FLEXIBLE INTEGRATION IN THE AREA OF CFSP/ESDP Debates

Transcription

FLEXIBLE INTEGRATION IN THE AREA OF CFSP/ESDP
Debates on the Provisions of the Draft Constitutional Treaty
ANNEX
Contents
Questionnaire ............................................................................................................................. 3
Experts........................................................................................................................................ 7
Country Reports ......................................................................................................................... 8
BELGIUM.................................................................................................................. 8
CZECH REPUBLIC ................................................................................................ 19
DENMARK .............................................................................................................. 26
ESTONIA ................................................................................................................. 32
FINLAND ................................................................................................................ 41
FRANCE .................................................................................................................. 49
GERMANY.............................................................................................................. 61
GREECE .................................................................................................................. 70
HUNGARY.............................................................................................................. 80
ITALY...................................................................................................................... 86
NORWAY ................................................................................................................ 94
POLAND................................................................................................................ 100
SPAIN .................................................................................................................... 114
UNITED KINGDOM (UK) ................................................................................... 132
2
Questionnaire
FLEXIBLE INTEGRATION IN THE AREA OF CFSP/ESDP
Austrian Academy of Sciences, ICE-Research Unit for Institutional Change and
European Integration & Department for History and Political Science, Paris Lodron
University of Salzburg (PLUS)
March 2004
Introduction
This introductory note should give some guidelines for your answers.
The aim of this questionnaire is to deliver a differentiated and detailed picture of national debates on
the new instruments of flexible integration in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy and
European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP) provided for in the Draft Constitutional Treaty
on the European Union.
Thus, in answering the questionnaire, please refer to positions of
government,
political parties,
military
pressure groups,
academia/think tanks
and the media as well as the public opinion in your country.
Where there are internal differences within groups and political actors, these as well as their possible
reasons should be noted. We would also kindly ask you to add some comments regarding changes and
continuities of the political debate and to answer every question as detailed as possible.
Please name sources and materials whenever possible.
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I. In General
1. National security doctrines.
a) Please describe and summarize recent trends in your country in relation to security and defence
policy. Have there recently been changes in the national security doctrine?
b) Did the Solana Paper, agreed on 12 Dec 2003, generate any interest? Is there a debate about
developing a new set of tasks to reflect the new security challenges that have been agreed? If so, what
will this amount to in type, scale and geographical extent?
2. Is there a debate on flexible integration (especially in the media or the public) in the area of
CFSP/ESDP (i.e. “Kerneuropa”, variable geometry, mult i-speed Europe, Directoire,...)? If not, please
refer to possible reasons for the absence of public awareness of these issues.
3.a) How were the suggestions of the constitutional draft concerning CFSP/ESDP and the failure of
the IGC 2003 discussed in your country? Has the failure of the IGC 2003 generated a national debate
about the idea of “Kerneuropa”?
b) How has the recent trio meeting UK-D-F been received in your country: as a positive event or as a
negative one?
c) To what extent has the Iraqi conflic t influenced the positions in your country?
4. Is the debate in favour of including flexible integration in the area of CFSP/ESDP in the Treaty of
the European Union or are there voices in your country which would like to deal with these issues
outside of the common institutional framework?
5. a) To what degree (right on information, consultation …) should the following European institutions
be involved in flexible integration, if your country is in favour of ESDP “within” the common
institutional framework?
−
European Council
−
Council of European Union
−
High Representative/European Foreign Minister (when established)
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
b) If your country is in favour of a foreign and defence policy “outside” the common institutional
framework what are the relevant ideas and concepts and how would these relate to the EU?
c) What reaction of your country is to be expected if its preferred option was not adopted?
6. Please summarize the trends of defence expenditure both in quantity (GDP) and quality (orientation
of expenditure, etc.) in your country in general.
7. Has any change been made to forward defence plans in order to reflect the needs of ESDP? What
interest is there in pooling current military capabilities with other EU members to reduce operating
costs?
II. Permanent Structured Cooperation
8. Is your country able and/or willing to join a permanent structured cooperation? If no, what are the
major concerns raised in the debate? If yes, what are the main difficulties to be solved? Which
circumstances, conditions are relevant for that decision (how many members; which members …)? Is
it politically realistic for your country to carry this burden in terms of financial and human resources?
9. The former Italian Presidency delivered a note in December 2003 (CIG 57/1/03) envisaging a
prospective Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. Is there a national debate on the criteria for
participation in permanent structured cooperation formulated therein (conditions of access and
exclusion)? If yes, which are the main positions of the parties involved?
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10. What are the positions within your country regarding the establishment of an autonomous
European Headquarters capable of planning significant military operations? What are the positions
concerning the relation of this Headquarter to the NATO?
11. Is there still a role for enhanced cooperation in CFSP/ESDP in the light of permanent structured
cooperation?
III. Missions
Missions on behalf of the European Union include (Art. III-210 par.1 Draft Constitutional Treaty)
−
joint disarmament operations
−
humanitarian and rescue tasks
−
military advice and assistance tasks
−
conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks
−
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict
stabilisation
12. In which one of these cases do engagement and/or support of your country seem possible or likely?
Which circumstances or conditions are relevant for that decision?
Only if USA is engaged
Only if NATO is engaged
Turkey is not opposed to it
Certain member states are participating (please name the countries)
A minimum number of member states are participating (one third, half, two thirds,…)
Even if certain member states explicitly oppose a mission
A resolution of the UN Security Council authorizes a mission
Other conditions.
13. Has there been a debate on the participation of your country during the EU missions in Bosnia Herzegovina (police mission), in Macedonia (Concordia; police mission Proxima) and in Congo
(Artemis)? If yes, which were the most controversial issues? What are the interest groups views on the
transfer of the NATO Bosnia mission to the EU?
IV. European Decision
14. How is the instrument of constructive abstention in the field of CFSP/ESDP seen and discussed in
your country? Has there ever been a situation in which (parts of) your country thought about using this
instrument?
15. What were the positions in your country concerning a “passarelle” clause from unanimity to QMV
(Art. III-201 par.3 Draft Constitutional Treaty): In which areas and under which circumstances would
it be possible for your country to accept such a clause? Is there a long-term perspective of accepting
such a clause?
V. European agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisit ion and
armaments (“Agency”)
16. Is your country able or willing to participate in the Agency? What are the major issues raised in
the debate? What may be problems in terms of financial and human resources?
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17. What are the positions within your country regarding the management of the agency? (technical or
a political manager)
18. For members of OCCAR and LoI respectively: Is the agency considered in your country as
replacement of OCCAR/LoI or are OCCAR/LoI considered as an integral part of the Agency?
VI. Mutual Defence Clause (Art. I-40 par.7 Draft Constitutional Treaty)
19. How was this clause discussed in your country?
20. Does this obligation conflict with other commitments resulting from
a) NATO membership of your country?
b) status of neutrality
21. a) For Non-NATO-members: Do you anticipate any problems in your country due to the fact that
some member states are restricted in cases of mutual defence because of their obligations deriving
from their NATO membership?
b) For Non-neutral members: Do you anticipate any problems in your country due to the fact that
neutral members are restricted in cases of mutual defence because of their special status?
22. Is there still a role for enhanced cooperation in CFSP/ESDP in the light of the mutual defence
clause?
VII. Conclusion
23. Please summarize and identify the most important issues related to CFSP/ESDP in your country?
Which are the most relevant trends and future perspectives? Which changes or continuities in the
national political debate on issues in the area of CFSP/ESDP can be discerned? Which impact on
national sovereignty due to flexible integration is perceived by the various groups?
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Experts
Belgium
André Dumoulin
Université Libre de Bruxelles
Eric Remacle
Mario Telò
Czech Republic
Lucie Königova
Institute for International Relations
Denmark
Lisbet Zilmer-Jones
Danish Institute of International
Affairs
Estonia
Andres Kasekamp
Estonian Foreign Policy Institute
Finland
Emmi Helle
Finnish Institute for International
Affairs
Hanna Ojanen
France
Michèle Bacot-Décriaud
IEP, Lyon
Germany
Matthias Jopp
IEP, Berlin
Greece
Dimitris P. Droutsas
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hungary
Ferenc Gazdag
Teleki Institute for Strategic and
Defence Studies
Italy
Marta d'Assù
Aspen Institute
Roberto Menotti
Norway
Helene Sjursen
Arena
Poland
Olaf Osica
European University Institute
Florence
Sweden
Gunilla Herolf
Swedish Institute for International
Affairs
Spain
Alicia Sorroza Blanco
Royal
Institute
Elcano
for
International and Strategic Studies,
Madrid
José Torreblanca
United Kingdom
Timothy Garden
Royal Institute for International
Affairs
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Country Reports
BELGIUM
André Dumoulin (Research Fellow Royal Military School, Associate Lecturer at the
Université libre de Bruxelles), in co-operation with Eric Remacle (Professor at the Université
libre de Bruxelles )
I. In General
Le « Plan stratégique 2000-2015 » du Ministère belge de la Défense a intégré quelques éléments d’un
concept national « stratégique » qui intègre la transformation de l’environnement international faisant
émerger de nouveaux risques qui peuvent avoir une influence déstabilisante sur l’Union européenne et
sur le pays. Il s’agit de passer d’une sécurité basée sur la peur à une stabilité reposant sur une gestion
active et préventive des facteurs d’instabilité. La politique de sécurité doit donc privilégier la
prévention des risques plutôt que leur encadrement. Cette dimension proactive a pour caractéristique
de recourir aussi aux instruments civils dans le cadre de la prévention des nouvelles menaces, faisant
en sorte que les instruments militaires puissent le plus souvent rester à l’arrière-plan. Cette politique de
sécurité est basée également sur la multinationalité des réponses, une approche multi-institutionnelle
en réponse au caractère polymorphe des menaces. Il conviendra donc d’élaborer une architecture de
sécurité non hiérarchisée au sein de laquelle les différentes organisations (UE, OTAN, OSCE, ONU)
se compléteront. Cela impliquera également une participation aux opérations de maintien de la paix et
de gestion de crise.
Le document sur la nouvelle Stratégie européenne de sécurité a été soutenu par le gouvernement belge
dans la mesure où son contenu est en harmonie avec les positions du Royaume en ce qui concerne la
perception des risques et la réponse pluridimensionnelle à engager face à ces différents challenges. La
nécessité d’élaborer un Concept stratégique a même été portée par la Belgique depuis plusieurs années
et particulièrement durant la présidence semestrielle du Conseil de 2001 dans la foulée du projet de
Livre blanc européen sur la sécurité et la défense. Ce soutien fut d’ailleurs confirmé par l’organisation
de séminaires et travaux en 2003-2004 sur la question du Concept stratégique européen dans le cadre
de l’Institut royal des relations internationales (IRRI) financé par le ministère belge des Affaires
étrangères. Le ministre estime cependant que la nouvelle Stratégie de sécurité de l’UE doit être
complétée par des plans d’action concrets. Le Parlement n’a pas eu de débat approfondi sur cette
Stratégie et le débat public à son sujet a été cantonné à quelques cercles spécialisés et universitaires.
CFSP/ESDP (i.e. “Kerneuropa”, variable geometry, multi-speed Europe, Directoire,...)? If not, please
La Belgique veut redynamiser la méthode communautaire. Elle estime qu’une Commission efficace et
opérationnelle au profit des Vingt-cinq constitue la meilleure réponse aux processus de différentiation
et de géométrie variable au sein de l’Union européenne. Cependant, afin d’éviter l’apparition de
directoires, il faut à moyen terme que la Commission soit limitée en nombre. Cependant, Bruxelles
considère qu’en cas d’échec de la CIG et de non-adoption du projet de traité constitutionnel, la
création d’une fédération européenne à l’intérieur de l’Union sera nécessaire. Celle -ci permettra
d’aller plus vite et plus loin avec ceux qui le veulent. Les autorités belges comme les parlementaires
sont favorables à une coopération plus approfondie entre les membres de l’Union qui partagent la
volonté d’avancer dans la voie d’une intégration européenne plus étroite. La création d’une « avantgarde volontariste » est explicitement citée et elle doit créer un effet d’entraînement sur l’ensemble du
corpus. Pour le Premier ministre, cette coopération plus étroite pourrait concerner la justice, la
défense, l’asile, l’immigration, la fiscalité et certaines questions sociale s. La Belgique soutient à la fois
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les approfondissements de l’Union, peut-être au prix d’une différenciation et d’un arrimage très étroit
avec le couple franco-allemand (voir la participation belge au Sommet des « Quatre » - avec
l’Allemagne, la France et le Luxembourg – du 29 avril 2003 sur les moyens d’approfondir les outils
opérationnels de la défense européenne dans le contexte du débat constitutionnel et de la guerre
d’Irak). Plus généralement, la position géographique de la Belgique prédispose à s’attacher aux pays
formant les zones régionales (Benelux) et au « croissant » anglo-franco-germanique, une manière de
garantir autant ses intérêts économiques que sécuritaires en premier lieu dans un espace vital précis.
En matière de PESC/PESD, la Belgique soutient l’idée qu’en cas d’échec de la CIG impliquant le
retour au traité de Nice, il ne sera pas possible d’améliorer et d’approfondir la politique européenne de
sécurité et de défense, vu les contraintes juridiques et les règles de décision contraignantes en matière
de défense. Compte tenu de la dysharmonie entre les avancées récentes en matière de PESD et les
contraintes d’un retour au cadre de Nice, Bruxelles défend le concept de coopérations structurées en
matière de sécurité et de défense si nécessaire hors du cadre du Traité de l’Union. Ce positionnement
est d’ailleurs sous-entendu dans le souhait du Premier ministre belge à retrouver l’esprit de Saint-Malo
(juillet 2002), puis dans le volontarisme du pays à déposer plusieurs propositions sur l’amélioration de
la défense européenne dans le cadre du Groupe des Quatre (avril 2003). Lesdites propositions doivent
bénéficier à l’Union européenne mais devront être engagées préalablement dans un bi- ou
multilatéralisme de coopérations politico-militaires avec les Etats qui le veule nt. En attendant, la
Belgique soutient les propositions de création d’un poste de « Ministre européen des Affaires
étrangères » et de coopérations renforcées en matière de défense «qui assureront à l’Union les
moyens d’une action plus forte et crédible sur la scène internationale ».
negative one?
La Belgique considère que le triumvirat anglo-franco-germanique peut être un plus en matière
d’approfondissement de l’Union européenne, dès l’instant où il peut fédérer les « petits et moyens »
Etats européens qui se retrouveront toujours « aspirer » par un des trois « grands ». Par réalisme et par
pragmatisme, le Premier ministre belge a affirmé que les Européens devraient oser réfléchir à un rôle
dirigeant confié aux Français, aux Britanniques et aux Allemands [en matière de politique de défense
commune] à la condition que cela ne relègue pas les États membres plus petits au rang de quantité
négligeable. Si pour le s autres dossiers, Bruxelles reste méfiante face à ce type de directoire aux
accents fortement nationaux, la Belgique soutient cette posture dans le champ de la sécurité et de la
défense. Elle permet également de dépasser les tensions autour de la guerre en Irak et d’asseoir une
crédibilité sécuritaire en Europe grâce à l’apport britannique stratégiquement indispensable. Le 21
janvier 2003, le Premier Ministre et le Ministre des Affaires étrangères prenaient position en faveur de
la contribution franco-allemande à la Convention européenne sur l’architecture institutionnelle de
l’Union, dont le contenu intégrait le concept d’Union européenne de sécurité et de défense. Le
Parlement s’est également prononcé dans le même sens, en particulier le Sénat dont le Président est
l’un des rares experts de défense sur la scène parlementaire belge.
c) To what extent has the Iraqi conflict influenced the positions in your country?
La crise irakienne a placé la Belgique dans une posture de contestation de l’intervention anglosaxonne car réalisée hors du cadre d’un mandat des Nations unies. Cette position, allant jusqu’aux
débats parlementaires sur l’opportunité d’interdire le transit de militaires et d’équipements américains
par le territoire national, a placé la Belgique dans le camp du refus de la guerre, aux côtés de la France,
de l’Allemagne et du Luxembourg. La guerre en Irak a favorisé le soutien de la Belgique au document
de Solana sur la nouvelle Stratégie européenne de sécurité qui allait mettre en avant multilatéralisme,
primauté de l’ONU, refus des frappes militaires préventives et soutien au concept d’interventions
pluridimensionnelles. Bruxelles fut réticent à l’envoi de troupes dans la zone tout comme d’une
implication visible de l’OTAN en Irak. Pour le ministre des Affaires étrangères, la guerre en Irak a fait
également apparaître l’idée que l’Europe doit pouvoir contribuer à sa propre sécurité, pour partager,
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avec les Etats-Unis, le risque de la sécurité du monde, devenir un contrepoids à l’intérieur d’une
alliance forte et renforcer le pilier européen dans l’OTAN. La Belgique fait également un lien indirect
entre la déstabilisation moyen-orientale et la guerre asymétrique symbolisée par le terrorisme qui peut
toucher l’Union européenne.
Prioritairement, la Belgique soutient la réflexion sur les coopérations différenciées et l’intégration
flexible en matière de PESC/PESD dans le cadre de l’Union européenne. Cependant, les travaux
engagés en matière de sécurité et de défense dans le cadre beneluxien, ou à travers le Groupe des
“Quatre“ (29 avril 2003) indique que Bruxelles peut privilégier les groupes relais et les structures
informelles d’initiative comme caisse de résonance. L’idée étant que les propositions et avancées
formulées de manière volontariste à quelques uns puissent être adoptées en tout ou en partie par les
instances européennes. Aussi, la question d’un quartier général européen autonome formulée dans le
cadre du Groupe des Quatre fut reprise et assimilée en grande partie par le Conseil de l’Union
européenne en décembre 2003. Le jeu du va et vient entre l’intergouvernementalisme des pays
volontaristes en matière de défense et l’intergouvernementalisme de la PESD est le processus adopté
et privilégié par Bruxelles. En d’autres termes, la réflexion sur une structure flexible en matière de
sécurité et de défense ne pourra émerger à quelques uns qu’après et seulement après le constat d’une
paralysie du processus PESD à Vingt-cinq, nonobstant le fait que cette politique sectorielle de l’UE est
pour l’instant en régime de croisière. Le soutien à la CIG - dont l’adoption souhaitée du projet de traité
constitutionnel dans les rubriques concernant les coopérations structurées - est pour la Belgique le
moyen de maintenir prioritairement la flexibilité dans le cadre de l’Union, et non en sa périphérie.
5. a) To what degree (right on information, consultation …) should the following European
institutions be involved in flexible integration, if your country is in favour of ESDP “within” the
common institutional framework?
−
European Council
−
−
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
Dans le cas d’une intégration du concept de flexibilité en matière de PESD au sein même du traité sur
l’Union (coopérations structurées), la Belgique soutiendrait les principes généraux et les processus de
décision déjà avancés dans le projet de traité constitutionnel en discussion dans le cadre de la CIG. La
Belgique attacherait néanmoins une importance très grande à l’autonomie et à l’esprit d’initiative du
futur Ministre européen des Affaires étrangères, de même qu’elle offrirait à la Commission
européenne les moyens de travailler en synergie et en harmonie avec les secteurs transversaux de la
sécurité. Le poids du Parlement européen devrait toujours rester circonscrit au contrôle des dépenses et
à une juste information, préséance intergouvernementale oblige. En cas de coopération
flexible/structurée en matière de PESD à l’intérieur de l’UE, il ne semble pas que la Belgique ait
vraiment clarifié sa position sur le degré d’implication des institutions européennes (Conseil, Ministre
des Affaires étrangères, Commission, Parlement) dans une telle procédure flexible, en particulier
jusqu’où ces institutions disposeraient d’un droit d’information, de consultation, voire de veto.
b + c) La Belgique sera favorable à une politique étrangère et de défense hors traité dès l’instant où
elle sera dans l’obligation d’entériner le constat selon leque l les Européens sont paralysés gravement
dans ces matières, au point d’en subir de graves conséquences communes. C’est pour ce motif qu’elle
insiste à la fois sur une prise de participation de l’Union dans les grands dossiers stratégiques et
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régionaux (Balkans, Magreb, Proche-Orient) et sur la capacité de l’Union de trouver des mécanismes
internes permettant une flexibilité suffisante dans ces domaines sans devoir « sortir » du Traité. Si une
coopération devait néanmoins être engagée hors Traité, il pourrait s’agir du champ de la sécuritédéfense, de la politique sociale et de la politique énergétique. Il pourrait également s’intégrer dans des
procédures communes impliquant le binôme franco-allemand ou la triangulation beneluxienne. Ce
scénario de coopération intégrée et à la carte transversale à l’UE est considéré par Bruxelles comme le
scénario «par dépit » dans la mesure où la Belgique a fait toujours reposer sa politique sur un
équilibre entre les coopérations les plus abouties et le désir d’approfondissement conduisant à une
supranationalité européenne : le premier pouvant à terme rendre totalement illusoire le second sur le
long terme. A contrario, la Belgique estime qu’à choisir entre une Union européenne simple grand
marché et une coopération plus étroite et plus intégrée à quelques uns dans certains domaines
économiques et stratégiques, la seconde posture sera la bonne pour des raisons de survie et de
crédibilité. Cette position s’est retrouvée enchâssée dans l’idée officieuse de groupe pionnier formé
des six pays fondateurs lancée par certaines capitales à la suite de l’échec de la première session de la
CIG en décembre 2003.
Les dépenses de défense de la Belgique (critères OTAN) se situent au quatrième rang par ordre
d’importance dans les dépenses de l’Etat fédéral (après la dette publique, la sécurité sociale et les
pensions). Elles correspondent en 2003 à 1,3 % du PIB. Le plan stratégique 2000-2015 repose sur trois
principes de base : l’interforces au sein de l’Armée belge qui doit devenir la règle générale, la
multinationalisation des forces lorsque cela est possible, et la coopération civilo-milita ire doit devenir
impérative. La réduction des effectifs des forces armées qui seront rajeunis doit permettre d’inverser le
pourcentage actuel du personnel administratif et de soutien (54%) et du personnel des missions
opérationnelles (46%). Globalement, le plan stratégique de modernisation tente d’intégrer les
nouveaux concepts de flexibilité, souplesse, aéromobilité et puissance de feu, associés à de probables
interventions multinationales inscrites dans le cadre de la défense européenne, des missions de l’ONU
et de l’OTAN. L’objectif est bien d’avoir des troupes opérationnelles à 100%, mieux équipées, plus
rapidement engagées sur le terrain et pouvant être maintenues longtemps sur place. Il entérine aussi
l’idée que toute spécialisation nette est encore pour l’instant exclue, nonobstant le constat d’une
impossibilité budgétaire de se doter de la panoplie complète des capacités militaires. Il y a volonté de
retrouver à terme une certaine marge de manœuvre permettant d’engager davantage de moyens en
matière d’achats d’équipements qui actuellement se situent seulement à hauteur de 13%. La recherche
d’économie d’échelle et de lutte contre les gaspillages se concrétisa récemment par la décision de
retour des forces belges d’Allemagne, l’adoption du principe de modularité et la création, unique en
Europe, d’un état-major unique interforce.
costs?
Le plan de restructuration des forces armées présenté en 2000 est bien associé en profondeur aux
nouveaux objectifs et sécurité et de défense européenne, la Defence Capabilities Initiative de l’OTAN
et les récentes décisions du sommet de Prague (2003). Soutenant le headline goal de l’UE, proposant
des nouvelles coopérations militaires, la Belgique a également entériné une restructuration qui
assimile les nouveaux besoins collectifs au profit de la défense européenne et des nouvelles missions
dites de Petersberg. Dès lors, pratiquement toutes ses unités sont intégrées dans une dimension
multinationale. Les nouveaux besoins en capacité de mobilité ont été assimilés : la définition de
nouveaux véhicules à roues en remplacement des chenillés, l’intégration de nouveaux drones,
l’aéromobilité nouvelle d’une grande partie de la brigade para, l’acquisition d’hélicoptères de transport
moyens, l’intégration de nouveaux moyens de communication, l’achat d’Airbus A-300M et de navires
multifonctions. Le maître mot du ministère de la Défense est d’harmoniser la planification des forces
avec celle fixée dans le champ de l’Union européenne et de l’OTAN, avec pour priorité les synergies
et la mutualisation par les coopérations et les niches, afin de trouver une marge de manœuvre
budgétaire.
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prospective Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. Is there a national debate on the criteria
for participation in permanent structured cooperation formulated therein (conditions of access and
(8 + 9.) La Belgique pourrait rejoindre une coopération structurée permanente. La difficulté principale
du Royaume ne se situerait pas dans le champ diplomatique ou conceptuel, mais plutôt en termes
budgétaires si des critères quantitatifs contraignants devaient être explicitement imposés.
Actuellement, le contenu des articles 40.6 et III.213 du projet de Constitution européenne dans sa
dernière version peut être assimilé et concrétisé par Bruxelles. Le protocole, dans son article 2, impose
des principes de coopération, de disponibilité, de flexibilité et de déployabilité qui vont dans le droit fil
des restructurations militaires belges en cours. Tout va donc dépendre des critères d’évaluation
annuelle des contributions annoncés à l’article 3 dudit protocole (critères qui doivent encore être
établis). L’inscription de la Belgique dans une coopération structurée permanente est un objectif
stimulant pour le pays et le moteur du principe de ces coopérations est la pression des pairs (peer
pressure).
La Belgique est un des pays qui a pensé et proposé le concept de capacité autonome pour la
planification et la conduite d’opérations autonomes de l’UE ; en d’autres mots, d’un quartier général
européen autonome au sein de l’Union européenne. Cette idée fut d’ailleurs inscrite dans les
propositions du Groupe des Quatre d’avril 2003. L’objectif était de compléter la panoplie des
structures institutionnelles autour de la PESD qui dispose déjà du Comité militaire, de l’état-major
militaire, du COPS, du Haut Représentant, d’une nouvelle Stratégie de sécurité. L’objectif belge était à
la fois de renforcer l’autonomie stratégique de l’UE en cas d’opérations autonomes sans moyens
OTAN tout en réduisant le s coûts en luttant contre le nombre élevé de quartiers généraux nationaux
multinationalisables. Bruxelles avait même proposé d’accueillir ce modeste QG intra-européen dans
une caserne belge (Tervuren). Les pressions américaines, britanniques et de certains Etats atlantistes
ont abouti à un accord en demi-teinte qui privilégie finalement en premier les grands QG nationaux
multinationalisables et le Shape. Malgré cette subsidiarité, le principe de cette cellule a été adopté par
les Européens en décembre 2003. La Belgique estime que ce quartier général autonome européen qui
doit être opérationnel en juin 2004 devrait monté en puissance, fortifié par les événements et s’imposer
dans les prochaines années. Bruxelles a néanmoins accepté l’idée qu’il fallait des synergies et des
coopérations entre ce QG et celui de l’OTAN, afin d’échanger les informations et éviter toute
ambiguïté inter-organisationnelle.
cooperation?
Dans la mesure où le concept de coopérations renforcées (article III-211) et celui de coopération
structurée permanente (article III-213) sont des notions différentes, « au statut différent » dans des
champs différents, la Belgique estime qu’il faut conserver les deux concepts. Il faut évaluer leur mise
en œuvre avant toutes nouvelles modifications juridico-institutionnelles. Néanmoins, la Belgique a
défendu dans le cadre du groupe des Quatre (avril 2003) la notion de coopération renforcée sous
l’appellation d’Union européenne de sécurité et de défense (UESD) qui, en définitive, correspondrait à
la coopération structurée permanente reprise à l’article III-213 du projet de Constitution. Au-delà de la
confusion des mots, la question fondamentale touche aux règles de la prise de décision en matière de
PESC/PESD. La Belgique, qui défend le principe du vote à la majorité qualifiée en matière de
politique étrangère et en matière de sécurité et de défense, souhaite que le Conseil l’adopte en matière
de défense, au-delà même du cadre de coopérations structurées permanentes.
12
III. Missions
−
−
−
−
−
stabilisation
Other conditions.
Depuis longtemps, la Belgique s’est engagée dans des opérations de gestion de crise et de maintien de
la paix dont l’ampleur des moyens fut modulée selon les contraintes budgétaires et le degré de
consensus interne. La décision d’intervention ne repose pas sur une grille de lecture figée mais est
prise au cas par cas, d’autant plus qu’en Belgique, l’exécutif et le législatif reposent toujours sur des
gouvernements de coalition et donc sur des élus de différents partis (lesquels divergent souvent très
fort, notamment sur les questions liées aux opérations en Afrique centrale). L’examen des opérations
récentes montre que celles-ci doivent en premier lieu être légalisées explicitement sinon implicitement
par l’ONU et/ou reposer sur une légitimité politique et morale (le cas du Kosovo étant resté une
exception pour laquelle le gouvernement a néanmoins cherché comme ses partenaires de l’OTAN une
base juridique). L’engagement dans les opérations OTAN (Kosovo, 1999), ONU/OTAN (Afghanistan,
2002-2004) UE (Ituri, 2003) et en bilatéral (Congo, 2004) indique la volonté belge de figurer en bonne
place à l’intérieur de la constellation de sécurité et de défense, de la construction de la PESD à la
nouvelle stratégie de l’OTAN. La Belgique ne va donc pas s’engager selon des critères rigides tels que
les options « seulement si les Etats-Unis sont engagés », « seulement si l’OTAN est engagée » ou « si
la Turquie n’y est pas opposée ». Elle préférera une approche souple, pragmatique, au cas par cas,
tenant compte des conditions géopolitiques et de ses capacités d’intervention propres (qui se
trouveront peut-être confrontées à des dilemmes en cas de multiplication des interventions au titre de
la PESD et/ou de l’OTAN). Il n’y a pas non plus de critères appelant la nécessaire participation de
certains Etats même si la Belgique est encline aujourd’hui « à travailler » avec la France et le
Luxembourg. Ces affinités sont à la fois culturelles et géographiques mais elles n’interdisent
aucunement les nombreuses autres collaborations multinationales avec d’autres Etats européens. La
question du nombre minimal d’Etats n’est pas codifiée mais la Belgique recherchera toujours à
partager les coûts, les moyens et les risques, tout autant que d’asseoir la plus large légitimité possible
en tentant de faire accepter une mission par d’autres partenaires (ex : Congo, 2004). Dans la mesure où
la Belgique insiste particulièrement pour que les opérations qu’elles mènent en coopération reposent
toujours sur un mandat de l’ONU, cette posture expliqua le refus belge de s’engager en 2003 avec la
coalition en Irak et le soutien à l’opération Artemis de l’UE en Ituri.
13
La Belgique a soutenu fermement l’intervention policière de l’UE en Bosnie -Herzégovine, la mission
militaire, puis policière, en Macédoine et l’opération au Congo. Les deux premières missions n’ont pas
porté à débat parlementaire conflictuel. La mission UE en Ituri (Congo) durant l’été 2003 a été l’objet
de débats belgo-belges dans la mesure où ce pays est une ancienne colonie et que le syndrome
rwandais est encore présent dans les esprits. En effet, l’assassinat des dix paracommandos belges à
Kigali au début du génocide de 1994 avait amené le gouvernement à retirer les Casques bleus belges,
puis à suivre les conclusions de la Commission Rwanda du Parlement (janvier 1998) qui avait
recommandé de s’abstenir d’une participation future de la Belgique aux opérations de l’ONU en
général et aux missions dans les trois ex-colonies (Congo, Rwanda, Burundi) en particulier. Depuis
2003, en raison des demandes des Etats de la région et de la nécessité de donner un prolongement
militaire aux missions diplomatiques répétées du Ministre belge des Affaires étrangères en RDC, au
Burundi et au Rwanda, le gouvernement a donc pu dépasser une interprétation stricte des
recommandations de la Commission Rwanda, mais la prudence est néanmoins restée de mise. La
Belgique ne souhaitait pas s’engager directement et militairement avec les Français et d’autres unités
allemandes et suédoises sur le terrain, mais plutôt soutenir politiquement l’opération et engager des
moyens logistiques, de transport et médicaux en retrait. Cette posture fut par la suite relâchée dans la
mesure où la Belgique est engagée d’initiative dans une politique de formation d’unités militaires au
Congo début 2004 dans une zone qui reste particulièrement instable. Les capacités d’extraction des
forces sont particulièrement organisées dans ladite zone et les forces d’instruction disposent de
moyens d’autodéfense adéquats afin de ne pas réitérer le drame des paras belges au Rwanda. Dans
tous les cas, la Belgique sera attentive aux capacités de protection de ses forces et de disposer de
règles d’engagement impliquant le recours explicite à la force afin de rendre crédible la dissuasion et
les opérations sous mandat ONU. A propos du transfert à l’UE de la mission SFOR de l’OTAN en
Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Belgique a été des plus favorables à ce nouveau mandat, dès l’instant ou
Bruxelles est un des ambassadeurs d’une montée en puissance de la PESD et l’avocat d’une capacité
européenne de stabilisation du continent à travers les missions de maintien de la paix, de stabilisation
et de reconstruction. En outre, la coopération entre l’UE et l’OTAN dans la zone devrait, pour la
Belgique, contribuer à renforcer la confiance mutuelle entre les deux organisations. La Belgique n’a
pas encore adopté un point de vue officiel sur une implication accrue de l’OTAN en Irak, mais reste
ouverte à une évolution en cas de changement politique sur le terrain après le 30 juin 2004. De même,
la notion de partage des tâches et des zones entre l’UE et l’OTAN n’a pas encore fait l’objet de débats
structurés décisifs dans le pays.
your country? Has there ever been a situation in which (parts of) your country thought about using
this instrument?
La Belgique a été favorable à la fois à l’extension du principe du vote à la majorité qualifiée et à la
simplification de son calcul. Cette position, défendue durant les travaux de la Convention, dans
différents mémorandums, est considérée comme un des éléments principaux de la recherche d’une
efficience en matière de politique commune tout en améliorant la démocratie. Relevons que durant la
Convention, le gouvernement belge s’est rallié à la formule de la double majorité du nombre d’Etats et
de 60% de la population. Lors de la CIG 2003, il défendra même le critère de 50% de la population.
Bruxelles considère que cette notion d’abstention constructive préfigure les coopérations structurées et
permet à ceux qui veulent aller plus vite et plus loin de le faire, tout en permettant aux autres Etats
réticents de pouvoir s’abstenir (non-participation) sans trop de conséquences. La Belgique peut
imaginer l’usage de l’abstention constructive dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense. Elle
souhaite dépasser le cadre étroit de Nice qui implique que les positions et actions communes avec
abstention constructive ne peuvent pas être mises en œuvre dans le domaine de la défense. Mais il
faut que le nouvel assouplissement préserve l’unicité et la cohérence de l’action de l’Union. Pour le
14
pays, la multiplication et l’intégration de ces mécanismes constituent un garde fou contre l’émergence
de directoires en dehors du contrôle institutionnel de l’Union.
such a clause?
La Belgique soutient la dernière version négociée à la première session de la CIG terminée en
décembre 2003 (mais non encore juridiquement adoptée à ce jour) du paragraphe 2 de l’article III-213
du projet de Constitution qui stipule que dans le cadre de l’établissement d’une coopération structurée
permanente, le Conseil statue à la majorité qualifiée après consultation du ministre des Affaires
étrangères de l’Union.
V. European agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and
La Belgique est disposée à participer à cette Agence qu’elle soutient fermement dans la mesure où
cette dernière devrait organiser les planifications et les commandes en commun, ce qui induirait des
économies d’échelle. Cependant, il est trop tôt pour définir une participation concrète dans la mesure
où la structure est actuellement en construction et ne sera finalisée que fin 2004. A ce stade, la
Belgique insiste d’abord sur le fait que les quatre missions de l’Agence doivent être développées de
manière équilibrée. D’autre part, qu’il ne faudra pas faire d’économies sur le personnel afin que
l’Agence monte en puissance et soit crédible, quand bien même les Britanniques souhaitent qu’elle ne
soit pas trop imposante et que le personnel soit à double casquette. La capacité budgétaire de la
Belgique à s’inscrire dans l’Agence n’est pas encore précisée mais certains projets structurels et de
procédures au sein de cette Agence européenne seront moins coûteux pour un petit pays qui pourrait
s’y atteler.
Actuellement, la Belgique a placé depuis le 16 février 2004 un lieutenant colonel (ex-adjoint du
Directeur national de l’armement) avec un mandat européen et travaillant dans l’Agency establishment
team.
Vu leurs fonctions et leurs statuts juridiques, l’agence ne peut être considérée comme une remplaçante
de l’OCCAR et de la LoI/Framework Agreement. De même, ces dernières ne peuvent être partie
intégrantes en tant que telle de l’Agence naissante vu leurs missions très différentes. Si pour des
raisons politiques, budgétaires, contractuelles et juridiques, la Belgique admet cette réalité, elle rejoint
la plupart des Etats européens qui estiment que les différents organes qui s’occupent de coopération
industrielle (OCCAR, LoI/Framework Agreement, GAEO, OAEO) doivent être mis en réseau autour
de l’Agence. De même, Bruxelles admet que l’OCCAR soit la structure qui va s’occuper de la gestion
des programmes de coopération définis à partir des évaluations réalisées par l’Agence.
Si une politique de rationalisation, de fusion et de restructuration des différents organes devait avoir
lieu, la Belgique soutiendrait le processus qui se devrait d’être entériné par tous les Etats membres.
L’objectif principal de Bruxelles est d’améliorer les synergies européennes de recherche, de
planification et de commande des équipements au profit d’une optimisation des ressources et une
harmonisation des besoins. Cette position rejoint celle de l’Union et du mandat de l’Agence qui doit,
dans un premier temps, coordonner ce qui existe puis, à moyen terme, intégrer ce qui existe, dont
l’OCCAR et la LoI/Framework Agreement.
15
La Belgique a été un ardent défenseur de la notion de solidarité dans l’épreuve, clause de sauvegarde
et soutien aux Etats membres de l’UEO, de l’OTAN et de l’UE. Répondre et soutenir le s autres Etats
est historiquement assimilé par Bruxelles dans la mesure où l’étroitesse du pays et son histoire faite
d’invasions implique pour la Belgique la prise de conscience de sa fragilité et la nécessité de
s’entourer d’alliés. Dans cet esprit, la notion de solidarité est particulièrement importante pour la
Belgique même si le concept de défense mutuelle (article III.214) a plutôt un impact symbolique vu la
présence des solidarités OTAN et UEO (renvoyant à l’outillage de l’Alliance). Néanmoins, l’objectif
est de démultiplier les obligations juridiquement les plus contraignantes afin que les petits pays soient
secondés et soutenus dans l’épreuve. Elle est aussi un gage de solidité des alliances et l’expression de
l’affirmation politique d’une Union européenne en devenir. Cependant, Bruxelles considère qu’un
article de solidarité commune dans le cadre de l’UE ne peut effacer la clause de défense collective de
l’OTAN à travers son article 5 ni celle, plus contraignante encore de l’UEO que Bruxelles souhaitait
en quelque sorte étendre aux autres Etats membres de l’UE. Lors du Conseil européen de mars 2004,
la Belgique a également soutenu le principe d’une solidarité en cas d’agression terroriste. Ici
également l’affirmation d’un destin commun et d’une solidarité sécuritaire reposent sur la construction
d’une Europe que le pays veut le plus communautaire possible, via l’écheveau des solidarités
pluridimensionnelles.
20. Does this obligation conflict with other commitments resulting from NATO membership of your
country?
21. For Non-neutral members: Do you anticipate any problems in your country due to the fact that
(20 + 21.) Pour la Belgique qui est membre de l’OTAN, il ne peut y avoir de conflit d’intérêt entre
l’obligation de solidarité de défense UE et OTAN dans la mesure ou une éventuelle solidarité
territoriale en cas d’agression majeure au sein de l’UE impliquerait automatiquement la solidarité à
travers l’Alliance atlantique. Cependant, à moyen terme, une montée en puissance relative de l’Union
en matière de PESD, des avancées plus conséquentes en matière d’intégration européenne ou un
affaiblissement des solidarités transatlantiques pourraient donner plus de crédib ilité à une clause de
solidarité de l’UE via un partage territoriale de cette tâche entre Européens et Américains. Mais
aujourd’hui, le jeu de la subsidiarité joue entre l’UE et l’OTAN en terme de clause de sauvegarde. La
première interviendrait soit en cas de menace non vitale, soit en cas d’affaiblissement des
engagements OTAN (qui restent juridiquement plus faibles qu’au sein de l’UEO et demeurent
dépendants de l’engagement des Etats-Unis, dont le Ministre belge de la Défense a craint le
relâchement après la guerre d’Afghanistan et la politique américaine d’action hors du cadre OTAN à
cette occasion). La Belgique n’a pas émis de réticences et a accepté l’article I-40 § 7 du projet de
Constitution sur la clause de solidarité qui renvoie explicitement pour les Etats européens membres de
l’OTAN aux procédures atlantiques en matière de défense commune. Bruxelles considère
officieusement que le statut de neutralité de certains Etats membres de l’Union européenne est en
contradiction avec les objectifs politiques de l’Union, les textes fondamentaux de solidarité de l’Union
et l’écheveau des intérêts intra-européens. Elle estime que la montée en puissance politique de l’UE et
l’adoption de la Constitution européenne pourrait réduire les contraintes et pondérer les traditions
historiques sécuritaires de ces pays au profit d’une dimension sécurité-défense partagée où la solidarité
serait obligatoire à l’instar de l’article V de l’UEO. Malgré ces craintes, Bruxelles a toujours cherché à
réduire les risques de divergences entre pays OTAN et neutres en contribuant à élargir la sphère de
collaboration entre OTAN et pays neutres (notamment via le Partenariat pour la Paix) et à élargir au
maximum le contenu des objectifs de la PESD et de la définition des missions de Petersberg en
collaboration avec les neutres, en particulier la Finlande et la Suède. Cette position belge a pu trouver
aisément un écho dans la mesure où Bruxelles appuie également fortement les priorités placées par la
Finlande et la Suède en matière de prévention des conflits et de gestion civile des crises.
clause?
