France - The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and

France has long-established procedures for approved
consumer organizations bringing actions to defend general consumer or investor interests, involving injunctive
relief, but debate on the introduction of collective damages actions has yet to resolve into reform. Traditional
principles oppose an opt-out approach.
France
By
VÉRONIQUE MAGNIER
Keywords: civil law; group litigation; ECHR procedural principles; opt-out; class action; contingency fees; consumer law; securities
regulation; competition law
The French Civil Litigation
System, the Increasing Role of
Judges, and Influences from
Europe
As part of the civil law family in Europe, the
French legal system has built a procedural
framework for litigation deeply rooted in
Romano-canonical origins. French civil litigation
does not include the main features that distinguish common law litigation, including pretrial
discovery, trial by jury, and the American rule on
costs. The main source of civil law procedure lies
in the Code of civil procedure, enacted in 1975
and following the 1806 Code. Although this code
has been amended several times and been
shaped by case law, its basic structure and characteristic features have endured. The French
civil trial is adversarial and not inquisitorial.
French rules underwent important changes
since the 1970s, reflecting some conceptual
evolution (Guinchard et al. n.d.).1 As a result of
an accelerating expansion of litigation over the
past thirty years, French justice had to face dramatic consequences that revealed crucial weaknesses and several shortcomings in the
administration of justice. The response of legislators faced with having to guarantee better
Véronique Magnier is a professor of law and heads the
master’s degree in business law at Paris XI Law School.
DOI: 10.1177/0002716208328332
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access to justice for everyone has been to aim for a more flexible and efficient
administration of justice, adopting a pragmatic and economical vision of justice.
The most important reform is entrusting a new judge with the care of leading the
preliminary investigation of major civil cases to put the dispute into shape for
hearing and decision (mise en état). Giving judges more power was intended to
allow better control over the entire proceeding and alleviate delays and costs.
Accompanying the considerable demand for democratization of access to justice in France, procedural rules developed rapidly under the influence of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR), which constantly shapes French procedure. Harmonization
of laws in Europe has also given rise to new expectations, especially among consumers. Globalization is a sociological element that also cannot be neglected,
especially in the European Union area.2 An increasing ideology of compensation
has arisen, requiring further reforms in France, including in relation to collective
redress mechanisms.
Overview of Collective Redress Mechanisms in France
Origins and relevant literature
French legal literature on class actions started appearing at the beginning of
the seventies with the expansion of what was called the “consuming society.”
Jurists expressed a need for introducing a group litigation mechanism in France
contemporaneously with a need for greater protection of consumers from abuse
of companies offering more consumer products and services. Meanwhile, specialists in civil procedure raised the question of incompatibility between reforms
induced by the introduction of a group litigation system and the main procedural
principles enacted in the new 1975 Code of civil procedure. The majority of
those academics recognized that the procedural principles applying to French
procedure hardly fitted a class action mechanism (Guinchard 1990/2005), but a
minority of them, mostly inspired by comparative studies (Cappelletti 1975; Kötz
1984, 103; Martin 1994; Martin and Martin 1984; Mazen 1987, 373; Smit 1975,
449; Stevenson 1975, 719), suggested that these principles were anachronistic
and had to be adapted to establish a better social justice system in France
(Caballero 1985, 247; Thery 1976/1979).
Once the act introducing the joint representative action for consumers was
passed in 1992, commentators rapidly pointed out the ineffectiveness of the new
procedure and the need for a true class action (Bore 1997, 1995; Picod 2005;
Redding 2007). Identical criticism was formulated against the proposals for a new
reform in 2006 (Claret and Paisant 2006; Fenouillet 2006, 2005; Gaudin 2007).
Many recent conferences involving academics, lawyers, and practitioners
revealed that group litigation has become a matter of the utmost interest,3 but the
long-running debate on how to reconcile general procedural principles and the
need for a class action mechanism remains the nodal point (Guinchard 2005;
Verpeaux 2007; Combe et al. 2008).
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In parallel, other fields have been concerned by the introduction of rules on
group litigation: securities regulation (Arsouze and Ledoux 2006; Guyon 1999,
1995; Le Bars 2005, 2004; Magnier 2008; Magnier and Lutfalla 2006; Magnier
(dir.) 2004; Neuville 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Vauplane 2001, 1994), competition law
(Bermon 2007; Combe et al. 2008; Hoepfner-Leger 2007), and copyright law on
the Internet (Pezard 2007). At the same time, economic analysis of law started
describing the positive impact of introducing a class action on the French economy (Deffains, Langlais, and Doriat-Duban 2008; Glenn 1988; Hastings and
White 2007; Lipsikier 2005; Temple 2005).
