25.
36
BGHSt 26, 201 at pp. 203; 28, 162 at pp. 163; 35, 6 at pp. 8; 37, 294 at pp. 297; 40, 257 at pp. 268; BGH NStZ
1981, 99; 1993, 364; 1987, 20; 1996, pp. 38; 1997, pp. 31; 1997, 83; BGH NJW 1980, pp. 1759; 1993, 21252127 at 2125; 2002, 1057 – 1059. Baumann/Weber/Mitsch, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 11th ed. 2003 (hereinafter: „AT“), § 26 marginal no. 54; Eser, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 22 marginal no. 42; Jescheck/Weigend, 516, 519;
Rudolphi, in: SK-StGB, § 22 marginal no. 13; Safferling, ZStW 118 (2006), 682 at 700; Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, AT
1, § 11 marginal no. 39; Tröndle/Fischer, § 22 marginal no. 10.
37
Baumann/Weber/Mitsch, AT, § 26 marginal no. 54; Roxin, AT II, § 29 marginal no. 139 and following; different opinion Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 40 marginal no. 48.
38
BGH NStZ 1989, pp. 473; 1996, pp. 38; BGHSt 43, 177 at 180, 182). Eser, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 22 marginal nos 41 and 42.
39
BGH NStZ 1987, 20; BayObLG NStZ 1997, pp. 442; Eser, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 22 marginal no. 42; Roxin,
JuS 1979, 1 at 6; Tröndle/Fischer, § 22 marginal no. 10; favouring a more objective approach Hirsch, in: Festschrift Roxin, 2001, 711 at pp. 721; the same, JZ 2007, 494 at 500-502; as well as Weigend, in: Hirsch/Weigend,
pp. 113 at 126-127, who favours legislation to follow an objective approach to the unlawfulness of attempts.
Similarly, Roxin, in: Festschrift Nishihara, 1998, 157 at 163-164.
40
See the summary by Eser, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 22 marginal nos 44-45 with further references.
41
BGH NJW 2002, 1057 at 1058; Kühl, AT, § 15 marginal no. 62; Hillenkamp, in: LK, § 22 marginal no. 107;
Roxin, AT II, § 29 marginal no. 177 and 178; Rudolphi, in: SK-StGB, § 22 marginal no. 15.
42
Eser, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 22 marginal no. 33; Hillenkamp, in: LK, § 22 marginal no. 108; Roxin, AT II, §
29 marginal no. 179; Rudolphi, in: SK-StGB, § 22 marginal no. 16.
43
BGHSt 28, 162 at 163 and 164.
44
Kühl, AT, § 15, marginal no. 62; Hillenkamp, in: LK, § 22, marginal no. 106; Roxin, AT II, § 29, marginal nos
174 et seq.; Rudolphi, in: SK-StGB, § 22, marginal no. 14.
45
BGHSt 43, 177 („Bärwurz“ case).
46
BGH NStZ 2001, pp. 475.
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able attempt, if the victim’s entering into the zone of danger is still not yet sure47. This resulted in
different decisions for the two described alternatives: While in the case of the poisoned brandy, the
beginning of the attempt was denied due to the fact that success was not yet secure, a punishable attempt was assumed in the case of the electric trap48, as the event of damage only depended on the very
likely using of the switch49.
A. 2. 1. 2. –2. 1. 4. Punishable preparatory acts
Specific preparatory crimes
The preparation of specific crimes is already a separate crime. Preparatory acts which obviously refer
to these crimes are then punishable themselves as a completion of the “preparatory crime”50. For example, in § 80 StGB, the preparation of an offensive war51 is punished with a sentence of ranging
from at least 10 years up to life-long imprisonment. The “completion” of an offensive war is not punished separately in the StGB. The preparation of a certain treasonable act is, according to § 83 StGB,
punished with imprisonment of between 1 and 10 years; the corresponding completion of the crime,
treason against the Federal Government, is punished with 10 years to life-long imprisonment, according to § 81 StGB.
For crimes involving explosions or nuclear attacks, the following applies: The preparation of a serious criminal offence involving explosives is punished with imprisonment of 6 months to 5 years, §
310 section 1, No. 2 StGB. If somebody “successfully” provokes an explosion and thus endangers
people or essential property of others, he is punished with imprisonment of at least one year, § 308
section 1 StGB. If the crime is only attempted, the punishment can be mitigated according to § 23
section 2 StGB. So, already the preparatory crime can, under certain circumstances, be punished in the
same way as the completed crime.
If the intention is to cause an explosion with nuclear power, the preparatory acts for this are, according
to § 310 section 1, No. 1 StGB, punished with imprisonment of one to ten years. As soon as the offender enters the stage of an attempt, § 307 section 1 StGB applies: already the “undertaking” of the
provoking of an explosion using nuclear power is punished with imprisonment of at least 5 years. For
this so-called offence of undertaking to commit a wrongful act (“Unternehmensdelikt”)52, the law
determines that the attempt (the “undertaking”) of the offence is punished as a completed crime.
Moreover, in the case of a successfully provoked explosion, the scope of punishment of § 307 section
1 StGB53 is the same as that which is applicable for the “undertaking”, i.e. the attempt of the offence.
Preliminary stages of participation according to § 30 StGB
In addition to these specified punishable preparatory acts, § 30 StGB generally lays down a punishment for certain preliminary stages of participation: in this, § 30 StGB states an exception from the
rule that preparatory acts are free from punishment. § 30 StGB applies if at least two people agree on
47
With this argumentation the Bundesgerichtshof ((hereinafter: BGH; BGHSt 43, pp. 177) denied the beginning
of an attempt referring to the insecure success; different opinion Böse, JA 1999, 342 at 345, 348.
48
BGH NStZ 2001, pp. 475. According to the BGH, the same applies to the case in BGH NStZ 1998, 294 at 295:
the perpetrator had placed explosives in the victim’s car which were supposed to explode when the car was
started.
49
According to Böse, the same applies to the „Bärwurz“ case, JA 1999, 342 at 345, 348; Streng, in: Gedächtnisschrift Zipf, 1999, 325 at pp. 337, pp. 346, favours a classification as a crime of omission.
50
Jakobs, AT, § 25, marginal no. 9; Zazcyk, in: NK-StGB, § 22 marginal no. 4.
51
If this causes the risk of a war in the Federal Republic of Germany.
52
Cp. hereunto Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB § 11 (February 2005), marginal nos 40-47.
53
§ 307 subsection 2 StGB punishes a perpetrator who successfully causes an explosion but only carelessly endangers people or important goods, with an imprisonment of between one and ten years. If the perpetrator has at
least carelessly caused the death of a person, § 307 subsection 3 includes an aggravation of the penalty.
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the realization of a felony54 in a certain way. Punishable are, according to § 30 section 1 StGB, the
attempted instigation to a felony55 (“versuchte Anstiftung zum Verbrechen”) and, according to § 30
section 2 StGB, the agreement, the acceptance of an offer and the declaration of being prepared to
commit a felony. The punishability of these preparatory acts is derived from the particular danger that
is caused by preparation involving several people: for each single participant, withdrawal from the
crime will be less easy if other participants are already involved in the planning and the single participant thus feels obliged to help the commission of the crime in some way56.
An attempted instigation according to § 30 section 1 StGB is the attempt to incite someone else to
commit a felony. For this, it is necessary that the instigator has a double intention: on the one hand
concerning his own contribution, on the other hand concerning the realization of the main offence by
the perpetrator57. Furthermore, an immediate step towards the actual instigation has to be taken – the
instigator has to begin to employ influence on the person who is to be instigated58. The reason why the
main crime is eventually not committed is of no interest for the punishability according to § 30 section
1 StGB59.
According to § 30 section 2 StGB, firstly a person who declares himself/herself to be prepared to
commit a felony together with others, is punishable. The elements of this offence are already fulfilled
by the mere announcement of being prepared to commit a felony – a possible reaction of the “recipient” of the declaration is not needed60. Secondly, according to § 30 section 2 StGB, a person who
accepts the offer of another person to commit a felony, is punishable. The reason for the punishability
is that, by accepting the offer, the offerer`s decision to commit the crime is formed61 or at least consolidated62. Finally and thirdly, agreement on committing a felony together is punishable. This possibility is a preliminary step to the co-perpetration of the future crime63. The agreement consists of a
54
Felonies are unlawful offences that are punished with at least one year of imprisonment or more, § 12 section 1
StGB. Misdemeanours are unlawful offences, which are punished with a minimum penalty of less than one year
or a pecuniary penalty, § 12 subsection 2 StGB; § 30 StGB is not applicable.
55
The attempt of aiding is not punishable, cp. hereunto infra A. 2. 2. 1.
56
Jescheck/Weigend, 701; Roxin, AT II, § 28 marginal no. 5, who demands that, for the attempted instigation and
the acceptance of an offer to commit a crime, the perpetrator additionally sets a causal proceeding into force
which can no longer be controlled. However, Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 30 marginal nos 1, 4, consider an intention contrary to the law, which becomes visible in the realization of the crime, as the reason for the
punishment.
57
Concerning the preconditions of instigation cp. infra 2. 2. 1.
58
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 30 marginal no. 20; Jescheck/Weigend, 703; Roxin, AT II, § 28 marginal no. 12. It is disputed whether the instigated person has to notice the influence or whether it is sufficient
when the instigator, for example, brings his declaration to the post office, cp. hereunto (in the latter sense) Roxin,
AT II § 28 marginal no. 12.
59
It is possible that the person to be instigated does not at all decide to commit the crime or that the person does
actually does not commit the planned crime; besides, the attempt to instigate may be unsuitable as the instigated
person had already been determined to commit the crime („omnimodo facturus“, cp. infra 2.2.1.); cp. for the
whole complex Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 30 marginal no. 21; Roxin, AT II, § 28 marginal no. 9.
60
This is, due to the particularly extensive formulation of the elements of the crime, criticized in literature as a
criminalization of the preliminary stage that goes too far, cp. Jescheck/Weigend, 705; Roxin, AT II § 28 marginal
no. 8.
61
In this sense Roxin, AT II, § 28 marginal no. 82 – the acceptance of an offer is then an attempted instigation.
62
In this sense Jescheck/Weigend, 705 – the acceptance of the offer is then an attempted mental assistance (aiding) by supporting the perpetrator in his decision to commit the crime; different opinion Roxin, AT II, § 28 marginal no. 84.
63
Jescheck/Weigend, 704; Roxin, AT II, § 38 marginal nos 60 and 61.
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common decision to carry out the felony as joint principals by causing its actus reus together64. An
agreement to commit a felony between (future) principals and accessories is not possible65.
The penalty for an attempted instigation according to § 30 section 1 StGB as well as for conduct according to § 30 section 2 StGB depends on the punishment for the attempted offence: it is derived
from the corresponding statutory definition of the felony and has to be mitigated, according to § 30
section 1, 2nd sentence, § 49 section 1 StGB66. Concerning the penalty of imprisonment with a certain
time limit, this means that a punishment of more than three quarters of the punishment laid down by
law must not be given, § 49 section 1, no. 2 StGB.
The offences mentioned under A. 1. concerning criminal and terrorist associations according to §§
129, 129 a, 129 b StGB are also offences that are committed in the preliminary stage of a crime, because the purpose of participation in associations is the pursuance of the association’s purpose and
that is the future commission of offences; see in particular A. 3. 1. and A. 3. 2.
A. 2. 2. Participation
A. 2. 2. 1. Treatment of the acting in concert of individuals in the commission of the offence
Questions relating to participation are examined as a part of both the actus reus and mens rea of the
crime67. For intentional offences, a dualistic system of participation68 is applied that distinguishes
between the in-/direct (co-) perpetrator of § 25 StGB on the one hand and the instigator of § 26 StGB
and the aide of § 27 StGB69 on the other hand. There is an obligatory mitigation (only) for the aide
and the non-punishability of the attempted aiding is binding as well. Apart from that, the conditions
and the criteria of demarcation between perpetrators and secondary parties (aides and instigators) have
to be developed by jurisdiction and academic research; the legal regulations leave a wide scope of
interpretation70. That has led to the development of a differentiated doctrine of perpetration and secondary participation by jurisdiction and literature. The doctrine of participation of today is essentially
a result of the dispute between the formerly prevailing doctrine of the German High Court (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH71, formerly Reichsgericht - RG72) which was based on subjective criteria, on the
one hand, and those doctrines of perpetration that were influenced by the criterion of control over the
act (“Tatherrschaft”) and that define the borderline between perpetration and secondary participation
by using a synthesis of objective and subjective criteria73, on the other. The subjective doctrine of
64
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 30 marginal no. 25; Hoyer, in: SK-StGB, § 30 marginal no. 46;
Jescheck/Weigend, 704; Roxin, AT II § 28 marginal no. 46.
65
BGH NStZ-RR 2002, 74-75; Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 30 marginal no. 25; Joecks, in: MKStGB, § 30 marginal no. 50; Roxin, AT II, § 28 marginal no. 60.
66
Jescheck/Weigend, 703.
67
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 25, marginal no. 1; Jescheck/Weigend, 643;
Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 47 marginal no. 82.
68
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 25, marginal no. 1; Jescheck/Weigend, 646.
69
For negligence offences, a uniformed notion of perpetrator applies: any careless (co-)causing of the success is
considered as perpetration of the negligence offence; Jescheck/Weigend, 654 with further references.
70
Critical hereunto Tiedemann, in: Festschrift Lenckner, 1998, pp. 411 at 433.
71
BGHSt 2, 150 at pp. 155 f; 6, 226 at pp. 228; 8, 70 at 73 extremely subjective theory: „In particular, a person
can be an accessory although he himself realizes all elements of the crime”); BGHSt 18, 87 at 87, 89-90; cp. also
Hoyer, in: SK-StGB, § 25 marginal no. 5.
72
RGSt 3, 181-183; RGSt 63, 101 at 102 „… neither for perpetration nor for co-perpetration a commission by
one’s own hand or a realization of the elements caused by otherwise directly bodily action is needed…. It is only
necessary that a person has somehow contributed to the realization of the objective elements of a crime with the
intention to complete a crime which someone else, the co-perpetrator, wanted to commit as his own crime”);
RGSt 74, 21 at pp. 23; RGSt 74, pp. 84 (esp. 85).
73
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 25 marginal no. 62 ff.; Gropp, AT, § 10 marginal nos 34 et
seq.; Jescheck/Weigend, pp. 651; Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal nos 26 et seq.; Roxin, AT II, § 25 marginal nos 13 et
seq., 27 et seq.
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perpetration is based on the formula of conditio sine qua non concerning the causality that considers
all conditions for success as of equal value (“theory of equivalence”). Therefore this doctrine concludes that the boundary between perpetration and secondary participation can only be defined in the
mental field74.
In literature, on the contrary, some commentators have strongly pleaded for a determination also75
depending on objective criteria76. Here the criterion of control over the commission of the crime (control over the act, “Tatherrschaft”)77 has become the main instrument to distinguish between perpetrator and accessory78. Control over the act is traditionally described as “das vom Vorsatz umfasste Inden-Händen-Halten des tatbestandsmäßigen Geschehens-ablaufs”: the perpetrator holds the proceedings in his hands and this is included by his intention79. The perpetrator is described as the “central
figure of the proceedings according to the statutory definition” (“Zentralgestalt des tatbestandsmäßigen Geschehensablaufs”) 80. The control over the act is derived from a combination of objective
and mental elements81 and has meanwhile been widely established as the main criterion of demarcation between perpetration and secondary participation82. The accessory thus contributes to the offence
without having control over the commission83, while the perpetrator dominates the causing of the
actus reus84.
Courts have not explicitly rejected the subjective theory of participation, yet this doctrine is meanwhile influenced by numerous criteria that were taken from the doctrine of control over the act85 (this
74
RGSt 3, 181-183; 74, 84 at 85 „bathtub case“: „… all conditions for the success, realized either by the perpetrator or by the accessory, are completely of equal value; the distinction can therefore not only depend on the participation in the realizing action. Decisive is if the suspect has acted with the will to be a perpetrator or if he only
wanted to support the criminal action of somebody else“. Cp. also Roxin, Täterschaft, pp. 5; the same, in: LK § 25
marginal no. 30.
75
The formally objective theory, which determines pepetration only by the objective criterion of the realization of
the immediate action by one’s own hand (represented by Beling, Die Lehre vom Verbrechen, 1906, § 49, 408;
today still represented by Freund, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 1998, § 10 marginal no. 36 et seq.). This theory
was not compatible with the legal regulation which does not support a criterion of the realization of the action by
one’s own hand neither for cases of labour-sharing co-perpetration nor for cases of indirect perpetration, completely prevailing view, cp. Hoyer, in: SK-StGB, vor § 25 marginal no. 9, § 25 marginal no. 11 with further references; Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal no. 24; Roxin, Täterschaft, pp. 36-38.
76
To the critique on the prevailing view cp. for example Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 47 marginal nos 51 et
seq., 60; Roxin, Täterschaft, pp. 51-52; Schünemann, in: Festschrift Roxin, 2001, 1 at 21; the same, GA 1986, 293
at 328-331.
77
For the first time introduced by Roxin, Täterschaft, 1st ed. 1963, today in 8th ed. 2006, pp. 307 ff.; the same, in:
LK, § 25 marginal nos 34-36.
78
Jescheck/Weigend, pp. 651; Roxin, in: LK, § 25 marginal no.s 30, 34 and the following.
79
This definition was introduced by Maurach, Deutsches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 1st ed. 1954, § 47 III B, 2
b; today Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 47 marginal no. 85.
80
Roxin, in: LK, § 25 marginal no. 36; the same, Täterschaft, pp. 25-32.
81
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 25 marginal no. 71; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 47 marginal no. 87; Roxin, AT II, § 25 marginal nos 27 et seq. Favouring such a demarcation already Heinitz, in: Festgabe 41. Deutscher Juristentag, 1955, 93 at 103.
82
Gropp, AT, § 10 marginal no. 36; Hoyer, in: SK-StGB, § 25 marginal no. 12; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, §
47 marginal no. 84; Roxin, in: LK, § 25 marginal nos 7, 10. Critics of the domatics of control over the act essentially criticize the lack of a certain determinability of the detailed elements of the notion of control over the act;
Freund, AT, § 10 marginal nos 45 at 48-49, 66–67; Kindhäuser, in: Festschrift Hollerbach, 2001, pp. 627 at 631632; Köhler, AT, pp. 497-498; Renzikowski, Restriktiver Täterbegriff und fahrlässige Beteiligung, 1997 (hereinafter: „Renzikowski“), pp.19-21. A counter model for the dogmatics of control over the act, on which a similar
consent exists, cannot be found in literature though. Therefore, no further discussion of the critiques on the dogmatics of control over the act follows here.
83
Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 47 marginal no. 89, § 50 marginal no. 45.
84
Jescheck/Weigend, pp. 652; Roxin, in: LK, § 25 marginal no. 7.
85
BGH NJW 1997, 3385 at 3386-3387; BGH NStZ-RR 1999, 186; BGH NStZ-RR 2000, pp. 278; BGH NStZ
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has led to the so-called “normative combination theory” in jurisdiction86). As, on the other hand, the
doctrines of control over the act also include mental elements87, a clear contrast between jurisdiction
and literature can hardly be determined88.
In detail, perpetration is divided into three forms, namely direct perpetration, indirect perpetration
(perpetration by acting through someone else, § 25 subsection 1, 2nd case StGB, “mittelbare Täterschaft”) and co-perpetration (perpetration by acting together with someone else, § 25 subsection 2
StGB, “Mittäterschaft”) 89.
A restricted notion of perpetration prevails (“restriktiver Täterbegriff”)90: Control over the act is
linked to the carrying out of the acts described in the statutory facts of the crime – either the perpetrator realizes them himself, or the acts committed by someone else are attributable to him as his own
according to § 25 subsection 1, 2nd case (“indirect perpetration”) or to § 25 subsection 2 (coperpetration).
The “indirect perpetrator” has control over the commission of the crime through another person, who
serves as a human means for the perpetration of the crime. The control of the perpetrator over the
acting person (the agent) emerges, when criminally non-responsible persons such as children or mentally ill people are used to commit a crime91; when the indirect perpetrator has deceived the agent on
the existence of one element of the crime92 (indirect perpetration on the strength of superior knowledge, “Wissensherrschaft”) or when the indirect perpetrator has control over the agent on the strength
of coercion93 (control over the act on the strength of superior will, “Willensherrschaft”) 94. A typical
element of these cases is a deficiency in responsibility of the person through whom the crime is committed95 (“innocent agents”), which makes it possible for the indirect perpetrator to get control over
the agent`s actual realization of the crime.
2002, pp. 145; cp. also Otto, Grundkurs AT, § 21 marginal no. 28. To the influence that the dogmatics of control
over the act already had on the early jurisdiction of the BGH cp. Roxin, Täterschaft, pp. 90-106.
86
“normative Kombinationstheorie”; Gropp, AT, § 10 marginal no. 32; Hoyer, in: SK StGB, § 25 marginal no. 6;
Roxin, AT II, § 25 marginal nos 22 et seq.
87
Otto, Grundkurs AT, § 21 marginal nos 23 et seq.
88
In the same sense Roxin, AT II, § 25 marginal no. 17.
89
For the demarcation of the different forms of perpetration cp. Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 25 marginal nos 2 et seq.; Küpper, GA 1998, pp. 519. Only bearers of the special quality can be perpetrators of the
special statutory offences, non-qualified persons can only be participants, cp. Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 47
marginal no. 116 with further references.
90
Overall opinion in literature and jurisdiction, cp. Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 25 ff.,
marginal nos 6 et seq.; Hoyer, in: SK-StGB, Vor § 25 marginal nos 8 et seq.; Jescheck/Weigend, pp. 648; Joecks,
in: MK-StGB, Vor §§ 25 marginal nos 9, 11; Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal no. 5; Renzikowski, 71 et passim.
91
Jescheck/Weigend, 668. The decisive criterion for perpetration is the defendant`s control over the act and over
the realization by the not liable agent, cp. Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 48 marginal no. 79.
92
The indirect perpetrator – a doctor – instructs a nurse who is in good faith to give the victim a certain medication, whose noxious effect only he – the doctor - knows. To the indirect perpetration if the innocent agent acts
without intention cp. Küpper, GA 1998, 519 at pp. 521; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 48 marginal nos 59 et seq.
93
The indirect perpetrator forces the innocent agent to commit a damage to property on his enemy’s car by
threatening him with a gun. The agent is excused by emergency, § 35 StGB, the compelliing person is an indirect
perpetrator of the damage to property according to §§ 303, 25 subsection 1, 2nd case StGB. Cp. to the whole
complex Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 48 marginal nos 76–78.
94
Indirect perpetration may also be considered when a person controls a proceeding in which (only) the person
who committed the actus reus is justified; cp. Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 25 marginal no. 27; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 48 marginal nos 68 et seq. (e.g. a deprivation of liberty is committed by a person in as
an indirect perpetrator who, by deceiving a public authority, causes the imprisonment of an other person; BGHSt
3, pp. 4; this is, at the same time, a control over the deceived on the strength of superior knowledge).
95
The doctrine of indirect perpetration operates only when the elements of the actus reus can be fulfiled by the
instrument of an other person. Therefore an indirect perpetration is not possible for crimes which have to be
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In recent years, the figure of indirect perpetration on the strength of organizational power in hierarchical organizations96 (“mittelbare Täterschaft innerhalb organisatorischer Macht-apparate”) has gained
particular importance. This model obtained significant practical relevance in connection with the trials
against members of the military or politicians of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) who
were accused of the manslaughter of refugees at the East German border97. The acts of manslaughter
were carried out by soldiers (the so-called “Mauerschützen”) who were criminally responsible themselves. Nevertheless, the members of the “National Defense Council” of the GDR were accused as
indirect perpetrators of killing “refugees from the republic”. It was argued that the military and political commanders made sure that the soldiers definitely complied with their instructions to shoot98 so
that they had “control” over what happened at the border by taking advantage of the military-political
system of command and obedience. The control over the particular shooting of a “refugee from the
republic” was derived from the control over the general regime at the border by the rulers99. Contrary
to the other forms of indirect perpetration, the acting person is fully criminally liable here100.
The judgments101 concerning indirect perpetration in connection with the handling of systematic
criminality in the former GDR have evoked strong discussions on the legal concept of organizational
control102. Nevertheless, this concept is gaining ground in German jurisdiction and is no longer employed only for unlawful systems, but is gradually becoming an all-purpose weapon against organized
committed on one’s own hand and for special statutory crimes; cp. Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 48 marginal
no. 46. These cases are of minor practical relevance, the main cases are the perverting of the course of justice, §
336 StGB, and bigamy, § 172 StGB, as well as sexual intercourse between relatives, § 173 StGB.
96
Introduced by Roxin, GA 1963, pp. 193 ff.; the same, AT II, § 25 marginal nos 105 et seq.; the same, in: Täterschaft, pp. 242-252, 704 et seq.; in favour of this opinion Ambos, GA 1998, pp. 226 et seq. (233); Joecks, in: MKStGB, § 25 marginal nos 123 et seq.; Küpper, GA 1998, pp. 519 at 523-525; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 48
marginal no. 88; critical Jescheck/Weigend, pp. 670; Rotsch, ZStW 112 (2000), pp. 518 at 528-530.
97
Precedent: BGHSt 40, 218 ff.; furthermore BGHSt 40, 257; BGHSt 40, 307 (316-317); BGHSt
42, 65 ff.; BGHSt 44, 204 ff.; lately BGHSt 48, 77 ff. (by omission).
98
Roxin considers the criterion of „fungibility“ inside the organizational machinery of power as the decisive
criterion. This criterion is meant to describe the interchangeability of the acting person and the availability of
„substitute perpetrators“at any time, cp. Roxin, last recently in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (hereinafter: “SchwZStR”) 125 (2007), pp. 1 at pp.13; the same, in: Festschrift Schroeder, 2006, pp. 387 at 394-395; the
same, AT II, § 25 marginal no. 107; Schünemann, in: Festschrift Schroeder, 2006, pp. 401 at 407. This criterion
has been criticized many times in literature though, cp. opposing opinion Herzberg, in: Amelung (ed.), Individuelle Verantwortung und Beteiligungsverhältnisse bei Straftaten in bürokratischen Organisationen des Staates, der
Wirtschaft und der Gesellschaft, 2000 (hereinafter: „Amelung“), pp. 33 at 37-39); Rotsch, JR 2004, pp. 248 at
249-250); the same, NStZ 2005, pp. 13 at 15-16; the same, ZStW 112 (2000), pp. 518 at 528-530; the same, ZIS
2007, pp. 260 at 261 (available under www.zis-online.com); in reaction to this, Roxin has extended his approach
by the additional precondition that the acting person inside an organizational machinery of power has to be
“much more inclined to commit the crime” as in cases without an organizational context, cp. Roxin, in: Festschrift
Schroeder, 2006, pp. 387 at 394-395; the same, in: SchwZStR 125 (2007), pp. 1 at 15-17.
99
BGHSt 40, 218 at 236. In the literature there are comments which have a point in stating that the decisive
element of organizational control is not the control over the particular acting person but actually over the machinery of power itself; cp. Ambos, GA 1998, pp. 226 at 234; Bloy, GA 1996, pp. 424 at 441; Schlösser, GA 2007, pp.
161 at 162; as well as Roxin himself, AT II, § 25 marginal no. 107; the same, in: Festschrift Schroeder, 2006, pp.
387 at 392-393.
100
Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 48 marginal no. 88; Roxin, AT II, § 25 marginal no. 107.
101
Cp. only BGHSt 40, 218; BGHSt 40, 307 (election fraud in the former GDR); BGHSt 45, 270 at 293, 296
(members of the National Defence Council of the former GDR); BGH NJW 2003, 522 (indirect perpetration by
omission by members of the Political Bureau of the former GDR).
102
Herzberg, in: Amelung, pp. 33; Knauer, NJW 2003, pp. 3101; Ranft, JZ 2003, pp. 582 at 584; Rotsch,
ZStW 112 (2000), pp. 518 ff.; the same, NStZ 2005, pp. 13 ff.; the same, ZIS 2007, pp. 260 ff.; Roxin, in: Festschrift Grünwald, 1999, pp. 549; the same, in: Amelung, pp. 55; the same, last recently in: Festschrift Schroeder,
2006, pp. 387; Schlösser, JR 2006, pp. 102 at 104 f.; with his own approach to a reasoning by a social control
over the act the same, GA 2007, pp. 161.
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criminality as well as against white-collar criminality103. However, especially in the field of economic
crimes, some legal commentators criticize that organizational control is used inappropriately to justify
the punishment of non-directly acting decision-makers as perpetrators104.
Currently it is hardly estimable to what extent the idea of organizational control might be employed in
connection with terrorist crimes – it is not unlikely that jurisdiction might refer to this idea, as the
BGH has already stated that, at least in Mafia-type structures, organizational control might be a suitable instrument105. Coming from this, it is just a small step from organized to terrorist criminality106.
Co-perpetration is determined by the parallel joint action of several perpetrators who, by labordivision, carry out a common plan together107. Co-perpetrators have common control over the commission of the crime on the strength of their common plan108 and their labor-dividing action when
carrying out this plan (functional control over the act109, “funktionelle Tatherrschaft”). Co-perpetration
leads to a mutual attribution of the part of the crime that each co-perpetrator has realized to the
other(s) 110.
In the context of terrorism, concerning the dogmatic of co-perpetration, it has to be emphasized that
also preparatory contributions may be considered as contributions from a co-perpetrator. A coperpetrator can also be a person who participated in the planning of the crime in a significant way
without contributing to the actual commission of the crime. According to jurisdiction111 and the prevailing view in literature112, the special influence of this person on the planning also results in him
103
Cp. the decisions that followed the precedent BGHSt 40, 218 in BGHSt, 43, 219 (general manager of a waste
disposal company); BGHSt 48, 331 at 342-343; BGHSt 49, 147 at 163-164, management of a concern); BGH
NJW 1998, pp. 767 (factual general manager of a GmbH is punishable for fraud by continuing the business of a
company after it has already become insolvent); BGH JR 2004, pp. 245 at 246, distribution of medication in a
veterinary clinic) with a critical annotation by Rotsch, JR 2004, pp. 248; Schünemann, in: Festschrift Schroeder,
2006, pp. 401 at 406.
104
Above all the „creator“ of the organizational control doctrine Roxin, Täterschaft, pp. 715-717; the same, in:
Festgabe BGH, 2000, pp. 177 at 192-192; the same, AT II, § 25 marginal nos 129 et seq., 138; the same, in:
SchwZStR 125 (2007), pp. 1 at 17-23;see also Ambos, GA 1998, pp. 226 at pp. 239; Joecks, in: MK-StGB, § 25
marginal nos 131-132; Krey, AT II (2002), § 28 marginal nos 159 et seq.; Küpper, GA 1998, pp. 519 at pp. 524;
Merkel, ZStW 107 (1995), pp. 545 at 555 et seq.; Muňoz Conde, in: Festschrift Roxin, 2001, pp. 609 ff. (611619); Murmann, GA 1996, pp. 296 (280); Otto, Grundkurs AT, § 21 marginal no. 92; Renzikowski, Täterbegriff,
pp. 90; Rotsch, NStZ 1998, pp. 491 at 493 and the following; the same, ZStW 112 (2000), pp. 518 at 530;
Schünemann, in: Festschrift Schroeder, 2006, pp. 401 at 412.
105
BGHSt 40, 218 at 237.
106
Also Roxin, AT II, § 25 marginal nos 129-130. In BGH NStZ 1999, pp. 503 at 504-505 the preconditions of an
organizational control are denied due to a lack of a corresponding organizational structure – but the preconditions
of a terrorist association are denied as well in this decision.
107
Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II § 49 marginal no. 4, 15; Roxin, AT II, § 25 marginal nos 188-189.
108
If two perpetrators cooperate without knowing about each other, they are independent perpetrators. This case
is not regulated in law, and thus they are both sole perpetrators, cp. Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 49 marginal
nos 80 et seq.
109
Bloy, GA 1996, pp. 424 at 425; Gropp, AT, § 10 marginal no. 81; Jescheck/Weigend, 674; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 49 marginal no. 5; Roxin, AT II, § 25 marginal no. 188; the same, in: LK, § 25 marginal no. 188.
110
Bloy, GA 1996, pp. 424 at 425, 437; Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 25 ff. marginal nos 7173; Hoyer, in: SK-StGB, Vor § 26 marginal no. 3; Dencker, Kausalität und Gesamttat, 1996, pp. 137; Hoyer, in:
SK StGB, Vor § 25 marginal no. 15; Puppe, ZIS 2007, pp. 234 at 234; Renzikowski, Täterbegriff, 71.
111
BGHSt 37, 289 at 292; 36, 249 at 250; 33, 50 at 52-53; 32, 165 at 178-179; 28, 346 at 348-349; BGH NStZ
1985, 165.
112
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 25 marginal nos 66 et seq.; Jakobs, AT, § 21 marginal no. 48; Joecks,
in: MK-StGB, § 25 marginal nos 175-176; Küpper, GA 1986, pp. 437 at 445-446; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, §
49 marginal nos 29-31.
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having control over the commission itself113. Hence this person can be considered as a co-perpetrator
despite the fact that he did not contribute to the actual carrying out of the plan. This extension of coperpetration has been criticized in literature as follows114: only preparing contributions cannot give
sufficient reasons for control over the realization and, in addition to this, this assumption leads to an
unlawful extension of the actus reus of the crime. However, this critique is (unfortunately) not yet
prevalent115.
In addition to the three forms of perpetration, two forms of secondary participation exist – the instigation of another person to commit an intentional, unlawful crime by evoking the decision to do so in
this person, § 26 StGB (instigation; “Anstiftung”), and the aiding (or assistance) – the supporting of
the intentional and unlawful crime committed by somebody else, § 27 StGB (“Beihilfe”). Aside from
the restrictive notion of perpetration, these modes of participation extend the punishability116 of participants who have not committed the crime themselves but have incited another person to do so or
supported another person in doing so.
Secondary participation is only possible in an intentionally and unlawfully committed main crime117,
§§ 26, 27 StGB. Concerning the reasons for the unlawfulness, secondary participation as a derivative
liability depends on the main crime. However, guilt depends on the question whether the participant
can personally be accused of the commission of the crime, and therefore has to be determined individually for each participant. This principle of limited accessoriness (“limitierte Akzessorietät”) is
legally determined in § 29 StGB118.
The instigator evokes the decision to commit a crime in the perpetrator119. For this, the act of instigating the future crime must be sufficiently precise120, and instigation is not possible when the perpetrator
had already decided to commit the crime himself121.
113
Jakobs, AT, § 21 marginal no. 48.
Bloy, GA 1996, pp. 424 at 433-437; Herzberg, ZStW 99 (1987), pp. 49 at 58-60; Puppe, ZIS 2007, pp. 234
at 241; Renzikowski, Täterbegriff, pp. 102 -104; Roxin, in: LK, § 25 marginal nos 181 et seq.; the same, AT II, §
25 marginal nos 203-204; Zieschang, ZStW 107 (1995), pp. 361 at 369-371.
115
As far as jurisdiction has already considered contributions of subordinate importance as reasons to assume coperpetration (cp. BGH NStZ 1995, pp. 122; BGH NJW 1999, pp. 2449; BGH NStZ-RR 2002, pp. 74 – providing
and driving of the get-away car), it has been strongly criticized in literature; cp. Cramer/Heine, in:
Schönke/Schröder, § 25 marginal no. 68; Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal nos 113-114; Küpper, NStZ 1995, pp. 331333.
116
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 25 ff., marginal nos 7, 17; Herzberg, GA 1971, pp. 1 at 2;
Hoyer, in: SK-StGB, Vor § 26 marginal no. 1; Jescheck/Weigend, 684; Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal no. 7; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 47 marginal no. 71; Gropp, AT, § 10 marginal no. 12; Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal no. 7;
Renzikowski, Täterbegriff, pp. 11; Roxin, AT II, § 25 marginal no. 5.
117
Gropp, AT, § 10 marginal nos 108 et seq.; Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal nos 134 et seq.; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT
II, § 50 marginal nos 63–67, 126.
118
Baumann/Weber/Mitsch, AT, § 28 marginal no. 46; reasons for a lawful excuse or for mitigation of guilt only
apply for the participant who fulfils them. So, if a main perpetrator acts without guilt, due to a case of necessity,
the participant can still be punished; cp. Baumann/Weber/Mitsch, AT, § 23 marginal no. 16; Zieschang, in: LKStGB, volume 2, 12th ed. 2006, § 35 marginal no. 71; Tröndle/Fischer, § 35 marginal no. 9. If the “participant”
has consciously taken advantage of the emergency situation of the acting person in order to use him as an instrument to realize the crime, he is an indirect perpetrator according to § 25 subsection 1, 2nd case StGB, cp.
Jescheck/Weigend, pp. 660.
119
A precondition for this is a mental contact between inciter and main perpetrator – the mere creation of a situation in which the main perpetrator it tempted to realize the crime is not sufficient; cp. Hoyer, in: SK-StGB, § 26
marginal nos 10 et seq.; Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal nos 171 et seq.; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 51 marginal no.
7.
120
Jescheck/Weigend, pp. 687; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 51 marginal no. 8.
121
„omnimodo facturus“; Jescheck/Weigend, 689; Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal no. 177; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II,
114
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The aide must support the commission of the main crime consciously and intentionally. Aiding does
not imply a causal connection in the sense of conditio sine qua non between the assisting action and
the main crime122. It is sufficient if the aide’s contribution supports, eases, speeds up, secures or enables the commission of the main crime in any way123.
For both forms of secondary participation, their mens rea consists of a double intention: firstly, the
accessory must provide his own contribution (i.e. the evoking of the perpetrator`s intention or the
supporting of the main crime), and secondly, his intention has to encompass the commission of the
main crime by the intentionally acting perpetrator124.
If a so-called agent provocateur provoked the attempt of a crime by instigating the perpetrator only
for prosecuting purposes, a punishable participation can be denied because there was no intention
concerning the completion of the main crime and so the needed double intention of the instigator was
not given125. This is based on the grounds that the agent provocateur, by his behavior, did not aim at
causing a violation of a legally protected interest but at enabling prosecution to take place126. The
permissibility of this practice of “prosecution” is disputed in literature127, especially when persons
who never had a tendency to commit a crime before are instigated to behave in a punishable way.
Nevertheless, the use of agents provocateurs is accepted in jurisdiction128. However, provocation can
later on lead to a mitigation for the perpetrator129.
A. 2. 2. Regulation and sanction of the acts of participation
The sanctions for perpetrators who act alone, indirect perpetrators and co-perpetrators result directly
from the elements of the crime. The instigator is punished in the same way as the perpetrator, § 26
StGB. The aide receives an obligatory mitigation, §§ 27 subsection 2, 2nd sentence, 49 subsection 2
StGB. All participants are punished according to the extent of their own personal guilt, § 29 StGB.
§ 28 StGB determines a relaxation of accessoriness for special personal elements (“besondere
persönliche Merkmale”)130. Special personal elements are “special qualities, circumstances and conditions” of strictly personal quality, § 14 subsection 1 StGB. These are elements which, although they
influence the unlawfulness of the crime, depend on the individual personality of the offender. For
example, this applies for the relations of a person to other people, to institutions or things131, e.g. the
fact that a person is an administration official is a “special personal circumstance”. Certain motivations are also special personal elements132, e.g. the motivation to kill a person out of greed (this is
122
BGHSt 46, 107 at 109; OLG Düsseldorf, StV 2002, 312; BayObLG NJW 2002, pp. 1663.
Jescheck/Weigend, 694; Krey, AT II § 33 marginal no. 297; Weigend, in: Festschrift Nishihara, pp. 197 at 206.
123
Roxin, in: LK, § 27 marginal no. 4 et seq.; Weigend, in: Festschrift Nishihara, 1998, pp. 197 at 207.
124
Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal nos 195 et seq.; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II, § 51 marginal nos 19, 24, 27, § 52
marginal nos 31-32.
125
Kühl, AT, § 20 marginal nos 201 et seq.; Maurach/Gössel/Zipf, AT II § 51 marginal no. 35; Tröndle/Fischer,
126
Baumann/Weber/Mitsch, AT, § 30 marginal nos 44 et seq.; Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 26 marginal nos 20 et seq.; Tröndle/Fischer, § 26 marginal no. 8 a.
127
Opposing opinion by Kühne, Strafprozessrecht, 7th ed. 2007 (hereinafter: „Strafprozess“), note 538; critically
also Endriss/Kinzig, NStZ 2000, 272-274; Kreuzer/Sinner, StV 2000, 114-116; Roxin, JZ 2000, 369-371.
128
BGHSt 32, 345; BGH NStZ 1995, pp. 506-508.
129
BGHSt 45, 321 at pp. 327. This applies in cases where persons who did not tend to commit a crime are provoked to commit an attempt of a crime. The behaviour of the agent provocateur which is attributable to the prosecution is viewed as a violation of the suspect’s right to a fair trial according to art. 6 subsection 1, 1st sentence
MRK. The assumption of tainted evidence in these cases is explicitly denied by the BGH, BGHSt 45, 321 (334 f.,
332 f.); critically hereunto Kühne, Strafprozess, marginal no. 537.
130
Roxin, AT II, § 27 marginal no. 4.
131
Lenckner/Perron, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 14 marginal nos 10, 11.
132
Lenckner/Perron, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 14 marginal no. 12.
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murder, § 211 StGB) or the motivation to kill when founded on an explicit and serious request of the
killed person (then it is killing of another person out of his own request, § 216 StGB).
If certain elements which justify the punishability are only given for the perpetrator and not for the
secondary participant, the sentence of the secondary participant has to be mitigated according to § 28
subsection 1 StGB. If, for example, “A” instigates a judge to commit the crime of perverting the
course of justice, § 339 StGB, it has to be taken into consideration for the punishment that “A” as a
“non-functional” was not able to violate the specific duties of a functional. Therefore, § 28 subsection
1 StGB determines that the sentence of the secondary participant has to be mitigated.
If a person involved (perpetrator or secondary participant) does not show mitigating or aggravating
special personal elements or elements that exclude him from punishment, which the perpetrator does
show or vice versa, each of these elements is only considered for the punishment of the person who
shows it133, § 28 subsection 2 StGB134. For example, the obstruction of criminal prosecution in favor
of a relative is free from punishment, according to § 258 subsection 6 StGB. If the relative acts in
concert with a non-relative as co-perpetrators, the punishability of the non-relative co-perpetrator
stays untouched from the privilege of relatives (§ 28 subsection 2 StGB). The special personal element
of relation is supposed to privilege only persons who are actually related to each other.
If a person involved has acted as a perpetrator as well as contributed to the crime as an accessory, the
minor mode of participation takes second place behind the major form (aiding steps back behind instigation, the latter behind perpetration135).
A. 3. Preparation and participation in relation to terrorism and other very serious forms of crime
A. 3. 1. Explicit prescriptive definitions of “terrorism”?
German criminal law does not contain a legal definition of the phenomenon of terrorism136. A certain
definition of terrorism can be derived from § 129 a StGB however137. § 129 a StGB determines the
punishability of the forming of a terrorist association138. The decisive element for a terrorist association is the pursuing of a certain purpose: if the association’s purpose is the commission of (a) particularly serious crime(s) it is, because of the high amount of unlawfulness of the crime(s), neither necessary that a specific terrorist purpose beyond the commission of the crime is pursued, nor is it necessary that the crime is likely to intimidate people139. The particularly serious crimes are enumerated in
§ 129 a subsection 1 StGB: they are murder, willful manslaughter, genocide, crimes against humanity
or war crimes as well as extortionate kidnapping and taking of hostages140. The aim to commit one of
these crimes is in itself sufficient to qualify the association as a terrorist one.
However, associations according to § 129 a subsection 2 StGB are different. The purpose here is also
the commission of finally enumerated crimes141, yet all of them show a more minor degree of unlawfulness than those in subsection 1. Therefore they have to be combined with a certain special determination and, in addition to this, they have to be suitable to cause significant damages. The (commission
133
E.g.: A thing was entrusted to the perpetrator, he commits a defalcative misappropriation according to § 246
subsection 2 StGB, while the participant, to whom the thing had not been entrusted, is punished for the basic form
of misappropriation, § 246 subsection 1 StGB.
134
Cp. Eser, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 246 marginal no. 29.
135
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vor § 25 marginal no. 49; Tröndle/Fischer, § 26 marginal no. 18.
136
Safferling, JICJ 2006, pp. 1152 at 1156.
137
Also Griesbaum, in: Festschrift Nehm, 2006, pp. 125 at 128, 129.
138
Cp. already A. 1. to §§ 129, 129 a, 129 b StGB.
139
Cp. Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 44.
140
§§ 211, 212 StGB (murder and manslaughter), §§ 6-12 Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (the German Code of International Criminal Law; hereinafter: VölkerStGB; genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes), §§ 239 a, 239 b
StGB (extortionate kidnapping and taking of hostages).
141
E.g. computer sabotage, arson crimes, crimes against the environment, altogether more than twenty catalogue
crimes.
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of the) crime has to be determined “to intimidate people in a considerable way, to unlawfully compel a
public authority or an international organization by using violence or by threatening to use violence or
to abolish or considerably impede the political, constitutional, economic or social basic structures of a
state or an international organization” and, in addition to this, to be apt to “significantly damage a
state or an international organization by the way of commission or the consequences” of the crime, §
129 a subsection 2, 3rd and 4th half-sentences StGB. Here it is supposed to be sufficient if only one of
the crimes shows the specific terrorist purpose or if this purpose can only be pursued by combining
the realization of several planned crimes142.
The enumerated crimes in § 129 a StGB do not attach the qualification as a terrorist crime to the pursuance of a certain political aim, but the purpose is reduced to a certain aptitude of the crime – to the
intimidation and the causing of damages143.
According to § 129 a subsection 3 StGB, it is even sufficient that the purpose of the association is
limited to the threatening with one of the crimes enumerated in subsection 1 and 2.
Compliance of the German provisions with internationally established definitions?
The present form144 of §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB is based on the “Act on the Transposition of the EU
Framework Decision on Terrorism of June 13, 2002” 145. The instruction in the framework decision to
punish those crimes which were committed with a specific terrorist purpose more severely, is fulfilled
with the individual rule of determination of punishment in § 46 subsection 2, 2nd sentence StGB146,
according to which the motivations and purposes of the perpetrator take influence on the determination of his sentence; a terrorist motivation is considered as an aggravating factor here147.