Pour la Belgique, qui a soutenu le principe des solidarités communes, le lien reste étroit entre les
coopérations renforcées et structurées en matière de sécurité-défense et la clause de défense mutuelle.
16
D’une part, parce que la défense commune exige des capacités optimales qui peuvent être plus
facilement approchées via les coopérations renforcées. D’autre part, parce qu’en cas de réticences de
certains Etats, une coopération structurée dans ce domaine peut être juridiquement admise dans le
cadre de l’Union européenne sans contraindre les autres Etats. Enfin, parce qu’une coopération plus
aboutie dans le champ de la défense peut stimuler et « pousser » les autres Etats membres réticents à
lever leurs tabous à propos de cette clause tout en garantissant à l’OTAN l’actuelle préséance pour les
Etats qui portent la « double casquette ».
VII. Conclusion
La Belgique estime que l’Union européenne ne peut devenir un acteur à part entière dans les relations
internationales si elle ne dispose pas de moyens, y compris de moyens militaires, pour donner de la
crédibilité à ses positions. Cette capacité militaire doit être au service de l’OTAN mais doit pouvoir
également être affectée à des choix stratégiques qui lui sont propres à travers l’Union européenne.
Lorsque cette dernière entreprend une action, elle doit pouvoir choisir de recourir ou non aux moyens
et capacités de l’Alliance atlantique qui peut parfois ne pas offrir le cadre d’intervention le plus
adéquat. L’existence d’une coalition arc-en-ciel (libéraux, socialistes, écologistes) durant la législature
1999-2003, puis d’une coalition violette (libéraux, socialistes) depuis 2003, c’est-à-dire pratiquement
dès la naissance et l’édification de la PESD n’a pas, pour ce dossier, apporté de tensions visibles, sauf
lorsque les dossiers militaires nationaux avaient une connotation communautaire ou idéologique
interne (dossier de la compétence en matière de licences d’exportations d’armements par exemple). Il
est vrai que, durant la guerre d’Irak, le courant pro-américain au sein des deux partis libéraux a été
obligé de se rallier à la position très “anti-guerre“ du Ministre des Affaires étrangères (membre du
parti libéral francophone), ce qui a facilité le consensus officiel sur ce thème, même si au Parlement et
dans certains think tanks, la position officielle a pu être critiquée par des personnalités politiques ou
des milieux d’affaires proches de Washington et désireuses d’éviter l’isolement de la Belgique. La
Belgique se considère comme un laboratoire en matière de coopération multinationale, de
fédéralisation européenne de la sécurité et de la défense. De même, Bruxelles fut le moteur
enthousiaste et non ambigu d’une affirmation de cette Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense
sachant que le pays et ses communautés et régions ont besoin d’une Europe stable et riche, sans renier
le lien transatlantique. Mais la Belgique souhaite un meilleur équilibre relationnel et une autonomie
réelle de décision dans le cadre de l’Union européenne. On peut constater que ces dernières années, le
différentiel de positionnement en matière de sécurité et de défense au profit de l’OTAN s’est quelque
peu équilibré avec un soutien visible à la PESD et à l’autonomie décisionnelle et stratégique
européenne. Si tous les partis soutiennent la PESD et les alliances de sécurité et défense, le débat
principal qui les concerne tournent autour du choix à faire entre de nouveaux moyens budgétaires à
engager ou la recherche prioritaire d’économies d’échelle permettant de trouver de nouvelles
ressources disponibles pour l’acquisition d’équipements nécessaires aux missions PESD et OTAN.
Devant ce dilemme et ce choix politique (en termes de priorités sociétales), on peut constater parfois
une inadéquation entre les paroles et les actes dans certains dossiers militaires. En d’autres termes,
d’un décalage pouvant apparaître parfois entre les « affichages » des discours européistes et les
« engagements » budgétaires. Cette dernière ambiguïté est celle qui menace le plus la crédibilité d’un
discours européiste faisant néanmoins de la Belgique un des grands ambassadeurs de cette PESD dans
le champ international et sécuritaire.
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17
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politique étrangère commune cohérente », conférence de presse, Bruxelles, 29 avril 2003.
18
CZECH REPUBLIC
Lucie Königová (Research Fellow Institute of International Relations, Praha)
I. In General
A new security doctrine (A Security Strategy of the Czech Republic) was adopted by the Czech
government on 10 December, 2003. This strategy is an update on the previous one, endorsed by the
government in 2001 in the wake of the terrorist attacks and new threats and risks
appearing/acknowledged after 11/9. This security doctrine confirmed that as before the terrorist
attacks, it is NATO that plays the key role in maintaining security in Europe. An easily detectable
conservatism in the sense that the Czechs are much closer to the intergovernmentalist and Atlanticist
end of the security spectrum in the debate within the EU. So, NATO will remain the key security
anchor for the Czech Republic for the foreseeable future, chiefly for being able to keep Americans in
Europe, beside its political and military efficiency. New definitions of threats and risks appeared in the
strategy and considerably more attention was paid, along with counter-terrorism measures, to
specialisation in fields where the Czech security forces have a comparative advantage and long-term
expertise.
The response in the Czech Republic to the Solana paper was relatively muted. Except for the three
areas of prime interest and engagement recently announced by Deputy Minister Jan Kohout: the
Balkans, the Caucus region and the Middle East. Especially the second and the third areas of interest
and active engagement link to the recent experience and long-term expertise Czechs have had in
dealing with Middle Eastern countries. These three areas also react to the suggested greater
responsibility to be taken by the EU and its members for the larger world. Czechs have decided to
specialise more, develop their niche capabilities (chemical units, special forces, intelligence) and
strengthen their post-conflict involvement to stabilize regions directly affecting Europe.
2. Is there a debate on flexible integration (especially in the media or th e public) in the area of
There is almost no debate whatsoever on flexible integration in the area of CFSP/ESDP in the media
or in the general public sphere. There have been three articles in the country’s broadsheets mentioning
this issue as part of the overall constitutional treaty package of problems still to be tackled by the IGC
and the Czech section of the BBC World Service had a few interviews and one debate on this which,
however, went largely unnoticed – all of this following the December 2003 summit. Flexibility has
been debated among the MPs and former conventionnels in their exchange with Prime Minister Špidla
after the December 2003 European Council. While Špidla spoke at the summit in terms of the Czech
Republic being ready to join the integration hard core this met with stark rebuke by the opposition
Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and clashed also with President Václav Klaus’ views. The only notion
that resonates with the public and in the media is the “first-class” vs. “second-class” membership
which, however, boils down mostly to the ability to draw upon EU funding and is not linked with the
CFSP/ESDP. However, the Ministry of Defence has finally started reacting to this new dimension in
European integration - otherwise the MoD has been rather sceptical to Europe’s security and defence
initiatives, convinced that NATO is the primary and sufficient security-provider. (interview with a
security expert).
19
see above
Additional question: What could be the reasons for the absence of this debate in public? How is
European Integration in general seen in media and public discourse?
Most of the public debate and media coverage has long been focused on accession negotiations, the
terms of the country’s membership in the EU and on the referendum. Any security matters are mostly
conflated with NATO and the country’s membership and commitments in the Alliance and since
media reported on the difficulties Czechs have with meeting all the goals and benchmarks in terms of
their NATO commitments people, in general, tend to see the CFSP (if they know about it at all) as a
“superstructure” becoming of any importance and interest only after the NATO requirements are met.
negative one?
It has gone largely unnoticed. The information has appeared in all the major media but the only
commentary which has sunk in soon after was that this might mark the beginning of the “Directoire”
rule. So, the only, though rather muted response was more or less negative.
The Prime Minister has seen in the conflict a new impetus for the creation of a more effective CFSP
and the army has been reinforcing its good public image, hoping for more funds in the near future. The
opposition ODS has been supporting the Czech mission but highlighting the Trans-Atlantic dimension
all the way along. The Czech and Moravian Communist Party (KSCM), however, have strongly
opposed the country’s units’ involvement and seen it as an imperialist move.
Additional question: Could you please elaborate on the argumentation of the Prime Minister (e.g.
division between “old” and “new” Europe)?
This Prime Minister’s declaration came at the December EU summit and was not supported by the
majority of his base party, i.e. the CSSD. Rather than by the division between the old and new Europe
he argued by the need to become the trend-setter and policy-maker rather than a policy-taker.
Moreover, the Social Democratic visions have always been very pro-European and pro-active in terms
of further integration although the focus has been on the economic area rather than foreign policy
(hence the disagreement with the Social Democratic grassroots organisations and most of the CSSD
elites).
The only debate is between the ruling Social Democrats (CSSD) and the Christian Democratic Party
(KDU-CSL) and the Freedom Union (US), the junior coalition parties on the one hand and the Civic
Democrats on the other hand. While the government parties are in favour of including flexible
integration, Civic Democrats (ODS) are definitely against it, worrying about “competence creep”.
Similarly, the ODS, especially its security expert and ex-conventionnel Jan Zahradil, is against any
QMV introduction into any further areas, the CFSP being the worst one to introduce it in.
−
European Council
−
−
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
There is no opinion on this issue – the ODS which would otherwise favour the European Council and
the Council of the European Union refuses to speculate about this since the party is against any
20
flexible integration in the area of CFSP, not to mention ESDP. Also, both the Civic Democrats and
Communists reject the notion of an EU Foreign Minister.
N/A
N/A (no such preferred option is on the table yet, so it was not officially endorsed either)
During the NATO accession talks the Czech Republic vowed to ensure that the defence expenditure
would grow by 0.1% GDP each year, reaching a 2%GDP growth rate by 2000. The Czechs, however,
have failed to meet this pledge. Following the devastating floods in 2002, the hugest investment
planned, i.e. the intended purchase of supersonic aircraft, was scrapped. In the meantime, a lion share
of capital expenditure went into the continuing procurement of sub-sonic L-159 aircraft for the Czech
Air Force (CZK 7.00bn) in 2002 and the T-72 M4CZ tank upgrade (CZK 1.6bn). Other investment
priorities include specialisation projects to meet NATO Target Force Goals. Some CZK 850m were
earmarked for the Czech Army’s units operating on international missions, chiefly under NATO
command. The year 2002 was the first one for all projected military deployments abroad to be covered
by the MoD budget, rather than using extra-budget measures such as the treasury bonds as in the
previous years. As of 2003, the total defence expenditure is no longer expressed in the percentage of
the country’s GDP but as an amount which guarantees the coverage of all expenditures to implement
the Czech Republic’s Army Professionalisation Concept. I.e. the expenditure for the 2004-2006 midterm budget aims at an incremental increase of allocations. For 2004, this figure stands at CZK 50.7bn,
rising to CZK 53.8bn in 2005, increasing yet again in 2006 to CZK 58.4bn to reach CZK 70.3bn by
2010. Most of the funds are going to go towards the Army professionalisation and general reform as
well as to the accomplishment of NATO-assigned tasks to meet the Target Force Goals as well as the
Headline Goals.
costs?
The army and the MoD have been rather sceptical regarding any pooling even though the ice has been
broken already but there is very little attention paid to it since the army and the defence sector are fully
involved and absorbed in their own reform and building up a professional army.
Additional question: Are there any tensions between different groups concerning the definition of
threats and goals for restructuring army forces? Discussions on conscription – professional army …?
Initially, the Czech Army was quite suspicious over the professional army concept. However, since
not so long ago (approximately 3 years) it has become more attentive to this concept fully and keenly
supported by the Defence Ministry. As for political actors, it is only the Czech Communist Party
(KSCM) that would like to retain the conscription system and that is a strong opponent of army
professionalisation.
The country is rather reluctant to take part in structured co-operation since very little seems to be clear
about where and how this could work for the near future. Czech army officials are more pragmatic
than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs people who, nevertheless, are cautious too. The Czech
government is definitely in favour of an open structure which other EU Member States might join
when willing and ready and would like to see the threshold relatively high (2/3 or 60% of all MS).
21
Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has highlighted that this is a question of setting up exact and
rather quantity-based criteria, with no room for arbitrariness. As for the preferred members, the Czech
Republic would care to see the UK involved as the linchpin of European defence.
There is no national debate on this – the note went almost unnoticed. The only two voices raised in
this context were those by several ODS and KSCM MPs.
The MoD would like the European Headquarters autonomy and size to be as limited as possible. The
army people would like to see it interlinked as much as possible with NATO’s SHAPE. This issue is
only weakly reflected by other (political) elites.
cooperation?
There is no opinion on this, except for the ODS (Zahradil) and Communists (Miloslav Ransdorf)
refusing both.
III. Missions
−
−
−
−
−
stabilisation
Other conditions.
These are rather preferences than conditions: the Czech Republic would appreciate if NATO was
involved, as well as the Brits and a minimum of 2/3 of MS were participating, supported by the UN
resolution. But neither the interviewed politicians nor the consulted (military and non-military) experts
would put it in such principled way – rather they more or less agreed this to be a matter of ad hoc
decisions (except for the 2/3 or 60% condition)
22
Czechs have their policing forces in Bosnia -Herzegovina and Macedonia. There has been almost no
debate on these two police missions, there was a consensus in the public sphere on this involvement.
Human security in general gets a very high and stable levels of support, both from politicians and the
general public. Communists, however, expressed their opinion on the Artemis mission, claiming that
to be an example of where the “directoire” might easily drag us into in the future. Finally, the MoD
was very strongly against the transfer of the NATO mission in Bosnia to the EU but the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister were mostly in favour. Civic democrats were also rather
unhappy about this transfer but did not demand otherwise – they claimed they could live with it.
Additional question: What is this conflict between MoD and the MoFA and the Prime Minister over
Bosnia an instance for?
An instance of the deep distrust apparent for a long time on the MoD side. While MoFA has been
more optimistic and open about the CFSP/ESDP initiatives, though not enthusiastic either, MoD –
until only a short time ago – was very sceptical and sometimes even openly hostile to any security and
defence activities outside the NATO framework. There are two reasons for that: 1) MoD officials were
happy to have learned just one structure and set of tasks and were reluctant to enter new environment
and get oriented in new structures and co-operative procedures; 2) any European effort without a
substantial involvement of the USA and the UK was perceived as toothless.
this instrument?
There has been no discussion on this instrument in the Czech Republic whatsoever – this is largely
seen (by the Foreign Ministry and MPs) as an operative issue to be tackled when a situation requiring
constructive abstention comes. But no such a situation was defined by the interviewees, nor has any
such statement appeared in the media.
such a clause?
This clause was discussed in quite some detail at the September 2003 Reflection Forum on the Draft
Constitutional Treaty organised jointly by the Foreign Ministry and the IIR and the consensus across
the whole political spectrum was that despite some relatively strong safeguards there are to many
question marks over this issue that it might be better to leave this out of the Treaty text altogether.
The country has already sent out its representative to work at the Agency – however, there have been
and will be problems of the shortage of both financial and human resources. There was no public or
parliamentary debate on this issue – the decision was taken by the Ministry of Defence and the
Foreign Ministry and the rest of the political scene simply endorsed it or hardly noticed.
Politicians, the military sector and security expert seem to converge in their opinion on the Agency,
viewing it as a more or less technical management issue. This has also translated into the appointment
of the CR’s representative as mentioned above.
23
Additional question: Does this mean that political management of the agency will not be acceptable to
the Czech?
In principle it does. It is seen as a purely technical arm with some political implications but which
should first start as a technical, managerial project and only then other options could be considered.
(interview with a MoD officer and a MoFA Head of Department)
No.
It has been discussed both by politicians and some major media in relation to terrorist attacks where
the majority opinions seem to be that this is an acceptable and even preferable option. However,
beyond terrorism and severe disaster situations, there is reluctance in the Czech Republic to fully
embrace this clause. Security experts agree this is a very ambitious task and commitment which, as
such, is a matter of internal security made, however, part of the CFSP while ESDP structures are to be
used to implement it. Since it will require a substantial degree of co-ordination, planning and
preparation done by security, rescue and health actors from MS as well as an intensive intelligence cooperation it is seen largely as a matter of the future rather than anything to be sought after in practice
immediately.
The military structures in the Czech Republic have not yet arrived on a definitive answer. Whatever
that may be, in the end, there is, however a strong “NATO-first” view of security in both the military
and among many opposition politicians. Even the government and the Prime Minister acknowledge
the commitment to meet NATO obligations first and be involved in NATO political and military
initiatives.
N/A
N/A
No.
clause?
Not really.
VII. Conclusion
•
integration by ‘objectives’ rather than by ‘directives’ (soft method of setting common EU
benchmarks while leaving the method of reaching them up to the respective states)
24
•
willingness to deploy Czech forces outside the EU’s immediate environment if there is a
clearly formulated cause (such as the campaign against terror) and unambiguous leadership
•
further exploration of convergence criteria – input in terms of the structure of defence budgets;
output in terms of the structure of forces
•
merging the functions of the High Representative of the EU for the CFSP and the
Commissioner for External Relations
(government positions for further negotiations)
As for the national debate and various groups’ stakes, ODS is an ardent defender of the old,
Westphalian notion of territorially defined sovereignty which must be preserved and in this
are backed by voiced concerns and sceptical comments made by President Klaus. Social
Democrats and the rest of the ruling coalition do not share their fears and would rather be
thinking about how to constructively link the CFSP/ESDP ambitions with NATO
commitments so that the country can finance both the European and Transatlantic dimension
without having to allocate more money for useless duplicities and declamatory initiatives. The
Draft Constitutional Treaty suggests that the Petersberg tasks be ambitiously expanded in
scope and type which has very specific implications for both the budget and the scarce ‘niche
capability’ forces to be sent on such missions. The media will surely continue to be interested
in the figure of the EU Foreign Minister which will still resonate with the public, though
perhaps with some aftertaste.
Major Sources and Literature:
Motková, Hana and Radek Khol (2004): CFSP Watch 2003: National Report – The Czech Republic.
www.fornet.info
Šedivý, Jirí (2003): Vnejší dimenze ústavní smlouvy /External Dimension of the Constitutional
Treaty /In: Mezinárodní politika 11/2003, UMV: Praha.
2003 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic
2003 Military Strategy of the Czech Republic
Czech Republic – Security Yearbook 2004
Koncepce výstavby profesionální Armády Ceské republiky a mobilizace ozbrojených sil Ceské
repubiky prepracovaná na zmenený zdrojový rámec [The Concept of Czech Republic’s Professional
Army Building and Czech Republic’s Armed Forces Mobilization Redrafted for the New Sourcing
Framework]. Ministry of Defense, 2003.
+ interviews with MoD, Foreign Ministry, Office of the Government and Czech Republic Army
officials and several military and security experts; interviews with and newspaper clipping analysis of
views aired by Czech MPs, ministers and the President.
25
DENMARK
Lisbet Zilmer-Jones (Visiting Scholar, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS)
I. In General
The Danish Centre Right Government has within the last year issued a number of reports indicating
changes in Denmark’s security and defence policy as well as security doctrine in response to the
international situation post September 11th . A Changing World , June 2003, is the Government’s vision
for new priorities in Denmark’s foreign policy. The Security Policy Conditions for Danish Defence,
August 2003, is a report from a working group commissioned by the Government and with the
participation of officials and researchers. The report was an important input to the government’s
proposal for a defence reform which was presented in March 2004. Political negotiations are currently
taking place.
A Changing World outlines the three dimensions in Danish foreign policy – European, transatlantic
and global, and underlines the need for the dimensions to be closely tied and mutually strengthening.
The EU is presented as Denmark’s most important channel for influencing the global agenda. There is
a call for a strengthening of CFSP in line with the Convention’s proposals. The Government calls for a
strengthening of the ESDP as well. The opt-out on defence is viewed as a restriction of Denmark’s
ability to influence the further development of the EU, and the government has stated in the report and
in speeches that at an “appropriate juncture” it will call a referendum on the opt-out. A large majority
of the political parties favours full Danish participation in the ESDP.
The proposal on a defence reform is based on the premises that the conventional military threat to
Danish territory has ceased for the foreseeable future. Consequently there is no longer a need for the
territorial defence structures. Instead, new asymmetric, dynamic and unpredictable direct threats to
Denmark and Danish citizens in the form of international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of
mass destructions have lead to a proposal for the Danish Armed Forces to strengthen its capabilities in
two areas 1) Total Defence, viewed as Homeland Security, including the ability to counter terrorist
acts and perform consequence management and 2) Internationally deployable military capabilities.
The general analysis has received broad political support. In the ongoing political negotiations, the
main issue is conscription. The government has proposed three months conscription, where the
conscripts are trained in areas relating to Homeland Security. The conscripts can then sign up for a
follow-on contract with the Armed Forces. The centre parties in the opposition want to scrap
conscription, while a right wing party wants to maintain nine months conscription.
The Security Strategy did not receive much interest in the media, but the Government (espc. the
Minister for Foreign Affairs) has made several positive references to it, and the Centre Left opposition
as well has voiced support for the strategy. A Changing World as well as the other reports described
above are very much in line with the EU Security Strategy.
Immediately after the IGC negotiations broke down in Brussels December 2003, there was an intense
debate in the media on flexible integration. The concept of a “Kerneuropa” was generally not viewed
as a viable outcome, as few commentators believed that the Franco-German axis would be sufficiently
strong to gather 6-7 countries in a core Europe. Especially foreign, security and defence policy was
viewed as an area, where France and Germany would need British participation. “Kerneuropa” was
26
viewed with scepticism, as it was likely to exclude Denmark with its opt-outs. Some sort of flexible
participation was viewed as less challenging, as Denmark was likely to remain in the forefront in some
policy areas.
There was some debate on the proposals for a strengthening of the CFSP in view of the split over Iraq.
There was generally a call for the EU to speak with one voice. There was only little debate on the
proposals concerning the ESDP, probably because of the opt-out on defence. On the failure of IGC
2003/”Kerneuropa” – see above.
negative one?
In general, the Government played down the significance of the trio meeting. The Prime Minister
found it natural that the three leaders met prior to the EU Summit. The media talked of a directoire,
but it was also described as a positive event which reinforced the impression that the split over Iraq did
no longer hamper further development of EU cooperation, especially CFSP/ESDP.
Denmark was part of the American led coalition in the war against Iraq. Opinion polls from spring
2003 showed that 42 pct. supported the decision and 51 pct. was against, but a year later a majority of
the Danish population (52 pct.) thinks the Government made the right decision when joining the
coalition. The Parliament was split over the decision to go to war. One of the Opposition’s arguments
was that Denmark should not join a coalition that only a minority of its EU partners participated in.
Afterwards, there has been broad political consensus that the conflict underlined the need to strengthen
the EU’s common foreign, security and defence policy, and there has been general support for
proposals to enable the EU to speak with one voice as well and to strengthen its crisis management
capabilities. At the same time, the Government has stressed that it will be a difficult task to have all
agree on a common stance – as demonstrated with Iraq - and thereby indicated a more open mind
towards the idea of flexibility. All in all, it can be argued that the Iraqi conflict has led to increased
political support for CFSP and ESDP among the pro EU parties. In terms of popular support,
according to the Eurobarometer the Iraqi conflict has not led to significant changes in the popular
support of CFSP and ESDP, but lately there has been an opinion poll, which show 63 pct. being in
favour of abolishing the defence opt-out – the highest rating ever. During the last couple of years, the
opinion polls have consistently showed more than 50 pct. in favour of abolishing the defence opt-out.
To the extent that flexibility is needed the general view is that it should be within the CFSP/ESDP and
not outside the common institutional framework.
−
European Council
−
−
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
Denmark’s position on the Convention’s proposals is presented in The Intergovernmental Conference
2003 – The Danish Government’s Position Paper (Position Paper) [www.um.dk, September 2003].
Denmark supports the extension of QMV, but the foreign policy should remain intergovernmental, and
27
the key institutions should be the European Council, the Council and the High Representative/Foreign
Minister. Closer involvement of the Commission would be enhanced through the creation of the post
as EU Foreign Minister, which receives broad support in the Parliament.
nil
Denmark would probably be sceptic towards cooperation outside the common institutional framework
as envisaged at the summit between Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003.
The Danish defence expenditures as pct. of GDP have more or le ss been stable from 1999-2003
accounting for 1.5-1.6 pct. (current prices). In the same period, the level for expenditures devoted to
equipment have steadily increased from 11.4 pct. in 1999 to 18 pct in 2003 (NATO). The proposal for
a defence reform is to be held within the same budgetary frame. Hence, increase in expenditures for
investment in equipment and participation in international operations (approx. 2000 soldiers, which is
almost twice as many as the current normal level) are to be covered by drastic cuts in supporting
structures.
costs?
Due to the opt-out, Danish defence plans have not been modified in order to adapt to ESDP
requirements. But due to the fact that the defence planning of NATO and the EU is based on the
principle of ‘a single set of forces’ and therefore should be complementary, the Danish membership of
NATO implies that by meeting NATO requirements, Denmark to a large degree also meets ESDP
requirements.
Denmark cannot participate due to the opt-out. The general view was that Denmark was prepared to
consider the possibility of structured cooperation “provided it is based on clear rules, on equal terms,
and is open to all” (Position Paper). The compromise reached at the Summit in Brussels December
2003 is generally perceived to meet those demands. If Denmark participated fully in the ESDP, it is
likely that she would be able and willing to participate in structured cooperation. The criteria for
permanent structured cooperation are still loosely defined, but seem to resemble the criteria for
NATO’s Response Force in many aspects. The Government’s proposal for a new defence reform is
based on meeting the criteria for NRF, and it is therefore likely that if there was no opt-out, the new
defence reform would make it possible for Denmark to join permanent structured cooperation.
There has been no national debate on the criteria.
28
Denmark was sceptical towards the idea of an autonomous European Headquarters as it was presented
at the Summit between Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003. Denmark wants
the ESDP to be based on the principle of no unnecessary duplication, and is in favour of conducting
EU led operations through the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements whenever appropriate. Denmark supports
the idea of a Planning Cell, as agreed upon at the Brussels Summit in December 2003, including the
proposal of an EU cell at SHAPE. In line with Denmark’s strong support of the development of the
EU’s civil crisis management capabilities as well as close coordination of the civil and military aspects
of crisis management, Denmark is very positive towards the idea of a Planning Cell with civil and
military components. Developing expertise in managing the civilian/military interface is very much
welcomed.
cooperation?
As flexibility in the area of development of capabilities, participation in operations and mutual defence
will take place through other means than enhanced cooperation, the only area left seems to be
enhanced cooperation on armaments, possibly within the framework of the Defence Agency.
III. Missions
−
−
humanitarian and rescue task s
−
−
−
stabilisation
Other conditions.
Denmark cannot participate in an EU led military operation. In order to support in principle an EU led
operation, it is not a condition that United States or NATO is engaged, but it is relevant that the EU
led operation is supported by NATO and thereby USA. If Denmark did not have an opt out, the
position of the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands would be relevant for a decision on
Danish participation, as would UN Security Council resolution on the matter. The participation of the
three countries mentioned and the larger EU member states in general would be of more importance
than a certain minimum number of member states. In general, Denmark has supported the involvement
of third countries in EU led missions. Denmark can participate in civilian operations, and is actively
involved in those, including the police mission in Bosnia and the police mission Proxima.
29
The only debate in Denmark has been concerning the fact that due to the opt-out, Denmark had to
withdraw its forces from Macedonia, when EU took over from NATO, and will have to withdraw its
forces in Bosnia, when the EU takes over. Such regret is expressed by all pro-EU parties in the
Parliament as well as the government. There is broad support behind the Danish participation in
civilian crisis management, i.e. the police missions in Bosnia and Proxima.
this instrument?
The Government has declared that “the EU cannot impose a certain foreign policy on a Member State.
Similarly, this Member State cannot prevent the others from pursuing a common foreign policy”
(Position Paper). Constructive abstention is seen as a possible solution if a Member State disagree
with the others. There are no reported cases of Denmark considering constructive abstention within the
CFSP. In the area of ESDP, Denmark has a sort of permanent constructive abstention due to the optout.
15. What were the positions in your country concerning a “passarelle” clause from unanimity to
QMV (Art. III-213 par.3 Draft Constitutional Treaty): In which areas and under which circumstances
would it be possible for your country to accept such a clause? Is there a long-term perspective of
accepting such a clause?
The Government is in general open vis-à-vis a “passarelle” clause, including in the area of CFSP,
where it favours an extension of QMV.
The opt-out is likely to prevent Danish participation in the Agency. The Government supports the
establishment of an Agency and the Prime Minister has on several occasions underlined its potential to
strengthen further European R&D in technology. Denmark does not have a large defence industry.
Danish Industry nevertheless regrets the fact that by not participating in the Agency, Danish industries
may not benefit from technological spin offs from closer European cooperation on R&D in the
defence area.
nil
As Denmark is not likely to participate in the Defence Agency, there is no official position. If full
Danish participation had been possible, then the general approach would probably have been to take
the main focus of the Agency into consideration. If the main task were to be R&T (Research and
Technology) this would probably call for a technical manager. If the main task turns out to be the
overall development of capabilities – which seems to be the case – then that would probably call for a
political manager.
nil
30
Denmark wants collective defence to be anchored in NATO. The main interest was that the clause was
not to weaken NATO through the creation of a parallel military structure in the EU. With the decision
to leave it to NATO to implement the security guarantee, it has been argued that it confirms NATO’s
position as the main framework for Europe’s collective defence.
Due to the opt-out, EU’s mutual defence clause does not include Denmark.
Nil
Nil
No, a security guarantee is to be implemented through NATO.
clause?
see answer to Q11
VII. Conclusion
All political parties, except the extreme right and left parties, support a strengthening of the CFSP and
ESDP. The parties differ on the purpose of strengthening the EU’s global role: the government argues
that it is necessary in order to become relevant to the United States, while the Centre Left argues that
the EU should counterbalance the United States. The split over Iraq has only strengthened the call for
an EU that speaks with one voice. Especially the pro-EU Centre Left opposition parties have
repeatedly called for a strengthening of the EU’s global role. The Government is also in favour, but
warns of the difficulties in achieving a common foreign policy, especially because the big member
states may be reluctant to accommodate their national foreign policy to an EU foreign policy. The
Government has strongly underlined the need for a CFSP that is not developed in opposition to the
United States but as a means of becoming a valuable partner to the United States. “Kerneuropa” is
generally viewed with scepticism, as it is likely to exclude Denmark, while flexible participation is
viewed as a pragmatic approach to overcoming the diversity in an enlarged Union.
All in all, the debate in Denmark in relation to CFSP/ESDP is heavily influenced by the defence optout. Hence, the view on flexibility is very much influenced by the question of whether or not it will
exacerbate the implications of the defence opt-out.
31
ESTONIA
Andres Kasekamp (Estonian Foreign Policy Institute)
I. In General
The Estonian government has mainly followed the line of traditional security and defence thinking,
adhering to ideas of polarity and balance of powers. Possible threats are seen as military ones and the
current defence doctrine is based on alliance building. In this context it is logical to see NATO as the
first choice. ESDP and CFSP are seen as competing concepts, which are not actively supported, since
they are perceived as potentially undermining transatlantic unity.
After signing the EU accession treaty, the government’s position shows some slight changes caused by
the EU security initiatives and the Iraq war. 1
Political parties in the coalition support the official government policy. In the opposition, the Center
Party2 and Social Democrats support more civilian aspects in security building: the peaceful resolution
of conflicts and improvement of relations with Russia.
Military structures are loyal to the government and supporting NATO partnership. The main
controversy for them is a choice between conscription and a professional army. Competence and
interest about EU methods is lower than about NATO options.
Pressure groups are very weak, mainly criticizing Estonian support of the USA’s pre-emptive defence
doctrine.3 NATO remains highly popular among citizens. 4
Academia/think tanks have provided some research and articles, mainly introducing post-modern
concepts and adapting it to the Estonian conditions; discussing the dilemma between EU and
transatlantic security 5 and defining Estonian needs and interest in these structures. 6 Unfortunately
there is lack of dialogue between state and think tanks and their opinion is not even debated.
The public is quite well informed about the consequences of NATO and EU (ESDP) accession, but too
tired to have a debate after the 2003 general election and referenda campaigns.
There were some state level as well academic discussions.
In academic discussions, Solana’s paper was welcomed, as it led to a clarification of the EU security
area, purposes and methods. One of the biggest concerns among all the groups is the EU-Russia
security dialogue and its influence to Estonia’s security. Mostly it was seen as a first step in forming a
clear area, purposes and methods for CFSP and ESDP.
The media, political parties and pressure groups showed very little interest about Solana’s paper.
1
White Paper on Draft Constitution, http://www.vm.ee/est/euro/kat_455
“Ja sõda algas ikkagi”, http://www.kesknadal.ee/index.php?aid=2532
3
Jaan Kaplinski Peace Letter, http://jaan.kaplinski.com/new/iraagist.html
4
Ministry of Defence, Public Oppinion about Defence 2003,
http://www.mod.gov.ee/static/sisu/files/riigikatse.pdf
5
Estonian Role and Choices in ESDP; http://www.evi.ee/lib/projekt.pdf
6
Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003, http://www.evi.ee/lib/valispol2003.pdf and State Procurement no 02245, Estonian Role and Choices in European Security and Defense Policy” Estonian Foreign Policy Institute,
http://www.evi.ee/eesti/proj.html
2
32
In the question of flexible integration, the Estonian government has contradictory positions, mostly
being strongly against the multi-speed idea, while supporting the idea of passive participation in the
CFSP and ESDP area.7 Passive participation has following key aspects:
1. Participate and support in the earlier initiatives agreed with the accession treaty
2. Not to support any new defence or security initiative which can create competition or overlap with
NATO
or
has
faced
direct
criticism
within
the
EU
a. Defend status quo until there appears clear danger that this plan or alternative solution will be
executed
despite
Estonian
criticism
b. Not to use veto when less than 1/3 of member states are supporting rejection of position.
See for example the dynamics of the Estonian positions in the Agency question
Media, academic groups and public opinion support a single -speed Europe, as they see Estonia outside
the core in a possible multi-speed model and are not in favour of creating new dividing lines inside the
EU. They also see the idea of core Europe as a method for discriminating against new members.
Some political parties connect it quite directly with the idea of equality. 8
The government position about articles concerning ESDP and CFSP was very conservative “we are
not going to do anything that could harm the transatlantic coalition”, The failure of the IGC was not
taken as something traumatic, because in many ways the government finds the Nice treaty and its
provisions more beneficial. 9
Among the political parties only the Social Democrats were greatly alarmed at the ramifications of the
failure of the IGC, seeing that it will lead to the next negative initiative for small border states – the
core Europe idea.
Academia/think tanks supported the Social Democrats logic, i.e., any failure in integration process
could cause cleavage inside Europe or dividing into differently integrated groups, what in general in
the long run is not in Estonian interests. 10
negative one?
As the recent trio meeting gives a signal about already informally existing Core Europe, the
government has downplayed it, claiming that it was a national affair having little to do with EU
procedures.
Public opinion is even more concerned as people see it as usual big powers game where big powers
make the policy and small ones need to obey and follow. As in the referenda campaign the main
argument for accession was the possibility of being an equal part of the EU family, people feel
confused. 11
Academia/think tanks see this process as an inevitable in this integration stage, not a positive one in
short term, but necessary in long term. 12
7
Juhan Parts, Euroopa ei saa kunagi valmis, http://www.vm.ee/est/euro/kat_303/4250.html
Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003, http://www.evi.ee/lib/valispol2003.pdf
9
Juhan Parts, Euroopa ei saa kunagi valmis, http://www.vm.ee/est/euro/kat_303/4250.html
10
Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004, http://www.evi.ee/lib/valispol2004.pdf
11
12
State Procurement no 02-245, Estonian Role and Choices in European Security and Defense Policy” Estonian
Foreign Policy Institute, http://www.evi.ee/eesti/proj.html
8
33
The Government has explained Estonian participation in Iraq coalition as an unavoidable part of
security alliance. But as all the main arguments in joining the campaign: problem of WMD, building
democracy in Iraq, etc, are weakening, the government has said very little about this question in recent
months. But as the price is already being paid, the government does not find it practical to leave the
Iraq coalition now.
Opposition political parties are continuously asking for explanations of the legal, financial and moral
aspects of participation in Iraq.
The military supports fully the government’s positions of alliance membership duties and NATO
primacy.
Pressure groups’ representatives have shown very little initiative mainly in writing newspapers
articles, pointing to the need to define moral arguments and integrated security interests in the triangle
Estonia -NATO-Iraq.
Academia/think tanks have shown very little interest about the influence of the Iraq conflict influence.
Two conferences discussing that topic were supported by the US Embassy and the George Marshall
Center.
Additional question: Could you elaborate this question more linked to ESDP/CFSP? Did the conflict
between mainly Germany and France on th e one side and the "new Europa" (Rumsfeld) on the other
influence position in your country concerning the area of ESDP/CFSP?
Government's position is still quite unchanged: As the USA is seen as the only guarantee for Estonian
independence, than Estonia supports any US lead coalition and opposes any critical or alternative
coalition (Franco-German or any other)
Cooperation with "New Europe" or Vilnius-10 countries is not priority in itself, but a part of
supporting the USA.
Positions are not changed, but the cleavage between public opinion and government's position has
gone deeper. Top politicians of government have directly supported US coalition and its methods in
the same time last public opinions are strongly against ( 62% against) government's position to support
US policy.
Social Democrats are only big party opposing this approach.
The government is once again supporting double standards and visions: on the one hand, they support
a single pillar system and a strong Europe, on the other, leaving defence aspects and crises
management for the NATO. It means that the government is trying to stop integration spill-over into
the defence area at every cost, but is ready to participate when in happens.
No major political or academic group has not supported the idea of flexible integration. Most political
and academic groups define this process as a gradual model for excluding Estonia from the decision
making process and also do not find it reflecting the equality principle mentioned in founding treaties
and accession treaty.
Estonian main political groups are afraid of the European growing cooperation in defense and security
questions (as it can harm relations with the USA) and want to be close to the decision table to block or
slow any development in that area.
Main discussion has been inside state institutions and among civil servants. Academic groups are
reacting to changes too slowly to be able to influence policy-making.
34
−
European Council
−
−
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
The government is in favour of the NATO primacy. They support the status quo, where CFSP and
ESDP are in the intergovernmental pillar and defence is fully in NATO’s competence. Accordingly, in
a crisis situation, NATO is the first option for rapid reaction. In that sense, the Estonian government is
still thinking in ESDI logic. 13
At the same time, the government is under pressure ready for step-by step compromises and not ready
to go straight against the defence dimension idea. The acceptance of the EU Armament Agency, after
initial rejection of the idea, can be seen as a first sign of flexibility.
Sovereignty is a central concept in that logic, co-operation in the military and defence field is seen as
eroding sovereignty and an act of weakness. EU supranationality in comparison with NATO
intergovernmentalism is also seen as crucial variable, which explains NATO as a first choice. 14
As Estonian government’s positions depend more on NATO’s driving forces and many of them are
also in the EU, the reaction could be quite the similar to those of the UK, Poland or Denmark. If a
compromise were found between NATO and ESDP primacy supporters, Estonia would follow.15
Estonia has raised its military expenditures to the level of 2% of GDP. The old territorial defence
concept is changing toward cooperative defence ideas integrated to NATO needs and capabilities.
Main investments are used to reform command and education system. Defence structure is reformed to
be more efficient inside NATO.
Forces for Rapid Reaction Mechanism are to be doubled in the next years. Landmine clearing and
naval mine-sweeping units are the most developed. 16
Estonia is still using a conscription system, but has an lively public debate about moving towards a
professional army.
costs?
Estonia is participating in ESDP efficiency and coherence reform debates, but following in practice
fully NATO rules and demands and only as many EU rules as the accession treaty requires. It means
that Estonia has made changes mostly in cases where NATO and ESDP reform interests overlap.
13
http://www.mod.gov.ee/static/sisu/files/edf%202003-06%20est%20002.pdf
15
16
http://www.mod.gov.ee/static/sisu/files/rahuoperatsioonid.pdf
14
35
Estonia is interested in structured cooperation, but if participation is rigidly linked with participation in
battle groups, then it is not possible in the near future. The major problem is developing the
capabilities of the Estonian armed forces.
There is a national consensus that there is no other option than participation in the EU and NATO
initiatives, as Estonia is too small to solve its security problems alone or even in the framework of
Baltic co-operation.
Military expenditure at 2% of GDP will be maintained over the next few years. In human and
technical resources, Estonia is planning to keep naval forces at the same level, but almost double
mobile ground forces for international missions by the end of 2005. 17
As NATO and EU partnership has just started, and ESDP is also just starting to define its command
and coherence details, only some aspects have been discussed.
9. The former Italian Presidency deliv ered a note in December 2003 (CIG 57/1/03) envisaging a
There has been no national debate in governmental or non-governmental level on this question.
The government does not support the idea of an autonomous EU Headquarters, as they find that every
competing defence structure next to NATO is not in the Estonian national interest. Military structures
are loyal to government and highly sceptical of the EU’s ability to lead military operation outside
NATO.
cooperation?
