Providers

Relation of service and mission of
provider in a quasi-market
M. Nyssens (UCL) – J. Defourny (ULg)
A. Henry (ULg), S. Nassaut (UCL)
Outline
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Field of research and analytical framework
Methodology
Empirical results
Conclusions
I.
Field of research and analytical framework
Evolution of public regulation in the field of « social services »
Why? Increase efficiency and responsiveness of public services, to support
free choice of providers, and explore new employment fields
Tutelary regulation
Quasi-market regulation
Types of
providers
Public and third sectors
All types (third, public, and forprofit sectors)
Competition
Limited
No restriction
Public
financing
To the supply side
To the demand side (vouchers,..)
Example in
Belgium
-Home care services for frail
and elderly people
- Work Integration Social
Enterprises
Service voucher  develop both
employment and personal
services (at this stage, mainly
housework), for all types of users
The voucher system
Company
in charge
of
managing
the system
Purchase and
payment
7,50
euros/Voucher
(1)
Refund of 20,80
euros/Voucher (3)
- State intervention of
13,30 euros/voucher
- exemption of VAT
State
Accredited
providers
(for profit,
public and
third sector)
Tax deduction
Users
one hour/ one voucher (2)
- at user’s home ( mainly housework)
=> A quasi-market to structure a new field of activity
Typology of providers, according to sector and mission
Third sector
Mission
Providers
Public sector
For-profit sector
Work
integration
Home care
Work
integration
Home care
Profit
Profit
WISE
Home care
services for
frail and
elderly
people
Welfare
local
social
services
Home care
services for
frail and
elderly
people
Temp.
Work
agencies
Firms
Service voucher quasi-market
Regulation
Tutelary
Tutelary
Tutelary
The voucher system : an impressive success …
Nb accredited
providers
+/- 2000
Nb users
+/- 800.000
Nbr workers
+/- 100.000
First market failure: positive collective externalities
7,50
euros
User’s share (individual consumption)
5,25
euros
20,80
euros =
exchange
value of
one
voucher
2,25
euros
13,30
euros
ALMP
Region
subsidy
Tax cut
State’s share, due to an
expected production of collective
benefits, such as:
Subsidy •
•
•
•
•
Struggle against black labour market
Employment creation for low qualified workers
Improvement of Work/family life balance
Equality between men and women
In-home support for elderly people, rather than
residential care
• …
Second market failure: asymmetries of information, leading to
quality uncertainty
State
Compliance with the service voucher
regulatory framework, labor laws, etc.
Provider/Employer
-Future service quality not
accessible to users
- Workload imposed by the
user, etc.
User
Risks of
opportunistic
behaviors
- Future job quality not accessible to
workers
- Punctuality of the workers, length of
provision, the content of the service
(permitted tasks?), etc.
User frequently absent from home
at the time of delivery
Worker
Research question
• In a context where:
•
•
•
There are market failures
The system is lightly regulated (accreditation not demanding, derogations
allowed to labour laws, subsidy not related to any criteria of job or service
quality)
Workers as well as users are potentially vulnerable (mostly low qualified
workers, and 30% of users above 60)
• Does the mission and/or the sector of providers influence the quality of
employment and of organization of the service?
• Results must be related to financial resources…:
•
•
•
Service voucher subsidy
Active labour policies
Regional subsidies
Methodology used
• Data :
• Surveys carried on a sample of 52 organisations
located in the three Regions of Belgium
• Two exhaustive databases from the national
Belgian office for employment (“ONEM”)
• Exploited thanks to traditional statistical methods
(the factor analysis and the cluster analysis)
• For the job quality analysis, data have also been
exploited thanks to a Data Envelopment
Analysis method
III. Some emblematic results
1) The start up of the service: Written agreement
With a contact
user/provider
At the user’s
home
Outside of the
user’s home
Without
a contact
user/provider
The start up of the service: Written agreement
With a contact
user/provider
At the user’s
home
Outside of the
user’s home
Visit by the provider
of the user’s home
Without a contact
user/provider
The start up of the service: Written agreement
• Functions of a visit to the user’s house :
• Regarding the quality of the service : evaluation of
the profile of the user and his/her needs
• Regarding the quality of the employment:
evaluation of the salubrity, the security of the
workplace, the work load
The start up of the service: Written agreement
With a contact
user/provider
At the user’s
home
Outside of the
user’s home
Without a contact
user/provider
Visit by the provider
of the user’s home
By mail
The start up of the service: Written agreement
With a contact
user/provider
At the user’s
home
Visit by the provider
of the user’s home
Outside of the
user’s home
Signature at the
enterprise
Without a contact
user/provider
By mail
The start up of the service: Written agreement
With a contact
user/provider
Without a contact
user/provider
At the user’s
home
Visit by the provider
of the user’s home
By the worker at the
user’s home
Outside of the
user’s home
Signature at the
enterprise
By mail
The start up of the service: Written agreement
100%
90%
80%
23%
15%
39%
70%
39%
69%
Signature et
visite à domicile
par un encadrant
(N=20)
23%
60%
50%
40%
71%
33%
39%
30%
15%
20%
10%
22%
54%
28%
15%
14%
0%
Insertion (N=19) Aide à domicile
(N=13)
For-Profit
(N=13)
Mission
indéterminée
(N=7)
Toutes missions
confondues
Signature à
l'agence ou au
domicile par
l'aide ménagère
(N=17)
Signature par
correspondance
et absence de
visite (N=14)
Source : échantillon enquête
The start up of the service: Written agreement
100%
90%
80%
33,3%
Signature et visite à
domicile, par un
encadrant
33,3%
Signature à l'agence ou
au domicile par l'aide
ménagère
70%
60%
50%
100%
40%
30%
20%
Signature par
correspondance et
absence de visite à
domicile
33,3%
10%
0%
Intérim (N=4)
Secteur privé à but lucratif
hors intérim (N=9)
Source : échantillon enquête
2) Number of workers by type of provider
Secteur
privé à but
lucratif :
55%
Pourcentage de travailleurs par type de prestataires Eco.Soc. Insert.