In addition to this, terrorism has led to the introduction of a special organizational crime148, which is
not (only) attached to already committed but to merely planned crimes (as well). The mere “project
stage” would be sufficient for this crime – it is not necessary that the members of the association have
already brought about specific acts of an attempt149. The organizational crimes serve, according to
prevailing opinion, the protection of public security and national order150. For this end they constitute
abstract crimes of endangerment in the preliminary stage of imminent violations of legally protected
interests151. The most decisive importance of these organizational crimes lies in their procedural implications: If there is a suspicion of a terrorist organization, the prosecution is allowed to employ sev-
142
BGH NStZ-RR 2006, pp. 267–269.
Critically Weigend, in: Festschrift Nehm, pp. 151 at 163.
144
Recently, the rules were amended by the Act on the Fight against Terrorism of January 5, 2007 (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz, BGBl I 2007, pp. 2), which essentially contains a prolongation of the rules of the Act on the
Fight against Terrorism of January 9, 2002 (BGBl I 2002, pp. 361) which were valid until January 10, 2007.
145
BGBl I (2003), pp. 2836; Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 5.
146
The same applies for the so-called „connected crimes“ in art. 3 of the Framework Decision (these are crimes
as serious theft, extortion, and the issuing of false administrative documents, which, when they are committed to
pursue a certain purpose, are supposed to be subsumed under the definition of terrorist crimes as “connected
crimes”). For the punishment, the pursued terrorist aim can here also be considered in an aggravating way according to § 46 subsection 2 StGB. If connected crimes are committed by perpetrators who are not at the same time
members of the terrorist association, they fulfil the crime of § 129 a subsection 5, 1st sentence StGB, „support of a
terrorist association“; cp. B. 1. 1.
147
BT-Drs. 15/813, 6; Stree, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 46 marginal no. 13. Cp. also BGH NJW 2004, 3054.
148
Federle, ZStW 110 (1998), pp. 767 at 792; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 5.
149
Weigend, in: Festschrift Nehm, pp. 151 at 164.
150
Federle, ZStW 110 (1998), 767 at 792; Griesbaum, in: Festschrift Nehm, pp. 125 at 129; Tröndle/Fischer,
151
Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 4; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 b marginal no. 6.
143
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eral special means of investigation152. The suspicion of a crime according to § 129 a StGB, for example, legitimizes the surveillance of telecommunication, § 100 a subsection 1 lit. 1 c) of the “Strafprozessordnung”, the German Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter: “StPO”), the acoustic surveillance of conversations in residential spaces, § 100 c subsection 2 lit. 1 b) StPO, the search of buildings
that are not inhabited by the suspect when it is, founded on facts, assumed that the suspect is currently
staying there, § 103 subsection 1, 2nd sentence StPO; the establishment of control points on streets and
places according to § 111 StPO153 as well as the drag-net technique according to § 163 d subsection 1
StPO154. The declared purpose of these authorizations is to enable intervention in terrorist organizations as soon as possible in order to prevent the commission of the planned terrorist crimes already in
the preliminary stage155.
Apart from the aggravated punishment of already committed crimes, terrorism allows, in the first
place, prosecution for organizational crimes at an early stage and it also leads to the legitimization of
numerous means of investigation.
The instructions given by the EU Framework Decision on Terrorism seem to be widely fulfilled by
national law. In some less decisive points, German legislature has made use of its scope of discretion
in the transformation156: § 129 a subsection 2 no. 1 StGB transposes article 5 subsection 3 in connection with article 2, 1, subsection 1 lit. b of the Framework Decision157, according to which “assaults to
the bodily integrity of a person” are to be considered as terrorist crimes. German legislature does not
consider any assault on the bodily integrity as sufficient in § 129 a subsection 2 no. 1 StGB, however,
legislature demands that particularly physical or mental damages as enumerated in § 226 StGB (severe
bodily injury) are intended158. This leads to the assumption that simple bodily injuries in the sense of §
223 StGB are not subject to the terrorist purpose according to § 129 a subsection 2 no. 1 StGB. The
demarcation in detail is questionable159, however, as § 129 a subsection 2 no. 1 StGB includes “mental” damages and enumerates “in particular” damages of the kind described in § 226 StGB. This leads
to the question whether other comparable serious damages might also be sufficient for the demanded
purpose in § 129 a subsection 2 no. 1 StGB. The question whether German legislature actually wanted
a restriction compared to the instructions of the Framework Decision is disputable160. In addition to
this, in the French, Italian, Spanish and Dutch version of the Framework Decision, a limitation to
serious bodily injury can also be observed161, so that such a limitation might possibly not contradict
the European instructions at all. Apart from these questions, the purpose to cause individual consequences of bodily injury hardly seems to be characteristic of a terrorist association162.
152
v. Bubnoff, in: LK, Vor § 129 note 2; Federle, ZStW 110 (1998), pp. 767 at 794; Maurach/Schroeder/Maiwald, BT II, § 95 note 2; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a note 3; Weigend, in: Festschrift Nehm, pp.
151 at 152, 167; the same, in: JICJ (4) 2006, pp. 912-932 at 925.
153
§ 111 subsection 1, 2nd sentence StPO: At a control point, anybody has to let the officials check his identity as
well as to let them search his carried items.
154
Data that have been gathered during controls by the police on the border or at control points may be submitted
to the prosecution officials.
155
For the numerous authorizations that exist aside these, cp. C. 1.
156
Cp. already note 147 for the „connected crimes“.
157
BT-Drs. 15/813, pp. 7; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 9.
158
Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 45; Weigend, in: Festschrift Nehm, pp. 151 at 165, note
66.
159
Also Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 9.
160
The same applies for the missing reference to the SprengG (act on explosives), pointed out by
Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 11. Legislation considered this as not necessary due to the reference to §
308 subsection 1–4 StGB that § 129 a subsection 2 no. 2 StGB already contains; cp. BT-Drs. 15/813, pp. 7.
161
The reasoning of the regulation also refers to this, BT-Drs. 15/813, pp. 7.
162
Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 9.
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On an international level, Germany joined the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) with effect from December 12, 2002163. Germany joined the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)164 with effect from December 19, 2003165. As German
law already rules the punishment of the financing of terrorism in §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB, no further
amendments were made on this point166. Furthermore the UN Convention for the Fighting against
Nuclear Terrorism was signed by Germany on September 15, 2005167.
A. 3. 2. – 3. 3. The constitutive elements of these specific offences
The catalogue crimes concerning the terrorist association according to § 129 a StGB are all taken from
the special part of the StGB. Specific terrorist crimes do not exist. In order to be considered the subject of a terrorist purpose of an association, a crime from the special part of the StGB has to fulfill
particular circumstances only in the case of § 129 a subsection 2 StGB168. At least one of the enumerated catalogue crimes has to be objectively apt to damage a state or an international organization in a
considerable way because of the way it is committed or its consequences. The special suitability to
cause damage is an objective quality of the planned crime; still, it can only be determined by considering the imagination of the members of the association. In this case, - just like in the case of the beginning of an attempt169 - a subjective purpose has to be determined by applying an objective standard.
Only for the catalogue crimes in subsection 2 must the perpetrator not only have the intention to
commit a particular crime, but beyond this intention must pursue a special goal. This goal lies in the
intention to intimidate people or to compel the state or an international organization170 by committing
these crimes. Strangely enough, the pursuance of political purposes, which has often171 been named as
a characteristic element of terrorism, is not an element of the organizational crime in § 129 a StGB172.
B. 1. 1. Preparatory acts, not followed by the commission of the crime, punished as separate offences
§ 129 a StGB is an organizational crime which clearly stays in the preliminary stage of the commission of a terrorist catalogue crime. Already the forming of or membership in an association whose
purpose is the future commission of terrorist crimes is an independent crime with its own actus reus.
Membership in a terrorist association depends on “active participation in the association”173. This
active participation can consist of any act in furtherance of the association’s purposes174. Active participation may also include preparatory acts for terrorist crimes.
Non-members of terrorist associations are also punishable if they support the association, § 129 a
subsection 5, 1st sentence StGB. Their support can consist of logistic support of the association as well
as of preparatory contributions to the commission of terrorist crimes – such as, for example, the provision of tools to commit the crime. The contribution of preparatory acts to terrorist catalogue crimes
becomes, according to § 129 a subsection 5 StGB, a completion of the organizational crime of “sup163
BGBl II 2002, pp. 2506-2518.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 9.12.1999 (GA Res. 54/109).
165
BGBl. II 2003, pp. 1923.
166
Cp. Weigend, in: Festschrift Nehm, 2006, pp. 151 at 155 with note 18.
167
Cp. for the existing extensive reglation in the StGB already A. 2. 1. 2. – 2. 1. 4.
168
Cp. hereunto already A. 3.
169
Cp. A. 2. 1. 1.
170
Critically Weigend, in: Festschrift Nehm, pp. 151 at 163, who complains about a combination of objective
purposes, subjective intentions and chain references”.
171
Schmalenbach, Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht (hereinafter: NZWehrR) 2000, pp. 15 at 19; Tomuschat,
EuGRZ 2002, 535 at 536; Weigend, in: Festschrift Nehm, pp. 151 at 162-163.
172
Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 7, § 129 marginal no. 11.
173
BGHSt 29, 114 at 119-121; 29, 288 at 294; BGH NStZ 2002, pp. 328 at 330.
174
As for example the renting of an apartment or the providing of a hiding place for association members who are
wanted by the police (cp. BGHSt 29, 288 at 294).
164
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port of a terrorist association”. The punishable participation as well as the support according to § 129
a subsections 1, 2 and 5 StGB can also concern associations whose purpose is only to threaten to
commit one of the crimes of the catalogue in subsection 2 and subsection 3.
In addition to this, according to the special crime of promotion of a terrorist association, § 129 a subsection 5, 2nd sentence StGB, a person who (as a non-member175) enlists members or supporters in
favor of the association is also punishable. A successful ending is not needed for the completion of
this offence176. This is also a crime in the preliminary stage of an (even unsuccessful) instigation to
make a person become a member of a terrorist organization or an (again also: unsuccessful) instigation to make a person become an accessory who assists in the pursuance of the purpose of the association (“support” in the sense of § 129 a subsection 5 StGB).
For the preliminary stages of participation concerning § 129 a StGB see infra under B. 1.2. and B. 1.3.
B. 1. 2. – 1. 3. Specific indictments punishing separately specific activities that take place prior to the
actual carrying out of the acts of terrorism or of the criminal plan
Due to the extensive formulation of the actus reus of § 129 a StGB177, specific indictments for single
preparatory acts concerning terrorist crimes from the catalogue are not necessary. The crimes of
founding or membership in as well as support and promotion of a terrorist association extend the punishability concerning imminent terrorist crimes significantly into the preliminary stage. In addition to
this, the ambit of punishable participation is extended by considering classical acts of secondary participation (promotion, support) as independent perpetrative crimes178.
Other crimes with a special focus on the preparation and support of terrorist crimes cannot be found in
the StGB. These are completely covered by § 129 a subsection 5 StGB, “support, promotion” 179.
B. 1. 4. Punishments for the commission of more than one form of participation in offences related to
terrorism
If one of the terrorist catalogue crimes is realized, the punishability for a preliminary agreement to
commit this crime, according to § 30 StGB, steps back and is subsidiary to the punishability for the
completed crime. If a member of a terrorist association, in the course of his membership180, commits
one of the crimes enumerated in § 129 a StGB, the catalogue crime and the membership in the association are, according to the prevailing opinion, convicted in nominal coincidence of offences (§ 52
StGB, “Tateinheit/Idealkonkurrenz”) 181. The offender is then only punished for the graver of the two
crimes. The same applies for the crimes of § 129 a subsection 5 StGB: The involvement in the realization of a terrorist catalogue crime necessarily fulfils, at the same time, the actus reus of the offence of
supporting a terrorist association according to § 129 a subsection 5, 2nd sentence StGB. These are
offences by one and the same act then; the offender is again punished for the graver crime, § 52 StGB.
If a non-member enlists members for a terrorist association and participates (as a non-member), in
addition to this, in the realization of a terrorist crime, these offences will typically be a case of a plu175
BGHSt 20, 89-90.
BGHSt 20, 89 at 90; Altvater, NStZ 2003, pp. 179 at 179; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a marginal
no. 74; Ostendorf, in: LK, § 129 marginal no. 19; Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 18 a;
Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 marginal no. 29.
177
Cp. hereunto supra B. 1. 1.
178
Concerning the preparation of crimes involving explosives, cp. Already the comments under A. 2. 1. 2.
179
Cp. the comments under B. 5.
180
All active contributions to the support of the forming, continuance or the action of the organization fulfil the
actus reus of membership in a terrorist organization; BGHSt 29, 288 at 291, 294; BGH NStZ 2002, pp. 328 at
330; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 20, § 129 marginal no. 24.
181
BGHSt 29, 288 at 291; BGH StV 1999, pp. 352 at 353; v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 marginal no. 87. Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 52 ff., marginal no. 91; Ostendorf, in: NK, § 129 marginal no. 33; Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 19, § 129 marginal no. 34; Tröndle/Fischer, §
129 a marginal no. 31, § 129 marginal no. 50.
176
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rality of offences182; then an adjusted cumulative punishment will be formed out of the single punishments for each crime, § 53 StGB (“Tatmehrheit/Realkonkurrenz”)183.
If a member of the terrorist association has already been convicted because of his membership according to §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB, and if his participation in a catalogue crime realized during his membership becomes public later, the principle of ne bis in idem is, according to jurisdiction184, not applicable, although both actions should form a unity of offences. Hence the perpetrator can still be convicted
of the catalogue crime.
B. 1. 5. Attempts in these fields of crime
The attempt of a terrorist catalogue crime enumerated in § 129 a StGB is punishable according to the
general law of attempts. Special rules for the moment of the beginning of the attempt do not exist.
This also applies for the organizational crimes in § 129 a StGB: The attempt to form a terrorist association as well as of membership in it according to § 129 a subsection 1 and 2 StGB are always punishable as a felony, §§ 12 subsection 1, 23 subsection 1 StGB185. If one considers, however, that this
forming essentially consists of an agreement on the future common pursuance of the association’s
purpose – that is to say of an agreement to commit terrorist crimes in a wider sense – an attempt of
forming a terrorist association is basically an attempt of an agreement to commit crimes. This clearly
shows the extension of punishability into the preliminary stage in § 129 a StGB.
As the forming of the association or involvement in it are already sufficient to complete the organizational crime, §§ 129 a, 22 StGB hardly provide any possibility to withdraw from an attempt of a
crime. Therefore, legislature permitted active repentance in §§ 129 a subsection 7 and 129 subsection
6 StGB: mitigation up to exemption from punishment may be granted if the perpetrator willingly and
seriously makes an effort to prevent the continuance of the association or the realization of terrorist
crimes, § 129 subsection 6 no. 1 StGB, or if he reports the association to the prosecution officials in
time, § 129 subsection 6 no. 2 StGB. The perpetrator is then exempted from punishment if the continuance of the association is successfully prevented – either as a consequence of his efforts or even
independently from them, § 129 subsection 6 in the end, StGB.
Attempted membership in an association which only pursues the threatening with crimes from the
catalogue, is not punishable (§ 129 a subsection 3 StGB). However, ringleaders and backers186 can
already be punished for attempting the forming or the membership, as for them, the crime is a felony
(§ 129 a subsection 4 StGB) 187. The attempt of supporting or promoting a terrorist association is not
punishable according to § 129 a subsection 5 StGB188.
B. 2. Special conditions for the participation in offences related to terrorism
B. 2. 1. The constitutive elements of complicity in offences related to terrorism
For participation in one of the terrorist crimes enumerated in § 129 a StGB, the general rules of participation apply. However, the question as to what extent participation in the organizational crime of §
182
The participation in a catalogue crime will hardly be (partly) identical with the promotion of a terrorist association.
183
Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 19, § 129 marginal no. 34, with further references.
184
BGHSt 29, 288 at 292-293; BGH NStZ-RR 1999, pp. 176 at 177; BGH StV 1999, 352 at 353;
Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 31, § 129 marginal no. 50. Critically Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a
marginal no.19, § 129 marginal no. 35.
185
186
For the definition of the notions of ringleader and backer, cp. the comments under B. 3. 3.
187
Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 16.
188
v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 marginal no. 72; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 23. That means that the
principle is kept that attempted assistance is free from punishment (the modality of supporting is a kind of secondary participation which has been converted into perpetration).
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129 a StGB is possible, is answered in different ways189. In § 129 a StGB, four different modes of
participation in the association are explicitly regulated:
(1) Forming an association as a perpetrator
(2) Membership in an association as a perpetrator
(3) Support of the association
(4) Promotion of the association.
As for the forming of an association as a perpetrator, instigation and aiding, §§ 26, 27 StGB, are possible190 according to the prevailing view in literature and jurisdiction191. If a member of an association
instigates a person who had so far not yet been involved to become a member of the association, this
is acting in the sense of the association’s purpose192, i.e. a form of (perpetrative) membership, which
makes the punishability of the instigation recessive.
Assisting actions by non-members in favor of the association are punished as perpetrative support, §
129 subsection 5 StGB193. The support requires an act of assistance which has to be of some advantage for the association in some way194. The same has to be assumed for aiding in the sense of § 27
StGB. Therefore cases of aiding concerning § 129 a StGB, which are not punishable as perpetrative
support in the sense of § 129 subsection 5 StGB, are hardly imaginable. Secondary participation in
support is, at the same time, a form of support of the association in itself. Therefore aiding or instigating another person to support a terrorist organization is punishable as perpetrative support according
to § 129 a subsection 5 StGB195.
If a non-member instigates a third person to become a member of the association, this is perpetrative
promotion according to § 129 a subsection 5 StGB196; an instigation according to the general rules is
not possible in addition to this197. Promotion has to refer to an association that already exists198. If this
is not the case, it can be either a perpetrative forming of the association or – if the amount of the con189
v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 a marginal no. 17 b, § 129 marginal nos 73, 74; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, §
129 marginal no. 99, § 129 a, marginal no. 70.
190
A minor opinion in the literature (v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 a marginal no. 17 b, § 129 marginal no. 73; Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 17, § 129 marginal nos 26-27) consider the incitement to the forming as a perpetrative “forming promotion” according to § 129 a subsection 5 StGB. As jurisdiction requires, for a
punishable promotion, that the association does already exist (BayObLG NJW 1998, pp. 2542 at 2542-2543;
agreeing Radtke, JR 1999, pp. 84 at 85; also Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 79; Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 18 a), a forming promotion is not possible, according to the prevailing view (BayObLG NJW 1998, pp. 2542 at 2543; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 100;
Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 marginal no. 26).
191
In this sense BayObLG NJW 1998, pp. 2542 at 2543; v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 a marginal no. 17 b, § 129
marginal no. 73; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 100; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no.
24, § 129 marginal no. 38.
192
v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 marginal no. 48.
193
v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 marginal nos 65, 73; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 marginal nos 103, 81, §
129 a marginal no. 73; Ostendorf, in: NK, § 129 marginal no. 20.
194
Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 74; § 129 marginal no. 104; Ostendorf, in: NK, § 129
marginal no. 20.
195
v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 marginal nos 48, 73; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129, marginal no. 103, § 129
a marginal no. 73; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 marginal no. 38.
196
The so-called sympathy promotion, which is suppposed to create mere sympathy with the association instead
of a new membership or a supporting action is no longer included; cp. Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 20,
197
v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 a marginal no. 17 b, § 129 marginal no. 73; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a
marginal no. 70, § 129 marginal no. 102; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 marginal no. 38.
198
BayObLG NJW 1998, pp. 2542 at 2542-2543; agreeing Radtke, JR 1999, pp. 84 at 85; also Miebach/Schäfer,
in: MK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 79; Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 18 a; cp. for the promotion see above B. 1. 1.
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tribution is not sufficient for this – aiding or (possibly only attempted) instigation to the forming of an
association according to §§ 129 a, 26, 27 or §§ 129 a, 30 subsection 1 StGB. The possibility of secondary participation in the offence of promotion, according to the general rules, is accepted by the prevailing view in literature and jurisdiction199.
B. 2. 2. Mere agreement or mere incitation not followed by the commission of the offence
An attempted instigation and an agreement to commit a crime in the sense of § 30 StGB are also punishable if they refer to the forming of a terrorist association, as this is a felony (§§ 129 a, 30 StGB)200.
Also, the mere declaration of being prepared to become a member of a terrorist association is punishable, according to §§ 129 a subsection 1, 2, 30 subsection 2 StGB. Support and promotion of a terrorist association by non-members are misdemeanors, § 30 subsection 2 StGB is therefore not applicable201.
If the attempted instigation to make a person become a member is done by a non-member, it is independently punishable as a completed enlistment of members according to § 129 a subsection 5 StGB.
§§ 30 subsection 1, 129 a subsection 1 or 2 StGB are so far not applicable202. If a member of the association tries to incite a person who is not yet involved, this is an action in the course of his own membership203, i.e. a completed commission of § 129 a subsection 1 or 2 StGB.
B. 2. 3. The evidence of participation in case of terrorist offences
Explicit procedural provisions granting an alleviation of the burden of proof concerning terrorist
crimes do not exist. However, the very extensive formulation of the statutory facts of § 129 a StGB,
which refers to a wide range of actions in the preliminary stage of terrorist offences, and which, in
addition to this, considers almost every contribution to the support of the association’s purpose, even
from non-members (support, promotion204), as a perpetrative realization of § 129 a StGB, does in fact
make evidence easier. Moreover, there is a regulation of active repentance in §§ 129 a subsection 7,
129 subsection 6 no. 2 StGB which, by legally granting privileges to a confessing member of the association, has the effect of a “small crown witness regulation”. By holding out the prospect of mitigation up to exemption from punishment, an incentive is supposed to be given to members of the association in order to make them support the prevention of terrorist catalogue crimes as well as the prosecution of members of terrorist associations.
B. 2. 4. Punishments for preparatory or collateral conduct to the activities and associations constituting terrorist crimes
Basically, the general rules of attempt and participation apply for the terrorist offences enumerated in
§ 129 a StGB. Assistance (“aiding”) to terrorist offences can therefore be provided through (actually)
neutral contributions if they increase the risk of the offences being realized and if the accessory makes
his/her contribution in awareness of this.
Furthermore, a special offence of supporting a terrorist association in the sense of § 129 a subsection 5
StGB does exist. Non-members of a terrorist association are punishable for supporting the association
according to § 129 a subsection 5, 1st sentence StGB if they contribute to the furtherance of the association’s purpose205. This offence is basically a form of secondary participation which is converted
199
BGHSt 29, 258 at 263-266; 36, 363 at 367-368; 43, 41 at 51; v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 marginal no. 73;
Miebach/Schäfer, § 129 marginal no. 101, § 129 a marginal nos 70, 71; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 24,
§ 129 marginal no. 38; disagreeing Ostendorf, in: NK, § 129 marginal no. 28; Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129
a marginal no. 17, § 129 marginal no. 27.
200
Bay ObLG NJW 1998, 2542 at 2543; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 24.
201
Cp. for the preliminary stages of participation the comments under A. 2. 1. 2.
202
BGHSt 20, 89-90; BGHSt 43, 41 at 51; v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 a marginal no. 38.
203
BGHSt 31, 16 at 17; v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 a marginal no. 38.
204
BGHSt 20, 89-90; promotion does not require a proof of success, cp. already B. 1. 1.
205
Cp. hereunto already A. 3.
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into perpetration. Supportive acts according to the statutory facts are, for example, the provision of
information or material to realize the offence, the provision of space, vehicles or similar things206. It is
essential that the contribution is aimed at supporting the specific purpose of the association; mere
socially usual contributions to the provision for elementary requirements207 (such as the sale of food or
items of everyday use or the renting of an apartment) without a specific connection to the purpose of
the association are not punishable as supportive acts. This also applies to the procedurally permitted
practicing of a defense lawyer’s profession208.
The promotion of a terrorist association by non-members is punishable according to § 129 a subsection 5, 2nd sentence, and can hardly be realized by “neutral” behavior.
According to § 138 subsection 1 StGB a person is punishable who learns about the planning of certain
finally enumerated crimes (such as murder, manslaughter, genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes209) and does not report this to the officials or to the endangered persons in time. According to §
138 subsection 2 StGB, the same applies for planned crimes in the sense of §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB. The
duty to report arises when someone learns from a credible source that someone else plans to form a
terrorist association, to become a member of it or to support or promote such an association210. The
reporting has to take place immediately after the person has heard about this, § 138 subsection 2
StGB211. As the purpose of § 138 StGB is to prevent the realization of the planned offence, the duty to
report only exists for as long as the prevention of the realization or the successful ending of the offence are still possible212. However, it is doubtful what the prevention of the forming of the association could look like in practice, as the forming is nothing more than an agreement of the future members on the common pursuance of the association’s purpose213.
The failure to report is not only punishable if it took place intentionally but also if the perpetrator
thoughtlessly (“leichtfertig” 214) fails to report, § 138 subsection 3 StGB.
B. 3. The separate offence for “terrorist” associations
B. 3. 1. The identification of terrorist associations
See supra A. 3., for the legal definition of the terrorist association in §§ 129, 129 a, 129 b StGB. A
“first list” of associations that were to be categorized as terrorist associations215 was made on a European level in the course of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP216 on the application of special actions to fight against terrorism217. This list is to be updated every six months218. Germany is, due to its
loyalty to the Union, obliged to harmonize its practice of prosecution with the Common Position.
206
Cp. for the criminal actions Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 20, § 129 marginal nos 30, 31 with jurisdiction references.
207
Ostendorf, in: NK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 22.
208
Ostendorf, in: NK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 23; Rudolphi/Stein, in: SK-StGB, § 129 marginal no. 17 b;
Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 20, 129 marginal no. 33.
209
These are as well the possibly terrorist catalogue crimes enumerated in § 129 a subsection 1 no. 1 StGB.
210
The duty to report does not apply for the participants of the organizational crimes, even if they only participate
in actions which are free from punishment (such as mere preparation), cp. Cramer/Sternberg-Lieben, § 138 marginal no. 20; Ostendorf, in NK-StGB, § 138 marginal no. 7; Tröndle/Fischer, § 138 marginal nos 18-19.
211
This a stronger requirement, compared to the duty to report other planned crimes: for the latter, a reporting „in
time“ is sufficient, § 138 subsection 1 StGB; cp. hereunto Tröndle/Fischer, § 138 marginal no. 27.
212
BGH StV 1990, pp. 146- 147; Cramer/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 138 marginal no. 9.
213
The general preconditions of a duty to report, according to § 138 subsection 1 StGB, apply for the crimes
which the association members plan in order to achieve their purpose, cp. Tröndle/Fischer, § 138 marginal no.
26.
214
This describes a fault of increased negligence.
215
Abl. EG L 344 v. 28.12.2001, p. 93.
216
The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.
217
Art. 1. subsection 1 in connection with annex to the Common Position, Abl. EG L 344 v. 28.12.2001, p. 93.
218
Cp. Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht, 2006, § 12 marginal no. 13.
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Also, a list of terrorist organizations which is constantly updated219 was made in connection with the
actions to suppress the financing of terrorism on a European level220. As this list is part of a Council
Regulation, it is directly applicable law in the member states221.
B. 3. 2. The requirements constituting a terrorist association
The concept of an association is uniformly defined in §§ 129, 129 a, 129 b StGB222. According to the
instructions of the EU Framework Decision on Terrorism, it follows the organizational model223, for
which at least three members of the association are needed224. The union of these persons must be
meant to last for a certain period of time225 and have a minimum of organizational consolidation226
which is shown in a coordinated and labor-sharing course of conduct227.
According to jurisdiction228, each member of a criminal or terrorist association has to submit his will
to the will of the community, in a way that the mutual relation is seen as a homogeneous union by the
participants. A common will of the association would be necessary for this; a one-sided personal submission to the will of a single leader would not be sufficient229. So if a single person leads a group by
using a system of command and obedience, this cannot be seen as a criminal or terrorist association,
according to jurisdiction230.
The decisive element for qualification as a terrorist association is the pursuance of a specific purpose –
see hereunto A. 3.
B. 3. 3. Differences in sentencing between mere participation in a terrorist association and other more
aggravating conduct
In § 129 a subsection 4 StGB, a special and obligatory rule of aggravation for ringleaders and backers
can be found. Ringleaders are leading personalities among the terrorist association (“Rädelsführer”)
219
As far as it can be overviewed, recently Abl. EU L 82 pp. 20 v. 21.3.2006. It is criticized that this list is not
subject to any judicial control; Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht, § 12 marginal no. 14, note 76; Gusy, GA 2005,
pp. 215 at 226.
220
Order (EG) Nr. 2580/2001 by the Council of December 28, 2001 on specific restrictive measures to fight
against terrorism which are aimed against certain persons and organizations, Abl. EG L 344 v. 28.12.2001, p. 70.
221
Cp. Abl. EG L 344 v. 28.12.2001, p. 73.
222
Cp. already A. 3.; Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 129 a marginal no. 2.
223
Cp. Art. 2 subsection 1 of the EU Framework Decision on Terrorism of June 13, 2002, Abl EG L 164, pp. 3.:
more than three persons. A contrast to this is the so-called conspiracy model as it is described in § 30 subsection 2
StGB – here two participants are already sufficient for the constitution of an association; cp. v. HeintschelHeinegg, in: Festschrift Schroeder, 2006, pp. 799 at 800; Kress, JA 2005, pp. 220 at 221.
224
BGHSt 28, 147; v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 marginal no. 12; v. Heintschel-Heinegg, in: Festschrift Schroeder,
2006, pp. 799 at 801; Kress, JA 2005, pp. 220 at 223; Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 129
marginal no. 4; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 21; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 marginal no. 6.
225
BGHSt 31, 239 at 240-241; v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 marginal no. 13; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129
a marginal no. 34.
226
v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 marginal no. 10; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 marginal no. 7.
227
Kress, JA 2005, pp. 220 at 223; Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 23;
228
BGHSt 28, 147 f.; BGHSt 31, 239 at 241; BGH NJW 1992, pp. 1518-1519; BGH NStZ 1999, pp. 503 at 504;
BGHSt 45, 26 at 35; critical on this criterion Federle, ZStW 110 (1998), pp. 767 at 794.
229
In this restrictive sense also Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 129 marginal no. 4;
Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a marginal nos 30-33; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 marginal no. 7.
230
Referring to the instructions of the EU Framework Decision on Terrorism, comments in literature (v.
Heintschel-Heinegg, in: Festschrift Schroeder, pp. 799 at 806; Kress, JA 2005, pp. 220 at 224) favour a more
generous interpretation of the notion of an association. The framework decision only requires a connection of
people which has been built not only coincidentally in order to commit a crime immediately. (Framework Decision on Terrorism, Abl. EG L 164 of June 22, 2002, pp. 4). v. Heintschel-Heinegg and Kress conclude from this
that a “common will” of the uniform connection of a terrorist association can no longer be considered as necessary.
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231
. Backers are persons outside the terrorist association who, in a certain way, act in favor of the terrorist association by significantly influencing the association’s conduct or a considerable number of its
members (“Hintermänner”) 232. If terrorist crimes in furtherance of the association’s purpose are
committed, the punishability of the ringleaders or backers for having committed the catalogue crimes
is regulated according to the general rules. The dominant position in the association is only taken into
consideration concerning the organizational crime of § 129 a subsection 4 StGB. If the ringleaders or
backers have not actually participated in the terrorist crimes, they cannot be punished for those crimes.
However, it has to be considered that, according to jurisdiction, perpetration as a co-perpetrator can be
committed by making preparatory contributions (see supra A. 2. 2.). This can be applicable for ringleaders and backers, at least as far as crimes which are essential for the association’s purpose are concerned.
§ 129 a subsection 6 StGB contains an optional reason for mitigation for involved persons whose guilt
is of a minor degree and whose participation is of subordinate importance for the association233.
B. 4. The liability of legal entities
German criminal law does not provide a criminal responsibility for legal entities234. A liability of legal
entities can still be taken from §§ 30, 130 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (OwiG), the Regulatory Offences Act. These rules determine that the legal entity has to pay a fine when natural individuals who
are authorized to represent the legal entity commit a regulatory offence that can be attributed to the
legal entity. The regulatory responsibility of legal entities is given alongside a possible personal responsibility of the natural individual. When the individual sanction against the acting representative is
determined, it is taken into consideration whether this person has already had a loss due to the sanctions against the legal entity235.
German legislature already considers the corresponding instruction from the EU Framework Decision
on Terrorism as fulfilled by this regulatory responsibility236. However, legal entities are only those
social organizations which are accepted as independent lawful personalities237. This will naturally not
be the case with terrorist associations in the sense of § 129 a StGB. A responsibility of terrorist associations according to §§ 30, 130 OwiG is thus hardly thinkable238.
B. 5. 1. – 5. 4. Specific indictments for the expression and/or dissemination of thought or opinions
linked to terrorism
There are numerous crimes which are linked to the particularly serious crimes enumerated in § 129 a
subsection 1 no. 1 StGB (murder, manslaughter, genocide etc.239) as well as crimes which are linked
to the crimes enumerated in § 129 a subsection 2 no. 2 StGB (arson, crimes involving explosives and
other crimes which are dangerous to the public): § 126 subsection 1 no. 2, 6 StGB punish the distur-
231
v. Bubnoff, in: LK, § 129 a marginal no. 36, § 129 marginal no. 76; Miebach/Schäfer, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a
marginal no. 61, § 129 marginal no. 119; Tröndle/Fischer, § 84 marginal no. 3.
232
v. Bubnoff, in LK, § 129 a marginal no. 36, § 129 marginal no. 77; Miebach/Schäfer, in: SK-StGB, § 129 a
marginal no. 61, § 129 marginal no. 121.
233
Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 85, § 129 marginal no. 124.
234
Cramer/Heine, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 25 ff., marginal nos 119 et seq.
235
Göhler, Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (hereinafter: „OwiG“), 13th ed. 2002, § 30 marginal no. 29.
236
BT-Drs. 15/813, p. 6: Concerning §§ 30, 130 OwiG, a special transfer of the framework instructions on the
punishability of legal entities is no longer necessary.
237
Göhler, OwiG, § 30 marginal no. 2.
238
It only seems to be possible that a behaviour of an organ of the legal entity which supports a terrorist association from the outside, can be attributed to the legal entity and that the legal entity is made responsible for this
according to §§ 30, 130 OwiG. However, a precondition for this is that the organ, by realizing the crime of § 129
a StGB, has violated a duty which is related to the business of the legal entity (cp. Rogall, in: Karlsuher Kommentar zum OwiG, § 30 marginal no. 76).
239
Cp. hereunto A. 3. 1.
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bance of public peace240. § 130 a StGB punishes the instruction to crimes in the sense of § 126 subsection 1 StGB241. An instruction according to the statutory facts is given when the methods of planning,
preparing, realization and successful escape from prosecution concerning the named crimes are shown
in written or oral publications242.
The giving of a reward after the commission of these crimes or their public approval are also punishable, §§ 140, 126 subsection 1 StGB. The approval of and the threatening with these crimes must be
apt to disturb the public peace, and they have to happen in public, i.e. in a meeting or by disseminating
written publications, sound recording tapes, picture carriers or similar things243; this can also be dissemination via internet244.
It has to be considered, however, that the rules of §§ 126, 130 a, 140 StGB refer to the catalogue
crimes of § 129 a subsection 1 StGB, but that they are applicable independently of the question
whether the crimes have been committed in a terrorist context. Particular crimes concerning the dissemination of terrorist ideologies in particular do not exist – the dissemination of these ideas is only
punishable if it specifically refers to the crimes from the catalogue in § 126 StGB.
B. 6. The sentencing of anticipated forms of preparation and participation related to terrorist associations
The crime of acting in or for a terrorist association according to § 129 a StGB extends punishability
concerning the catalogue crimes from § 129 a subsection 1 StGB into the preliminary stage. The terrorist context leads to significantly increased penalties for the misdemeanors among the catalogue
crimes: e.g. the completed destruction of important means of work, according to § 305 a StGB, is
punished with pecuniary penalty or imprisonment of up to five years. If the crime is committed by a
member of a terrorist association whose purpose is (among others) the realization of such crimes, the
member can be punished with imprisonment of one year to ten years. The fact that, according to § 129
a subsection 2 StGB, the crime does not have to be attempted or completed, but only be aimed at,
makes this discrepancy in the range of punishment extremely problematic245. It has also been criticized that, by enumerating them as catalogue crimes of § 129 a StGB, these crimes are upgraded from
misdemeanors to felonies and that thus the amount of wrongfulness of the organizational crime exceeds the wrongfulness of the commission of the corresponding catalogue crime itself246.
B. 6. 1. Withdrawal and reconciliation with the victim
No special rules for withdrawal or possible reconciliation of perpetrator and victim exist concerning
the terrorist catalogue crimes, as terrorist crimes are subsumed under the crimes of the special part of
the StGB. For active repentance concerning membership in a terrorist association, see above under B.
240
For members of a terrorist association, whose purpose is to threaten with crimes, § 129 a subsection 3 StGB,
the threatening with crimes is at the same time a practiced membership in the terrorist association – § 126 und §
129 a StGB are in nominal coincidence of offences then.
241
This rule was introduced in 1976 under the influence of the terrorism of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), for
the history in detail see Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, Vorbem. §§ 123 ff. marginal no. 2. §
111 StGB generally punishes the public call for criminal actions without relation to any particular crimes. The
rule applies for a course of conduct which cannot be punished as instigation, as the scope of addressees or the
planned crimes are not precise enough; cp. Eser, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 111 marginal no. 1.
242
243
This does not apply for the reward of crimes.
244
§ 11 subsection 3 StGB, cp. hereunto BGHSt 47, 55 at pp. 60; BGH NStZ-RR 1999, pp. 238 at 241 for the
discrimination via internet of someone showing his/her Christian faith in public (§ 166 StGB), for which the same
should apply; see also Tröndle/Fischer, § 11 marginal no. 36, § 184 marginal nos 23 et seq.
245
Cp. hereunto Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 a marginal no. 10; Kühl, NJW 1987, pp. 737 at 746; Dencker, StV 1987,
pp. 117 at 120-121; Lenckner/Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, § 129 a marginal no. 1.
246
Miebach/Schäfer, in: MK-StGB, § 129 a marginal no. 12. However, it has to be considered here that, for the
misdemeanours enumerated in § 129 a StGB, a special order of the punishability of attempts is regulated in law.
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1. 5. As there is no victim in the crime of the forming of a terrorist association, a reconciliation of
perpetrator and victim is not needed.
B. 6. 2. Peculiarities concerning the actual enforcement of the penalty
The suspicion of a crime according to §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB already in itself leads to the permissibility
of remand, § 112 subsection 3 StGB; an additional special reason for arrest247 is not needed – this
would be the case for the suspicion of any other crime. To avoid violation of the general principle of
adequateness, the rule is interpreted in a restrictive way by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, hereinafter: BVerfG) 248: remand may only be ordered if otherwise the prosecution
or the successful investigation of the crime might be endangered249.
Generally, prisoners must be granted the right to receive visits from their defense lawyer to enable
them to get unlimited access to legal consultation250. This right is founded in § 148 subsection 1 StPO
for persons on remand, and in § 26, 1st sentence Strafvollzugsgesetz (Treatment of Offenders Act) for
prisoners who have already received their final sentence.
If prisoners are suspected of having committed a crime of §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB or if they are already
sentenced to an imprisonment for such crimes, their correspondence with their defense lawyer will be
monitored, for persons on remand, § 148 subsection 2 StPO is applicable, for imprisoned persons §
148 subsection 2 via the referral in § 29 subsection 1, 2nd and 3rd sentence Strafvollzugsgesetz251).
Conversations between prisoners who are suspected of the crimes of §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB and their
defense lawyers may therefore only be held if both parties are separated by a glass window to prevent
the submission of documents to the defense lawyer, § 148 subsection 2 3rd sentence StPO respectively
§§ 27 subsection 4, 3rd sentence, 29 subsection 1, 2nd and 3rd sentence Strafvollzugsgesetz in connection with § 148 subsection 2 3rd sentence StPO252.
For persons on remand253 who are suspected of a crime of §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB as well as for prisoners who are convicted according to §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB254, a so-called “confinement incommunicado”255 according to § 31 of the Act on the Introduction of the German Civil Code, the Einführungsgesetz zum BGB (EGGVG), may be ordered. In this case, oral and written conversations with the defense lawyer as well as with people outside the prison or with co-prisoners may be completely prohibited. Preconditions for this are an existing danger to the life, body or freedom of a person and, correspondingly, a well-founded suspicion that a terrorist association presents a real threat256. If the confinement incommunicado is ordered, any contact of the prisoner, even with his defense lawyer, is
prohibited257. The prisoner only gets a lawyer as a contact person, § 3 EGGVG. This restriction is,
247
These are: (the risk of) escape, the risk of repetition or the risk of tampering with evidence, § 112 subsection 2
StPO.
248
BVerfGE 19, 342 at 350-351.
249
Meyer-Goßner, Strafprozessordnung, 49th ed. 2006 (hereinafter: „StPO"), § 112 marginal no. 37.
250
Joester/Wegner, in: Feest (ed.), Kommentar zum Strafvollzugsgesetz, 5th ed. 2006, (hereinafter:
„StVollzG“), § 26 marginal no. 3.
251
Calliess/Müller-Dietz, Strafvollzugsgesetz, 10th ed. 2005, § 29 marginal no. 6, § 26 marginal no. 3.
252
Joester/Wegner, in: StVollzG, § 27 marginal no. 10; Laufhütte, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, 5th ed. 2003 (hereinafter: „KK-StPO“), § 148 marginal no. 16; Meyer-Goßner, StPO, § 148 marginal
no. 22.
253
Schoreit, in: KK-StPO, § 31 EGGVG marginal no. 17.
254
Schoreit, in: KK-StPO, § 31 EGGVG marginal no. 15.
255
Act to amend the EGGVG of September 30, 1977, BGBl I, p. 1887.
256
Kühne, Strafprozessrecht, 7th ed. 2007, § 9 marginal no. 212; Meyer-Goßner, StPO, § 31 EGGVG marginal
no. 1.
257
Meyer-Goßner, StPO, § 31 EGGVG marginal no. 7.
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because of the prevention of contact to the defense lawyer, considerably disputed as it concerns the
right of being heard in court and the corresponding restriction of legal protection258.
C. Other questions – Specific preventive measures to combat terrorist activities and associations259
There are no preventive authorizations concerning terrorist crimes in particular. However, in the case
of an existing danger for the life, body or freedom of a person as well as in case of an imminent commission of particularly grave crimes, numerous authorizations exist in the Police Functions Acts of the
German Federal States. For example, in the North-Rhine Westphalian Police Functions Act, these are
the authorizations according to § 17 (undisclosed employment of technical measures to gather pictures
and visual recordings), § 18 (undisclosed employment of technical measures for the interception and
recording of spoken conversations), § 19 (employment of people whose cooperation with the police is
not known to others260), § 20 (gathering of data by employing under-cover agents261), § 31 (search for
wanted persons by screening devices262).
Police departments and departments of public prosecution have established a wide network of experts
on the topic of Islamist terrorism. These experts are constantly given further training263. In Berlin, a
“Terrorism Defense Centre” has been founded264, where representatives of the Federal Attorney, of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureaus of Investigation of the German Federal States, the
Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federation and the Federal States, the Secret Services, the Federal Police, the Bureau of Duty Investigation and the Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees work together.
D Reform proposals
D. 1. – 2. Reform proposals concerning the forms of preparation and participation in terrorist activities
Further extensions of the punishability of preparation and participation are currently – as far as can be
seen - not planned265.
A clearer formulation of the statutory facts of § 129 b StGB is often demanded266, but this is hardly
going to be planned in the near future because of the minor practical importance of this prescription.
Apart from this, no concrete reform plans concerning substantive criminal law are currently apparent.
D. 3. The current discussion on legislative reforms
However, in Procedural Law, the introduction of numerous preventive authorizations to intervene in
connection with terrorist crimes is under consideration: the storage of fingerprints at registration offices is under discussion as well as the inclusion of biometric data in passport pictures and their gathering by the registration offices, the permissibility of online searches267, the use of data that have been
258
Joester/Wegner, in: StVollzG, § 26 marginal no. 2.
For the importance of the role of the victim in this context (point C. 2. of the questionnaire) cp. already B. 6. 1.
260
This formulation describes the employment of informers of the police who come from the milieu.
261
Under-cover agents are police officers for whom a „legend“ is created, under which they are introduced to the
„milieu“.
262
The police may require the submission of person-related data from particular groups of persons from files in
order to automatically compare them with other data, as far as this is necessary for the defence against a present
danger for the continuance or the security of the federation or one of the lands of the federation or for life, body
or freedom of person.
263
Diwell, in: Festschrift Nehm, 2006, pp. 101 at 107.
264
Diwell, in: Festschrift Nehm, 2006, pp. 101 at 109.
265
With regard to the presently already very extensively defined punishability of actions in the preliminary stage
and of participation, further extensions are hard to imagine.
266
Kress, JA 2005, pp. 220 at 226; Tröndle/Fischer, § 129 b marginal no. 2.
267
This was declared as unconstitutional by the BVerfG (BVerfGE 115, pp. 166) because of a lack of legal authorization and because of the intervention in the fundamental rights of informational self-realization (art. 2 subsection 1 in connection with art. 1 subsection 1 of the German Federal Constitution (“Grundgesetz, (hereinafter:
GG”) as well as of art. 13 GG (Integrity of the home).
259
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gathered in connection with the toll for trucks for the investigation of serious crimes and the constant
storage of data concerning established telecommunication connections268 (e-mail communication,
mobile phones, telephone connections). These initiatives are controversially disputed269 - it is hardly
predictable if and in what way they will finally be realized.
The introduction of an Air Security Act (“Luftsicherheitsgesetz”), the intention of which is to legitimize the shooting of kidnapped airplanes if they are planned to be used as weapons in the same way
as during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, is also planned. Such a law
was already enacted on January 11, 2005270 but then was declared unconstitutional and void by the
BVerfG, because the right to live of the innocent airplane passengers as well as their dignity as human
beings had not been sufficiently considered271.