No one in the government, academia or the media can see any advantage for Estonia in enhanced
cooperation. It is widely interpreted as big members attempting to guide EU foreign policy and
defence in the name of the whole union without consulting the small minority.
In a situation of choice, mutual permanent structured cooperation is preferred. At the same time,
Estonia is attempting to avoid this development.18
III. Missions
−
−
−
−
−
stabilisation
17
White Paper of Estonian Government to the Parliament, http://webstatic.vm.ee/static/failid/364/valge_raamat.doc
18
36
Estonian participation depends on its allies’ positions and ability to support the mission. Estonia is
ready to contribute in peace-keeping, conflict prevention and post conflict civilian tasks. 19
The USA and UK are seen as main partners and NATO as the main institutional framework. It means
that Estonian participation does not depend that much on the number of supporting member states, but
is in clear dependence on the USA-UK position. 20
UN Security Council’s authorization would certainly be desirable, but as consensus among its
permanent members is rare, this possibility has not been under discussion.
Opposition parties at the same time are more supportive of EU military and crises management cooperation as they see it as too complicated to be a EU member but oppose its integration initiative.
There has been general discussion what purposes should be followed in these missions and what are
the geographical borders of crises management. The Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia missions,
which are geographically close, important for EU security, have a clear role division with NATO, and
also very understandable for people are strongly supported.
In EU African initiatives, especially concerning military missions, the Estonian government is
requesting more transparency about the motives and purposes and its connection to EU security. As
NATO itself is supporting the idea of role division and leaving post-military tasks to the EU, the
Estonian government is ready to support and participate in these missions, providing Estonia has
mobile units available.21
Public opinion polls also show that people are ready to participate in security building, taking it as the
price for their own security umbrella .22
this instrument?
Using constructive abstention in the CFSP area has not been under discussion or planned to be used.
such a clause?
The Estonian government has been against using “passarelle” under today’s definition. In the
government’s White Paper, not a single field was marked as possible area for compromise. The
Government has requested specification of its practical working and long term purpose.
Academics and think tanks see it on the other hand as a quite normal intermediary step from the
intergovernmental model to a supranational one. 23
19
Estonian Ministry of Defence http://www.mod.gov.ee/?op=body&id=154
21
Missions, Estonian Ministry of Defence, http://www.mod.gov.ee/?op=body&id=154
22
23
20
37
As most of Estonian military equipment is of non-EU origin, the Estonian government was initially
against the establishment of the Agency. This position has changed during recent months without any
major debates, as it was both beneficial in the long run and an opportunity to demonstrate ‘good will’.
Estonia is supporting technical manager and consideration of small states specific situation.
Initially the Estonian government paid little attention to this EU initiative.
This option was discussed during the Future Convention and resulted in the position: Estonia sees
NATO as a basic defence provider, but in the situation where the EU initiative is not replacing or
competing with NATO’s role, Estonia supports it.
Political parties, pressure groups and media accepted this development without any major attention or
debate. 24
NATO member since 2 April 2004
No, as Estonia sees NATO as a major hard security provider and the EU mainly dealing with
humanitarian and civil aspects, neutral members are not seen as a problem.
clause?
The Estonian government, academics or media can not see any advantage for Estonia in enhanced
cooperation, it is widely interpreted as the big members’ attempt to guide EU foreign policy and
defence in the name of the whole union without consulting the small minority.
In situation of choice, the mutual defence clause is preferred. 25
VII. Conclusion
24
25
38
The main question is the future role and division of competences between NATO and CFSP/ESDP in
European security.
Being very traditiona l in supporting modern values and NATO hard line, the Estonian political elite is
step-by-step moving closer to debate and analysing alternatives in the triangle Estonia -NATOCFSP/ESDP.
Estonia is trying to avoid two undesired choices: first, delegate most of its sovereignty and defence to
EU or NATO, but stay independent from Russia, and second, keep high degree of sovereignty, but
face Russian pressure alone. Quite surprisingly, in this situation, where flexible integration could offer
a middle way, political groups are fighting very hard against it, seeing it as an attempt to divide
Europe into “first” and “second” and not offer guarantees to the last group. To avoid
misunderstandings, the government is instead supporting the intergovernmental model in CFSP/ESDP
reforms and governance.
Additional question: Could you elaborate a bit on opposition parties positions? Is there any
significant difference in positions worth mentioning? If not, what could be the explanation for this?
CFSP/ESDP has not been the main topic of public discussion of political groups. Tendencies are
following
1.
no
group
is
supporting
the
idea
of
flexible
integration
2. Right wing and Conservative parties (coalition: Reformierakond, Rahvaliit/ and Pro-Patria from
opposition ) are trying to block any development in ESDP area and concentrate on US partnership.
They
see
it
best
way
for
long
term
sovereignty.
3. Social Democrats (strongest party in opposition) are slightly supporting EU centered security model
and development of ESDP as it is seen as a logical part of integration.
4. Centre Party has no defined position on that question
List of References.
1. Address by Estonian Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland at the European Institute in
Bucharest,
The
European
Union
after
the
First
of
May,
http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_140/4391.html
2. White Paper of Estonian Government
static.vm.ee/static/failid/364/valge_raamat.doc
to
the
Parliament,
http://web-
3. Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003, http://www.evi.ee/lib/valispol2003.pdf
4. Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2004, http://www.evi.ee/lib/valispol2004.pdf
5. EU Constitutional Treaty influences, Speech of Prime Minister Parts in Estonian Parliament,
25.09 2003 http://www.peaminister.ee/et/base_pm?file=kone&news_id=7281&language=et
6. State Procurement no 02-245, Estonian Role and Choices in European Security and Defense
Policy” Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, http://www.evi.ee/eesti/proj.html
7. "Security
Policy
Implications
http://www.evi.ee/eesti/proj.html
for
Estonia
of
EU
Membership"
8. Official letter no 6.1/11397 of Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Italian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 21st November, 2003
9. Estonian Ministry of Defence, Estonian defence
10. Ministry
of
Defence,
Public
Oppinion
Forces
about
in
2003-2006,
Defence
2003,
39
11. A Historical Milestone for the Transatlantic Community, Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha, Prime
Minister of Bulgaria, Juhan Parts, Prime Minister of Estonia, Indulis Emsis, Prime Minister of
Latvia, Algirdas Brazauskas, Prime Minister of Lithuania, Adrian Nastase, Prime Minister of
Romania, Mikuláš Dzurinda, Prime Minister of Slovakia, Anton Rop, Prime Minister of
Slovenia http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/?id=5016
12. Juhan
Parts,
Euroopa
ei
saa
http://www.vm.ee/est/euro/kat_303/4250.html
kunagi
valmis,
SL
Õhtuleht
40
FINLAND
Emmi Helle (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA)
I. In General
Finland is walking on a tightrope between the policy of non-alignment and the developing of the
CSDP/ESDP. The Finnish security policy has traditionally laid emphasis on credible defence, military
non-alignment of the country and the role of the UN Security Council in international crisis situations.
However, the EU mutual defence clause, called in Finland EU security guarantees, accepted by the
member states in December 2003 Summit as a part of the future Constitution and the solidarity clause
agreed upon in the European Council of March 2004 have heated the discussion on the traditional
security conceptions. Although the mentioned EU decisions have been so far only political, they have
caused intense debate in Finland on the nature of the Finnish military alignment. There are those
foreign policy practitioners as Liisa Jaakonsaari (social democrat), Head of the Parliamentary
Committee on Foreign Affairs, who retain that Finland has been already aligned with the CFSP/ESDP,
whilst the official line of the Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen (Centre) emphasises that Finland remains
militarily non-aligned because it does not belong to any military alliance, namely to the NATO. Also
the Finnish President, Tarja Halonen, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja, adhere to
Vanhanen’s line.26
After his nomination in June 2003, Prime Minister Vanhanen took a somewhat cautious stance as
regards the CFSP/ESDP and the EU politics in general. Nevertheless, after the EU Summit of
December 2003 he has become visibly more determined in declaring that Finland should participate
actively in the core policy areas of the EU, including the CFSP/ESDP.
Finland exerts an open-door policy vis-à-vis NATO by being an active partner in the Partnership for
Peace programme and by considering the NATO membership as an option for the future. However, it
is not planning to apply for a full membership of the Alliance in the next years to come. Nevertheless,
the NATO membership debate has been quite heated in the past months, with personalities as the exPrime Minister, Speaker of the Parliament Paavo Lipponen and the ex-President Martti Ahtisaari
visibly in favour of the Finnish membership in the Atlantic Alliance.
The White paper on Finnish Security and Defence Policy is under preparation and will be published in
autumn 2004, but it is not expected to bring any major changes into the security doctrine. This means
that Finland will remain non-aligned, and will continue to emphasise the role of the UN Security
Council in the management of the international security and credible defence capabilities in the
management of the national security. Finland will also continue its active role in the development of
the ESDP and aims at strengthening the transatlantic relations.27
Before the adoption of the EU’s Security Strategy, more precisely in the autumn 2003, there were
some doubts in Finland about the nature of the Strategy. These concerns were expressed mainly by the
Finnish Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs. It was feared that the new Security Strategy
would not emphasise enough the importance of crisis prevention, international law and the role of the
UN in the international crisis management. 28 However, after the adoption of the Security Strategy the
tones reproduced in the media have been mainly positive. The Finnish political elite has been content
with the strategy initiated by Javier Solana as it has listed the security challenges and threats of the
26
See e.g. Helsingin Sanomat 26.3.2004 or 29.3.2004.
Press release 124/2004, Government Information Unit, 15 April 2004.
28
Hels ingin Sanomat, 5 November 2003.
27
41
Union in a clearly written form. The emphasis of the Security Strategy on effective multilateralism of
the EU has been welcomed by the Finnish official view.29
As for the new security challenges of the Union, there has been a debate in Finland to establish a unit
of some hundreds of soldiers for the rapid reaction forces of the EU. The possibility to cooperate with
Sweden and perhaps with the Baltic States will be considered in the deployment of these forces.
However, the Finnish contribution to the rapid reaction forces would be quite marginal and logistical
in nature.30 Finland has also promised some two thousand troops for the future EU crisis management
operations. After the adoption of the solidarity clause in March 2003 there has been some discussion
about changing the Finnish Law on Peace-keeping. This would permit the Finnish troops to participate
in the EU operations – for example in the case of a terrorist attack in one of the EU countries - without
having to receive a mandate from either the UN or the OSCE, which at this moment is obligatory in
every mission. 31 Regardless the attacks of terrorism in Madrid, Finland has considered the threat of
terrorism in its territory quite a remote and unrealistic possibility. Therefore no specific measures on
terrorism have been adopted apart of those agreed in the EU Summit of March 2004.
The Finnish public debate and media have been worried about the possibility of a multi-speed Europe
or of a “Kerneuropa” in the area CFSP/ESDP. Finnish official line has hoped that all the member
states could participate on an equal basis in the strengthening of the CFSP/ESDP and has been
concerned about the creation of an intense, closed cooperation between the biggest member states in
defence. Therefore Finland was content with the amendment in the constitutional draft that changed
the criteria for the permanent structured cooperation so that it would be open to all the EU member
states that would be willing to participate in it.
The biggest concern of Finland as regards the constitutional draft was the formation of a closed core of
states cooperating more intensively in defence. Finland wished also that the civilian crisis management
would have been emphasised more and that a whole chapter would have been devoted to it in the text
of the constitutional draft. In addition, Finland was in favour of extending the QMV in the area of the
CFSP, while it would have conserved the unanimity in defence issues.
The Finnish official view would have liked to exclude the mutual defence clause from the
constitutional draft. There was a heated discussion in the media about the formulation of the
controversial clause. The most problematic thing for Finland was its automatic nature. Finland
emphasised each country is right to decide whether and in which way it could help an EU country
subject to e.g. a terrorism attack. In fact, Finland, Ireland, Austria and Sweden forwarded their own,
following proposal concerning the first paragraph of Article 40 (7) of the Constitutional Treaty to the
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs: “If a Member State is victim of armed aggression, it may request
that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or
other, in accordance with art 51 of the UN Charter.”32 However, in the end Finland accepted the final
proposal on mutual defence clause forwarded by Italy.
The failure of the ICG was seen by the media as a complete defeat of the Union. However, the Finnish
politicians had hoped from the beginning of the IGC that the constitutional draft would not have been
agreed in such a short period of time (Italian presidency), because they estimated that much more time
would have been needed to finish accurately the details of the treaty. Prime Minister Vanhanen was
content with the fact that a solution was found in the issue of mutual defence clause. He was also of
29
Ulkoministeri Tuomioja Euroopan Turvallisuusstrategiasta, Finlandia-talo, Helsinki, 25 February 2004.
Helsingin Sanomat, 6 April 2004.
31
Helsingin Sanomat, 26 April 2004.
32
Letter of Finland, Ireland, Austria and Sweden for Minister Franco Frattini, 4 December 2003, in
http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/vn/liston/base.lsp?r=47075&k=fi&old=718
30
42
the opinion that the constitutional process would continue during the Irish presidency without any
major difficulties.33 Nevertheless, there were doubts in the media whether some of the member states
willing and able to establish a more intensive collaboration in some policy areas would in the future do
it outside the EU decision structures.
The major parties did not take any particular positions as regards the outcome of the IGC. The parties
debated more on whether Finland should join the “Kerneuropa” in the case that some kind of a core of
member states would emerge. In this discussion, the Social Democratic Party and the National
Coalition Party were in favour of an active role of Finland in the possible core, whilst the Centre Party,
the Green League and the Left Alliance took a more reserved stance.
negativ e one?
The trio meeting between France, Germany and Great Britain on 18th February 2004 was perceived in
Finland as an attempt to try to find a solution to the EU’s constitutional deadlock in the level of the big
member states before the European Council that was to be held in March. The Finnish media called
them the “Three musketeers” trying to save the Union from internal divisions. At the same time it was
feared that the three states would form a separate directoire or an institutionalised inner circle that
would dictate conditions to the smaller member states. The good intentions of the three were
questioned in a situation in which it seemed that each member country tried to promote its own
interests in the Union. 34 The Finnish government did not take an official stand regarding the trio
meeting.
Finnish official position regretted the US and its partners’ intervention in Iraq because it was
performed without a mandate from the UN Security Council. 35 Also the Finnish public opinion has
been quite sceptical about the US intervention in Iraq and about the US foreign policy in general.
Consequently - as the US is seen the leading state of NATO - the positions concerning the Finnish
NATO membership have become more critical.
As regards the specific effects of the Iraq crisis, Finland had its own “Iraq-gate”. The newly elected
Prime Minister Anneli Jäätteenmäki (Centre Party) had to resign shortly after her nomination in May
2003, as it became public that she had misused in her election campaign information from secret
documents about the statements on Iraq of ex-Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen’s during his visit to
Washington, D.C. in December 2002.
Finnish political elite was concerned with the rift in the positions between the EU countries as regards
the Iraqi intervention. Finland did not stand for any of the two major camps and continued underlining
the role that the UN should have had in Iraq. 36 The media described the Iraq crisis as a failure of the
CFSP and feared that the work of the European Convention would have been threatened by the
conflict.37
Finland is in favour of including flexible integration in the area of CFSP/ESDP in the Treaty of the
European Union and is of the opinion that the participation to flexible integration should be open for
all the member states.
33
Aamulehti, 14 December 2003.
Helsingin Sanomat, 18 February 2004.
35
Finnish position on the war in Iraq, Government Information Unit, press release 82/2003, 20 March 2003.
36
See e.g. the column of the former Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen at Turun Sanomat 13 March 2003 or speech
of President Tarja Halonen at the Parliament 26 March 2003.
37
See e.g. the editorial of Kaleva, 23 March 2003.
34
43
−
European Council
−
−
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
According to the official position Finland accepts the proposals made in December 2003 for the
European Council about the organisation of structural cooperation/ flexible integration. In these
proposals all the decisions are made in the Council of the European Union and the Foreign Minister
has the right on information. As for the EU institutions, Finland regards these measures sufficient. 38
framework what are the relevant ideas and concepts and how would these relate to the EU? –
Finland considers it important to include flexible integration in the area of CFSP/ESDP in the new EU
Constitution. If flexible integration in CFSP/ESDP would be dealt “outside” the common institutional
framework Finland would oppose. However, as Finland usually prefers conciliatory tones in its EU
policies it would most probably try to seek a compromise.
The defence budget of Finland in 2004 is of 2073.3 million Euro, which is 1.41 per cent of the Finnish
GDP. The Finnish defence budget has not been subject to any major alterations neither in quantity nor
in quality during the past ten years. In 1994 the defence budget was of 1 543.1 million Euro,
correspondent to 1.66 per cent of the GDP.39
In 2004 27.6 per cent of the budget is used for purchase of defence material, while in 2003 it was of
26.6 per cent (of the total of 1952.2 million Euro) and in 2002 of 30.2 per cent (of the total of 1712.2
million Euro). In 2004 Finland dedicates 43.4 million Euro to international crisis management,
correspondent to 2.1 per cent of the defence budget, while in 2003 the same figures were 51.6 million
Euro / 2.6 per cent and in 2002 24.5 / 1.4 per cent. This means that there was a major addition to the
international crisis management activities in 2003. 40
As regards the long-term military expenditure, no major changes are foreseen for the term of the
current government (2003-2007). The White Paper on the Finnish Security and Defence Policy to be
published in autumn 2004 will contain the budgetary framework for the period of 2004-2012 and no
public information about the future budget guidelines will be available before that.41
costs?
The ESDP has not yet had a major influence to the orientation of the Finnish defence expenditure. As
mentioned before (1b), there has been a plan to establish a ca. 300-soldier-unit to the rapid reaction
forces of the EU and a decision to commit some two thousand troops for the EU crisis management
operations. 42 There has been some discussion about cooperation with Sweden and possibly with the
Baltic States and the UK in the framework of the rapid reaction forces.43
38
Information from the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in relation to this inquiry.
Puolustusbudjetin osuus BKT:sta, Finnish Defence Ministry, in www.defmin.fi
40
Puolustusmenojen jakautuminen, Finnish Defence Ministry, in www.defmin.fi
41
Information from the Finnish Defence Ministry in relation to this inquiry.
42
Information from the Finnish Defence Ministry in relation to this inquiry.
43
Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja in Helsingin Sanomat 16 April 2004 and Defence
Minister Seppo Kääriäinen in Helsingin Sanomat 6 April 2004.
39
44
Finland is willing to participate in permanent structured cooperation. The substance of the Finnish
participation is under consideration at the very moment.44 Finland has required that structured
cooperation should be equally open to all the member states. They should be able to choose the forms
and volume of their participation. It has also requested that all the member states together should
decide on the criteria, contents and starting date of structured cooperation. Only after the cooperation
has started, the participating member states would decide with QMV, following the agreed criteria, on
the participation of other willing member states. Finnish participation to the permanent structured
cooperation would at the beginning most probably be quite marginal because of its restricted resources
in defence.
The national debate in Finland is in favour of the openness of structured cooperation to all the member
states that are willing to participate in it. Therefore Finland is opposed to any kind of participation
criteria.
Finland accepted the proposals on developing the military and planning structures forwarded in the
European Council of December 2003. However, Finland underlines that the military structures of
NATO should not be doubled with those of the EU, but that the NATO’s planning structures should be
utilised also in the planning of the EU operations. Finland retains it important that when using the
military devices of NATO for planning an EU operation, the citizens of the EU non-aligned member
states should be treated equally in comparison with the citizens of the EU NATO member states’
citizens.45
cooperation?
Finland has no official position on this subject.46 The constitutional draft includes articles (III-325 and
III-326) that make enhanced cooperation in the area of CFSP/ESDP possible. It is difficult to predict
whether – when the EU will have a new Constitution - structured cooperation will have a concrete
influence on the role of the enhanced cooperation. It could be that whilst structural cooperation would
be realised in the area of ESDP, there would be more need for enhanced cooperation in the traditional
sector of CFSP.
III. Missions
−
−
−
−
44
46
45
45
−
stabilisation
Other conditions.
The engagement of Finland seems possible in conflict prevention and peace-keeping missions as well
as in humanitarian and rescue operations. If the other non-aligned countries would participate in a EU
mission, it would be easier for Finland to justify its participation. At least for the time being, a
necessary condition for the Finnish participation in these operations is to have a UN Security Council
authorisation. However, there is an on-going debate in Finland on this condition and the White Paper
on Finnish Security and Defence Policy to be published in autumn 2004 might bring a change to this
issue. The media commentaries have also concentrated on the problematique of the UN mandate,
while there has not been rather any discussion about the possible costs of the operations. The absence
of the Finnish troops from the EU operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo was
justified by shortage of human resources, as 200 Finnish troops had just been sent to Ethiopia and
Eritrea. However, Finland contributed economically to the operation.
There has not been much public debate in Finland on the EU missions and the media attention has
been quite marginal. The political elite has been content with these first operations realised in the
framework of ESDP and they have been considered as an important step forward in the EU crisis
management. Finland has been in favour of transferring the SFOR-operation from NATO for the EU
and has promised that when the transfer takes place the Finnish contribution will be important. It has
also been said that the operation in Bosnia -Herzegovina will be the most difficult one that the EU has
had so far.47
Finland sent a group of 23 persons – composed of police officers, legal advisors, coordinators and
trainers of personnel - for the EUPM. For Concordia Finland sent 23 peace-keeping officers. Despite
the risks, Finland supported the EU’s Artemis mission in Congo. The country participated to the costs
of the operation but it did not send any troops into Congo, because it had just sent some 200 peacekeepers for the UNMEE operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea and consequently it was impossible to
arrange troops in such a short period of time.
this instrument?
47
Defence Minister Seppo Kääriäinen in Kaleva, 6 April 2004.
46
Finland considers the instrument of constructive abstention useful in the field of CFSP/ESDP and
regards that this instrument should be conserved also in the future. Finland has never considered using
constructive abstention. 48
such a clause?
Finnish official position wishes that in the new Constitution QMV would be extended to the area of
CFSP with the only exception of ESDP. Consequently, Finland is of the opinion that the “passarelle”
clause has only a marginal influence to the effectiveness of the decision-making of the EU in the
CFSP. In other words, Finland has a reserved stance concerning the clause. 49
Finland welcomes and supports the establishment of the European Agency of Defence Capabilities
Development and is willing to participate in it. According to the offic ial view, the Agency should
include in a balanced way all the tasks that the Council addressed to it in November 2003: resources,
cooperation in defence material, industrial and market issues and research.50 Limited economic
resources in defence might be a problem for Finnish participation at the beginning, while the certainty
on longer-term budgetary guidelines will be reached only in autumn 2004 when the White Paper will
be published.
There has already been a common understanding on the fact that the leadership of the Agency would
be political and composed of the defence ministers. The political decisions influencing to the
functioning of the Agency should, however, be made in the Council of the European Union. 51
Finland is neither a member of OCCAR nor of Lol.
In the Finnish media there was quite an intense discussion about the mutual defence clause and its
impacts on non-alignment. At first the official position did not want the clause to be included in the
constitutional draft, but – when convinced about the fact that the clause did not involve automatism –
the Finnish representatives accepted it anyway in the December 2003 Summit.
The mutual defence clause was feared to be in conflict with the status of “neutrality” 52 of the country.
In fact, many commentators53 were of the opinion that Finland turned into an aligned country after
48
Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, 4/2003 vp.
50
51
52
The concept of neutrality is not anymore used in Finland in relation to its security and defence policy. It has
been replaced by the word non-alingment.
49
47
having accepted the clause. However, the political elite defended the Finnish decision by claiming that
Finland remains non-aligned as long as it does not join a military alliance (NATO).
some member states are restricted in cases of mutual defence because of their obligations deriv ing
No.
neutral members are restricted in cases of mutual defence because of their special status? 22. Is there still a role for enhanced cooperation in CFSP/ESDP in the light of the mutual defence
clause?
They are two different concepts. The mutual defence clause does not rule out enhanced cooperation in
CFSP/ESDP.54
VII. Conclusion
Finnish priorities in the CFSP/ESDP are strengthening of the EU’s security role and capabilities,
developing the civilian and military crisis management as a single entity and making the decisionmaking more effective. Finland considers the role of the UN in the international crisis management as
well as keeping up good transatlantic relations as equally important. Finland will continue to perform
an active role in the CFSP and wants to be fully involved in the development of the ESDP. Finland
sees that the EU’s security commitments and cohesion contribute positively to Finnish security. 55 Most
probably there will not be any major changes in the Finnish views as regards CFSP/ESDP in the near
future and the White Paper on Security and Defence Policy to be published in autumn 2004 is
expected to reinforce the prevailing perceptions. Finland sees no crucial problematique as regards the
development of the CFSP/ESDP and national sovereignty, because important decisions on national
defence will continue to be made at a national level.
53 E.g. Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs Liisa Jaakonsaari (Social Democratic Party),
MEP Esko Seppänen (The Left Alliance) and Professor of the Department of Strategy of the Finnish Defence
College Pekka Sivonen.
54
55
Press release 124/2004, Government Information Unit, 15 April 2004.
48
FRANCE
Michèle Bacot-Décriaud (Institut d'études politiques de Lyon IEP)
I. In General
Ces derniers mois, la politique de défense et de sécurité française s’est surtout caractérisée par une
réaffirmation de ses ambitions européennes et mondiales.
Concernant ses ambitions européennes, la France a poursuivi une action constante en 2003 et 2004
visant à faire progresser la défense européenne. Pour ce faire, elle a agi à la fois au niveau des
relations bilatérale s (avec notamment l’Allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne) et et au niveau des relations
multilatérales (avec entre autres la Belgique et le Luxembourg). Cela s’est traduit notamment en avril
2004 par la présentation au Comité Politique et de Sécurité (COPS) par les ministres de la Défense de
la France, de l’Allemagne et de la Grande-Bretagne d’une initiative sur la constitution de groupements
tactiques interarmées européens mobilisables en 15 jours. La dimension européenne de la politique de
défense française a également été affichée dans le cadre de la loi de programmation militaire (LPM)
française pour la période 2003 – 2008.
En parallèle de son engagement constant en faveur de la PESD, la France a également manifesté sa
volonté de se rapprocher de l’OTAN. La France a ainsi souscrit assez largement aux conclusions du
sommet de l’OTAN de Prague, en approuvant notamment l’engagement capacitaire de Prague. Elle a
également annoncé sa contribution à la NRF, à hauteur de 1 700 militaires, 8 avions de combat Mirage
2000, 1 radar volant, 1 avion ravitailleur et 1 appareil de guerre électronique. Ce rapprochement
France-OTAN a été amorcé en octobre 2003 avec l’intégration d’une mission militaire française au
sein de l’ACT (Commandement Allié Transformation).
Par ailleurs, la France a réaffirmé ses ambitions de jouer un rôle sur la scène internationale,
notamment à l’occasion de la crise irakienne et plus généralement dans le cadre de la lutte antiterroriste. Depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, la France a ainsi conservé la même attitude
concernant la lutte contre le terrorisme, en s’opposant à un recours systématique à la force armée et en
privilégiant une option diplomatique pour négocier avec les régimes accusés de complicité avec les
terroristes. Elle a toujours refusé de cautionner l’intervention militaire menée sous l’égide des EtatsUnis en Irak. En s’opposant fermement aux Etats-Unis, la France a accru sa visibilité sur la scène
internationale.
La politique de défense et de sécurité française vise également à faire en sorte que la France puisse
jouer le rôle de Nation-cadre, apte à gérer des actions interarmées menées dans le cadre de l’OTAN ou
de l’UE. Dans cette optique, la France a organisé à l’exercice OPERA 3 Terre à la fin du mois de
novembre et au début du mois de décembre 2003. La France entend ainsi jouer un rôle de premier plan
sur la scène internationale et européenne en matière de défense et de sécurité.
Tous les partis politiques se prononcent pour une France forte et indépendante sur la scène
internationale. Cependant, les stratégies proposées pour préserver ou restaurer le statut de la France
dans le monde divergent en fonction des partis. De cette façon, les partis représentés au Parlement
(notamment l'UDF, le PS, le RPR et dans une moindre mesure le Parti Communiste) défendent l'idée
selon laquelle la France ne peut être forte que si l'Europe est forte. C'est pourquoi ils soutiennent le
développement de la construction européenne, notamment en matière de sécurité et de défense. Ils
envisagent ainsi le renforcement de la PESC et de la PESD comme un moyen pour les Européens de
s'émanciper de la tutelle des Etats-Unis et de celle de l'OTAN. Mais, dans le même temps, ils militent
pour le maintien de la souveraineté de la France en la matière, c'est pourquoi ils sont généralement
opposés à une intégration des politiques étrangère ou de défense des différents Etats membres.
L'argumentaire du Front national est différent. Il s'appuie en effet sur l'idée selon laquelle le
renforcement de la position française sur la scène internationale ne peut pas passer par le
développement de la construction européenne. Selon lui, au contraire, la France doit sortir d'une
49
Europe inféodée aux Etats-Unis pour retrouver son indépendance en matière de défense et de politique
étrangère. Il est ainsi opposé à tout transfert de souveraineté en la matière.
La stratégie européenne de sécurité présentée par Javier Solana n’a pas suscité beaucoup d’intérêt en
France. Ceci s’explique en partie du fait que les connaissances de la population française sur l’Europe,
et plus encore sur la défense ou la sécurité européennes, sont très limitées. Ainsi, la plupart des
Français ignorent sans doute qui est Javier Solana et les fonctions qu’il exerce au sein de l’UE.
Cependant, si la stratégie européenne de sécurité a été peu discutée dans la presse, certains centres de
recherches spécialisés en ont parlé, mais sans vraiment en débattre, sans émettre de critique. Patrice
Buffotot, directeur de l’Observatoire Européen de Sécurité (Paris 1, Panthéon – Sorbonne) a par
exemple présenté le projet dans un article publié en janvier 2004 dans la revue Défense et stratégie
(Buffotot Patrice, “ Le bilan de la PESD en 2003 ”, Défense et stratégie, n°8, janvier 2004 , pp. 9-10).
Par ailleurs, il n’existe pas vraiment en France de débat relatif à l’élargissement des missions de l’UE.
Il y a plutôt un consensus sur l’opportunité qu’a l’Union d’accroître son champ d’action en matière de
politique étrangère et de défense, sur un plan aussi bien fonctionnel que géographique.
De la même façon qu’il existe en France un consensus sur l’extension des missions de l’UE, il n’y a
pas vraiment de débat relatif à la question de l’intégration souple en matière de PESC ou de PESD.
La presse spécialisée en parle, mais elle est lue par un pourcentage relativement faible de la
population. Les journaux tels que Le Monde, L’Humanité , Le Figaro ou encore Libération, y
consacrent certains articles, notamment à l’occasion des grands sommets européens, mais ils
s’adressent surtout à un public averti, déjà initié et intéressé par ces questions.
Il est à noter que certaines catégories de la population sont plus naturellement amenées à réfléchir sur
ces questions. C’est notamment le cas de la classe politique et des élus. Ainsi, à l’Assemblée nationale
par exemple, les parlementaires membres de la Délégation de l’Assemblée nationale pour l’UE, de la
Commission des Affaires étrangères ou celle de la Défense consacrent des réunions sur ces thèmes et
publient des rapports relatifs à la question de l’intégration souple en matière de PESC/¨PESD.
Le Commissariat général du Plan a également consacré un débat sur la question des “ perspectives de
coopérations renforcées dans l’UE ”. Le site de la Convention sur l’avenir de l’Europe a en outre
proposé un forum permettant aux internautes de venir s’exprimer sur la construction européenne.
Le manque de connaissances (et d’intérêt) d’une grande partie de la population sur les questions
européennes s’explique dans une large mesure par leur très grande technicité. Elles renvoient en effet à
un vocabulaire juridique, spécialisé, avec notamment l’emploi de nombreux sigles que la plupart des
gens ne maîtrisent pas. De plus, l’Europe semble pour beaucoup très éloignée de leurs préoccupations
quotidiennes et nombreux sont ceux qui pensent que, de toute façon, la construction européenne se fait
sans eux, qu’ils ne peuvent pas intervenir dans la prise de décisions, et donc qu’il est inutile qu’ils s’y
intéressent.
Il n’y a là encore pas eu en France un réel débat populaire concernant les suggestions du projet de
traité sur l’UE en matière de PESC/PESD. Les journalistes spécialisés et les centres de recherche ont
davantage mis l’accent sur l’échec de la Conférence intergouvernementale (CIG) en insistant sur la
difficulté pour les Européens de parler d’une seule voix, même s’ils ont précisé qu’il y avait eu un
relatif consensus sur les questions de défense.
50
Patrice Buffotot a ainsi souligné qu’ “ un des paradoxes de la construction européenne réside dans le
fait que malgré l’échec de la Conférence intergouvernementale en 2003 à adopter un Traité
constitutionnel pour l’Union européenne et la persistance d’une profonde division des Européens face
à la guerre d’Irak, prouvant une nouvelle fois l’absence d’une vision commune dans le domaine de la
politique étrangère, l’Europe a néanmoins progressé dans le domaine de la politique européenne de
sécurité et de défense ” (Buffotot Patrice, “ Le bilan de la PESD en 2003 ”, Défense et stratégie, n°8,
janvier 2004, p. 8).
L’échec de la CIG n’a pas non plus suscité un débat à l’échelle nationale sur l’idée d’un noyau dur
européen, les Français étant depuis longtemps majoritairement favorables à la mise en place de
coopérations renforcées dans le cadre de l’UE, celles-ci permettant à certains Européens d’aller plus
loin dans certains domaines lorsque tous les Etats membres ne sont pas d’accords.
negative one?
La réunion entre la France, l’Allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne a été perçue comme un événement
positif en France. Les Français ne considèrent pas ces réunions comme une volonté des “Trois
Grands ” de dominer l’Europe. Ils trouvent au contraire normal que les trois plus grands pays
d’Europe se rencontrent à intervalles réguliers. Ceci est d’autant plus vrai en matière de défense
européenne, que ces trois pays se présentent comme les “ fondateurs ” de la PESD. Par ailleurs, cette
rencontre était importante aux yeux des Français car elle devait marquer la réconciliation entre la
France et la Grande-Bretagne après les désaccords suscités par la crise irakienne. Elle devait permettre
également à la Grande-Bretagne de donner de nouvelles preuves de son engagement en faveur de la
défense européenne.
Le conflit irakien a d’une part fait prendre conscience aux Français des difficultés persistantes que
rencontre l’Europe à parler d’une seule voix, en mettant à jour l’existence de deux camps, l’un –
majoritaire - soutenant l’intervention militaire américaine en Irak et l’autre –organisé autour de la
France – favorable à une solution pacifique. Il a d’autre part mis en évidence la nécessité pour les
Européens de poursuivre le développement de la défense européenne, s’il le faut par le biais
d’initiatives soutenues par un petit nombre de pays (cf la rencontre sur la défense européenne entre la
France, l’Allemagne, le Luxembourg et la Belgique, organisée le 29 avril 2003). Pour la France, la
crise irakienne a montré que l’Europe doit continuer ses efforts pour s’affirmer comme un véritable
acteur sur la scène internationale.
A priori, le conflit irakien a conforté l'idée défendue par la plupart des partis politiques français selon
laquelle le vote à la majorité qualifiée ne doit pas être instauré en matière de PESC/PESD. Cette
position est défendue par les différents partis représentés à l'Assemblée nationale (notamment le PS,
l'UMP, l'UDF). Le Front national étant en général hostile à toute idée d'intégration européenne, la crise
irakienne l'a conforté dans ses positions.
La France est favorable aux deux options, qui lui semblent davantage complémentaires
qu’incompatibles. De cette façon, les Français sont partisans d’une intégration souple dans le champ
de la PESC et de la PESD, mais dans le même temps, ils ne voient pas d’inconvénient au fait que
certains Etats européens décident de prendre des initiatives en matière de défense européenne en
dehors de l’UE. A cet égard, il convient de noter qu’il existe déjà différentes initiatives qui se sont
développées hors du cadre institutionnel européen, même si ces initiatives ont pu ensuite être reliées à
l’UE (Groupe Aérien Européen, Eurocorps, …).
−
European Council
51
−
−
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
En la matière, le gouvernement français se rallie à la proposition contenue dans le projet de Traité sur
l’UE. Il s’agit notamment de l’article I.39 “ §2. Le Conseil européen identifie les intérêts stratégiques
de l’Union et fixe les objectifs de sa politique étrangère et de sécurité commune. Le Conseil des
ministres élabore cette politique dans le cadre des lignes stratégiques établies par le Conseil européen
(…). §3. Le Conseil européen et le Conseil des ministres adoptent les décisions européennes
nécessaires. §4. Cette politique étrangère et de sécurité commune est exécutée par le ministre des
Affaires étrangères de l’Union et par les Etats membres, en utilisant les moyens nationaux et ceux de
l’Union. (…) §6. Le Parlement européen est consulté régulièrement sur les principaux aspects et les
choix fondamentaux de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune et est tenu informé de son
évolution. ”
Si cet article concerne la PESC, il est à noter que le gouvernement français se prononce en faveur des
mêmes compétences pour chaque institution en matière de PESD. Il est par ailleurs favorable à une
implication “ indirecte ” de la Commission européenne dans la PESC et la PESD, étant donné qu’il
défend la mise en place d’un ministre des Affaires étrangères de l’UE qui soit dans le même temps
vice-président de la Commission. Cette double casquette du ministre des Affaires étrangères de
l’Union permettrait d’assurer la liaison entre la politique étrangère au sens strict et les affaires
extérieures qui sont à la charge de la Commission.
Le gouvernement français est également d’accord avec le contenu de l’article I.27 du projet de Traité
constitutionnel, qui prévoit dans son paragraphe 1 que le ministre des Affaires étrangères de l’Union
“ conduit la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l’Union. (…) §2. Le ministre des Affaires
étrangères de l’Union contribue par ses propositions à l’élaboration de la politique étrangère commune
et l’exécute en tant que mandataire du Conseil des ministres. Il agit de même pour la politique de
sécurité et de défense commune. ”
La position du gouvernement français traduit surtout son souci de préserver le règne de
l’intergouvernemental en matière de politique étrangère et de défense européenne. Elle s’oppose en
cela à celle des parlementaires français, qui se sont prononcés à différentes reprises en faveur d’un
renforcement du rôle des parlements nationaux autant que du Parlement européen dans la PESC et
dans la PESC. Par exemple, le 16 janvier 2004, les sénateurs français ont plaidé pour une
“amélioration significative du contrôle interparlementaire de la PESD et son inclusion officielle dans
le Traité constitutionnel européen ” (http://www.assembly-weu.org/fr/presse/cp/2004/1.html).
Additional question : Est-ce qu'il y a là aussi un consensus entre des partis politiques sur le règne de
l'intergouvernemental en matière de politique étrangère et de défense européenne ? Si des
parlementaires francais se sont prononcés en faveur d'un renforcement du rôle des parlements
nationaux et du Parlement européen dans la PESC/PESD, quelles sont leurs expectations concrètes
d'un tel renforcement pour l'efficacité de la PESC/PESD ?
Les partis politiques de la droite et de la gauche parlementaires sont dans leur ensemble favorables au
maintien des règles intergouvernementales pour les questions de défense et de sécurité européennes.
Seuls les députés Verts (écologistes) ont manifesté à différentes reprises leur volonté d'une intégration
européenne plus poussée en la matière. La plupart des parlementaires se sont prononcés ces dernières
années en faveur d'un renforcement des compétences des Parlements nationaux et du Parlement
européen en matière de PESC/PESD. Ils demandent notamment à ce que les Parlements nationaux et
le Parlement européen soient inscrits dans le projet de Constitution comme jouant un rôle actif dans la
PESD. Ils demandent aussi la création d'un forum interparlementaire (composé de représentants des
parlements nationaux et du parlement européen) ou celle d'une conférence parlementaire annuelle
relative à la PESC/PESD. Ils veulent participer plus activement à la définition, à la mise en place et au
contrôle de la PESC et de la PESD. Ils désirent également aller au-delà de la simple audition du
ministre des Affaires étrangères ou de la Défense, ils se prononcent pour un réel suivi politique.
52
La France n’est pas vraiment favorable à l’idée d’une politique étrangère et de défense construite en
dehors de l’UE, mais davantage en faveur de simples initiatives bilatérales ou multilatérales en matière
de défense et de sécurité européennes (GAE, Eurocorps, …).
De plus, il est à noter que le développement d’une politique étrangère et de défense européenne ne
remet en cause ni l’existence d’une politique étrangère et de défense nationale, ni les alliances
historiques auxquelles participent la France, telles que l’Alliance atlantique.
La France s’adapterait et pourrait y participer sous certaines conditions et dans certaines circonstances
seulement (cf. la participation française à l’Alliance atlantique, son retrait de la structure militaire
intégrée en 1966). Elle pourrait essayer également de mettre en place d’autres coopérations.
On peut tout d’abord noter que le budget de défense de la France est l’un des plus importants en
Europe, avec celui de la Grande-Bretagne. La France se présente ainsi comme un modèle pour ses
partenaires de l’UE, elle veut les convaincre non seulement d’augmenter leurs dépenses de défense,
mais également d’orienter ces dépenses en direction de la défense européenne, comme elle -même l’a
fait dans sa loi de programmation militaire (LPM). La France poursuit en effet le but d’améliorer la
crédibilité et l’efficacité de la PESD.
Au niveau quantitatif, le budget de défense français est en constante augmentation ces dernières
années, après avoir connu une certaine stagnation : la loi de finances initiale pour 2003 prévoyait une
augmentation du budget militaire en valeur de 7.2% par rapport au budget 2002 et le budget pour 2004
marque une progression globale de 4.1% par rapport à l’année précédente, avec une augmentation des
seules dépenses d’investissement de 2.9%.