Pays
5%
Eco.Pub. Insert.
10%
18%
15%
Secteur
économie
sociale :
27%
Secteur
public :
18%
Assoc.Aide aux
personnes
Init.Pub.Aide aux pers.
Intérim
12%
3%
37%
Secteur privé à but
lucratif hors intérim
Autres Init. Eco. Soc.
Source : données Onem
2) Number of FTE workers by type of provider
Secteur
privé à but
lucratif :
41%
Pourcentage d'ETP par type de prestataires
Pays
5%
13%
10%
Eco.Pub. Insert.
18%
Assoc.Aide aux
personnes
Secteur
économie
sociale:
35%
Secteur
public:
24%
Eco.Soc. Insert.
20%
15%
Init.Pub.Aide aux pers.
Intérim
37%
Secteur privé à but
lucratif hors intérim
23%
17%
4%
12%
Autres Init. Eco. Soc.
Source : données Onem
3) Organisation of collective supervison of the workers
100%
8%
90%
80%
42%
43%
70%
69%
60%
50%
Pas d'organisation
de réunions
collectives
92%
40%
30%
58%
57%
20%
Organisation de
réunions
collectives
31%
10%
0%
Insertion
Aide à domicile
For-profit
Mission
indéterminée
Source : échantillon enquête
Employer
User’s supervision
(visit,…)
User
Worker’s supervision
(collective meetings,
training,…)
Worker
For temporary work agencies:
The more important is the satisfaction of the client (commercial
relationship)
A (job) « interview » at a new client’s home
Long term contract if the client is satisfied
No respect of the anti-discrimination law
The provider is just an administrative intermediate
Destination of the workers who left their first employer
Conclusions
• The type of regulation and the type of mission
determines the nature of outcomes,
especially regarding the collective impacts :
• Organisations with a social mission that are still
embedded in a tutelary mode of regulation take
more into consideration the needs of vulnerable
workers and users.
• Social mission and access to public
financing…
•The Federation of temporary work agencies : an « oversubsidiation » of public or third sectors’ providers, inducing a
situation of unfair competition.
• Gadrey (2004) : in a context of quasi-market, subsidies are
legitimate as long as providers contribute to the general
interest.
• Quality of employment and of the organisation of the
service has a cost and therefore can legitimate additional
public funding to compensate the contribution to the general
interest
• Final report: http://www.belspo.be/belspo/ta/publ_fr.stm
• Regards économiques N°69, avril 2009
Les titres-services : quelle qualité d'emploi et d'organisation du
service ? http://www.uclouvain.be/285518.html
• Defourny J., Henry A., S. Nassaut, Nyssens M., 2010, Does the
mission of providers matter on a quasi-market? The case of the
Belgian "service voucher" scheme, Annals of Public and
Cooperative Economics (in press)
• Laurent Gardin Marthe Nyssens, 2010, Les quasi-marchés dans
l’aide à domicile : une mise en perspective européenne, Annals of
Public and Cooperative Economics (in press)
• Nassaut S., Nyssens M., (2009), « Civicness and service
governance: the case of the Belgian quasi-market in the field of
proximity services », in Evers A., Brandsen T., Dekker P., Civicness
in the governance and provision of social services, NOMOS
publishing house
• Nassaut, S., Nyssens, M., Vermer, M.-C., (2008) : Les effets d’une
coexistence de différents modes de régulation, suite à la création
d’un quasi-marché dans le secteur belge de l’aide à domicile. Le cas
des Services agréés d’aide aux familles et aux personnes âgées,
in : Revue économie et société, série EGS, n°9, 2, pp. 265-292