E Final Remarks
The main problem concerning the criminal legislation on terrorism is already inherent in the nature of
criminal law: the functions of criminal law are the repression and the prosecution of already committed crimes. However, the declared purpose in connection with terrorism is to prevent crimes in the
preliminary stage by intervening as early as possible. The approach chosen by German legislation, to
limit the ability of terrorist organizations to act in so far as is possible, definitely appears to be more
promising as a method of defense against terrorist dangers than the introduction of more severe punishments for terrorist crimes. It may be true that, with the criminalization of the preliminary stage
according to §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB, legislature went too far. Still, in view of the small number of convictions according to §§ 129 a, 129 b StGB, this seems to have caused no considerable practical damage. On the other hand, the instruments for preliminary investigations, which are widely disputed and
have partly already been introduced, are definitely alarming: firstly, the discussed storage of biometric
data and secondly, the surreptitious surveillance of telecommunications, including the constant storage
of connection data and the expected legalization of online searches. Together, these form a wide range
of measures to screen society. Such measures in the field of terrorist associations may indeed be precious instruments to prevent imminent attacks and can thus have a very useful effect. But it has to be
considered that authorizations to intervene which apply on a nationwide basis and independently of
any concrete suspicion272 also lead to the gathering of a wide range of data on innocent and nonsuspects. The mark must not be overstepped here. Legislation and executive power are thus on a tightrope-walk between necessary prevention by early investigation in the terrorist milieu and the protection of individual freedom. The fact that the fight against terrorism seems to be particularly popular in
an atmosphere of common fear of attacks does not make it easier. But it would be disastrous to try to
satisfy the increased wish for security by continuing to create more and more means for governmental
investigation. For one dilemma is inevitable: it can be definitely predicted that preventive investigative interventions will reduce individual freedom; but one can only hope that attacks will actually be
prevented by this. Of course one should not fail to implement reasonable preventive measures, but one
should also be clear on one point: absolute security does not exist.
268
Also in this context, BVerfGE 115, pp. 166 ff., has stated the necessity of a legal authorization because of an
intervention in art. 2 subsection 1 in connection with Art. 1 subsection 1 as well as Art. 13 GG.
269
A sufficient consideration of the freedoom rights is required by Forster, SchwZStR 121 (2003), pp. 423;
Hetzer, StraFo 2005, pp. 318; the same, MschrKrim 88 (2005), pp. 111 at 122-125; Kühne, in: Festschrift
Schwind, 2006, pp. 103 at 104-105; Walter/Neubacher, Kriminologisches Journal, 34 Jg. 2002, pp. 98 at 103;
favouring further authorizations to intervene v. Bubnoff, NJW 2002, pp. 2672.
270
Act on the New Regulation of Air Security Duties of January 11, 2005, BGBl I 2005, p. 78.
271
BVerfGE 115, pp. 118.
272
As, for example, the video surveillance in public places or the storage of telecommunication connection data;
cp. for the present discussion only recently Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of July 3, 2007, pp. 1, 2 und 4.
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GUINÉE*
Mamadou Alioune DRAME**
Avec la vague des attentats dans le monde, il est incontestable que le caractère transnational du terrorisme se manifeste par le fonctionnement mondialisé de réseaux terroristes ainsi que par l’universalité
de la menace.
Aujourd’hui, aucun pays n’est à l’abri de cette menace d’où un développement de la coopération internationale anti-terroriste.
La République de Guinée s’inscrit dans cette logique en mettant en œuvre des moyens juridiques
appropriés dans le respect du nécessaire équilibre entre les exigences de la sécurité et celles des libertés.
Le Droit pénal antiterroriste guinéen est un droit récent. Avant l’adoption du Nouveau Code pénal le
31 décembre 1998 la législation pénale ne contenait aucune référence au concept de terrorisme. Certaines dispositions législatives avaient, bien sûr, été prises concernant l’usage d’explosifs mais aucune
sur le terrorisme.
Le Nouveau Code pénal issu de la Loi n° 98/036/AN du 31 décembre 1998 s’est inscrit dans une
perspective différente et plus audacieuse en prévoyant un chapitre consacré au terrorisme et en faisant
une infraction autonome. Il crée même une infraction terroriste spécifique, le terrorisme écologique.
Le Droit pénal antiterroriste guinéen a été complété par diverses dispositions contenues dans le Code
de procédure pénale issu de la Loi n° 98/037/AN du 31 décembre 1998 : Allongement du délai de
garde à vue, perquisitions de nuit, etc.
Aussi, la République de Guinée a ratifié maintes Conventions internationales relatives à la lutte contre
le terrorisme. Au regard des dispositions de l’article 79 de la Loi Fondamentale celles-ci « ont, dès
leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celles des lois, sous réserve de réciprocité ».
Pour suivre le canevas, voici quelques réponses au questionnaire.
QUESTIONNAIRE
A) - Questions générales :
1. Aperçu des manifestations du phénomène de la mondialisation au niveau pénal interne :
2. Grandes lignes du régime juridique général des actes préparatoires et de la participation dans votre
système :
C’est l’article 505 du Code pénal guinéen qui donne la définition des actes de terrorisme.
Le législateur guinéen a créé des infractions autonomes, soit par renvoi à des infractions de droit
commun, soit par création d’infractions génériques.
*
révision éditoriale de la part de la Revue
**
Magistrat, Inspecteur Général Adjoint des Services Judiciaires du Ministère de la Justice et des Droits de
l’Homme ; chargé des cours de Droit aux Universités guinéennes, au Centre de Formation et de Documentation
Judiciaires du Ministère de la Justice et à l’Agence Internationale pour le Développement Durable en Afrique.
Tel : (224 ) 60 58 22 55 e-mail : [email protected] BP : 5538 Conakry République de Guinée.
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Guinée
L’article 505 du Code pénal dispose en effet que : « Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu'elles
sont en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement
l'ordre public par l'intimidation ou la terreur, les infractions suivantes :
- Les atteintes volontaires à la vie, les atteintes volontaires à l'intégrité de la personne, l'enlèvement et
la séquestration ainsi que le détournement d'aéronef, de navire ou de tout autre moyen de transport ;
- Les vols, les extorsions, les destructions, dégradations et détériorations ainsi que les infractions en
matière informatique;
- La fabrication, la détention et l’utilisation de machines, engins meurtriers ou explosifs;
- La production, la vente, l'importation ou l'exportation de substances explosives;
- L'acquisition, la détention, le transport ou le port illégal de substances explosives ou d'engins fabriqués à l'aide des dites substances;
- La détention, le port, ou le transport d'armes et de munitions des première et quatrième catégories
spécifiées à l'article 2 de la loi L /96/008 du 22 juillet 1996 ».
La commission de toutes ces infractions est punissable même en cas de simple tentative. Celle-ci
consiste en un commencement d’exécution qui établit le but injuste poursuivi même si une cause
étrangère en empêche la réalisation.
2.1.4. Peines applicables : comparaison avec les peines applicables aux infractions réalisées :
Les peines applicables sont contenues dans l’article 507 du Code pénal qui dispose que : « Tout acte
de terrorisme sera puni de la détention criminelle à temps de 10 à 20 ans.
Lorsque cet acte aura entraîné la mort d'une ou plusieurs personnes, le ou les coupables seront punis
de la peine de mort.
La tentative du crime prévu au présent article sera punie comme le crime lui-même ».
2.2. Participation :
2.2.1. Traitement du concours de personnes dans la commission de l’infraction (catégories d’auteur,
instigation, coopération, complicité…) :
Les participants à l’infraction sont tous sanctionnés par la loi pénale guinéenne, l’auteur principal tout
comme le complice, c’est-à-dire toute personne qui participe en connaissance de cause à un crime ou à
un délit dont un autre est l’auteur principal. La sanction atteint également l’instigateur qui est considéré comme complice de l’infraction.
En revanche la personne qui coopère, c’est-à-dire informe l’autorité administrative ou judiciaire de la
préparation de la commission d’un acte de terrorisme et a permis d'éviter la réalisation de l'infraction
et d'identifier, le cas échéant, les autres coupables est exempte de peine.
Ce mécanisme de l’exemption de peine concerne également quelques infractions liées à la criminalité
organisée : Association de malfaiteurs (Article 270 du Code pénal), fausse monnaie (Article 147 du
Code pénal), etc.
Il est plus large, en effet car ce mécanisme concerne tous les actes qualifiables de terrorisme. Ces
actes doivent avoir fait l’objet d’une tentative au sens de l’article 3 du Code pénal.
Toutefois, il faut noter que deux conditions sont cumulatives pour que l’exemption soit retenue : La
non-réalisation de l’infraction tentée et l’identification des autres coupables.
3. Préparation et participation par rapport au terrorisme et autres formes très graves de criminalité :
3.1. Existe-t-il, dans votre ordre juridique, des définitions normatives et des catégories spécifiques
d’actes de « terrorisme » et d’autres formes très graves de criminalité ? Sont-elles conformes ou harmonisées avec les définitions établies au niveau international (par exemple dans la décision-cadre de
l’Union européenne de 2002 contre le terrorisme ; ou dans la Convention des Nations Unies de 2000
contre la criminalité organisée transnationale)?
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Les définitions contenues dans le Code pénal guinéen sont conformes aux définitions établies au niveau international. Le projet de Loi en préparation entend inclure toutes autres définitions comme
celles contenues dans le Projet final de Loi cadre relatif à la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme
dans les Etats membres de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Occidentale
(CEDEAO).
3.2. Comment se présentent les éléments constitutifs (ou différentiels) de ces délits spécifiques par
rapport à ceux des délits communs ? En ce qui concerne l’élément matériel ? En ce qui concerne
l’élément moral ?
Les infractions spécifiques retenues sont celles contenues à l’article 505 du Code pénal indiqué ci
haut. L’élément matériel est réalisé par la commission de l’un des actes de ces infractions déterminées.
En ce qui concerne l’élément moral, force est de reconnaître que les infractions terroristes sont des
infractions intentionnelles cela se démontre suffisamment au regard de certaines d’entre elles (Homicide, vol, etc.) qui ont chacune dans ses éléments constitutifs un élément intentionnel que le Législateur souligne à l’aide de l’adverbe « intentionnellement » ou « volontairement ».
Chacun des faits devant être intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur.
Par la commission de son acte, l’agent pénal doit avoir conscience de violer manifestement la loi pénale et la volonté d’inscrire cette action criminelle dans un cadre et un contexte de terreur.
3.3. En particulier, la norme qui prévoit l’infraction ou la circonstance aggravante requiert-elle explicitement que l’auteur agisse en poursuivant une finalité spécifique (de nature terroriste ou subversive,
ou relative aux buts d’une organisation criminelle) ?
L’auteur doit avoir agi en poursuivant une finalité spécifique. Le Législateur guinéen le précise clairement : L’acte terroriste doit avoir pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou
la terreur.
B) Caractéristiques de l’élargissement des formes de préparation et de participation :
La Législation guinéenne n’est pas abondante en matière de terrorisme. Les différentes Conventions
internationales relatives au terrorisme et ratifiées par la République de Guinée sont toutes applicables
dans le droit interne.
Au regard du Code pénal, les simples actes préparatoires, tels que l’incitation ou la provocation non
suivie de la réalisation du délit, sont-ils punis comme délit autonome. Ces faits sont retenus comme
des actes de complicité punissable.
D’ailleurs, il est prévu, dans le projet d’amendement du Code pénal une disposition portant sur les
actes préparatoires permettant de mettre en œuvre les paragraphes 2 (a) et 2 (e) de la Résolution 1373
(2001) du Conseil de Sécurité. Bien entendu, les Etats restant libres de criminaliser les actes préparatoires d’autres infractions.
Des incriminations spécifiques existent dans la Législation guinéenne qui punissent de manière autonome des activités spécifiques. Il en est ainsi de la fabrication ou de la possession de faux documents
(Article 162 et suivants du Code pénal), la fabrication, la possession ou l’acquisition d’explosifs ou
d’armes (Article 479 et suivants du Code pénal) etc., qui interviennent en amont de l’exécution effective d’actes terroristes ou de la réalisation du dessein criminel.
En pratique, la Justice guinéenne n’a pas connu de cas dans lesquels un même individu peut être poursuivi et puni en raison de la réalisation d’un des actes préparatoires (par exemple, le « recrutement »)
et aussi en raison de la réalisation d’un des délits qui en représentent le « but » (par exemple « exécution d’un acte de terrorisme » ) et, éventuellement, aussi pour le délit d’association ou d’appartenance
à un groupe terroriste ou criminel qui poursuit le même but (infra, B-3).
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Toutefois, pour être en conformité avec la Résolution 1373 (2001) du Conseil de Sécurité, ces actes
préparatoires sont punissables au regard du nouvel article prévu dans le Projet d’amendement du Code
pénal guinéen.
Mais, il n’y a pas de règles ou de conditions spéciales pour la prise en compte pénale de la tentative, la
participation au délit ou pour la punition de la complicité dans ces domaines de criminalité.
En droit pénal guinéen, la tentative des crimes est toujours punissable. Alors qu’elle n’est punissable
en matière de délit que si une disposition légale la prévoit expressément.
En matière de complicité, celle-ci n’est punissable que si l’agent pénal a agit en pleine connaissance
de cause à la réalisation du crime ou du délit dont un autre est l’auteur principal.
Aucune disposition spécifique dans le Code pénal guinéen ne prévoit la punition explicite de conduites antérieures ou collatérales, comme celles de soutien, d’assistance, d’aide « externe » (de la part de
personnes non associées ou au travers de contributions socialement adéquates, par exemple de la part
d’un avocat, médecin…) aux activités et aux associations constituant des formes très graves de criminalité, ou aux auteurs individuels.
Une infraction autonome d’association, d’organisation ou de groupe « terroriste » ou consacré à des
formes très graves de criminalité, est prévue, par rapport au simple accord ou au concours dans de tels
délits dans le Code pénal guinéen sous l’appellation d’association de malfaiteurs sans en ressortir de
façon spécifique la notion de terrorisme.
Ainsi, les infractions communes en matière d’associations criminelles, éventuellement aggravées sont
punissables
Ces associations sont identifiées, non pas par leur inscription dans listes prédéterminées au niveau
gouvernemental ou autre, mais elles sont concrétisées par un ou plusieurs faits matériels. Cette circonstance de fait étant laissée à l’appréciation de la Cour et du Jury lors des Assises.
Aucune condition constitutive et/ou spécialisantes de l’association ainsi qualifiée (par exemple, nombre minimal de complices, conditions relatives à l’organisation, à la répartition des rôles, à la stabilité
ou à la durée de l’organisation ou du groupe, à la nature du programme criminel, aux finalités spécifiques poursuivies, etc. n’est fixée par le Législateur guinéen. Il indique clairement dans l’article 269 du
Code pénal : « …quelle que soit sa durée ou le nombre de ses membres… » parlant de l’association de
malfaiteurs.
Ainsi, le simple regroupement de ces individus dans le but de préparer ou de commettre des crimes
contre les personnes ou les propriétés suffit à caractériser l’existence de l’association.
Il n’y a pas à proprement parler de différenciation de traitement en termes de sanction entre la simple
participation et les autres conduites plus qualifiées (telles que la constitution, l’organisation, la direction, etc.). La loi sanctionne à la fois ceux qui ont commis matériellement l’infraction et ceux qui,
n’étant pas passés à l’action pour une raison quelconque, se sont associés et organisés pour mener à
bonne fin les infractions qu’ils avaient décidé de perpétrer.
Aussi, il n’y a pas de règles ou de conditions spécifiques quant à la responsabilité des membres ou des
dirigeants de l’association pour l’exécution des délits qui représentent le but de l’association délictueuse même s’ils n’ont pas participé matériellement à l’exécution.
Des dispositions et des sanctions relatives à la responsabilité (pénale ou autre) des personnes morales,
éventuellement prévue de manière générale dans l’ordre juridique guinéen, s’appliquent aussi pour la
commission des délits en matière de terrorisme et d’autres formes très sérieuses de criminalité.
Certes, la législation guinéenne n’a pas indiqué de façon spécifique concernant le terrorisme mais
pour la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales, elle ne sanctionnait que le cas des infractions en
matière de drogues. Un nouvel article est contenu dans le projet d’amendement du Code pénal qui
permet l’établissement de la responsabilité des personnes morales et ce, pour être en conformité avec
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la Convention des Nations Unies contre la criminalité transnationale organisée qui requiert que cette
responsabilité pénale, civile ou administrative soit établie.
Dans les textes répressifs guinéens, il n’y a pas d’incriminations spécifiques de conduites consistant
en l’expression et/ou la diffusion de la pensée et d’opinions liées au terrorisme, qui peuvent être distinguées de l’éventuel délit d’incitation à commettre des délits terroristes ou d’autres formes de participation morale ou de complicité dans le cadre de ces délits.
L’apologie, le prosélytisme idéologique, la publication et la diffusion d’écrits et de matériel, entre
autres audiovisuel ou sur Internet, la propagande, etc. en lien avec le terrorisme ne font pas l’objet
d’incriminations autonomes dans la Législation guinéenne.
Les éléments matériels et moraux requis pour que chacun de ces délits soit punissable supposent que
les auteurs passant de la simple intentionnelle criminelle caractérisent ces faits par des actes concrets.
Par exemple, vol d’armes, attaques ciblées contre des personnes physiques, etc. Cette action est réalisée dès que les malfaiteurs passent de la simple intention criminelle à la réalisation de l’infraction.
Des tirs sont commis ou des violences sont exercées sur des victimes, etc.
Pour le traitement applicable par rapport à celui d’autres délits terroristes et/ou d’autres délits communs correspondants, les sanctions varient selon la gravité des infractions commises.
Les peines définies par les articles 507 et suivants du Code pénal se réfèrent aux peines pour les infractions selon le régime ordinaire.
Dans l’application des incriminations pénales susmentionnées, le désistement et/ou l’éventuel dédommagement, l’activité réparatrice, voire la réconciliation avec la victime sont sans influence sur
l’application de la peine. Il faut retenir que le désistement de la victime (ou de la partie civile) n’éteint
pas l’action publique et la sanction peut intervenir selon la gravité de l’infraction commise. Des circonstances atténuantes peuvent bien bénéficier au criminel selon certaines dispositions particulières.
Il en est ainsi en cas d’exemption ou de diminution de peine : La peine privative de liberté encourue
par l'auteur ou le complice d'un acte de terrorisme sera celle de la réclusion criminelle à temps de 5 à
10 ans si, ayant averti les autorités administratives ou judiciaires, il a permis de faire cesser les agissements incriminés ou d'éviter que l'infraction n'entraîne mort d'homme ou infirmité permanente ou
d'identifier, le cas échéant, les autres coupables.
Lorsque la peine encourue est la détention criminelle à temps, celle-ci est ramenée à 5 ans de détention criminelle.
Les coupables pourront, en outre, être frappés d'interdiction de séjour pendant une période de 5 à 10
ans et interdits d'exercer les droits mentionnés à l'article 37 Code pénal (Article 509 du Code pénal).
Il n’y a pas de façon spécifique de particularités relatives à l’exécution effective de la peine et des
sanctions ou mesures, en particulier en ce qui concerne le régime carcéral, et des limitations ou des
conditions particulières pour bénéficier de mesures d’aménagement de la peine ou autres institutions
favorables au condamné pour commission d’actes de terrorisme.
Comme les autres condamnés, il peut bénéficier d’une liberté conditionnelle, d’une grâce ou d’une
amnistie, par exemple.
AUTRES QUESTIONS :
En ce qui concerne les mesures de prévention ou d’autres instruments de nature non pénale pour lutter
contre les activités et les associations terroristes et les autres formes très sérieuses de criminalité, celles-ci sont fondées uniquement sur l’information des activités terroristes, leur dénonciation et la sensibilisation des citoyens dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.
La question des victimes a une importance considérable car elles bénéficient de toutes les garanties
prévues dans le Code de procédure pénale et d’autres textes internationaux relatifs à la lutte contre le
terrorisme.
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Ainsi, les règles relatives au droit d’action des victimes et à leur indemnisation sont celles de droit
commun.
PROPOSITIONS DE REFORME :
Actuellement, il y a des réformes législatives en projet au niveau du Ministère de la Justice et des
Droits de l’Homme suite aux travaux de la Commission d’Incorporation des dispositions internationales dans le droit interne et à une séance de travail qui a eu lieu à Vienne entre des experts guinéens et
ceux de l’ONUDC.
Ces réformes portent sur plusieurs articles du Code pénal et du Code de procédure pénale en vue de
l’incorporation dans le droit interne guinéen des Conventions des Nations Unies sur la criminalité
transnationale organisée, contre la corruption et des instruments universels contre le terrorisme.
Dans ce travail de réforme, la question de l’action civile collective pourrait trouver une réponse. Ainsi,
il serait possible à certaines associations légalement habilitées pour défendre en Justice les intérêts
collectifs qu’elles représentent, et ce, par dérogation au principe classique selon lequel seul celui qui
peut exciper d’un préjudice personnel et direct peut exercer les droits de la partie civile.
E) - Considérations finales :
Le souhait de la République de Guinée est de pouvoir former à la fois des Officiers de Police Judiciaire et des Magistrats dans la connaissance des différentes Conventions Internationales relatives à la
lutte contre le terrorisme, la connaissance des actes de terrorisme et des méthodes efficaces pour la
lutte contre cette criminalité.
Un séminaire national est d’ailleurs prévu du 11 au 13 septembre 2007 à Conakry dans ce sens mais
avec, pour un premier temps avec uniquement des Magistrats du Parquet et de l’Instruction.
L’Association Guinéenne de Droit Pénal s’engage au retour de ce Colloque à organiser une série de
séminaires dans ce sens avec le concours de l’Association Internationale de Droit pénal et toutes autres Institutions Internationales.
A nos jours, la République de Guinée a ratifié douze instruments universels contre le terrorisme :
- La Convention relative aux infractions et à certains autres actes survenant à bord des aéronefs, 1963 ;
- La Convention pour la répression de la capture illicite d’aéronefs, 1970 ;
- La Convention pour la répression d’actes illicites dirigés contre la sécurité civile, 1971 ;
- La Convention sur la prévention et la répression des infractions contre les personnes jouissant d’une
protection internationale, y compris les agents diplomatiques, 1973 ;
- La Convention internationale contre la prise d’otages, 1979 ;
- La Convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires, 1980 ;
- La Convention pour la répression d’actes illicites de violence dans les aéroports servant à l’aviation
civile internationale, 1988 ;
- La Convention pour la répression d’actes illicites contre la sécurité de la navigation maritime, 1988 ;
- La Convention pour la répression des actes illicites contre la sécurité des plates-formes fixes situées
sur le plateau continental, 1988 ;
- La Convention sur le marquage des explosifs plastiques aux fins de détection, 1991 ;
- La Convention internationale pour la répression des attentats terroristes à l’explosif, 1997 ;
- La Convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme, 1999.
La République de Guinée a engagé la procédure de ratification du treizième instrument universel
contre le terrorisme : La Convention internationale pour la répression des actes de terrorisme nucléaire
déjà prise en compte dans le projet de Loi portant amendement du Code pénal guinéen.
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Krisztina KARSAI / Réka VÉGVÁRI
A) General Questions
1. Introduction: The personal and territorial scope of application of the Hungarian Criminal Code is
statutory by Articles 3, 4 of the Hungarian Criminal Code (CC) Act IV/1978
Article 3 says that the Hungarian law has to be applied to offences committed in Hungary, as well as
to the acts committed by Hungarian citizens abroad which are defined as offences in Hungarian law.
The Hungarian law shall also be applied to criminal acts committed on the board of a Hungarian ships
or Hungarian aircraft situated outside the borders of the Republic of Hungary. The Article 4 lays down
that Hungarian law has to be also applied to acts committed by non-Hungarian citizens abroad, if they
are a/ criminal acts in accordance with Hungarian law and are also punishable in accordance with the
law of the place of perpetration, b/ criminal acts against the state (Chapter X of CC) regardless of
whether it is punishable in accordance with the law of the place of perpetration, except the espionage
against the allied forces (CC Art. 148), c/ crimes against humanity (Chapter XI of CC) or any other
offences in case the prosecution is prescribed by an international treaty. In the latter cases (a-c) the
criminal proceedings has to be ordered by the Attorney General.
2. General outlining of the general juridical system of preparatory acts and of participation in your
system
2.1. Preparatory Acts
The Hungarian Criminal Law distinguishes between the preparation, the attempt and the accomplished
offence as the three possible steps of realisation of (the elements of) an offence.
1. General Rules upon Preparation
Article 18 CC says that the preparation is punishable, if the following legal conditions are conjunctively fulfilled.
the law orders especially a sanction for the preparation the act of preparation is realised in order to
commit an offence one or more of the following act is committed: ensuring the conditions, which
facilitate or which are required for committing of an offence invitation to perpetrate an offence offering the perpetration of an offence undertaking the perpetration of an offence agreement on joint perpetration of an offence.
How is it regulated in the CC?
For example: Article 166 CC, Homicide
(1) The person who kills another person, commits a felony, and shall be punishable with imprisonment from five years to fifteen years.
(2) The punishment shall be imprisonment from ten years to fifteen years, or life imprisonment, if the
homicide is committed
a) planned in advance,
b) for profit-making
*
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c) for another base reason or purpose,
d) with special cruelty,
e) against a public official or a foreign public official during or because of his official proceedings,
against a person performing public duties during the performance of such duties, or against a person
providing assistance to or acting in defense of such persons performing official or public duties,
f) on more than one person,
g) endangering the life of many people,
h) as special recidivist.
i) against a person under the age of fourteen.
(3) Any preparation to commit homicide is a felony and shall be punishable by imprisonment of up to
five years.
(4) A person, who commits negligent homicide (manslaughter), shall be punishable with imprisonment from one year to five years.
(…)
2. Special Legal Forms of Punishing Preparation
The Hungarian Criminal Code contains some special rules to sanction the preparation without applying the general regulation concerning Article 18.
A) If only one of the above mentioned preparatory acts is punishable.
For example: Article 207 CC, Pandering
(1) The person who solicits another person for sexual intercourse or fornication for somebody else in
order to make profit, commits a felony, and shall be punishable with imprisonment of up to three
years.
(2) The punishment shall be imprisonment from one year to five years, if the pandering is businesslike.
(3) The punishment shall be imprisonment from two years to eight years, if the pandering is committed
a) against of a relative of the perpetrator or of a person under his education, supervision or care or who
has not yet completed his eighteenth year of age,
b) with deceipt, violence or direct menace against life or limbs.
c)
(4) The person who agrees on the perpetration of pandering defined in subsection (2) commits a felony and shall be punishable with imprisonment of up to three years.
In this case, other preparatory acts, for example ensuring the conditions required for committing of the
business-like pandering, are not punishable. Of course, if afterwards the pandering is realised, as an
attempted or accomplished offence, such a contribution could be evaluated as participation.
B) If the preparation or some acts of the preparation are regulated separately as a sui generis offence.
For example: Article 242 Subornation of Perjury
(1) Any person who strives to invite another person to give false testimony in a criminal case commits a felony, and shall be punishable by imprisonment of up to three years, or if committed in a civil
proceeding the perpetrator is punishable for misdemeanor by imprisonment of up to two years.
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(2) Any person committing subornation of perjury in a disciplinary, infraction or arbitration case or
any other judicial proceeding shall be punished by imprisonment of up to one year, work in community service or a fine.
In this case, only the invitation is the punishable act, which is, as a matter of fact, an act of the preparation. The preparation itself is not generally punishable here, the CC lifts out only one aspect of the
general definition of preparation (Article 18).
What are the differences between the mentioned forms of ruling (between A and B)?
In the case of B), because the punishable act is a separated offence, the realization of an attempt is
dogmatically not excluded and also the participation in the offence is possible.
3. Attempt
Concerning Article 16 CC, the attempt means that the perpetrator begins the realization of the legal
elements of the intentional offence, but does not finish it. Every intentional offence could be – theoretically – attempted, and it is generally punishable in the Hungarian criminal law.
The person, due to the voluntary desisting of whom the finishing of the crime has not taken place,
furthermore, the person who voluntarily prevents the occurrence of the consequence which is relevant
for the statutory criminal law, shall not be punishable for attempt. (Article 17 Section 3). In this case,
if the attempt in itself realizes another offence, the perpetrator shall be punishable for that offence.
2.1.2. Limits with reference to attempt
The limit between preparation and attempt is the definition of the given offence, regulated by the
Special Part of the CC. The attempt means already the realization of one or more defined elements of
the offence, while the acts of preparation are outside of the scope of the statutory elements of the offence.
2.1.3. Punishable preparatory acts (and/or conspiracy?)
1. Preparation (Article 18)
Ensuring the conditions: this preparatory act is a general one, if the other forms like b-e (Article 18)
are not realized, but the contribution of a person to a future offence is relevant.
Invitation, offering or undertaking the perpetration of an offence: these acts are unilateral statements,
even if the other party – for example – does not accept it or is not punishable in his person, the preparation is realized on the side of the acting person.
Agreement on joint perpetration of an offence: if at least two persons agree to commit the offence
jointly, but none of them begins the perpetration of the agreed offence.
Subjective element of the preparation – in relation to all above mentioned acts: the offender, who is
made liable for the punishable preparation, shall realize his relevant act intentionally and with the
special intent. The special preparation’s intent covers a future subjective plan of the perpetrator, accordingly the acts of the preparation serve for the latter commitment of the – on this way – prepared
offence.
2. Voluntary desisting
The person, who has committed an act of the preparation, shall not be punishable for preparation,
a) if because of his voluntary desisting, the perpetration of the offence does not begin;
b) if he withdraws his invitation, offer, undertaking with the aim of the prevention of the perpetration,
or makes efforts so that the other contributors desist from the perpetration, provided that the commencement of the perpetration does not take place for any reason whatsoever;
c) if he informs the authority about the preparation.
In these former cases, if the preparation fulfils already another act of an offence in itself, the perpetrator shall be punishable for the offence.
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3. Conspiracy
In the Hungarian criminal law, the criminal conspiracy means when two or more persons are engaged
in criminal activities under arrangement, or they conspire to do so and attempt to commit an offence at
least once, nevertheless they do not constitute a criminal organization (Article 137 Nr 7).
The dogmatic figure of the criminal conspiracy could be theoretically applied to almost every statutory offence, but it functions as aggravating circumstance only by certain offences laid down in the
Special Part of the CC. For example in case of trafficking in human beings (Article 175/B) the perpetration in criminal conspiracy aggravates the offence.
There is also another form of joint perpetration in the Hungarian criminal law, the criminal organization. The criminal organization means when a for longer time organized, coordinated group of three
or more persons collaborate to intentionally engage on organized way in criminal acts, which are
punishable by imprisonment of five years or more (Article 137 Nr 8).
The figure of the criminal organization has a different legal character in the Hungarian criminal law as
the criminal conspiracy. If an offence (intentional, with five years imprisonment or more) is perpetrated in the criminal organization, the provided punishment shall be doubled, however it shall not
exceed twenty years (Article 98). More closely, this figure works as a “general aggravating circumstance” of every intentional offences, which are punishable by imprisonment of five or more years.
The Hungarian Criminal Code contains furthermore a special offence in connection with the organized criminality: any participation in a criminal organization is punishable as well (Article 263/C). If a
person, in order to commit offences in a criminal organization, ensures the conditions, which facilitate
or which are required for the committing, invites the perpetration, offers or undertakes it, or agrees on
joint perpetration of the offence, or supports the activities of the criminal organization in any other
manner, it is punishable by imprisonment of up to five years. This is a separate criminal offence, but
the above mentioned acts are same like the in Article 18 established preparatory acts, only the “other
support” is additionally defined.
The need for creating such an offence was risen from the fact that establishing a criminal organization
does not defined as a separate offence, consequently any preparation or attempt of it can not be punishable. It means that, this offence – regulated in Article 263/C – is a special form of the preparation.
Would realize at least an attempt of an offence in that criminal organization, the perpetrator won’t be
punished for this separate offence of preparation as well, only for the attempted or accomplished offence (in a criminal organization).
2.1.3. Field of applicability (general/specific for certain offences)
Preparation is not generally punished in the Hungarian criminal law. Only in that case could be punished, if the CC, in its Special Part contains a direct regulation upon the punishing.
The preparation of the following offences is punishable according to the Hungarian CC – for example:
- almost every offence against the State and the offence against humanity
- Homicide
- Kidnapping; Trafficking in Human Beings; Smuggling of Human Beings
- Pandering
- Public Danger by Using Fire or Explosive Materials
- Illegal Possession of Explosives or other Destructive Devices
- Seizure of Aircraft, Railway, Waterway and Road (vehicular) Means of Public Transport or Vehicles
Capable of Mass Transport of Goods
- Forgery of Public Documents
- Misuse of Narcotic Drugs
- Offence against the System and Data of Information Technology
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- Counterfeiting of Money
- Fraud and Counterfeiting of Non-Cash Means of Payment
2.1.5. Applicable punishments: a comparison with the punishments applicable to the offences committed
1. Short overview of the Hungarian criminal sanctions
Hungarian criminal law is based on a dual system of sanctions: penalties and measures are laid down
in the CC. The Criminal Code determines both the legal content of each penalty and measure and the
basic conditions for their applications. Distinction should be made between principal and secondary
penalties. The principal penalties are imprisonment, community service and fine (Art. 38). The secondary penalties entail the deprivation or limitation of certain rights: exclusion from participation in
public affairs, disqualification from profession or from driving motor vehicles, a ban on entering
certain areas and expulsion. Another type of secondary penalty is of a financial nature: a fine imposed
together with other penalties (Art. 38). The measures are different from penalties. Criminal culpability
is always needed to impose penalties, however certain measures are applicable without criminal culpability. Criminal record does not contain the applied measures but penalties. Categories of penalties
and measures depend on the legislator’s decision. Admonition and probation are educational measures. The compulsory psychiatric treatment – applicable to mentally disordered offenders who cannot
be punished because of insanity or diminished responsibility – and the compulsory treatment for alcoholics are remedial measures. There is a regulation for probationary supervision as well which is
applied in most cases in addition to probation. The confiscation of property as a measure can be applied against the offender or any person who has gained financial means as the result of a crime. The
aim of this measure is to identify and secure any property with criminal origin. Finally, confiscation as
security measure is defined by the law, for example it can be applied on the equipment used in the
committed crime (CC Art. 70).
The court determines the penalty freely within the framework defined by the law in general. According to Art. 83 of the CC, the penalty has to be inflicted in such a way that it should commensurate
with the danger of the offence and that of the offender on the society. Furthermore, the degree of
criminal culpability (mens rea) and other aggravating and mitigating circumstances have to be considered. The CC allows imposing a less severe penalty than it is originally provided by the law, if even
its minimum term is too severe (CC Art. 87). For that case the CC foresees a sequence of penalties,
which defines the penalty replacing the originally provided one. For example if the minimum defined
penalty is ten years, the applicable penalty could be minimum 5 years or if the minimum defined penalty is five years, the applicable minimum is two years or instead the defined minimum two years, the
minimum will be one year according to Article 87. This possibility is the so-called “jump down”.
System of sanctions in Hungarian Criminal Code
Penalties
Preventive Measures
Principal penalties
Secondary penalties
Including deprivation Without deprivation of
of liberty
liberty
1. imprisonment
2. exclusion from par- 1. compulsory psychi- 1. admonition
2. community service
ticipation in public atric treatment
2. probation
3. fines
affairs
2. compulsory treat- 3. confiscation
2. disqualification from ment for alcoholics
4. confiscation of
a profession
property
3. disqualification from 3. only against juve- 5. probationary superdriving motor vehicles
niles: special education vision
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4. a ban on entering
certain areas
5. expulsion
6. fines imposed in
addition to imprisonment
in a reformatory institution
[6. against legal persons:1
- liquidation of the
legal person
- limitation of the legal
person’s activity
- fine as a measure]
2. Applicable punishments to preparation
If the preparation in punished by the law, which means that the Special Part of the Hungarian Criminal
Code contains its punishability expressis verbis, the punishment is less severe as the sanction of accomplished offences.
3. Applicable punishments to attempt
The attempt is generally punishable in the Hungarian Criminal Code; every intentional offence defined in the Code could be realized as an attempted offence.
The above mentioned possibility to mitigate the penalty affects doubly in the case of attempt, because
the “jump down” could be applied twice. For example if the minimum defined penalty is ten years, the
applicable penalty could be minimum one year.
2.2. Participation
1. Treatment of the acting in concert of individuals in the commission of the offence (categories of the
criminal, instigation, cooperation, complicity)
According to the Hungarian criminal law participants of a criminal offence are the principal, joint
principals, and secondary participants (instigator and accomplice/aiding or abetting).
The Hungarian criminal law is basically based on the objective theory. A principal is the person who
realizes the legal facts of a crime. Principal is the main perpetrator acting within the frame of the legal
elements of a criminal offence. It is the question of the wording of a criminal offence, who will be the
principal.
Joint principals are persons who jointly realize the legal facts of an intentional offence, in awareness
of each other's activities. The objective proviso of participation as joint principal is that there are at
least two persons who commit the same offence. The principal has to realize legal fact, hence this is a
condition regarding both joint principals. This type of participation is not a simple co–delinquency,
but needs a subjective element also, the knowledge of each other’s activity. Each perpetrator has
knowledge of their own activity and in addition has knowledge of the other person’s activity.
Principal can use different tools during the perpetration, with the exception of another person, an innocent agent. When a person makes a tool of another person to commit a criminal offence, is responsible as a principal for. This form of participation is designated as „indirect principal” in Hungarian
legal science. The notion can not find in the CC, but in the science. In this case the court estimates the
criminal liability as a principal. An „indirect principal“ is a person using another person in the commission who is under 14 years, or insane, or is in error, or is under threat or violation. In these cases
there are at least two participants of a criminal offence, but the objective and subjective elements are
splited between those persons in a way, that they can not be joint principals. The connection between
the objective and subjective side is inevitable part of joint principal. In case of „indirect principal“
actus reus is on that person’s side, who commit the offence directly, but the mens rea is partly or entirely on the side of the “indirect principal”.
Secondary participation covers both the instigation and the accessory. Common feature in this forms
of perpetration is, that both are collateral acts. It means, that without principal there is neither instiga1
Regulated by a separate act: Act CIV of 2001 (see more under 2.6.)
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tion nor accessory. The evaluation of criminal law regarding this type of activity depends on the estimation of principal’s act. The separate responsibility of other parties, e.g. in case of unsuccessful
instigation, could be established in the frame of preparation, when the preparation constitutes a criminal offence. The responsibility for instigation or accessory is irrespective of the practical sentencing of
a principal.
The secondary participation lasts until the accomplishment of the offence. It could start before the
commitment, during of it but never can join the main offence after its perpetration.
Conducts of participation are regulated in the General Part of the CC. As far as the secondary participation is concerned generally it can join to any intentional offences. There is an another solution in the
CC as well; the acts of secondary participation are regulated as a separated offence in the Special Part
of the CC, so secondary participation become principal, as expanding form of participation. It always
depends on the wording of the law, i.e. the elements of a specific offence, that a certain conduct is
regulated as secondary participation or principal. The general rule is in the General Part, the expanding form or regulation is more exceptional in the Special Part of the CC.
Instigator is a person who intentionally persuades another person to perpetrate a criminal offence. The
instigator’s conduct is a deliberate action that gives the main motive to principal to commit an offence. The instigation is usually addressed to a certain person, but it can be also addressed to a group
of people. In every cases the instigation aims at committing a certain criminal offence, not committing
any type of crime. The general invitation to commit criminal offences is not an instigation. Instigator
is responsible for the offence to which he or she instigated the principal. It is necessary, that the principal at least attempts the commitment.
Accessory is someone, who helps intentionally another person (the principal) to commit a crime.
There is a distinction between psychical or physical form of complicity. The conduct is always intentional: the accessory knows the principal’s intention and gives assistance to the perpetration. The
physical accessory is different from the joint principal. The responsibility depends on the wording of
the offence, in this basis someone would be principal or accessory. When the objective element has
done by the participant is not involved in the elements of the offence, the person would be an accessory. Distinction should be formed between psychical complicity and instigation. The latter does not
give the main motive to the principal, but encourages or strengthens his or her intent.
An accomplice is usually present when the crime is committed, but it is not necessary for establishment of the criminal responsibility.
The applicable punishment is the same as in case of the principal, but there is a rule in the General
Part of CC, according to which in respect of an attempt or an accomplice, the punishment can be mitigated depending on the circumstances of the case (the “jump down” see also under A) 2.1.5./1) The
conclusion of this regulation is that in the lawmaker‘s opinion the accessory in general is less serious
form of participation than the instigation, the principal or joint principal.
An accessory is guilty of the same offence, and by law the same sanction is applicable as the principal.
2. Other forms of participation
There are other types of participation in CC; those are criminal group, conspiracy and criminal organization. It is very dangerous, when more persons participate in the commitment of a criminal offence.
Perpetration could be more organized, and has encouraging effect to the participants. This types of
forms of participations could be regulated as an aggravated circumstance, or as a separate offence. In
Hungarian criminal law the previous solution can be found.
The notion of criminal group is in the General Part of the CC. An offence is perpetrated in group if at
least three persons participate in the commission. Criminal group is the less organized form of joint
perpetration. This method of commitment is regulated as aggravated circumstance of some criminal
offences in the Special Part of the CC, e.g.
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For example: Article 321 CC, Robbery
(1) The person, who takes away a thing not belonging to him to appropriate it unlawfully from another person in such a way that he applies for this purpose violence or direct menace against life or
limbs against somebody or puts somebody into an unconscious state or state of incapability for defense, commits a felony, and shall be punishable with imprisonment from two years to eight years.
(2) It is also a robbery, if a thief caught in the act applies violence or direct menace against life or
limbs for keeping the thing.
(3) The punishment shall be imprisonment from five years to ten years, if the robbery is committed
a) in an armed manner,
b) in respect of a considerable value,
c) as part of a criminal conspiracy, or in group.
d) against a public official or a foreign public official while acting in his official capacity, or against a
person performing public duties in the course of such proceedings…
When an offence is committed in criminal group, the court should establish the forms of participation
within the group. It could be principal, joint principal, instigation or accessory. To criminal conspiracy
and criminal organization see A) 2.1.3./3.
Other forms of criminal relations are, assistance after the commission and omission of reporting. Assistance without previous agreement given after the commission of the offence, to enable someone to
escape or dispose of evidence or proceeds does not come within the definition of accessory but is a
separate criminal offence. The punishment is more severe when the assistance after the commission is
connected to the following offences, for example: some offences against the State, Homicide; Kidnapping; Terrorist Offence; Seizure of Aircraft, Railway, Waterway and Road (vehicular) Means of
Public Transport or Vehicles Capable of Mass Transport of Goods or a military offence which is also
punishable with life imprisonment.
There are some offences in the Special Part of the CC, in connection with the reporting that is an obligation. When a person omits its reporting, it is a punishable conduct. Relatives of the perpetrator in
general shall not be punishable for the omission of reporting. In the case of the Terrorist Offence,
there are more severe rules: if somebody does not report to the authorities about any preparation of a
terrorist offence, shall be punished with an imprisonment up to three years. The relatives are here not
relieved of this duty.
3.1. Does it exist, in your juridical regulations, explicit prescriptive definitions of «terrorism» and of
Definition of “terrorism”
The terrorism as such is not defined in the Hungarian law. Even the criminal law contains only the
“definition” of a terrorist offence – see below.
The offence regulated in the CC is compatible with the provisions of the Council Framework Decision
of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA), the amendment of the CC from 1st March
2003 (by the Act Nr. II of 2003) takes into consideration the obligation to harmonization of the criminal law.
Definition of “other very serious crimes”
The definition of organized crime is also missing from the criminal law system, the dogmatic figure of
the criminal organization substitutes it usually. See the answer above under A) 2.1.3./3.
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The protected interest of the terrorist offence is complex. It covers the protection of the proper function of state organs, public security, and also protection of life, physical integrity, the right to privacy,
and political and property rights.
1. Objective elements
As far as the actus reus / objective elements are concerned the perpetrator’s conducts are,
a) perpetration of criminal offence involving violence against person, or causing public danger or
involving weapons; or
b) seizing considerable assets or property and making demand to state organ or international organization in return for refraining from doing harm or injury to the said assets or of returning them; or
c) in connection with the above mentioned offences, invitation, volunteering, undertaking or agreement on the joint perpetration; providing the means necessary or helpful for the perpetration, supplying or collecting financial means; or
d) supporting the activities of the terrorist group in any other way,
e) threatening with the commitment of offences is mentioned in point a), b).
The “offences involving violence against person; causing public danger, or involving weapons” shall
mean Homicide; Assault; Willful Endangerment while Performing one’s Professional Duties; Violation of Personal Freedom; Kidnapping; Offence against the Security of Traffic; Imperil of Railway,
Air or Waterway Traffic; Violence against a Public Official; Violence against a Person with Public
Duties; Violence against the Supporter of a Public Official; Violence against a Person Protected by
International Law; - Public Danger by Using Fire or Explosive Materials; Disruption of the Functioning of a Public Utility; Seizure of Aircraft, Railway, Waterway and Road (vehicular) Means of Public
Transport or Vehicles Capable of Mass Transport of Goods; Abuse of Explosives; Abuse of Firearms
and Ammunition; Smuggling of Weapons; Abuse of Goods or Services of Military Strategic Technology; Abuse of Radioactive Substances; Abuse of Weapons Prohibited by International Treaties; Offence against the System and Data of Information Technology; Robbery; Criminal Damage when
committed intentionally.
In point b) the perpetrator’s conducts are related to purpose and means. The mean is the unlawful
seizure of the considerable assets or property. It could be performed without occupation e.g. installing
an explosive device in a building. The purpose is the demand addressed. Demand could be various,
personal, political, lawful, or unlawful. It is necessary for the offence, that the two conducts follow
each other.
The offence is accomplished in case of point a), when the offence involving violence against person,
or causing public danger or involving weapons is accomplished or is attempted. In case of point b)
when making demand to the addressee, case of point c), and d) when the invitation, volunteering or
undertaking etc. are completed. In case point e.) with notification of the demand.
Direct objects of the offence are persons, different from the perpetrator, or corporal or intellectual
properties.
The notion of other person means that, when a principal threat with hunger-strike or suicide, his act
could not be labeled as a terrorist offence. (e.g. unlawful threat).
Indirect objects of the offence are the addressee of the unlawful threat or demand, which can be a state
organ, another state, international organization, or its public official or employee in leading or administrative position. Indirect object of the offence could be the population of the state as well.
2. Subjective elements
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As far as the mens rea/ subjective elements are concerned, the offence shall be committed intentionally, and specific terrorist intent is needed. The perpetrator commits the specific offences listed above
in order to force a government agency, a country, or an international organization to perform, or refrain from performing, or endure any act; to intimidate the population; to alter or destabilize the fundamental constitutional, social or economic order of another country or to destabilize the functioning
of an international organization.
3. Punishments
The terrorist offence (accomplished or attempted) is punishable with imprisonment from ten years to
fifteen years or with life imprisonment.
The acts of preparation are punishable here as sui generis conduct [see A) 2.1./2.a], which means, that
the mitigating rules in General Part of CC on preparation are not applicable, and the conduct can be
attempted. There is no punishable preparation in this section in the meaning of the General Part, all
acts with preparatory feature constitutes a sui generic criminal offence in early stage of perpetration.