7. Has any change been made to forward defence plans in order to reflect the needs of ESDP ? What
costs?
Cela fait plusieurs années que la France développe la dimension européenne de sa politique de défense
et qu’elle oriente son budget de défense dans cette direction. La France a ainsi progressivement
“ européaniser ” non seulement sa politique de défense et de sécurité, mais également sa politique
industrielle de défense. Elle met ainsi plus particulièrement l’accent sur le développement de projets
industriels européens, avec notamment la construction de l’avion de transport militaire A400M. Elle
favorise également la restructuration et l’intégration des industries de défense à l’échelle européenne,
avec la constitution de champions européens, tels qu’EADS. Elle a par ailleurs accru sa concertation
avec ses partenaires européens en matière de politique industrielle, notamment dans le cadre de
l’OCCAR ou de la LoI.
La mise en commun de capacités militaires avec les autres Etats membres de l’UE ainsi que le
développement de projets industriels européens présentent tout d’abord un intérêt économique, en
favorisant les économies d’échelle, mais également un intérêt industriel et politique, en accroissant la
compétitivité européenne face à la concurrence américaine. De cette manière, l’Europe de l’armement
vise à renforcer l’Europe de la défense et favorise l’autonomie européenne par rapport aux Etats-Unis.
Elles permettent aussi une plus grande efficacité de la défense européenne, en évitant les duplications
inutiles et en favorisant l’interopérabilité, l’établissement de relations de confiance et d’habitudes de
travail en commun.
53
it politically realistic for your country to carry this burden in terms of financial and human resources
?
La France est sans conteste à la fois favorable et prête à participer à des coopérations permanentes
structurées (renforcées). Elle se présente comme l’un des Etats membres qui ont le plus milité pour la
mise en place de telles coopérations. La preuve en est d’ailleurs qu’elle participe déjà à différentes
organisations telles que l’UEO, l’OSCE ou encore l’OTAN, à des initiatives telles que la LoI et
l’OCCAR, ou encore à des forces militaires comme l’Eurocorps ou le Groupe Aérien Européen
(GAE).
Cependant, la France n’est pas prête à s’engager à n’importe quelle condition : la perspective d’une
coopération structurée doit être crédible et l’expérience doit être enrichissante pour chacun des
participants. La France ne veut ainsi pas faire de mauvaises alliances. Elle demeure par ailleurs très
attentive aux éventuelles pertes de souveraineté. La France étant favorable aux coopérations
renforcées, elle serait prête à en accepter à partir d’un nombre minimum de membres (voire deux si
l’éventualité se présente).
Enfin, la France juge non seulement politiquement réaliste mais aussi et surtout nécessaire qu’il y ait
un partage du fardeau en termes de ressources humaines et financières.
exclusion)? If yes, which are the main positions of the parties involved ?
Il n’y a pas eu de débat en France sur le document présenté par la présidence italienne en décembre
2003 et relatif aux coopérations structurées permanentes (renforcées).
Il existe un relatif consensus en France sur l’établissement d’un Quartier général européen autonome
capable de planifier des opérations militaires. La France, la Belgique, l’Allemagne et le Luxembourg
se sont ainsi prononcés dès le mois d’avril 2003, lors d’une rencontre à Bruxelles, sur la création d’un
“ noyau de capacités collectives de planification et de conduite d’opérations pour l’UE ”. Les quatre
Etats avaient ajouté que “ dans le souci d’améliorer les capacités de commandement et de contrôle
disponibles tant pour l’UE que pour l’OTAN ”, ils entreprendraient “ les démarches nécessaires en vue
d’établir pour l’année 2004 au plus tard un quartier général multinational déployable pour des
opérations conjointes et qui serait basé sur des quartiers généraux existants ”. Concernant les relations
de ce quartier général avec l’OTAN, ils précisaient que “ afin d’assurer un lien étroit avec l’OTAN, il
aurait également vocation à établir des arrangements de liaison avec le SHAPE, y compris sa possible
utilisation en vue d'appuyer le DSACEUR dans son rôle de candidat premier pour assurer le
commandement d'opérations menées par l'Union européenne avec recours aux moyens et aux
capacités de l'OTAN ” (Conclusion du sommet entre la France, l’Allemagne, la Belgique et le
Luxembourg consacré à la défense le 29 avril 2003 à Bruxelles, Europe/Document n°2316, 01/05/03).
Les propositions de ces quatre Etats réunis à Bruxelles en avril 2003 montrent bien leur volonté de
préserver les relations entre l’UE et l’OTAN, en favorisant la mise en place d’un lien étroit entre le
futur quartier général européen et les structures de l’OTAN. La France, tout en souhaitant préserver
l’autonomie de décision de l’UE, est favorable au maintien de relations privilégiées entre l’UE et
l’OTAN en matière de PESD.
Et de ce fait, lors du Conseil européen de Bruxelles du 12 décembre 2003, le Conseil de l’UE a décidé
la création d’une cellule avec des composantes civiles et militaires capable de conduire des opérations
militaires autonomes, tout en confirmant la mise en place de liens étroits entre cette cellule et l’OTAN
(création par ailleurs d’une cellule de l’UE auprès de l’ état-major de l’OTAN).
cooperation?
54
La France ne voit pas de contradiction à ce qu’il y ait en matière de PESD des coopérations structurées
(renforcées) à côté du cadre général de la PESD. Les partis politiques ne semblent pas vraiment
s'intéresser à cette question. On peut penser que de nombreux hommes politiques ne perçoivent pas la
différence entre coopération structurée et coopération renforcée, ces deux notions étant relativement
complexes. De manière assez générale, force est de constater que les parlementaires français ont pour
la plupart des connaissances limitées en matière de défense européenne, mis à part quelques membres
de la Commission de la Défense nationale, de celle des Affaires étrangères ou de la Délégation de
l'Assemblée nationale pour l'Union européenne.
III. Missions
−
−
−
−
conflict prevention and peace-keeping task s
−
stabilisation
Other conditions.
Il est avant tout certain que la France ne peut soutenir ou participer à une mission de l’UE que si celle ci respecte les principes de la charte de l’ONU, et donc qu’elle ait été autorisée par une résolution du
Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies. A cet égard, on peut noter l’actuelle politique de renforcement
des liens UE-ONU, avec notamment la mise de l’UE à la disposition de l’ONU.
Concernant les autres conditions, la France a montré par le passé que la participation ou la nonparticipation des Etats-Unis n’influence pas sa décision de soutenir ou de participer à une mission de
l’UE. Il en est de même pour ce qui concerne la participation ou non de l’OTAN et l’accord ou non de
la Turquie.
De plus, la France soutenant la mise en place de coopérations renforcées en matière de PESD, elle ne
s’opposerait pas à une mission de l’UE qui ne comprendrait qu’un nombre très restreint d’Etats
membres ou à laquelle serait opposée une majorité d’Etats membres.
Il n’y a pas vraiment eu de débat relatif à la participation de la France aux différentes opérations de
l’UE entreprises dans le cadre de la PESD. La France est en effet impliquée depuis de nombreuses
années, dans le cadre de l’OTAN, dans la stabilisation et la pacification des Balkans : les Français
55
considèrent donc qu’il est normal que leur pays poursuive cette tâche dans le cadre de l’UE. Par
ailleurs, les Français ont bien perçu le rôle de Nation-cadre joué par la France dans l’opération mise en
place par l’UE au Congo. Cela participe du rayonnement de la France sur la scène internationale.
Enfin, le transfert de la mission de l’OTAN à l’UE en Bosnie serait perçu comme un événement positif
en France : les Français l’ appréhendent comme une nouvelle avancée de la défense européenne et
donc comme la preuve du renforcement de la capacité d’action de l’UE sur la scène internationale.
this instrument?
L’introduction de l’abstention constructive dans le domaine de la PESC/PESD est plutôt bien perçue
en France. Il n’y a là encore pas vraiment de débat à ce propos au sein de la population française, ni
même au sein de la classe politique. L’abstention constructive est ainsi conçue comme une
contrepartie nécessaire au principe d’unanimité qui régit la PESC et la PESD (et auquel la France est
très attachée). L’abstention constructive permet de cette façon à l’UE d’avancer en matière de PESC
ou de PESD, même si tous les Etats membres ne sont pas prêts à aller plus loin : c’est un instrument
qui permet avant tout d’éviter les blocages, il facilite la prise de décision, tout en préservant la
souveraineté de chaque Etat membre.
La France ne l’a encore jamais utilisée. Elle pourrait le faire si elle estimait qu’une décision qui rallie
l’accord de l’ensemble de ses partenaires ne correspond pas à ses intérêts. En pratiquant l’abstention
constructive, elle pourrait ainsi préserver ses intérêts sans empêcher ses partenaires de mettre en place
une politique qu’ils jugent conforme aux intérêts de l’UE.
such a clause?
Les Français sont dans une large majorité opposés à un passage du vote à l’unanimité au vote à la
majorité qualifiée en matière de PESC et plus encore en matière de PESD. Ils sont en effet très
attachés à l’intergouvernementalisme et ils entendent préserver la souveraineté et la liberté de décision
de la France pour des questions aussi fondamentales que la défense.
Les dirigeants français, comme la population française et l’ensemble de la classe politique sont
d’accord avec la formulation retenue dans le projet de Traité constitutionnel. L’article I. 39 §7 du
projet du projet de Traité constitutionnel précise ainsi que “ en matière de politique étrangère et de
sécurité commune, le Conseil européen et le Conseil des ministres adoptent des décisions européennes
à l’unanimité, sauf dans les cas prévus à la Partie III. (…) §8. Le Conseil européen peut décider à
l’unanimité que le Conseil des ministres statue à la majorité qualifiée dans d’autres cas que ceux visés
dans la Partie III ”. L’article I. 40 §4 souligne de la même façon que “ les décisions européennes
relatives à la mise en œuvre de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune, y compris celles
portant sur le lancement d’une mission visée au présent article sont adoptées par le Conseil des
ministres statuant à l’unanimité sur proposition du ministre des Affaires étrangères de l’Union ou sur
proposition d’un Etat membre ”.
La France est d’autant plus opposée à un passage à la majorité qualifiée qu’elle considère que les
coopérations structurées ou renforcées en sont une alternative, en permettant aux Etats membres qui le
désirent d’aller plus loin dans certains domaines.
Il semble clair que la France est prête et décidée à participer à la future Agence européenne de
l’armement. Elle l’est d’autant plus qu’elle est l’un des premiers Etats à s’être prononcé en faveur de
56
l’établissement d’une telle agence. Elle avait par exemple fait des propositions dans ce sens avec
l’Allemagne à la Convention européenne, puis par la suite avec la Grande-Bretagne. Dans une
déclaration faite à Prague le 21 novembre 2002, les dirigeants français et allemands avaient de cette
façon proposer d’inscrire dans le futur Traité constitutionnel “ la création d’une Agence européenne de
l’Armement, le cas échéant sur la base de la coopération renforcée ”.
L’engagement de la France et de ces partenaires européens en faveur d’une telle agence a commencé à
porter ses fruits lors du Conseil européen de Thessalonique, les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement de
l’UE soulignant la nécessité de créer courant 2004 “ une agence intergouvernementale dans le
domaine du développement des capacités de défense, de la recherche, des acquisitions et de
l’armement ”. De plus, dans son projet de Traité constitutionnel, la Convention a prévu la mise en
place d’une “ agence européenne de l’armement, de la recherche et des capacités militaires ” (articles
40 et III. 212 du projet). Le 17 novembre 2003, le Conseil de l’Union a annoncé le développement
concret de l’agence, en instituant un groupe de travail chargé de la mettre en place au cours de l’année
2004. C’est ainsi qu’a été créée une équipe de mise en place de l’agence, une Agency Establishment
Team (AET). Il est à noter que l’annonce de la création de l’Agence européenne de l’Armement a
reçu un écho d’autant plus favorable en France que les industriels français – mais plus généralement
européens – la réclamaient depuis des années. Une telle Agence doit permettre en effet d’harmoniser
le marché européen de l’armement, le développement des capacités de défense des Etats membres et
les recherches entreprises en la matière. Elle soulève donc des enjeux économiques, industriels mais
aussi stratégiques et politiques. En effet, plus les Européens seront performants en matière
d’armements, moins ils devront avoir recours aux matériels américains. L’Agence européenne
participe donc aussi à la quête d’autonomie de l’Europe par rapport aux Etats-Unis.
La mise en place de l’Agence peut cependant se heurter à des problèmes d’organisation et de
hiérarchie. De cette façon, l’institution de l’équipe chargée de mettre en place l’Agence a posé des
problèmes de concurrence entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne, chaque pays voulant pour directeur
de l’équipe un de ses ressortissants. Les Etats membres vont donc devoir accepter des compromis
concernant les modalités d’organisation pratique de l’Agence. Il en est de même pour les questions
financières : les Etats vont devoir réfléchir au financement de l’Agence, à une répartition des dépenses
entre les membres qui soit acceptée par tous comme étant équitable.
A priori, les Français se prononcent davantage en faveur d’une direction politique pour l’Agence
européenne de l’armement, mais soutenue par des conseillers techniques. D’ailleurs, les faits semblent
confirmer l’option soutenue par la France : le directeur de l’Agency Establishment Team, le
britannique Nick Whitney, occupait auparavant un poste “ politique ”, en tant que responsable de la
politique de sécurité internationale au ministère britannique de la Défense. Les autres membres de
l’équipe chargée de mettre en place l’agence sont des experts du Secrétariat du Conseil, de la
Commission européenne et des Etats membres.
NB : La France est à la fois membre de l’OCCAR et de la Lettre d’Intention.
Il semble que les dirigeants français ne considèrent l’Agence ni comme une organisation visant à
remplacer l’OCCAR et la LoI, ni comme une organisation les englobant complètement. De cette
façon, les Français mettent plutôt en avant la thèse d’une complémentarité entre ces différentes
initiatives. Plus exactement, l’Agence serait amenée à s’appuyer sur l’OCCAR et sur la LoI. De cette
façon, Sophie Batas Bjelic souligne que la future agence “ pourra s’appuyer sur l’expérience acquise
par l’OCCAR dans le domaine de la gestion des programmes en coopération dès que celle -ci pourra
être mise à contribution ” (Batas Bjelic Sophie, “ Vers un marché européen de l’armement dans le
domaine aéronautique ? ”, Défense et stratégie , n°8, janvier 2004, p. 14).
Il peut être intéressant de souligner que pendant longtemps, les dirigeants français laissaient souvent
entendre que l’OCCAR pourrait être considérée comme l’embryon d’une future Agence européenne
de l’Armement. Cependant, désormais, les discours officiels semblent avoir évacué cette “ filiation ”
57
entre les deux organisations et mettent plutôt en avant l’idée d’une coopération entre elles et plus
précisément d’une mise à contribution de l’OCCAR et de la LoI pour l’Agence. Ainsi, à Prague, en
novembre 2002, la France et l’Allemagne avaient mis en avant la nécessité de développer une
politique européenne de l’armement. Pour ce faire, il proposait de “ recourir le cas échéant à une
agence, en s’appuyant sur l’OCCAR progressivement élargie, pour l’acquisition de matériels
développés dans le cadre de programmes mult inationaux (et à) des coopérations renforcées pour
certains domaines de la LoI et de l’OCCAR ” (Propositions conjointes franco-allemandes pour la
Convention européenne dans le domaine de la PESD, Prague, 21 novembre 2002). Au moins sur le
court terme, les dirigeants français ne semblent donc pas envisager une dissolution de l’OCCAR et de
la LoI dans l’Agence européenne de l’armement. Cependant, cette perspective pourrait être amenée à
se concrétiser à plus long terme.
La clause de défense mutuelle n’a pas été beaucoup discutée en France : les médias français ont
davantage rapporté l’adoption par les Etats membres de l’UE d’une clause de solidarité mutuelle,
contenue à l’article I.42 du projet de Traité constitutionnel.
Cependant, on peut souligner que les Français sont plutôt favorables à une clause de défense mutuelle.
Ils ne l’appréhendent pas comme une possible atteinte à leur souveraineté ou à leur liberté de décision,
et ce d’autant plus que la France, en tant que membre de l’OTAN et de l’UEO, a déjà souscrit à ce
genre d’engagement. Les dirigeants français étaient d’ailleurs très impliqués dans l’intégration par la
Convention d’une telle clause dans le projet de Traité constitutionnel. La France se prononce d’ailleurs
depuis plusieurs années pour l’intégration dans le Traité sur l’UE de l’article V du Traité de Bruxelles
modifié.
La clause de défense mutuelle contenue dans le projet de Traité constitutionnel et celle contenue dans
le Traité de l’Atlantique Nord ne sont pas incompatibles ni concurrentes. Au contraire, elles sont
complémentaires. La Convention sur l’avenir de l’Europe a d’ailleurs voulu éviter toute possibilité de
mise en concurrence des deux clauses de défense mutuelle. L’article I.40 §7 du projet de Traité sur
l’UE prévoit ainsi que “ pour mettre en œuvre une coopération plus étroite en matière de défense
mutuelles, les Etats membres participants travailleront en étroite coopération avec l’Organisation du
Traité de l’Atlantique Nord ”. De plus, l’article III.214 ajoute que la clause de défense mutuelle prévue
par le projet de Traité “n’affecte pas, pour les Etats membres qui sont concernés, les droits et
obligations résultant du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord ”.
De la même façon, la neutralité de certains Etats membres de l’UE ne pose pas de problèmes pour
l’effectivité de la clause de défense mutuelle. Il faut rappeler que les Etats sont libres de souscrire ou
non à cette clause qui s’apparente dans le projet de Traité constitutionnel à une coopération structurée
(renforcée). Les Etats neutres ont donc la possibilité de ne pas s’engager dans cette voie. Si au
contraire ils le font, cela implique qu’ils acceptent le contenu de l’article I.40 §7, qui stipule que
“ dans le cas où l’un des Etats participant à cette coopération serait l’objet d’une agression armée sur
son territoire, les autres Etats participants lui portent aide et assistance par tous les moyens en leur
pouvoir, militaires et autres, conformément aux dispositions de l’article 51 de la Charte des Nations
Unies ”.
La France est membre de l’OTAN, elle n’est donc pas concernée par la question.
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Il ne devrait pas y avoir de problèmes : les Etats neutres ont en effet la possibilité de ne pas souscrire à
la clause de défense mutuelle, et ils peuvent également utiliser l’abstention constructive ou à la clause
opting-out de départ.
clause?
La coopération renforcée dans le cadre de la PESC/PESD conserve son utilité malgré l’existence de la
clause de défense mutuelle. De cette façon, il s’agit de deux instruments plus complémentaires
qu’antagoniques. Ils seront en effet probablement utilisés dans des contextes différents :
-
l’utilisation de la clause de défense mutuelle est en effet conditionnée strictement à l’article
I.40 §7 du projet de Traité constitutionnel par une agression armée sur le territoire d’un Etat
membre, qui plus est un Etat membre qui participe à cette coopération plus étroite en matière
de défense mutuelle,
-
une coopération renforcée peut au contraire être mise en place dans n’importes quelles
circonstances, pas seulement dans un contexte de crise. Par ailleurs, les coopérations
renforcées peuvent concerner de très nombreux domaines : la coopération renforcée peut
permettre à certains Etats d’avancer davantage sur des questions militaires, d’autres en matière
d’armements, …
Il semble donc qu’il y ait de la place pour ces deux instruments dans le cadre de l’UE, la clause de
défense mutuelle n’a pas vocation à se substituer aux coopérations renforcées. Ce faisant, elle
risquerait en effet de restreindre la capacité des Etats membres à faire avancer la défense européenne.
VII. Conclusion
On peut mettre en avant différents enjeux ou débats soulevés par la PESC et par la PESD et qui
demeurent aujourd’hui en suspens.
Il s’agit tout d’abord de la question de l’avenir de la défense européenne. On peut s’interroger sur les
limites à fixer à la PESD, sur le plan géographique et fonctionnel. L’UE doit-elle se diriger vers la
défense collective en intégrant l’article 5 du Traité de Bruxelles modifié ?
Par ailleurs, le récent élargissement suscite des interrogations : comment construire une défense
européenne à 25 alors que c’était déjà une entreprise difficile à 15 ? Les Etats membres auront-ils la
volonté politique d’aller plus loin en matière de défense européenne ?
Un autre enjeu essentiel est la question de l’évolution des relations entre l’UE et l’OTAN, et donc
aussi entre l’UE et les Etats-Unis : les nouvelles missions de l’OTAN ne vont-elles pas empiéter sur
celles de l’UE ? La NRF ne va-t-elle pas concurrencer la FRR de l’UE ? L’UE va-t-elle poursuivre sa
quête d’autonomie par rapport à son partenaire américain ?
En outre, on peut se demander si, conformément aux souhaits des parlementaires nationaux et
européens, les Etats membres vont accepter de développer la dimension parlementaire de la PESC et
de la PESD.
Enfin, se pose la question de la crédibilité et de l’efficacité de la PESC et de la PESC, à mettre en
relation avec l’évolution future des budgets de la défense des Etats membres. Ainsi, pour que la
défense européenne puisse continuer de se développer et être convaincante, il faut que les Etats
membres fassent preuve d’une volonté politique suffisante et qu’ils la traduisent en une augmentation
concrète de leurs dépenses militaires. Or, à cet égard, on peut nourrir des inquiétudes sur la position
future de la France, le nouveau ministre de l’Economie et des Finances, M. François Sarkozy, ayant
annoncé son intention de procéder à d’importantes coupes dans le budget de la Défense.
Depuis de nombreuses années, la position de la France à l’égard de la PESC et de la PESD fait preuve
d’une grande continuité. De cette façon, le changement de majorité en 2002 n’a pas engendré de
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bouleversements dans la politique européenne de la France. Même avant cette date, le Président – de
droite – et le gouvernement – de gauche – avaient adopté la même ligne de conduite en matière de
PESC et de défense européenne. Depuis la fin des années 1990, la France s’impose en effet comme
l’un des piliers et des moteurs de la défense européenne, c’est elle qui a donné avec la GrandeBretagne une impulsion décisive à Saint-Malo en décembre 1998, c’est elle qui a voulu relancer ce
chantier en avril 2003 avec l’Allemagne en pleine crise irakienne. Cette continuité s’explique en partie
par le fait que la France conçoit la défense européenne comme un passage obligé pour que l’Europe
puisse s’affirmer comme un véritable acteur sur la scène internationale.
Enfin, on peut penser l’intégration souple en matière de PESC et de PESD n’est globalement pas
perçue en France comme une atteinte à la souveraineté nationale.
En guise de conclusion, on peut reprendre les termes de Patrice Buffotot : “ Il n’existera pas de
véritable défense européenne sans l’adoption par l’ensemble des pays membres d’une défense
collective de l’Union européenne, ce qui veut dire en d’autres termes, l’intégration de l’article V de
l’UEO. Cela nécessitera du temps et de la persuasion pour la faire accepter par plusieurs pays, dont
notamment les neutres comme l’Autriche, la Finlande, l’Irlande et la Suède. Il est vrai qu’une absence
de menace militaire majeure ne facilite pas le processus. Les solutions aux questions posées par la
défense européenne ne viendront que d’une prise de conscience des Européens eux-mêmes. S’ils
refusent d’investir plus dans leur outil de défense, celui-ci deviendra obsolète et la seule solution qu’il
leur restera, sera alors de s’intégrer dans un système de sécurité euroatlantique où l’Europe ne pèsera
plus d’un grand poids ”. (Buffotot Patrice, “ Le bilan de la PESD en 2003 ”, Défense et stratégie, n°8,
janvier 2004, p. 11).
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GERMANY
Matthias Jopp (Institut für europäische Politik, IEP, Berlin)
I. In General
Germany’s security doctrine is based on NATO’s strategique concept and, since very recently, the
EU’s security strategy which includes major German interests in approaching international security
through multilateralism and the strengthening of international institutions (notably the UN) and of
international law. The German security concept is outlined in detail in the “Verteidigungspolitische
Richtlinien” (VPR) of the Ministry of Defence. As of May 21, 2003, the latest VPR emphasizes the
need for embedding the Bundeswehr into multilateral or multinational force structures and advance the
goal of multinational cooperation and integration. Also, the VPR sets out the following foundations of
German defence policy:
-
the transatlantic partnership as a basis for German security policy,
-
ESDP as a means to strengthen the area of stability in and around Europe and as a means to
strengthen the two-pillar-structure of NATO. ESDP can act where NATO is not engaged or
decides not to do so; for furthering its security interests as well as global principles and norms
Germany actively participates in the United Nations and the OSCE.
In view of the developments after September 11, 2001, the government is revitalising its arguments
about a reform of the UN which would lead to including Germany with a permanent seat in the
Security Council.
Although Germany, since the mid-nineties (after the rule of the Constitutional Court in 1974), has
become more and more involved in non-Article -V-missions (peace-keeping and peace-stabilisation),
notably in the Balkans, and thus has changed from an abstaining to an engaged member of the Western
community in crisis management, it was only after September 11 when the government officially
recognized that security and defence policy in today’s world has a global dimension (Struck: The
frontline of the defence of German and European interests lies at the “Hindukush”).
The conditions for Germany’s participation in military crisis management missions are rather strict:
there must exist a UN or OSCE mandate or a ceasefire agreement and a request of the conflicting
parties or a request of democratically elected government (for keeping peace in a country); action
could only be taken within multilateral frameworks of NATO or the EU or directly under the UN; a
positive vote of the Bundestag would always be required (Parlamentsarmee).
The Solana Paper was widely accepted and welcome in the German public. Within the security and
integration communities it was and is discussed how the economic, diplomatic and military means of
the EU could be strengthened and synergy in using them be reinforced. Among the measures discussed
for translating the security strategy into practice are the following: the strengthening of conditionality,
including an anti-terrorism clause in trade and cooperation agreements of the EU; stronger cooperation
in the field of home and justice affairs, notably through the establishment of a European Attorney of
Law, a common border policy and operational powers for Europol; the strengthening of the ESDP
through the establishment of battle groups by 2007; the strengthening of the EU’s non-proliferation
policy and weak arms exports control policy. Although it is widely accepted within the political elite
and security experts that the ESDP should cover the full spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks and that
military operations could not only be limited to the geographic vicinity of the EU, but would also have
to be conducted in areas of wider distance up to ten thousand kilometres, it is also clear that Germany,
61
due to its budgetary and capability constraint would have to limit its engagement to a selected number
of missions (i.e. in the Balkans or Africa), of a peace-stabilisation type.
The issue of flexible integration in CFSP/ESDP is not discussed in the wider public, but in expert
circles of the security and integration community. The major argument is that flexible integration in
CFSP/ESDP will help to produce a workable foreign, security and defence policy in an enlarged
Union. Most experts and relevant government officials agree on the point that structured cooperation
should, in its protocol, include a reference to the importance of the Atlantic Alliance and should set
standards for participation without using criteria which would have direct budgetary implications
(such as defence convergence criteria).
One further argument was and is that, apart from pre-defined flexibility through "structured" and
"closer cooperation", "enhanced cooperation" should be expanded to the CFSP and ESDP as a general
possibility without veto option (through the use of QMV). The overall view is that without flexibility
it would be difficult to advance security integration and produce reasonable policy outputs in CFSP
and ESDP due to the unanimity rule in decision-making in that policy field. The view is also widely
shared that a multi-speed Europe or variable geometry should be possible through using the
mechanisms within the Union as provided by the future constitution. However, this is more the longerterm perspective. For the time being and the years to come groups of member states should continue to
organise defence or armaments cooperation among them for advancing European security and defence
and improving military capabilities.
This was one of the reasons for the German government (apart from the restrictive British position) for
being in favour of limiting the competence of the new armaments agency to a networking and
coordination function. For the time being, the work in institutions such as OCCAR seems to be more
effective (and controllable to prevent costly self-dynamics) than in the framework of the EU.
However, the overall idea in Germany is that the existing groupings outside the EU Treaty should
organise their activities in the perspective of future EU integration (and not for avoiding EU
integration), i.e. in the perspective of transferring the outside cooperation one day into the EU
framework (e.g. like the Schengen Agreement).
As far as the cooperation between France, the UK and Germany is concerned, it is widely welcome
among experts, government officials and the public, that only this triangle has the strength to forge a
consensus among the Union of 25 on difficult institutional and essential policy issues. In other words,
it is questionable whether any progress on essential CFSP issues would be possible without agreement
among the big three (see Yugoslavia, Tervuren, follow-up etc.).
The suggestions of the constitutional Draft Treaty were received very positively among experts and in
the wider public in as far as the new possibilities for flexible integration and the suggested double hated European Foreign Minister is concerned. However, there was strong criticism on the persistence
of the unanimity rule in CFSP and ESDP. The impression was that German representatives in the
Convention had lost a battle even if there was some support from the French and the Italian side (see
Italian Presidency proposal on the use of QMV on the basis of a foreign ministers’ proposal).
The failure of the IGC was very negatively perceived. Some blamed the government because of its
inflexible stance on the double majority issue, thereby risking the whole project of a European
Constitution. But the overwhelming majority supported the government in insisting on a voting system
more efficient than the one provided by the Nice Treaty and blamed Poland and Spain for the failure
of the IGC because of the stiffness and inflexibility of their positions. Directly after the failed
conference, government officials, with obvious disappointment, aired the idea of differentiated
integration or two-speed Europe. But there was no such debate on “Kerneuropa” developing
comparable to the one in 1994 when the Schäuble/Lamers Paper came out. Only from end-February to
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mid-April when first Fischer dropped the idea of “Kerneuropa” and later the Chancellor, with a view
to French sensitivities, uphold the idea of a multi-speed Europe in an enlarged Union, some
Newspapers picked up the issue and some think tanks restarted their old work on cores and circles. But
the focus of the wider debate quickly moved to other issues such a the issue of Turkey’s accession to
the Union and the “strategique dimension” of EU enlargement as promoted by the Foreign Minister.
negative one?
UK-D-F trio meetings are seen increasingly as indispensable for taking the EU forward on strategic
issues, major questions of external policy and problems of institutional CFSP/ESDP design. On the
other hand, the Franco-German cooperation is still seen as an essential part of Germany’s European
policy. If an agreement cannot be found among the three in the first instance, the preferred option is to
find an agreement with the French partner and then seek the participation or cooperation with the
British.
Traditionally, Germany favours a mediating stance between Atlantic and European positions.
Therefore, NATO as well as the European Union have been the central institutional frameworks
within which Germany has pursued its security interests. However, during and after the election
campaign 2002, Chancellor Schröder and major representative of the Social Democratic Party as well
as the Greens voiced their concerns regarding the United States’ policy of military intervention in Iraq
which was perceived as unilateral and ill-advised if not unfounded. This critical tone towards
Washington was accompanied by a rapprochement between Berlin and Paris so that Germany’s
balancing position between Paris and Washington seemed to be at stake for the time being. This
exactly was the point of harsh criticism by the opposition parties. The argument of the CDU/CSU was
that it was the first time in Germany’s history that a government retreated from the support of the
United States in the fight against a major threat. One year after the war in Iraq with no WMD found
and growing instability in that country the opposition is moving towards the position of the
government with more critical voices to be heard on the ways and means the US is handling the Iraqi
situation. On the whole, the Iraqi conflict may not have changed Germany’s position in the middle
between Washington and Paris, but has certainly opened up greater acceptance for European initiatives
in security and defence policy.
In principal, decision-makers, experts and politicians have a clear preference for dealing with
European foreign and security policy in the Treaty framework, the more so once the possibilities of
flexible integration, as provided for in the European Constitution are available after its
ratification/coming into force. However, there are still particular issues which will be treated outside
of the EU’s institutional framework (for some time at least). This covers initiatives such as the contact
groups for Bosnia and Kosovo or specific forms of military cooperation like the Franco-German
Brigade, the Euro Corps, EUROFOR and EUROMAFOR, or defence industrial cooperation in the
form of the Letter of Intent (LoI) and OCCAR (Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière
d’armement). A key question is to what extent the above mentioned initiatives can be linked more
closely to the framework of the European Union for avoiding parallel structures, political frictions and
costly duplication. The general mood in Germany is that all these initiatives should be better linked to
the EU through exploiting, in the longer term, the possibilities of structured or enhanced cooperation
or, in the minimum, through better coordination of the various initiatives in the framework of the
Union.
−
European Council
−
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−
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
The Council and the High Representative/European Foreign Minister (when established) should
always be involved in flexible ESDP integration. The European Commission and the European
Parliament play a rather reduced role. In the Council all member states should attend the meetings in
which only the countries participating in enhanced or structured cooperation have a right to vote. The
trigger mechanism for flexible integration should involve the full Council taking decisions by
qualified majority. In both cases, enhanced cooperation and structured cooperation, the Union Minister
for Foreign Affairs should be consulted before deciding on the cooperation in question. The Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs would have to assess the compatibility of the planned cooperation among
a number of member states with the overall direction of the CFSP and the acquis politique. Also the
Commission should evaluate the coherence of the intended cooperation with other Union policies. The
European Parliament should be informed about projects for enhanced cooperation and the Union’s
Foreign Minister (where required, also the Commission) should keep the European Parliament
regularly informed about the progress in flexible integration.
See above.
Should the Treaty on a European Constitution fail, Germany would try together with some partners, in
view of the non-existent flexibility in ESDP on the basis of the Nice Treaty, to realize, as much as
possible the ideas related to enhanced and structured cooperation outside of the Treaty framework.
After a significant drop in the German defence budget in the first half of the nineties, the defence
budget is since then relatively stable with about 24 to 25 billion Euros annually and about 1.7 per cent
of the GDP (in 2003). The room of manoeuvre for a new defence project within the defence budget is
rather limited. About 75 per cent of the expenditures are spent for covering running costs. These
include with 12.5 billion Euros for the 280000 soldiers and 120000 civil servants about half of the
overall defence budget. Only 24 per cent of the defence budget are available for investment, out of
which only 3.95 billion Euros are invested into military procurement. Since military procurement is a
long-term affair, more freedom of manoeuvre for new types of investment would only be available
from 2008 and 2012 onwards. This was one of the reasons why recently the defence minister decided
for cutting down procurement overplanning within the next coming years. However, some qualitative
accentuations in procurement and maintenance are identifiable in as far as specific assets of the
Bundeswehr are concerned such as ABC-detecting, MRCA-ACR Tornados, cruise missiles, airdefence, space based reconnaissance and longer-term projects such as the A400M and the EuroFighter.
costs?
The defence plans try to include to the extent possible the requirements of the ESDP with a view to the
headline goals and the ECAP process (see point 6). The Defence Ministry traditionally prefers role and
task sharing as a means for developing European defence capabilities in view of the limited budgetary
possibilities. Since Britain, France and other partners seem to be less interested in role and task sharing
and more in the concept of pooling of capabilities, the Ministry is reconsidering its position. One
possible approach might be the pooling of identical systems such as the Euro-Fighter or the future
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A400M which could produce economies of scale in terms of reducing running costs, training, logistics
and spare parts (operating costs).
Germany is willing and able to join the permanent structured cooperation. The whole idea about it was
very much developed by Germany together with France. There are only two major difficulties which
could arise from the Protocol on Structured Cooperation should it come into force in a way as it is
discussed now. One problem could arise from the level of investment expenditure on defence
equipment should this become more precisely formulated. Up to now the government tried to avoid
any more precise formula on this to have an open room of interpretation. The second problem may
arise from a commitment to make military forces available within a period of five to thirty days since
the decision-making procedures involving a parliamentary vote of the Bundestag are time-consuming.
On the other hand, the stipulations on structured cooperation in the European Constitution may help
the government, notably the MoD and the MFA, to better argue for a change towards a greater
flexibility for obtaining parliamentary consent. On the whole, it should not be a major problem for
Germany to carry its burden within the framework of permanent structured cooperation in terms of
financial and human resources.
There is little or no discussion in the wider public on such detailed and technical proposals as the one
of the former Italian Presidency. German representatives were largely supporting the Italian
Presidency’s proposal and are still arguing alo ng these lines in the resumed IGC.
The solution found with France and the UK on the establishment of an autonomous European
Headquarter is largely accepted among the main political parties. The government was only criticised
by opposition parties at the time when it, together with France, Belgium and Luxembourg, promoted
the idea of establishing such a Headquarter outside of the EU framework and independently of NATO
and did this in an undiplomatic way which alienated the Americans. The general agreement that the
EU Headquarter should only be used in the event of no national Headquarters being available satisfied
the MoD which was not happy about seeing a new rival to its costly multinational Headquarter at
Potsdam. The establishment of a link to NATO via the European cell at shape as agreed in the
trilateral meetings with the British and the French found the support of the MoD and also to some
extent of the MFA. However, some experts believe that through this and some other elements of close
cooperation between the small EU and the big NATO the idea of an autonomous EU capability for
taking action may fade away (receded).
cooperation?
Enhanced cooperation is a method across the board of all possible fields of working together in the
area of CFSP/ESDP. It could even be used within structured cooperation should this type of
cooperation be watered down through practically all member states participating in it. It would then
serve providing the ground for those wishing to move more forward in security and defence
integration than the other participating states.
III. Missions
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−
−
−
−
−
stabilisation
Other conditions.
The support and engagement of Germany is likely in all of the mentioned five tasks, among which the
first four missions could also be run by the EU autonomously whereas the last type of missions would
preferably be done in a NATO context or in cooperation with the US or in the EU framework in
cooperation with the US. The first four types of missions would imply a non-engagement of NATO
which, however, would not require a NATO Council permission for the EU to act. For autonomous
EU operations, there would be a preference for acting together with France and/or Britain. A minimum
number of member states would not be required as long as mechanisms of enhanced cooperation (one
third) will not be used. If a member state would explicitly oppose a mission it would not be possible to
conduct an operation on behalf of the Union since such a decision would require unanimity.
As for the legitimisation of military operations a UN Security Council resolution or an OSCE
resolution would be required. Other conditions would involve a ceasefire agreement between the
conflicting parties and a joint request of these to the EU for peace-keeping or peace-stabilisation. It
would also be possible that a democratically elected government (as it was the case with Macedonia )
requested the EU to conduct a peace-keeping operation.
There was only limited discussion on the EU police missions in Bosnia -Herzegovina and Macedonia
because of their civil nature and the obvious security needs of these two countries. Also Concordia, the
peace-keeping mission in Macedonia, passed the Bundestag relatively easy. The fact of this operation
being a successor to NATO’s Amber Fox mission and the fact that the operation would be conducted
in close cooperation with NATO via DSACEUR helped to facilitate the decision-making process. The
situation was markedly different in the case of the operation Artemis in Congo although basic
preconditions for taking action had been met such as a unanimous decision of the EU Council and a
precisely formulated UN mandate. However, things were rather complex.
First, there was a discussion in the media and within the older German security establishment whether,
after Afghanistan, now Africa should become a zone of security interest for Germany. The
government, notably Foreign Minister Fischer, pointed at the EU’s responsibility towards the big
neighbouring continent and at the fact that Germany, as a leading EU member, could not shy away
from this EU responsibility. Secondly, there was some discussion about a Bundeswehr overstretch
66
because of commitments made to international peace keeping with about 8,000 to 9,000 troops,
meaning 30,000 troops in total because of the rotation business. Hence, the overall feeling was that
Germany could not play any leading role in the operation Artemis and should avoid becoming dragged
into any deep intervention.
Finally, the Christian democratic and liberal opposition parties criticised the government in having not
consulted with NATO about the planned operation but running it separately as an autonomous EU
affair. The argument was that ESDP should not rival NATO or support French world power ambition.
The Christian democrats and the liberals clearly underlined their preference for ESDP operations in
close liaison with NATO. However, this preference of the opposition parties was not contested by the
government, at least not by the MFA. The debate on that point did not unfold any dynamics because of
the firm support of the British of the autonomous EU operation leading to nobody assuming – as
pointed out by Foreign minister Fischer in the Bundestag debate on the issue – that the British would
try to undermine NATO.
What was left from the debate after the successful conclusion of the operation was the criticism of
some security analysts and integration experts of the role of the French, initially designed as a role as a
framework nation but acting in fact as a lead nation with EU blessing and the support of some EU
members, including Germany. Hence, the view was shared among these experts, and specialists in the
MoD, that this would not be the preferred option for future missions in Africa.
this instrument?
The instrument of constructive abstention is seen as a useful tool for facilitating consensus among EU
members. Experts in the MFA, the Chancellery and in think tanks dealing with issues of the European
Convention were even thinking of lowering the threshold for constructive abstention from one third of
the member states down to fifty percent in the defence field. However, in principle constructive
abstention is seen as a weak mechanism (weaker as a formula used in the OSCE: consensus minus
one) since it is, on the one hand, combined with the possibility of opting out from commitments
related to a unanimous decision and, on the other, does not change anything with respect to the veto
right of single member states. Hence, the longstanding German position on the need of using QMV in
the CFSP for reasons of organising an effective and effic ient foreign policy remains unchanged, the
more so the Union grows in terms of the number of member states.
such a clause?
All German representatives in the European Convention were very much in favour of introducing into
the Convention draft treaty at least a "small" passarelle clause for an unanimous decision on whether
QMV could be used in particular policy fields of the CFSP without amending the treaty. It was a
minimalist fall back position. The overall German objective remains the generalisation of QMV in
CFSP.
Germany is very much interested in the Agency. The Agency is a long-term project of Germany for
EU integration promoted together with France and some other partners. The major issues in the debate
are centred around the question whether the Agency should have own decision-making powers and
budgetary means or whether it should have only a coordination function. In the end, the mainstream
thinking was oriented towards an Agency with a coordination and networking function for two
reasons: On the one hand because of British resistance to any construction going beyond this model,
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on the other hand because of the success story of OCCAR which should be continued and lead only to
a step by step process of integration into the EU framework.
As already said above, the role of the Agency should be more of a technical nature. However, this is
only seen as a first step in the perspective of a stronger Agency model in the longer term.
OCCAR and LoI are seen as an integral part of a European network managed by the Agency. Both
processes should, for the time being, rest with their present juridical nature whereby synergy also with
other initiatives should be produced by the Agency. From a German point of view, it is important that
the six to eight leading arms production nations of the EU are organised in OCCAR or LoI. But they
could form the avant-garde for a future EU armaments' policy.
The mutual defence clause was an idea promoted by all German governments since 1996-97. In March
1997, Germany with six other nations had proposed to integrate, in a flexible way, the commitments of
article V of the WEU treaty into the EU framework. This failed in 1997 but remained a German
position in developing a European defence policy. It was repeated at the Summit of the four nations
(France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg in April 2003). During the deliberations of the European
Convention, however, it was not a first priority of German government officials and other
representatives in the Convention. German representatives in the Convention followed on this issue
very much their French counterparts who pushed the issue (including Giscard).
This obligation does not conflict whatsoever with NATO membership, since NATO commitments
have a prominent place in the formulation of the relevant article in the Draft Constitution.
This will largely depend on the interpretation of the new article (of article 1-40 par. 7) in the European
Constitution on part of countries such as Sweden or Austria. Should the hig hlighted importance of the
security status of each member state lead to a restrictive interpretation of the mutual defence
commitment in terms of being obliged to nothing (not even overflight rights for fighter aircraft of
other member states in conflict situations) the clause would loose any real meaning.
clause?
Resulting from the answer to the question 21 b) the answer is: Yes. The particular character of "closer
cooperation" in relation to mutual defence had been deleted in the course of the IGC. In addition, the
mutual defence clause had been weaken through the position of neutral and post neutral countries,
which could in fact mean reserving the right or opt outs from any commitment to mutual defence.
Hence, for those countries being interested in a stronger version of the clause, enhanced cooperation
could be used in order to set up the necessary military and institutional structures for a stronger
underpinning of the weak and openly formulated clause.
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VII. Conclusion
The most important issues will be the design and execution of a successful neighbourhood policy
towards the East and towards the South, a particular policy towards Russia aiming at the further
transformation of this country towards, as far as possible, democracy and market economy; a policy
towards the near and the middle East including Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan and, last but not least, a
policy towards Africa with a strong accent on conflict prevention. On the whole the objectives of the
European security strategy need to be translated into practice including an improved non-proliferation
policy, the prevention of states failing and the fight against terrorism.
In the transatlantic relationship the EU-NATO link needs to be improved on the basis of a true
partnership. One of the major questions is how to establish consensus within the EU-25 on
transatlantic issues and how to launch a successful strategic dialogue with the United States? To try to
reach a common basis between Europe and the US on how to approach problems of world order is one
of the keys to transforming the transatlantic alliance into a structure with two equal pillars.
As far as the ESDP is concerned, there will be in the future difficult and important operations in the
Balkans, perhaps in Moldova and probably in the longer term more operations in Africa. In Germany
it will be a difficult task to convince parliamentarians and the wider public that Germany via its
membership of the EU will have to become more engaged in crisis management and in regions which
do not belong to the traditional security interests of Germany whether it is Afghanistan or Africa.
People need to learn that they can trust in the decision-making of the Union in a way that engagements
in Africa are not bolstering French post-colonial ambitions. Although NATO enjoys a rather
uncontested high esteem in Germany, it is leaking slowly into the conscious of the wider public that
the EU is going to become an important security actor too. However, some EU-isation in the security
thinking of the country is necessary. This is particular true for the MoD and for changes in thinking
within the security establishment. A big issue will be linked to the question to what extent decisionmaking procedures need to be simplified. There will be more pressure from the European level for
quick decision-making on various forms of military crisis management and this may easily conflict
with the tradition of a "Parlamentsarmee". Will the Europeanisation trend help to refine the national
decision-making procedures because of the strong affinity of Germans with the EU?
As far as the issues of national sovereignty and flexible integration are concerned, there is little or no
conflict in the wider public or between leading parties on the CFSP. The consensus lies with
generalising QMV in CFSP decision-making. As far as the ESDP is concerned, there is a cleavage
between the social democrats and the opposition parties in as far as the latter stress more the
complementary nature of the ESDP to NATO and insists on a NATO first and EU second approach.
Politicians who are in favour of a European army (in the longer term) can be found in nearby all
political camps. In practice, the question is more about whether role and task sharing should be pushed
within the EU in a way that the Bundeswehr can strengthen its assets (like ACR Tornados or ABC
detecting systems) and would not have to spend more on equipment not being fully available in the
Bundeswehr. The alternative which is only more recently discussed is whether Germany should not
work more towards the pooling of weapons systems of a similar nature (Eurofighter and A400M) and
towards the procurement and running of collective assets belonging to the EU, similar to the AWACS
system belonging to NATO. In principle, the question of sovereignty in all these models, including biand multi-lateral force structures (such as the Eurocorps), are not a big difficulty because of the
traditional German culture of multi-lateralism and integration in NATO and the EU. Since it does not
seem realistic to achieve deeper integration in Foreign and Defence Policy with all 25 EU-member
states at once, the idea of flexible integration in CFSP and ESDP is welcome and seen as a necessity to
develop the European Union in these policy fields.
69
GREECE
Dimitris P. Droutsas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Gene ral remark:
Greece has always been a staunch supporter of the development of a Common Foreign and Security
Policy for the EU. In this regard, Greece has actively participated in the entire evolutionary process of
the EU over the last decade (inter alia, the Intergovernmental Conferences that led to the adoption of
the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties). Greece has laid particular emphasis on the need to
bolster the Union with a credible and strong foreign and security policy, which should have at its
disposal the necessary institutional framework, coherence and unity, along with vital operational tools
in order to underpin the role of the EU on the international scene.
In light of the above, and in a spirit of solidarity, Greece contributes substantially to the development
of the CFSP, especially as regards issues related to her geographic proximity (i.e., the Balkans, the
Middle East, the Mediterranean and the Caucasus). Greece's main objectives include the eradication of
current loci of conflicts, the prevention of potential crises and the consolidation of a climate of
security, the implementation of the fundamental principles of international law and the strengthening
of the rule of law, and the protection of human and minority rights.
At the same time, Greece was, from the very beginning, one of the strongest advocates of the inclusion
of a credible security and defence dimension in support of the CFSP, as was finally decided by the
European Council in Cologne in June 1999. Since then, Greece contributes, by all the means at her
disposal, to the development of the ESDP and to the strengthening of Europe's capabilities, being fully
aware that only with improved capabilities will the EU be able to pursue a strong and credible foreign
policy.
I.In General
1.National security doctrines.
a)Please describe and summarize recent trends in your country in relation to security and defence
Greece’s national strategy includes the following fundamental principles:
-
Defend the national independence, sovereignty and integrity of the country against any threat.
-
Support the European orientation of the country.
-
Reinforce the country's position in the Balkans aiming to make it the Balkan pillar of the EU.
-
The active presence of Greece in the area of the Black Sea Countries and of the Eastern
Mediterranean.
-
The development of an active and dynamic military diplomacy aiming to promote the policy of
security, peace and cooperation in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.
-
To validate Greece's participation in all international organizations which are currently readapting
their strategy and practice to the new data of the international political reality.
-
The efficient function of the country as the metropolitan centre of the Greek nation by taking the
necessary initiatives for the motivation of Greeks around the world.
-
The international support of Greece’s national interests.
The policy of national defence is part of the national strategy. Its general aim is through combined
actions in the field of defence diplomacy and of foreign policy the reinforcement of Greece's security,
its stabilizing presence in the international environment and its constructive role as the generating
force of positive developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and the wider region.
The principles of the policy of national defence are:
-
The peaceful policy of Greece.
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-
The trust to the Treaties and Agreements, the UN Chart, and the Helsinki Final Act, in accordance
to which Greece:
* Considers its borders as permanently fixed as well as the exercise of its lawful sovereign rights
and aspires to the respect of the status quo in the region, as it stems from the international
Treaties and Agreements that Greece has signed.
*
Remains firm and unrelenting to issues concerning its security and sovereignty.
* Considers as both a national duty and a vital (national) interest the survival of the Cypriot
Hellenism, the reinforcement of their will and the guarantee of their security.
- The commitment to peace, stability and the principles of international security and the active
participation to the efforts for its establishment.
- The peaceful resolution of disputes and the deterrence of threats against national security by
political, diplomatic economic and military means.
- The respect of the international obligations stemming from the Treaty for the Conventional Forces
in Europe (CfE), the "Open Skies" Treaty and other relevant Agreements.
- The prevention from obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and
biological) and the support of the international efforts for the reduction of their proliferation.
The aims of the national defence policy are:
-
The preservation of peace, safeguarding the territorial integrity of Greece and the protection of the
national independence, sovereignty and security of the Greek people from any foreign attack or
threat.
-
The guarantee of the Cypriot Hellenism's security and concern about the Hellenic minorities
abroad.
-
To secure in priority, the means for national defence, in order to efficiently support the exercise of
the national sovereignty on land, sea and in the air.
-
To secure the capability to perform land, sea and air strategic transportation.
-
The existence of stability in the region, the resolution of the regional conflicts and the preservation
of military balance.
-
The promotion of friendship, good-neighbourhood relations and cooperation in the zone of
Greece’s geopolitical interest, in Europe, the Adria tic, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Eastern
Mediterranean, the Middle East and Northern Africa.
-
The optimisation of the advantages from Greece’s participation in Alliances and the organisations
for collective security (NATO, WEU, OSCE, EU) in order to protect Greece’s national interests
and at the same time honour Greece’s commitments to them.
-
The contribution to the development of the national economy especially through the development
of the domestic defence industry and the implementation of armaments and defence research
programs.
-
The reinforcement of the security conditions for the citizens with the contribution of the Armed
Forces in case of disasters, catastrophes and civil emergencies in general, and with emphasis on
the border regions as well as the reinforcement of the unity and solidarity between the people and
the Armed Forces promoting, at the same time, the social role and the acceptance of the Armed
Forces.
In the framework of the national defence policy as it is determined by the Governmental Council on
Foreign Affairs and National Defence, the Ministry of National Defence formulates the national
military strategy which provides the guidelines for the use of the defence power of the Country, the
development of the defence planning, the planning of the forces structure as well as the decision
making procedures on defence issues. The national military strategy is part of Greece’s national
strategy that aims to reinforce Greece's position both in the near and the wider international area.
71
The central axis of Greece’s military strategy is the deterrence of the Turkish threat and secondarily of
risks stemming from other directions, in conjunction to the policy for the de-escalation of tensions.
The pillar for the execution of the deterrence policy is the Armed Forces of the country in conjunction
with other complementary power factors. The military doctrine of Greece is a defensive one, oriented
to face any external threat. Greece’s goal is to increase the operational readiness and the capability of
the Hellenic Armed Forces to implement an efficient deterrence policy that should be continuous,
unrelenting and convincing, having the following elements:
-
Credibility
-
Declaration of Greece’s intention to react, if challenged.
-
Capability to launch a counter-blow (to respond to an attack).
The “Solana Paper” of December 2003 itself did not generate any particular interest or (public) debate.
In Greece, the new security challenges were thoroughly discussed during the Greek EU-Presidency
(January to July 2003) that prepared the “Solana Paper”.
Furthermore, the upcoming Athens 2004 Olympic Games and the issue of the security arrangements
for the Games forced Greece to develop a new set of tasks to reflect the new security challenges.
According to the provision of the 2833/2000 Law, the security of the Olympic Games has been
assigned to the Hellenic Police. In its headquarters a special agency has been formed under the name
"Olympic Games Security Division" (OGSD). In order to accomplish its mission according to the
relevant law and the relevant Presidential Decree that has been issued (63/2001), OGSD can cooperate
with other agencies relevant to the security of the Olympic Games, namely the Hellenic Armed
Forces.
On 5 February 2002, the “Olympic Games Branch” was established within the Hellenic Armed Forces,
headed by a Lt General, directly under the Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff.
The mission of the Branch is to assist the Hellenic Police in its task of securing the Athens 2004
Olympic Games, the operational planning of the necessary projects as these stem from the law and the
planning of OGSD along with the concern for the execution of security plans and actions, in general.
The assigned tasks that the Armed Forces have undertaken towards the security of the Olympic Games
are the following:
-
They will safeguard the national borders (land, sea, air), they will survey the open seas, the
national airspace - Athens FIR in cooperation with the Civil Aviation Authority and they will
assist in dealing with natural, technological or other disasters, according to the Civil Protection
Planning.
-
They will provide support to the Hellenic Police, by participating in the police task of securing the
Olympic venues and activities, with the provision of an almost 16.000 men force and the provision
of the means, along with the police forces. In this framework, the Armed Forces will take missions
as follows:
-
Deployment of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers - Warrant Officers to the chain of
Command of the OGSD, in order to man the Operational Centers of Olympic Security, as well as
the collective organs operating for the needs of the OGSD.
-
Deployment of personnel for checking pedestrian or vehicle access to Olympic Venues or events.
-
Deployment of personnel for patrolling athletic or non athletic areas, venues for the hospitality of
foreign VIPs along with the crucial areas for the security of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games.
-
Deployment of personnel for escorting members of the Olympic Family and VIPs.
72
-
Deployment of bomb squads, for defusing explosive devices into the venues, transportation means
and underwater areas.
-
They will provide aerial means to survey the Olympic Venues and Events.
-
They will provide specialized personnel as trainers for the Training Programs of OGSD.
-
They will provide the necessary personnel and means required for the planning and preparation of
the Readiness Exercises for the Olympic Security.
-
They will maintain aerial means in readiness, for transportation of personnel and material, in
exceptional cases.
-
They will provide personnel for guarding Vital Venues.
-
They will assist the Hellenic Police, in the monitoring of land borders in order to reinforce the
patrols in those areas. In that framework, already assigned units and established military
guardhouses in the border area will be deployed. This task will require increased intensity of aerial
surveillance, execution of Special Forces exercises and, probably, the activation of the national
guards in the border areas.
-
They will assist the Coast Guard in the surveillance of the sea borders and the Greek Seas for the
reinforcement of their patrolling. In that framework, the deployment of the Hellenic Fleet will be
necessary, in order to conduct surveillance and deterrence operations in the entire Greek sea.
-
The surveillance and control of the Greek air space will require the involvement of the biggest part
of the air defence system of the country (radars, anti-aircraft weapons, aircrafts).
-
They will provide intelligence support.
-
They will provide geographical products, in order to support the operational planning of the
OGSD, according to the existing capabilities.
CFSP/ESDP (i.e. “Kerneuropa”, variable geometry, multi-speed Europe, Directoire,…)? If not,
please refer to possible reasons for the absence of public awareness of these issues.
There is no debate on flexible integration in the area of CFSP/ESDP, especially in the media or the
public.
The main reasons for the absence of public awareness of these issues are:
-
Public opinion in Greece is traditionally very positive regarding the EU.
-
Greece has always been taking a positive position regarding the further developing and
strengthening of CFSP/ESDP. Thus, flexible integration in these areas is seen as a positive step
into this direction.
The suggestions of the constitutional draft concerning CFSP/ESDP were not discussed, but positively
accepted in Greece, since the Greek positions and proposals were largely taken into account.
The failure of the IGC 2003 was not discussed in an extensive manner. Major Greek positions and
sensitivities were taken into account in the final draft and did not seem to be in danger even if a
revised text was to be submitted. The overall impression was that the reaching of a final compromise
was only a matter of time and soon to be accomplished.
3.b) How has the recent trio meeting UK-D-F been received in your country: as a positive event or as
a negative one?
On the one hand, initiatives taken by some of the EU-Member States, particularly the large ones,
outside of the common institutional framework are observed in a very critical manner by Greece
73
(particularly after the negative experiences regarding the so-called “initiative of the five” regarding the
EU-accession of Cyprus without prior settlement of the political problem).
On the other hand, the trio meeting UK-D-F was seen as a possible step towards the further developing
and strengthening of CFSP/ESDP, and thus was not received as a totally negative event.
3.c) To what extent has the Iraqi conflict influenced the positions in your country?
Since Greece has always been taking a positive position regarding the further developing and
strengthening of CFSP/ESDP, the Iraqi conflict did not influence the positions in Greece in a
substantial manner. It surely served as an additional argument in favour of a strong CFSP/ESDP.
The debate is definitely in favour of including flexible integration in the area of CFSP/ESDP in the
Treaty of the European Union.
In general, Greece has a very reluctant approach to any initiative outside the common institutional
framework.
5.a) To what degree (right on information, consultation…) should the following European institutions
be involved in flexible integration, if your country is in favour of ESDP “within” the common
institutional framework?
-
European Council
-
-
-
European Commission
-
European Parliament
Greece’s general approach is to strengthen, as much as possible, those European institutions that will
ensure the further development of the Union’s policies and minimise the influence of “intergovernmentalism”.
There are no specific proposals regarding the concrete role of each institution.
5.b) If your country is in favour of a foreign and defence policy “outside” the common institutional
5.c )What reaction of your country is to be expected if its preferred option was not adopted?
Although for Greece one of the strategic goals in the IGC is the development of a Common European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) into a collective system of security and solidarity through the
integratio n of a "mutual assistance clause" within the Treaty of the Union, Greece will not block the
adoption of the Constitution if this goal is not accomplished.
However, it would be very difficult for Greece to agree to the development of ESDP “outside” the
common institutional framework.
The overall geo-strategic environment renders it necessary for Greece to allocate considerable human
and financial resources towards its National Defence. This reality is clearly reflected in the budgets of
the Ministry of National Defence. For the fiscal year 2002, the final approved budget for the Ministry
of National Defence reached 3.725 million Euro, which represented 5.65% of the total national budget
and 4.9% of GDP. Per category of expenditure for the 2002 budget, 2.47% constituted the respective
contribution to NATO projects, 19.1% expenditures on armaments capability expansion and 32.55%
for operational expenses. The remaining 45.9% was channelled towards personnel payroll.
74
Greek national defence expenditure as percentage of GDP is the highest among EU countries, despite
a gradual decrease during the last years, both as pe rcentage of the total national budget and of GDP.
The political leadership of the Ministry of National Defence aims at maximising the benefits of
defence spending while minimising the cost of resources expended.
A critical variable in realizing the above goal is the National Defence Policy Design, which aims at the
optimal development of the Hellenic Armed Forces, in order to achieve national security. The National
Defence Policy encompasses two sets of procedures:
- The Defence Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, which refers to the procedures for
determining the size of the Armed Forces and the utilisation of available human and financial
resources.
- The Defence Material Acquisition System, which refers to the procedures for determining
operationa l procurement needs.
Through the National Defence Policy Design the minimisation of defence expenditures cost is
achieved as well as the increase of the participation of the domestic defence industry in the total
military procurement budget. This is of critical importance as it reduces capital outflows from the
country, boosts domestic employment, contributes to extra value added in the economy and enhances
the transfer and diffusion of technological know-how.
The rapid improvement of the relations between Greece and Turkey, introduced by Greece by the socalled “rapprochement policy” with Turkey in 1999, makes the Greek government hope to be able to
decrease military expenditure by 20%.
interest is there in pooling current military capabilities with other EU members to educe operating
costs?
circumstances, conditions are relevant for that decision (how many members; which members…)? Is it
politically realistic for your country to carry this burden in terms of financial and human resources?
Greece is able and willing to join a permanent structured cooperation.
There is no outspoken preference for any particular circumstances, conditions for that decision. Greece
would oppose to criteria that would prevent Greece’s own (and Cyprus’) participation in a permanent
structured cooperation. E.g. regarding the criterion of the participation of a minimum number of
Member States, Greece’s preference would be 8 Member States. One third of the Member States (i.e. 9
Member States in EU-25 or EU-27) would be acceptable too. Greece could also accept abolishment of
the participation of a minimum number of Member States as a prerequisite for a permanent structured
cooperation. E.g. regarding the question of who should decide on the subsequent participation of a
Member State in a permanent structured cooperation, Greece’s preference would be that such decision
was taken only by those Member States already participating in a permanent structured cooperation.
Since Greece is already investing a very high percentage of its GNP in defence, it seems politically
realistic for Greece to carry this burden in terms of financial and human resources.
9. The former Italian presidency delivered a note in December 2003 (CIG 57/1/03) envisaging a
There is no national debate on the criteria for participation in permanent structured cooperation
formulated in the Protocol. Greece is willing to accept any criterion, as long as it does not prevent
Greece’s own (and Cyprus’) participation.
(Compare also question 8.)
75
The establishment of an autonomous European Headquarters capable of planning significant military
operations is not questioned by Greece.
Concerning the relation of this Headquarter to NATO, full autonomy of the European Headquarters
must be ensured. For Greece it is very important that no of the “difficulties” existing within NATO
due to different viewpoints regarding certain issues between Greece and Turkey are imported into the
CFSP/ESDP.
cooperation?
III. Missions
Missions on behalf of the European Union include (Art. III-210 par. 1 Draft Constitutional Treaty)
-
-
-
-
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation
12. In which of these cases do engagement and/or support of your country seem possible or likely?
A minimum of member states are participating (one third, half, two thirds,…)
Other conditions.
Engagement and/or support of Greece seem possible and likely in all of the cases mentioned in Art.
III-210 par. 1 Draft Constitutional Treaty.
There has been no discussion about the prerequisites for participation, particularly whether
participation of a minimum of or of certain EU-Member States would be conditional. In case of a
prerequisite of participation of a minimum of Member States, Greece’s preference would be 8, or one
third of the Member States (i.e. 9 in EU-25 or EU-27). Greece would also be ready to accept
abolishment of the prerequisite of participation of a minimum of Member States. Engagement of or
approval by any third country or organisation is certainly no prerequisite for a mission on behalf of the
EU. Authorization of a mission by the UN would certainly be most appreciated.
(The prerequisite for participation of Greece in the framework of the activities of the UN, OSCE and
the EU was the respect of certain rules such as the existence of a clear mandate prior to the formation
of the force, the definition of the chain of command and of the size, the definition of the rules and the
concept of operations and the acceptance of the ethnic composition of the force by all belligerent
parties.)
76
The EU missions in Bosnia -Herzegovina, in FYROM and in Congo were prepared and finalised
during the Greek Presidency, which in the case of ESDP had a duration of 12 months (1 July 2002 –
30 June 2003) due to the Danish opt-out. The finalisation of the operational capability of the EU was
one of the priorities of the Greek Presidency in the field of ESDP the accomplishment of which was
proven in practice by the afore-mentioned EU missions.
IV.European Decision
this instrument?
The instrument of constructive abstention in the field of CFSP/ESDP is seen as a necessity that must
be accepted in order to proceed with the developing and strengthening of CFSP/ESDP.
There has been no situation (yet) in which (parts of) Greece thought about using this instrument.
(Art. III-213 par. 3 Draft Constitutional Treaty): In which areas and under which circumstances
would it be possible for your country to accept such a clause? Is there a long-term perspective of
accepting such a clause?
Greece has a positive approach to QMV as a general clause in the EU.
Greece was a staunch supporter of the establishment of such Agency and contributed a lot during her
Presidency (1 July 2002 - 30 June 2003). Greece is able and most willing to participate in the Agency.
The major issues raised in the debate are:
- The European defence industry is facing today social and economic challenges that necessitate coordination of actions. Defence industrial restructuring should be pursued with the aim to promote
competitiveness and strengthen the potential of the European workforce.
- The most important factors that impact on the role and functions of such an industry are the new
operational requirements. For instance, if the EU is carrying out an operation in Afghanistan or an
Iraq-type mission, it will require an extremely different type of arsenal than the one required in
Europe in previous decades.
- The low-level of defence spending in Europe. Slowdown in the economy means that there is
reduced margin for an increase in defence spending. This is a fact and a parameter that has to be
taken into consideration very seriously indeed. Fiscal difficulties due to the prolonged slowdown in
Europe but also the fact that the Stability Pact within the Eurozone is extremely restrictive, insofar
as financing defence spending is concerned. International competition becoming even more
intensified; the share of sales in the international market for the European defence industry has
fallen significantly from 56% in 1989 to under 40% in 1999, while on the other side of the Atlantic,
ever-greater resources are being allocated for defence research, in an already very strong defence
industrial and technological base. In just ten years, the EU has lost 16% of the international market
and this unfortunately is an ongoing and accelerating trend. What is encouraging of course is, that
there is mobility because of this trend, with buy-outs and consolidation of defence industries, which
reinforces the European defence industrial prospects.
- At a European level, we need to improve co-ordination on armaments issues, as well as to
harmonise our policies in the field of Research and Development. It would be irrational to have
different researchers pursuing the same research programmes, which would result in overlapping a
serious amount of national resources. Such a restructuring will enhance the competitiveness of the
77
European defence industry on the international market and will ensure the operational capability of
the European Rapid Reaction Force under any future demanding circumstances.
The Hellenic Ministry of National Defence takes considerable measures in the direction of
safeguarding the long-term viability and increasing competitiveness of the domestic defence industry
(state controlled and private). The Ministry of National Defence aims at the continuous increase of the
share of the domestic defence industry in the armaments budget, in the meanwhile supporting export
efforts and encouraging diversification towards the production of non-defence products as well.
The Ministry of National Defence contributes to the modernisation of the Hellenic defence industry
and the upgrading of its technological infrastructure through an active policy of compensatory benefits
and the compulsory participation of domestic companies in major armaments programs.
In parallel, the merger of the two state controlled defence industries is moving forward, aiming at the
creation of a strong, competitive entity.
Considerable efforts have taken place for the development and rationalisation of the Hellenic defence
industry sector. A direct by-product of these efforts has been the substantial increase of the
participation of domestic companies in the total armaments budget during the last five years.
17. What are the positions within your country regarding the management of the Agency? (technical
or political manager)
There is no real debate on this question in Greece, but given the political importance of the Agency
there is a preference for a “political manager” having the over-all control and being supported by
technical experts.
18. For members of OCCAR and LoI respectively: Is the Agency considered in your country as
VI. Mutual Defence Clause (Art. I-40 par. 7 Draft ConstitutionalTreaty)
For Greece, one of the strategic goals in the IGC is the development of a Common European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) into a collective system of security and solidarity through the integration
of a "mutual assistance clause" within the Treaty of the Union.
Greece is NATO-Member State. The obligations deriving from the “Mutual Defence Clause” in Art. I40 par. 7 Draft Constitutional Treaty do not conflict with the commitments resulting from Greece’s
NATO membership. The only question (of undisputable domestic relevance) is how the reference to
NATO in Art. I-40 par. 7 Draft ConstitutionalTreaty could be interpreted, i.e. could the Mutual
Defence Clause be activated vis-à-vis Turkey?
21.a) For non-NATO-members: Do you anticipate any proble ms in your country due to the fact that
21.b) For non-neutral members:
Do you anticipate any problems in your country due to the
fact that neutral members are restricted in cases of mutual defence because of their special status?
If a member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, this should be of concern to every
EU-partner and should activate all EU-partners to a certain extent. Although it might be difficult,
particularly for public opinion, to understand why certain Member States should be (at least partially)
excluded from the obligations in cases of mutual defence because of their special status (neutrality),
this will not cause problems in Greece.
22) Is there still a role for enhanced cooperation in CFSP/ESDP in the light of the mutual defence
clause?
78
VII. Conclusion
23. Please summarize and identify the most important issues related to CFSP/ESDP in your country.
Greece has always been a staunch supporter of the development of a Common Foreign and Security
Policy for the EU. In this regard, Greece has actively participated in the entire evolutionary process of
the EU over the last decade (inter alia, the Intergovernmental Conferences that led to the adoption of
the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties). Greece has laid particular emphasis on the need to
bolster the Union with a credible and strong foreign and security policy, which should have at its
disposal the necessary institutional framework, coherence and unity, along with vital operational tools
in order to underpin the role of the EU on the international scene.
In light of the above, and in a spirit of solidarity, Greece contributes substantially to the development
of the CFSP, especially as regards issues related to her geographic proximity (i.e., the Balkans, the
Middle East, the Mediterranean and the Caucasus). Greece's main objectives include the eradication of
current loci of conflicts, the prevention of potential crises and the consolidation of a climate of
security, the implementation of the fundamental principles of international law and the strengthening
of the rule of law, and the protection of human and minority rights.
At the same time, Greece was, from the very beginning, one of the strongest advocates of the inclusion
of a credible security and defence dimension in support of the CFSP, as was finally decided by the
European Council in Cologne in June 1999. Since then, Greece contributes, by all the means at her
disposal, to the development of the ESDP and to the strengthening of Europe's capabilities, being fully
aware that only with improved capabilities will the EU be able to pursue a strong and credible foreign
policy.
79
HUNGARY
Ferenc Gazdag, Teleki Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies
I. In General
The currently valid NSS was adopted by the government on 31 March 2004. The document was
formulated on base of the parliamentary resolution of December 1998, which rendered to the
governments the formulation of the priorities for the given governmental cycle. This document
substituted the first NSS adopted by the previous government on 6 May 2002. Both governments made
efforts to get the consent of the opposition parties.
Think tanks criticize 3 points with regard to the NSS. First, the document was born too late, in the
middle of the governmental cycle. The previous NSS was adopted in the last two weeks of the that
time governmental cycle. Second, the level of adoption is questionable: such type of document should
rather be adopted at parliamentary level, maybe by qualitative majority.
The Solana paper did not generate public official position. At the same time the security strategy of the
EU directly influenced the Hungarian NSS in the making: „The national security strategy is based on
he basic principles of the security and defence policy of the Republic of Hungary, and it is in
accordance with Strategic Concept of NATO of 1999 and the European Security Strategy adopted by
the EU”.
In addition to informing the public, the publications about the Solana paper called the attention to the
fact that the influence of American NSS adopted in September 2002 can be registered markedly. Not
only its structure but sometimes its formulations follow the American document. (see preventivepreemptive). The lack of a wider debate is not by surprise, basic information accessible for the
politically interested public is still missing, the first selection of documents of the EU’s security and
defence policy was only in 2003, the number of books on the topic is below 10, and those of the
studies is 3 dozens at best.
Paradoxically, the debate about the new security challenges was pursued within the framework of the
so called defence review related to the reform of the armed forces. Two marked positions were formed
in the debate: the one that sticked to territorial defence (representing the traditional perception of
security) and that of representing the defence of interests (a modern perception of security preferring
the expeditionary army). The debate was also done at the level of parties. The conservative national
parties rather tended toward the traditional, while the liberal-socialist side toward the interest-based
position. As the debate was related to the reform of the armed forces, the military took a major part in
it, and among them – although by different motivation and interests – the same pattern was
reproduced.
The political elite received the question of flexible integration with considerable antipathy. At the
level of rhetoric , it was referred to in a positive sense when the possible involvement of Hungary in
„Kerneuropa” was raised (eg. During the visit of Jacques Chirac in February 2004). The reason for the
rejection of the idea of flexible integration was the fear from second rank membership.
The media showed little interest for the flexible integration, and for the evolution of the EU in general,
before accession. Its reason had to do partly with the lack of knowledge, partly with the fact that the
80
attention was paid to the specific interests of the acceding countries instead of concentrating on the
discourses about the internal evolution of the integration. The situation changed only after the
referendum on accession (April 2003), but that time the debate between the government and the
opposition parties distorted the fair discussion the questions of integration. The same process could be
observed before the European parliamentary elections of 2004. The media and the public is only
beginning to discover the different positions within the EU..
The flexible integration was not a subject of public debate, we only know about isolated experiments
(eg. At universities).
According to think tanks the record of the so called public foundation which was created by the
government in order to disseminate information about the EU and popularize it, was rather modest,
and information about the second pillar practically did not come to the fore. Among academic centres
there was some debate, but an overwhelming pro-atlantist approach dominated it.
The sources of the current soft-Atlantic ist Hungarian approach in the „Old vs. New Europe” debate
can be characterized as follows:
The mainstream approaches
•
national-conservative: mistrust in Europe in defence matters is rooted in the historical legacy
of Hungary, puts the US high as a security guarantor
•
liberal: the emphasis on human rights, and the related opposition towards dictatorships (based
on the lessons of Kosovo and Iraq) makes the US and NATO the best security option
•
pragmatic: NATO and /or the USA are the only effectively functioning security players with
real capabilities
•
left: because of its perceived post-communist legacy and the compensation pressure due to
criticism vis-à-vis the quasi free-rider status of Hungary in terms of its contribution to NATO,
Hungary should fulfill the requests of NATO and US without too much hesitation.
Non-mainstream positions both from the extreme right and left include strong anti-Americanism, but
with a paralel anti-Europeanism, in the case of the previous leaning toward self-reliance, in the case of
the latter toward Eastern orientation.
In general, it can be asserted that the basic debates on the main strategic questions of the EU have not
been done in Hungary.
It follows from the above said, that this point was not expressed at government policy level.
Judging from the articles and reports in the press it can be assumed that the Hungarian public was
inpatient and there was also a kind of lack of understanding with regard to difficulties of the
institutional reforms of the EU and the slowness of the accession process. The Hungarian public has
not yet identified itself with the internal problems of the integration (as it was the case with NATO, as
well). There was no debate about the draft constitution either. On some items that appeared important
for the political elite – defence of minorities, Christian values in the preamble, the principle of one
country-one commissioner – opinions were formed. So it is understandable that the failure of the IGC
in 2003 did not shake Hungary.
negative one?
As a small country and as a newly acceded country both the political elite and the media interpreted
the UK-D-F trio’s proposals as making business over the head of the small ones, so the reception was
negative.
81
The Hungarian policy wants to avoid the pressure of choice. The official position is formulated in the
slogan „More Europe, means (or should mean) stronger ties with the US”, and the attempt to
downplay the importance of the transatlantic debate („it would be artificial to divide Europe from the
US”
The Hungarian position is a typical wait-and-see, low profile position in the transatlantic debate. It is
also somewhat balancing in between the two extreme positions and presents the case as a problem of
the future : „WE are in favour of the common defence policy, but it has to be approached rationally,
avoiding the parallel structure with NATO … (we) do not reject the pioneer role of the Germans,
French, Belgians or that of Luxemburg and the closer cooperation in the field of defence policy …
however … Hungary is not yet ready to do so nor in terms of finances neither in terms of the
military.”56
It is also characterized by the perceived „trap-situation”: most clearly it was demonstrated by the case
when the Hungarian prime minister was asked to sign the letter of eight, it was felt that both options –
to sign or not to sign - are bad, but the option perceived as „less worse” was chosen.57
The public opinion – in harmony with the European public opinion – criticized the Iraq policy of the
political elite.
The parties approached the question in a specific way. The opposition parties verbally opposed the
Hungarian participation, while they voted in favour in the parliament. In the course of events the
opposition parties modified their position and began to urge the withdrawal of Hungarian troops (300
personnel transport unit). At the same time such a modification did not mean the identification with a
pro-European option. Some analysts find assert that such a modification has to do with a certain
security policy „isolationism” or „provincionalism”.
An official Hungarian position is expressed in the formula „more Europe should not mean less
America”. In this sense the Hungarian policy can accept every institutional solution that does not
loosen the strategic relations with the US, or that does not lead to the creation of a multi-speed Europe.
−
European Council
−
−
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
We do not know about any official position.
During the accession talks to NATO Hungary undertook to increase its defence budget up to 1.8%
beginning from the autumn of 1997. According to this, the increase of the defence budget began but it
has not reached the undertaken level. It can be explained partly by the significant austerity measures
56
57
See interview of Hungarian prime-minister Medgyesi in Der Standard 18 October 2003
See the interview of Hungarian prime -minister Medgyesi
82
during given fiscal years, partly by the lack of political will. The cost of international mission also
mean additional burden.
According to think tanks the basic problem of defence budget is not its size or the need to increase it,
but rather the rationale for spending it. The so called defence review done between August 2002 and
August 2003 meant a certain change int he priorities in the defence budget: procurements came to the
fore as opposed to the previously preferred improvement of living conditions of the personnel.
costs?
See point 3.
No.
No.
cooperation?
No.
III. Missions
−
−
−
military advice and assistance ta sks
−
−
stabilisation
83
Other conditions.
1. Joint disarmament operations
2. Humanitarian and rescue tasks
3. Military advice and assistance tasks
4. Conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks
5. Tasks of combat forces
USA
NATO
1.
x
x
x
2.
x
x
x
3.
x
x
x
4.
x
x
x
x
x
5.
Turkey
certain MS minimum
MS
even MS UN
oppose
SC
Other
No debate. In think tank circles there is an overall scepticism vis-a-vis the multicultural arrangement
in Bosnia.
this instrument?
No.
such a clause?
The Hungarian policy, in general, accepts the application and extension of QMV, but only on a caseby-case basis.
No publicly available information
No information.
84
In no way. Opinions were expressed in think tank circles that this clause could weaken article 5. of the
Washington Treaty.
Yes.
The question has become irrelevant by the adoption of the Daft Constitution..
clause?
VII. Conclusion
85
ITALY
Marta Dassù’, Aspen Institute
I. In General
The threat assessment has clearly changed with the end of the Cold War, with growing emphasis on
regional crisis (especially though not only under the “humanitarian” rubric) multi-directional threats,
non-conventional threats possibly by non state actors.
In terms of capabilities to respond to these risks and threats, since the 1980s, there has been a gradual
shift from territorial defense to more projectable forces, initially in at least two contexts: NATO’s
doctrinal adjustment (actually pre-dating the end of the Cold War) and participation in peacekeeping
missions (under various configurations, UN, NATO and ad hoc). In the 1990s the trend accelerated,
bringing about the decision to abandon the conscription system altogether.
The Navy has traditionally been more oriented toward power projection (and more technologically
advanced), particularly looking at threats and interests located along the “Southern Flank”
(Mediterranean, Middle East including the Gulf). The crises in the Balkans/Adriatic region in the
1990s, in parallel with increasing deployments of land contingents in peacekeeping/peacemaking
operations, forced some changes on the Army as well.
All major parties, with strong backing from a majority of public opinion, support active participation
in multilateral peace-support operations, especially under UN mandate (although with varying specific
arrangements in terms of chain of command). The Kosovo operation of 1999 (Allied Force) was
controversial due the nature of the operation and the lack of explicit UNSC mandate, but NATO was
largely seen as an adequate – at least sufficient – legitimizing institution under exceptional
circumstances (an ongoing or imminent humanitarian emergency).
Participation in ISAF has also been relatively non-controversial, while the Iraqi crisis has evidenced
the limitations of public support in the absence of an institutionalized form of legitimacy when using
military force.
Interest was scant and very short-lived, essentially limited to few experts and analysts. Newspapers
and other media presented the decision with little emphasis.
Reference to the “new threats” indicated in the Solana Paper was already frequent before formal
adoption by the EU Council: thus, declaratory policy has not changed significantly. However, practical
consequences may be felt indirectly, particularly by raising the stakes at with regard to potentially
costly reforms of the Armed Forces: if a vast reallocation of the defense budget, or even an increase,
should become EU policy, it would be easier for the executive, political parties, or lobbies, to make
the case that Italian decisions are constrained by European level commitments – a logic which worked
well with the introduction of the euro.
So far, implementation of the Strategy has not been seen as an urgent priority (even in Brussels), so
that the rather soft Headline Goals remain the only relevant benchmark. Contributing to the EU-RRF
is widely viewed as a national interest, but so far this has not implied major changes or additional
financial efforts.
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The broader public probably has a rather vague notion of how “Europe” works, centered on the belief
that integration equals more power to supranational institutions. In other words, classical Europeanist
rhetoric has long dominated most discussions on European affairs. The current government coalition,
however, is on the whole less pro-European than any of its predecessors and has affected the climate
in which debate is conducted, by turning criticism of EU institutions into an almost mainstream
feature.
The centrist parties on both center-right and center-left (and even more so the Presidency of the
Republic) view themselves as the guardians of Europeanist orthodoxy, often in close cooperation with
vast sectors of the foreign policy bureaucracy.
The media reflect this rather superficial debate, mostly depicting the EU as a set of constraints
(sometimes welcome, sometimes less so) but rarely as an arena where specifically Italian projects or
policies can or should be pursued. As a consequence, “Kerneuropa” and variable geometry are hardly
among the main concerns of Italian citizens – except for the recurrent Italian fear of being left out of
possible “directoires”.
The failure of the IGC 2003 has not been perceived as closely linked to CSFP/ESDP issues, but rather
to the broader balance of power within the EU, reluctance of some members to accept certain elements
of “deepening”, and the repercussions of enlargement (especially the Polish bid for middle rank).
Two lines of thought have emerged: one emphasizing the new role of the UK as a full participant in
the tripartite “core” and the new entry – Spain, but potentially Poland too – in a sort of broadened core
– which would allow Italy to be included; the other line of thought advocating a return to the original
logic of the founding members, which of course include Italy but excludes the UK – in which case, a
strong link to the Franco-German couple should be pursued. The first line of thought reflects the
general orientation of the center-right, while the second is closer to the choice made by the center-left.
Neither seems to have crystallized into a full-fledged policy yet.
negative one?