3.3. In particular, does the incriminating or aggravating rule explicitly state that the perpetrator be
yes
See the answer above under A) 3.2./2.
1.1. Are the mere preparatory acts, such as the agreement or incitement not followed by the commission of the crime, punished as separate offences or as conspiracy?
yes
See the answer above under A) 2.1.3/3 (generally and to organized crime) and A) 3.2./3 (to terrorist
offence).
1.2. More particularly, are there specific indictments (and, if so, when have they been introduced)
yes
The punishability for such acts is based on separately regulated offences, and if the acts complies the
elements of a separate offence, it is possible to punish the offender for both (for the separated offence
and for the terrorist offence as well).
1.3. Do more preparatory and/or accessory offences, in respect of the commission of these offences,
exist?
no
There is no special regulation. To the general rules see A) 2.1.
one of these preparatory acts (for example, «recruitment») and also for the commission of one of the
offences representing the «final aim» (for example, «commission of an act of terrorism»)? and, possibly, also for the offence of association or participation in a terrorist or criminal group pursuing the
same aim (infra, B.3)?
In the Hungarian criminal law, the accomplishment of an offence absorbs any former acts of preparation (and former attempts of the same offence as well), similarly if the person commits the offence
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himself as a principal, his earlier acts of participation are absorbed. If the act of the individual fulfils a
separate offence as well, he is responsible for the latter offence too. See B) 1.2.
common offences?
no
There is no special regulation. To the general rules see the answer above under A) 2.1.3.
no
There is no special regulation. To the general rules see A) 2.2.
See the answer above A) 2.1.
yes
See the answer above under A) 2.
no
There are no special rules on evidence or assumptions in criminal procedure related to participation
terrorism or other serious offences.
In Hungarian law, the assumption exists under criminal law, also affecting the procedure, that all
assets, acquired during participation in organized crime, shall be deemed subject to confiscation until
its contrary is proved.
«external» help (on the part of non-associated individuals or through adequate social contributions, for
example, on the part of a lawyer, a doctor...) to the activities and associations constituting very serious
crime, or to individual associated?
no
3. Is there a separate offence for «terrorist» association or organization or group, or for an organization addicted to very serious crime, with respect to the conspiracy or mere complicity in such crimes?
Or are common offences (if the case, aggravated) for criminal association applied?
terms by the law?
See the answer above under A) 2.13./3 and A) 3.2./3.
See the answer above under A) 2.13./3 and A) 3.2./3.
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no
There is no difference in applicable punishment between the mere participation and other conduct
regarding terrorist or other serious offence, although in practice the sentence is more severe to perpetrators holding leading position or role. There are no special rules or conditions concerning the responsibility of members or leaders of the association for commission of offences representing the
purpose of the criminal association if they did not take active part in the commission of the offence.
Where can be established those persons could be made responsible for instigation or accessory on the
basis of general rules.
Act 2001 of CIV on Criminal Law Measures Applicable to Legal Entities regulates the criminal liability of legal persons.
The conditions of the responsibility are gaining financial advantage for the entity, committing criminal
offence intentionally by a person, and punishing this person. Criminal sanctions applicable to legal
persons always shall be based on the „natural“ person‘s liability for an intentional criminal offence.
The sanctions against the legal entity are applicable as well, when a person has not criminal responsibility because of death or insanity. Applicable measures are the liquidation of the legal person; the
limitation of the legal person’s activity and imposing fine as a measure. The liquidation of the legal
person is only applicable separately, limiting the activity and imposing fine are applicable cumulatively or independently.
5. Are there specific indictments for conduct consisting of the expression and/or dissemination of
commit such acts?
No
punished?
There are no further special rules as the already mentioned.
Any person who threatens to perpetration a terrorist offence commits an offence, and shall be punished from two to eight years imprisonment.
The question has no relevance regarding the Hungarian criminal law.
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no
no
C) Other questions
The Act XV of 2003 on the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering is an important nonpenal measure in this field, its objective is to prevent the laundering of the proceeds of criminal activities through the financial system, the capital markets and other areas exposed to potential money laundering operations as well as to help combat the flow of funds financing terrorism.
The Act introduces new – more severe – rules on identification of customers of certain providers and
on reporting to competent authorities in the event of noticing any information, fact or circumstance
that may suggest money laundering. To the providers who are obliged to detailed identification of
their customers, see below:
a) financial services or activities auxiliary to these;
b) investment services or activities auxiliary to these or investment fund management services;
c) insurance underwriting, insurance agency or insurance consulting services;
d) commodity exchange services;
e) postal financial intermediation services, postal money transfer, accepting and delivering domestic
and international postal money orders;
f) real estate agency or brokering or any other incidental services;
g) auditing;
h) accountancy (bookkeeping), tax consulting services whether or not certified, or tax advisory activities under agency or service contract;
i) casino operations;
j) trading in precious metals, precious stones, articles, ornaments and jewellery made of precious metals and/or stones, cultural assets, works of art, or selling the above-specified assets at auctions or on
consignment;
k) providing services of a voluntary mutual insurance fund;
l) providing legal counsel or notary services.
The mentioned Act shall apply to every person who are engaged in the territory of the Republic of
Hungary, it means, that the nationality of customers or providers is indifferent, if they make use of the
services or offer their services in Hungary.
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The victim itself, or the number of victims are not legal elements of terrorist offence, causing death of
one or more people is an aggravating circumstance of some criminal offence e.g. of causing of public
danger or seizure of an aircraft etc.
The procedure starts ex officio, private motion is not required.
In the criminal procedure the victim could participate as witness, if the crime infringed or endangered
his or her rights or lawful interests. The witness has a right to legal protection.
Act CXXXV of 2005 on Supporting of and Compensation to Crime Victims contains the notion of
victim. The definition covers direct and indirect victims of offences.
The victim could get support or compensation. A victim has a right to general information in connection his or her own rights. A victim cam claim special information, legal assistance and immediate
subsidy. The compensation is provided by the Hungarian State, and depends on the reasonable needs
of the victim.
D) Reform proposals
Act XXVII of 2007 has just amended some provisions of the CC. The modification of terrorist offence
expands the forms of preparation. Conducts forming preparatory acts before the amendment, became
sui generis acts. The main point of the modification is, that the general rules in the General Part of the
CC are not applicable any more for these conducts, and the preferences attached either.
The new law entered into force on the 1 June 2007.
no
With regard to the recent modification, there are no new needs to revision. See the answer under D) 1.
no
With regard to the recent modification, there are no new needs to reform. See the answer under D) 1.
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ITALY*
Francesco VIGANÒ**
1. Globalization and criminality in Italy
As in other Western countries, the recent growth in the free movement of persons, goods, services and
capital has opened up new opportunities for large-scale profitable criminal activities undertaken by
criminal organizations often operating on a transnational scale. Italy is, therefore, also affected by
almost all the criminal activities that are being tackled under the third pillar of the EU, starting with
trafficking in human beings (in particular prostitutes), drugs, weapons, child pornography, etc. and
related issues of money laundering. Italy’s peculiarity, if anything, is represented by the fact that organized crime has a long ‘homegrown’ tradition, in view of the widespread presence of powerful
mafia-style organizations operating locally, which consider the opportunities opened by globalization
as a golden opportunity to expand their activities and increase their profits.
Furthermore, the immigrant flows that Italy has seen in the last two decades have also led to the rise of
forms of crime ascribable to specific ethnic groups variously working with the traditional mafias.
While drug trafficking is a common denominator of almost all the criminal groups active in Italy,
trafficking in women and exploitation of prostitution appear for example to be managed above all by
criminal groups made up of immigrants from Eastern Europe, and the Chinese ‘mafia’ appears to be
particularly active in the extortion and systematic exploitation of fellow nationals.
The criminal phenomenon and product of globalization – in both the senses that I have mentioned –
that has given cause for the most concern in recent years in Italy, however, is Islamic fundamentalist
terrorism. So far Italy has not suffered the trauma of attacks on its soil, having been hit above all in
Iraq and Afghanistan through attacks on its military contingent stationed in Nassiriyah and numerous
kidnappings, some of which have ended tragically with the deaths of the hostages. However, the investigations conducted by police have shown the presence of Islamic fundamentalist ‘cells’ operating
in the country, which appear to be involved above all in providing logistic support (in particular, the
making of false documents and recruitment of new ‘combatants’ to be sent to training camps) for
larger terrorist organizations located in Asian or North African countries. An investigation conducted
by the Italian and Spanish authorities has also revealed the existence of clear links between the perpetrators of the Madrid bombings in March 2004 and ‘cells’ operating in Italy; and further investigations
this year have led to the discovery, in our country, of indoctrination centers and, perhaps, training
centers in the use of military techniques. On this occasion, the authorities confiscated substances that
could have been used to make bombs and other explosive devices. This fact could be the first indication of the concrete preparation of attacks to be carried out in Italy, while previously there was only
evidence of vague plans emerging from some isolated wiretapped conversations between individuals
engaged rather in recruiting ‘combatants’ to send abroad.
*
**
Professor of Criminal Law at the Università degli Studi, Milan.
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2. General outline of the general judicial system of preparatory acts and of participation in Italy
2.1. Preparatory acts.
a) Principles and basic rules in the Italian Criminal Code
In principle, preparatory acts are not punishable under Italian criminal law.
Art. 56 of the Italian Criminal Code (hereafter: ICC) provides that “anyone who carries out acts which
are adequate (‘idonei’) and unequivocally directed at the commission of a crime shall be punished
under the law of attempt”. Although the wording of art. 56 does not explicitly refer to the traditional
dichotomy ‘preparatory/executive acts”, which had been adopted by the Napoleon criminal code and
by almost all the Italian penal codes in the 19th century, most scholars still hold that mere preparatory
acts (such as the legal purchase of a weapon in order to kill someone later) do not fall under the law of
criminal attempt, since these actions should be considered as ‘equivocal’. The usual arguments are,
firstly, that one might buy a gun for purposes other than deliberately killing a person; and secondly,
that even if it is proved that the gun was actually intended as a weapon to deliberately kill someone,
such an act is far too remote from the perpetration of the crime to deserve a punishment, since there is
still plenty of time for that person to rethink about his intention, and possibly to give up his plan. Only
the actual commission of a specific crime – firing at the victim, or giving him the poison, or threatening people with a weapon in an attempted robbery, etc. – should be therefore treated as ‘unequivocal’,
and be properly punished as an attempt to commit the crime.
Criminal attempts are subject to a more lenient punishment than completed crimes. Under art. 56 ICC,
the sentence which would have been passed for the completed crime must be reduced by one to two
thirds; should the completed crime have been punished with life imprisonment, the sentence must be
between 12 and 24 years’ imprisonment.
The rationale behind art. 56 is that a person is not to be punished for his bad thoughts, but for his
harmful deeds. More precisely, the actual causation of social harm, or at least the creation of an immediate risk of such a harm by the defendant is commonly seen as a condition for criminal liability
(“principio di offensività”). Three basic assumptions are implied in this principle as developed by
Italian scholars, namely
(i) that protection of socially relevant interests (“beni giuridici”) is the sole legitimate purpose of
criminal law, whereas enforcement of morals is not,
(ii) that any criminal provision enacted with a view to protecting socially relevant interests may only
be applied in the specific case at trial if the court is satisfied that this interest was actually harmed, or
at least put at risk by the defendant, and
(iii) that in the latter case the nature of the risk caused by the defendant must have been such that an
imminent harm could have been reasonably expected as a result of his action.
Assumptions (ii) and (iii) are both relevant to the law of criminal attempt as stated in art. 56 ICC: the
“adequacy” requirement means that the defendant’s action must cause an actual risk of harming the
interest protected by the relevant criminal provision – which is e contrario confirmed by art. 49 ICC,
explicitly ruling out any punishment for impossible attempts –, whereas the “unequivocal direction”
requirement is commonly construed, as pointed out before, as expressing the need of an imminent
threat for the interest involved, thereby excluding any remote threats caused by merely preparatory
acts.
The provision of mandatory mitigation of the sentence in attempt cases reflects the emphasis on the
consequences of the defendant’s acts rather than on his intentions: from this perspective, the creation
of a mere risk of harm should attract a lesser punishment than the actual causing of it, even if the actor’s mens rea is the same in both cases.
In principle, neither incitement nor conspiracy are per se punishable under Italian criminal law, as
stated in general terms by art. 115 ICC (“Unless provided otherwise by specific provisions, should
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two or more persons agree to carry out a crime, and this crime is actually not committed, none of them
is punishable for the mere conspiracy [...]. The same rule applies in the case of incitement to commit a
crime [...], if the crime is not committed”). Both incitement and conspiracy are commonly held to be
merely preparatory acts, which do not immediately bring about any harm, nor imminent risk of such a
harm. On the other side, both are punished as forms of complicity to the crime, whenever this is actually committed, or at least attempted, by the principal.
b) Exceptions
Of course there are many provisions in the ICC, and in Italian criminal legislation in general, which
do not follow these patterns.
(i) Firstly, quite often the attempt to commit a particular offence is elevated to a crime in itself. This
happens in the so called “delitti di attentato”, which are described by the relevant criminal provisions
as “acts directed at the commission of” a specific offence, or plainly as “attempts” to bring about a
specific harm. For example, art. 280 ICC refers to “a person who attempts to kill or injure a person
with a terrorist or subversive intent”; the penalties for this crime vary according to the actual consequences of the act, but are always harsher than the standard punishment for attempted homicide. Such
provisions do not explicitly state the “adequacy” and “unequivocal direction” requirements, which in
general characterize criminal attempts under art. 56 IPC, and could theoretically be construed as encompassing preparatory acts as well. However, these two basic requirements are considered implicit
both by scholars and case law. Consequently, a man who purchases a gun in order to kill a State secretary is not deemed guilty under art. 280 ICC until the very moment he actually points the gun and fires
it at the victim.
(ii) Secondly, and more relevantly in our context, a significant number of Italian criminal provisions
(in the ICC and elsewhere) do punish acts, whose harmfulness for socially relevant interests entirely
depends on the assumption of a risk of the future commission of a further offence by the defendant or
others. These provisions should therefore be regarded as criminalization of preparatory acts. In our
last example, the man who purchases a gun without authorization with a view to killing a State secretary will be deemed guilty of the crime of unlawfully possessing a weapon, although no actual harm
nor imminent risk of death or injury for anyone has occurred yet: the risk that he himself or a third
person may later use the gun to unlawfully kill someone – a risk, which is significantly higher when
the possession of the gun is unlawful than in the case of legal purchase of a weapon – is commonly
seen as a good reason for criminal law to stop from the very beginning such possible developments,
and therefore prevent the future commission of crimes. Recent legislation aimed at combating organized crime and terrorism has moved greatly towards this pattern of criminal liability, by penalizing
activities such as recruitment, training, making or possession of forged papers, etc., and setting harsh
sentences for them (see infra).
(iii) Thirdly, it can be convincingly argued that also offences of participation in a criminal organization (art. 416 ICC: criminal organization; art. 416 bis ICC: mafia organization; art. 270 bis ICC: terrorist or subversive organization; etc.) are in fact examples of criminalization of preparatory acts. The
basic requirement of these offences is namely that the accused has either taken part in the criminal
activities of the organization (but not necessarily in the commission of specific crimes: for example by
providing the means – weapons, cash, cars, mobile phones, etc. – or in general carrying out any preparatory act for the commission of an offence), or has done any other activity (immediately unrelated
to the commission of any crime: for example by harboring his fellow terrorists, or providing them
with ‘official’ jobs in order to cover their unlawful activities) for the sake of the organization. The
reason why all these activities are deemed criminally relevant lies in the risk, created by the mere
existence of the organization as such, that further crimes (the so called ‘final crimes’) will be committed later by its members – basically the same rationale, which underlies the criminalization of the
activities which come under group (ii).
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(iv) Finally, there are various provisions in the ICC and elsewhere which – contrary to the general rule
stated by art. 115 ICC – do criminalize the mere incitement or conspiracy to commit particular, usu.
rather serious, crimes. It is an autonomous offence, for example, to incite someone to commit a crime
against the personality of the State (art. 302 ICC), as it is to participate in a conspiracy to commit such
a crime (art. 304 ICC), if the crime is not committed nor attempted later; and rather harsh punishments
are provided for such actions (imprisonment up to 6 years for conspiracy and up to 8 years for incitement). On the other hand, art. 414 ICC sets a term of imprisonment up to 5 years for both the public
incitement to commit a crime and the public glorification of a crime already committed; and the sentences can be increased to 7 and a half years, under a recent anti-terrorism statute (d.l. 144/2005),
when the crime to which the incitement or glorification refers is an act of terrorism, or is a crime
against humanity.
2.2. Participation.
The law of complicity is stated in arts. 110-119 ICC.
The basic principle is that anyone who takes part (“concorre”) in the commission of an offence, whatever his role might be, is deemed guilty of the offence, and must be sentenced within the sentencing
framework set by law for this offence (art. 110 ICC).
An essential condition for criminal complicity is that the offence be actually committed, or at least
attempted, by one or more of the accomplices. One cannot ‘take part’ (for example as an instigator, or
a conspirator) in a crime which has not yet been committed, or at least attempted; nor is any attempt to
take part in the commission of a merely planned crime per se criminally relevant under Italian criminal law. If A suggests that B should kill C, none is punishable until B actually kills C, or at least attempts to kill him – from this very moment only A will be considered as B’s accomplice, and be guilty
of (attempted or completed) homicide together with A.
The standard opinion among scholars and case law is that one ‘takes part’ in an offence, whenever he
does an act, which can be regarded as the conditio sine qua non for the committed offence. The court
must therefore be satisfied that the crime would not have been committed but for the contribution of
that person, or at least that the crime would have been committed in a significantly different way without his contribution. The specific nature of the contribution, on the other hand, is immaterial: A may
well ‘take part’ in a homicide by instigating B to kill C, by giving B advice, by purchasing B the gun,
or even by directly firing at C at B’s request.
Hence it follows that Italian criminal law does not differentiate between the accomplices according to
their specific roles in conceiving or carrying out the crime. All those who have actually carried out the
crime are subject to the same sentencing framework as those who have simply incited, abetted or
otherwise aided the perpetrators in the commission of the crime. It does not follow, however, that the
sentence will be in concreto the same for all the accomplices: the court may well give different sentences in exercising its discretionary power – within the legal framework set by the relevant criminal
provision – depending on the importance of the contribution, degree of mens rea, social dangerousness, etc. of every accomplice (see art. 133 ICC, stating in general the factors which have to be taken
into consideration in the determination of the sentence in case of conviction). In addition to this, art.
114 ICC provides a special mitigating circumstance for the accomplices whose contribution was of
minimal importance for the commission of the offence. Other special grounds of mitigation or aggravation are provided by arts. 111, 112 and 114 ICC, in general depending on the weight of each one’s
contributions, rather than on the role respectively played by every accomplice in the perpetration of
the crime.
The term “terrorism” first appeared in Italian criminal legislation in 1978, when – a few days after the
traumatic kidnapping of the key politician Aldo Moro by the Red Brigade – a new crime of kidnapping with subversive or terrorist intent was enacted (art. 289 bis ICC). The crime of attempt to kill or
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injure someone with terrorist intent followed in 1979 (art. 280 ICC), and in 2001 – just one month
after the Twin Towers’ attack of 9/11 – the existing offence of participation in a subversive organization was enlarged to cover organizations with terrorist intent as well. Lastly, a new art. 280 bis was
introduced in the ICC, proscribing any act aimed at causing damage to property or goods through the
use of explosives or other lethal devices with a terrorist intent.
Each of these acts was of course already punishable before these new provisions were enacted. Therefore, the main purpose of these provisions is to enhance sentences in respect of the perpetrator’s specific intent. For example, under art. 56 and 575 ICC an attempt to kill someone is usually punished
with between 7 and 14 years’ imprisonment, whereas under art. 280 ICC an attempt to kill someone
with terrorist intent will be punished with at least 20 years imprisonment. The actus reus and the
intention to kill are indeed the same in both cases; therefore, the harsher sanction for the latter conduct
is only attributable to the particular aim pursued by the author.
On the other hand, since 1979 a terrorist intent by the perpetrator constitutes a ground for mandatory
aggravation of the sentence for any crime (art. 1 d.l. 625/1979) other than the offences especially
qualified by this intent. A simple theft can therefore become a ‘terrorist’ crime – and be sanctioned
more severely than any ordinary theft – if committed, say, by a member of an Islamic cell in order to
fund the activity of al Qaeda.
In spite of the practical importance of the concept of “terrorism”, the Italian criminal system lacked
any legislative definition of it until 2005. This deficiency was not seen as a problem as long as terrorism was considered an internal problem: the aim of domestic organizations like the ‘Red Brigade’ was
at the same time terrorist and subversive and no one paid attention at the time to categorization issues.
Serious problems arose, however, when prosecutors and judges had to deal with the activities of Islamic ‘cells’, which were not planning any terrorist acts to be carried out in Italy, but were providing
instead mere logistic support to larger organizations located abroad, esp. in the Middle East – in particular, by recruiting members, raising funds, etc. Considerable inconsistencies then arose among
Italian courts about the crucial question whether the activities of these latter organizations could be
considered as ‘terrorist’, esp. when it was not established whether they had only military targets in the
context of armed conflicts – as maintained by defense councils –, or intended to strike the civilian
population as well.
A new law in July 2005 introduced a legal definition of “act with terrorist intent” (art. 270 sexies
ICC), with a view to solving authoritatively these disputes. “Acts with terrorist intent” are also identified as any acts which, by their nature or context, are likely to cause serious damage to a State or international organization and are committed with intent
(i) to intimidate the population, or
(ii) compel public agents or international organizations to do or to abstain from doing any act, or
(iii) destabilize or destroy the fundamental political structures of a State or of an international organization.
The definition applies as well to any other act that is defined as such by international covenants or
other international provisions to which Italy is legally bound.
The above definition broadly corresponds with the definition provided by the EU framework decision
on terrorist crimes of 13 June 2002. The main difference is that the Italian provision does not enumerate the single acts which should fall under the definition of terrorism. This has raised some criticisms
among commentators, who have pointed out the vagueness resulting from the very broad description
of “any acts which, by their nature or context, are likely to cause serious damage to a State, population
or international organization”. It should be considered, however, that the actus reus of most terrorist
acts is usually described by other criminal provisions qualified by a terrorist intent – as attempt to kill
or injure someone (art. 280 ICC), kidnapping (art. 289 bis ICC), participation in a terrorist organization (art. 270 bis ICC), etc. –, so that the requirement of the likeliness of the causation of serious dam-
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age works in the end as an objective limitation of the possible qualification of such acts as terrorist
acts.
***
1. Preparatory acts
As mentioned before, there has been in recent years a remarkable increase in offences amounting to
preparatory acts, particularly in relation to terrorism. As we will immediately see, however, some of
these offences already existed from the very entry into force of the ICC in 1930. No special regulation
exists for attempt in relation to these offences, to which art. 56 ICC seems theoretically to apply –
although it may be difficult in practice to imagine an attempt to commit these crimes (as in the cases
of arts. 302 and 304 ICC, which we will examine next).
(a) Incitement and conspiracy (arts. 302 and 304 ICC)
Incitement and conspiracy to commit a “crime against the personality of the State” (a category which
encompasses the most relevant terrorist offences, such as arts. 270 bis, 270 ter, 270 quater, 270 quinqiues, 280, 280 bis and 289 bis) are autonomous offences under arts. 302 and 304 ICC. Both provisions, as already pointed out, lay down an exception to the general rule of art. 115 ICC, which states
that instigation and conspiracy, if not followed by the actual commission of the crime, are not punishable.
In particular, art. 302 ICC reads as follows: “A person who incites someone to intentionally commit
one of the offences as set forth by chapters one and two of this part [concerning crimes against the
personality of the State] shall be liable to between 1 and 8 years’ imprisonment, if the incitement is
not followed by the commission of the offence. However, the term may not exceed half of the term set
for the offence to which the incitement refers”.
Art. 304 ICC reads as follows: “If two or more persons agree to commit one of the offences mentioned in art. 302, all of them shall be liable to between 1 and 6 years’ imprisonment, if the offence
which they have agreed to has not been committed. The sentence shall be increased for those who
promoted the conspiracy. However, the term may not exceed half of the term set for the offence to
which the incitement refers”.
Neither art. 302 nor art. 304 ICC apply if the offence to which the incitement or conspiracy refer has
actually been committed, even at the stage of attempt. In this case, those who have incited or conspired to the offence are punishable as accomplices of it, and are consequently liable to the same sentence as the perpetrator(s) under the general rule laid down by art. 110 ICC (see above). Thus, if A
incites B to commit a terrorist crime (for example to kidnap the politician C in order to compel a government to free some arrested fellow terrorists), A will be liable under art. 302 until B initiates the act
of kidnapping; from this very moment onwards, both will be liable as accomplices of the (attempted
or completed) offence set forth by art. 289 bis ICC.
On the contrary, a liability under arts. 302 or 304 is not in principle inconsistent with a liability for the
crime of membership of a terrorist organization under art. 270 bis ICC. Although no case law exists
on this specific point, it is therefore arguable that A is guilty of both the offences set forth by art. 270
bis and 302 if he, being a member of an Islamic terrorist cell, incites B to kidnap the politician C for
terrorist purposes.
(b) Public incitement (art. 414 subs. 1 and 4 ICC)
Art. 414 subs. 1 ICC reads as follows: “A person who publicly incites another person to commit an
offence shall be punished:
1) with between one and five years’ imprisonment, in the case of incitement to commit a felony;
2) with imprisonment not exceeding one year, or a fine not exceeding 206 euros, in the case of incitement to commit a misdemeanor”.
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Under subs. 4, added in July 2005, the sentence is increased if the incitement refers to terrorist offences or to crimes against humanity. This new provision is probably meant as a tool against radical
preachers in the mosques, who often incite their audience of believers to take up the fight against the
infidel, and possibly join the combatants in the global jihad. However, to my knowledge, no one has
been indicted for this specific charge so far, possibly because Italian prosecutors are very careful in
dealing with Muslim communities and their religious leaders, in order to avoid giving any wrong
impression of waging a ‘religious war’ against Islam as such.
The main difference between art. 414 subs. 1 and art. 302 ICC lies in the addressee(s) of the incitement: whereas under art. 302 the incitement must be directed at one or more single persons, art. 414
subs. 1 requires that the incitement take place in public, and creates therefore the risk that someone
could commit a crime following the incitement. “In public” means not only in the presence of a number of persons in the same place, but also through the press or other means of communication (art. 266
ICC) – arguably including Internet web sites.
Unlike in the case of an art. 302 offence, it is immaterial whether someone has in fact committed the
crime to which the incitement refers. In this event, it is theoretically possible that the person who has
publicly incited to commit a crime may be liable both under art. 414 subs. 1 or 3 and for an offence
committed by someone from the audience as an instigator of this latter offence under the law of complicity.
(c) Recruitment (art. 270 quater ICC)
Art. 270 quater, which was enacted in the immediate aftermath of the London bombings of 7 and 21
July 2005, reads as follows: “A person who, except in the cases provided for by art. 270 bis, recruits
one or more persons to carry out acts of violence or sabotage of essential public services, with terrorist
purposes, also against a foreign State, institution or international organization, shall be punished with
between seven and fifteen years’ imprisonment”.
The provision does not clarify what “recruit” means; according to the first commentators, and in the
absence of relevant case law, A recruits B when he prompts B to join an armed group as a new member of it. It is worth noting that only A is liable for this offence, whereas B is possibly liable for the
different offence of membership of a terrorist organization under art. 270 bis ICC. On the other hand,
the provision may not be applied together with an art. 270 bis ICC offence. In practice, art. 270 quater
will apply if there is not enough evidence that A himself is a member of the armed group, or of any
other terrorist group.
In the light of the above, art. 270 quater ICC has a much narrower scope than the wide provision of
art. 6 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005, according to
which “recruitment for terrorism” also means to solicit another person to commit or to participate in
the commission of a terrorist offence or to join any association or group (not necessarily armed) for
terrorist purposes. This kind of conduct is indeed punishable under art. 302 ICC or 414 subs. 1 ICC,
depending on whether the conduct is carried out in private or in public, as already explained.
(d) Training (art. 270 quinquies ICC)
Art. 270 quinquies, which was enacted in 2005 too, reads as follows: “A person who, except in the
cases provided for by art. 270 bis, trains or provides instruction in the making or use of explosives,
firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous chemical or biological substances, or in other
specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of carrying out acts of violence or sabotage of essential public services, also if carried out against a foreign state, institution or international organization,
shall be punished with five to ten years’ imprisonment. The same penalty shall apply to the person
receiving instruction”.
The offence does not depend on the actual commission of other terrorist crimes by the trainee (or by
the person who receives instruction). If the latter commits an act of terrorism using the methods or
techniques he has learned from his trainer, he will be liable both for an art. 270 quinquies offence
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(together with his trainer) and for the act of terrorism itself. An art. 270 quinquies offence, however,
may not be applied together with the offence of membership of a terrorist organization (art. 270 bis
ICC): if A, being a member of a terrorist organization, provides his fellow member B with instruction
in the use of explosives, both will be only liable for an art. 270 bis offence.
Art. 270 quinques ICC applies both to the trainer and the trainee, and to anyone who provides instruction; no mention is made by the criminal provision of the person who receives instruction. Hence
arguably it follows that, for example, the mere possession by a person of videos showing military
methods or techniques is not criminally relevant, unless the prosecution can prove that this person is
being currently “trained” by another (i.e. finds himself in a stable individual relationship with a specific trainer). Thus, if A on one occasion provides his acquaintance B with some of these videos,
which are found during a police raid on B’s premises, only A will be liable for the offence.
The wording of art. 270 quinquies ICC largely corresponds with art. 7 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005).
(e) Counterfeit documents for travel abroad (art. 497 bis ICC)
Art. 497 bis ICC, enacted in 2005 at the same time as the previous two offences, reads as follows: “A
person who is found in possession of a counterfeit document valid for travel abroad shall be punished
with between 1 and 4 years’ imprisonment. The penalty stated in subs. 1 is increased by between one
third and one half for a person who makes and produces the counterfeit document, or possesses it for
purposes other than for personal use”.
Since experience tells us that members of fundamentalist Islamic organizations have to move very
often from one country to another in pursuit of their terrorist aims, the legislature in 2005 introduced
this provision in order to crack down on the activity which makes it possible for them to cross borders
by avoiding police controls: i.e., forging or otherwise making false identity papers. In order to enhance
the preventive effect of the provision, the legislature has extended its scope to the simple possession
(either for personal use or for any other purpose) of forged documents by anyone who has not participated in the forgery or the making of false documents.
2. Special rules on complicity
No exception is foreseen to the general rules of the law of complicity for terrorist or other serious
crimes, apart from the already examined rules about incitement and conspiracy under art. 302 and 304
ICC.
The general law of complicity also applies to the various offences related to criminal organizations.
Under art. 110 ICC, a person who contributes to the (criminal or non-criminal) activities of such an
organization while not being a member of it is legally held as an accomplice of the organization on the
whole. In particular, a huge case law has been developed in recent years about complicity with mafiatype organizations (art. 416 bis): doctors, judges, politicians, entrepreneurs, etc. have been indicted –
and often convicted – on charges of complicity with the mafia, on the assumption that they gave support to a specific mafia group, in the knowledge of its criminal nature, without being themselves part
of the group (i.e., without being subject to its disciplinary rules, and in general without being recognized by the organization as members). The principles of this case law could well apply in the future
to the activity of terrorist organizations, for example in relation to professional forgers of documents
that provide these organizations with false papers, in the knowledge of their terrorist aims.
3. Criminal organizations
As already pointed out, a number of provisions concerning criminal organizations exist in Italian
criminal law. Whereas the offence of conspiracy is exceptional in our system (as in the case of art. 302
ICC) and still very unfamiliar to Italian prosecutors and judges – no one has yet been charged, to my
knowledge, for conspiracy to commit terrorist crimes under art. 302 ICC –, criminal organization
offences are commonly used in practice as a key legal instrument in the fight against organized crime
in Italy. Suspected members of criminal organizations are subjected to very intrusive investigations
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such as wiretapping and bugging, to longer terms of custody and to special procedural rules; and, if
deemed guilty at trial, they can be sentenced both for the charge of membership of the criminal organization and for the crime(s) committed in this role on behalf of the organization.
(a) Participation in a terrorist organization (art. 270 bis ICC)
Among these provisions, a specific offence concerns association with terrorist or subversive purposes.
Art. 270 bis reads as follows:
“A person who promotes, establishes, organizes, directs or funds an organization that intends to carry
out acts of violence for terrorist purposes or to subvert the democratic order shall be punished with
between seven and fifteen years’ imprisonment.
A person who participates in such an organization shall be punished with between five and ten years’
imprisonment.
For the purpose of criminal law, terrorist purposes shall include acts of violence against a foreign
State, an institution or international organization”.
As is usual in the provisions concerning criminal organizations, two distinct sentencing frameworks
are provided for simple and ‘qualified’ members (such as the persons who promoted the creation of
the organization, their leaders, etc.); and the harsher framework is extended here to the persons who
finance the organization, while not necessarily being members of it.
It falls on the criminal court to assess the ‘terrorist’ nature of an organization. The court is not bound
by any official list of terrorist organizations, such as those drawn up by the UN or the EU. It is for the
prosecution to prove that the organization on the whole intends to commit violence for terrorist or
subversive purposes – being on the other side immaterial whether violence is directed against internal
or external objectives (such as a foreign country, or an international organization). The definition of
‘terrorist’ purposes is found, as we have seen, in art. 270 sexies ICC (see above).
It is commonly held by scholars and case law that the terrorist purposes of an organization may not be
purely speculative: art. 270 bis ICC should not become an instrument to criminalize mere ideological
dissent. Instead, the organization on the whole must pursue some specific criminal plans. If the prosecution can show that the three radical Muslims A, B and C in their regular meetings harshly criticized
American and European policy towards the Middle East – possibly qualifying as ‘pigs’ Western countries –, glorified the gestures of ‘martyrs’ for the cause of Islam, and even expressed their desires to
die in the global jihad, such a case would probably still be too weak to support a conviction for participation in a terrorist organization, since the terrorist purposes of the accused are still too vague, and
likely to be considered purely an expression of ideological dissent, covered as such by the guarantee
of art. 21 of the Italian Constitution. To support a conviction of A, B and C for this charge, evidence
of a specific criminal plan (e.g., a bombing in tube station X of city Y), or at least of the commission
of some preparatory acts for still unidentified terrorist offences (such as, for example, fund raising or
– as occurred in various cases recently dealt with by Italian courts – recruitment of combatants to be
sent to training camps in the Middle East) would probably be needed. It would not be necessary to
prove, on the other hand, that the organization had already committed terrorist acts – although it is
clear that such evidence, if available, would indeed ease the case for prosecution.
Apart from the nature of the ‘terrorist’ purpose, there are no other strict requirements in Italian law
concerning the features of a terrorist organization. Although in general a criminal organization requires at least three members (cf. art. 416 ICC, which sets forth the general offence of participation in
a criminal organization), there is some support in case law for the assumption that only two members
are enough for a terrorist organization; and, in spite of the fact that scholars claim that the organization must be organically structured and have a clear distinction of roles among its members, the courts
are generally prepared to accept much lower standards, and to admit the existence of ‘terrorist organizations’ even in groups of individuals that are not hierarchically structured, with no fixed distinction
of roles, and with no stability in their composition.
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Any person who has been accepted as such by the organization itself, and who shares its criminal
purposes is considered a member of a terrorist organization. It is not fully clear, at the current state of
case law, whether or not a criminal conviction as a ‘participant’ also requires evidence of a positive
activity done by the defendant in the exercise of the specific role assigned to him by the organization.
Some decisions, upheld by the Court of Cassation, have maintained – in relation to the mafia – that
participation is basically a status, which can be possibly acquired through a formal entrance into the
organization (in accordance with its own rules and rituals); and, consequently, that it is not necessary
for the prosecution to provide evidence of the activity done by the accused, if there is sufficient evidence that he has become a member of the organization by way of mutual consent. Such a principle
could possibly apply to terrorist organizations as well, esp. in the event that there should be no evidence of specific activities carried out by the defendant, being instead clear that he has bound himself
to blindly obey the organization’s leaders (even in the case of an order to carry out a suicide attack).
As already pointed out, any person who, not being a member of a terrorist organization, supports its
activity in the knowledge of its criminal purposes is in principle liable as an accomplice of the organization itself, and is therefore subject to the same sentencing framework set forth by art. 270 bis for
mere membership under the general law of complicity (art. 110 ICC).
(b) Assistance to members of terrorist organizations (art. 270 ter ICC)
Art. 270 ter ICC reads as follows: “A person who provides refuge or food, hospitality, transport,
means of communication to one ore more persons who are members of the organizations described in
art. 270 bis shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding four years. The penalty is
increased if assistance is provided on a continuous basis. A person who commits said actions on behalf of a relative shall not be liable”.
The provision – which is ancillary to the general offence set forth by art. 270 bis – provides a lesser
sentencing framework than the one applicable to the actual participants in a terrorist organization. Art.
270 ter apply to any person who, not being a member of the organization, provides food, mobile
phones, etc. to one or more single members of it – provided, of course, that he cannot be considered as
an accomplice of the whole organization, in which case he will be liable, as we have just seen, to the
same sentencing framework set forth by art. 270 bis according to the general law of complicity.
4. Liability of legal entities
A law enacted in 2001 (d.lgs. 231/2001) makes a legal entity liable for certain crimes perpetrated by
its agents. Although this liability is explicitly qualified by the law as “administrative”, it is arguable
that its very nature is in fact criminal, since the liability of legal entities depends both on the previous
commission of a criminal offence by a natural person acting in the interest or for the benefit of a legal
entity (actus reus) and on an organization fault of the legal person itself (which operates as a kind of
mens rea). Moreover, the liability has to be assessed by criminal courts through a criminal proceeding, which can lead to a range of severe sanctions (fines, disqualification, confiscation, etc.).
Under art. 25-quater of d.lgs. 231/2001, legal entities are liable to pecuniary and disqualification sanctions for any offence committed by its agents (under the circumstances specifically set by art. 5, 6 and
7) with a terrorist or subversive intent, and for any other offence coming under art. 2 of the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999).
5. Criminalization of expression and/or dissemination of thoughts or opinions
(a) Glorification (art. 414 subs. 3 ICC)
Besides the offence of public incitement to commit a crime under art. 414 subs. 1 ICC, the Code also
punishes the glorification of an (already committed) offence.
Art. 414 subs. 3 ICC reads: “A person who publicly glorifies one or more offences shall be subject to
the penalty set forth in subs. 1 [imprisonment of between one and five years]
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Under subs. 4, introduced in July 2005, the penalty is increased (up to a maximum of seven and a half
years’ imprisonment) if the glorification concerns offences related to terrorism or crimes against humanity.
“Glorification” means justifying the commission, or even praising the criminal action and/or the perpetrator. The law does not provide more precise indications regarding actus reus, while the mens rea
must be intention. The purpose of criminalizing such acts is to avoid any incitement, even indirect, to
commit crimes of the same nature.
The crime of glorification, however, has been harshly criticized by some scholars, who, for many
years now, have pointed out that it lies in uneasy tension with the freedom of expression of thought
provided for by art. 21 of the Italian Constitution. The Italian Constitutional Court, in a decision dating back to 1970, did in fact hold the criminalization to be lawful, but added that glorification is to be
understood not as the pure and simple expression of thought, but as a communication which is likely
to provoke the commission of crimes having regard to the circumstances of the case (C. Cost.
65/1970). As a result, the Italian Constitutional Court fundamentally upheld the criterion – originally
developed in US constitutional case law – whereby only those restrictions on freedom of expression
are permissible that serve to prevent a “clear and present danger” of the commission of an offence.
Subsequent case law has for the most part followed the position expressed by the Italian Constitutional Court, requiring – if not the establishment of an immediate danger that an offence would be
committed – at least the reasonable possibility, given the circumstances of the fact, that such communication would be followed by criminal events. It is clear, on the one hand, that this criterion could
easily encompass speeches or statements made by radical preachers in mosques, on websites or in any
other printed or audio-visual format, and intended to glorify the acts of ‘combatants’ in their global
jihad against the West. On the other hand, the vague wording of the law could easily allow its application also to expressions of thought – highly common in the Islamic world, even in non-fundamentalist
circles – aimed at justifying any act of terrorism carried out in the name of a sort of legitimate defense
against Israeli, American and Western policies in general. Here too, however, it should be noted that
great caution has been exercised so far by prosecutors in Italy to avoid any accusations of criminalizing mere expressions of dissent.
(b) Dissemination of ideological hatred (art. 3 l. 654/1975)
Also worth mentioning in this context is the offence under art. 3 l. 654/75, as amended by d.l.
122/1993, which reads: “Unless a more serious offence has been committed, any person who:
a) disseminates ideas founded on racial or ethnic superiority or hatred, or incites the commission of
discriminatory acts on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding 18 months or a fine not exceeding 6, 000 euros;
b) who incites, in any other way, the commission, or himself commits violence or acts of provocation
of violence on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds, shall be punished with imprisonment of
between six months and four years”.
The law does not punish an offence that is specifically terrorist in nature; however, its formulation
could in theory cover acts of incitement and dissemination of hatred and violence against members of
different religions or ethnic groups – actions which are highly frequent in Islamic fundamentalist
circles.
6. Sentencing
As for the sentencing framework, the principle of proportion between the seriousness of the crime and
the term of the sanction – a principle which scholars and case law draw from the constitutional principle of equality (art. 3 of the Constitution) – requires that the sentence for the commission of merely
preparatory acts be lower than that contemplated for acts which directly cause harm. This leading
principle is generally respected by the Italian legislature, although legislation in recent years related to
international terrorism has considerably stiffened the sentences also for merely preparatory acts. For
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example, membership of a terrorist organization (art. 270 bis subs. 2 ICC), as well as recruitment and
training for terrorist purposes (arts. 270 quater and quinquies) now carry a sentence of five to ten
years’ imprisonment; and those constituting, organizing or financing a terrorist organization now face
a sentence of seven to fifteen years’ imprisonment (art. 270 bis subs. 1 ICC).
I have already underlined, moreover, that the furtherance of acts of terrorism is an aggravating factor
which can be applied to any offence that does not contemplate such a purpose among its elements (art.
1 l. 15/1980).
On the other hand, there are significant sentence reductions or even immunities for persons responsible of terrorist offences who co-operat with police or judicial authorities. Since its entry into force
(1930), the Italian Criminal Code contemplates provisions which in the case of crimes against the
personality of the State (which, as we have seen, include all terrorist crimes) grant immunity to conspirators and members of criminal organizations who withdraw from the conspiracy or organization
before the criminal enterprise has been committed, or otherwise prevent such enterprise to be committed (arts. 308 and 309 ICC). Art. 4 d.l. 625/1979, turned into law no. 15/1980, envisages a sentence
reduction of between one third and one half for those who co-operate with police or judicial authorities to prevent terrorist or subversive activity, or who assist the police and judicial authorities in gathering relevant evidence in order to identify or capture accomplices. More radically, art. 5 of the same
law grants immunity to those who prevent the commission of a terrorist or subversive enterprise, while
at the same time providing essential evidence to enable the exact reconstruction of the facts and the
identification of accomplices.
Further important differences as regards sentencing between those convicted of ordinary offences and
those convicted of terrorist offences concern the prison regime. Those convicted of terrorist offences
are subject to a special prison regime, originally conceived for members of mafia-type organizations,
in which the granting of ordinary concessions – extra-mural work, short-term leave, leave of absence
from prison by day, probation, etc. – is generally dependent on their co-operation with police and the
judicial authorities in identifying their accomplices (art. 4 bis l. 354/1975, as amended by l. 279/2002).
In the absence of co-operation, the sentence imposed is served entirely within the penal institution.
Offenders detained or incarcerated for terrorism-related offences may also, where their persistent links
with a criminal organization have been established, be subject to a ‘tough prison’ regime under art.
41-bis l. 354/1975, i.e. a special detention regime following an order issued on a case by case basis by
the Minister of Justice. This regime is intended to drastically reduce the possibility of interactions
between the offender and the criminal organization, in particular through heavy restriction of contact
with relatives, solitary confinement, checking of correspondence, etc. This special prison regime,
originally aimed at members of the Mafia, has recently been extended to terrorist offenders.
***
C) Other questions
1. Preventive measures and non-penal instruments
The fight against terrorism, even after the shock of September 11 and the subsequent bombings in
Madrid and London, is, in the Italian legal order, essentially entrusted to the criminal law system,
managed by institutional actors that are independent of the executive. Hence, Italy – like the majority
of European countries – has not followed the US in using a war model to combat Al-qaeda terrorism.
Instead it is dealt with as a form, albeit serious and extremely dangerous, of criminality, to be tackled
with instruments typical of criminal law.
This, therefore, means in particular that – in compliance with art. 13 of the Italian Constitution – only
a judge can order the custody of suspected terrorist, if there are serious grounds to believe that they
have committed an offence On the contrary, the police have no power to detain suspected terrorists for
more than 48 hours.
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However, Italian law envisages a number of preventive measures in respect of persons suspected of
terrorist activities, when there are as yet no serious grounds for believing a specific offence has been
committed.
Some of these measures may be ordered by a Court on the grounds that the person affected by the
order has actually committed “preparatory acts [...] directed [...] at the commission of terrorist offences” (art. 18 l. 152/1975, as amended by d.l. 374/2001). The court can order, with recourse to a
lower standard of evidence than that required in criminal proceedings, measures restricting personal
freedom, such as the prohibition to reside in one or more municipalities or provinces, or the obligation
not to leave the municipality of residence (art. 2 l. 575/1965). The same procedure and the same lower
standards of evidence apply in the enforcement of preventive measures related to property, such as the
confiscation of assets possessed directly or indirectly by a suspected terrorist, when their value is
disproportionate to his declared income or to his economic activity, or when there are sufficient
grounds to believe that the assets are the fruit of unlawful activities (art. 2 ter l. 575/1965). All these
preventive measures, which were until now used above all to combat mafia-related crime, were also
extended in 2001 – in the aftermath of September 11 – to suspected terrorists. This extension has,
however, been only theoretical, given that the measures restricting personal freedom appear quite
ineffective in containing the dangerousness of suspected terrorists, while the confiscation of assets
provision has been made superfluous by the possibility of using the instrument of freezing of assets,
adopted at a European level as an instrument to combat the financing of terrorism, which operates, to
a very large extent, outside judicial control.