Essentially as a negative but inevitable episode which, however worrisome, reflects a deeper trend:
leadership in the EU at 25 can only be provided by an inner core. The Italian problem is that only on
certain issues can Italy be a full participant in the core; thus, the suggestion that an acceptable core
should be flexible, issue-based, open to future additions, transparent in its agenda. In conclusion, a
flexible Europe based on a set of enhanced cooperations more than a directoire.
The Iraqi crisis has produced contradictory effects.
On one hand, it may have reinforced a relatively new Euroscepticism, in the sense that divisions
among the Europeans were made all to evident by Iraq, confirming the fear that “Europe” does not
exist on key foreign policy issues; on the other hand, the need for more European coordination in the
face of an increasingly unilateralist America has become stronger than ever. In practice, both sides of
the debate have been provided with new arguments in favour of their respective positions.
Clearly, the more problems emerge for the US-led operations in Iraq, the more the Berlusconi
government will come under pressure to qualify its support for the US through forms of
“conditionality”. Such a trend might strengthen the pro-EU actors in the domestic debate.
There is a widespread preference for the institutional channels (thus for a Treaty-based integration in
the field), but obviously not to the detriment of effectiveness. A paralyzed EU makes it almost
inevitable for the major countries to resort to various ad hoc formats, sometimes with relatively good
87
results, such as in the case of the Contact Group for former Yugoslavia or the more recent tripartite
UK-French-German mission to Tehran. In principle, there should be no contradiction between the two
channels, but of course a series of ad hoc decisions would ultimately damage the institutional
framework – or hamper its consolidation.
The prevailing attitude in Italy seems to be rather pragmatic, viewing the EU, but also NATO and ad
hoc coalitions (often based on a UN mandate) as suitable venues for military-civilian interventions in
crisis areas. The practical requirement of a “lead nation” or “natione cadre”, in particular, was clearly
confirmed, once again, by the first fully EU mission in Bunia, Congo. The effectiveness of the mission
is the first priority, followed by the broadest possible institutional legitimacy – then comes the specific
preference for the EU.
−
European Council
−
−
−
European Commission
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European Parliament
It seems hardly disputable that CFSP/ESDP can only rest on solid intergovernmental foundations:
therefore, it is clearly the European Council that will control and actually “activate” ESDP. By
extension, the HR/EU Foreign Minister will have a crucial role to play, presumably in bringing
important issues to the Council’s attention, but mostly in executing policies under a strong Council
mandate. It is also understood that creation of the new position would tend, at least gradually, to unify
(thus to some extent “supra-nationalize”) CFSP/ESDP, but this would be an incremental process to be
tested case by case.
The Commission should certainly be informed and consulted, and actively involved in important area
such as emergency assistance (especially on financial grounds), but in the context of ESDP per se it is
not realistic to envisage a central role for it.
As for the European Parliament, Italian MPs are obviously sensitive to the issue of some form of
oversight over CFSP/ESDP, but they seem to realize that this can only be indirect and partial.
Concerns have been raised, however, on the insufficient political oversight and transparency of CFSP
decisionmaking.
There does not seem to be any systematic thinking into the matter, since the assumption is that the EU
framework will indeed be the first option – just not the only one, and not always a possible one. The
guiding concept remains that some form of legitimization is essential, be it through the UN authorizing
an ad hoc coalition of the willing, or NATO as a multilateral organization of democracies deciding on
the basis of consensus.
c) What reaction of your country is to be expected if its preferred option wa s not adopted?
In a broad sense, if the EU should fail to become the core organization for peacekeeping (and some
peace-enforcement) mission, ad hoc arrangements with the main players in the defense field (the UK,
France and Germany) would become more like ly. Depending on a series of external factors (type of
US administration, government in power in Italy, Transatlantic climate, etc.), the link to the US might
also gain added importance in planning as well as executing multilateral missions (including
industrial, acquisition and to some extent doctrinal choices to facilitate a “plug-in” approach between
Italian forces and American forces).
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Defense expenditure has remained rather stable over the past few years, at around 1% of GDP. The
last decade has witnessed the most massive change in the structure of the armed forces since WWII,
with the transition from a conscription army of over 300,000 units (plus Carabinieri) to a professional
military of around 190,000 units (including land, air and sea components), plus around 110,000
Carabinieri (most of whom will continue to be deployed within Italy).The transition will be completed
in a few months.
The Army has undergone the greatest changes in quality, structure and doctrines since the end of the
Cold War. It now has thousands of units constantly deployed abroad on multinational missions, often
in faraway location under relatively high-risk conditions, with high rotation rates. The Army is
expected to maintain a “balanced” structure comprising light (Alpini and paratroopers), medium
(Cavalry and armoured infantry) and heavy (tanks and mechanized infantry) units. It is not as
technologically advanced as the top NATO land forces, but it can effectively inter-operate with them.
The Navy has undergone relatively minor changes, but it can now project more power at more
distance than in the past, even for prolonged missions. For instance, in 2002 the Italian Navy operated
in the Indian Ocean in cooperation with the US Navy: on that occasion, the light aircraft carrier
Garibaldi successfully carried out hundreds of missions. More generally, the Navy has been serving as
“enabler” in support of the Army on a variety of missions, providing both transport-logistics and
combat power. A larger and more advanced aircraft carrier will be operational in about ten years.
The Air Force is suffering from a serious resource crunch, given its modernization requirements. Its
combat capabilities today are not top level (based for now on Tornados, AMX “Ghibli” and a few
Eurofighters). Existing aircraft are constantly being updated through smart munitions and new
communication equipment, but the next few years will probably see an effort to acquire especially
unmanned vehicles and satellite systems.
costs?
Virtually no specific changes so far. However, there is considerable interest in pooling certain
capabilities: for instance, the “battle group” concept will probably become the framework for
significant Italian contributions. Pooling decisions will continue to be constrained by a continuing
reluctance to envisage a strong specialization of Italian forces, preferring instead to maintain forces
across the spectrum and invest more heavily in “enabling” capabilities (those that would allow Italian
forces to be more projectable and, on a rotational basis, more readily deployable).
Italy is actively involved in the existing initiatives designed to promote the pooling of strategic lift
(both air and sea).
In principle, Italy would certainly be willing to contribute to a stable “structured cooperation”. But the
political configuration is likely to be crucial in determining the level of commitment.
Clearly, Italy will try to participate in any form structured cooperation involving – as major countries
– France, Germany and the UK. Political reasons – the fear to be left out - would play a major role in
the decision.
In terms of financial burdens, however, the debate so far has been very low profile, thus not truly
involving tough budgetary decisions. The climate in Parliament does not seem favourable, in part
because few key political leaders are persuaded that an increase in defense spending would translate in
increased security for the country – or even significantly greater political weight in Europe. This is
likely to continue especially as long as Germany does not raise its own defense spending, providing a
sort of alibi for keeping the status quo: indeed, the point of reference tends to be Germany because
89
both France and the UK are perceived as belonging to a league of their own with regard to the
propensity to fund (and use) the armed forces.
It is understood that permanent structured cooperation will focus on higher-end military (or mixed
civilian-military) tasks – hence the reference to “targeted combat units” in the Protocol on Structured
Cooperation. Therefore, the measures required by structured cooperation are bound to pose sensitive
questions in at least two respe cts (both mentioned explicitly in the Protocol: a concern with
maintaining a (theoretically) full spectrum military apparatus – the logic of specialisation – and a
concern with ensuring adequate Parliamentary control over military commitments – the possible
review of national decisionmaking procedures.
The most delicate issues seem to have been temporarily resolved through the joint British-FrancoGerman position of December 2003, by reiterating the EU’s reliance on the Berlin plus arrangement,
the commitment to intense EU-NATO contacts in a crisis, and by deciding to set up a small planning
cell at SHAPE. Envisaging national headquarters as the main options for autonomous EU operations
was also conducive to a more cooperative climate that addressed underlying Italian concerns.
cooperation?
This question cannot be answered at the present stage and in the abstract: too much will depend on
how mechanisms such as enhanced cooperation and structured cooperation will be interpreted and
used in practice. Setting precedents will be at least as important as establishing the institutional
parameters.
III. Missions
−
−
−
−
−
stabilisation
Due to our recent experience with multinational missions, it is likely that humanitarian/rescue tasks
and conflict prevention/peacekeeping tasks will turn out to be less divisive domestically. In particular,
on these types of mission there is a rather solid bipartisan consensus – provided of course that the
official motivation for a mission is viewed as credible and coherent.
The other missions may contain more ambiguity and possibly be seen as more susceptible to “mission
creep”: for instance, disarmament operations may well involve coercive measures that are hardly
predictable in advance (especially in cases of weapons collection in tense conflict situations); another
slippery slope may be that of military advice and assistance, although there are precedents of Italian
participation in both kinds of tasks.
Deployment of combat forces for peacemaking and stabilization are by definition the most challenging
tasks on the list, but given the current engagement in Iraq – under very harsh conditions, in the
absence of strong institutional backing, and with rather shaky domestic support – seems to indicate
90
that the international political context and the inclinations of the government in power are more
relevant than the configuration of the coalition per se.
Only if USA is engaged --- Such a precondition has been overcome by recent experience, and will be
even more so over the next few months especially in the Balkans.
Only if NATO is engaged --- NATO may be very important as a sort of back up option in case an EU
operation should run into major difficulties on the ground. But initial engagement by NATO does not
seem to be indispensable.
Turkey is not opposed to it --- Turkey is seen as a significant actor deserving serious consultation, but
not a veto power on EU decisionmaking.
Certain member states are participating (please name the countries) --- At least one other major
European power should be part of the initiative, if such a mission is to be truly multinational in spirit
and substance. However, for limited missions of the Alba type and scale (1997), even a small or token
contribution by another major power could suffice (in that case, there was virtually no institutional
support for the Italian-led mission, except a role of WEU, but France was involved in a supporting
role).
A minimum number of member states are participating (one third, half, two thirds,…) --- This would
really depend on the scale of the mission, and can hardly be defined in the abstract.
Even if certain member states explicitly oppose a mission --- Another ad hoc decision to be made: it
would depend on the perception of the priorities involved in a given crisis. There would be great
pressure for the activation of the constructive abstention mechanism.
A resolution of the UN Security Council authorizes a mission --- This would greatly facilitate the
decision, but the Kosovo precedent suggests that there may be for the EU (as was then the case for
NATO) exceptions.
Other conditions.
Given Italy’s geographical proximity and significant involvement in the Balkan crises since the early
1990s, plus its well recognized expertise in the field of policing (Carabinieri in particular),
participation in the Bosnian mission was rather natural and widely expected.
Macedonia followed largely the same pattern: the functional area where Italy can make the most
significant contribution is precisely that of peace-support in non-combat situations, which are also the
scenarios for which public support is stronger.
Operation Artemis in the Republic of Congo was of a different nature: geographically or politically
there was no compelling rationale for major Italian involvement. The main interest there, beyond the
obvious humanitarian motivation that originated the operation, was in supporting the incremental
growth of the EU’s capabilities through experience on the ground. NGOs such as the Comunità di
S.Egidio are very active on the African continent, and it is in Italy’s general interest to see the EU take
on more responsibilities in that vast geographical area, also in light of the country’s shortfalls in terms
of force projection capabilities – for which EU-level pooling of resources could clearly be a partial
solution.
Open opposition was limited to elements of the pacifist movement (mostly non-Catholic in these
specific instances), and debate in Parliament as well as on the media and in the expert community was
muted by the existence of explicit UNSC authorization for the peace-support forces, in addition to the
NATO, NATO/EU or the EU in a leading role.
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The shift from a NATO mission to an EU mission in Bosnia is mostly welcome as a sign of maturity
of EU peacekeeping capabilities (as well as a relative consolidation of the situation on the ground).
The military is confident that, as things stand, the EU should be up to the task.
this instrument?
The expert community is largely in favour of the constructive abstention mechanism, as a reasonable
way to avoid paralysis. Since the introduction of the concept in the CFSP/ESDP debate, there have not
been cases where key Italian interests were so directly threatened by a possible EU intervention to
justify an activation of the mechanism.
(Art. III-213 par.3 Draft Constitutional Treaty): In wh ich areas and under which circumstances would
such a clause?
Enlarging the application of QMV within CFSP was the preferred option from an Italian viewpoint. In
theory, Italy would not object to such a clause, but there are serious reservations with respect to QMV
in the context of the JHA pillar.
Italy’s support for consolidation of the European defense industry has been viewed as rather
halfhearted in recent years by some observes: in particular, critics of the Berlusconi government have
pointed as evidence at the decision not to join the A400M project. Some military experts have argued,
however, that Italy will actually be better equipped than some of its EU partners in the next few years
in the crucial field of strategic lift, precisely thanks to the acquisition of state-of-the-art transport
aircraft (from a US company). In practice, it is not certain that participation in specific projects should
be seen as a sign of the overall commitment to EU-level coordination in the defense industrial sector.
An important stimulus for active participation in the Agency will be the attempt to “secure” key
programs, at least by avoiding significant cuts once they are already launched: clearly, a tight
multilateral setting makes any change of plan more costly for any contributing country, thus more
unlikely.
There is probably a certain penchant for the French position that the Agency should have a significant
political mandate, and not focus exclusively on improving capabilities. But no clearcut official
position has clearly crystallized so far.
As a member of both OCCAR and LoI, Italy has an interest in keeping the “club” selective. As a
consequence, the two groupings could remain outside the Agency at least initially, to be possibly
incorporated at a later stage, thus ensuring the effectiveness of the new body but also the survival of
what has already been achieved.
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The Mutual defense clause was mostly viewed as an integral part and a logical extension of the EU
“deepening” process in the field of security and defense. As such, it has not raised particular interest as
a separate issue.
No significant conflict exists with other formal commitments, although a delicate constitutional
problem may be raised in case assistance to an EU member might entail, for instance, a retaliatory
action under uncertain circumstances and without specific UNSC authorization. But such an
eventuality is probably seen as a very unlikely combination, and in any case the solidarity clause
leaves room for a variety of responses and levels of commitment.
No specific problem linked to the neutral members of the EU.
clause?
The two aspects seem to be almost unrelated, since the mutual defence clause will be essentially a
political statement, rather than an automatic military/defence commitment undertaken by the
members. Enhanced cooperation is likely to remain an instrument to allow the EU some flexibility.
VII. Conclusion
Today’s situation is pretty fluid: since 2003, there was a bipartisan arrangement – at least a broad
understanding – on the importance of Italy’s engagement in peacekeeping missions and even, under a
UN mandate, in peace-enforcement missions. The number of Italian soldiers deployed abroad stands
to demonstrate this commitment: in the Balkans, in particular, Italy is maintaining a presence of
around 9,000 troops (including Carabinieri, who actually play a key role). The debate on the Iraqi
crisis has fractured this underlying consensus and badly split the country . As the center-right
executive continues to view Italian participation in a US-led mission as an essential component of the
Transatlantic link, the center-left – at least in the current phase – has “radicalized” its positions in a
pacifist direction, in parallel with a large section of public opinion. As a consequence, it seems
reasonable to believe that any significant military operation will require an explicit UNSC mandate. In
other words, the link between ESDP and the UN will be emphasized.
On the whole, Italy’s position will be weakened by two main factors: scarce funding for defense
expenditure, and likely exclusion from the (possibly) enlarged UNSC. This financial and political
weakness may well force Italy to concentrate on the “low end” of the CFSP/ESDP spectrum of
operations, i.e. the military and civilian elements of “classical” peacekeeping in and around Europe.
In any case, the absence of a solid bipartisan consensus will mean that a lot will depend on which
governing coalition will be in power at any given time.
93
NORWAY
Helene Sjursen, Arena
I. General
The structure of the Norwegian armed forces is currently under comprehensive review, as is the whole
concept of participation in international operations. This process started in 2001 with the first ‘Long
Term Plan’ (langtidsplan) on defence for the period 2002-2005. Then followed by a second ‘Long
term Plan’ for the period of 2005-2008.There are also some efforts under way to define something that
might be defined as a security doctrine.
The restructuring is basically launched as a reaction to what is considered a new generation of risks
and threats. It involves change from a territorially based defence and security doctrine to what is
referred to as a “vision of agile, technologically superior, flexible and effective military forces”
(Devold 12.3.2003).
The argument is that the risk of large-scale conventional military aggression against Norway has
diminished but that other risks have emerged. International terrorism is pointed to as a major threat to
international security. Also international, organized crime and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction are defined as serious threats in the 21st century. More socially-bound threats such as
epidemic diseases, increases in man-made catastrophes, mass displacement of people, hunger, ethnic
and cultural conflicts are also referred to.
The Long Term Plan on Defence for the period 2002-2005 is considered to be the first comprehensive
Norwegian response to the current transformation of NATO and the fundamental changes taking place
within the Euro-Atlantic area. The plan focuses on restructuring the peacetime establishment. The
entire national command structure will be reorganized and scaled down. It will be adjusted to a smaller
forces structure and peacetime organization. Furthermore the armed forces will be aligned to enable
Norway to contribute more effectively to multilateral forces, enhancing co-operation with the Allies
and Partners.
Norway intends to further develop its Armed Forces Task Force. The Force will serve as a force pool
for generating contributions adjusted to operations at hand, particularly improving capabilities and
readiness to contribute to Alliance-led operations. The ability to contribute units to multilateral crisis
response operations will be integrated as a permanent feature of the new structure. The Telemark
battalion will specifically be trained and developed to participate in international operations, primarily
NATO operations. A Joint Operational Headquarters co-located with NATO’s joint Headquarters
North will be established in Stavanger, on the West coast of Norway.
The purpose of the Long term Plan for the period 2005-2008 is defined as furthering adaptation and
modernisation of the Norwegian armed forces by increasing the operational capability and the
proportion of usable forces with rapid reaction capability. The plan constitutes the establishment of a
usable and deployable army brigade, Brigade North, and the establishment of a joint, usable and
deployable ISTAR capability for surveillance and intelligence. Furthermore the scope of the
capabilities to national and international crisis management operations is expanded. A comprehensive
reform of the Home Guard is launched and all army officers will be assigned mandatory operations
abroad.
Keywords: crisis management, small and flexible military units, alliance-led and peacekeeping
operations, mainly in a NATO framework.
94
The Solana paper appears to have generated quite a substantial amount of interest within the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. However, this did not filter out into the public debate, nor was there any evidence
of interest in the paper amongst politicians (this includes politicians who usually deal with foreign and
security policy). There was no public debate on the paper and it was only briefly mentioned in some of
the quality papers.
Work on restructuring the armed forces of Norway and the redefinition of the premises of Norwegian
security and defence policy are not described as linked to developments in the EU but developments
within NATO and in the broader international security environment.
There is very little – if any at all – discussion on flexible integration in the area of CFSP/ESDP in the
media or the public in Norway. Public awareness of the CFSP/ESDP in general is quite low. To the
extent that the CFSP/ESDP is discussed it is in very general terms, and often linked to the question of
its potential “threat” to NATO as an institution and/or to the difficulties that a non-EU NATO member
like Norway faces given the development of an alternative security structure in Europe. The main
reason for the lack of discussion is most likely the fact that Norway is not a member of the EU. This in
turn leads to limited knowledge and understanding of European political processes. However, the long
standing Atlanticist tradition in Norwegian security policy is also an independent factor that
contributes to strengthen the focus on other actors and institutions than the CFSP/ESDP.
The failure of the constitutional draft has been discussed in general however the specific implications
for the CFSP/ESDP have not been discussed in public or in the political arena.
negative one?
The trio meeting of UK-D-F has not led to any public reaction or discussion that would suggest that it
is seen as either positive or negative from a Norwegian perspective. In the foreign ministry, however,
there is often a certain concern connected to such developments because of the fear that NATO will be
weakened. Such concerns are however rarely expressed in public. The official position is that the
development of an ESDP as a good thing for European security.
The majority of the Norwegian electorate was critical to the war in Iraq. Formally the Norwegian
government did not support the war. This does not appear to have had any immediate consequences
for the perspectives of different actors on the CFSP/ESDP.
4. Is there a debate with regard to the inclusion of flexible integration in the area of CSFP/ESDP in
the common institutional framework? Which consequences for your country can be expected?
As noted above, there is hardly any discussion of specific issues within the CFSP/ESDP in Norway.
Some might believe that flexible integration in CFSP/ESDP might make Norwegian participation
easier. This would be consistent with propositions from the current Prime Minister about the
possibility that flexible integration in the EU in general might make it easier for a non member like
Norway to gain influence in the Union. However my personal assessment would be that it would not
make much difference to what is considered to be the most difficult issue for Norwegian foreign
policy makers with regard to the CFSP/ESDP, which is that even though they are invited to take part
in military operations, they enter the process of planning such operations at a rather late stage and they
are not part of the day to day policy-making process in foreign and security policy. This is unlikely to
change with flexible integration.
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Defence expenditures in Norway 2000 - 2004
2000
2001
2002
2003 (budget)
2004 (budget)
27,2
28,1
30,1
29,6
29,2
Drift (mdr)
19,9
19,8
Investment
(mdr)
9,4
9,2
1,88
1.87
Expenditures
(mdr)
% af GDP
1,85
1,84
1,98
Defence expenditure 1991 - 2004
(mdr)
Expenditures
Drift
Investment
% of GNP
2004 (budget)
29,2
19,8
9,2
1,87
2003 (budget)
29,6
19.9
9,4
1,88
2002
30,1
1,98
2001
28,1
1,84
2000
27,2
1,85
1999
26,4
2,14
1997
25,0
2,25
1995
22,4
2,38
1993
22,0
2,65
1991
22,6
2,94
1989
Sources:
Statistisk Sentralburå: Offentlige forvaltning – totale udgifter (1991-2002). (www.ssb.no)
Forsvarsdepartementet: Fakta om forsvaret 2003. (www.odin.dep.no/fd/)
Forsvarsdepartementet: Fakta om forsvaret 2004. (www.odin.dep.no/fd/)
6. Has any change been made to forward defence plans to reflect the needs of ESDP? What interest is
there in pooling current military capabilities with EU members to reduce operating costs?
The defence restructure plans in Norway are basically launched as a reaction to changes in the
international security environment and to the changed role of NATO. Norwegian national security is
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regarded as closely linked with the international security and the vision of expanding the Norwegian
armed forces in the alliance-integrated direction is justified with reference to this view.
3500 Norwegian troops and 80 police officers have been made available for peace operations in the
context of the ESDP (Traavik 2002).
Officially, Norway has welcomed the emergence of a European Security and Defence Policy and
supports a stronger European role in crisis management. In this context it is always stressed that the
ESDP is regarded as a supplement and not a replacement for NATO and it is argued that the ESDP
must be developed in harmony with NATO. Even though the increasing importance of the ESDP is
acknowledged in Norway, NATO is considered the cornerstone of Norwegian security. The
importance of the overall framework provided by the UN is also systematically highlighted.
However, unofficially, the efforts to establish an autonomous European headquarters cause serious
concerns in Norway. There was relief in Norway that a compromise was found that placed the EU
headquarters with NATO. This is the result of the Atlanticist orientation of Norwegian security policy
combined with Norwegian non-membership in the EU.
II. Missions
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−
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stabilisation
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−
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−
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−
Other conditions.
The only relevant condition (of the ones listed) would be that a resolution of the UN Security Council
would most likely be considered necessary for Norwegian engagement or support for EU missions.
The other conditions do not seem to be particularly relevant. Or perhaps rather – there does not seem
to be any thought through strategy or any consistent assessment of the conditions under which Norway
should support – or not such missions. Representatives both from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
from the Ministry of Defence claim that decisions on Norwegian participation will be (and have so far)
been made on an “ad hoc basis”. The primary logic of Norwegian policy here is that as a non-EU
member it is important for Norway to be as active as possible, to show both an interest in EU activities
and an ability to make a contribution. This is considered to be the only way in which Norway can gain
97
knowledge of EU processes and some influence on decisions made, given that the country stands
outside the formal institutional framework.
Norway has participated in several international operations, particularly NATO-led operations (the
main contribution of Norway is now in Afghanistan). Norway is contributing with personnel both to
the EU police operations in Bosnia -Herzegovina and Macedonia.
Norway did not participate in the EU mission in Congo. It was invited to participate but it is unclear
how and why the decision not to participate was made.
There is no sign of public or political debate on the Norwegian participation in the EU missions. There
is however public debate over Norway’s contributions to Iraq.
III. European agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and
10. How is the idea of the Agency discussed in your country?
The Norwegian position is primarily one of concern about the potential consequences of being
excluded from the agency.
IV. Mutual Defence Clause (Art. I-40 par.7 Draft Constitutional Treaty)
V. Conclusions
As noted in the above, the debate in Norway (both the public debate and discussions amongst
practitioners) is strongly influenced by the role of Norway as European NATO member and a non- EU
member. The key concern amongst policy-makers is the risk of marginalization (in the public at large
there is little interest in or attention paid to the CFSP/ESDP).
The main issue in the debates thus tends to be what the consequences of a more robust CFSP/ESDP
might have for Norway and what possibilities Norway has for participating in this policy-area despite
its membership. The CFSP/ESDP is rarely discussed “on its own terms”. To the extent that there is a
debate about the CFSP/ESDP itself, it is always very general. It is very rare to hear Norwegian actors,
whether in the public debate, in more closed specialist meetings or debates in parliament, express a
view of the particular direction in which this policy ought to go, or of the advantages or disadvantages
of particular institutional solutions.
Furthermore, Norwegian security policy is clearly Atlanticist. This is not only a result of the outsider
position in EU. It is a more fundamental orientation of Norwegian security policy. This means that to
the extent that developments in the CFSP/ESDP are discussed they are also often discussed with a
view to what they might mean for the Atlantic Alliance.
The official Norwegian line on the CFSP/ESDP is that Norway supports such developments. The
unofficial line is however much more ambiguous, and reflects the twin concern of
1) protecting what is perceived as Norway’s ability to be a “player” in European security and
2) maintaining NATO as the core security institution in Europe.
At the same time, some changes to the official position of Norway on the CFSP/ESDP can be
observed in the 1990s.
Until the St. Malo declaration of 1998, Norwegian policy-makers expressed skepticism not only to the
desirability of an independent security or defence policy of the EU, but also to the ability of the EU to
develop such a policy. Focus in newspaper reporting and in public debates, as well as in discussions
with representatives with the ministries, was on the many disagreements between the EU’s member
98
states on foreign and security policy and on the difficulty of developing a common foreign and
security policy.
The St. Malo declaration came as a great shock to the Norwegian foreign policy establishment. Very
few expected further developments in the direction of a common security policy for the EU. Even
fewer expected the UK to take such a clear stance. After a period of confusion certain redefinitions in
policy strategy could be observed. There has also been less skepticism about the potential for further
integration cooperation in security in the late 1990s and early 2000s and an increasing recognition of
the ability of the EU to develop capacities also in this field. This change is evident both in the
Ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence), amongst politicians and more
broadly in the security and defence “establishment”.
Concerns about the potential risks of such developments for NATO are also played down both in
public and in Norway’s dealings with representatives from the EU. Hence, this latter phase is
characterized also by less skepticism – at least in public – about the desirability of the development of
security capabilities for the EU. However, NATO remains the core international security instit ution in
Norwegian eyes.
With regard to the policy initiatives towards the EU Norwegian police since the late 1990s consists in
emphasizing Norway’s willingness to contribute to the ESDP and to be as closely aligned to the
CFSP/ESDP as possible. The argument as noted earlier is that this is the only way of gaining some
influence as well as information about European developments.
References
Forsvarsdepartementet (2001): Stortingsproposisjon nr. 45 (2000-2001): Omleggingen av forsvaret i
perioden 2002-2005.
Forsvarsdepartementet: (2004): Stortingsproposisjon nr. 42 (2003-2004): Den videre modernisering av
Forsvaret i perioden 2005-2008.
Devold, Kristin Krohn (2003): “Security in a New Era. Transforming the Norwegian Defence”.
Defence Contracts Bulletin. 12.03.2003.
Traavik, Kim (2002) The Copenhagen Summit: A Norwegian perspective. Speech in Oslo
19.December 2002.
99
POLAND
Olaf Osica, European University Institute Florence
I. In General
Polish security and defence policy is still torn between the past and the present, between traditional
security threats and modern ones. This clash is somehow hidden, i.e. takes place behind the scenes in
relations between on the one hand Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry, and the General Staff and
most political parties. The former two institutions (although the Defence Ministry is balancing
between the political pressure coming from the MFA, NATO and EU, and opposition of the General
Staff) have a political perspective and an entirely new perception of security and the role of the Polish
army. They tend to stress soft-security risks and expect army to be a political asset which might be
transformed into political leverage in NATO and EU. Hence, they prefer a small, professional but
modern army. The General Staff is on the contrary very conservative, as military circle s usually are,
and still hesitant to make a radical breakthrough in the reform of the army. It sees armed forces, as
most of policy-makers do, through the prism of traditional defence against a military aggression.
A new (already the 3rd) Strategy on National Security was adopted on September 8, 2003 (the 1st
strategy was adopted in 1992, the 2nd in 2000). Its main principles are:
§
“the line of distinction between the external and internal security aspects becomes blurred.
The importance of the internationa l factor is growing and so is the role of international
collaboration, including, in particular, one within the allied arrangements. The impact of nonmilitary factors, including, above all, economic, social and ecological, is growing”
§
“the changes in our security environment essentially consist in a shift of emphasis away from
the classical risks (armed invasion) that decrease in importance and towards the
unconventional risks that originate also with hardly identifiable non-state entities.”
§
„the size, organisation and assets of the armed forces will be continually adapted to defence
requirements, allied and international commitments and the social-economic potential of the
State. As the nature of security threats evolves, static armed forces designed for territorial
defence will be gradually phased out in favour of advanced, mobile, highly specialised units.
The nature of new risks necessitates cooperation between the armed forces and civilian
structures within the scope of response to non-military threats, as well as in rescue and
antiterrorist operations in the homeland and outside its borders.”
at the same time, however,
§
“The mission of State policy and defence system is to counter politico-military threats and
above all defend Poland's territory against any armed aggression, to secure inviolability of the
borders, to protect State bodies and public institutions and ensure continuity of their operation,
to protect population and assure its survivability in a situation of crisis or conflict”
§
NATO: “NATO and our bilateral political-military cooperation with the USA and other major
Member States constitute the most important guarantee of external security and stable
development of our country. Our bilateral relations with the USA also represent an essential
link of the transatlantic relationship. Active and close political and military contacts with the
USA (...) make up a significant achievement of the Polish security policy. (...) NATO is for
Poland the key platform for multilateral and bilateral collaboration within the scope of
security and defence preparedness and the main pillar of politico-military stability on the
continent. (...) Poland supports NATO's evolution towards new missions and capabilities,
while preserving NATO's credible assets and capability for the classical collective defence
functions. These functions guarantee stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and safeguard
Poland against the likelihood of direct threats. Our country, together with the other Allies, will
100
participate in combating the threats of international terrorism and other threats of the new
type. NATO also needs to develop capabilities in regard to crisis response, civil emergency
planning, prevention and combating of the consequences of "asymmetric attacks". Essential is
the implementation of the allied decisions made at the Prague Summit in 2002 and concerning
the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) and the streamlining of command structures in
line with the present operational requirements. Poland shall actively contribute to the
implementation of these decisions. We support the Alliance's selective engagement in out-ofarea stabilisation missions. Such missions represent in practice a new form of Allied
involvement that adds to the vitality of the Alliance. The transformations taking place in the
Alliance's missions and doctrinal message merit a profound consideration and reflection in the
NATO strategic concept. (...) Poland shall continue to act in support of NATO's cohesion,
including the congruence of allied interests on the international scene, elimination of the
technology gaps between the Allies' military assets and capabilities, increased access of
European states to NATO's operational and defence capabilities and the American know-how.
An enhanced responsibility of NATO's European members is consistent with Poland's
interests.
§
European Union: “(…) We shall be actively participating in the development of the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as an indispensable complement to the CFSP and a
mechanism enabling the streamlining of the operational capabilities of the Member States.
Poland, as a member of NATO and EU, will support the construction of military and civil
emergency capabilities within the Union as they, too, constitute NATO's European pillar and
make use of NATO resources. For its part, Poland will endeavour to make a corresponding
contribution, both military and civil, to the Union's capabilities. Essential in this context will
be a gradual harmonisation of European procurement policies and armament market in ways
to guarantee taking advantage of the specific capabilities and experiences of all EU members.
The EU efforts in the sphere of operational capabilities and the Prague Summit defence
commitments for NATO should be mutually complementary and synergic. This will also
manifest itself in peacekeeping operations undertaken by European forces. As a member of
both organisations, Poland would like to see the growth of their permanent and
institutionalised cooperation so as to ensure full complementarity of the EU and NATO
operations. Thus, we will take and support initiatives aimed at the structural reinforcement,
collaborative and working interoperability of both organisations and also initiatives that
maximise the efficiency of use of their respective available resources.”
Additional question: Concerning the “clash between Foreign Ministry … and the General Staff and
most political parties.” Could you elaborate what parties do not take a “modern” stance on security
issues? Maybe Samoobrona? Could a shift in power after the next elections change polish security
and defense policy?
The party system in Poland is still far from being a fully-fledged one, i.e. each election brings new
parties as the old ones split up. The only party that has existed throughout the 1990s – the postcommunist SLD – split up this year: due to corruption scandals and implementation of liberal
economic program by Miller’s government a left-wing group of SLD detached and created a new
party SDPL (Social-Democracy of Poland).
In addition to that most parties lack either concrete programmes on foreign and security policy, or
established structures, expertise and policy-makers who deal with these issues on the permanent basis
(like e.g. ‘Aussenpolitischersprecher’ in Germany). Therefore it is really hard to say what sort of a
stance do political parties have on main foreign and security policy issues; they rather react to events,
often in an inconsistence manner. However, if one tries to outline their position along the line of
‘modern vs. conservative approach to security’ it seems that out of six main parties represented in the
parliament it is Samoobrona (Self-defence) and Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) –
the former left-wing populist, the latter right wing - which stick to the old concept of security, i.e.
understood primarily as having military potential to defend Poland. This corresponds with their
general approach to Poland’s foreign policy in NATO and towards EU they describe as treason of
national interests and exposing Poland to all sorts of possible threats be it military, political or
economic. But it is really impossible to find out any coherent pattern of thinking in either party. E.g.
101
among Samoobrona’s members there is a remarkable number of former military who heavily oppose
against the modern conception of army (they seem to prefer an old type of army but with modern
equipment) since it may diminish national defence potential, but at the same time the leader of
‘Samoobrona’, Lepper, visits and praises Russian neo-nationalist and communist party leaders like
Zyrinowski.
Apart from the two, one can say that the conservative Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice) and
leftist but accenting attachment to Polish tradition Polskie Stronictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant’s Party)
tend to perceive Polish security through the prism of military threats form the East. Yet, if in the case
of PiS it results from a highly anticommunist and anti-Russian stance, in PSL it seems to be a sideeffect of a very peculiar situation of this grouping: having its roots in the political system of
communist Poland - as a satellite of the communist party - PSL accents now national features like the
tradition of Polish peasants fighting against conquerors to win rural electorate.
It is worth-noting, however, that even the parties which present the most modern approach to security the liberal-conservative Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) and the Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej (Alliance of Democratic Left) – they still have not officially called for abandoning
conscription and creation of a all-voluntary forces (AVF).
It is rather unthinkable that a shift of power may change polish security and defence policy. There
might be some adjustments/changes of priorities resulting from the security dynamic in Transatlantic
relations or internal developments in Russia and Belarussia – the better they are the faster the
evolution of security perception towards ‘modern threats’ – but the core of it will remain the same.
It did generate interest, but a modest one. Two things were in the center of the discussion: that for the
first time EU outlined a global perspective, and that security perception of Europe was quite similar to
that of the US, even if means/tools for its implementation are traditionally different. At the same time
commentators indicated that Javier Solana’s attempt was seen by some EU members as too ambitious,
or too close to the US approach, and therefore watered down in the course of elaboration of the final
draft.
The reasons why the EUSS did not attract much attention seem to be following:
§
It appears that none EU strategy or a document can bring a visible and significant shift
towards ESDP among Polish public opinion and policy-makers, unless EU really starts to
address problems it talks so much about. Here, however, one thing must not be forgotten.
Although Poland does share the security perception embraced by EUSS, it is much more
preoccupied with ‘old’ or traditional threats, which come from eastern neighbourhood of
Poland. In this regard the EUSS seems to be written more from a ‘western perspective’, i.e.
focusing on modern threats. Arguably, there is also a wide-spread conviction among Polish
policy-makers and public -opinion that the litmus-test of any EU political and military
ambitions is the way it approaches challenges in Eastern Europe and on the territory of the
former Soviet Union (e.g. Moldavia, Georgia). As nobody truly believes – due to lesson
learnt in the past - that EU would ever risk to challenge politically Russia in this region –
what is seen necessary to improve security there (e.g. Transdniestria) or to counterbalance
Russia’s imperial tendencies (Georgia) – so is the interest in EUSS limited.
§
And last but not least, time of elaboration of the EUSS overlapped with a discussion on a far
more important issue, i.e. that of the system of weighting votes in the Council. As Poland
objected the Convention proposal of the ‘double -majority” and favoured the system designed
at the Nice Summit, it led to strong political tensions with the rest of EU members. The ‘Nice
or death’ struggle dominated the agenda of Poland’s foreign policy and public debate clearly
overshadowing other issues including that of ESDP and EUSS.
There was no position of parties concerning EUSS as it did not evoke deeper interest. This event
happened almost unnotic ed. It was Nice and Iraq that attracted attention of the public and politicians.
The litmus-test-conviction applies to all main parties: if there is a serious political and/or military
102
crisis in Europe and main EU-members adopt a common, solid stance and undertake necessary means
without waiting for the US or being afraid of Russia, then the litmus-test would be passed. This is, of
course, somehow a rather sad perspective since no one really wants a situation that would require
passing the litmus-test. The alternative, positive solution (and at the same time quite realistic) is that
Poland as the EU member will increase its commitment to CFSP and ESDP and leave behind the
thinking in terms of the ‘candidate state’. Criticizing EU members is definitely much easier for an
outsider than a member who fully participates in EU decision-making process.
Basically, there is no structured debate but rather an inflow of information, which produces a feeling
of perplexity. Variable geometry, multi-speed Europe and ‘Kerneuropa’ are not understood or
analysed but seen as many faces of the same problem: an attempt on the side of ‘old’ EU members to
‘hi-jack’ European integration by approving fundamental decisions without ‘new comers’ input in the
fear that they might obstruct the deepening of integration; e.g. in the area of CFSP/ESDP due to their
attachment to NATO and the US.
There was also no particular interest in the work of the Polish representatives to Convention, i.e. they
were not seen as being able to influence the agenda. On the other hand, as one observer rightly pointed
out, it did not seem that ‘statements of Polish representatives were prepared in advance, consulted and
consistent with a broader conception. They appeared as spontaneous declarations referring mainly to
concrete but not-interlinked with each other elements of the Convention’s debate.’58
Undoubtedly, there is a clear lack of proper information on the nitty-gritty of the European Defence
Policy. Hence, its objectives and outcomes are often perceived through the prism of
commentators’/policy-makers personal affiliations or the general context of EU-Polish relations, i.e.
left-wing media and experts tend to be much in favour of ESDP than right-wing ones which prefer
NATO and are afraid of tensions with the US. Both however do not have a professional understanding
of the process, its politico-military and institutional underpinnings. By the same token, if there is a
period of diplomatic struggling between Poland and EU-members on security issues, it usually has a
rather negative impact on the Polish perception of ESDP. Example: the conflict over Iraq - which
pitted Poland against France and Germany – increased hesitation among policy-makers and the public
opinion towards ESDP that has always been seen as a design of the two latter states. Thus, it was
feared that allowing EU to go further with ESDP could be used by Paris and Berlin to detach European
defence from NATO.
The idea of a European External Representative was met with considerable support, although
commentators pointed out to the fact that EU does not need new institutional designs, but rather a
sense of solidarity and common political will. Welcomed was especially the merger between the office
of the Commissioner for External Affairs and High Representative for CFSP as it was expected to
enhance EU external activities, its visibility and ensure more coherence of actions. Criticised was the
proposed abandonment of Presidencies, since – as it was argued – it might reduce small member’s
engagement in CFSP. Poland proposed ‘group Presidencies’.
Unlike CFSP, ESDP evoked vehement critique, which to large extent was a result of the FrancoGerman-Belgian-Luxemburg summit in Tervuren (April 2003) 59 . The absence of the UK was
interpreted as a sign that the meeting was more a sort of anti-American manifestation, than a serious
contribution to European defence project. Even less convincing was Belgium and Luxemburg
58
Cf. Klaus Bachman, Konwent Europejski. O czym dyskutuje Konwent UE, a o czym powinien i co nalezy
zrobic, aby go do tego zmusic?, Raporty i Analizy CSM 1/03, www.csm.org.pl
59
Here, however, one should not forget that form 1999 Poland belonged to the group of countries being very
sceptical towards ESDP for various particular reasons. More to that: Cf. Olaf Osica, CESDP as seen by Poland,
Reports and Analyses of Center for International Relations, 5/2001.
103
participation, if one bears in mind their military weakness which very much contrasted with the
summit message that military strength is as a precondition for robust EU Rapid Reaction Forces. The
political message from Tervuren clearly impinged upon the perception of ESDP in Poland. It was
feared that:
§
The ‘closer and structured co-operation’ might endanger NATO’s collective defence
role and transatlantic ties in general.
§
Criteria set for participation in ‘structured co-operation” would exclude countries
having no military capabilities fulfilling ‘higher criteria’ and which could not make
‘more binding commitments to one another’ with a view to the ‘most demanding
missions.’60 The reason of concern resulted from the fact that definition of criteria was
up to only those members which would meet them.
§
That both forms of co-operation would lead to creation of a parallel and duplicated
military structures (EU and NATO), impede upon military planning, and introduce
new division lines in Europe.
In a nutshell, there were those who entirely refused the idea of ESDP on the basis of its anti-American
and anti-NATO vocation, and those who endorsed it provided that it really allows Europe to perform
crisis-management, but would not put at risk and complicate transatlantic relations. Interestingly
enough the UK engagement to ESDP seems no longer be regarded in Poland as a solid guarantee that
European ambitions will be developed in accordance with NATO principles and agreement with the
US. That is a new phenomenon.
The discussion on the failure of the IGC 2003 divided Poland into two intellectual and political camps:
while the overwhelming majority of political parties – both from the opposition and the government –
were supportive of the Polish conduct, critics were to be found almost exclusively among intellectuals,
often former politicians (e.g. Tadeusz Mazowiecki), some experts and journalists. One could also
observe another regularity: those who were in favour of Polish conduct at the days of the Iraqi conflict
usually endorsed Polish stance on the draft Constitution and were very critical on French and German
policy towards both issues. Unsurprisingly then, advocates of opposite choices argued that Poland
manoeuvred itself into a political dead-end and risked political alienation on the eve of EU accession.
In other words Polish stance on Iraq and on the Convention presented two sides of the same coin, i.e.
limits of Poland’s right to pursue a sovereign foreign and security policy as EU member.
Therefore, the failure of the IGC had two interpretations. One sought Franco-German fault for their
inability to compromise and tendency to dominate the enlarged EU at the expense of other members. It
was argued that for the future of EU and the success of its enlargement, it was much better to accept
and go through a transient crisis then to reach – under time pressure – another (after Nice) ‘rotten
compromise’. This would then certainly lead to much more serious failures. The second interpretation
was based on a conviction that the number of voices Poland would have in the Council has almost
nothing to do with Polish ‘political power’ and that far more important is the ability to build coalitions.
Opposing against a solution which was adopted by majority of members means that Poland would
loose potential partners, rather then win their support.
In this context the failure of the IGC 2003 did evoke a sort of a national debate on “Kerneuropa”, but
it was limited to a narrow group of experts/journalist/policy-makers. The common assumption was
that the idea of ‘Kerneuropa’ is a bad one for it divides members into different categories, puts an end
to European solidarity and increases the intra-European rivalry between potential ‘insiders’ and
‘outsiders’. There were, however, contradictory statements on how to avoid such a prospect, and what
should Poland, do if ‘Kerneuropa’ is to be la unched?
The government’s position says that the idea is wrong as it would mean a de facto end of EU and
European integration. It would namely split EU members into two different categories, i.e. the
enlargement would then bring only economic profits (but they would be limited) neglecting the whole
political side. Hence, the old division of Europe would not be overcome, but rather refashioned.
60
Art. 213 of draft Constitution
104
Commentators and policy makers who shared this view stressed, however, that the notion of
‘Kerneuropa’ is a kind of political ‘black-mail’ some EU members (particularly France and Germany)
use to force others to approve solutions that serve only their interests. But neither Paris nor Berlin
would ever go so far as it would imply a political decoupling from the rest of Europe. In other words,
it is not only Poland that needs Germany, but also Germany needs Poland. Therefore Poland should
resist each and every project that may be used for introduction of this idea.
On the other side, there were voices pointing out to the opposite. ‘Kerneuropa’ is not only an
intellectual construction or a tool of political pressure, but a very likely answer to the present political
dynamics in Europe, i.e. tension between EU enlargement and deepening of European integration.
Hence, Polish foreign policy would be self-defeating, if it constantly challenges France and Germany.
It would only strengthen the prospect of ‘Kerneuropa’. Shall it, however, turn out that the idea is to be
launched in practical terms, Poland should not fight it back, but rather seek to join it and become an
insider of a ‘European core’.
negative one?
Rather a negative one. Although it is accepted that main EU countries – like Germany, France and the
UK – do have right to, or even should play the role of leaders of European integration, this have to
happen within a context of a European debate that engages all members. From the Polish vantage
point, meetings like the one mentioned resemble a traditional search for political domination over
Europe: ideas that relate to whole EU are first being precooked within a small circle of main members,
and only then brought onto EU agenda on the basis of ‘take it, or leave it’. That was the Polish
experience with the crisis over Iraq when France and Germany approved a line of conduct without
having consulted it with others, and on that basis claimed that this was w European decision.
Therefore, the timing of the meeting was really unhelpful bearing in mind how fresh was the memory
of Iraqi conflict and the failure of the IGC 2003. It seems also, that Poland fears that this sort of
meetings may be one day institutionalised making EU less flexible politically.
As mentioned before the Iraqi conflict has had a tremendous impact upon Poland’s position and the
self-evaluation. Poland endorsed the US line of conduct towards Iraq from the early days of the
mounting crisis. This stance complicated relations with Germany and France, what undoubtedly
weighed in the perception of Convention’s work in the area of CSFP/ESDP. However, it appears now
that the presence of the Polish troops in Iraq might generate a turning point in the Polish foreign and
security policy with an direct impact on the Polish approach to ESDP. For the first time Poland gained
opportunity to experience and perform a huge military operation in a war-like circumstances: Poland
leads a multinational division composed of almost 20 nations. Secondly, it directly co-operates with
US commanders on the theatre of war, gathering good and bad experiences. Hence, despite serious
political problems resulting from the fact that the WMD has not been found in Iraq thus far, the up-tonow military performance is broadly regarded as successful. Many experts and politicians argue that
this not only increases Poland’s added-value for European Defence Policy, but that any form
‘structured co-operation’ seems now unthinkable without Poland. In other words, the Iraqi experience
apparently modified Polish thinking on ESDP and ‘structured co-operation’: while before that time
Poland tended to perceive it first and foremost in terms of being left outside, now there is a growing
conviction that it must have a part in it.
Polish approach to flexible integration in general is characterized by an assumption that it must be
handled with care. First, there is still no clear vision of how ‘flexible co-operation’ should work in
practice; how should relations and competences between participating member-states and common
institutions look like, how should it be financed, etc. Anxiety results also from the fact that for a very
long time ‘flexible integration’ was seen as an attempt to build ‘a Union within Union’ and exclude
other members. Even if this opinion was questioned as irrelevant, Polish experts and commentators
105
argue that apart from clearly set criteria for participation, political will of given member states is
equally important. And some member-states might not have interests to invite Poland.
Flexible integration in CFSP/ESDP outside the Treaties is seen as a nightmare scenario that would
reduce if not deprive Poland of any influence in this area. Therefore, even if there is a recognition that
it might happen – e.g. the idea of a European planning staff – Poland will try to put this into a
institutional framework of either NATO or EU. There is a consensus that EU must retain its solid
institutional structure which must not be undermined by initiatives taken outside its framework.
There is no clear and comprehensive approach among Polish policy-makers to the division of
competences between EU bodies. In a nutshell, from the analysis of Polish contribution to
Convention’s work results that Poland is searching here for a balance between, on the one hand,
support for the ‘community method’ and deepening of integration, on the other, however, protecting
integration’s dynamics against setbacks resulted from too ambitious or radical solutions. 61
−
European Council: strategic guidelines for actions
−
Council of European Union: day-to-day management of all aspects of CFSP/ESDP
−
High Representative/European Foreign Minister (when established): Poland envisaged that
the ‘Foreign Minister’ should be placed within the Commission (e.g. as a vice-Chairman of
the Commission62 ), but have two deputies: one responsible for community aspects of CFSP
and the second would chair the Politico-Military Committee. He or she would have right for
submitting initiatives to the Council on behalf of the Commission. 63
−
European Commission: see above + a need to engage EC into the European Armaments
Agency in order to provide financial resources for Reserach&Development programmes.
−
European Parliament: consultative role
Poland has always objected to any form of co-operation in the area of CFSP/ESDP taking place
‘outside’ the common institutional framework.
It is hard to predict, but it seems that it would be seen in Poland as a negative development. There are
two main point of reference of a possible Polish reaction;
•
Poland role within EU: if Poland strengthens its position and become a full-fledged
institutional citizen, the reaction would probably be more moderated since it wouldn’t be seen
as undermining Poland’s role and position. However, Polish politics nightmare has always
been ‘exclusion’ from the mainstream of European politics: it usually puts Warsaw on the
sidelines of Europe.
•
and the transatlantic relations: if this should take place in a moment of intensive transatlantic
disputes then undoubtedly Poland would vehemently oppose to it, because it would endanger
the whole political and institutional constellation of relations between Europe and the US.
61
Cf. Rafal Trzaskowski, Podzial kompetencji w UE – zarys problemu (Division of Compteneces in EU –
outline of the problem), Raporty i Analizy CSM 9/02, www.csm.org.pl
62
Remarks by Prof. Danuta Hübner, Polish Government Representative to the Convention on the Final Reports
of the Working Groups on External Action and Defence, 27.04.2004.
63
Wystapienie Pana Ministra Wlodzimierza Cimoszewicza podczas Forum “Wspólnie o przyszlosci Europy”
“Efekty prac Konwentu-Traktat Konstytucyjny” Warszawa, 26 czerwca 2003 roku
106
Defence expenditures: Polish defence budget equals 1,98% of the GDP (15,5 billions of PLN), which
amounts to 7,99% of the total state budget. Since there seems to be no real prospect for the increase of
defence expenditures, additional funds are generated by changing the structure of the MOD budget,
e.g. increase of expenditures for new equipment from 12,7% in 2002 to 14,6% in 2003 (nominally
21%).
The 6-years plan of modernization of Polish Armed Forces (PAF) (2001-2006) adopted in January
2001 and the plan ‘Army – 150 thousands’. After the introduction of both programmes PAF will
consist of two closely linked but qualitatively different parts: operational, highly mobile forces
equipped with offensive combat assets and capabilities, tailored to coalition’s missions, and with a
significant number of professional soldiers; and territorial forces based upon conscription and
equipped with defensive combat assets and capabilities. Apart from that the modernization’s plan
assumes:
§
Minimum 1,95% of the GDP for defence over the program’s duration, i.e. 2001-2006
§
Reduction of the number of military personnel and conscripts to 150.000; from 180.000 in
2001, already achieved.
§
Closure of 40 military bases
§
A 40% reduction of infrastructure (barracks, depots, training grounds)
§
Withdrawal from the service of the eldest ships, all Mig-21 aircrafts (but overtake of 23 Mig29 from the German ‘Luftwaffe’) and all T-72 tanks (but overtake of 128 Leopard 2 A4 tanks
from the Bundeswehr)
§
Purchase of 48 F-16 Block 50-52, contract signed in 2003
§
Purchase of 8 small strategic transport aircrafts (CASA C-295), contract signed in 2002
§
Purchase of 690 armoured transport vehicles (AMV Patria) for the land forces; the contract
went to Finnish Patria, contract signed in 2003
§
investment in communication (TACOMS post2000) and commanding systems for the Air and
Land forces
§
Procurement of precise guided missiles for the navy
§
Purchase of precisely anti-tank guided missiles for the land forces with launch-pads; the
contract went to Rafael, signed in January 2004
§
Modernization of MI-24 helicopters for the purpose of Combat SAR operations
costs?
Poland pays attention to needs of ESDP as to those resulting from the reform of NATO (Nato
Response Force and Prague Capabilities Commitment). Therefore there are no special plans
concerning EU, but rather an attempt to enable Polish Armed Forces to perform operations under the
aegis of both EU and NATO.
a) Naval transport seems to be one of those areas where Poland will be interested very much
and will search for partners. It seems that after the upcoming round of NATO enlargement the
Baltic See will drastically change its geopolitical significance. Though the Russian military
presence in Kaliningrad may be regarded as a potential source of problems, the Baltic See
already is a quasi both ‘EU and NATO sea’. This raises a question of how NATO allies should
make use of it in light of vanishing military threats for the entire region. It also poses
challenges for the naval forces of countries like Poland, which do not present any global
ambitions of possessing significant military fleet. However, naval transport as well a small
fleet of support ships (i.e. logistic) offers political and military advantages as it would
certainly strengthen allied transport capacity. Possible partners are those from the region:
Germany, Scandinavian countries and Baltic countries.
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b) Strategic air transport is another issue endorsed among Polish military. Poland defines its
security interests as main European countrie s: the Balkans, area of the former USSR, and the
Middle East. After EU accession when Poland faces immigration’s problems not only from the
East, but also from African countries, Africa may also be regarded as an area of some political
interests. Poland considers its participation (with aircrafts) in the planned European Strategic
Transport Command.
c) all aspects of C4IRS
After the meeting in Naples (November 2003) Poland declared that it wants to join ‘structured cooperation’. This was then confirmed by Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz’s parliamentary statement. It
remains to be seen what this will bring in practical terms and how Poland will formulate its detailed
expectations, and what they will be. Therefore, it is to early to say how many and which members
Poland would like to see within this type of co-operation. It seems, however, that Polish diplomats are
aware of the fact that a balance must be preserved between, on the one hand, inclusiveness – criteria
should be set in a flexible way to enable as many as possible interested members to participate; and on
the other, effectiveness – i.e. they should not be to low because it would not improve the overall
military power of EU-members.
Main problems:
Ÿ
Operational and political harmonisation with NATO, i.e. if structured co-operation should occur as
a way for sidelining NATO’s leading role then it seem doubtful whether Poland would still like to
take part in it, rather it would search ways to slow down the pace of its development if not to
hamper it at all.
Ÿ
Engaging the military, especially the General Staff, which are still much more NATO oriented and
bound to traditional security perception, i.e. traditional collective defence
Ÿ
Financial constraints are the most serious problems. However, military people and experts
recognize that from a financial point of view the participation in the ‘structured co-operation’ and
the military reform are two sides of the same coin: precondition for playing an important military
and political role within European context - an ambition that Poland clearly does have not only
within EU, but also NATO.
The debate on the criteria drew a lot of attention between the presentation of the Constitutional draft
and the summit in Naples (November 2003). It was feared that the approach of the Convention to the
permanent structured co-operation and the criteria set for participation privileged main European
powers: the UK, France and Germany. By imposing accession criteria convenient from them they
could prevent other members from participation: it would be up to them to decide which members
meet these criteria, and which do not. 64 The catalogue of criteria approved by the Italian Presidency is
regarded as very ambitious but honestly addressing EU needs. According to government circles
Poland is capable to meet them, although it will not be an easy task, mainly due to financial problems.
However, there is one thing more which may change this: the idea of the Battle Groups, as it was
presented, is seen as an attempt to add a new criterion. It remains to be seen what will be Polish
answer to that new initiative.
64
Cf. art. 213 of the Constitution’s draft.
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The battle -group-problem and the structured co-operation have been debated mainly in MFA and
MOD. They are simply to complex for non-experts, e.g. the relation between the battle -group concept
and NATO Response Forces, the nitty-gritty of force planning etc. As I wrote, the crucial thing or the
main question that came around again and again was whether it was something that created
opportunities for Poland or whether it complicated Transatlantic relations and weakened Polish
position in EU. As the overall mood after Iraq towards France and Germany was rather negative, so
was the dominating approach to structured cooperation and battle groups concept among the whole
political spectrum. In this regard the UK stance remains not fully understood as British politics has
always been seen as very cautious towards French and German ideas on CESDP. One should also
remember that Poland – unlike the UK and France – does not have a tradition of expeditionary forces.
Hence, the interest in this sort of military actions – undertaken by former colonial powers – is rather
limited.
Poland opposed the establishment of a European operational HQ, as it could lead to institutional decoupling of EU from NATO. Furthermore, it was pointed out to the fact that if NATO and EU
operational planning is not kept under one roof , it impinges the military planning in the member
countries: since troops pledged to NATO and EU are the same, hence there must be a common or inter
EU-NATO co-ordination of their activities, training and tasks. From the vantage point of view of
Poland, it would be enough if there is a European planning cell within NATO’s SHAPE.
cooperation?
It seems that structured co-operation and enhanced co-operation are two sides of the same coin, which
is EU ability to perform political and military action in the outside world. In this sense it is hard to
imagine a flourishing CFSP without ESDP, or the other way around. The question remains whether it
will be the ‘structured co-operation having impact on the enhanced co-operation, or the latter one will
facilitate the former.
Additional question: Could you go more into detail in answering this question (e.g. different
members)?
Just to clarify one thing: I understand – on the basis of the draft Treaty - that ‘structured co-operation’
is a form of enhanced co-operation in the area of ESDP (Art. III 213 par. 5). Hence, the questions
sounds: is the place for enhanced co-operation in CFSP if there is structured co-operation in ESDP, or
the other way around.
If I am correct then, when looking at EU as at a conglomerate of its member-states, and not an entity,
one can imagine that some members will initiate/join only enhanced co-operation – aimed at political
or soft-security co-operation - without committing themselves to military or hard security cooperation, namely the structured one. I would, however, assume that it would be the case for neutral
EU members, as other would do their best to participate in both types of co-operation.
III. Missions
−
−
−
−
−
stabilisation
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Basically, in all of them. It depends on the area of a mission (Africa is less important than the Balkans,
or the territory of the former Soviet Union) and political considerations.
Only if USA is engaged: tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and
post-conflict stabilisation
Only if NATO is engaged: see above
Turkey is not opposed to it: ??? NA
Certain member states are participating (please name the countries): it depends on the type and place
of the mission. Certainly, the more serious and danger the mission is the more important the
participation of the US and the UK.
A minimum number of member states are participating (one third, half, two thirds,…): the more the
better, but undoubtedly numbers are not so important. It is rather the political and military ‘weight’ of
involved countries that plays crucial role.
Even if certain member states explicitly oppose a mission: France and Germany, neutral countries
A resolution of the UN Security Council authorizes a mission: it is always seen as one of the
preconditions. However, due to Russia and China, both are seen as oppressive powers, Poland is very
reluctant to make an action dependent on their consent.
Other conditions.
No. It was seen as a smooth transition which did not change anything significantly. It was welcomed
as a first sign of European ability to perform peace-keeping missions on its own. Experts pointed out,
however, to the fact that EU still relies on NATO in terms of logistic, communication, etc. Unlike the
Balkan operations, Artemis was seen a bit more critically: press commentators apparently having their
sources in MFA or NATO argued that EU had bypassed NATO while deciding to send troops, what
should not have had place on the basis of Berlin ‘plus’ agreement, which says that ‘the right to first
refusal’ belongs to NATO. Therefore, Artemis was interpreted as a small precedent, but potentially
dangerous for the future of NATO-EU relations. There was no official or unofficial stance of the main
parties on this issue. It was simply taken into consideration without a thorough analysis of its possible
implications. Generally, it was welcomed that EU took the mission, but criticized was the way in
which it happened (i.e. bypassing NATO). Africa is too far and Polish public opinion does not see it as
a direct source of problems; Poland is still not an immigration country for asylum-seekers from
Africa. This may, however, change in the future after EU accession.
this instrument?
In general, this instrument is believed to be necessary. Poland is against a European unanimity at any
price, i.e. the one that is enforced by means of institutional solutions leaving no room for members’
objections. Although Poland has just joined EU, it did twice use the constructive abstention. In both
cases it referred to Belarus: in 2000 Poland did not joined EU when it decided to suspend diplomatic
ties with Lukaszenka regime, and 2003 when EU was about to impose economic embargo against
Belarus. The decision was explained by the presence of Polish minority in Belarus, and by the fact that
economic embargo would hit the society rather than the regime.
such a clause?
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In general, Poland could accept a “passarelle”, but in a very careful manner so it wouldn’t impinge
upon state’s interests. There is, however, no detailed information on this. It seems that polish policymakers and the public opinion are not ready for a QMV in CFSP.
Therefore, much will depend on timing/political climate of a decision: ‘Iraqi experience’ clearly
diminished chances for Polish consent in this regard.
Yes, it is. Poland declared that it will join the Agency from the beginning of its work, what indeed
happened. The reason was that if Poland wants to play a serious military role in Europe, it has to
participate in projects aimed at improvement of the European military capabilities. Only then can
Poland gain a political leverage upon European Defence Policy. The main problem for Poland is the
shape of its defence industry which still undergoes transformation. Therefore Poland will try to on the
one hand, use the Agency as a vehicle for engaging Polish defence industry into multinational
projects, on the other, however, it will oppose to abandoning Art. 296 TUE as the defence industry is
not ready yet to for an open-market competition with Western companies.65
Though the Agency appears as having only technical role to play, there is a conviction that in practice
it may have a political impact as well. First, it will participate in co-shaping ESDP, secondly the logic
of European integration has proved thus far, that projects and institutions that had theoretically no
political significance, produced so tied co-operation that members eventually face the need for more
political cohesion.
The bottom line of Polish approach is that the Agency becomes a serious body, and not another ‘talkshop’.
Additional question: Does this mean, Poland is in favor of a political manager?
I think that it is to early to asses it. It would be no surprise, however, if Poland would embrace the role
of a political – though with clearly set prerogatives - manager as it recognizes that being only a
technical one, the Agency will not yield expected results. If my interpretation of Polish position is
correct, I would assume that it searches for possibilities to gain as much influence on CESDP as
possible. It is an area in which Poland – as the only new EU member – has much to offer. This can be
achieved only if the Agency becomes something more that technical manager. The nature of this
‘more’ should be clarified in the upcoming 2-3 years. There was a meeting of the Committee for
National Defence of the Polish parliament (January 2004) devoted to defence in the Constitutional
Treaty and dominated by the problem of the Agency (unfortunately, more questions were posed than
answers given). The general message was that Poland assumes that the Agency may become in the
future a sort of a collective EU defence ministry.
The attachment of the clause was seen as unnecessary since it duplicated obligation of NATO
members. Further more, it was argued that it may send a message to the US conservatives, that Europe
65
Art. 296, par. b) of the Treaty establishing European Communities states that: ‘any Member State may take
such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are
connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely
affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for
specifically military purposes.’
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does not need American security umbrella. Unsurprisingly, in the background of the debate on the
mutual defence clause lay Iraq and the Tervuren summit (April 2003). Hence, it was mainly seen as
political provocation/manifestation of those countries plunged into an Anti-American hysteria. It
seems that Poland does envisage a defence role for EU, but it was hesitant about attaching this at a
time of deep transatlantic disputes. Doing this in the way it happened, only diminishes the importance
of the clause: it remains on paper, but it already caused new division lines. Far more important that
institutional designs is European solidarity and the political climate.
It was also pointed out that the present state of European security makes traditional defence obsolete.
For an terrorist attack – like the 9/11 – there is a ‘solidarity clause’. Therefore, the practical use of
mutual defence clause is very limited.
a) NATO membership of your country? It remains to be seen. The problem is that if compared with
NATO defence clause, EU does not have any infrastructure, contingency planning and military power
to perform this role. Conflicts may appear in political sphere especially with relation to the US.
Yes. There main source of concern goes back to the operation in Kosovo, when Austria rejected
NATO request to open its air space for NATO aircrafts. Such a stance, if repeated, may seriously
impede upon efficiency of military assistance.
clause?
That is one of the main problems: can mutual defence clause work if there is only a small group of
members which are bound by it? The answer must be no, unless one creates paper-guarantees or
intellectual designs which – when push comes to shove – may lead to confusion, instead of clarity and
delays instead of rapid actions. Generally, the relation between ‘enhanced co-operation’, ‘structured
co-operation’, ‘mutual defence clause’, and the conditions for participating in them must be clarified.
As it is now it only increases perplexity: competing interpretations introduce political tensions.
VII. Conclusion
It is certainly to early to assess Polish role vis-à-vis CFSP and CESDP, as Poland is a new EU
member. Undoubtedly, Poland will remain one of the most pro-Atlantic countries among memberstates, interested in preserving the leading role of NATO and avoiding any competition between the
alliance and EU. However, this does not have to mean, as it was the case in the past years, that
Warsaw will try to slow down the pace of ESDP development. The debate on ‘Iraq’ and the
Constitution created a new momentum or a turning point in Polish foreign and security policy. Poland
regards itself as politically able and military capable not only to contribute to ESDP, but also to be
among members initiating a ‘permanent structured co-operation’. Further more, one should not forget
that for a foreseeable future new member states will stay outside main integration projects like ‘Euro’
or ‘Schengen’. Therefore, Poland clearly search its chance in ESDP as the only political project within
Polish reach that might enhance Warsaw standing within EU, and at the same time allow to manifest
Poland’s constructive role and approach to European integration. The combination of military skills
and self-assurance with political ambitions appears as the main driving force behind Polish approach
to ESDP. The same holds true for CFSP which Poland has always seen as an area of vital importance
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for enlarged EU due to its eastern neighbourhood. One thing that might reverse this positive trend is to
be found in the climate and state of transatlantic relations. Should ESDP or CFSP occur to be
instruments of anti-American manifestations, Poland will certainly diminish or even abandon its
commitments to them. Thus, the more cooperative and close are ties between EU and the US, the more
constructive role of Poland shell be expected.
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SPAIN
Alicia Sorroza Blanco and José Ignacio Torreblanca, Royal Institute Elcano for International and
Strategic Studies
I. In General
1. National security doctrine.
policy. Have there recently been changes in its national security doctrine?
There have been profound changes in the organization of Spain’s defence and security policy during
the past 10 years, changes caused by new challenges and opportunities to which Spain should give
appropriate answers.
- New risks and threats to security
- Impact of new technologies
- Armed Forces reform in the Western World
- Demand for professional armed forces in Spanish society
The first government of Jose M. Aznar (People’s Party, Conservative, 1996-2000) engaged in a
thorough revision of Spanish defence policy. This resulted in, first, the modernization and
professionalisation of the Armed Forces and, second, Spain’s full participation in NATO’s military
structure.
The government drafted a new National Defence Directive (Directiva de Defensa Nacional, DDN1/96)
outlining security and defence goals as the starting point of a new defence planning cycle. The
Directive pointed to three high-priority objectives: first, to deepen the internationalization of the armed
forces; second, to achieve their full professionalization; and third, to promote a greater awareness in
Spanish society of the need for effective defence.
The impact and visibility of these reforms has been remarkable. Internationalization, along with full
integration in NATO, has led to a greater presence of Spanish troops on peacekeeping operations. This
kind of contribution has become more frequent, with increasingly larger numbers of troops involved.
The first operation was in Albania and was followed by IFOR and SFOR, Oriental Timor, Macedonia
and Kosovo.
Concerning the full professionalisation of the Army, two years of intense negotiations found the
bipartisan consensus necessary for the Spanish Congress to approve a legal framework for the
modernization and full professionalization of the Armed Forces. Compulsory military service was
ended opening the way for a completely voluntary army.
The professionalization process was accompanied by a substantial modernization of the main air, land
and sea capabilities. A number of programmes were established for the period 2000-2015, among
them the European combat airplane (Eurofighter 2000), the new F-100 frigate, the Leopard 2E tank
and the G-36E assault rifle.
Having engaged in such a deep overhaul of Spanish defence policy in his first term, Aznar’s second
term in office (2000-2006) was presided over by continuity and implementation concerns. There was,
however, a stronger emphasis on the decision to contribute to the consolidation of the ESDP, which
was a central issue during the Spanish Presidency of the UE (first semester of 2002). Aznar’s
government took the EU Presidency, shortly after 9/11 attacks on the EU, as an opportunity to push
forward a number of measures dealing with external and security measures which his government had
been promoting at the EU level for the last two years.
An event having an important impact on Spain’s strategic thinking was the seizing in June 2002 by
Morocco’s Gendarmerie forces of a tiny and uninhabited rock (1,5 square km, equivalent to a football
field) of disputed sovereignty 200 meters off the coast Morocco and six miles west of Ceuta, the
Spanish enclave in Morocco. The conflict over Isla Perejil (or ‘Parsley’) was short and non-violent:
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Spanish troops seized the island, arrested the dozen servicemen occupying it and returned them to
Moroccan authorities. Despite the apparent insignificance of the event (the rock lacked any strategic
value of the rock), what caused most concern in Spain was the implication of Morocco’s unfriendly
act for the future security of the Spanish enclaves in Morocco (Ceuta and Melilla) as well as for the
series of islands controlled by Spain off the coast of Morocco (Chafarinas, Alhucemas). This concern,
together with the ‘neutrality’ or mild position adopted by some key European partners (specially
France), which made impossible for the EU to decisively back Spain and, as Spain had wanted,
threaten Morocco with economic sanctions, would lead the Aznar government and the Spanish
military to emphasize the need to maintain an autonomous territorial defence capacity, cooperate
closely with the US and NATO and, accordingly, show little enthus iasm for the future of ESDP.
9/11 and the Parsil Island crisis combined to push Aznar and his government closer to the US and
away from France and Germany. Then, when the Iraq crisis escalated at the beginning of 2003, it was
no surprise that Aznar sided with the Bush Administration and volunteered, together with the UK, to
lead a pro-American coalition in the continent to balance Chirac and Schröder’s anti-war stance.
Aznar’s activism contributed widely to rise his status to the eyes of the Bush Administration and Blair
government, but the transatlantic rift which followed did little to promote any progress on the field of
ESDP. Only when France, Germany and the United Kingdom reconciled after major military
operations ended in Iraq and ESDP negotiations started to show some progress on the framework of
the Constitution negotiations, did Spain look back to ESDP in an attempt not to be excluded from the
process.
The unexpected victory of the Socialist Party in the March 14 elections, three days after the bombings
of March 11 in Madrid which killed 197 people, was followed by Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez
Zapatero’s decision to pull Spain’s troops out of Iraq. This marked a major U turn in Spain’s foreign
and security policy and, combined, with the decision to ‘return to the core of Europe’ (meaning France
and Germany), opened the way for an active engagement of Spain’s in negotiations over the future of
ESDP.
The change of government meant therefore a return to the European Union and ESDP, the
abandonment of the idea of a privileged relationship with the US, NATO and the UK, the rejection of
US’ doctrine of anticipatory action and an emphasis on the role of the UN and international law as
preconditions for Spain’s participation in peacekeeping operations.
Paradoxically, this U turn in defence policy may have little effect on actual defence planning because
Zapatero’s new security defence doctrine has changed the goals, but has little impact on the means
(internationalization, professionalization and modernization). Accordingly, military planners at the
Spanish Ministry of Defence do not expect substantial changes in Defence policy, especially if it is
considered that the Strategic Review which was debated in Congress in December 2002 gained the
support of the Socialist Party. Although a new Directive of Defence, replacing DDN 1/2000, is being
announced, along with a new process of strategic revision, the main elements of the current Defence
Policy, some of which are as follows are to remain:
•
Spanish Natio nal Security is linked to the security of the European continent, it is a ‘shared
security’. This is why Spain offers its full support to the development of an independent and
autonomous European capacity.
•
Spain understands that the Atlantic Alliance continues to be essential for European defence.
•
The security of Spain is closely related to stability in North Africa and the Mediterranean
region, which is why Spain must play a relevant role in this particular region of the world.
•
The projection of forces is necessary to project stability, overcoming in this way the concept
of territorial defence. The missions outside our borders play a very important role in the
activities of the Armed Forces.
•
Defence is understood as a collective effort, surpassing an autarkic conception although
always guaranteeing self-defence with our own capacities.
Mr. Bono, the new Defence Minister, speaking to the Defence Commission in the Spanish Senate on
May 25, 2004, said that the government will follow the principle of ‘peace and parliament’. Despite
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their differences, the main opposition party, Popular Party, considers that it has more points in
common than against with the socialist Government in questions of Defence Policy. It should also be
considered that the political legislature has just begun.
The Spanish Defence Minister, in his presentation to the Defence Committee of the Spanish
Parliament (25/V/2004), mentioned three principles of International Relations in this field:
•
Sovereign cooperation but not submission
•
Loyalty to our allies: Europe and NATO
•
Respect of International Law, reinforcing the role of the United Nations and rejecting the
concept of pre-emptive war
Government officials do not perceive any important and tangible change, although perhaps the rhetoric
has become more pro-European and less Atlanticist, although currently and even in the medium term
European and Spanish Security are tied to NATO.
b) Did the Solana Paper, agreed on December 12, 2003, generate any interest? Is there a debate
about developing a new set of tasks to reflect the new security challenges that have been agreed? If so,
what will this amount to in type, scale and geographical extent?
European Security Strategy has generated some interest in different sectors of the Government as well
as in the academic and specialized worlds. At the official level, the debate on this document is on
general aspects, not on its actual application in Spain. The general opinion is that European Security
Strategy is not, stricto sensu, a security strategy. It is considered an important step in the configuration
of the ESDP, a good framework and a good basis for thinking about a EU which takes greater
responsibilities and which is more active in the international scene.
The positive aspects of the Solana Paper mentioned in different interviews and documents include the
following: a global approach to Europe’s security interests and threats, an emphasis on the need to
improve European capabilities and the recognition that the EU may have to use hard power in certain
situations. Despite these positive aspects, the significant gaps and shortcomings in the document have
been mentioned. In general, the Solana Paper is more vague and less complete than a security concept.
The reason for this ambiguity can be found in the necessity to achieve a consensus between the
different positions of the various member states.
But this consensus exists only on conceptual terms, not at the operational level. These basic
agreements consist in the acceptance of an ESDP independent of NATO structures. All member states
have accepted the commitment to improve their military capacities, which is essential for the strategic
credibility of the EU. But there is no real consensus in the approach to warfare, when the military
option is needed, and when hard power must be used.
CFSP/ESDP (ie, ‘Kerneuropa’, variable geometry, multi-speed Europe, Directoire,...)? If not, please
The Barometer of the Elcano Royal Institute (BRIE) is a periodic survey, carried out three times a
year. The BRIE focuses exclusively on opinions and attitudes regarding International Relations and
Spanish Foreign Policy in all its aspects. We based our answer on the results of the BRIE’s fifth
(February 2004) and sixth waves (May 2004) (http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/default_eng.asp).
In the sixth wave, 44% of Spaniards believe that ‘in the long term, the member states in the Union will
cooperate in a larger number of actions and policies (defence, economy, etc.)’, while 41% felt that
‘there will be groups of states cooperating in certain areas but not in others’. Compared with the fifth
wave of the BRIE, there is a sense of greater optimism.
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In February 2004, with Aznar still in government, while pro-Europeanism was on the increase, so too
was pessimism about the political future of the European Union. The net result is that it was widely
believed that Europe would follow a ‘variable geometry’ model. Only 33% believed that there would
be full cooperation between member countries in the long term, while 50% consider that there will be
groups of countries cooperating in some areas, but not in others. Reflecting also on some of the views
of the Aznar government, Spaniards seemed to fear the emergence of a ‘Directoire’ composed of the
larger European countries. Probably euro-pessimism and fear of the emergence of a ‘Directory’ might
have something to do with the small quota of power that Spaniards believe their country enjoys in the
EU. Most people (60%) think that Spain’s influence in EU decisions is small, as opposed to 30% who
think its influence is significant.
about the idea of ‘Kerneuropa’?
negative one?
In general terms, the advance in CFSP and ESDP was well received by the academic world, the main
political parties and the Spanish government. It was considered an important step in reinforcing the
EU’s role in Internationals Relations, but the pro-Atlantic sectors warned of the risks of weakening
NATO.
The failure of the IGC 2003 at the Brussels summit had a negative influence on the opinion of
Spaniards regarding the possibilities of reaching an agreement to approve a European Constitution in
2004. According to the 5th BRIE (February 2004), most people (52%) thought it unlikely that member
countries could achieve an agreement. The Brussels failure was still in their minds. We should say that
responsibility for the failure of the ICG December summit was fairly evenly distributed, although
France was the country most mentioned.
The Socialist Party, then in the opposition, criticized Aznar’s lack of commitment with the future
European Constitution, and his confrontation (Iraq war , the new and old Europe, the impact on
Transatlantic relations) with ‘core Europe’ (the Franco-German axis) but supported Spanish
negotiations in the ICG with the ‘institutional package’ which includes the voting system in the
Council, the distribution of seats in the European Parliament and the make-up of the Commission.
In the 6th BRIE (May 2004), with Zapatero already in government, euro-optimism regarding the
European Constitution increased. The majority (58%) now believe it is likely that the government in
the EU will achieve an agreement to pass the future Constitution this year, in 2004. Concerning the
trio meeting – France/Germany/UK– there was an important and negative reaction within the
Government, the political parties, the ministries and public opinion. Opinions diverged. Some analyst
related the meeting to the failure of the EU summit in Brussels in December 2003, after which France
and Germany said that the EU could only advance by means of a strategy involving ‘hard cores’ or
‘pioneering groups’. This concept was opposed by most member States, including Spain. Others
thought that this new ‘directoire’ with British participation was the answer that Paris and Berlin had
found when they realised that in an enlarged EU, the Franco-German axis is necessary, but
insufficient, to lead the European Union.
According to the Elcano Survey (February 2004), only 13% agree that ‘Europe needs the strong
countries, such as Germany, France and the UK to lead the European project and have more power
and influence than the rest’. On the contrary, 80% take the view that ‘all European countries are equal
and should have the same influence and decision-making capacity’. The consensus on this point is
such that there are no differences by age or political persuasion.
117
The general perception is that the mechanism of flexible integration within the treaties is better. The
instruments of flexibilization are considered the only solution to an increasing stagnation of the
European Union with 25 members. This is not the best solution, but within the European framework
the coherence of the process would be guaranteed. The Socialist Party, currently in office, has
accepted with great enthusiasm the flexibility mechanism, considering it a great step forward for the
development of the PESD.
institutions be involved in flexible integration, if your country is in favour of ESDP ‘within’ the
−
European Council
−
−
−
European Commission
−
European Parliament
It is not very clear how relations will be between the different European institutions with the new
institutional design.
Academic analysts believe that the European Commission must have an important role in
controlling common European interests.
Members of European parliaments are worried about accountability and believe that major
involvement of both the European Parliament and national parliaments is necessary in issues
related to CESP/ ESDP.
The broad consensus on the necessity of a European Council of Defence Ministries should be
highlighted.
b) If your country is in favour of a foreign and defence policy ‘outside’ the common institutional
Spain, which in the early 1990s made drastic reductions in military spending, in line with most other
European nations, is at present slightly increasing its defence budget since the beginning of the
century. However, most of the increase has been absorbed by personnel costs generated by the
transition from a predominantly conscript force to an all-volunteer force. In fact, the growing cost of
the ongoing army professionalisation process is affecting its already limited capacity for military
investment.
118
Defence expenditure as % of gross domestic product
Defence
expenditure
Average
Average
Average
Average
19801984
19851989
19901994
19951999
2.3
2.1
1.6
1.4
2000 2001
2002
2003e
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.2
as % of GDP
Source: OTAN Statistic s
Distribution of total defence expenditure by category
Average
Average
19901994
19951999
% devoted to personal expenditure
64.9
% devoted to equipment expenditure
12.4
%
devoted
expenditure
to
infrastructure 1.2
% devoted to other expenditure
21.2
1999
2000 2001
2002
2003e
66.5
66.0
63.9
63.4
62.4
61.7
12.8
11.5
12.9
12.7
12.8
11.8
0.8
1.8
1.7
2.2
2.3
2.3
19.7
20.8
21.4
21.7
22.4
24.2
Source: OTAN Statistics
costs?
Spain’s legal framework on defence and security policies is fully compatible with a European security
and defence policy. The Strategic Revision recognised as the basic criteria the necessity of having a
‘rapid joint reaction force’ with the object of participating in operations under the command of NATO,
the UN, the EU or ad-hoc coalitions. Also, to advance towards inter-operability and standardization
with both allies and European partners. Despite the formal coherence between the strategic revision
and ESDP, everybody agrees that many aspects raised in the Revision must be implemented.
So far, according to official resources, Spain has had no problems in fulfilling either these objectives
or the European requirements in defence matters.
There is not too much interest in pooling current military capabilities with other EU members.
Basically, because Spain is considered a medium-sized power, with national interests that must be
protected by its own Armed Forces and capabilities.
Academics, the Government and the opposition (Popular Party) believe there are some national
interests that are not shared by all our partners. That is why some capa city to act autonomously
remains indispensable and why specialization must be limited.
119
The general opinion is that Spain is able to join a permanent structured cooperation, both in political
and capability terms.
The Defence Ministry does not believe that we will have to face too many obstacles to participate in
this kind of enhanced cooperation, basically because we have enough financial and human resources
to meet established European commitments. Spain is capable of contributing almost immediately with
a national ‘Battle group’.
For some analysts, Spain is at the limit of its capabilities, so we urgently need to improve, both in
qualitative and quantitative terms, our deployable forces.
Structured cooperation, as finally accepted, did not please many in some official circles. The Protocol
establishing the accession and exclusion criteria to become a member of permanent cooperation, is
seen as an important improvement. But at the same time it is perceived as a very complicated system
in which some member states could be excluded if the rest of participants (by QMV) should so decide.
There has not been a significant debate related to the protocol of permanent structured cooperation.
We believe the reason is the lack of credibility that this kind of protocols and pacts have in Spain since
the breach of the Stability Pact by Germany and France. All sources believe that the protocol will be
further negotiated in order to make it accessible to every country which wants to participate in the
structured cooperation process.
The establishment of an autonomous European Security Defence Policy is accepted by the main
Spanish Political parties; however, their positions must be clarified.
The Popular Party has a very atlanticist position. The US and NATO (in this order) are considered the
real guarantee of Spanish security and defence. The autonomous cell inside NATO has been accepted
(the UK has also accepted) but there is some concern that these initiatives could negatively affect our
Atlantic alliance, or create the fiction that we have, in fact, a real PESD.