Far more effective – and of wide practical application – are the administrative instruments which may
be applied to foreigners, residing lawfully or unlawfully in Italy, who are suspected of carrying out
terrorist activities. Art. 3 d.l. 144/2005 in particular introduced – as a temporary measure, which is due
to remain in force until the end of 2007 – a deportation order, which may be issued against foreign
nationals who have committed preparatory acts directed at the commission of terrorist crimes, as well
as against foreigners when there are grounds to believe that their stay in Italy could in some way help
terrorist organizations or activities. The deportation order may be issued by the Ministry of the Interior or, on delegation, by a prefect. The order is immediately enforceable, and does not require judicial approval – in contrast with what normally happens in the case of all other deportation orders. The
provision – which is frequently applied even to persons acquitted of the charges brought against them
in a criminal court – has been harshly criticized by scholars, who point out the risks connected with
the total lack of judicial scrutiny of the grounds of the deportation, as well as the risk that the deported
person may in fact be handed over to police authorities in countries which regularly torture suspected
terrorists. The European Court of Human Rights has in fact on several occasions, in recent months,
called on the Italian government not to deport various suspected terrorists, in view of the risk that they
could be subjected to torture or treatments prohibited by art. 3 ECHR in the destination countries.
2. Victims
There are no specific provisions that attribute a particular role to victims of terrorist offences in the
criminal trial.
***
D) Reform proposals
1. Compatibility with fundamental rights
Italian terrorism legislation, like criminal legislation concerning organized crime in general, has been
fiercely criticized by some scholars, who point out its departure from the ‘classic’ principles of criminal law. They question the constitutional lawfulness of criminalizing preparatory acts, in the light of
the ’principio di offensività’ mentioned above, according to which criminal provisions may only be
enacted with a view to neutralizing imminent risks of harm. Equally controversial is the penalization
of mere participation in a criminal organization, in view of the risk of thereby criminalizing the mere
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intention of carrying out a criminal enterprise. Also heavily criticized is the solution of increasing
penalties for ordinary offences only in relation to the terrorist purposes pursued by the agent - which
is once again considered as a violation of the imminent-risk requirement, since the rationale behind
the aggravating factor is just a state of mind. Moreover, many scholars criticize the vague wording of
these provisions, and of the very definition of terrorism now set forth by art. 270 sexies ICC. Finally,
strong reservations have been expressed about the compatibility of the special prison regime reserved
for terrorist suspects with the rehabilitative function that the sentence is supposed to play under art. 27
subs. 3 Constitution.
The greatest problems of compatibility with fundamental rights protected by the Constitution are
probably to be found in the already analyzed offence of glorification under art. 414 ICC. The obvious
risk connected with the application of this provision is that of unduly restricting the freedom of
thought protected by art. 21 of the Constitution.
Summarizing these and other criticisms, many authors have recently pointed out the risk of the Italian
criminal law system slipping towards a model, described by the German criminal lawyer Günther
Jakobs, of an ‘enemy criminal law’ (‘diritto penale del nemico’, Feindstrafrecht), concerned with
individuals who are identified not as ordinary criminals, but to all intents and purposes as enemies –
the practical implication being of course that enemies should not be ‘rehabilitated’, but just ‘neutralized’. Jakobs’ claim has generated a huge debate in Italy. While the terrorist-enemy model is generally
rejected, attitudes among Italian scholars differ on the possibility of adapting the guarantees and fundamental rights to the context of the fight against terrorism: while some would reaffirm in toto the
principles of ‘classic’ criminal law even in the case of terrorist-related crimes (thereby rejecting, for
example, the criminalization of merely preparatory acts and differing prison sentences), others are
more willing to accept a cautious relaxation of these principles with a view to protecting protect public
security against terrorism, while maintaining the basic guarantees of a ‘fair trial’ and a core of essential rights of the individual – including the right not to be subjected to torture and not to be deprived of
his freedom without judicial scrutiny.
The case law of the Italian Constitutional Court, for its part, has so far almost always upheld the special counter-terrorism laws (in the fields of substantive, prison and procedural criminal law), going so
far as to state – in a landmark decision of 1980 – that in emergency situations significant restrictions
of fundamental rights through special laws may be tolerated, provided that such situations are circumscribed in time and do not turn into a ‘never-ending’ emergency. As for the offence of glorification,
the Italian Constitutional Court has ruled – as we have seen above – that it is compatible with the
Constitution so long as it is applied to communications that are likely to provoke the commission of
crimes. Anyway, it currently seems quite unlikely that the Italian Constitutional Court would declare
any of the special laws examined above as being radically incompatible with the principles or fundamental rights enshrined in the Italian Constitution.
2. Requests of modification of the current legislation
Those who are most openly critical of the present criminal legislation against terrorism simply call for
the abolition of all special provisions and a return to the ordinary principles of criminal law, which
they believe sufficient to tackle even the terrorist threat; and, in parallel, they call for the abolition of
the special prison regime reserved for terrorists, criticizing for the most part also the concession provided to those persons who co-operate with the law.
While these criticisms occupy a considerable place in academic circles, they have very little influence
on the political and media debate, where, on the contrary, the need to strengthen as much as possible
the instruments to protect public security against the threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism prevails.
Following the last legislative intervention in July 2005, which introduced many of the measures analyzed in this paper, there have not been – to my knowledge – any specific calls for the current legislation in the field of substantive criminal law to be modified. Instead, there have been many demands
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for greater coordination of terrorism-related investigations, which are currently handled by 25 specialist district prosecution departments. This co-ordination could in fact be achieved through the creation
of a national anti-terrorism Prosecutor’s office, along the lines of the present anti-Mafia Prosecutor’s
office.
***
E) Final remarks
The wide criminalization of preparatory acts in the fight against serious forms of organized crime, and
in particular terrorism, raises basic questions on the role of criminal law. The reactive model characteristic of ‘classic’ criminal law, which intervenes ex post to sanction an offence already committed
which has harmed the primary interests of society, now appears to be in crisis; and a different, preventive model appears to have taken its place, whereby criminal law is required above all to prevent the
causation of harm, neutralizing the criminal before he can implement his plan.
The transition from the first to the second model is the subject of an intense debate all over the world
among criminal scholars, who not only observe this phenomenon, but also tend to heavily criticize it.
A criminal law that focuses on prevention must necessarily arm itself with instruments of investigation that intrude on the private sphere of individuals (interception of communications, undercover
agents, etc.), in order to acquire proof of preparatory acts still remote from the sphere of potential
victims; and it tends inevitably to attribute ever greater weight to the criminal intentions of the individual, rather than to the external actions that directly harm the interests of the victims. On the other
hand, the functions traditionally attributed to punishment are notably modified in the transition from
the first to the second model: the focus of the criminal intervention is no longer on deterrence (which
is assumed to be of little effect in the case of terrorists who are willing to sacrifice their lives), nor is it
on retribution for a harm (that has not yet been caused), nor even on the rehabilitation of the offender
(which it is assumed is in vain in the case of individuals who consider themselves to be at war with the
State that punishes them). The focus is here simply on the timely neutralization of dangerous individuals - who must above all be prevented from harming society. In this perspective, a fundamental
role is attributed, not so much to the penalty, as to the pre-trial custody, which from a mere instrument
serving the needs of the trial tends to become the true outpost of the protection of society against dangerous individuals.
The understandable concerns expressed by criminal law scholars, however, are very unlikely to prevent the progressive slide of the criminal justice system from a reactive to a proactive model. The
protection of public security – which is increasingly emphasized as a fundamental right of citizens –
tends by its very nature towards this result, since it appears unreasonable to public opinion and politicians to wait until a criminal attack has commenced before intervening with criminal law enforcement, as the traditional law of criminal attempt would require. People undoubtedly expect that a terrorist attack be prevented as far as possible, even at cost of to restraining the personal freedom of its
(possible) perpetrators well before the event, through the criminalization of mere preparatory acts
and/or the participation in a terrorist organization.
One ought not to forget, on the other hand, that criminal law is an instrument that provides many more
guarantees than other imaginable alternative instruments of a preventive nature. A person detained
because he is alleged to have committed an offence (even if only a preparatory act) has in the Italian
legal system, from the very beginning of his detention, the right to be informed of the charge and of
the sources of evidence against him, and is able to exercise his right to defend himself before a judge
against the charge within a few days from his arrest; and later, he will have a fair opportunity to be
tried, within a reasonable period of time, according to procedural rules compatible with art. 6 of the
European Convention of Human Rights. These guarantees are completely absent in the opposite
model of administrative detention of suspects for an indefinite period, adopted by the Bush administration in the context of their ‘war on terror’ launched in the wake of September 11. Defending the
role of criminal law and criminal justice in the fight against terrorism, even at cost of accepting some
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significant deviations from the ‘classical’ model, means therefore defending some basic rights of the
accused, and in general of all whose personal freedom is restricted by State agencies. A preventionbased model of criminal law is likely to be, in the present situation, the best possible compromise with
a view both to satisfying the need to protect public security and, at the same time, maintaining a core
of individual rights and guarantees.
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Soichiro SHIMADA
1. Individuation of the manifestations of the phenomenon of globalization at an internal penal level.
Globalization has had tremendous influences on internal criminal legislation of Japan.
In recent years, the Penal Code of Japan (1907) has been revised multiple times to keep pace with the
phenomenon of globalization. The following examples illustrate this.
In 2001, the Penal Code was revised to make the possession and creation of forged credit cards a punishable offence. The act of preparing for creating forged credit cards is also a punishable offence.
In 2003, the rules on the application of criminal law to offences committed abroad were revised; since
then, the Japanese criminal law can be applied to some serious offences committed abroad when the
victims are Japanese.
Since 2005, the Penal Code punishes human trafficking. This revision is the implementing legislation
of the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.”
Further, recently, “the Act on the Transfer of Profits from a Crime” was legislated on 29.3.2007.
system.
2.1. Preparatory acts:
2.1.1. Limits with reference to attempt.
The Penal Code of Japan contains no definition of the limits of the attempt. According to the decisions
of criminal courts, the imminent danger of the accomplishment of the attempted crime must be recognized. An attempt is punishable only when specifically so provided in the article concerned. However,
there are many provisions that punish attempts. Not only attempts of serious offences but of minor
crimes, such as “breaking into a residence, ” are punishable.
2.1.2. Punishable preparatory acts (and/or conspiracy?).
2.1.3. Field of applicability (general / specific for certain offences).
Punishing preparatory acts is exceptional. Preparatory acts are punishable only when specifically so
provided and the Penal Code lists only 10 very serious offences that punish preparatory acts, such as
homicide, robbery, and arson of inhabited building. Many offences, such as rape, theft, blackmail,
etc., which have provisions for punishing their attempts, do not have provisions for punishing their
preparatory acts. Moreover, only those acts that come very close to being attempts have been prosecuted, although the Penal Code does not stipulate any explicit limitation on punishable preparatory
acts.
However, some acts punish conducts that are substantially correspondent with preparatory acts. For
example, the possession, transfer, or import of firearms or swords (Act against the Illegal Possession
*
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Preparatory Colloquium A Coruña (España), September 2007
Japan
of Firearms and Swords), the possession, transfer, import of chemical weapons (Act against Chemical
Weapons), or even the possession of tools for picking (Act against the Illegal Possession of Picking
Tools).
2.1.4. Applicable punishments: a comparison with the punishments applicable to the Offences committed.
Punishments applicable to preparatory acts are considerably less severe than those applicable to offences committed. For example, the prescribed punishment for the preparation of homicide is imprisonment with labor for not more than 2 years, and there is even a room for exemption from the sentence; the prescribed punishment for the act of homicide, on the other hand, is death penalty, life imprisonment with labor, or imprisonment with labor for not less than 5 years.
However, the prescribed punishment for the possession of dangerous objects is considerably more
severe than that for the preparation of such objects. For example, the possession of pistols is punished
through imprisonment with labor from 1 year to 10 years, and the possession of swords is punished
with imprisonment with labor for not more than 3 years or with a fine of less than 50, 000 yen.
2.2. Participation:
2.2.1. Treatment of the acting in concert of individuals in the commission of the offence (categories of
the criminal, instigation, cooperation, complicity...)
.2.2.2. Regulation and sanction of the acts of participation.
The Penal Code classifies participants of crime into three types: principals, instigators, and accessories. According to the decisions of the criminal courts, conspirators who do not execute the actus reus
of crimes itself can be punished as co-principals, when they actively participate in the offences with
the intent of pursuing their interests (conspirator-principals theory). Based on this theory, most of the
prosecuted participants are punished as principals (according to the statistics of the judicial office, 97–
98％).
This conspirator-principal theory differs from that of Anglo-American legal system in one very important aspect. In Japan, a conspirator can be punished only when the punishable act has been executed.
Principals and instigators are to be punished according to the prescribed punishment for each crime.
However, the punishment of accessories must be reduced according to §68. For example, when an
accessory were to be sentenced to a death penalty if he or she were a principal, then he or she would
have to be punished by imprisonment with or without labor either for life or for a definite term of not
less than 10 years. When life imprisonment with or without labor is to be reduced, it shall be reduced
to imprisonment with or without labor for a definite term of not less than 7 years. When imprisonment
with or without labor for a definite term is to be reduced, its maximum and minimum terms of punishment shall be reduced by one-half of the original punishment.
3.1. Does it exist, in your juridical regulations, explicit prescriptive definitions of ≪terrorism≪ and of
“The Act on Prohibiting the Financing of Offenders who have the Intent of Threatening the Public”
contains a definition of “the offences with the intent of threatening the public.”
These include very serious offences such as homicide, serious injury, kidnapping, taking victims as
hostages, capsizing ships, crashing airplanes, and setting fire to trains, public facilities, or houses with
the intent of threatening the public, the Government, or foreign governments.
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The definition of “organized crime” is provided in “the Act on Punishing Organized Crimes and Forfeiture Profits of Crime, ” which was established as the implementing legislation of “United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.”
“Subversive organization” has been defined in “the Subversive Activities Prevention Law” (1952),
which was applied, for example, to the cult group Aum Shinrikiyo. This definition, however, is not
harmonized with the internationally established one. A subversive organization is defined as one that
has executed subversive acts as part of the activities of the organization and adheres to the belief that
society shall be altered by using violence.
§3 of “the Act on Punishing Organized Crimes and Forfeiture Profits of Crime” aggravates serious
offences which are carried out as activities of the organization and by the group established to execute
such offences. This offence requires no specific intent.
“The Subversive Activities Prevention Law” punishes the preparation and incitation of arson (imprisonment with or without labor for not more than 5 years) and of disturbance and traffic endangerment
(imprisonment with or without labor for not more than 3 years). These offences are punishable only
when they are executed with political intent. This Act also incriminates all activities that are viewed as
being profitable for the subversive organization when it has been ordered to be dispersed (imprisonment with labor for not more than 3 years or a fine of not more than 50, 000 yen). This offence requires, as a typical crime, only the recognition of the actus reus; that is, it does not require a specific
intent.
As already mentioned in A) 3.2, 33, the “Subversive Activities Prevention Law” punishes some preparatory acts. A bill, which recommends an amendment to “the Act on the Punishment of Organized
Crime and the Forfeiture Profits of Crime, ” is being discussed in the Diet since 2003. This amendment punishes the conspiracy of many offences (See D3).
The possession of explosive substances or dangerous weapons and preparing falsified documents are
prohibited and indicted frequently. Whether terrorists commit these crimes is irrelevant. However, as
far as it has been known, the prohibition of activities profitable for subversive organizations (see A)
3.3) has never been applied.
exist?
There are no special regulations for the preparation and for the accessories of such offences.
However, attempts at committing some offences, which have the same function as the preparatory acts
(such as the possession of firearms or swords), are punished and the regulations of the Penal Code on
accessories can be applied to such offences.
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one of these preparatory acts (for example, recruitment) and also for the commission of one of the
offences representing the final aim (for example, commission of an act of terrorism)? And, possibly,
also for the offence of association or participation in a terrorist or criminal group pursuing the same
aim (infra, B.3)?
In many cases, the same individual has been punished both for the commission of the preparatory act,
such as the possession of firearms or making explosive substances, and for offences representing the
final aim, such as homicide. Association or participation in a terrorist or criminal group by itself is not
punishable in Japan.
common offences?
There are no special regulations on them.
As mentioned earlier in A) 3.2, 33, “the Subversive Activities Prevention Law” punishes the mere
incitement of arson and of disturbance and traffic endangerment with political intent, and “the Decree
to Prohibit the Possession and Use of Explosive Substances” (1884) punishes the incitement of and
agreement to using explosive substances with the intent of disturbing law and order, or of causing
injury, or of destruction. The prescribed punishment is imprisonment with or without labor from 3 to
10 years.
There are no such rules.
≪external≪ help (on the part of non-associated individuals or through adequate social contributions,
for example, on the part of a lawyer, a doctor...) to the activities and associations constituting very
serious crime, or to individual associated?
“The Act on Financing the Offenders with the Intent of Threatening the Public” punishes the act of
knowingly providing money to the offenders who intend to threaten the public (See A) 3). Further, the
ordinary rules of participation can be applied to such offences.
3. Is there a separate offence for terrorist association or organization or group, or for an organization
addicted to very serious crime, with respect to the conspiracy or mere complicity in such crimes? Or
are common offences (if the case, aggravated) for criminal association applied?
terms by the law?
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The Japanese judicial system does not include any offences with regard to organizing or participating
in criminal association.
Legal persons are subject to punishment only when there are special provisions for “dual punishment,
” which punish not only representatives or employees of the legal persons but also legal persons themselves. There is no provision, however, that is applicable to the commission of acts of terrorism or to
the offences provided in the Penal Code (homicide, arson, etc.).
commit such acts?
punished?
There has been no such indictment. Only the act of instigating someone to commit acts of terrorism is
punished.
As mentioned in A) 2.2.1, the Penal Code classifies participants in crime into three types, and the
punishment for the accessories in the offence must be reduced. The reason for this reduction is that the
accessories do not play important roles in the offence. Except this rule, however, awarding the sentence is left to the discretion of the judges.
According to the judgments of criminal courts, the provision for withdrawal from attempts cannot be
applied to withdrawal from preparation. It can be considered only within the framework of the discretion of the judge. On the contrary, the judgments of criminal courts adopt the theory of “withdrawal
from complicity.” According to this theory, a conspirator who withdraws from the intended crime by
extinguishing his or her distribution is not to be punished when the crime is committed later. Compen-
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sation and reconciliation with the victims are to be considered only within the framework of the discretion of the judge; usually, however, they are important factors in the sentencing.
There are no such peculiarities.
C) Other questions
There is “the Act on Controlling Organizations which have Executed Indiscriminate Homicide.” This
act does not have criminal but administrative nature and is applicable to organizations that have executed indiscriminate homicide to which the “Subversive Activities Prevention Law” can be applied
and is still capable of executing it.
The Public Safety Commission can order such organizations to be under control and observation for
not more than 3 years (this duration can be renewed, if necessary). When this order comes into effect,
the organization must report inside information to the Public Safety Commission every three months
and can be prohibited from undertaking some activities that are profitable for the organization.
If non-nationals have committed a crime in Japan, they are forcibly deported according to “the Act on
the Control of Immigration” after the sentence is executed.
In the judicial system of Japan, victims generally do not play an important role. They are not competent to prosecute. At the trial, they are treated at an almost equal level with the other witnesses. However, they have the option of observing the trial and are given the competence to express their opinions on their suffering (Criminal Procedure Law §292-2). Their opinions cannot be treated as evidence
at the fact-finding process; nevertheless, it can be taken into consideration in the sentencing.
The reform proposal of the Criminal Law Council has been offered, and the bill to reinforce the right
of victims at the trial is being discussed in the Diet.
However, even this reform proposal does not allow them the right to prosecute.
D) Reform proposals
The bill that amends “the Act on the Punishment of Organized Crime and the Forfeiture Profits of
Crime” to punish conspiracy in many offences is being discussed in the Diet since 2003. The Japan
Federation of Bar Association and some scholars of criminal law object to this bill. They insist that
punishing conspiracy is incompatible with the Japanese judicial system and threatens the freedom of
thought and conscience guaranteed by §19 of the Japanese Constitution. Due to such a situation, this
bill has not yet been passed, though it has been discussed over a long period. It has been revised numerous times and the number of offences to which conspiracy is applicable has decreased during the
deliberation.
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Two very important legislative reforms have now been highlighted and are being discussed in the
Diet.
One is “the Act against Causing Danger to Human Life, Health, or Property with Nuclear Materials.”
This Statute has been established as part of implementing legislation under the international treaty on
the prohibiting of terrorism with nuclear materials.
It punishes the use of nuclear materials, possessing them with the intent to use them, and threatening
with an announcement to use or steal nuclear materials. This bill has already been passed through the
House of Council and will probably have been passed in this session.
The other is the amendment of “the Act on the Punishment of Organized Crime and the Forfeiture
Profits of Crime” to punish conspiracy. According to the first bill, which was drafted by the Ministry
of Justice, the conspiracy of the offences must be executed as an activity of the organization and the
offence committed must have the prescribed punishment whose upper limit is imprisonment with or
without labor for more than 4 years (when the upper limit of prescribed punishment of the offences
committed is not more than 10 years, the punishment of the conspiracy is imprisonment with or without labor for not more than 2 years, and when the upper limit is higher, the prescribed punishment for
conspiracy is imprisonment with or without labor for not more than 5 years).
Nevertheless, this bill was criticized severely on the following two grounds.
1. The offences to which the provision of conspiracy can be applied amount to more than 600. This
implies the abandonment of the principle that the punishment for the preparation must be exceptional.
2. The definition of “organization” is so vague that it can be used to repress political activities.
The government party (Liberal Democratic Party) has accepted these criticisms and has amended
the original bill several times. The latest version of the bill imposes some restrictions.
1. The offences to which the provision of the conspiracy is applicable are limited. In general, they
must have the prescribed punishment, the upper limit of which is imprisonment with or without labor
for more than 5 years. In addition, there are some exceptional offences, which explicitly state that the
provision of the conspiracy is applicable.
2. Instead of the word “organization” that can be interpreted to include labor organizations or citizens’
organizations, the term “criminal organization” is used. This is defined as an organization that has the
purpose of executing such serious crimes as the basis of its unity.
3. The conspiracy is punishable only when it is executed as the activity of the organization. The meaning of “as the activity” is defined explicitly in the provision. It implies that the conspiracy must be
based on the decision of the organization and the result and profit of the conspired crime must revert
to the organization.
4. An overt act is required.
5. There is a provision, which gives a warning by the application of the provision of conspiracy, to be
careful and conscious of the freedom of the association and other basic rights of people and to refrain
from disturbing the activities of legal organizations, such as labor organizations.
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NETHERLANDS*
M.M. DOLMAN**
A. General questions
1. Individuation of the manifestations of the phenomenon of globalization at an internal penal level
This report discusses the ways in which Dutch criminal law has responded to developments which
may be seen as aspects of ‘globalization’. ‘Globalization’ is not a legal term; in fact, it may be used to
denote several distinct, but sometimes interrelated phenomena. As these phenomena may call for legal
– as opposed to political or military – responses, they will be the focus of these introductory remarks.
‘Globalization’ may be loosely defined as the world’s getting smaller. Ultimately, this process may be
explained from developments in human communication. As information travels around the world
more freely, people become more readily – and acutely – aware of events taking place on the other
side of the world. Traditional means of communication like print, radio and television are fast becoming superseded by decentralized means of communication made possible by the internet and wireless
telephone networks. In addition, people are finding it ever easier to act on their newly acquired
knowledge, by traveling to places they only heard about in the past. As a consequence, global migration has taken on proportions hitherto inconceivable.
As criminal justice traditionally has been organized along the lines of nation states, these developments may call for specific legal responses. On the one hand, so-called organized crime may use the
opportunities provided by increased mobility of persons, goods and capital by increasing the scale of
its operations, notably where states have failed to take account of the international aspects of crimes
taking place on their territory. Economies of scale also apply to criminal activity. In addition, globalization may offer new opportunities to criminals willing to exploit the fact that globalization has made
existing economic inequalities all the more visible.
On the other hand, developments in communication have profoundly altered the nature of political
debate, which is ever more often conducted on a global plane. The threat of terrorism makes it painfully clear that disaffected groups may take their grievances anywhere they want to, striking at the
heart of their perceived enemies and gaining maximum exposure in doing so. Terrorism has taken on
global dimensions not only because of the motives behind it, but also because terrorist groups often
find ready support outside their countries of origin, in that they are able to draw on the disaffectations
of minorities elsewhere.
As neither organized crime nor terrorism ordinarily falls within the scope of international crimes as
these have been defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, they must ultimately be
addressed at the national level. The legal responses to these phenomena must, however, take account
of their global nature. In part this may be achieved through international judicial cooperation, although
this is largely geared towards enabling states to enforce their domestic laws. In addition, harmonization of substantive criminal law may be called for, which would create uniform conditions for the
repression of crimes irrespective of the locale of their commission.
*
**
Dr. M.M. Dolman is lecturer in criminal law at the Universiteit van Amsterdam.
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system
2.1.1. Limits with reference to attempt
Attempt: general provisions
Title IV (Articles 45-46b Sr) of the Dutch Penal Code concerns attempt and preparation. Its provisions
1
read (my translation) :
2
(Art. 45) 1. An attempt to commit a crime is punishable where the perpetrator manifests his intention
by initiating the crime.
2. In case of attempt, the maximum penalty prescribed for the crime is reduced by one third.
3. In case of a crime carrying a sentence of life imprisonment, a term of imprisonment of not more
than twenty years shall be imposed.
4. The additional penalties for the attempt are as for the completed crime.
3
(Art. 46) 1. Preparation to commit a crime which, by statutory definition, carries a term of imprisonment of not less than eight years, is punishable, where the perpetrator intentionally obtains, manufactures, imports, transits, exports or has at his disposal, objects, substances, information carriers, spaces
or means of transport intended for the commission of the crime.
2. In case of preparation, the maximum principal penalty prescribed for the crime is reduced by one
half.
3. In case of crimes carrying a sentence of life imprisonment, a term of imprisonment of not more than
fifteen years shall be imposed.
4. The additional penalties for preparation are as for the completed crime.
5. Objects are understood to comprise all tangible objects and all property rights.
4
(Art. 46a) An attempt to induce another to commit a crime by employing one of the means listed in
Article 47, paragraph 1(2), is punishable, provided that the sentence imposed shall not be more severe
1
In 1997 an integral translation of the Dutch Penal Code was published in the American series of foreign penal
codes: Louise Rayar & Stafford Wadsworth, The Dutch penal code, Littleton, CO: Rothman 1997. I have used
this translation, although I have not followed it strictly. Firstly, a revision of the translation was made necessary
by subsequent revisions of the Penal Code. Secondly, I take issue with the translation on some terminological
matters. Needless to say, I am fully responsible for any defects in the translations included in the text.
2
Original Dutch: (Art. 45) 1. Poging tot misdrijf is strafbaar, wanneer het voornemen van de dader zich door een
begin van uitvoering heeft geopenbaard. 2. Het maximum van de hoofdstraffen op het misdrijf gesteld wordt bij
poging met een derde verminderd. 3. Geldt het een misdrijf waarop levenslange gevangenisstraf is gesteld, dan
wordt gevangenisstraf opgelegd van ten hoogste twintig jaren. 4. De bijkomende straffen zijn voor poging
dezelfde als voor het voltooide misdrijf.
3
Original Dutch: (Art. 46) 1. Voorbereiding van een misdrijf waarop naar de wettelijke omschrijving een gevangenisstraf van acht jaren of meer is gesteld is strafbaar, wanneer de dader opzettelijk voorwerpen, stoffen, informatiedragers, ruimten of vervoermiddelen bestemd tot het begaan van dat misdrijf verwerft, vervaardigt, invoert,
doorvoert, uitvoert of voorhanden heeft. 2. Het maximum van de hoofdstraffen op het misdrijf gesteld wordt bij
voorbereiding met de helft verminderd. 3. Geldt het een misdrijf waarop levenslange gevangenisstraf is gesteld,
dan wordt gevangenisstraf opgelegd van ten hoogste vijftien jaren. 4. De bijkomende straffen zijn voor voorbereiding dezelfde als voor het voltooide misdrijf. 5. Onder voorwerpen worden verstaan alle zaken en alle vermogensrechten.
4
Original Dutch: (Art. 46a) Poging om een ander door een der in artikel 47, eerste lid onder 2e, vermelde middelen te bewegen om een misdrijf te begaan, is strafbaar, met dien verstande dat geen zwaardere straf wordt
uitgesproken dan ter zake van poging tot het misdrijf of, indien zodanige poging niet strafbaar is, terzake van het
misdrijf zelf kan worden opgelegd.
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than that which may be imposed for an attempt to commit the crime, or, where such attempt is not
punishable, for committing the offence.
5
(Art. 46b) Neither preparation nor an attempt to commit a crime obtains where the crime has not
been completed by reason only of circumstances dependent on the perpetrator’s will.
In Dutch law, an attempt exists if two requirements are satisfied: intent and initiation. An attempt only
amounts to a punishable offence if the perpetrator acted intentionally: his acts must prove his intention
to commit a crime. Intent consists of an cognitive and a volitive element: a person is said to have acted
with intent if he acted knowingly and willingly. In this respect, two remarks have to be made. Firstly,
several grades of intent are distinguished, the highest grade being premeditation and the lowest dolus
eventualis. For the purposes of Article 45 this means that in principle – unless the appropriate statutory definition requires a specific form of intent – the perpetrator at least must have accepted the con6
siderable risk of committing an offence. Secondly, intent may be inferred from a person’s acts: if an
7
act can only be committed intentionally, a person is said to have acted with intent.
A crime is initiated if the perpetrator’s acts, viewed by their outward appearance, are geared towards
8
completion of the crime. The question whether the perpetrator’s acts were in fact geared towards
completion of the crime he intended must be answered with regard to the statutory definition of the
9
crime: are the perpetrator’s acts characteristic for the completed crime? In this respect, a distinction
must be made between formal and material definitions. Materially defined crimes – causing an occurrence in any which way – are initiated if and when that occurrence would have taken place without
further steps on the part of the perpetrator. Manslaughter for instance is attempted if and when as a
consequence of the perpetrator’s actions the victim’s death would ordinarily ensue; it is immaterial by
10
which means the perpetrator has sought to bring about the intended victim’s death. Formally defined
crimes – mere acts, irrespective of their consequences – on the other hand are initiated once the perpetrator commences the act. Theft for example is defined as unlawfully taking another person’s goods
without his consent, so the crime of theft is attempted once the perpetrator has commenced to take
possession of another person’s goods. It follows that where the appropriate statutory definition doesn’t
11
require additional circumstances there is little or no room for attempt , as the crime is completed by
12
the mere act . Where, on the other hand, additional circumstances are required, such circumstances
13
may constitute initiation notwithstanding that the perpetrator hasn’t yet commenced the central act.
5
Original Dutch: (Art. 46b) Voorbereiding noch poging bestaat indien het misdrijf niet is voltooid tengevolge
van omstandigheden van de wil van de dader afhankelijk.
6
HR 17 December 1996, NJ 1997, 245.
7
HR 6 February 1951, NJ 1952, 474; HR 21 November 2000, NJ 2001, 160. Recent case law, however, seems to
show greater reluctance in this respect: HR 10 October 2000, NJ 2001, 4; HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552; HR
24 June 2003, NJ 2003, 555; HR 18 January 2005, NJ 2005, 154; HR 6 September 2005, NJ 2006, 50.
8
HR 24 October 1978, NJ 1979, 52; HR 8 September 1987, NJ 1988, 612.
9
HR 24 March 1992, NJ 1992, 815; HR 14 December 1993, NJ 1994, 293.
10
HR 1 July 1996, NJ 1997, 427.
11
As is demonstrated by case law on theft, which is completed by taking goods from the victim’s dominion.
Consequently, the thief need not be in full possession; if he is apprehended whilst leaving the scene of the crime,
he is guilty of theft, not merely attempted theft. See for example HR 11 January 2000, NJ 2000, 588.
12
That is, unless the wording of the statutory definition may be stretched to encompass acts which take place over
a longer period of time. Such interpretation is especially prevalent as regards contraventions of the Opium act; the
act of exporting drugs isn’t limited to taking them across the border, but encompasses the whole smuggling operation, starting when the smuggler takes care of the drugs and ending when he delivers them. See for example 13
December 1994, NJ 1995, 252.
13
Whereas simple theft is only attempted if and when the perpetrator makes to take away something, burglary is
attempted once the perpetrator tries to gain access to the goods he intends to steal; see HR 20 June 1920, NJ
1920, p. 807; HR 22 June 1999, NJ 1999, 636.
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In judging the perpetrator’s acts, one must assume the viewpoint of an objective bystander, albeit one
14
who is in possession of all relevant facts, not only those which are visible from the outside. As a
consequence of this approach, the distinction between the requirements of intent and initiation becomes blurred: acts which are ostensibly geared towards the completion of a crime carry the implica15
tion that the perpetrator intended to commit it.
As the focus on outward appearances in modern doctrine derives from the fact that an attempt carries
the risk of the intended crime being completed, the reason why it wasn’t completed is of special relevance. An attempt might fail because of the inadequacy of the means the perpetrator used or because
of its object, but such inadequacies do not necessarily imply that no risk existed of the intended crime
16
being completed. In this respect, a distinction is made between relative and absolute inadequacy :
17
attempt is punishable only where the means used ordinarily are suited for their purpose , and the
18
19
crime may in fact be committed with respect to its intended object . If either the means or the ob20
ject is wholly unsuited, an attempt isn’t punishable.
As the criminality of attempt and preparation derives from the risk of the intended crime being completed, Article 46b Sr provides that neither preparation nor an attempt to commit a crime obtains
where the crime has not been completed by reason only of circumstances dependent on the perpetrator’s will. In that event no punishable offence has been committed, either by the person who prepared
21
it or attempted to commit it or by persons who participated in its commission.
Involuntary non-completion is not an element of punishable attempt or preparation, but an exception
to the perpetrator’s liability. Consequently, the prosecution need not prove that the defendant ceased
execution of his criminal plans involuntarily; it is up to the defendant to adduce evidence which makes
his defense of voluntary non-completion credible.
It follows from the nature of the exception that the perpetrator’s decision not to follow through is
relevant only where the crime has not yet been completed. Whether this is in fact the case depends on
the statutory definition of the crime; a person who induced another to commit an crime has to convince that person not to attempt it. Non-completion however presupposes attempt or preparation: the
exception only applies to cases in which the perpetrator ceases execution of his criminal plans. Consequently, the perpetrator is liable if he has followed through, but the intended crime isn’t completed
22
because of circumstances over which he had no control.
14
HR 20 June 1989, NJ 1990, 33; HR 2 December 1992, NJ 1993, 321.
See HR 2 November 2004, NJ 2005, 275.
16
H.J. Smidt, Geschiedenis van het Wetboek van Strafrecht: volledige verzameling van regeeringsontwerpen,
gewisselde stukken, gevoerde beraadslagingen, enz. (bew. J.W. Smidt & E.A. Smidt), Zwolle: H.D. Tjeenk Willink 1891-1901, I, p. 426, 429.
17
See for examples HR 29 March 1949, NJ 1949, 422 (administering an insufficient dose of arsenic); HR 8 December 1993, NJ 1993, 321 (intended victim of deception was not in fact deceived); HR 7 October 2003, JOL
2003, 503 (use of an incorrect PIN in bank fraud).
18
See for examples HR 20 December 1870, W. 3281 (theft from an empty poor box); HR 31 August 1931, NJ
1932, p. 1255 (theft from an empty cash register).
19
See for example HR 7 May 1906, W. 8372: administration of a foul but innocuous concoction does not amount
to attempted murder.
20
See for example HR 17 March 1987, NJ 1988, 166: the intended murder victim dying from causes unrelated to
the perpetrator’s actions does not make him an unsuitable object; it does, however, prevent the intended murder
from being completed.
21
Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 22 268, nr. 3, p. 4, 20, with reference to Article 50 Sr: non-completion of the offence
is not a personal circumstance excluding criminal liability.
22
HR 7 May 1946, NJ 1946, 587; HR 24 June 1969, NJ 1970, 28; HR 4 April 1978, NJ 1979, 24; HR 19 April
1983, NJ 1983, 573.
15
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Attempt: special provisions
Article 79 Sr provides that an attempt as specified in Articles 92-94 (attempt against state security),
108 (attempt on the life or liberty of the King, the King’s consort, the heir apparent or the spouse of
the latter), 115 (attempt on the life or liberty of the head of a friendly nation) and 117 Sr (attempt on
the life or liberty of an internationally protected person) occurs where the perpetrator manifests his
23
intention to commit an offence by initiating it within the meaning of Article 45 Sr. Because such
attempts are defined as crimes per se the provisions of Articles 45(2, 3) and 46b Sr do not apply: as
the crime is completed once is has been initiated, the cause of its non-completion is irrelevant.
2.1.2. Punishable preparatory acts (and/or conspiracy)
Preparation: general provisions
Preparation may be loosely defined as the run-up to initiation of the intended crime; it ends where the
intended crime is attempted. Preparation of serious crimes was criminalized in 1994, specifically in
24
order to combat organized crime. As preparatory acts which didn’t amount to punishable attempt as
a rule were not punishable at all, the police was forced to wait until the intended crime had been initiated in the sense of Article 45. And although the completion of a crime may still be some way off
25
once it is initiated, in practice waiting for initiation often posed an unacceptable risk. In such cases,
the police let public safety prevail, by disturbing the criminals’ plans prematurely, i.e. before the in26
tended crime had been initiated. Because in that event the criminal got off scot-free, preparation of
the most serious crimes was criminalized.
Because preparation precedes attempt – i.e. an act which by its outward appearance is geared towards
completion of the intended crime – the criminal character of preparatory acts isn’t necessarily evident.
In order to maintain a semblance of legality, several restrictions applied which precluded innocent
everyday activities from being criminalized. According to its statutory definition, the prepared crime
had to carry a term of imprisonment of at least eight years, the perpetrator had to act intentionally and
his acts had to be obviously intended for the joint commission of that crime. Furthermore, preparatory
acts were defined as obtaining, importing, transiting, exporting or having at one’s disposal objects,
substances, information carriers, spaces or means of transport.
The requirement that a crime must carry a minimum prison term of eight years in order for its preparation to be punishable limits the application of the general provision of Article 46 to the most serious
27
crimes. In general, preparation would only be punishable in respect of crimes against state security ,
28
crimes against royal dignity , crimes against heads of friendly states and other internationally pro29
30
tected persons , crimes concerning the exercise of civic rights and obligations , crimes against pub23
In English, the Dutch terms ‘poging’ (Article 45 Sr) and ‘aanslag’ (Article 79) are both translated as: attempt.
Act of 27 January 1994, Stb. 1994, 60, which entered into force on 1 April 1994.
25
HR 8 September 1987, NJ 1988, 612, being a case in point. In this case, two persons – both wearing wigs and
two sets of clothes – were sitting in a stolen car with false licence plates, opposite a bank, with the engine running. In addition, they were in possession of fire arms and materials which might be used to shackle someone.
According to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal had rightly judged that no robbery had been attempted, as
the defendants hadn’t left the car. In view of the fact that they had undertaken what looked like a dress rehearsal
before, there was no way of telling what they would have done in the present instance.
26
Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 22 268, nr. 3, p. 7, 10.
27
Articles 92-95a, 97(1), 98, 98a(1, 2), 99, 100, 101, 102, 103 and 105 Sr. It should, however, be noted that
Articles 96(2) and 97(2) Sr contain specific provisions in respect of preparation of crimes against state security,
whereas Articles 97a, 97b and 98a(3) Sr define preparatory acts as crimes per se.
28
Articles 108, 114a and 114b(1) Sr. It should, however, be noted that according to Article 114b(2), Article 96(2)
Sr also applies to the crime defined in Article 114b(1).
29
Articles 115, 117, 117b, 120a and 120b(1) Sr. It should, however, be noted that according to Article 120b(2),
Article 96(2) Sr also applies to the crime defined in Article 120b(1).
24
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31
32
lic order , crimes endangering the general safety of persons or property , crimes against public au33
34
35
36
37
38
thority , perjury , counterfeiting , forgery , crimes against public morals , abandonment ,
39
40
41
42
43
crimes against personal liberty , capital crimes , abortion , causing bodily harm , theft , extor44
45
46
tion , official misconduct and crimes against the safety of shipping and aviation .
The requirement of intent governs all elements of the statutory definition of preparation to which it
applies grammatically. Consequently, preparation is only conceivable with respect to crimes whose
47
statutory definitions contain that subjective element. Ordinarily, dolus eventualis would suffice , but
as the perpetrator’s plans still have to come to fruition, ‘purpose’ would be a more appropriate term.
The definition of preparatory acts isn’t really restrictive, as just about any act which is instrumental to
the commission of a crime is covered by it. In practice, only the term ‘objects’ appeared to be too
48
narrow, as it is commonly understood to refer to tangible objects only. Because of the definition of
49
‘funds’ in the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism – which extends to
property rights – section (5) was included in 2002, making the term ‘monies or other means of pay-
30
Articles 121, 121a, 122b(1), 123 and 124 Sr. It should, however, be noted that according to Article 122b(2),
Article 96(2) Sr also applies to Article 122b(1).
31
Articles 140(3) and 140a Sr.
32
Articles 157, 161(2°, 3°), 161bis(3°, 4°), 161quater, 161sexies(3°, 4°), 162, 162a, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172(1),
173a, 174 and 176b(1) Sr. It should, however, be noted that according to Article 176b(2), Article 92(2) Sr also
applies to conspiracy with terrorist intent to the crimes defined in Articles 157, 161, 161bis, 161quater, 161sexies,
162, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172, 173a and 174. See Article 83a Sr for the definition of terrorist intent.
33
Articles 178(2), 181(3°), 182(2[2°, 3°]) and 197a(4, 5, 6) Sr.
34
Articles 207(2), 207a and 207b Sr.
35
Articles 208 and 209 Sr.
36
Article 225(3) Sr.
37
Articles 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248 and 252(3) Sr.
38
Articles 257(2) and 258 Sr.
39
Articles 273a(3, 4, 5, 6), 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 281(2 [2°]), 282, 282a, 282b and 282c(1) Sr. It should, however be noted that according to Article 282c(2), Article 96(2) also applies conspiracy to the taking of hostages
with terrorist intent.
40
Articles 287, 288, 288a, 289, 289a(1), 291 and 293 Sr. It should, however, be noted that according to Article
289(2), Article 96(2) Sr also applies to conspiracy to murder with terrorist intent.
41
Article 296(3, 4) Sr.
42
Articles 301(3), 302, 303, 304a and 304b(1) Sr. It should, however, be noted that according to Article 304b(2),
Article 96(2) Sr also applies to conspiracy to cause bodily harm with terrorist intent.
43
Articles 311(2) and 312 Sr.
44
Article 316 Sr.
45
Article 358(2), 364 and 384a(3) Sr.
46
Articles 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 485a, 385b, 385d, 395(2[3°]), 396(2[2°, 3°]), 415a and 415b(1) Sr. It should
be noted, however, that according to Article 415b(2), Article 96(2) Sr also applies conspiracy to the crimes defined in Articles 385a, 385b and 385d with terrorist intent.
47
Kamerstukken II 1990/01, 22 268, nr. 3, p. 15-16.
48
See Article 3:2 BW. Because of this private law definition, the Penal Code contains a number of provisions
which extend the definition of the term ‘object’ in order to cover intangible rights; see for example Article 33a(4)
Sr.
49
New York, 9 December 1999, Trb. 2000, 12. In Article 1(1) of the Convention, the term ‘funds’ is defined as:
assets of any kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets,
including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities,
bonds, drafts, letters of credit.
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50
ment’ in section (1) superfluous . The term ‘having at one’s disposal’ gave rise to the question
whether actual, physical possession is required. Although this has been argued by some commentators, the question is answered in the negative in the parliamentary histories of the 1994 and 2002
51
acts.
In order not to criminalize innocent everyday activities, preparatory acts were required to be obviously
intended for the joint commission of a crime. Whether such obvious intent was present had to be
judged objectively; the average observer would have to come to the conclusion that a criminal enter52
prise was being embarked upon. This approach – which was in keeping with the doctrine on attempt
53
– was confirmed by the case law, which required concrete evidence of a crime being intended. Consequently, mere intent was insufficient; the intent to commit a crime could only be said to be present
where the perpetrator’s actions carried the real risk of the intended crime being committed.
In a recent terrorism case, the Court of Appeal was not satisfied that the perpetrator’s actions did carry
the real risk of the intended crime being committed. In the Court’s opinion, the perpetrator’s intent has
to be judged in conjunction with the nature of the means he has at his disposal. Therefore, the fact that
they might in abstract be of use in the commission of a crime isn’t decisive; what is paramount is their
actual importance in the perpetrator’s plans and – consequently – whether they represent a real risk.
For that reason the Court – although it had no doubts as to the defendant’s terrorist intentions – came
to the conclusion that no crime had been prepared: the defendant’s plans hadn’t moved beyond the
embryonic stage and his preparations were so primitive and clumsy that they posed no real risk for the
54
foreseeable future.
Because the perpetrator’s intent had to be judged in conjunction with the means he had at his disposal,
it needed to be established that he intended to use them according to their obvious purpose. Actual
intent was required, not just the possibility that a crime was being prepared. Even where the perpetrator had means at his disposal of which no lawful use may be made, it needed to be proven that he
55
intended to use those means in the execution of his criminal plans. But as that might still be some
56
way off, no certainty was required in this regard.
As preparation – like attempt – was criminalized because of the risk it carries of the intended crime
being committed, similar considerations apply in respect of the adequacy of means and object. Consequently, preparation is only punishable where the means the perpetrator had at his disposal might in
50
Act of 20 December 2001, Stb. 2001, 675, which entered into force on 1 January 2002; see Kamerstukken II
2001/02, 28 031, nr. 5, p. 4.
51
Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 22 268, nr. 3, p. 18; Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 031, nr. 5, p. 9. The latter document seems to imply that a person who donates a sum of money to a charity serving as a front for a terrorist organisation has that money at his disposal.
52
Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 22 268, nr. 3, p. 18. The Explanatory Memorandum was not entirely consistent in
this respect, as it was also suggested that a van which still has to be adapted in order to ram a shop front is obviously intended for robbery; Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 22 268, nr. 3, p. 18. On the whole, however, an objective
line was taken.
53
See for example HR 18 November 2003, JOL 2003, 605.
54
Hof Den Haag 18 November 2005, LJN AU6181.