The Socialist Party, now in office, supports the creation of an autonomous European headquarters,
because it is essential for European strategic credibility. It also believes in the need to be independent
from the US in military terms.
In military sectors there are concerns about possible duplications at the strategic more than the
operational level. However, the creation of a fully autonomous military structure in the European
Union is perceived as an irreversible process.
cooperation?
120
III. Missions
Missions on behalf of the European Union include (Art. III-210 par.1 Draft Constitutional Treaty):
−
−
−
−
−
stabilisation
Only if the US is engaged
If Turkey is not opposed
Other conditions
According to the government’s position, Spain is capable and has the political will to participate in the
full range of new Petersberg tasks.
Nonetheless, the Popular Party has the perception that if our troops were to be involved in high-risk
missions with the certainty of entering in combat they would not go because the Socialist government
would prefer to stay out of the operation or offer alternative support.
According to the public interventions of different members of the Zapatero Government and their
electoral programmes, force should be used only as the last option. Spain will be involved in
international missions only under international law and with a strong United Nations mandate. The
European Defence policy must be the natural frame of Spanish action in the international scene.
There has not been a debate on the participation of Spanish troops in a EU mission. This has not been
a controversial issue, because the legal framework and the objectives have been very clear.
The transfer of the NATO Bosnia mission to the EU is seen as an opportunity to show that the EU can
lead military operations. The EU mission in Bosnia will put to the test the coherence, the effectiveness
and the efficiency of European military structures. It will be an interesting case for further study.
121
this instrument? 15. What were the positions in your country concerning a ‘passarelle’ clause from
unanimity to QMV (Art. III-213 par.3 Draft Constitutional Treaty): In which areas and under which
circumstances would it be possible for your country to accept such a clause? Is there a long-term
perspective of accepting such a clause?
There is a general acceptance of the need for this kind of flexible instruments in the field of
CFSP/ESDP, if they are openly for the rest of the members and not exclusive. The Popular Party, with
a more inter-governmental approach to the European integration process, has more doubts about the
‘passarele’ clause. The Socialist Party has preferred the extension of the circumstances in which it
could applied.
armaments (‘Agency’)
The Government’s position on this is to be part of the Agency from its creation. We should mention
that during the Spanish Presidency of the European Union (2002), a European armaments policy
received a great boost. The Government team, which prepared the programme in the field of defence
policy, proposed the setting up of a sole body to coordinate and systematize the different initiatives,
programmes, etc., in this particular and complex field.
The Franco-German document presented in the Convention proposed the creation of a European
Armament body. It was well received even by the United Kingdom, in the middle of the Iraqi crisis (at
the Le Touquet Franco-British Summit). The surprise came when the majority of countries wanted to
participate, for fear of being excluded in future, even when an important commitment is needed to
improve military capabilities.
According to offic ials’ declarations, there will be no significant difficulties because the commitments
to be made by Spain will be negotiated. However, some specialists emphasize the need to prepare a
corporate strategy to defend national interests. Spain must take its capacities and programmes to the
Agency (for example Bazan and Izar, that have a significant weight in our national industry).
Both the Spanish and Germany nominees were rejected. In the end, the British candidate won over the
French. The future CEO of the Agency, the British senior-executive Nick Witney, will be replaced
after his contract expires by a French executive, under the system of management by rotation as
decided by both countries and by Javier Solana (the High Representative for the European Common
Defence and Security Policy (ECDSP). The differences between the French and the British
perspectives are significant. While the UK seeks to harmonise military operational requirements,
supporting the initiative of the Defence Ministries, France prefers to advance further and let the
Agency define the equipment and armament programmes. Spain is closer to the British approach,
which is more technical than political.
122
Spain will become a member of OCCAR at the end of 2004.
Some analysts think that OCCAR is a difficult organization because each member defends its own
interests, and Spain has to do the same. The interests that are influenced by the OCCAR will impact on
employment, I+D and industrial and technological development in Spain.
LoI could be a good link between the European Agency and the OCCAR.
A mutual defence clause similar to Artic le V of the North Atlantic Treaty has been added, allowing
EU member states to assist other member-states if they are attacked. This 'assistance clause' has been
criticised during the Convention and ICG negotiations by Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden who
want to ensure that they maintain their militarily neutral status, but also by most Atlanticist countries
in the European Union such as the United Kingdom and Spain.
The most important concern regarding the clause was that it could weaken the Atlantic Defence
Alliance.
There was not a conflict between our membership and the clause. But for many sectors the declaration
did not mean anything and was not necessary because NATO already has one. From an academic and
pro-European point of view, the clause would be an important step to improve the trust between
member states.
clause?
VII. Conclusion
national sovereig nty due to flexible integration is perceived by the various groups?
123
List of interviewed experts
Teniente Coronel José Luis Andrés Martín, Área Unión Europea, Dirección General de Política de
Defensa, Ministerio de Defensa./ Lt. Colonel J.L. Andrés, European Union Area, Defence Policy
Direction, Ministry of Defence.
Dr. Félix Arteaga, Investigador sobre seguridad interior europea en el Instituto Universitario de
Investigación en Seguridad Interior (IUISI) de la UNED / Dr. F. Arteaga, Analyst in european security
issues in the University Institute of Internal Security, (UNED).
Teniente Coronel Juan Campins Miralles, Dirección General de Política de Defensa, Jefe de Área
OTAN y Defensa Europea./ Lt. Colonel J. Campins, Head of the OTAN and European Defence Area,
Defence Policy Direction, Ministry of Defence
D. Carles Casajuana Palet, Director del Departamento de Política Internacional y de Seguridad del
Gabinete de la Presidencia/ Mr. C. Casajuana. Director of the International and Security Department,
Prime Minister Office.
D. Ignacio Cosidó , Senador, Partido Popular (PP)./ Mr. I. Cosidó, Senador, People’s Party.
D. Rafael Estrella Pedrosa, Diputado a Cortes Generales, (PSOE)./ Mr. R. Estrella. Member of the
Spanish Parliament (Socialist Party).
Prof. Dr. Natividad Fernández Sola, Especialista en temas de defensa europea, vicerrectora de
Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad de Zaragoza./ Prof. Dr. N. Fernández. Analyst in European
defence issues, Deputy Vice-chancellor for International relations, Zaragoza University.
D. Julián García Vargas , Ex Ministro de Defensa / Mr. J. García -Vargas. Former Defence Minister.
D. Fernando Mansito, Representante adjunto de España ante el Comité Político y de Seguridad de la
UE. / Mr. F. Mansito. Spanish Deputy Representative to the EU Political and Security Comité (PoCo).
D. Pedro Méndez de Vigo, miembro del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Ministerio de
Defensa de España./ Mr. P. Méndez de Vigo. Analyst at the European Institute of Strategic Studies,
Ministry of Defence.
Dr. Martín Ortega, Investigador Principal Instituto de Estudios de Seguridad de la Unión Europea. /
Dr. M. Ortega, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Strategic Studies, Paris.
D. Joan Prat y Coll. Embajador permanente de España en el Consejo de la Organización del
Atlántico Norte / Mr. J. Prat, Spanish Ambassador to the Council of the North Atlantic Organization
Teniente General Félix Sanz Roldan, Director General de Política de Defensa, Ministerio de
Defensa./ Lt. General F. Sanz, General Director for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence
124
SWEDEN
Gunilla Herolf , Swedish Institute for International Affairs
I. In General
The most recent change of security doctrine took place in February of 2002, as a new formulation of
the Swedish doctrine was established. While military non-alignment was retained, the possibility of
change was not excluded. It was the result of a compromise among all parties except the Liberals.
Therefore its future in view of the phrase ‘military non-alignment has served Sweden well” was
interpreted in different ways by different parties.
Political parties vary in their views on continued non-alignment. The Liberal Party prefers immediate
application for NATO membership, whereas the Moderate Party (Conservatives) says that it is a
matter of when, rather than if. The Christian Democratic Party would like to have a new formulation,
since much has happened since 2002 but have not specified their particular view. The Green Party and
the Left Party (former Communists) are strongly against abandoning non-alignment. Both Prime
Minister Göran Persson and Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds of the ruling Social Democrats have
recently expressed their support for continued non-alignment.66
Neither adherence to mutual security guarantees within the EU defence nor membership of NATO are
suitable alternatives for Sweden, according to Göran Persson. However, the capability for participation
in crisis management operations has to be strengthened. According to the Persson Sweden cooperates
with NATO in all matters except when those concerning military guarantees. 67
A debate is pursued on non-alignment in which the daily newspapers and politicians are active.
Dagens Nyheter, the biggest one, is particularly interested in this issue, many editorials advocating
NATO membership. Former supreme commander as he retired wrote an article in which he claimed
that continued non-alignment was an untenable position, since Sweden was deprived of influence.68
The general public is, however, solidly for continued non-alignment. In a poll made in January 2004,
24 per cent of those interviewed declared that they were positive towards joining NATO, whereas 59
per cent preferred to remain non-alignment and 17 per cent were undecided. 69 Generally, people do not
see the need for military guarantees for Sweden. Nor do they see a need for joining NATO in order to
help out creating stability in Europe, since this task, as they see it, is carried out already now in well
working cooperation.
The Solana Paper elicited very little interest in itself. The new threats have, however, for some time
been subject to much interest. The factor that initiated the ongoing change in the Swedish defence
forces was the end of the Cold War, which made the previous defence system, centring on territorial
defence aimed at meeting the Soviet Union, obsolete.
66
See the Moderates at www.moderaterna.se; Christian Democrats at www.kristdemokraterna.se; the Liberals at
www.folkpartiet.se; the Centre Party at www.centerpartiet.se; the Greens at www.mp.se; the Social Democrats
at www.socialdemokraterna.se; the Left Party at www.vansterpartiet.se; See also Sveriges Riksdag,
Utrikespolitisk debatt [Swedish Parliament, Foreign Policy debate], Report of the proceedings 2003/04:61, 30
Jan. 2004, Prime Minister Göran Persson; and 2003/04:67, 11 Feb. 2004, Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds.
67
The Swedish Parliament, Report of the proceedings, 2003/04:61, 30 Nov. 2003, Prime Minister Göran
Persson.
68
Johan Hederstedt, ‘Increasingly expensive to say no to NATO. Non-alignment cannot give Sweden full
influence in EU’s security cooperation,’ Dagens Nyheter, 17 Dec. 2003.
69
Svenska Dagbladet, 17 Jan. 2004.
125
With this came also a new geographical focus, since threats against Sweden were no longer seen as
suitable to meet only by forces in Sweden. While Sweden had for many years been very active in
international activities, since these were now carried out in Europe and were directed at the variety of
new threats, they were now also seen to have a direct impact on Sweden’s own security.
Two particular and interlinked threats are seen to be of special importance: international terrorism and
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, both important for the CFSP/ESDP. The fight against
terrorism must, however, it is claimed, in order to maintain legitimacy and popular support, be pursued
in accordance with international law.70 Swedish defence is now being restructured for more flexibility,
including availability at short notice. Typical for all the new challenges, such as terrorist attacks, as
described by the Parliamentary Defence Commission, is that Sweden will have to meet them in
cooperation with others.71
While there has been an awareness of initiatives for flexible integration these have not been much
debated, since Swedes are generally against concepts such as Kerneuropa, directoire aso. As France,
Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg held their meeting in Brussels in April of 2003 their initiative
was criticized by Göran Persson and Foreign Minister Anna Lindh. One of the arguments were that
this initiative created further divisions in Europe at a time when the EU had just demonstrated how
divided it was vis-à-vis the Iraq war and thereby contributed to weaken it further. In addition, the
initiative risked creating transatlantic rifts. 72 Ideas such as those proposed by the four were also
disliked by Sweden since generally Sweden did not believe that Europe would become stronger
through initiatives like these. Of course, it was also disadvantageous to Sweden, which would not
become part of it.
Sweden had hoped for these proposals to be abandoned through the activitie s of the UK and others.
When this did not happen, together with other non-aligned after the Naples meeting in late November
2004, they launched their proposal for a change.
As expressed by Göran Persson, flexible integration is not unnatural, but it has to be based on the right
of all to join. After the change of the proposal, that took place in early December, the prime minister
and the foreign minister expressed their view that Sweden should join the structured cooperation.
The IGC results (after the compromises made in early December) were seen as satisfying for Sweden
and the Prime Minister saw it as important that all the progress made would not be deleted by the
failure to agree. As obvious from the answer to question 2, no debate on Kerneuropa took place after
this failure.
negative one?
Mostly meetings between the three have been reported without any positive or negative connotations.
There is, however, generally in Sweden a fear of the three forming a directoire, which is reflected in
newspaper articles. There is, however, at the same time also a wish that Europe will be more united in
these matters, for which good relations between the three major ones is a prerequisite.
70
Försvarsberedningen, Vårt militära försvar – vilja och vägval [Parliamentary Defence Commission, Our
Military Defence – Commitment and Choices], Ds 2003: 34, 3 June 2003, p. 20.
71
See Regeringens proposition 2001/02:10, Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret [Government Proposition
2001/02. Continued Reform of Total Defence].
72
See Göteborgsposten 18 June 2003 and Dagens Nyheter 29 April 2003.
126
Sweden took a ‘European’ position vis-à-vis the Iraq problem. It did not exclude an eventual attack
but only after a UN decision. In the first hand, however, the monitors should be given more time to
find weapons of mass destruction. The prime minister many times afterwards deplored the fact that it
had not been possible to find a common European standpoint. The attack, since carried out without
support of the UN Security Council, was a breach against international law.73
The American policies were a cause for concern: unilateral policies, disregard for the UN and for
international law were all criticized. Since one of the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay is a Swedish
citizen demands for giving him a trial has been a matter for discussion with American representatives
on a number of occasions.
The Swedish policy has increasingly seen Europe as important. This might partly be a consequence of
the recent American policies, including the experiences of Iraq. It should, however, also be seen as a
natural consequence of the ongoing build-up of the European Union in terms of resources and not least
the fact that it is now enlarging with ten new countries. In addition to this there is also a clear wish in
Sweden to re-establish good relations to the United States. While realizing that there are still major
disagreements between the two countries they are seen to have much in common. Sweden also realizes
its dependence on American presence in Europe.74
Sweden feels strongly that all such work should be carried out within the institutional framework of
the EU. No groups within the country have expressed any other views.
European Council
European Commission
European Parliament
Sweden prefers the present system of involvement of the various bodies in ESDP matters.
Military expenditure is being reduced. In 2002 it was 1.7 per cent, whereas in 2000 it amounted to 2.2
per cent of GDP.
costs?
Swedish military forces are in the process of being restructured in order to become more flexible for
different kinds of tasks. They also need to be available at short notice for international missions. The
Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), operational since 1 July
2003, envisages joint Nordic contributions.
73
Statsminister Göran Perssons anförande i riksdagen vid den särskilda debatten om Irakfrågan, 20 mars 2003
[Speech by Prime Minister Göran Persson at the special debate on Iraq, 20 March 2003]
74
Swedish Parliament. Records of the proceedings 2003/04:67, 11 Feb. 2004, Laila Freivalds.
127
The new supreme commander, Håkan Syrén, in a report to the Swedish government on 30 April 2004
has declared that the development of a European rapid reaction capability should be the guideline for
the continued reform of the Swedish military forces. Several laws need to be introduced, such as a
more flexible type of employment for officers and a reform of the conscription system. The battle
group concept, according to the supreme commander, is the right way to go. After discussions with his
colleagues in Europe, the supreme commander sees no alternative to this concept.
The ambition is to increase the capability gradually during the period 2005-2007. After 2008 Sweden
should be able to contribute with a battle group of 1 500 soldiers (plus another 300 for reinforcement).
Their task will be to solve problems in high- risk environments outside the EU area leaving some 1015 days after a decision on such a mission is taken, but with a fairly short staying power (30-120
days). They will also be available for national tasks.75
See also above, question 7.The Swedish government is positive towards Swedish participation in
structured cooperation. So are also most of the political parties (the exceptions being the Green Party
and the Left Party). In many of the statements during discussions in the Parliamentary Committee on
European Union Affairs speakers underlined the view that this means a strengthening of the crisis
management tasks for which the aim is to prevent tragedies such as Srebrenica to happen again. 76
Sweden wants all kinds of flexible cooperation to be open to all. As a small country it realizes that
only such a principle would allow Sweden to join.
The Swedish government is content with the proposal after the changes made in early December, since
they meant that all countries would be allowed to participate and the decisions on structured
cooperation would be taken by all EU members.
Sweden was negative to the idea of an autonomous headquarters. The changes in the proposal were
greeted with satisfaction. As expressed by Göran Persson, a civilian-military planning unit was needed
in order to complement the facilities of NATO. This was, he declared, entirely uncontroversial and in
line with earlier practices.77
cooperation?
No statements have been made on this.
III. Missions
75
See web site of Swedish defence forces, www.mil.se, www.mil.se/article.php?id=11113.
See record of proceedings of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on European Union Affairs, 5 Dec.and 11
Dec. 2003, www.riksdagen.se
77
The Swedish Parliament, Report of the proceedings, 2003/04:50, 16 Dec. 2003, Göran Persson. .
76
128
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation
Other conditions.
Sweden is willing to participate in all these kinds of tasks and missions when preceded by a UNSC
authorization. Sweden has emphasized the need to include also conflict prevention as an important
task, not least during its presidency in the spring of 2001. However, this does not exclude military
ones, including peace enforcement. The Parliamentary Defence Commission has stressed the need to
practice and prepare for the military tasks, above all peace enforcement. See also below.
Sweden has participated in all of these. The Prime Minister, when mentioning this fact, has declared it
to be an important act of solidarity. 78 In the Artemis Sweden (together with France) was involved in
peace enforcement activities in order to stop attempts to ethnic cleansing. There has been no public
debate on this. The views of government representatives were that this was a good example of a
mission that was needed, and also a good example of when the EU was able to help the UN.79
this instrument?
Constructive abstention is seen as a good instrument. There is no information available of any
thoughts of using it.
such a clause?
The government and all the political parties are against the passarelle. The Prime Minister sees one
possibility for using it. This is when something dramatic happens and at the same time the Union
agrees that the issue cannot be handled through the usual procedure. It would, however, not be suitable
for a situation with conflicting views.80
78
The Swedish Parliament, Report of the proceedings 2004/04: 61, 30 Jan. 2004, Göran Persson.
Defence Minister Leni Björklund before the Parliamentary Standing Committee for European Union Affairs, 6
Feb. 2004, www.riksdagen.se.
80
Göran Persson appearing before the Parliamentary Standing Committee for European Union Affairs 11 Dec.
2003. See also web site of the EU2004 Committee: www.EU2004.se.
79
129
Sweden is very interested in participating in this Agency, having itself a substantial military industry
sector. There are no financial or human problems.
In due course it will be an integrated part but the final details are not yet defined.
The clause was discussed in terms of what kind of EU would be the result of introducing such as
clause and also to a degree the consequences for Sweden. The Government, which, together with
Austria, Finland and Ireland had protested against the original formulation, discussed the one proposed
by the four at the meetings of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on European Union Affairs. The
Liberal Party was content with the original formulation and together with the Christian Democrats it
argued for stronger formulations on solidarity in the proposal of the four. The Green Party and the Left
Party did not find the new formulations satisfactory since they were not sufficient in order to protect
Swedish non-alignment. 81
The new proposal was accepted by all parties even though the Green Party and the Left Party were still
critical, arguing that Sweden was now “less non-aligned”.. The Moderates and the Centre Party saw
the formulations as satisfactory and having no effect on Swedish non-alignment policy, whereas the
Liberal expressed their contentedness that Sweden was now less non-aligned. The Prime Minister and
the Foreign Minister argued that the formulation had no effect whatsoever on Swedish nonalignment.82
No.
clause?
?
VII. Conclusion
81
82
Parliamentary Standing Committe for European Union Affairs, 5 Dec. 2003, www.riksdagen.se
Parliamentary Standing Committee on European Union Affairs, 11 Dec. 2003, www.riksdagen.se
130
A crucial element for Sweden is the UN role in crisis management. NATO and EU military cris is
management tasks are both seen as serving the UN. The view on NATO membership has been stable
for a long time and little points to any change. Swedish representatives are, however, worried out
being left out of important developments. Interoperability and the possibility to maintain technical
competence on a high level are crucial matters.
131
UNITED KINGDOM (UK)
Timothy Garden, Royal Institute for International Affairs
The UK Government has been actively engaged in trying to update its security and defence policy in
the light of its changing threat assessments. On coming to power in 1997, the new Labour
Government carried out a radical strategic defence review which sought to give Britain the capability
to engage in rapid deployments at a distance. Prime Minister Blair changed British policy on European
Defence in 1998, and the St Malo summit unblocked UK resistance to moves towards ESDP. He
helped forge a NATO consensus for the Kosovo operation in 1999. All these moves were broadly
welcomed by all the UK political parties, the media, and expert commentators. Those with antiEuropean views worried about the effect on NATO of moves towards greater European defence cooperation.
After 11 September 2001, the UK Government did a brief reappraisal of the conclusions of its earlier
defence review, but considered that expeditionary capability was still the key focus. The lead up to the
Iraq war of 2003 strained the political consensus on defence and security policy. The move back to a
closer transatlantic relationship was welcomed by Conservatives, and by the significant section of the
media who support anti-European agendas. The Liberal Democrats opposed the rush to war, and
supported the need for closer co-operation with EU partners. The Labour party was divided.
After the combat phase of the Iraq operation was complete, the Government published a further White
Paper on defence policy. Although, it lacked clear forward programme and structure details, this
policy paper is thought by most commentators to continue the move of UK military capabilities
towards operations in support of US-led interventions. UK policy now formally recognises that major
military operations will be done in alliance with the US. At the same time, the British Government has
tried to mend fences in the EU and has been co-operating since the Iraq war in furthering ESDP.
Public opinion normally takes little interest in defence policy. The armed forces are among the most
respected professions in the country. There is widespread mistrust of any moves that might be
characterised as a European Army. There was deep public mistrust of intervention in Iraq.
The Solana paper, agreed on 12 December 2003, generated no interest among UK politicians, the
media or the public. Only a small group of academic specialists followed its development. It appears
that the UK Government preferred it to pass without comment given the difficulties all moves on
European defence issues cause.
negative one?
The discussions on all aspects of the constitutional draft have been marked by emotion rather than
substance. The detailed proposals were considered only by parliamentary and academic specialists.
The wider debate has centred not on the proposals, but on the question of whether a referendum is
132
required in order to ratify the constitution. The two opposition political parties argue for a referendum
(but for opposite reasons), and the Government initially argued against one for fear of being unable to
carry any vote on Europe with the people. In a surprise move, Prime Minister Blair changed the policy
in April 2004 to one of having a referendum. Given that the Conservative opposition party remains
firmly transatlantic and NATO orientated, it has little interest in advocating any developments which
would strengthen CFSP/ESDP. The pro-European Liberal Democrats strongly advocate the need for a
security pillar which works in Europe, and welcomed the majority of the draft constitution proposals.
The Government plays to a domestic anti-European audience by highlighting changes which it will
require before ratification. It seeks to ensure that the UK is at the centre of decision making on foreign
and security policy matters, while wishing to preserve its sovereignty
The UK, German, French meeting has been welcomed not unnaturally by the British government, and
causes few political or public problems. It is variously characterised as Britain working with Europe,
Britain at the centre of Europe, and Britain being important to the Franco-German axis. All believe
that it is good for the UK and good for Europe.
The Iraqi conflict has been more difficult for the UK in its relations with EU partners than any event
since joining the Community. The close relationship with the US in the lead up to Iraq caused many
fractures in relationships, particularly with France and Germany. The government and the
Conservative opposition encouraged anti-French sentiment in the media, which further exacerbated
public antipathy to the EU in general and CFSP in particular. Although significant moves have been
made in recent months, there is still much damage to be repaired. It is fortunate that 2004 is the
centenary of the Entente Cordiale between France and England as this is giving greater impetus to
repairing relationships. However, the continuing problems in Iraq, and differences of view over the
way forward continue to cause problems.
There has been limited debate about the issue of flexible integration (or closer cooperation) in
CFSP/ESDP. What debate there has been has focused upon the effect flexible integration will have on
Britain’s commitment to NATO, the worry being that it could undermine NATO. The UK has not
been opposed to flexible integration per se. But the UK has been keen to avoid any form of flexibility
leading to a position where the UK appears to be relegated to a ‘second tier’’ of the EU. .At the same
time the UK Government is aware of the danger of such a group emerging and Britain not being able
or willing to participate. The UK has been keen to avoid not being constrained by the EU and smaller
states. It has suited the UK (along with other large member states) to be able to freely collude with
other large powers such as the US or Russia.
Although the UK is suspicious of some elements of the common institutional framework, there are
very few voices that call for CFSP/ESDP to be dealt with outside it. The UK does not support such
proposals as that of Jacques Delors for a "Federation of Nation States", with a specific institutional
framework or "a treaty within the Treaty".
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European Council
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European Commission
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European Parliament
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The UK Government has long taken the position that CFSP and ESDP are a matter for decisions by
Member States in the Council. The UK Government has also repeatedly made clear its view that
national parliaments have the primary role in the scrutiny of polic y and decisions in these areas while
noting the arrangements set out in the draft Treaty for the European Parliament to be consulted on the
main aspects of CFSP, including ESDP. The UK government also notes the need for rapid responses
and the difficulties this presents in communicating with both the European Parliament and national
parliaments. There has been little debate as to what the UK would do if faced with the prospect of a
group of member states creating a separate framework from that of the EU. The UK has adapted its
position on structured cooperation so as to ensure that this development does not lead to a separate
system. It is to be assumed that the UK would seek to pursue a similar approach and in doing so water
down the proposals. The UK would not accept any idea of a federation or stronger supranational
system.
The UK Government has indicated in its budget plans announced in March 2004 for 2005-2008 that it
intends to increase defence spending above the rate of general inflation. It has not said how much the
increase will be. Broadly over the period 1997 to 2004, UK defence expenditure has kept pace with
inflation, but no more. Two years ago, the MOD introduced a new resource accounting budgetary
system. This means that figures from previous years, which were expressed in cash terms, are no
longer directly comparable with the new resource figures. This change has led some commentators to
wrongly base assessments of UK performance on the new higher figures. The broad trends remain a
decline in real defence expenditure from 1991 to 2000 followed by a slight increase between 2000 and
2003. UK defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP continues to decline. In cash terms, the UK
spent about £24 bn in the year 2002-03 which was 2.4% of GDP.
Defence expenditure is generally considered by the academic community to be correctly weighted
towards the equip ment programme. However there are a number of expensive equipment projects still
to be delivered which were more appropriate to the Cold War. The new defence white paper seeks to
move towards network enabled capabilities. The rationalisation of the UK armed forces has been
largely completed, and much of the support area has been contracted out to commercial organisations.
There is thus little room for further rationalisation, and commentators believe that the budget is under
severe strain from both operatio nal commitments and rises in costs.
The media and public have focused on equipment shortages for Iraq and procurement scandals, but
there is little support for rises in defence budgets.
costs?
The UK government has from time to time pushed forward on policy initiatives to develop ESDP. It
has seen co-operation with France as a key method for advancing capabilities. However differences
over Iraq have made such co-operation difficult recently. Nevertheless, the UK has shown a
willingness to commit significant capabilities to the Helsinki Headline Goals. It has also shown a
willingness to provide both forces and headquarters facilities for EU sponsored operations. It is not
apparent that any changes have been made to existing defence plans and programmes in the light of
needs for ESDP. The UK Government claims that its forward programme is a model for other EU
countries.
Despite some UK academic and think tank proposals for pooling forces among EU members, there has
been little enthusiasm in the UK Ministry of Defence. It is usually argued that UK forces must be able
to operate without relying on contributions or permissions from other nations. This constraints does
not appear to apply to dependence on the USA. The Conservative Party is strongly opposed to any
increased integration of EU military capabilities. The Liberal Democrats have pooling proposals in
their defence policy document. The media takes little interest in EU military operations, unless they
can be characterised as risks of developing a European Army.
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The UK Government was initially sceptical of the ideas behind structured co-operation. It feared a
number of things. It was concerned that the original ideas by France, Germany, Belgium and
Luxembourg were an example of gesture without real content, which would annoy the Americans
without achieving greater coherence among European forces. The UK feared that it would be used to
create an ‘avant-garde’ group of Member States which would be incompatible with the overall
workings of the EU. However, the British position changed following the Franco-British-German trilateral talks in November 2003. At this meeting the British government seemed to ease its opposition
to the Convention’s proposals, and accepted the idea of a specifically European military headquarters,
as long as this was integrated into the NATO framework. This approach was confirmed at a meeting
between President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair on 24 November in London, when the British
Prime Minister emphasised that, despite his desire to strengthen European defence, nevertheless
‘NATO will remain the cornerstone of our defence’.’
Britain’s change of approach stemmed in part from recognition by all involved that ESDP would need
to be built from the bottom up through the development of specialist contributions from EU members.
The UK secured assurances that became part of the package, such as the ability of all states to join
forms of structured cooperation at any stage. The UK has sought guarantees and reassurances about
how member states will qualify for participation in an operation and to ensure that the Council has
oversight of the initiative. These reflect two of the UK’s concerns: First, that member states should be
ready to develop improved defence capabilities. Secondly, in doing so member states should commit
themselves to supply by 2007 (through either national contributions or multinational contribution)
units to carry out crisis management missions, supported by sufficient transport and logistical
capabilities
The UK has appeared to recognise that US leadership in major military operations will not be put at
risk by ESDP and structured cooperation. UK views ESDP as only modest in terms of desired military
capabilities and the UK should therefore face no significant problems in contributing. For the UK,
high intensity military operations will continue to depend on the US. The EU will therefore continue
to need to look to NATO and the US to assist in major military operation in the Balkans or near
abroad.
Again, there has been limited debate on this issue. The note from the Italian Presidency was largely in
response to the emergence of a Franco-British-German deal in the preceding weeks. For the UK the
wording of ‘permanent structured co-operation’ is seen to be widely open enough to include all EU
member states and therefore avoid the possibility of creating different tiers or divisions in European
integration.
There have been some concerns in the media about suggestions that ‘structured cooperation’ would be
authorised by the Council acting by QMV. The UK government would prefer Council to decide by
unanimity on the setting up and membership of any ‘structured co-operation’ group.
The moves by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003 to establish an EU military
operations headquarters at Tervuren angered the UK government. It was characterised by British
officials as an attempt to subvert NATO while providing no real substance or capabilities. However,
135
later in the year at Berlin, Prime Minister Blair was reported as having agreed to a separate planning
capacity for the EU. This caused some tension with the US, and intense diplomacy followed.
The UK argues that it is willing to see such a European HQ slowly evolve out of the EU planning cell,
but that this should emerge through experience. The UK has now accepted that an EU planning
capability should be established provided that it keeps close links with NATO. The UK has been keen
to make it clear that the EU is not creating a full headquarters but is instead seeking to enhance the EU
military staff (EUMS) through a non-permanent cell with civil and military components. British fears
that the cell would allow the EU to act autonomously have been allayed by the cell having the
implementation of military operations listed as a low ranking priority.
cooperation?
Structured cooperation can be seen as an attempt to go beyond ‘enhance cooperation’ and allow a
small number of endowed states to drive forward ESDP in the name of the whole Union. The United
Kingdom is uneasy with such an idea and would therefore not wish to rule out the possibility of
enhance cooperation. For the UK flexibility within ESDP should seek to include as many countries as
possible and avoid creating second and third rank membership within the EU. At the same time it
should allow member states to opt out when necessary.
III. Missions
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stabilisation
Other conditions.
The British Government has declared that it will in future plan on the assumption that major high
intensity warfare will only be conducted as part of a coalition in alliance with the USA. Lesser
operations can be done in coalition, through NATO, through the EU or independently depending on
the circumstances. Thus in the right circumstances, the UK would be prepared to carry out any of the
missions specified in the EU draft constitutional treaty. If the USA wished to be engaged, then the UK
would probably support US participation. If NATO wanted to undertake the task, then the UK would
probably support it as a NATO operation. However, it would not be a necessary condition in either
case. The Turkish view would not be a significant factor. The UK does not require a UN resolution,
but is more comfortable when there is one. There would be no other constraints such as minimum
participation. If the UK supported a particular mission, it is unlikely to be moved by a state which
opposed.
136
The Conservative Party would feel more strongly attached to US and NATO participation. The Liberal
Democrats are more supportive of greater EU action in these fields. The public and media do not
examine the issues in any great detail.
The debate has only been at the level of elites. All UK interest groups have been content with EU
participation provided that NATO agrees and the EU has the capability. There was a slight UK
diplomatic concern over the NATO-EU consultation process for Artemis, but it came to nothing.
There is generally a welcome for the transfer of the NATO Bosnia mission to the EU provided that the
necessary liaison arrangements are in place between NATO and the EU.
The UK government sees advantage in engaging other EU members in more demanding operations.
However, it is also sensitive to US concerns about any adverse effects on NATO.
this instrument?
No ‘parts of’ the United Kingdom could currently use, or seek to use ‘constructive abstention’ in the
field of CFSP/ESDP. The UK Government as the Member State of the EU has exclusive competence
in the field of CFSP/ESDP. There has been limited debate about the use of this instrument.
The UK has faced a conundrum with constructive abstention. HMG is concerned that progress in EU
common foreign policy should not be hampered by the excessive use of vetoes, especially by smaller
member states. At the same time it is opposed to any moves to qualified majority voting in CFSP. The
UK Government has faced substantial media coverage over the issue of QMV in CFSP with the UK
insisting that this was one of its ‘red lines’ for the IGC. UK Governments have been keen to show that
it is for the individual member state to decide whether or not to abstain. The UK Government has also
stressed that constructive abstention cannot be used to make the UK act against its national interest if
it is in a minority. Media discussion of QMV for decisions about implementation are often taken to
mean the UK can be forced to follow a particular line on CFSP.
But the UK has been reflecting on ways to strengthen and enhance the use of constructive abstention
and possibly of developing enhanced cooperation which has led to some movement on the idea of
structured cooperation (see above).
such a clause?
The UK government is strongly against any move towards QMV in the CFSP area. There is no long
term prospect of change in this respect. At the beginning of the debates surrounding the European
Convention the UK Government did state that it would consider extension of QMV on a case by case
basis stressing that any future decision to move to QMV would have to be made by unanimous
agreement in the Council. But HMG has increasingly ‘red lined’ extension to CFSP (along with tax
and defence, but not in JHA).
The UK Government has been an enthusiastic proponent of the Agency, and sees it as an important
mechanism to improve European capabilities. The UK wants the agency to be “capability led” and
follow a four-fold modus operandi that would allow it to: determine the capabilities that are required;
137
evaluate honestly how far short of these capabilities the member states are falling; analyse the way in
which gaps can be bridged; lobby, bully and argue for solutions that will overcome deficiencies. It has
been working closely with France to ensure that progress is made in this area. The UK will participate,
but it is not clear to what extent it will affect current UK defence programmes. Questions arise as to
the extent the UK will want to be seen to give up independent capabilities in both defence
development and actual military units. HMG is concerned with the extent to which this will appear to
limit the UK’s ambitions to maintain an independent capability. The UK defence budget is in
difficulty, and the focus is more on following US equipment proposals. There is an awareness of US
concerns over the sharing of technology which the UK wishes to avoid jeopardising, and on which
grounds the opposition Conservative Party opposes the creation of the Agency. UK defence companies
also remain torn between co-operation with partners in Europe and the US.
HMG also stresses that the Armaments Agency should be responsible to and run by the Member
States, and that it is important for the Member States to recognise that possessing the correct
capabilities is only useful if they have a willingness to use them.
The UK would like the Agency to focus upon the development of capabilities and in doing so stresses
the central role of Defence Ministers in the agency’s decision-making process. This creates a tension
with the French government who would prefer the Agency to be multi-functional in nature and that
this should therefore be taken into account in the composition of the Steering Board. Unlike Britain,
France would like to ensure that the views of other ministries were represented where this is relevant,
namely in debating industrial or research questions.
The UK has argued that nothing will be achieved unless the 25 member state defence ministries are
prepared to buy-in to a shared vision of how Europe’s defence capabilities are to develop and how
Europe’s procurement and technology should be geared in its support. As a result the UK pushes for
defence ministers to be on the steering board of the agency and the Secretary -General of the Council
of the European Union/High Representative for CFSP to head it so as to avoid parochial concerns.
The UK government also has security concerns which mainly surround the possibility of jeopardising
the sharing of technology with the US.
The UK would prefer the Agency to look more to partnership and networks with existing bodies such
as LOI and OCCAR. The agency should be seen as a new point of coordination. The UK would like to
avoid a vast bureaucratic agency and thus seek to ensure it maintains only a small core staff.
In the British Government White Paper on its approach to the draft consitutional treaty (Cm5934 dated
September 2003), the UK government position was clearly set out for Parliament. It said:
"We will not, however, support all the proposals as currently set out in the Convention text. We
believe that a flexible, inclusive approach and effective links to NATO are essential to the success of
ESDP. We will not agree to anything which is contradictory to, or would replace, the security
guarantee established through NATO." This approach was supported by all 3 political parties and has
had very little public discussion as a result.
The UK position, agreed by all political parties, is that NATO membership remains of key importance
and provides the basis for collective security. There are no areas of media or academia which make a
case for the alternative European approach to mutual defence.
21.
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Given that the UK approach is that a mutual defence clause will not be acceptable, then this is not seen
as a problem.
clause?
The UK supports enhanced cooperation in the more limited form of a “solidarity clause” whereby all
member states come to the assistance of a single member state suffering from a terrorist attack or a
man- made or natural disaster. For the UK, the corollary to this compromise was an explicit assertion
that NATO remains the body ensuring collective defence for its members.
VII. Conclusion
The UK remains strongly committed to NATO, but also recognises the role of the EU, alongside
NATO, as the preferred institutional framework for flexible solutions in defence policy, instead of adhoc arrangements outside the EU.
At the same time the UK argues that Britain, France and Germany are key to advancing agreement on
CFSP/ESDP issues, with the Dutch and the Nordic states as effective players The UK, France and
Germany possess sufficient political, economic and military weight to make CFSP/ESDP credible. It
is upon this relationship that the foundations of CFSP/ESDP rest.
The UK government views itself as one of the most committed to making an effective ESDP work.
The UK is little interested in rhetorical integration when there is a lack of necessary troops or
equipment or even a willingness to use them. There is impatience with the seemingly endless
multilateral meetings to discuss common defence policy, without evident implementation of what has
been agreed. There is an established distaste in London for governments that propose new institutions
without committing necessary capabilities to make them work.
Britain continues to view participation in CFSP/ESDP as necessary in order to sell the ideas to
Washington and allay fears of undermining NATO. For the UK government, a strong measurement of
the success of ESDP/CFSP has been the extent to which the EU successfully engages with the US.
Succesive governments have worried about whether the US (or others such as Russia) take the EU
seriously in defence and foreign policy. For this reason Blair has been keen for the EU to engage with
the US to show that allies are useful and that multilateralism serves US interests. This seems set to
remain a priority for the UK.
The UK sees itself as a leading player in European and global foreign, security and defence issues.
The UK has increasingly been seen to pursue its global interests and responsibilities through the EU.
For this reason Britain often views CFSP/ESDP instrumentally as a means of promoting her interests,
and therefore UK involvement in CFSP has been seen more as a case of adaptation rather than a break
in foreign policy priorities. In doing so this creates a contradiction of wanting to continue to possess
and retain an independent capability in foreign and defence affairs while at the same time facing
demands to accept limitations in CFSP/ESDP.
In comparison to European integration in general, the UK has not shown an attitude of aloofness
towards EPC/CFSP/ESDP and has been involved from the beginning. Furthermore, the UK has been
closely involved in European security and defence since 1945. Problems arise when co-operation
becomes formal and structured within the EU and begins to take on ‘supranational’ overtones.
There is a long-standing fear of a French led CFSP/ESDP. This has strong connections to why the UK
was seen to join European integration in the first place, and why France twice vetoed UK membership.
In fact the UK is similar to France in its approach to CFSP in that they both use it instrumentally.
France is also acknowledged to be the key bi-lateral partner for work in CFSP and ESDP.
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The UK’s change of approach to the issue of ‘structured cooperation’ has displayed the UK’s
recognition that a major Franco-German defence initiative is highly possible over the coming decade,
whether within the European Union or outside it. This was undoubtedly a factor in persuading the UK
government to adapt its scepticism to the original Franco-German proposals. This reflects the longstanding motivating fear of exclusion from important developments on the continent.
There is a deep suspicion of supranational/federal policy making. As a consequence there is no
appetite for ideas that seek to move foreign or defence policy from the intergovernmental to the
supranational. The debate often centres on the domestically contested concept of sovereignty.
The presentation, wording and symbolism of involvement in the EU are crucial. The British press has
constantly forced successive governments to be on the defensive against claims that sovereignty is
being surrendered to ‘Europe’. Recent media debates about the European constitution highlighted the
fact that the EU would have such national characteristics as a ‘Foreign Minister’ or a ‘President’. This
is also fed by the much wider debate on membership of the Euro. In general there has been a longstanding inability to communicate the depth of engagement in the EU, with foreign and defence policy
being no exception.
The domestic debate about Europe remains emotional and difficult. The Euro plays into all aspects of
the debate.
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FLEXIBLE INTEGRATION IN THE AREA OF CFSP/ESDP Debates

Transcription

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