55
HR 17 February 2004, NJ 2004, 400: in view of the fact that the defendant had apparently discarded a letter
containing information on the robbery of armoured trucks, there was insufficient evidence of his intent to commit
such robberies.
56
HR 18 November 2003, JOL 2003, 605. The perpetrator’s intent to use the means he has at his disposal to
prepare a crime might, however, be inferred from the use he made of them; HR 17 September 2002, NJ 2002,
626.
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57
fact have been used to commit the intended crime and that crime might in fact have been committed
in respect of its intended object.
In 2007, the requirement that preparatory acts are obviously intended for the commission of a crime
58
was scrapped. The relevant amendment formed part of a bill to amend the Penal Code, the Code of
Criminal Procedure and other acts in order to extend the possibilities for investigation and prosecution
59
of terrorist offences. The Explanatory Memorandum doesn’t make a great deal out of the proposed
amendment, arguing it was in keeping with current practice. In view of the differences of opinion in
legal doctrine regarding the requirement of obvious intent – some stressing the perpetrator’s intent,
others the nature of the means he has it his disposal – and considering that case law applies it none too
60
strictly , the requirements could be dispensed with. In addition, Article 46 will be more in keeping
with the special provision of Article 96(2 [3°] Sr.
As a consequence of this amendment, the perpetrator’s intent – i.e. the use he intends to make of the
means at his disposal – has become decisive in determining whether a crime was being prepared. In
this respect, explicit reference is made to the financing of terrorist attacks: the criminal purpose of
holding or providing funds in order to finance terrorism isn’t evidenced by their very nature. It remains to be seen, however, whether this amendment will actually result in extending the punishability
of preparation, as Article 46 Sr still requires that a crime was in fact being prepared. In this respect
much depends of the facts of the case; if the means the perpetrator has at his disposal may be put to
61
lawful use, preparation of a crime cannot be proven.
At the time preparation was criminalized, the most important requirement for its punishability was
that a crime which would be jointly committed was being prepared. In the Explanatory Memorandum
to the Bill which introduced Art. 46 to the Dutch Penal Code, this requirement was motivated by re62
ferring to the greater likelihood of joint plans being completed. It meant that acts of preparation by a
single person could be punishable, provided that they were intended for the joint commission of a
crime. Because that intention was paramount, it was irrelevant whether the intended crime was in fact
committed jointly. Preparatory acts intended for the commission of a crime by a sole perpetrator were,
however, not punishable, even if committed jointly.
In 2002, the requirement that the prepared crime would be jointly committed was scrapped. The principle motive behind this amendment lay in the fact this requirement is absent from the Convention for
63
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. In the wake of the 9/11 bombings it was felt that it
placed undue restrictions on what had been dubbed the ‘war on terror’, as preparation of actions by
lone terrorists did not amount to a criminal offence. In addition, it was argued that the gravity of
preparation of a crime which is to be committed by a lone perpetrator isn’t such that it warrants its
64
being treated differently from preparation of a crime which is to be committed jointly. This argu-
57
Hof Den Haag 18 November 2005, LJN AU6181.
Act of 20 November 2006, Stb. 2006, 580, entry into force on 1 February 2007.
59
Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 30 164, nr. 3, p. 49.
60
Reference is made to HR 17 September 2002, NJ 2002, 626.
61
Although it concerns a question of evidence, the author of the present report is under no great illusions as to the
proof of the intent to prepare a crime. The fact that the defendant had means at his disposal which might have
been used to prepare a crime may acquire greater weight in view of his refusal to explain their presence, a practice which has been sanctioned by the ECHR in the Murray case: ECHR 8 February 1996, Reports 1996-I. Furthermore, people who are charged with terrorist crimes may for good reasons disbelieve the truism that the innocent have nothing to fear.
62
Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 22 268, nr. 3, p. 17.
63
New York, 9 December 1999, Trb. 2000, 12.
64
Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28 031, nr. 5, p. 4
58
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ment of course is fallacious, as the restriction to crimes to be committed jointly didn’t derive from
their supposedly greater gravity, but from the fact that such crimes are more likely to be completed.
Preparation: special provisions
Article 96(2) Sr provides that a person who, with the intent to prepare or promote the commission of a
crime defined in Articles 92-95a Sr: (1) tries to induce another person to commit that crime, to commit
it through a third person or to commit it jointly, to aid and abet the commission of that crime or to
provide opportunity, means or information for its commission; (2) tries to acquire opportunity, means
or information for the commission of that crime for himself or others; (3) has means at his disposal he
knows are intended for the commission of that crime; (4) prepares or possesses plans for the commission of that crime which are intended to be divulged to others; or (5) tries to prevent, hamper or frustrate any official measure to prevent or suppress the commission of that crime, is liable to a prison
term not exceeding ten years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000).
The preparatory actions defined in Article 96(2) Sr must because of their definition be committed
intentionally, although dolus eventualis suffices. This doesn’t hold, however, for the perpetrator’s
intent to prepare or promote the crimes defined in Articles 92-95a Sr: preparing of promoting those
crimes must have been his primary motive. The preparatory acts are characterized by the fact that they
amount to a criminal offence, regardless of their consequences; whether the crime the perpetrator
65
sought to prepare or promote is in fact prepared, attempted or committed is irrelevant.
Article 97(1) Sr provides that a person who establishes contact with a foreign power with the intent to
induce it to commit hostilities or wage war against the state, to strengthen its resolve in that respect, to
promise it assistance or to assist it in its preparations is liable to life imprisonment or a prison term not
exceeding thirty years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000). According to section (2), acts
committed in preparation of the crime defined in section (1) are punishable by a prison term not exceeding ten years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000).
Article 98a(1) Sr provides that a person by whom any information, object or data specified in Article
98 – i.e. information etc. classified in the interest of the state or its allies and information etc. emanating from a prohibited place and relevant to the security of the state or its allies – is intentionally disclosed, or by whom, without authority, said information, object or data is intentionally provided or
made available to a foreign power, a person or body established in a foreign country, or to a person or
body of such nature that there is a risk of the information or data becoming known to a foreign power
or to a body or person established in a foreign country, where he knows or y should reasonably suspect the information or data to be of such nature, is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding
fifteen years or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000). In addition, section (2) provides that where the
offender has acted in wartime, or in the employment of or on assignment for a foreign power or a
person or body established in a foreign country, life imprisonment or a term of imprisonment not
exceeding thirty years or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000) may be imposed upon him. According
to section (3), acts committed in preparation of the crimes defined in sections (1) and (2) are punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding six years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000).
Article 121 Sr provides that a person who by an act of violence or by threat of violence disperses a
meeting of one or both chambers of parliament, compels it or them to take or to refrain from taking
any decision, removes a member or a minister from that meeting or intentionally prevents a member
or a minister from attending such meeting or from discharging his duties therein without let or hindrance, is liable to life imprisonment or a term of imprisonment not exceeding thirty years and/or a
fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000). According to Article 122(1) Sr, conspiracy to the crime defined
in Article 121 is punishable by a prison term not exceeding ten years and/or a fine of the fifth category
(€ 67.000). This provision is complemented by section (2), which provides that in respect of prepara-
65
See for an example Rb. Rotterdam 14 February 2006, LJN AV1652.
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tion Article 96(2) Sr applies. Accordingly, acts committed in preparation of the crime defined in Article 121 Sr are punishable by the same penalties as conspiracy to that crime.
Conspiracy
Conspiracy to commit a crime does not generally amount to a criminal offence; the Dutch Penal Code
does not contain a provision to that effect. There are, however, a number of provisions according to
which conspiracy to commit specific crimes does amount to a criminal offence. Foremost among these
is Article 96(1) Sr, providing that conspiracy to commit one of the crimes defined in Articles 92-95a
Sr (crimes against state security) is punishable by a prison term not exceeding ten years and/or a fine
of the fifth category (€ 67.000). In addition, conspiracy has been criminalized in respect of the crimes
defined in:
66
– Article 102 (aiding and abetting the enemy in time of war) ;
– Article 108 (attempt on the life or liberty of the King, the heir apparent or the spouse of the latter
67
with terrorist intent) ;
– Articles 115 and 117 (attempt on the life or liberty of the head of a friendly nation with terrorist
68
intent) ;
69
– Article 121 (violence against parliament) ;
– Articles 157, 161 (2, 3), 161bis(3, 4), 161quater, 161sexies(3, 4), 162, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172, 173a
70
and 174 (endangering and causing damage to public works with terrorist intent) ;
71
– Article 282a (deprivation of liberty with terrorist intent) ;
72
– Article 289 (murder with terrorist intent) ;
73
– Article 303 (grievous bodily harm with terrorist intent) , and
74
– Article 385a-385d (crimes against the safety of shipping and aviation with terrorist intent) .
Conspiracy to these crimes is punishable a prison term not exceeding ten years and/or a fine of the
fifth category (€ 67.000).
The rationale of criminalization of conspiracy lies in the vital interests which are at stake, considering
that once two or more persons have agreed to commit a crime the chances of their following through
with their plans – thus endangering the protected interests – increase. According to Article 80 Sr, a
conspiracy exists once two or more persons agree to commit a crime; such an agreement must be
seriously intended and specific but no overt acts need to take place. Consequently, although one might
well imagine persons attempting to conspire – meeting or even agreeing to meet in order to conspire
would qualify as an attempt – there is little need or use for such reasoning in order to establish criminal liability.
66
Article 103 Sr.
Article 114b Sr.
68
Article 120b Sr.
69
Article 122 Sr.
70
Article 176b Sr.
71
Article 282c Sr.
72
Article 289a Sr.
73
Article 304b Sr.
74
Article 415b Sr.
67
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2.1.3. Field of applicability (general/specific for certain offences)
According to Article 91 Sr, the general provisions in the preceding articles in principle apply to the
offences defined in the Dutch Penal Code as well as to offences defined in other acts or regulations.
As regards the applicability of the general provisions on attempt, there are, however, two kinds of
restriction. Firstly, there are limitations of a general nature, deriving from either the definition of attempt or the statutory definition of the pertinent offence. The obvious examples of this category are
misdemeanors and offences whose mental element consists of negligence; attempt is only punishable
75
where the intent to commit a crime has been initiated. Secondly, it may be explicitly provided that
the attempt to commit a specific offence isn’t punishable. At this time, the only such provision still on
76
the statute books relates to simple assault.
Furthermore, although the application of Article 45 to the crimes defined in Articles 92-94, 108, 115
and 117 Sr – which define some attempts as crimes per se – as such isn’t inconceivable, it would in
effect amount to criminalization of preparatory acts. Consequently, it would strain the arrangement in
Articles 45 and 46 Sr, which provides that preparatory acts are only punishable under the conditions
set out in the latter article. There is no practical need for the application of Article 45 Sr either, as
preparatory acts have been defined as crimes per se with respect to most attempts referred to.
Article 79 Sr – which provides that an attempt defined in Articles 92-94, 108, 115 and 117 Sr as a
crime per se occurs where the perpetrator manifests his intention to commit an offence by initiating it
within the meaning of Article 45 Sr – only applies to those crimes.
As regards the applicability of the general provisions on preparation, three restrictions derive from its
statutory definition: a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than eight years must
have been intentionally prepared. Consequently, preparation does not amount to a criminal offence in
respect of misdemeanors and less serious crimes and in inconceivable in respect of crimes whose
mental element consists of negligence.
Furthermore, it may be argued that the general provisions on preparation do not apply to conspiracy.
Conspiracy exists once two or more persons agree to commit a crime, whereas it was the legislator’s
stated intent to criminalize preparation only in cases where the conspirators have followed through
with their plan. In addition, Article 96(2) Sr – which complements the provision of section (1) on
conspiracy – contains special provisions on preparation. It should be noted, however, that in the
course of the parliamentary debate on the Terrorist Crimes Bill, an amendment to the effect that Arti77
cle 46 does not apply to conspiracy was rejected.
75
H.J. Smidt, Geschiedenis van het Wetboek van Strafrecht: volledige verzameling van regeeringsontwerpen,
gewisselde stukken, gevoerde beraadslagingen, enz. (bew. J.W. Smidt & E.A. Smidt), Zwolle: H.D. Tjeenk Willink 1891-1901, I, p. 420. As regards offences whose mental element consists of negligence, an apparent exception must, however, be made concerning negligently receiving goods of criminal provenance (Article 417bis Sr).
Because goods are necessarily received intentionally, attempting to receive them is quite conceivable; this isn’t
altered by that fact that in respect of the goods’ criminal provenance suffices. See HR 6 February 1990, NJ 1990,
417.
76
Article 300(5) Sr. The provision’s rationale is obvious: without it, a futile gesture would amount to a criminal
offence. Oddly enough, attempted ill-treatment of an animal has been punishable since a similar provision was
scrapped in 1961.
77
Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 28 463, nr. 24.
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Article 96(2) Sr complements section (1) of that article in that they apply to the same crimes: where
conspiracy to commit a crime is punishable, so is preparation within the terms of article 96(2). The
preparation of terrorist crimes – i.e. crimes committed with terrorist intent – is criminalized in a similar fashion, as the statutory provisions which criminalize conspiracy to terrorist crimes are always
78
complemented by a provision on the perpetration of such crimes.
Article 97(2) Sr only applies to the crime defined in section (1).
Article 98a(2) Sr only applies to the crimes defined in sections (1) and (2).
Article 122(2) Sr only applies to the crime defined in Article 121 Sr.
Conspiracy
The provisions criminalizing conspiracy only apply to the crimes they explicitly refer to, i.e. the
crimes defined in Articles 102; 108; 115 and 117; 121; 157, 161(2, 3), 161bis(3, 4), 161quater,
79
161sexies(3, 4), 162, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172, 173a and 174; 282a; 289; 303; and 385a-385d.
2.1.4. Applicable punishments: a comparison with the punishments applicable to the offences committed
According to Article 45(2) Sr, the maximum penalty prescribed for the pertinent crime is reduced by
one third in the case of attempt, which reduction may be explained from the fact that the danger posed
to the protected interest ultimately wasn’t realized. If the pertinent crime is punishable by life impris80
onment, a prison term of twenty years may be imposed (Article 45[2] Sr). The imposition of addi81
82
tional penalties and non-punitive sanctions is not similarly affected; they may be imposed regardless of the crime being completed (Article 45[4] Sr).
An attempt as defined in Articles 92-94 Sr (attempt against state security) is punishable by life imprisonment or a prison term not exceeding thirty years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000); an
attempt as defined in Article 108 Sr (attempt on the life or liberty of the King, the King’s consort, the
heir apparent or the spouse of the latter) is punishable by a prison term not exceeding fifteen years
and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000) or – if the victim’s death ensues or the attempt was premeditated – by life imprisonment or a prison term not exceeding thirty years and/or a fine of the fifth
category (€ 67.000); an attempt as defined in Article 115 Sr (attempt on the life or liberty of the head
of a friendly nation) is punishable by a prison term not exceeding fifteen years and/or a fine of the
fifth category (€ 67.000) or – if the victim’s death ensues or the attempt was premeditated – by life
imprisonment or a prison term not exceeding thirty years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000);
and an attempt as defined in Article 117 Sr (attempt on the life or liberty of an internationally protected person) is punishable by a prison term not exceeding fifteen years and/or a fine of the fifth
category (€ 67.000) or – if the victim’s death ensues or the attempt was premeditated – by life imprisonment or a prison term not exceeding thirty years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000).
78
See Articles 114b, 120b, 176b, 282c, 289a, 304b, 415b Sr.
See Articles 103, 114b, 120b, 122, 176b, 282c, 289a, 304b, 415b Sr respectively.
80
Although in Dutch law, life imprisonment means exactly that (see Article 10[1] Sr), crimes punishable by life
imprisonment may alternatively by punished by a fixed prison term of thirty years; hence the provision that a
prison term of twenty years may be imposed in the case of attempt.
81
Disqualification from the exercise of certain rights (Article 28 Sr), forfeiture (Articles 33-34 Sr) and publication of the judgment (Article 36 Sr).
82
Removal from circulation (Articles 36b-36d Sr), seizure of illegal gains (Article 36e Sr), compensation (Article
36f Sr), committal to a psychiatric hospital (Article 37 Sr), committal to an institution for the criminally insane
(Articles 37a-38k Sr) and committal to an institution for habitual offenders (Articles 38m-38u Sr).
79
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According to Article 46(2) Sr, the maximum penalty prescribed for the pertinent crime is reduced by
one half in the case of preparation. If the pertinent crime is punishable by life imprisonment, a prison
term of fifteen years may be imposed. As is the case with attempt, the imposition of additional penalties and non-punitive sanctions is not similarly affected.
Preparation within the terms of Article 96(2) Sr is punishable by a prison term not exceeding ten years
83
and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000). In addition, forfeiture and disqualification from the
84
exercise of certain rights may be ordered.
Preparation within the terms of Article 97(2) Sr is punishable by a prison term not exceeding ten years
85
and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000). In addition, forfeiture and disqualification from the
86
exercise of certain rights may be ordered.
Preparation within the terms of Article 98a(3) Sr is punishable by a prison term not exceeding six
87
years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000). In addition, forfeiture and disqualification from
88
the exercise of certain rights may be ordered.
Preparation within the terms of Article 122(2) Sr is punishable by a prison term not exceeding ten
89
years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000). In addition, forfeiture and disqualification from
90
the exercise of certain rights may be ordered.
Conspiracy
Articles 96(1), 103, 114b, 120b, 122, 176b, 282c, 289a, 304b, 415b Sr all provide that conspiracy to
the crimes referred to in those articles is punishable by a prison term not exceeding ten years and/or a
91
fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000). In addition, forfeiture and disqualification from the exercise of
92
certain rights may be ordered.
2.2. Participation
2.2.1. Treatment of the acting in concert of individuals in the commission of the offence (categories of
the criminal, instigation, cooperation, complicity)
Principals: preliminary remarks
Title V of Book I of the Dutch Penal Code (Articles 47-54 Sr) concerns participation in criminal of93
fences. Article 47 Sr reads (my translation) :
83
It should be noted, however, that a maximum fine of € 67.000 may only be imposed in respect of crimes committed after 1 February 2006, when the Recalibration of penalties act (Wet herijking strafmaxima: Stb. 2006, 11)
entered into force. As regards crimes committed before that date a maximum fine of € 45.000 may be imposed.
84
See Articles 33-34 and 106 Sr respectively.
85
A maximum fine of € 67.000 may only be imposed in respect of crimes committed after 1 February 2006.
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
Original Dutch: (Art. 47) 1. Als daders van een strafbaar feit worden gestraft: 1° zij die het feit plegen, doen
plegen of medeplegen; 2° zij die door giften, beloften, misbruik van gezag, geweld, bedreiging of misleiding of
door het verschaffen van gelegenheid, middelen of inlichtingen het feit opzettelijk uitlokken. 2. Ten aanzien van
de laatsten komen alleen die handelingen in aanmerking die zij opzettelijk hebben uitgelokt, benevens hun gevolgen.
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(Art. 47) 1. The following persons are liable as principals:
(1) those who commit a criminal offence, either personally or jointly with another or others, or who
causes an innocent person to commit a criminal offence;
(2) those who, through gifts, promises, abuse of authority, use of violence, threats or deception or
providing the opportunity, means or information, intentionally solicit the commission of an offence.
2. With regard to the last category, only those actions intentionally solicited by them and the consequences of such actions are to be taken into consideration.
With respect to participation four preliminary remarks have to be made. Firstly, under Dutch case law,
a person may be held liable for an offence he did not physically commit, if he can be said to have
acted through another person, irrespective of whether that other person is also by himself criminally
responsible for that offence. An offence is considered as having been functionally committed if three
requirements are satisfied: (i) the statutory definition of the offence allows for its functional commis94
95
sion (ii) the defendant violated a norm which was addressed to him , and (iii) the physical acts of
96
another person can be imputed to the defendant . A person is held liable as the functional perpetrator
of an offence because of his facilitating another person’s acts: if he had control over those acts and
accepted them or tended to accept them.
Secondly, legal doctrine also recognizes compound participation, i.e. participating in acts of participa97
tion. In principle, any form of compound participation is punishable, provided that the acts in which
a person participates are themselves punishable. The only limit to ever increasing circles of liability is
set by the requirement of intent: a person has to intend the participation of others. This requirement,
however, is applied rather loosely by the Supreme Court. According to the Court, it does not extend to
98
the exact form of participation.
Thirdly, participants have in common that they contribute to the commission of an offence, either
99
previously or simultaneously: complicity after the fact generally is not a punishable offence. As a
consequence, participation is subject to what may best be called the dependency principle: participa100
tion only amounts to a punishable offence if at least a punishable attempt has been made. A notable
exception to this principle is provided in Article 46a Sr, which criminalizes unsuccessfully soliciting
or causing an innocent person to commit a crime. In that case, a person is liable for attempting to
participate in a crime which doesn’t actually ensue. The dependency principle doesn’t imply that the
person who committed the offence has to be prosecuted, much less that he must be found guilty; as
regards the liability of participants, it’s sufficient that a criminal offence is proven to have been committed.
Finally, although Article 91 Sr provides that the general provisions in the preceding articles apply to
all offences defined in the Dutch Penal Code as well as to offences defined in other acts or regula-
94
This requirement only excludes offences with a dominant physical component, like violent offences and offences against public morals. Murder may, however, be committed functionally: HR 29 May 1990, NJ 1991, 217.
95
This is evident where the statutory definition of the offence requires it to have been committed in a certain
capacity; see HR 31 August 2004, NJ 2004, 591.
96
HR 23 February 1954, NJ 1954, 278.
97
HR 24 January 1950, NJ 1950, 287: solicitation of complicity to attempted deception.
98
To give an example: if a person has planned a murder, it’s irrelevant for his criminal liability for murder whether the person he employs for the execution of his plans commits the murder by himself or jointly with others, or
solicits a third person; see HR 31 March 1987, NJ 1988, 633.
99
Certain types of cooperation after the fact – typically involving the handling of goods of illegal provenance –
have been penalized in Title XXX, Book II of the Dutch Penal Code (Articles 416-420).
100
See for example HR 18 September 1995, NJ 1996, 40: liability for unsuccessful solicitation may not be founded in Article 47 Sr (although it may be founded in Article 46a Sr).
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tions, this principle is subject to two qualifications: acts of parliament may contain explicit provisions
101
to the contrary and it may be sidestepped it by defining acts of participation as offences per se.
Joint commission
An offence is said to have been committed jointly where two or more persons consciously collaborate
and jointly execute an offence. Conscious collaboration means that the perpetrators must knowingly
and willingly – i.e. intentionally – collaborate with a view to the commission of an offence. Consequently, their intent must apply to the collaboration between them and to the commission of a criminal
102
act; whether it extends to other circumstances depends on the relevant statutory definition.
No
explicit agreements need to have been made; tacit collaboration suffices. A person may even be
deemed to have intended the joint commission of an offence where he was present at its commission
103
and didn’t distance himself from it. Such reasoning is prevalent in respect of violent crime, notably
104
manslaughter and murder.
It does, however, rest on the presumption that it was in fact possible to
105
distance oneself ; in the absence of that opportunity, a person who was present at the commission of
106
the offence cannot be said to have jointly committed it .
The requirement of joint execution doesn’t imply that the perpetrators must all be personally involved
with the commission of the offence. Provided that their collaboration is intimate and complete, giving
107
In a way, the requirements of conscious collaboration
support may amount to joint commission.
and joint execution are communicating vessels: as the perpetrators collaborate more intimately, joint
execution is less important. In the event of one person planning an offence which is subsequently
108
committed by another, they may be said to have committed it jointly.
Commission through another person
Someone is said to have committed an offence through another person where he caused the commission of an offence for which the perpetrator may not be held liable. Consequently, in order to hold
someone liable for having committed an offence through another person two requirements must be
satisfied. Firstly, the intellectual actor must have intended to cause a criminal act. In this respect, it
should be noted that the requirement of intent on the part of the intellectual actor only applies to the
material actor’s actions; whether it extends to the elements of the relevant offence depends on its
statutory definition.
Secondly, the material actor must not be liable himself. His liability may be excluded on the grounds
that he lacks the mental element or capacity required by the appropriate statutory definition or his
109
actions are excused.
Offences whose statutory definition requires a certain capacity – an official
capacity, for example – may therefore be said to have been committed through another person where
101
See for examples Articles 131, 133 and 140 Sr, which are commented on under 2.2.2. Article 46a Sr isn’t
wholly comparable to such provisions, as it concerns the unsuccessful solicitation of a specific offence, whereas
according to the statutory definitions of participatory acts as offences per se the offence in which the perpetrator
intended to participate is irrelevant.
102
HR 2 February 1999, NJ 1999, 554; HR 6 December 2005, LJN AU2246.
103
HR 11 January 2000, NJ 2000, 228; HR 8 May 2001, NJ 2001, 480.
104
See for examples HR 8 May 2001, NJ 2001, 480; HR 28 May 2002, NJ 2003, 142; HR 14 October 2003, NJ
2005, 183.
105
HR 12 April 2005, NJ 2005, 577.
106
HR 2 October 2004, NJ 2004, 682.
107
HR 29 October 1934, NJ 1934, p. 1673.
108
HR 17 November 1981, NJ 1983, 84/197; HR 15 April 1986, NJ 1986, 740; HR 14 April 1987, NJ 1988, 515;
HR 24 January 1995, NJ 1995, 352.
109
HR 26 June 1898, W. 7146.
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110
either the intellectual actor or the material actor
possesses the necessary capacity. Where only the
intellectual actor possesses the necessary capacity, this is self-evident, as the material actor cannot
commit the offence; where the material actor does possess that capacity, his liability must be excluded
111
because he lacks the necessary mental element or his actions are excused.
Solicitation
Someone is said to have solicited the commission of an offence where he incited another person to
commit an offence for which that person may himself be held liable; generally, a person who solicits
the commission of an offence does not participate in it. In order to hold someone liable for solicitation, four requirements must be satisfied: (i) intent on the part of the intellectual actor, (ii) incitement,
(iii) use of certain means and (iv) liability of the material actor.
As Article 47(1[2]) Sr specifically provides that the commission of an offence must be solicited intentionally, the intellectual actor’s intent must apply to his inciting another person to commit an offence,
as well as to all elements of that offence. Intent on the material actor’s actions only does not suffice; in
fact, the intellectual actor’s intent doesn’t have to extend to the way in which the material actor subse112
quently goes about committing the offence. The requirement of incitement means that the intellectual actor must have caused the material actor’s decision to commit the offence. Consequently, an
113
offence isn’t solicited where the perpetrator had already decided to commit it.
In order to solicit another person to commit an offence, the intellectual actor must use one of the
means listed in Article 47(1[2]) Sr: gifts, promises, abuse of authority, violence, threats, deception or
providing opportunity, means or information. Abuse of authority doesn’t require a formal relationship
as exists between parents and children or employers and employees; it may derive from circumstances
114
which oblige a person to do what another person tells him. Violence, threats and deception have the
same effect, although it mustn’t be so strong as to exclude the material actor’s culpability. In that case,
an innocent person was caused to commit an offence. Information must be relevant in the context of
115
the intended offence, in that it is suited to bring about its commission.
Article 47(2) Sr provides that as regards the intellectual actor only the actions he intentionally solicited and the consequences of such actions – i.e. consequences in respect of which no intent is re116
quired
– are to be taken into consideration. This provision applies to the legal qualification of the
intellectual actor’s involvement with the offence as well as to the penalties which may be imposed.
Where, for example, the intellectual actor only intended to solicit simple theft, he isn’t held liable for
the material actor’s subsequent use of force, nor is he punished for it.
110
See, for example, HR 21 April 1913, NJ 1913, p. 961.
This peculiarity distinguishes causing an innocent person to commit an offence from solicitation: in respect of
solicitation, it is always the material actor who must possess the necessary capacity.
112
Solicitation of theft, for example, may imply the intellectual actor’s accepting the risk of the wrong object
being stolen; HR 29 April 1997, NJ 1997, 654.
113
HR 8 March 1920, NJ 1920, p. 458; HR 25 January 1944, NJ 1944, 362. The fact that the material actor has in
the past committed similar offences does not, however, preclude solicitation, provided that in the present instance
his decision to commit an offence was prompted by the intellectual actor; see for examples HR 3 January 1934,
NJ 1934, p. 549; HR 28 June 1937, NJ 1938, p. 173; Hof ‘s-Hertogenbosch 19 October 1999, NJB 1999, nr. 154.
114
HR 1 June 1976, NJ 1977, 42; HR 14 May 1991, NJ 1991, 769.
115
HR 27 February 2001, NJ 2001, 308.
116
Such consequences – for example: the fact that a victim of assault subsequently dies (Article 300[3] Sr) –
generally serve as aggravating circumstances. There are, however, also offences whose statutory definition explicitly exempts circumstances which constitute liability from the requirement of intent, notably offences against the
general safety of persons and property (articles 157-176b Sr); see HR 29 March 1966, NJ 1966, 395.
111
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Accessories
Articles 48 and 49 Sr deal with accessories, i.e. persons assisting in the commission of a crime by
117
118
another person. Its provisions read (my translation) :
(Art. 48) The following persons are liable as accessories to a crime:
(1) those that intentionally assist during the commission of the crime;
(2) those that intentionally provide the opportunity, means or information necessary to commit the
crime.
(Art. 49) 1. The maximum principal penalties prescribed for the crime are reduced by one third in
respect of accessories.
2. In respect of crimes for which a life sentence has been prescribed, a prison term not exceeding
twenty years shall be imposed.
3. The additional penalties are the same as may be imposed for the crime itself.
4. In determining the sentence, regard may only be had for the acts the accessory intentionally made
possible or promoted, as well as their consequences.
119
consists of assisting another person in the commission of a crime, either previously or
Complicity
simultaneously. Because misdemeanors and complicity are considered less serious, complicity only
amounts to a criminal offence in respect of crimes; Article 52 Sr explicitly says so. In order for an
accessory to be criminally liable, three requirements have to be satisfied: the accessory must intend to
assist in the commission of a crime, he must have given actual assistance and the crime must have
ensued. The accessory’s intent must extend to his own contribution as well as to (the elements of) the
crime towards whose commission it is made. In both respects, dolus eventualis suffices: it is sufficient
for an accessory to have consciously accepted the considerable risk of contributing to another person’s
120
crime.
The question arises, however, whether the accessory is also liable where his intent as to the crime he
intended to assist in does not concur with the intent of its perpetrator. As regards this question, three
situations must be distinguished: the perpetrator may commit an entirely different crime, a similar but
less grave crime or a similar but graver crime. In the first situation, it is obvious that the accessory
cannot be held liable, as he did not in fact assist in the commission of a crime. In the second situation,
the accessory’s liability is limited to the crime the perpetrator has committed. Where, for example, the
accessory intended to assist in the commission of burglary, he is only liable for simple theft if the door
wasn’t locked. The third situation is provided for in Article 49(4) Sr: although the accessory is liable
for having contributed to the offence committed by the principal – indeed, the legal qualification of
his contribution conforms to the qualification of the offence committed by the principal – only those
actions which were intentionally facilitated or promoted by the accessory and the consequences of
121
such actions – i.e. consequences in respect of which no intent is required
– are to be taken into
117
Art. 52 Sr expressly states that complicity to a misdemeanour is not punishable.
Original Dutch: (Art. 48) Als medeplichtigen van een strafbaar feit worden gestraft: 1° zij die opzettelijk
behulpzaam zijn bij het plegen van het misdrijf; 2° zij die opzettelijk middelen, gelegenheid of inlichtingen verschaffen tot het plegen van het misdrijf.
119
Although the different nature of liability founded in Article 48 Sr is best expressed by the term ‘accessory’, I
use the term ‘complicity’ to denote the liability of accessories, for simple reason that no comparable noun deriving from the word ‘accessory’ exists.
120
HR 8 May 1979, NJ 1979, 481; HR 26 February 1985, NJ 1985, 651; HR 13 November 2001, NJ 2002, 245.
121
Such consequences – for example: the fact that a victim of assault subsequently dies (Article 300[3] Sr) –
generally serve as aggravating circumstances. There are, however, also offences whose statutory definition explicitly exempts circumstances which constitute liability from the requirement of intent, notably offences against the
general safety of persons and property (articles 157-176b Sr); see HR 29 March 1966, NJ 1966, 395.
118
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consideration in the sentence. Where, for example, the accessory intends to assist in the commission
of assault but the principal intends to murder the victim, the accessory is liable as an accessory to
murder but may only be punished for having assisted in the commission of assault.
Article 48 Sr distinguishes between two types of complicity: anterior complicity – which precedes the
offence – and simultaneous complicity – which concurs with the offence. The relevance of this distinction lies in the fact that – because it is further removed from the completed crime – anterior com122
plicity must consist of providing opportunity, means or information necessary to commit the crime.
Consequently, in the case of anterior complicity an active contribution is required, whereas simultane123
ous complicity may be wholly passive, provided the accessory was under a legal obligation to act.
Such an obligation exists where under the circumstances – specifically in view of his previous conduct
– a person is in a position to prevent the crime from being completed; mere knowledge of the princi124
pal’s criminal intentions is insufficient.
125
The assistance provided by an accessory does not have to be indispensable , although he must in
fact have supported the principal; no liability exists where the accomplice was in no way helpful in the
126
commission of an offence . Assistance after the fact generally does not amount to a criminal of127
fence, although it may be relevant in connection with previous conduct.
Criminal liability of legal entities
Originally, the Dutch Penal Code only provided for criminal liability of natural persons: only they
could be principals of or accessories to criminal offences. In 1976, however, a general provision was
128
introduced to the effect that criminal offences may also be committed by legal persons.
Strictly
speaking, this provision doesn’t increase the number of acts for which persons may be held criminally
liable – wherein lies the primary importance of the provisions on the liability of principals and accessories – but the number of persons liable for those acts.
The criminal liability of legal persons is provided for in Article 51 Sr, which reads (my transla129
tion) :
122
The careful reader will observe that providing opportunity, means or information may also amount to solicitation. The cardinal difference between solicitation and complicity – which explains why complicity may be punished less severely – is that in the case of solicitation, the participant puts the idea of committing an offence in
someone else’s head, whereas in the case of complicity that idea has already taken hold; HR 13 June 1898, W.
7145; HR 22 October 1928, NJ 1929, p. 189; HR 6 March 1939, NJ 1939, 897; H.J. Smidt, Geschiedenis van het
Wetboek van Strafrecht: volledige verzameling van regeeringsontwerpen, gewisselde stukken, gevoerde beraadslagingen, enz. (bew. J.W. Smidt & E.A. Smidt), Zwolle: H.D. Tjeenk Willink 1891-1901, I, p. 413.
123
HR 12 December 2000, NJ 2002, 516; Hof Den Haag 9 August 1988, NJ 1988, 979.
124
HR 27 November 2001, NJ 2002, 517.
125
HR 7 January 1918, W. 10225.
126
This does not mean, however, that the principal must have been aware of being assisted; unlike joint commission, complicity doesn’t require conscious collaboration; HR 6 October 1998, NJ 1999, 90. A person may, for
example, be liable as an accessory to burglary although the burglar wasn’t aware of the door having been deliberately left open.
127
That is, under Article 48 Sr. Special provisions may penalize assistance after the fact: see HR 8 January 1985,
NJ 1988, 6; HR 15 December 1987, NJ 1988, 835.
128
Act of 23 June 1976, Stb. 1976, 377. It should, however, be observed that the criminal liability of legal persons
wasn’t entirely novel, as specific provisions to that effect has been enacted in respect of economic and fiscal
offences.
129
Original Dutch: (Art. 51) 1. Strafbare feiten kunnen worden begaan door natuurlijke personen en rechtspersonen.
2. Indien een strafbaar feit wordt begaan door een rechtspersoon, kan de strafvervolging worden ingesteld en
kunnen de in de wet voorziene straffen en maatregelen, indien zij daarvoor in aanmerking komen, worden uitgesproken:
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(Art. 51) 1. Criminal offences may be committed by natural persons and legal persons.
2. Where a criminal offence is committed by a legal person, criminal proceedings may be instituted
and such penalties and measures as are prescribed by law, where applicable, may be imposed:
(1) against the legal person, or
(2) against those who have ordered the commission of the criminal offence and against those who
directed such unlawful behavior, or
(3) against the persons mentioned under (1) and (2) jointly.
3. In the application of the preceding sections, the following are deemed to be equivalent to legal
persons: unincorporated companies, partnerships, shipping companies and special funds.
Whether a legal person exists must be judged primarily according to the criteria set out in book II of
the Dutch Civil Code. It should, however, be borne in mind that for the purpose of establishing criminal liability private law criteria cannot be decisive. Consequently, defects in the establishment or
structure of a legal person don’t preclude criminal liability. Moreover, Article 51(3) broadens the
definition of legal persons in order to accommodate manifestations which are not legal persons stricto
sensu. In sum, it may be argued that for the purpose of establishing criminal liability any manifestation which has an existence independent of the natural persons involved may be dubbed a legal per130
son.
The criminal liability of legal persons closely resembles the liability of functional perpetrators, as
legal persons necessarily act though natural persons. Consequently, similar requirements apply.
131
Firstly, it must be said that the legal person contravened a norm addressed to it. If not, the relevant
132
offence may not be committed by a legal person. Secondly, the actions of a natural person must be
imputed to the legal person. Whether this is possible depends on the facts of the case, notably the
character of the act in question and its context: was the act committed by someone in service to the
133
legal person, did it fit normal practice and did the legal person benefit from it? In addition the criteria developed in respect of functional perpetration may be applied: a legal person may be judged to
have committed a criminal offence where it had control of the relevant acts and accepted or tended to
134
accept them.
Thirdly, the legal person must have possessed the mental element required by the
relevant statutory definition, if any. Ordinarily, in the absence of a formal decision to commit criminal
offences, the intent or carelessness of a natural person must be imputed to the legal person; whose
intent or carelessness may be imputed depends on the structure of the legal person and the various
responsibilities of natural persons working within it. In this respect, much depends on the way in
which the legal person goes about its business: the natural person whose intent or carelessness is imputed to the legal person need not have acted in any formal capacity.
1°. tegen die rechtspersoon, dan wel
2°. tegen hen die tot het feit opdracht hebben gegeven, alsmede tegen hen die feitelijke leiding hebben gegeven
aan de verboden gedraging, dan wel
3°. tegen de onder 1° en 2° genoemden te zamen.
3. Voor de toepassing van de vorige leden wordt met de rechtspersoon gelijkgesteld: de vennootschap zonder
rechtspersoonlijkheid, de maatschap, de rederij en het doelvermogen.
130
Case law even provides an example of Article 51 Sr being applied to a British limited company; HR 13 November 2001, NJ 2002, 219.
131
This is evident where the statutory definition of the offence requires it to have been committed in a certain
capacity; see HR 22 June 2004, NJ 2004, 441.
132
This requirement only excludes offences with a dominant physical component, like violent offences and offences against public morals.
133
HR 21 October 2003, NJ 2006, 328; HR 29 March 2005, LJN AR7619.
134
HR 1 July 1981, NJ 1982, 80; HR 14 January 1992, NJ 1992, 413.
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Liability of directors
Alongside the criminal liability of legal persons a provision was introduced to the effect that natural
persons may be held liable on account of their involvement with a criminal offence committed by a
legal person. As this type of liability does increase the number of acts for which a person may be held
liable, it resembles participation. It is, however, of an essentially different nature, because it isn’t
founded in a person’s participation in actual offences, but rather in his not preventing the commission
135
of a criminal offence by persons in the service of the legal person.
Where a legal person has committed a criminal offence, the natural persons who ordered or directed it
may be punished accordingly. In the absence of an explicit order a natural person may be held liable
for having directed the commission of the offence if he (i) consciously refrained from taking preventive measures, although he was competent to take such measures and should have done so under the
circumstances and (ii) as a consequence accepts the considerable risk of the relevant act’s occurrence,
136
thereby intentionally promoting it. Article 51(2) applies to all persons who were in fact involved in
the commission of a criminal offence by the legal person, regardless of their formal positions; they
needn’t have acted in a specific capacity. It may even be that the commission of an offence by a legal
137
person is directed by a person who – on paper, at least – has nothing whatsoever to do with it.
2.2.2. Regulation and sanction of the acts of participation
Specific provisions on participation
In respect of some offences, the fact that they were committed jointly serves as an aggravating cir138
cumstance.
Because two or more persons committing the offence jointly poses a greater danger to
the protected interest, it may be punished more severely than would be possible under Article 47(1)
Sr. Although such provisions prevail over Article 47(1) Sr, they do not detract from the general re139
quirements for the liability of participants, which must be judged according to the same criteria.
Participation as an offence per se
In addition to the general provisions concerning inchoate offences there are several provisions which
deal with certain specific types of conduct. Title V of Book II of the Dutch Penal Code, which deals
with offences against public order, contains a number of provisions which penalize acts which foster,
encourage or advance the criminal intentions of others.
Articles 131 and 132 Sr penalize incitement and dissemination of seditious materials. Article 131
provides that a person who publicly, either orally or in writing or by image, incites another or others to
commit any criminal offence or act of violence against the public authorities is liable to a term of
imprisonment not exceeding five years and/or a fine of the fourth category (€ 16.750). Article 132(1)
provides that a person who disseminates, publicly displays or posts written matter or an image containing incitement to commit any criminal offence or act of violence against the authorities, or who
has such in stock to be disseminated, publicly displayed or posted, is liable to a term of imprisonment
not exceeding three years and/or a fine of the fourth category (€ 16.750), where he knows or has serious reason to suspect the written matter or the image to contain such incitement; according to section
135
Of course this implies that the court needs to establish that a criminal offence was committed by the legal
person; this implication echoes the dependency principle which governs participation.
136
HR 16 December 1986, NJ 1987, 321/322; HR 21 January 1992, NJ 1992, 414. Consequently, at least dolus
eventualis is required; mere carelessness on the part of an official who should have prevented the offence from
being committed is insufficient; HR 19 November 1985, NJ 1986, 125/126.
137
HR 16 June 1981, NJ 1981, 586.
138
See for examples Articles 138 (unlawful entry), 139 (breach of the peace), 182 (coercing or resting an official), 311 (theft) and 312 (theft with violence or menaces) Sr.
139
HR 17 November 1981, NJ 1983, 84/197.
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(2) the same penalties apply to a person who, with like knowledge or like reason to suspect, publicly
utters the contents of such matter.
Incitement is punishable as such: whether its intended effect ensues is irrelevant. Where the intended
offences ensue, incitement may – provided the means listed in Article 47(1[2]) Sr were employed – be
qualified as solicitation. Consequently, attempted incitement is hardly conceivable: either a person
incites others to commit offences or he does not. The fact that Article 46a Sr contains a specific provision regarding attempted solicitation may be explained from the different contexts in which solicitation on the one hand and incitement on the other hand take place: in the case of solicitation, the perpetrator tries to induce a specific person to commit a specific crime, whereas in the case in the case of
incitement the perpetrator addresses the general public in general terms. Because of the greater risk
solicitation carries of actually bringing about the commission of an offence, an allowance was made
for the eventuality of its intended perpetrator not following through: otherwise, attempted solicitation
140
wouldn’t have been punishable.
Although incitement must be committed intentionally and publicly, neither requirement is very strict.
The requirement of intent does not imply intent on the criminal character of those offences: intent on
141
the underlying acts suffices.
Nor does the requirement that incitement must be public mean that it
must have taken place publicly. What is essential is that the utterances are made under such circumstances that the public may take notice of them. For instance, a speaker at a private meeting may be
142
liable for incitement if journalists are present and his speech is subsequently reported in the press.
Articles 133 and 134 Sr penalize offering assistance to commit a criminal offence and possession or
dissemination of materials containing such offers. Article 133 provides that a person who publicly,
either orally or in writing or by image, offers to provide the information, opportunity or means to
commit a criminal offence is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months and/or a fine
of the third category (€ 6.700). Article 134(1) provides that a person who disseminates, publicly displays or posts written material or an image, in which the provision of information, opportunity or
means to commit any criminal offence is offered, or has such in stock to be disseminated, publicly
displayed or posted, is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three months and/or a fine of
the second category (€ 3.350), where he knows or has serious reason to suspect the written material or
the image to contain such offer; according to section (2), the same penalties apply to a person who,
with such knowledge or suspicion, publicly utters the contents of such writing.
Article 133 Sr penalizes public offers of assistance to the commission of a crime. As with incitement,
it’s irrelevant whether the intended effect is achieved. Furthermore, the offer can be of a general nature. This offence differs from solicitation in that intent to induce a specific person to commit an offence is not required. Article 134 is its corollary: it penalizes dissemination of materials offering assistance for the commission of a crime.
Articles 135 and 136 Sr criminalize failure to warn the authorities of the intention of others to commit
specific crimes. Article 135 Sr provides that a person who has knowledge of a criminal conspiracy and
who, at a time when the commission of the crime conspired to can still be prevented, intentionally
omits to give timely and proper notification thereof, either to judicial officers or police officers or to
the person threatened by the crime is liable, where the offence ensues, to a term of imprisonment not
exceeding one year and/or a fine of the fourth category (€ 16.750).
140
The fact that the intended perpetrator doesn’t actually do anything criminal is, however, taken into account in
the provision that attempted solicitation is only punishable in respect of crimes.
141
This is a consequence of a peculiarity of Dutch substantive criminal law. Generally, intent on the illegality of
an act is not required. This is only the case where the statutory definition of an offence expressly requires intent
on the unlawfulness of the act; see HR 5 February 1934, NJ 1934, p. 620.
142
HR 22 May 1939, NJ 1939, 861.
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Article 136(1) provides that a person who has knowledge of an intention to commit one of the crimes
defined in Articles 92-110 (crimes against state security and crimes against royal dignity) or to commit desertion in wartime, treason while a member of the armed forces, murder, abduction, rape, a
crime endangering the general safety of persons or property or a terrorist crime, where this causes
danger to life, and who, at a time when the commission of these crimes could still be prevented, intentionally omits to give timely and proper notification thereof, either to judicial officers or police officers, or to the person threatened by the crime is liable, where the crime ensues, to a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year months and/or a fine of the fourth category (€ 16.750); according to
section (2), the same penalties apply to a person who has knowledge of the commission of any of the
offences listed in paragraph 1 resulting in danger to life, and who, at a time when the consequences
could still be averted, intentionally omits to communicate such in like manner.
Article 140(1) Sr provides that participation in an organization that has as its object the commission of
crimes is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding six years or a fine of the fifth category
(€ 67.000); according to section (3) the term of imprisonment may be increased by one third in respect
of the founders, leaders or directors.
An organization within the terms of Article 140 Sr requires structured, continuous collaboration. The
143
participants must strive to achieve their purpose by adhering to and enforcing common rules.
But
although spontaneous collaboration does not amount to an organization, its membership may vary.
Furthermore, the organization must have the commission of a multiplicity of offences as its object,
144
that is: as a feasible means to achieve its – possibly quite legitimate
– purposes; no actual crimes
145
have to be committed . If, however, the organization’s object is limited to the commission of a single crime, Article 140 does not apply.
According to the case law, participation in an organization does neither necessarily imply formal
membership, nor participation in the offences which are its object. Participation does not imply formal
membership of the organization, nor involvement in the offences the commission of which are its
146
object. The question is whether a person did in fact participate in the organization’s activities. Participation not only implies belonging to the organization, but also requires taking part in or supporting
147
acts which aim at or are directly connected with the realization of the organization’s objectives.
Article 140(4) specifically provides that participation in a criminal organization comprises providing
financial or material assistance to and raising funds or recruiting persons in aid of it. Consequently,
participation in a criminal organization implies intent on its criminal character. But as there will generally be some division of labor within an organization, no knowledge of specific offences is required.
Article 140(2) Sr provides that participation in the continued activity of a legal person banned by final
judgment or legally forbidden or in respect of which an irrevocable declaration as referred to in Article 5a(1) Conflict of laws in respect of corporations has been made is punishable by a prison term not
exceeding one year and/or a fine of the third category (€ 6.700).
In addition to the aforementioned provisions, there are a number of provisions which define certain
148
types of complicity as separate offences. The rationale for these provisions may be that a reduction
of the maximum penalties by one third provided for in Article 49(1) Sr was found to be unduly lenient
143
HR 16 October 1990, NJ 1991, 442.
HR 26 June 1984, NJ 1985, 92; HR 26 February 1991, NJ 1991, 499.
145
HR 14 February 1995, NJ 1995, 426: collection of debts by use of force.
146
HR 16 October 1990, NJ 1991, 442.
147
HR 18 November 1997, NJ 1998, 225.
148
See for examples Articles 198 (removing or hiding sequestered goods), 199 (breaking official seals), 203
(solicitation of desertion in peacetime), 204 (solicitation of mutiny in peacetime), 359 (hiding of money by an
official), 361 (losing official documents) and 375 (complicity in violation of private communications) Sr and
Article 10a(1[2]) Opium act.
144
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or that in the absence of a specific provision complicity would not amount to a criminal offence. Military offences are an example of the latter category, as the military quality of the perpetrator often is an
element of the offence. Consequently, civilians – who lack the required quality – would not commit a
criminal offence by participating in it.
3.1. Does it exist, in your juridical regulations, explicit prescriptive definitions of ‘terrorism’ and of
definitions (for example, with the Framework Decision of the European Union of 2002 against terrorism or with the UNO Convention of 2000 against multinational organized crime)?
149
Terrorist crimes have been defined in Article 83 Sr, which reads (my translation) :
Terrorist crimes are considered to be:
1° each of the crimes defined in Articles 92 through 96, 108(2), 115(2), 117(2), 121, 122, 157(3),
161quater(2), 164(2), 166(3), 168(2), 170(3), 174(2), and 289, as well as in Article 80(2) Nuclear
energy act, where it has been committed with terrorist intent;
2° each of the offences punishable by imprisonment under Articles 114a, 114b, 120a, 120b, 130a,
176a, 282c, 289a, 304a, 304b, 415a en 415b, as well as Article 80(3) Nuclear energy act;
3° each of the crimes defined in Articles 140a, 282b, 285, derde lid, en 288a, as well as in Article
55(5) Arms and munitions act, Article 6(4) Economic offences act, Article 33b Civil use of explosives
act and Article 79 Nuclear energy act.
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 prompted international organizations as well as states to
investigate whether criminal law was sufficiently geared towards the repression of terrorism. In 2002
150
the Council of the European Union adopted a framework decision , which the Netherlands imple151
mented through the Terrorist crimes act of 2004 . Although the framework decision does not contain an explicit definition of terrorist crimes, it may be surmised from Article 1 that a terrorist crime
must be regarded as such in domestic law and be committed with terrorist intent. The latter term is
defined in Article 83a; see the answer to question 3.2 as to what constitutes ‘terrorist intent’.
Article 83 Sr provides which crimes are regarded as terrorist crimes in Dutch criminal law, by enumerating all crimes which may qualify as such: section (1) refers to crimes which – if completed – are
punishable by life imprisonment or a term of imprisonment not exceeding thirty years, section (2)
refers to provisions according to which terrorist intent serves as an aggravating circumstance in respect of specific crimes, and section (3) refers to specific terrorist offences.
In a recent case, the Rotterdam District Court ruled that a terrorist organization within the terms of
Article 140a (see part B, question 3) must have terrorist crimes as defined in Article 83 Sr as its ob152
ject; it’s insufficient for it to have terrorist intent as defined in Article 83a Sr.
Consequently, an
149
Original Dutch: (Art. 83) Onder terroristisch misdrijf wordt verstaan: 1° elk van de misdrijven omschreven in
de artikelen 92 tot en met 96, 108, tweede lid, 115, tweede lid, 117, tweede lid, 121, 122, 157, onderdeel 3°,
161quater, onderdeel 2°, 164, tweede lid, 166, onderdeel 3°, 168, onderdeel 2°, 170, onderdeel 3°, 174, tweede
lid, en 289, alsmede in artikel 80, tweede lid, Kernenergiewet, indien het misdrijf is begaan met een terroristisch
oogmerk; 2° elk van de misdrijven waarop ingevolge de artikelen 114a, 114b, 120a, 120b, 130a, 176a, 282c,
289a, 304a, 304b, 415a en 415b, alsmede artikel 80, derde lid, van de Kernenergiewet gevangenisstraf is gesteld;
3° elk van de misdrijven omschreven in de artikelen 140a, 282b, 285, derde lid, en 288a, alsmede in artikel 55,
vijfde lid, van de Wet wapens en munitie, artikel 6, vierde lid, van de Wet op de economische delicten, artikel
33b van de Wet explosieven voor civiel gebruik en artikel 79 van de Kernenergiewet.
150
Framework decision of 13 June 2002, L 164/3 (22 June 2002).
151
Act of 24 June 2004, Stb. 2004, 290, which entered into force on 10 August 2004.
152
Rb. Rotterdam 10 March 2006, LJN AV5108. The organisation in question allegedly had the commission of
incitement (Article 131 Sr), possession of seditious materials (Article 132 Sr), inciting hatred (Article 137d Sr)
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organization only qualifies as a terrorist organization to the degree that its object is the commission of
terrorist crimes; the fact that its terrorist intentions extend to the commission of other, non-terrorist
crimes is immaterial in this respect. It is therefore of paramount importance that the definition of terrorist crimes in Article 83 Sr adequately reflects the ways in which terrorists operate. In the opinion of
the Court, however, this conclusion does not detract from the fact that a non-terrorist crime like incitement may be committed with a view to the commission of terrorist crimes. As a matter of fact, this
would be highly relevant in establishing whether an organization has the commission of terrorist
crimes as its object.
In Dutch substantive criminal law, there currently exists no definition of other types of serious crime.
From the definition of terrorist crimes in Article 83 Sr it follows that the difference between terrorist
and common crimes lies in the requirement that terrorist crimes be committed with terrorist intent.
This applies equally to all three categories of terrorist crimes: in respect of the first category, Article
83 Sr explicitly says so, whereas in respect of the latter two categories terrorist intent is required by
the appropriate statutory definitions. Terrorist intent is defined in Article 83a Sr, which reads (my
153
translation :
Terrorist intent is considered to be the intent to seriously frighten the population or part of the population of a country, to unlawfully compel a government or international organization to do, refrain from
doing or suffer any act, or to seriously disrupt or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional,
economic or social structures of a country or international organization.
The first part of this definition (“Terrorist intent [...] any act”) was inspired by Article 2(1[b]) of the
154
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
It is, however, not a
literal translation; some changes were made in order to accommodate the concept of an allencompassing United Nations treaty on terrorism. The term “seriously frighten” (“ernstige vrees aan
te jagen”) was preferred over “intimidate” (“intimideren’) because it makes clear that the frightening
of a population isn’t required to have resulted in its being intimidated. Furthermore, intimidation is
associated with direct confrontation, whereas frightening by indirect means is no less important. The
phrase “to unlawfully compel a government or international organization to do, refrain from doing or
suffer any act” (“een overheid of internationale organisatie wederrechtelijk te dwingen iets te doen,
niet te doen of te dulden”) was preferred over “to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” because it is broader and in keeping with Article 284 Sr,
which defines the crime of coercion. The second part of this definition (“or to seriously [...] organization”) was inspired by the concept referred to above.
As regards terrorist crimes, this question has been answered under 3.2; as regards the intent of participants in a criminal organization, I refer to 2.2.2: participation as an offence per se.
and threatening of serious crimes (Article 285 Sr) as its object, but only the latter crime qualifies as a terrorist
crime under Article 83 Sr.
153
Original Dutch: (Art. 83a) Onder terroristisch oogmerk wordt verstaan het oogmerk om de bevolking of een
deel der bevolking van een land ernstige vrees aan te jagen, dan wel een overheid of internationale organisatie
wederrechtelijk te dwingen iets te doen, niet te doen of te dulden, dan wel de fundamentele politieke, constitutionele, economische of sociale structuren van een land of een internationale organisatie ernstig te ontwrichten of te
vernietigen.
154
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York 9 December 1999,
Trb. 2000, 12; a Dutch translation was published in Trb. 2001, 62.
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As regards preparation, I refer to A.2.1.2: general provisions; as regards participation, I refer to
A.2.1.2: conspiracy. In that respect, it’s important to note that with the exception of Articles 103 and
122 Sr, all provisions in the Penal Code which criminalize conspiracy were either introduced or substantially amended by the Terrorist crimes act of 2004.
Under A.2.1.2: conspiracy I have remarked that the mere agreement to commit a criminal offence as a
rule isn’t punishable; conspiracy – which is only punishable where this has been explicitly provided –
is the only exception. In this respect it is important to note that where conspiracy is punishable, preparation generally is too; see under A.2.1.3: preparation: special provisions. In addition, there are a
number of provisions which define acts of participation as offences per se: see under A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se.
Recruitment
Article 205 Sr provides that recruiting another person for foreign military service or armed struggle
without official permission is punishable by a prison term not exceeding four years and/or a fine of the
155
Originally this provision only criminalized recruitment for foreign milififth category (€ 67.000).
tary service, as this may easily jeopardize foreign relations. Recruitment for armed struggle was added
by the Terrorist crimes act, which took away any doubt as might have existed regarding the object of
recruitment. Whereas previously it could be argued that only recruitment for service with a foreign
country’s armed forces – i.e. its regular troops – was punishable, the current provision explicitly extends to recruitment for armed struggle in any way, shape or form, including service with irregular
troops.
It is important to note that currently recruitment for armed struggle does not qualify as a terrorist offence, as Article 83 Sr doesn’t mention Article 205 Sr. An amendment to include Article 205 Sr was
156
defeated in parliament.
Forgery
The common offence of forgery has been defined in Article 225 Sr. Section (1) provides that forging a
document intended to prove any fact with the intent that it be used as genuine and true is punishable
by a prison term not exceeding six years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000); section (2)
provides that the intentional use, delivery or possession of a forged document is punishable by the
same penalties where the perpetrator knows or has reason to suspect its intended use. In addition,
section (3) – which was added by the Terrorist crimes act – provides that the maximum penalties under sections (1) and (2) may be increased by one third where the offences defined in those sections are
committed with the intent to prepare or facilitate a terrorist crime.
155
Article 205 Sr literally requires that no permission from the King was obtained, which may be explained from
the fact that the Dutch constitution previously required the King to consent to his subjects going into military
service of a foreign power.
156
Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 164, nr. 15.
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Weapons and explosives
Contraventions of the rules governing the use of weapons and explosives are criminalized in the Arms
157
158
and munitions act
and the Civil use of explosives act
respectively. Where such contraventions
are committed with terrorist intent, they may qualify as terrorist crimes; see Article 83 Sr, which mentions both Article 55(5) Arms and munitions act and Article 33b Civil use of explosives act.
Drugs offences
As regards drug offences, special mention must be made of Article 10a of the Opium act, which paved
159
the way for criminalization of preparation in general. Article 10a Opium act criminalizes the preparation of intentionally importing or exporting (Article 10[5] j° 2[A] Opium act), growing, preparing,
processing, selling, delivering, dispensing or transporting (Article 10[4] j° 2[B] Opium act) and producing (Article 10[5] j° 2[D] Opium act) of substances listed in Annex I to the Opium act, i.e. ‘hard
drugs’. It criminalizes the attempt to induce another person to commit such offences, either as a principal or an accessory, the attempt to obtain opportunity, means or information to commit such offences and possessing objects, means of transport, substances or means of payment he knows or has
reason to suspect are intended for the commission of such offences. These preparatory acts are punishable by a prison term not exceeding six years and/or a fine of the fifth category (€ 67.000).
exist?
Several types of conduct which encourage, foster or advance the criminal intentions of other have
been defined as offences per se. The application of the relevant provisions – whose inclusion in the
Penal Code derives from the dependency principle which governs participation – is not limited to
certain crimes or types of crime; they are discussed in greater detail under A.2.2.2: participation as an
offence per se.
one of these preparatory acts (for example, ‘recruitment’) and also for the commission of one of the
offences representing the ‘final aim’ (for example ‘commission of an act of terrorism’)? and, possibly,
also for the offence of association or participation in a terrorist or criminal group pursuing the same
aim (infra, B.3)?
In the answer to this question a distinction must be made between preparatory acts which have been
defined as offences per se and preparatory acts which are only punishable under the general provision
of Article 46 Sr. As regards the latter, the same individual may only be punished for the completed
offences, as the preparation of the offence is consumed by its completion; as regards the former, the
same individual may indeed be punished for preparing as well as for committing an offence, because
these are considered distinct offences. Likewise, the same individual may be punished for participation in a criminal or terrorist organization as well as for his participation in specific crimes the organization had as its object.
common offences?
Article 79 Sr does indeed contain a special provision regarding the attempt against state security, the
attempt on the life or liberty of the King, the King’s consort, the heir apparent or the spouse of the
latter, the attempt on the life or liberty of the head of a friendly nation and the attempt on the life or
157
Act of 5 July 1997, Stb. 1997, 292, most recently amended by Act of 7 April 2006, Stb. 2006, 236.
Act of 7 July 1994, Stb. 1994, 552, most recently amended by Act of 20 November 2006, Stb. 2006, 593.
159
Article 10a Opium act was introduced by Act of 4 September 1985, Stb. 1985, 495, preceding the introduction
of Article 46 Sr by a full nine years.
158
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liberty of an internationally protected person; see under A.2.1.1: attempt: special provisions. Where
these crimes where committed with terrorist intent, they qualify as terrorist crimes; see under A.3.2.
In addition to offences in respect of which joint commission serves as an aggravating circumstances
there are a number of provisions which define acts of participation as offences per se: see under
A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se.
Under A.2.1.2: conspiracy I have remarked that the mere agreement to commit a criminal offence as a
rule isn’t punishable; conspiracy – which is only punishable where this has been explicitly provided –
is the only exception. In addition, there are a number of provisions which define acts of participation
as offences per se: see under A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se. Of these, only Articles 135
and 136 Sr – which criminalize the failure to warn the authorities of another person’s intention to
commit an offence – relate to specific offences; under the other provisions the nature of the offence
the perpetrator intends to foster, encourage or advance is immaterial.
There are no explicit provisions – either of a procedural or a substantive nature – regarding proof of
participation in terrorism or other serious crime, so the general provisions on participation apply. The
burden of proof resting on the public prosecutor may, however, be alleviated considerably by provisions which criminalizes participation as an offence per se, as these do away with the constrictions
deriving from the dependency principle.
‘external’ help (on the part of non-associated individuals or through adequate social contributions, for
example, on the part of a lawyer, a doctor etc.) to the activities and associations constituting very
serious crime, or to individual associated?
See under A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se, where fostering, encouraging and advancing the
commission of criminal offences by individuals as well as organizations are discussed; participation in
terrorist organizations is discussed under 3.
3. Is there a separate offence for ‘terrorist’ association or organization or group, or for an organization
addicted to very serious crime, with respect to the conspiracy or mere complicity in such crimes? Or
are common offences (if the case, aggravated) for criminal association applied?
The common criminal organization is discussed under A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se; the
terrorist organization is discussed below. In respect of the latter, it is important to note that an organization only qualifies as a terrorist organization where it has the commission of terrorist crimes as its
object. Consequently, it needs to be established that the organization’s objective was the commission
of such crimes as are listed in Article 83 Sr which are considered terrorist crimes where they are
committed with terrorist intent in the sense of Article 83a Sr; see under A.3.1-3.2.
terms by the law?
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Criminal organizations are identified by their object, i.e. the commission of (terrorist) crimes; see
Articles 140 and 140a Sr respectively. Where an organization hasn’t made its criminal objectives
publicly known – which is hardly likely in respect of a common criminal organization, but certainly
possible in respect of a terrorist organization – its object must be determined in reference to the intentions of its participants: they must strive to bring about its criminal objectives.
The characteristics of common criminal organizations are discussed under A.2.2.2: participation as an
offence per se; terrorist organizations are discussed above.
Under Article 140(3) Sr the maximum term of imprisonment for participation in a criminal organization may be increased by a third in respect of its founders, leaders or directors; consequently, a prison
term not exceeding eight years may be imposed. Although according to this provision being a founder,
leader or director in itself does not amount to a criminal offence but serves as an aggravating factor in
respect of participation, it would be difficult to conceive of an example of a founder, leader or director
not participating. The terms ‘leader’ and ‘director’ seem to exclude the eventuality of leaders and
directors not participating, as they would by definition lead or direct an organization whose criminal
intentions have become manifest. As regards founders the theoretical possibility exists of them founding an organization which subsequently develops criminal intentions, but where they do not participate in the organization’s criminal activities they are unlikely to be prosecuted.
Under Article 140a(1) participation in a terrorist organization may be punished by a prison term not
exceeding fifteen years and/or a fine of € 67.000; Article 140a(2) Sr provides that founders, leaders or
directors of a terrorist organization may by punished by life imprisonment or a prison term not exceeding thirty years. Although the latter provision doesn’t say in so many words that merely founding,
leading or directing a terrorist organization does not amount to a criminal offence, in view of the affinity between Articles 140 and 140a Sr it must nonetheless be assumed that it only serves as an aggravating factor.
As participation in a criminal or terrorist organization has been defined as an offence per se, it’s irrelevant whether the organization’s criminal intentions have materialized; see under A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se. Consequently, there are no special rules for participants who were not
involved in the commission of specific crimes. If they were, they may be charged cumulatively, for
their participation in the organization as well as for their actual involvement in the crimes it had as its
object; see also under 4.
According to Article 91 Sr, Article 51 Sr – which provides for the criminal liability of legal persons
and their directors – applies to all criminal offences; see A.2.1.1: criminal liability of legal persons,
liability of directors. Consequently, a legal person and/or its directors may be held liable for participating in a criminal or terrorist organization.
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commit such acts?
and other matters, also audiovisual and on the internet, propaganda etc. linked to terrorism, separately
punished?
The expression or dissemination of opinions likely to encourage, foster or advance the terrorist intentions of others has indeed been criminalized; see under A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se.
Glorification of terrorist crimes as such will not be criminalized. Although there appeared to be ample
160
support in parliament to criminalize glorification of terrorist crimes , ultimately the government
decided against introducing a bill to that effect, in view of strong criticism from the judiciary, the
161
criminal bar and academics .
See under A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se. Because the expression or dissemination of incendiary opinions is completed once they have been made public, it’s immaterial whether such opinions have the intended effect, i.e. encouraging, fostering or advancing the crimes of others.
See under A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se. As regards this question, is should be noted that
– as the appropriate provisions define crimes per se – the applicable penalties do not in any way depend on the penalties provided for the crimes the perpetrator seeks to encourage, foster or advance.
Although the offences discussed under A.2.2.2: participation as an offence per se may in theory conflict with treaty or constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of thought and freedom of expression, there is hardly any Dutch case law on their compatibility with such guarantees. The reason for
this appears to be twofold: firstly, the enjoyment of the freedom of thought and the freedom of expression is always subject to limitations in order to prevent crime and secondly, the relevant statutory
provisions only criminalize the expression and dissemination of opinions whose incendiary nature is
162
evident.
The applicable penalties in respect of preparation and anterior participation are discussed under
A.2.1.4: preparation: general provisions; preparation: special provisions and A.2.2.1: principals: preliminary remarks; accessories, respectively.
160
Indeed, two motions urging the government to refrain from criminalising glorification of terrorist crimes failed
to be adopted; the first motion to that effect was defeated (Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 754, nr. 9; Handelingen
II 2004/05, 49, p. 3188-3189), the second motion was withdrawn by its proponents (Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 29
754, nr. 59; Handelingen II 2005/06, 21, p. 1331-1332).
161
Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 29 754, nr. 94 (bijlage).
162
The judgment of the Rotterdam District Court of 10 March 2006 discussed under A.3.1 provides a recent
example.
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6.1. Is the enforcement of the abovementioned penal indictments, what is the importance of the withdrawal from and/or a possible compensation, or of reconciliation with the victim/victims?
In the answer to this question, a distinction must be made between penalties on the one hand and
measures on the other hand. Penalties are of an essentially punitive nature: as they intentionally inflict
harm on the perpetrator of a criminal offence, they must be founded in his culpability; indeed, in the
absence of culpability no penalty may be imposed. Article 9 Sr distinguishes between principal penalties: imprisonment (Article 10 Sr), detention (Article 18 Sr), community service (Article 22c Sr) and
fine (Article 23 Sr) and additional penalties: deprivation of certain rights (Article 28 Sr), forfeiture
(Articles 33-34 Sr) and publication of the judgment (Article 36 Sr). Measures serve to protect society
from danger or – where such danger has manifested itself – to remedy the consequences of a criminal
offence. They comprise removal from circulation (Articles 36b-36d Sr), seizure of illegal gains (Article 36e Sr), compensation (Article 36f Sr), committal to a psychiatric hospital (Article 37 Sr), committal to an institution for the criminally insane (Articles 37a-38k Sr) and committal to an institution for
habitual offenders (Articles 38m-38u Sr).
The Dutch Penal Code does not provide for extraordinary sanctions in respect of victims of serious
crime or terrorism, so common sanctions apply. Of these, only compensation is of practical relevance.
Community service serves as an alternative for short custodial sanctions and in addition benefits the
community as a whole, goods removed from circulation are destroyed because of the danger they pose
to the public and illegal gains which are seized flow into the public coffers. Article 36f Sr provides
that the court which convicts a person of a criminal offence may impose the obligation to pay the
government a sum of money for the benefit of the victim, which the government upon receipt transfers
to the victim forthwith. The most important requirement for obliging the perpetrator of a criminal
offence to compensate the victim is that the perpetrator is liable for damages under private law. In
essence, the measure of compensation serves to alleviate the victim’s position, by sparing him the
necessity to bring a civil case against the perpetrator; if the perpetrator is found to be liable for damages, the government acts as bailiff on his behalf.
The Dutch prison system does indeed have special facilities for those convicted of serious and/or
terrorist crimes whose detention under normal conditions would pose unacceptable risks. Firstly, there
is an Extra Security Unit, designed for detainees who pose an extreme risk of flight as well as an unacceptable risk of recommitting serious violent offences or whose escape poses a socially unaccept163
able risk which prevails over the risk of flight. Secondly, there are two Terrorist Units, designed for
detainees suspected or convicted of terrorist crimes that have engaged or are engaging in expressing or
164
disseminating radicalist opinions. In these facilities, detainees lack many of the liberties awarded to
detainees under normal conditions. Their movements within the confines of the facility are severely
restricted, as are their contacts with the outside world. Although the regime in the Extra Security Unit
has been severely criticized from its inception – even provoking a critical report from the European
165
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and giving rise to a condemnation by the European Court
163
Rules on selection, assignment en transfer of detainees, Stcrt. 2000, 176, most recent revision published in
Stcrt. 2006, 181, Article 6.
164
Rules on selection, assignment en transfer of detainees, Article 20a.
165
Report to the Netherlands Government on the visit to the Netherlands carried out by the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 17 to 27 November 1997, CPT/Inf (98) 15 [EN], 29 September 1998, http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/nld/1998-15-infeng.htm#II.B.4. On a subsequent visit, conditions in the Extra Security Unit were found to have improved, although they were still far from perfect; see Report to the Authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the
visits carried out to the Kingdom in Europe and to the Netherlands Antilles by the European Committee for the
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166
of Human Rights
– there are currently no plans to dispense with it; indeed, the regime in the Terrorist Units has been modeled on the regime in the Extra Security Unit. As regards the Terrorist Units,
the question has recently been asked whether such restrictive measures might not prove counterproductive, in that they may strengthen the detainees in their radicalist beliefs. A critical television docu167
mentary
prompted two members of parliament to ask for the Justice Minister’s view on the mat168
ter . Although no answer has been received yet a radical change in policy seems unlikely; any
changes in the foreseeable future will likely be of a gradual, not a fundamental nature.
C. Other questions
As regards terrorism there are indeed several preventive measures in place or under consideration.
Firstly, a bill has been introduced in parliament which provides for administrative measures in the
169
interest of national security.
The rationale of this bill is that there may be real threats to national
security which criminal justice cannot adequately deal with, for instance where there no suspicion of a
criminal offence having been committed exists or where a suspect has been acquitted. The bill envisages two types of measures: restriction of a person’s freedom of movement and restriction of public
services. A person’s freedom of movement may be restricted in the interest of national security if his
conduct connects him to terrorist activity. He may be forbidden to dwell in certain localities or in the
vicinity of certain persons or he may be required to report to the police at certain times. Restrictions of
this type initially apply for a period of three months, which may be extended to a maximum of two
years. Public services may be restricted by rejecting applications for subsidies, permits or exemptions
or by withdrawing them if the person concerned may be connected to terrorist activity and a considerable risk exists that he will abuse the subsidy, permit or exemption to support it.
Secondly, there are a number of European instruments in place aimed at curtailing the financing of
170
terrorism. Each of these instruments has an appendix which lists persons, groups and other entities
involved in terrorism, which is periodically revised. They are implemented through the Sanctions Act
1977, which provides for administrative as well as criminal enforcement of the European rules on
171
freezing terrorist assets.
The Sanctions Act 1977, however, has a wider scope than the European
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in February 2002, CPT/Inf (2002) 30,
15 November 2002, http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/nld/2002-30-inf-eng.pdf.
166
ECHR 6 July 2006, application no. 8196/02 (Salah v. The Netherlands).
167
KRO Reporter, 29 April 2007, 20.45 hrs, Nederland 3. The documentary was entitled ‘Guantanamo Vught’,
referring to the location of the prison complex which also houses the Extra Security Unit; the other Terrorist Unit
is located in Rotterdam.
168
Kamervragen II 2006/07, nr. 2060714120.
169
Kamerstukken II 2006/06, 30 566, nrs. 1-2.
170
Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against
certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, L344, p. 70; Council Common Position
2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, L344, p. 93;
Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed
against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the
Taliban of Afghanistan, L139, p. 9.
171
Act of 15 February 1980, Stb. 93, revised by acts of 12 March 1986, Stb. 99, 4 June 1992, Stb. 422, 16 December 1993, Stb. 650, 10 July 1995, Stb. 355, 6 November 1997, Stb. 510, 13 April 2000, Stb. 196, 23 November 2000, Stb. 496, 16 May 2002, Stb. 270, 23 April 2003, Stb. 214, 17 December 2003, Stb. 2004, 9, 20 November 2006, Stb. 605 and 7 December 2006, Stb. 706.
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172
instruments in that – firstly – it applies to a greater number of European persons and organizations
and – secondly – it may provide for freezing assets which are located in The Netherlands only, pend173
ing revision of the European lists . Furthermore, the Sanctions Act 1977 provides for granting specific exemptions, for instance to allow a person access to sufficient means for sustenance.
Victims have no role in the application of the non-penal measures discussed under 1.
D. Reform proposals
Although legal doctrine has been largely critical of recent expansions of liability for preparation and
participation, there has been ample support for them in parliament and indeed in society at large. This
is made especially clear by the introduction of the bill on administrative measures in the interest of
national security discussed under C.1, which demonstrates that recent expansions of criminal liability
are still considered insufficient to adequately address the terrorist threat. In effect, the limits of criminal repression have been reached.
E. Final remarks
[p.m.]
Abbreviations
Art.
Article
Article
BW
Burgerlijk Wetboek
Civil Code
Handelingen I/II
Parliamentary Minutes (of the
First/Second Chamber of Parliament)
Hof
Gerechtshof
Court of Appeals
HR
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden
Supreme Court of the Netherlands
JOL
Jurisprudentie online
Online Case Law
Kamerstukken I/II
Parliamentary Documents (of
the First/Second Chamber of
Parliament)
Kamervragen I/II
Parliamentary Questions (of the
First/Second Chamber)
LJN
Landelijk jurisprudentienummer National Case Law Number
NJ
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
Dutch Law Reports
Rb.
Rechtbank
District Court
Sr
Wetboek van Strafrecht
Penal Code
172
173
Sanctieregeling terrorisme 2002 II, Stcrt. 2002, 138.
See for the most recent example the Sanctieregeling terrorisme 2007, Stcrt. 2007, 39.
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Stb.
Staatsblad
Stcrt.
Trb.
W.
Staatscourant
Tractatenblad
Weekblad van het Recht
Bulletin of Acts, Orders and
Decrees
Official Gazette
Bulletin of Treaties
Law Weekly
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Coloquio Preparatorio del XVIII Congreso Internacional de Derecho Penal
A Coruña (España), 5-8 septiembre 2007
Sección I. Parte General
“La expansión de las formas preparatorias y de participación”
POLONIA*
Barbara KUNICKA-MICHALSKA
A.
A.1. La más importante manifestación del fenómeno de la globalización a nivel penal interno parece
ser la introducción al Código Penal polaco la definición del delito de carácter terrorista en el art.115
párrafo 20 del Código Penal polaco, y el tenerlo en cuenta en las reformas de otras normas penales.
Más adelante vamos a hablar sobre esta definición, en el punto A.3.1.
Se observa también una clara tendencia a la expansión de las formas preparatorias y de participación.
Vamos a hablar sobre eso en el punto D (propuestas de reformas).
A.2.1.
A.2.1.1. Según el Código Penal polaco, incurrirá en responsabilidad penal por tentativa quien con la
intención de cometer el hecho prohibido propende directamente, mediante su comportamiento, a la
realización del hecho, que no obstante no se produce (art.13 párrafo 1 del CP). Se distingue la tentativa posible e imposible. La tentativa imposible tiene lugar, cuando el autor ignore que la ejecución del
hecho es imposible, por falta del objeto idóneo para cometer el hecho prohibido, o debido al empleo
de un medio impropio para cometer el hecho prohibido (art. 13 párrafo 2 del CP). El tribunal penaliza
por la tentativa dentro de los límites de las sanciones señaladas para la infracción de que se trate
(art.14 párrafo 1 del CP). En el caso de tentativa imposible, el tribunal podrá aplicar la atenuación
extraordinaria de la pena o renunciar la penalización (art.14 párrafo 2 del CP). El Código Penal polaco
prevé también el arrepentimiento espontáneo (activo). Así pues, quien voluntariamente desista del
hecho o impida el resultado delictivo, no incurrirá en la pena correspondiente a la tentativa (art. 15
párrafo 1 del CP). El tribunal podrá aplicar la atenuación extraordinaria de la pena al autor, que voluntariamente hubiera tratado de impedir el resultado delictivo (art.15 párrafo 2 del CP).
Estas son las reglas concebidas en la Parte General del CP, que, por lo general, tienen su aplicación en
los casos de todos delitos, en los cuales la tentativa puede tener lugar, en esto también en los casos de
delitos de carácter terrorista y en los casos de las demás formas muy graves de criminalidad. Sin embargo, existen delitos sui generis, que consisten en la tentativa, como el delito de golpe de Estado
(art.127 párrafo 1 del CP).
A.2.1.2. En el derecho penal polaco los actos preparatorios tienen lugar sólo en los casos, cuando el
autor, con la intención de cometer el hecho prohibido, emprende las acciones, cuyo fin es crear las
condiciones favorables al hecho, siempre que propendan directamente a la realización del hecho, especialmente con ese fin se concierta con otra persona, se procura o adopta medios, reúne informaciones o prepara un plan de acción (art.16 párrafo 1 del CP).
El concertarse con el fin de cometer el hecho prohibido constituye una forma de actos preparatorios,
aunque el actuar colectivamente y en acuerdo con otra persona constituye la autoría (coautoría).
Si se trata de los actos preparatorios, también está prevista la institución del arrepentimiento espontáneo (activo). Según el art.17 párrafo 1 del CP, no incurrirá en la pena por los actos preparatorios,
quien voluntariamente haya desistido de ellos, y en especial haya destruido los medios preparados o
*
Nota importante: El texto publicado es la última versión original del informe nacional enviado por la autora, sin
que se haya procedido a su revisión editorial por parte de la Revue.
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Polonia
haya evitado la posibilidad de que sean usados en el futuro; en caso de ponerse de acuerdo con otra
persona con el propósito de cometer el hecho prohibido, no incurrirá en la pena quien además emprendió importantes esfuerzos tendentes a evitar su comisión.
Como se indica en los arts. 17 párrafo 2 y 15 párrafo 1 del CP, no incurrirá en la pena por los actos
preparatorios quien voluntariamente desista de cometer el hecho o impida el resultado delictivo.
A.2.1.3. En el derecho penal polaco, los actos preparatorios no son punibles, salvo los casos que la ley
lo disponga (art. 16 párrafo 2 del CP). Entonces los actos preparatorios son punibles solamente en los
casos indicados por la ley, es decir cuando constituyen el delito sui generis.
En la Parte Especial del Código Penal polaco están previstos los siguientes delitos, en cuyos casos son
punibles los actos preparatorios:
1) El iniciar o el llevar a cabo la guerra de agresión (art.117 párrafo 2 del CP);
2) El crimen de genocidio (art. 118 párrafo 3 del CP);
3) El golpe de Estado contra Polonia o en el perjuicio del estado aliado, que asegura le reciprocidad
(art.127 párrafo 2 del CP), salvo el arrepentimiento espontáneo, definido en el art.131 párrafo 1 del
CP;
4) El golpe contra los órganos constitucionales del Estado polaco o en perjuicio del estado aliado, que
asegura la reciprocidad (art. 128 párrafo 2 y art. 318 párrafo 2 del CP), salvo del arrepentimiento espontáneo, definido en el art. 131 párrafo 2 del CP;
5) El golpe forzado contra unidad militar polaca (art. 140 párrafo 3 del CP;
6) Algunos delitos contra la seguridad pública (art. 168 del CP). Se trata especialmente de graves
delitos que crean la amenaza para la vida y la salud de numerosas personas o para el patrimonio en
grandes dimensiones, definidos en los arts. 163 párrafo 1, 165 párrafo 1, 166 párrafo 1, 167 párrafo 1
del CP;
7) El causar el catástrofe del tráfico (tránsito), que amenaza la vida o la salud de numerosas personas o
del patrimonio en grandes dimensiones (art. 175 del CP);
8) El delito de toma en rehén (art. 252 párrafo 3 del CP);
9) La falsificación de documentos (art. 270 párrafo 3 del CP);
10) La falsificación de moneda (de billetes) o de papeles (valores) de mercado o el ponerlos falsos en
circulación (art. 310 párrafo 4 del CP).
Algunos de los delitos enumerados pueden tener el carácter terrorista, si son conformes con la definición del delito de carácter terrorista, que contiene el art. 115 párrafo 20 del CP polaco.
Los actos preparatorios son punibles también en algunos casos de delitos definidos en las leyes penales complementarias. Así, por ejemplo, la Ley sobre la prevención de la narcomanía del 2005 prevé la
pena privativa de libertad hasta 2 o 3 años (depende del tipo del delito) por los actos preparatorios a
los delitos relacionados con drogas (estupefacientes) y sustancias parecidas.
En algunos casos incurre en la pena sólo el entrar en concurso, es decir esta forma de los actos preparatorios que consiste en ponerse de acuerdo con otra persona con el fin de cometer del hecho prohibido. Esta situación tiene lugar en los casos de algunos delitos, como: ponerse de acuerdo un soldado
con otros soldados con el fin de cometer el delito de no cumplir con la orden (art.343 párrafo 3 del
CP).
A.2.1.4. En cuanto a las penas previstas en los casos cuando los actos preparatorios son punibles, hay
que destacar, que las penas por actos preparatorios son mucho más bajas que las penas previstas para
la realización del hecho.
Es interesante, que en Polonia el delito de no denunciar algunos delitos (enumerados en la norma)
consiste en no denunciar no sólo la realización del hecho, sino también la tentativa y los actos preparatorios, cuando sean punibles (art.240 del CP).
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A.2.2.1. Si se trata del concurso de personas en la comisión de la infracción, en el derecho penal polaco se diferencian:
1) la autoría, que tiene varias categorías;
2) la instigación;
3) la complicidad.
Ad.1) En el Código Penal polaco se puede distinguir categorías de autoría. Según el art. 18 párrafo 1
del CP, incurrirá en responsabilidad penal por la autoría no sólo él, que ejecutase el hecho prohibido,
solo o conjuntamente y en acuerdo con otra persona, pero también él, quién dirige la ejecución por
otra persona del hecho prohibido, o manda la ejecución de tal hecho, aprovechándose de la sujeción de
la persona.
Así, se distinguen:
- la autoría personal (individual);
- la coautoría;
- la autoría dirigente;
- la autoría consistente en el mandar tal acción.
El autor personal (individual) es él, que ejecuta el hecho personalmente.
El coautor es quien ejecuta el hecho prohibido conjuntamente y de acuerdo con otra persona.
El autor dirigente es el, quien dirige de la ejecución por otra persona del hecho prohibido.
El autor que manda es quien, aprovechándose de la sujeción de otra persona, la ordena la ejecución
del hecho prohibido.
Ad 2) De acuerdo con el art.18, párrafo 2 del CP polaco, incurrirá en responsabilidad por instigación
el quien, queriendo que otra persona cometa el hecho prohibido, la incita a ello.
Ad 3) Según el art.18 párrafo 3 del CP polaco, incurrirá en responsabilidad por complicidad el quien,
con la intención de que la otra persona cometa el hecho prohibido, por su comportamiento le facilita
su comisión, especialmente procurando el medio, los medios de transporte, proporcionando consejos o
informaciones. Responde por la complicidad también quien en contra a la obligación jurídica especial
de no admitir a cometer el hecho prohibido, por su comportamiento le facilita a la otra persona el
comisión.
A.2.2.2. Por la instigación y la complicidad, el tribunal fijará la pena dentro de los límites de las sanciones previstas para la autoría (art.19 párrafo 1 del CP).
Cada participante en el cometer el hecho prohibido, responde dentro de los límites de su acción intencionada o involuntaria, independientemente de la responsabilidad de los demás participantes (art.20
del CP polaco).
Las circunstancias personales, eximentes, atenuantes o agravantes de la responsabilidad penal, sólo se
tomarán en consideración en el caso de la persona a la cual se refieren los mismos (art.21 párrafo 1 del
CP).
Si la circunstancia personal (la característica particular) del autor, influyente aunque sea sólo en la
agravación de la pena, constituye un elemento constitutivo del hecho prohibido, el participante incurrirá en la responsabilidad penal prevista para este hecho prohibido si ha sabido (ha estado consciente)
de esta circunstancia (característica), aunque no le ateñía (art.21 párrafo 2 del CP). Si esto no le atañe
al participante, el tribunal puede aplicar la atenuación extraordinaria de la pena (art.21 párrafo 3 del
CP).
Fijando la pena por la complicidad, el tribunal puede aplicar la atenuación extraordinaria de la pena
(art.19 párrafo 2 del CP).
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Si hubiere sólo tentativa, el instigador y el cómplice incurrirán en responsabilidad por la tentativa
(art.22 párrafo 1 del CP). Si no hubiere tentativa del hecho prohibido, el tribunal puede aplicar la
atenuación extraordinaria de la pena o renunciar su imposición (art.22 párrafo 2 del CP).
Según el art. 23 párrafo 1 del CP no incurrirá en la pena, el participante, que voluntariamente impida
la realización del hecho prohibido. De acuerdo con el art. 23 párrafo 2 del CP, el tribunal puede aplicar la atenuación extraordinaria de la pena al participante quien voluntariamente trataba de evitar la
realización del hecho prohibido.
Incurre en responsabilidad penal por instigación así llamado "provocador”, es decir quien incita a otra
persona a cometer el hecho prohibido con el fin de que se ejercite la acción penal contra ella (art. 24
del CP). En este caso no se aplica ventajas previstas en los arts.22 y 23 del CP, sobre las cuales ya se
ha dicho.
A.3.1. Polonia está comprometida con diferentes convenios (multilaterales) relacionados con el terrorismo, especialmente con el Convenio Europeo sobre la lucha contra el terrorismo (Estrasburgo 27 de
enero 1977), Dz.U. 1999, No 17, pos.557 y 558 (1) y con el Protocolo del 15 de mayo del 2003 de
este Convenio (Dz.U. 2004, No 172, pos.1803).
Como efecto de la implementación en el derecho interno de la Decisión marco del Consejo de la
Unión Europea del 13 de junio del 2002 sobre la lucha contra el terrorismo (2), el legislador polaco ha
introducido al Código Penal polaco la definición del delito de carácter terrorista, por la Ley del 16 de
abril del 2004 (Dz.U. 2004, No 93, pos.889). La definición fue introducida al nuevo párrafo 20 del
art.115 del CP. Art.115 del CP trata sobre las “Explicaciones de las nociones (los términos de la Ley”,
y está situado en la Parte General del Código Penal.
Según el nuevo párrafo 20 del art.115 del CP, el hecho prohibido de carácter terrorista es el hecho, por
cuya comisión está prevista la pena privativa de libertad de duración máxima de, al menos, cinco
años, y que ha sido cometido con el fin de:
1) intimidación considerable de muchas personas,
2) el forzamiento del órgano del poder público de la República de Polonia o de otro estado o del órgano de la organización internacional a que emprendan determinadas acciones o las desistan,
3) provocar perturbaciones considerables en el régimen del gobierno o en la economía de la República
de Polonia, de otro estado o de la organización internacional - así como la amenaza de cometer tal
hecho.
Esta definición no consiste en la definición del delito de terrorismo, sino trata sobre el delito de carácter terrorista. Esto indica que el carácter terrorista puede tener varios delitos, concebidos en el CP o en
leyes complementarias, si están en conformidad con la definición citada.
La definición mencionada no es un traslado literal de la definición de la Decisión - marco, sin embargo constituye una implementación suficiente, ya que los fines son evaluados de acuerdo con la Decisión marco.
En Polonia se ha adicionado un requisito (una condición), que trata solamente de hechos prohibidos
castigados con pena privativa de libertad, cuyo límite máximo sean, al menos, de 5 años.
En la definición polaca, contenida en el art. 115 párrafo 20 del CP, se ha desistido de la enumeración
de los delitos, mencionados en las letras a-i del punto 1 del artículo 1 de la Decisión - marco, sin embargo estos delitos en Polonia constituyen delitos, según las normas penales de la parte especial del
derecho penal polaco. Su comisión con el objetivo mencionado en la definición del delito de carácter
terrorista (art.115 párrafo 20 del CP) les concede el carácter terrorista (si el límite máximo de la pena
privativa de libertad, prevista por dado delito, sea, al menos, de 5 años).
La perpetración de carácter terrorista, así como la perpetración actuando en una banda organizada o en
una asociación, que tiene como objetivo la perpetración, es la circunstancia agravante que causa la
agravación extraordinaria de la pena (art.65 del CP).
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El problema del terrorismo despierta el gran interés de los penalistas polacos (3).
Constituyen delitos también otras formas de la delincuencia muy grave.
Polonia el 2 de octubre del 2001 ha ratificado la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la criminalidad organizada transnacional, aprobada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el 15 de
noviembre del 2000 (Dz.U. 2005, No 18, pos.158 y 159). Vale la pena recordar que Polonia fue la
iniciadora de esta Convención. Polonia el día 18 de agosto de 2003 ha ratificado el Protocolo contra la
trata de personas, en particular de mujeres y niños, adicional a la Convención contra la criminalidad
organizada transnacional (Dz.U. 2005 No 18, pos.160 y 161). Polonia ha ratificado también (el 29 de
agosto del 2003) el Protocolo contra el tráfico ilícito de emigrantes por tierra, mar y aire, que complementa la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la criminalidad organizada transnacional,
aprobado el 15 de noviembre del 2000 por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (Dz.U. 2005
No 18, pos.162 y 163).
Polonia ha ratificado también otras Convenciones relacionadas con varias formas de grave criminalidad transnacional, como relacionadas con tráfico de drogas o estupefacientes, tráfico de armas, tráfico
de personas, con el blanqueo de dinero, la corrupción, las acciones ilícitas relacionadas con la prostitución, el abuso sexual de los niños, en esto - la pornografía.
Polonia está comprometida con muchos instrumentos jurídicos de la Unión Europea, como, por ejemplo, ya mencionada, Decisión -marco del 2000, que definió en términos jurídico-penales el marco del
fenómeno de terrorismo y los instrumentos fundamentales de lucha contra este fenómeno, las Decisiones-marco sobre la orden europea de detención o la adquisición de pruebas documentales, así como el
comiso de los productos de crimen, contra los ataques informáticos, el tráfico de drogas o de armas de
fuego, la trata de seres humanos, etc. Polonia ha implementado sus regulaciones al derecho interno.
Pero el tamaño de este informe no da posibilidades para hablar sobre todos los aspectos. Entonces
vamos a hablar solamente sobre algunas cuestiones.
El tráfico (la trata) de personas, aun con su consentimiento, constituye un delito del art. 253 del CP la pena privativa de libertad de mínimo 3 hasta 15 años. En el párrafo 2 del art. 253 del CP se castigan
las actividades relacionadas con el organizar la adopción ilícita de niños - la pena privativa de libertad
de 3 meses hasta 5 años.
La seducción o el secuestro (rapto) de otra persona con el fin de prostituirse ella en el extranjero están
castigados con la pena de privación de la libertad de 1 hasta 10 años (art. 204 párrafo 4 del CP).
Según el art.8 de regulaciones que introducen al CP, por el hecho de causar la entrega de otra persona
en la esclavitud o por el tráfico de esclavos, se prevé la pena privativa de libertad de mínimo 3 hasta
15 años.
Los delitos relacionados con las drogas (estupefacientes), sustancias psicotrópicas, paja de adormidera
y precursores están regulados en la Ley de 29 de julio del 2005 sobre la prevención de la narcomanía
(Dz.U. 2005, No 179, pos.1485 con cambios posteriores).
El blanqueo de dinero (de ingresos del delito) - constituye delito concebido en el art. 299 del CP. En
Polonia este delito tiene ámbito amplio, ya que se trata de ingresos de cada delito y no sólo de los
delitos más graves. Por el delito de blanqueo de dinero está prevista la pena de privación de la libertad
de 6 meses hasta 8 años (art. 299 párrafo 1 del CP). Si el autor actúa de acuerdo con otras personas,
así como si obtiene el provecho patrimonial considerable - la pena es más severa, es decir de 1 año
hasta 10 años (art.299 párrafo 5 del CP).
No incurre en la pena por blanqueo de dinero el autor, en el caso del arrepentimiento espontáneo, es
decir cuando el autor voluntariamente revela, ante los órganos perseguidores, las informaciones sobre
las personas participantes en la comisión del delito y sobre las circunstancias de su comisión, si esto
evitó la comisión de otro delito. Cuando el autor ha tratado de revelar estas informaciones y circunstancias, el tribunal aplicará la atenuación extraordinaria de la pena (art.299 párrafo 8 del CP).
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El tráfico ilegal de armas de fuego o de municiones consiste el delito previsto en el art. 263 del CP, así
como la producción de armas de fuego y las municiones (la pena privativa de libertad de 1 hasta 10
años). Por la tenencia ilegal de armas de fuego o municiones está prevista la pena de privación de la
libertad de 6 meses hasta 8 años.
La falsificación de moneda constituye el delito del art. 310 del CP. La pena prevista por este delito es
la de privación de la libertad de 5 hasta 15 años o la pena de 25 años de privación de la libertad.
La falsificación de documentos está castigada con la pena de multa, la de la limitación de la libertad o
de privación de la libertad de 3 meses hasta 5 años (art. 270 del CP).
El delito de toma en rehén con el objetivo (fin) de forzar al comportamiento determinado, está previsto en el art. 252 del CP polaco, con la pena de privación de la libertad de 1 hasta 10 años. Si la consecuencia del hecho será la muerte de la persona o grave perturbación de su salud - la pena prevista es la
de privación de la libertad de 2 hasta 12 años.
No incurrirá en la pena el autor, que desiste de la intención de extorsionar y pone en libertad a la persona tomada en rehén (el arrepentimiento activo).
El tráfico de células, tejidos u órganos constituye el delito previsto en el art.44 de la Ley de 1 de julio
de 2005 sobre la extracción, la conservación y el transplante de células, tejidos y órganos con la pena
privativa de la libertad de 3 hasta 15 años (Dz.U.2005 No 169, pos.1411).
El tráfico de emigrantes puede ser castigado sobre todo según el art.264 párrafo 3 del CP. Esta norma
prevé la pena de privación de la libertad de 6 meses hasta 8 años por el organizar para otras personas
de cruzamiento ilegal (ilícito) de frontera de la República de Polonia.
Entre los delitos contra la administración de justicia se encuentra, entre otros, el delito de usar la violencia o amenaza ilegal con el objetivo de ejercer la influencia en el testigo, perito, traductor, acusador
o acusado, o en relación con esto la violación de su intangibilidad corporal (art.245 del CP) - la pena
de privación de la libertad de 3 meses hasta 5 años). Se conoce también el delito de influenciar a las
diligencias formales del tribunal, con violencia o amenaza ilegal (la pena privativa de libertad de 3
meses hasta 5 años) - art.232 del CP.
El ejercer la influencia con violencia o amenaza ilegal en las diligencias formales del órgano constitucional de la República de Polonia es el delito contra la República de Polonia - art.128 párrafo 3 del CP
(la pena de privación de la libertad de 1 año hasta 10 años).
Existen también las normas penales que prevén las penas por otras formas de la delincuencia de que se
trata, especialmente por la corrupción y por la explotación de la prostitución, el abuso sexual de niños
y el usarlos en la pornografía, así como por los delitos informáticos. En esta materia le recomendamos
al lector la bibliografía presentada en la nota 4 (4).
B) 3.
La norma penal muy importante es la norma del art.258 del CP polaco. Esta norma contiene el delito
específico, que consiste en formar parte de una banda organizada (un grupo organizado) o de una
asociación, que tienen como objetivo la comisión del delito (o delito fiscal). El art.258 párrafo 1 del
CP prevé por este delito la pena de privación de la libertad de 3 meses hasta 5 años. La pena más
severa (de 6 meses hasta 8 años) está prevista en el caso de la banda (del grupo) o la asociación que
tiene el carácter armado o tiene como objetivo la comisión del delito de carácter terrorista (art.258
párrafo 2 del CP).
Para el autor que crea o dirige la banda o la asociación está prevista la pena privativa de libertad de 1
año hasta 10 años, y si se trata de la banda (del grupo) o asociación que tiene como objetivo (fin) la
comisión del delito de carácter terrorista - la pena privativa de libertad de duración mínima de 3 años
(hasta 15 años) - art.258 párrafo 4 del CP. No incurre en la pena por ese delito (definido en el art. 258
del CP) él que voluntariamente renuncie la participación en la banda (en el grupo) o en la asociación y
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revele ante el órgano de persecución de delitos todas las circunstancias substanciales del hecho cometido o evite la comisión del delito intentado (en esto también del delito fiscal) -art.259 del CP.
B) 4.
En Polonia es vigente la Ley del 28 de octubre del 2002 sobre la responsabilidad de sujetos colectivos
por los hechos prohibidos, castigados con la pena (Dz.U. 2002, No 197, pos.1661 con cambios posteriores). En Polonia la responsabilidad del sujeto colectivo (de la persona jurídica) no es la responsabilidad independiente (autonómica) del sujeto colectivo, sino que es la responsabilidad por el hecho
prohibido que constituye el comportamiento de la persona física, la persona que está vinculada con el
sujeto colectivo de manera determinada en la Ley. Además, el sujeto colectivo responde solamente en
los casos cuando este comportamiento ha causado o podía causar beneficios para el sujeto colectivo,
aunque no patrimonial. La Ley contiene una larga lista de delitos (de tipos delictivos), cuando tiene
lugar esta responsabilidad de sujetos colectivos. En la lista figuran, entre otros, los delitos de carácter
terrorista, el delito de participación en la banda (el grupo) organizada o en la asociación que tiene
como objetivo la comisión del delito, en esto también los que tienen el carácter armado o tienen como
objetivo cometer delito de carácter terrorista, así como otras muy graves formas de delincuencia.
B) 5.
En el Código Penal polaco hay delito autónomo (sui generis), consistente en exhortación pública a
cometer delito, así como en la aprobación pública de la comisión del delito. Se trata de toda clase de
delito, no solamente de carácter terrorista (art.255 del CP). También existe el delito sui generis de
hacer propaganda pública al régimen de estado fascista u otro totalitario o la exhortación al odio a
causa de diferencia de nacionalidad, las étnicas, raciales, de la religión o por falta de fe (art.256 del
CP).
C.
Una medida de prevención especial, que no tiene carácter penal, es la obligación que tienen varios
sujetos, entre otros, las instituciones financieras (en esto los bancos), consistente en registrar las transacciones financieras, que exceden la cuota de 15 000 Euros (junto con la identificación del cliente y
los beneficiarios de la transacción) y en el caso de transacciones "sospechosas" - la obligación de
registrarlas independientemente de la cuota, de su valor (precio). Los datos tienen que ser transmitidos
al Inspector General de la Información Financiera. Esta obligación está prevista en la Ley del 16 de
noviembre del 2000 sobre la prevención de la puesta en la circulación financiera de valores de propiedad provenientes de fuentes ilegales o no reveladas, como también sobre la financiación del terrorismo (Dz.U. 2003, No 153, pos.150 con cambios posteriores).
Otras medidas de prevención son diferentes medidas procesales previstas en las leyes así llamados "
policiales", concernientes a los órganos para los asuntos de la lucha contra la delincuencia, en esto en
la Ley sobre el Buró Central de Anticorrupción.
Si se trata de las víctimas de los delitos con uso de violencia, a parte de los mecanismos de naturaleza
civil, el legislador polaco ha promulgado le Ley del 7 de julio del 2005 sobre la compensación (indemnización) estatal para las víctimas de algunos delitos intencionales (Dz.U. 2005 No 169,
pos.1415). Se trata de las víctimas de los delitos intencionales cometidos con uso de violencia, en los
casos cuando la víctima ha muerto o ha sufrido determinadas lesiones corporales. La compensación
está limitada, ya que no puede rebasar la cuota de 12.000 zlotys polacos.
D.
Actualmente en Polonia se elaboró el Proyecto gubernamental de la Ley sobre la reforma del Código
Penal y algunas otras leyes. Las modificaciones previstas en el Proyecto son numerosas. Algunas se
refieren a las cuestiones presentadas en este informe.
Uno de los rasgos característicos del Proyecto es la clara tendencia a la expansión de las formas preparatorias y de participación.
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Si se trata de los actos preparatorios, aunque no se propone cambiar el principio de que los actos preparatorios son punibles sólo en los casos previstos por la Ley, tampoco se propone el cambio de la
definición de los actos preparatorios (art.16 del CP), se propone importante ampliación del catálogo de
delitos, cuya preparación será punible. Entonces a los casos de la punibilidad de la preparación, enumerados en este informe, se añadió los nuevos, en esto, por ejemplo se propone la punición de los
actos preparatorios en los casos:
a) Los actos preparatorios para el crimen de homicidio de tipo básico y algunos tipos calificados. La
pena prevista sería de 2 hasta 15 años (art.148 párrafo 5 del CP en la versión del Proyecto). La falta de
la penalización por los actos preparatorios al homicidio fue criticada ya hace muchos años por el Profesor Dr. Jerzy Sliwowski –el gran penalista polaco.
b) Los actos preparatorios a algunos delitos contra la seguridad pública, en cuales casos actualmente
los actos preparatorios no son penalizados (art.164 párrafo 1 del CP y art. 168 del CP en la versión del
Proyecto).
c) Actos preparatorios al nuevo delito de la financiación del terrorismo, propuesto en el Proyecto (art.
165a del Proyecto y art. 168 del CP en la versión del Proyecto).
d) Actos preparatorios al delito de tráfico de personas, aún con su consentimiento (el nuevo párrafo
1a del art.253 del CP, propuesto en el Proyecto).
e) Y en algunos casos más.
En el Proyecto se propone una modificación de la definición de la autoría, incluyendo la forma de
autoría consistente en el encargo para otra persona la ejecución del acto prohibido a cambio del brindado o prometido beneficio material o personal.
Si se trata del nuevo delito del financiamiento del terrorismo, en el Proyecto se propone la siguiente
norma (art. 165a del CP):
“Quien reúne, transfiere u ofrece medios de pago, valores, divisas, derechos de propiedad u otros
bienes móviles o inmuebles con el objetivo de financiar el delito de carácter terrorista” ( con la pena
de privación de la libertad de 3 hasta 15 años).
La proposición está vinculada con la Convención de la ONU del 1999 sobre la lucha contra la financiación del terrorismo.
En el Proyecto se propone también la nueva norma penal que prevé la pena por falsos alarmas sobre
bombas y otras acciones similares (art.172a del CP propuesto en el Proyecto).
En el Proyecto se propone ampliar los elementos constitutivos del delito de no denunciación. El actual
catálogo de los delitos abarcados por la obligación de denunciarlos (en el art.240 del CP y en algunas
leyes complementarias) se amplía con los delitos de carácter terrorista, la catástrofe de tránsito, el
tráfico de personas aún con el consentimiento de ellas, algunos delitos contra la seguridad pública, el
iniciar o desarrollar la guerra agresiva, el nuevo delito de la financiación del terrorismo, propuesto en
el Proyecto.
Se propone introducir al Código Penal nuevas normas concernientes a varios comportamientos vinculados a violencia relacionada con un evento masivo, concentración o lugar público (art. 254a, 254b,
254c, 254d y 254e del CP, propuesto en el Proyecto).
En el Proyecto se introduce también muchas otras modificaciones (ya que el Proyecto es muy amplio);
sobre todo se agrava machas penas, lo cual es criticado por parte de muchos penalistas polacos.
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NOTAS
(1) El texto polaco de la Convención fue publicado, entre otros, en el libro: Standardy prawne Rady
Europy, Teksty i komentarze.Tom III.Prawo karne. Redaktor naukowy: Eleonora Zielinska, Instytut
Wymiaru Sprawiedliwosci. Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 1997 (Estándares jurídicos del Consejo de
Europa. Textos y Comentarios, tomo III. Derecho Penal. A cargo científico de Eleonora Zielinska. El
Instituto de la Administación de la Justicia, Editorial Científica.Varsovia 1997), p. 425 ss. Ver tambien Andrzej Marek, Komentarz do Europejskiej Konwencji o zwalczaniu terroryzmu (Comentario a
la Convención Europea sobre la lucha contra el terrorismo), en el mismo libro, p. 432 ss.
(2) Esta Decisión fue publicada en el idioma polaco, entre otros, en el libro: Prawo Wspólnot Europejskich a prawo polskie. Documenty karne. Czesc II. Redaktor naukowy : Eleonora Zielinska. Instytut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwosci. Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2005 (El Derecho de las Comunidades
Europeas y el Derecho polaco. Documentos penales. Parte II. A cargo científico de Eleonora Zielinska. Instituto de la Administración de la Justicia. Editorial Científica. Varsovia 2005), p. 483 ss.Ver
también Filip Jasinski, Eleonora Zielinska, Comentario, en el mismo libro, p.494 ss.
Ver también, entre otros, Marie- Aude Beernaert, La décision -cadre de 13 juin 2002 relative a la lutte
contre le terrorisme, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal 2006 No 77 (1 et 2 trimestres ), " Le Droit
Pénal de l' Union Européenne, p. 277- 284.
(3) Ver trabajos punlicados en el libro a cargo científico de Krzysztof Indecki: Przestępczosc terrorystyczna. Ujecie praktyczno-dogmatyczne (La delincuencia de carácter terrorista. En enfoque práctico y
dogmático), Poznan-Bialystok- Lodz 2006 y alli citada (pags. 310-323) la bibliografía seleccionada
sobre el terrrismo, publicada en Polonia en los años 2001 -2005 (según el estado para la fecha del 5 de
mayo del 2006), reunida por Krzysztof Indecki, que abarca 214 publicaciones.
(4) Para más detalles sobre los problemas mencionados en este informe ver por ejemplo: Marian Cieslak: Pologne/Poland, Le système penal a l'épreuve du crime organisé, Revue Internationale de Droit
Pénal, 3 et 4 trimestres 1997, p.939 - 953; Barbara Kunicka- Michalska: Pologne/Poland, Les systèmes de justice penale a l'épreuve du crime organisé, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 1 et 2 trimestres 1998, p.463-483; Barbara Kunicka-Michalska: Pologne/Poland, Informe nacional polaco
sobre la corrupción en las transacciones comerciales internationales, para una de la Secciones del
Congreso de la AIDP en Pekin, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, Número dedicado al Coloquio
Preparatorio en Tokio, en francés; Barbara Kunicka-Michalska: Niños como víctimas de la pornografía infantíl : las enmiendas al Código Penal polaco, en el libro: Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.
Festschrift in honour of Irene Melup, Bangkok, 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice, April 2005, p. 513- 520; Emil Plywaczewski, Stanislaw Waltos: Organized Crime in Poland,
Nouvelles Etudes Pénales, 1998, No 16 “ Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Area”, p.153-174; Emil
Plywaczewaski, Stanislaw Waltos: Organized Crime in Poland, informe nacional para el Congreso de
la AIDP en Budapest, Revue Internnationale de Droit Pénal, número dedicado al Coloquio Preparatorio en Guadalajara (Mexico); Stanislaw Waltos: International Jurisdiction Over Organized Crime,
Nouvelles Etudes Pénales 1998, No 16 “ Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Area”, p. 249-259; Juan
Carlos Ferré Olivé, Enzo Musco, Barbara Kunicka-Michalska, Jorge Almeida Cabral y Otros: Fraude
de subvenciones comunitarias y corrupción. Edición a cargo de Juan Carlos Ferré Olivé, Ediciones
Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca 2002; Juan Carlos Ferré Olivé, Enzo Musco, Barbara KunickaMichalska, Jorge Almeida Cabral y Otros: Blanqueo de dinero y corrupción en el sistema bancario.
Edicion a cargo de Juan Carlos Ferré Olivé, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca 2002 ;
Juan Carlos Ferré Olivé, Enzo Musco, Barbara Kunicka - Michalska i inni Autorzy ( y otros Autores):
Korupcja w sektorze prywatnym, Corupción en el sector privado, Corruzione nel settore privato, Corrupção no sector privado, redaktor naukowy (a cargo científico de) Juan Carlos Ferré Olivé, Instytut
Nauk Prawnych Polskiej Akademii Nauk (Instituto de Ciencias Jurídicas de la Academia Polaca de
Ciencias), Edición SCHOLAR, Varsovia 2004; Juan Carlos Ferré Olivé, Enzo Musco, Barbara Kunicka-Michalska, Jorge Almeida Cabral y Otros: Fraude y corrupción en la Administración Pública, Edi-
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ción a cargo de Juan Carlos Ferré Olivé, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca 2003; Juan
Carlos Ferré Olivé, Enzo Musco, Barbara Kunicka-Michalska, Jorge Almeida Cabral y Otros: Cooperación policial y judicial en materia de delitos financieros, fraude y corrupción. Edición a cargo de
Juan Carlos Ferré Olivé, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca 2003; Juan Carlos Ferré
Olivé, Enzo Musco, Barbara Kunicka-Michalska, Jorge Almeida Cabral and other Autors: Grotius II
Penal Programme, Penal Legislation in the Fight Against Financial Crimes, Fraud and Corruption,
Computer Fraud and Internet Crimes, Spain, Italia, Portugal and Poland, Universidad de Salamanca.
Fundacion General, 2004; Wojciech Cebulak, Emil W.Plywaczewski, Prostitution in the United States
and Poland, Edición Temida 2, Bialystok 2007.
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George ANTONIU / Florin STRETEANU**
A.1 Questions générales
Le phénomène de la globalisation de la criminalité n'est pas resté sans conséquences au niveau du
droit pénal roumain. Le législateur a rapidement réagi après la ratification des principales Conventions
internationales qui ont marqué le développement de ce processus. Par exemple, la Convention contre
la criminalité organisée transnationale (2000) a été ratifiée par la loi no.565 de 2002; La Convention
internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme, adoptée par L’Assemblée générale des
Nations-Unies le 9 décembre 1999, a été ratifiée par la Loi no.623 de 2002 et ses dispositions ont été
reprises par la Loi no.535 de 2004 sur la prévention et la répression du terrorisme, ainsi que par
d’autres lois internes notamment en matière de blanchiment d’argent; la Convention internationale
pour la répression des actes de terrorisme nucléaire, signée à New-York le 24 septembre 2005 a été
ratifiée par la Loi no.369 de 2006; La Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la prévention du terrorisme, signée à Varsovie le 16 mai 2005, a été ratifiée par la Loi no.411 de 2006. Par suite de ces
documents internationaux, le nouveau code pénal roumain (adopté par la Loi no.301/2004) a incriminé le terrorisme (art.295-300), le crime organisé (art.354-356), le trafic de personnes (art.204); le
trafic d’immigrants (art.330), le trafic de mineurs (art.205), la pornographie infantile (art.238), la
corruption des fonctionnaires internationaux (art.308), le trafic de drogues (art.386-390), les infractions contre les systèmes informatiques (art.440-446), les crimes et délits contraires aux intérêts financiers de l’Union Européenne (art.479-484) etc.
Le nouveau code pénal n’est pas entré jusqu’à présent en vigueur, par conséquent les faits mentionnés
continueront à rester dans des lois spéciales d’où le nouveau code les a assumées (par exemple, La loi
no.656/2002 sur le financement des actes de terrorisme; la Loi no.678/2001 sur le trafic de personnes;
la Loi no.78/2000 sur les faits de corruption; la Loi no.143/2000 sur les drogues; la Loi no.39/2003
sur le crime organisé; la Loi no.575/2004 sur le terrorisme; la Loi no.196/2000 pour la prévention et la
lutte contre la pornographie, etc.).
A.2 La loi roumaine, de règle, n’incrimine pas les actes de préparations à l’infraction. Cette règle
générale admet deux catégories d’exceptions: la première concerne le cas où le législateur a assimilé
les actes préparatoires aux actes d’exécution de sorte que les actes préparatoires seront sanctionnés à
titre de tentative. Par l’assimilation, est considéré l’acte d’exécution le fait de fabriquer ou de se procurer des moyens et des instruments, ainsi que le fait de prendre des mesures en vue de
l’accomplissement des infractions prévues par les articles 156, 157, 159-166).
La deuxième exception est donnée par l’incrimination de certains actes préparatoires en tant
qu’infractions autonomes. Par exemple, selon l’art.285 du Code pénal constitue une infraction le fait
de fabriquer ou de détenir des instruments ou des matériaux dans le but de les employer pour la falsification des monnaies ou des titres mentionnés par les articles 282-284 code pénal.
*
**
George Antoniu, prof.univ.dr. Str.Sfinţii Voievozi 35, sector 1, România [email protected]
Florin Streteanu, conf.univ.dr. Str. Avram Iancu nr.11, Cluj-Napoca, România [email protected]
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En ce qui concerne la participation, la loi roumaine incrimine le fait de l’auteur (art.24, la personne
qui accomplit directement le fait prévu par la loi pénale), s’il y a plusieurs auteurs, ils seront sanctionnés à titre de co-auteurs; l’instigateur (art.25, personne qui détermine avec intention une autre personne à commettre le fait prévu par la loi pénale); et le complice (art.26, personne qui, avec intention,
facilite ou aide de n’importe quelle manière a l’accomplissement d’un fait prévu par la loi pénale,
ainsi que celui qui promet avant ou pendant l’accomplissement du fait qu’il va faire receler les biens
provenant de l’infraction ou qu’il va favoriser l’auteur, même si après l’accomplissement du fait la
promesse n’a pas été tenue.
La loi roumaine définit la participation pénale par rapport au fait prévu par la loi pénale et non pas par
rapport a l’infraction; aussi, faut il observer que la loi roumaine n’a pas accepté la théorie de l’auteur
médiat, en consacrant en échange la participation impropre (à savoir la situation où les participants
n’agissent pas avec la même forme de culpabilité. Tandis que l’instigateur et le complice agissent avec
intention, l’auteur accomplit le fait par faute ou sans culpabilité, par exemple, quand une personne
majeure a déterminé un mineur de moins de 14 ans à soustraire un objet).
Dans le code pénal en vigueur on incrimine même l’instigation non suivie d’effet. C’est la situation où
les actes d’instigation n’ont pas été suivis d’un commencement d’exécution (art.29 code pénal).
2.1. Les actes préparatoires
2.1.1. La doctrine et la jurisprudence roumaine distinguent l’acte de préparation de l’acte d’exécution
(dans les limites ou l’acte préparatoire est assimilé à celui d’exécution) d’après le critère légal prévu
même par la loi; l’acte de préparation serait celui qui ne réalise pas les conditions de l’assimilation, à
savoir l’acte qui ne représente pas une fabrication de moyens ou d’instruments ou de prise de mesures
pour l’accomplissement de l’infraction. Par contre, ce ne serait pas un acte de préparation, que l’acte
qui réalise les conditions de l’assimilation avec l’acte d’exécution. Dans les autres situations dans
lesquelles l’assimilation ne fonctionne pas, l’acte préparatoire serait distingué de l’acte d’exécution
par rapport aux critères qui existent dans la doctrine (de l’univocité, équivocité, de la causalité inerte,
le critère formel, etc.).
Dans la doctrine roumaine, l’acte de préparation est conçu comme un acte qui réalise les conditions
matérielles et spirituelles de l’accomplissement du fait; si un acte extérieur réalise seulement les traits
de l’acte préparatoire ou ne réalise pas les conditions de l’acte préparatoire assimilé à l’acte de
l’exécution, la loi ne l’incrimine pas.
2.1.2. La loi roumaine, à mesure qu’elle n’incrimine pas l’acte de préparation, ne le sanctionne pas.
2.1.3. L’acte de préparation n’est pas incriminé, ni sanctionné, sauf les cas exceptionnels, lorsque
l’acte de préparation est assimilé à l’acte d’exécution ou quand il est incriminé comme infraction
autonome.
2.1.4. Si l’acte de préparation était sanctionné comme infraction autonome, il aurait les limites de
sanctions prévues par la loi pour l’infraction respective; si l’acte de préparation est assimilé à l’acte
d’exécution, la sanction serait identique à la peine pour la tentative de l’infraction. Dans ce cas, la
peine serait entre demi-minimum et demi-maximum prévue par la loi pour l’infraction consommée
sans que le minimum soit plus petit que le minimum de la sanction. Si la peine prévue par la loi est la
détention à vie, on applique la peine d’emprisonnement de 10 à 25 ans.
2.2. La Participation
2.2.1. La loi roumaine prévoit comme des participants: l’auteur (co-auteur), l’instigateur et le complice (art.24-26).
2.2.2. L’instigateur et le complice sont punis avec la sanction prévue par la loi pour l’auteur.
L’unification du traitement pénal à l’égard des participants ne concerne que la peine prévue par la loi,
de sorte que le juge peut infliger des peines différentes aux personnes qui ont pris part à
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l’accomplissement de l’infraction, en tenant compte de la contribution de chaque participant et des
critères généraux de l’individualisation de la peine.
En cas de participation impropre, si l’auteur agit de façon non-intentionnelle, il est tenu responsable à
ce titre, tandis que l’instigateur et le complice seront poursuivis en raison d’une infraction intentionnelle.
Certainement, si l’auteur agit en présence d’une cause de non-imputabilité, il sera exonéré, mais
l’instigateur et le complice qui ont agit de façon intentionnelle (autres solutions étant exclues) vont
encourir la peine prévue pour le délit intentionnel.
En ce qui concerne l’instigation non suivie d’un commencement d’exécution, l’instigateur sera puni
d’une peine ayant comme limites le minimum général de la peine d’emprisonnement (15 jours) et le
minimum spécial prévu pour l’infraction qui a fait l’objet de l’instigation, si l’infraction en cause est
punie de la détention à vie, la peine pour l’instigateur sera l’emprisonnement de 2 à 10 ans. Le même
traitement est applicable si suite à l’instigation, l’auteur a commencé l’exécution mais il s’est désisté
ou il a empêché la consommation de l’infraction. Afin qu’on puisse sanctionner l’instigateur dans les
hypothèses mentionnées, la peine prévue pour l’infraction qui a fait l’objet de l’instigation doit être
supérieure à 2 ans d’emprisonnement. Dans la vision de la doctrine, bien que réglementée dans le
chapitre consacré à la participation, l’instigation non suivie d’effet n’est pas une forme de participation proprement dite, mais plutôt une infraction autonome.
3. Préparation et participation par rapport au terrorisme et à d’autres formes très graves de criminalité.
La réglementation actuelle en matière de terrorisme se trouve dans les dispositions de la Loi nr.535 du
25 novembre 2004 sur la prévention et la répression du terrorisme.
Selon l’art.2 de la Loi, tombent sous l’incidence de cette réglementation les faits commis par une
entité terroriste qui répondent à l’une des conditions suivantes :
a) les faits sont commis, en règle générale par violence et produisent: inquiétude, insécurité, peur,
panique ou terreur au sein de la population ;
b) les faits portent atteinte de façon grave aux personnes ou aux biens mentionnés par l’art.4 § 10-12 ;
c) les faits ont pour but d’atteindre certains objectifs spécifiques de nature politique visant à contraindre les autorités étatiques ou une organisation internationale à ordonner, à renoncer ou à influencer la
prise de certaines décisions en faveur de l’entité terroriste.
Conformément aux dispositions de l’art.4 § 1, « l’entité » c’est la personne, le groupement, le groupe
structuré ou l’organisation qui :
a) commet ou participe à l’accomplissement des actes terroristes ;
b) prépare ou encourage le terrorisme ;
c) appuie par quelque moyen qu’il soit le terrorisme.
La criminalité organisée est réglementé en droit roumain par une loi spéciale nr.39/2003 sur la prévention et la répression de la criminalité organisée.
3.1. Parmi les nombreuses incriminations apportées par la Loi nr.535 sur le terrorisme, on peut distinguer 2 catégories : ainsi, d’une part on a crée des formes aggravées de certaines infractions qui existaient déjà en droit pénal roumain et de l’autre part on a consacré quelques incriminations nouvelles.
Par exemple, selon l’art.32 la Loi, on a qualifié d’actes de terrorisme et on a aggravé le traitement
pénal pour certaines infractions prévues par d’autres lois, lorsque lesdites infractions ont été commises
dans les conditions mentionnées par l’art.2. Il s’agit des infractions de meurtre (art.174-177 C.pen.),
coups et blessures volontaires (art.181-182 C.pen.), séquestration (art.189 C.pen.), destruction
(art.217-218 C.pen.), pour les infractions au régime des armements et des munitions, des matériaux
nucléaires, des matériaux explosifs (art.279-280 C.pén.), pour certaines infractions prévues par le
Code aérien (art.106-109). en même temps, l’art 33 de la loi qualifie d’infractions assimilées aux actes
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de terrorisme et renforce la répression pénale pour quelques infractions liées à l’activité terroriste (par
exemple, le blanchiment d’argent, les infractions de corruption, la traite d’êtres humaines, le faux
monnayage ainsi que tout autre infraction ayant pour but l’obtention d’un avantage économique au
profit d’une entité terroriste).
Comme on peut observer, les conditions de l’art.2 de la loi, auxquelles se rapportent toutes les formes
aggravées des infractions déjà existantes, concernent soit l’élément matériel de l’infraction (les
moyens d’accomplissement – violence – ou le résultat – un état d’intimidation grave au sein de la
population, une atteinte grave aux personnes ou aux biens), soit l’élément moral (ont pour but
l’atteinte de certains objectifs de nature politique). Par conséquent, la norme inscrite dans l’art.32 de la
loi, en faisant référence aux dispositions de l’art.2, ne requiert pas explicitement dans tous les cas une
finalité spécifique de nature terroriste. Cette finalité est clairement définie par l’art.2 lettre c), mais
elle ne l’est pas dans l’hypothèse de l’art2 lettre a).
A titre d’incriminations nouvelles on peut mentionner le terrorisme écologique (selon l’art.32 lettre f
de la Loi, constitue une infraction pénale l’introduction ou l’émission dans l’atmosphère, le sol, le
sous-sol ou les eaux de produits, substances, matériaux, microorganismes ou toxines qui sont susceptibles de mettre en danger la santé des personnes, des animaux ou l’environnement ), la menace
d’actes terroristes (conformément á l’art.32 lettre g, constitue une infraction la menace de commettre
l’un des actes visés par les points a-f), la direction d’une entité terroriste (1er alinéa de l’art.35), le fait
d’administrer les biens d’une entité terroriste (art.39).
En examinant la conformité des dispositions de la Loi nr.535 de 2004 avec celles de la décision-cadre
2002/475/JAI sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, on peut constater que la plupart des dispositions inscrites dans la décision-cadre trouvent une correspondance en droit interne. On doit signaler quand même
qu’il y a des comportements visés par la réglementation européenne qui n’ont pas été pris en compte
par le législateur national. Par exemple, les actes mentionnés par l’art.1 lettres g) et h) ne se retrouvent
pas parmi les incriminations de la loi n.535 (Il s’agit notamment de : g) … la provocation d’incendies,
d’inondations ou d’explosions, ayant pour effet de mettre en danger des vies humaines ; h) la perturbation ou l’interruption de l’approvisionnement en eau, en électricité ou toute autre ressource naturelle
fondamentale ayant pour effet de mettre en danger des vies humaines). Dans certains cas lesdits comportements pourraient éventuellement être sanctionnés sur la base des textes du Code pénal réprimant
les destructions.
En même temps, les critères choisis par le législateur roumain pour définir les actes terroristes ne
coïncident pas toujours avec ceux énoncés par l’art.1er de la décision cadre. En effet, selon ce texte la
finalité terroriste est toujours requise dans ce contexte (selon le texte, « Chaque État membre prend les
mesures nécessaires pour que soient considérés comme infractions terroristes les actes intentionnels
visés aux points a) à i), tels qu’ils sont définis comme infractions par le droit national, qui, par leur
nature ou leur contexte, peuvent porter gravement atteinte à un pays ou à une organisation internationale lorsque l’auteur les commet dans le but de : gravement intimider une population ou ; contraindre
indûment des pouvoirs publics ou une organisation internationale à accomplir ou à s’abstenir
d’accomplir un acte quelconque ou ; gravement déstabiliser ou détruire les structures fondamentales
politiques, constitutionnelles, économiques ou sociales d’un pays ou une organisation internationale
… »), tandis que dans la loi roumaine le but spécifique n’est pas toujours mentionné de façon explicite, comme on l’a déjà montré.
En ce qui concerne la loi spéciale qui régit la criminalité organisée afin de déterminer le champ
d’application de la loi, le législateur s’est inspiré des dispositions de la Convention des Nations Unies
contre la criminalité transnationale organisée (ratifiée par la Loi 565/2002), en faisant appel à deux
notions : groupe criminel organisé et infraction grave.
Selon l’art.2a) de la Loi, le groupe criminel organisé est un groupe structuré, composé de trois ou
plusieurs personnes, qui existe pour une certaine période et agit de concert dans le but de commettre
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une ou plusieurs infractions graves pour en tirer directement ou indirectement un bénéfice financier ou
un autre bénéfice matériel.
En même temps, le législateur a ajouté une autre précision selon laquelle il ne s’agit pas d’un groupe
criminel organisé dans l’hypothèse d’un groupe constitué occasionnellement en vue de commettre
immédiatement une ou plusieurs infractions, groupe qui ne connaît pas une continuité, une structure
déterminée ou des rôle établis d’avance pour ses membres.
En deuxième lieu, le législateur a dressé une liste d’infractions considérées comme infractions graves
mais l’énumération y contenue n’est pas exhaustive ainsi, on retrouve dans cette liste (art.2 lettre b de
la Loi) :
- le meurtre et ses formes aggravées ;
- la séquestration arbitraire ;
- l’esclavage ;
- le chantage et l’extorsion ;
1
- les infractions contre le patrimoine qui ont causé des conséquences particulièrement graves ;
- les infractions au régime des armes à feu et des munitions, des matériels explosifs, nucléaires ou
des autres matériels radioactifs ;
- la falsification de monnaies ou d’autres valeurs ;
- la divulgation d’un secret économique, la concurrence déloyale, les infractions au régime des opérations d’importation et exportation, la malversation, les infractions aux dispositions concernant
l’importation des déchets ;
- le proxénétisme ;
- les infractions concernant les jeux de hasard ;
- les infractions de trafic de stupéfiants ;
- la traite de personnes et les infractions liées à la traite de personnes ;
- le trafic de migrants ;
- le blanchiment d’argent ;
- la contrebande ;
- les infractions de corruption, les infractions assimilées aux infractions de corruption et les infractions directement liées aux infractions de corruption ;
- la banqueroute ;
- les infractions commises par les systèmes et les réseaux informatiques ou de communications ;
- le trafic de tissus et d’organes humains.
En même temps, est considérée comme infraction grave au sens de la Loi nr.39 toute autre infraction
2
punie d’emprisonnement pour laquelle la loi prévoit un minimum spécial de 5 ans ou plus .
1
Selon l’art.146 du Code pénal roumain, une infraction a causé des conséquences particuliéerement graves lorsqu’elle a causé un dommage supérieur a 200.000 lei (environ 55.000 euros) ou a perturbé de façon particulièrement grave l’activité d’une autorité publique, d’une autre unité visée par l’art.145 ou d’une autre personne morale
ou physique.
2
On doit mentionner que le nouveau Code pénal, approuvé par le Parlement en 2004 et dont l’entrée en vigueur
est prévue pour 2008, renonce à l’énumération et qualifie d’infraction grave toute infraction pour laquelle la loi
prévoît une peine dont le maximum est supérieur a 5 ans d’emprisonnement (art.356 N.C.pén.). En remplaçant le
critére du minimum de la peine (utilisé par la loi n.39) par celui du maximum le législateur a élargi de façon
considérable la sphère des infractions entrant dans le domaine de la criminalité organisée, car, pour la moitié des
infractions prévues par le Code pénal le maximum de la peine est supérieur à 5 ans.
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3.2. Les incriminations nouvelles en matière de terrorisme ont des éléments constitutifs spécifiques
plutôt en ce qui concerne l’élément matériel (comme résulte de la définition des infractions) qui est
explicitement mentionné dans le texte cité. L’élément moral va être déduit de l’ensemble
d’incriminations qui sont prévues pour prévenir et combattre le terrorisme. Cela signifie que l’auteur
doit agir dans la connaissance du but de la loi, à savoir la prévention et la répression du terrorisme
(but, défini dans l’art.2 de la loi no.535/2004).
En ce qui concerne la criminalité organisée, la loi spéciale (nr.39/2003) souligne explicitement le but
de l’établissement d’une organisation criminelle. C’est-à-dire le but de commettre une ou plusieurs
infractions graves afin d’obtenir directement ou indirectement un bénéfice financier ou d’autres bénéfices matériels.
3.3. La loi roumaine en matière de terrorisme ou de criminalité organisée souligne parfois explicitement le but terroriste de l’action incriminée, parfois l’élément moral peut être déduit de l’ensemble
des dispositions en matière.
Les nouvelles réglementations en matière de criminalité organisée et notamment en matière de terrorisme ont apporté en droit roumain un élargissement des formes de préparation punissable.
1. À coté des exceptions traditionnelles au principe de l’impunité des actes préparatoires (déjà montré), l’entrée en vigueur de la Loi nr.535 de 2004 sur la prévention et la répression du terrorisme a
multiplié de façon considérable les hypothèses où ces actes peuvent devenir punissables.
Comme on l’a déjà montré, l’instigation non suivie de la réalisation de l’infraction est, en règle générale, punissable en droit roumain, en vertu de l’art.29 C.pén. De plus, en matière d’association de
malfaiteurs, l’infraction peut être commise aussi par le fait d’entamer la création d’une telle association (art.323 C.pén.), disposition qu’on retrouve aussi en matière de terrorisme (art.35 alinéa 2 de la
Loi n.535 de 2004) et de criminalité organisée (art.7 de la Loi n.39 de 2003).
En même temps, parmi les infractions créées par la Loi n.535 de 2004 on peut retrouver de nouvelles
incriminations des actes préparatoires; ainsi, selon le 5e alinéa de l’art.32 de la Loi, est assimilé à la
tentative le fait de fabriquer ou de se procurer les moyens et les instruments, ainsi que le fait de prendre des mesures en vue de l’accomplissement des infractions prévues par le 1er alinéa.
A son tour, l’art.33, relatif aux faits assimilés aux actes de terrorisme, apporte plusieurs incriminations
des actes préparatoires. Selon le texte de l’alinéa 1er lettres a-d), « sont assimilés aux actes de terrorisme :
a) le fait de se procurer, de détenir, de fabriquer, de fournir ou de produire, dans un but terroriste, des
moyens de destruction, des substances toxiques, des matériaux, des micro-organismes ainsi que
d’autres substances nuisibles qui sont susceptibles de mettre en danger la santé des gens, des animaux
ou l’environnement ;
b) le fait de recruter, d’instruire ou de préparer les entités terroristes en vue de l’utilisation des armes à
feu, des munitions, des substances explosives, des armes chimiques, biologiques, bactériologiques ou
nucléaires ainsi que dans le but de faciliter ou d’accomplir des actes de terrorisme ;
c) le fait de faciliter l’entrée ou la sortie du territoire national, d’héberger ou de faciliter l’accès dans la
zone où se trouvent les objectifs visés, d’une personne dont on sait qu’elle a aidé ou va aide à
l’accomplissement d’un acte terroriste ou qui a commis ou va commettre un tel acte ;
d) le fait de recueillir ou de détenir en vue de leur transmission, ainsi que la mise à la disposition des
terroristes de données ou d’informations sur les objectifs visés par ceux-ci ; …. ».
En même temps, le législateur a introduit dans le 2e alinéa de l’art.35, une incrimination spéciale de
l’association de malfaiteurs. Selon le texte, constitue une infraction pénale le fait de s’associer ou
d’entamer la création d’une association ayant comme but l’accomplissement d’actes de terrorisme,
ainsi que le fait d’adhérer ou d’aide par tout moyen à une telle association. L’infraction est punie de
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10 à 15 ans d’emprisonnement, sans pouvoir outrepasser le maximum de la peine prévue pour
l’infraction qui constitue le but de l’association. Il s’agit en effet d’une incrimination spéciale aussi
par rapport aux dispositions de l’art.323 C.pén. (association de malfaiteurs) que par rapport à celles de
l’art.7 de la Loi n.39 de 2003 (groupe criminel organisé).
L’art.35 n’apporte aucune précision à l’égard des rapports entre l’infraction ci-dessus définie et
l’infraction qui constitue le but de l’association dans l’hypothèse où cette dernière infraction a été
effectivement commise. La solution ne peut être que celle consacrée par l’art.323 C.pén. en matière
d’association de malfaiteurs. Selon l’art.323 alinéa 2, lorsque l’infraction d’association a été suivie de
l’accomplissement d’une infraction, on va appliquer aux personnes qui ont commis cette dernière
infraction la peine prévue pour celle-ci, en concours avec la peine prévue par l’alinéa 1er (la peine
pour le délit d’association). Il faut noter qu’il s’agit d’un concours réel d’infractions, qui est sanctionné en droit roumain selon les règles du cumul juridique (on inflige la peine la plus grave qui peut être
augmentée dans certaines limites).
1.1. Les simples actes préparatoires (l’incitation ou la provocation) non suivis de la réalisation du délit
sont punis par la loi roumaine seulement à titre d’exceptions ; soit par l’assimilation avec des actes
d’exécutions (on a montré déjà les situations) soit comme infractions consommées (voir l’exemple,
art.285 C.p.). La loi roumaine ne connait pas l’institution « conspiracy ».
1.2. On a mentionné déjà les cas spéciaux où les actes préparatoires sont assimilés aux actes de terrorisme (art.33, Loi n.535/2004). Ces actes seront punis en concours avec l’acte de terrorisme en vue
duquel ont été effectués (par exemple un acte de ceux prévus par l’art.32).
Dans d’autres hypothèses où la loi a incriminé les actes préparatoires à titre d’infractions autonomes,
on les punit en concours avec l’infraction préparée à travers des actes en question. Par exemple, la
doctrine et la jurisprudence admettent l’application des règles relatives au concours d’infractions entre
le faux monnayage (art.282) et l’infraction de fabrication des instruments ou matériaux destinés à
3
servir à la falsification (art.285 C.pén.) .
En ce qui concerne la tentative aux infractions de terrorisme, elle est punissable selon les dispositions
de l’art.32 alinéa 4 et de l’art.34 alinéa 3. De plus, comme on a déjà montré, le législateur a élargi la
sphère de la tentative en y incluant certains actes préparatoires assimilés aux actes d’exécution. En
effet, conformément aux dispositions de l’art.32 alinéa 5 et de l’art.34 alinéa 4 « est considéré tentative le fait de fabriquer ou de se procurer les moyens et les instruments, ainsi que le fait de prendre des
mesures en vue de l’accomplissement des infractions prévues par le 1er alinéa ».
1.3. Il n’y a pas d’autres dispositions concernant les actes préparatoires par rapport à la commission de
ces délits.
1.4. Une personne ne peut être poursuivi et punie en raison de la réalisation d’un acte préparatoire, si
un tel acte n’a pas été assimilé à un acte d’exécution ou n’a pas été incriminé distinctement comme
une infraction autonome, même si l’acte préparatoire a été le moyen de la commission d’une infraction plus grave. Dans ces cas, l’auteur répondra seulement pour l’infraction consommé.
Au contraire, si l’acte de préparation est puni, l’auteur sera sanctionné pour l’infraction moyenne en
concours d’infraction avec l’infraction qui en représentant le « but » de l’infraction, c’est à dire en
concours d’infractions avec celle qui a représenté le but de l’action de l’auteur.
La loi roumaine prévoit aussi qu’il existe toujours un concours d’infractions entre celle de constituer
une association criminelle et les infractions commises en réalisant le programme d’activité de
l’association.
3
Voir V. Papadopol, Comentariu, en Th.Vasiliu et alii, Codul penal comentat şi adnotat, Partea specială.
Ed.Academiei, t.II, Bucureşti, 1977, p.230-231; Cour Suprême de Justice, section criminelle, déc.nr.453/1991, en
Colectiv, Probleme de drept din deciziile Curţii supreme de Justiţie, Ed.Orizonturi, Bucureşti, 1993, p.389-390.
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La même solution s’impose quand une personne a commis un acte de recrutement de membres dans
une organisation terroriste etc. ensuite il réalise un acte de terrorisme. Il répondra aussi pour le délit
d’association ou d’appartenance à un groupe terroriste ou criminel qui poursuit le même but. Le recrutement apparaît comme une sorte d’objectif poursuivi par l’association terroriste.
1.5. En ce qui concerne la tentative en matière de terrorisme il y a une seule règle dérogatoire et qui
consiste dans le fait déjà mentionné, que les certains des actes préparatoires sont traités comme des
actes d’exécution. Cela signifie qu’il peut y avoir une tentative d’infraction en matière de terrorisme
même quand l’acte d’exécution provient de ceux assimilés avec les actes préparatoires. Ces actes
assimilés, se distinguent profondément des actes d’exécution proprement-dits.
Ils ne représentent pas l’exécution effective du délit (ce qui caractérise l’acte d’exécution proprementdit, mais ils représentent de simples conditions qui contribuent à l’exécution du délit.
2. Les nouvelles réglementations sur la prévention et la répression du terrorisme et du crime organisé
n’ont pas apporté des modifications importantes en ce qui concerne les conditions pour la prise en
compte de la participation. Quelques aspects doivent être soulignés quand même.
D’abord, dans certaines hypothèses, les actes d’instigation ou de complicité sont qualifiés d’actes
d’exécution et incriminés de façon autonome; ainsi, selon l’art.33 alinéa 1er, lettre g) de la Loi n.535
de 2004, est assimilé aux actes de terrorisme « tout autre fait commis dans l’intention d’aide, de faciliter, de dissimuler ou de déterminer l’accomplissement des actes de terrorisme ».
En même sens, selon l

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