Legislative background
French judges were the first to allow a group of people to organize themselves
to defend their own but shared interests in justice. Therefore, a case law on “ad hoc
nonprofit organizations” developed based on this so-called “Jurisprudence des
ligues de defense,” illustrated by a famous case decided in 1913 by the French
Supreme Court, the Cour de cassation,4 in which a group of wine growers was
permitted to bring a joint action to defend their interests in court.
In 1984 and 1990, two task forces, both under the supervision of the leading
consumer law scholar Professor Calais Auloy, proposed the creation of a group
litigation procedure for consumers,5 but these proposals were not followed in the
mid-1990s when consumer and investor protection was reinforced by the creation of a joint representative action (discussed below). In January 2005,
President Jacques Chirac came out in favor of introducing class actions into the
French law for consumers,6 after which a task force was set up in April 2005,7 but
the government later decided to remove the draft bill from Parliament’s agenda.
In July 2007, President Sarkozy asked the Ministry for the Economy to relaunch
proposals for a class action in French law, and a new bill started being discussed
before the parliament in spring 2008 but the proposal was then abandoned.
Litigation mechanisms
So far, French law has no special rules on group litigation, but two collective
redress mechanisms exist.
1. Action for the financial reparation of the consumer collective interest
The Royer Act of December 27, 1973, created an action for the financial reparation of the consumer collective interest, in order to guarantee fair trade behavior and protection for consumers. Under Article L. 421-1 of the French
Consumer Code, approved associations whose express aim is the protection of
consumer interests may take an action in the collective interest of consumers.
When a criminal offense has been committed, consumer associations may, if they
are approved for this purpose, “exercise the rights of a party to the prosecution
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in respect of events directly or indirectly harming the collective interest of consumers.” When no criminal offense has been committed, Article L. 421-7 of the
Consumer Code allows consumer associations referred in Article L. 421-1 to
“join proceedings in the civil court.” This procedural mechanism is the only one
by which consumer associations may join consumers’ individual cases.
The main objective of this action is not to seek damages but to stop certain illegal practices (e.g., unfair contract terms). Any compensation that the courts
award as a remedy for the infringed collective interest is allocated to the claiming consumer organization, not to individual consumers. This action is by far the
most frequently used collective redress mechanism in France. However, the
action will be admitted to the extent that the damage claimed by the association
differs not only from any suffered by the general public, but also from any suffered by the direct victims. Thus, the purpose of this type of action is to defend the
collective interest, so the injury to be repaired continues to be collective and the repair
of an individual injury is not possible. The Cour de cassation has held that the collective interest is necessarily different from the individual interests of the victims
who suffered personally and who can only ask for compensation.
Since actions in the collective interest of consumers can be initiated only by
associations, consumers have neither cost nor risk if the case is lost. The mechanism does not impose specific information requirements or obligations to report
to public authorities, so there are no additional costs. Actions in the collective
interest of consumers may be brought in criminal or civil courts, but the criminal
procedures are longer.
2. Joint representative actions
Joint representative action for consumers. Under Article L. 422-1 of the
Consumer Code, where several identified individual consumers have suffered
personal prejudice having a common origin through the actions of the same person, any approved association recognized as being a nationwide representative
may, if instructed to do so by at least two of the consumers concerned, sue for
damages in any court on behalf of those consumers. The association can initiate
the action only after it has been instructed to do so by at least two consumers,
each of whom must give their prior written authorization to sue in their name and
on their behalf. Consumer associations can solicit their authorization in newspapers and magazines, but not via TV or radio or by distributing tracts or personalized letters. The rules say nothing regarding solicitation through the Internet, but
an attempt by a group of lawyers to introduce a class action by soliciting victims
through electronic means failed.8 This action was heavily criticized in summary
proceedings initiated by the members of the Lille Bar,9 an opinion from the Paris
Court of Appeal Law Society,10 and in proceedings on the merits brought by several consumer associations.11 This result shows that current rules are not fitted for
class actions initiated by lawyers and that many changes in ethics and the law
would need to occur before group litigation could exist in France.
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Joint representative action for investors. Under Article L. 452-2, al. 1 of the
Monetary and Financial Code, if several identified investors have suffered personal prejudice having a common origin through the actions of the same person,
any approved association of investors may, if instructed to do so by at least two of
the investors concerned, sue for damages before any court on behalf of those
investors. The formalities are identical to the joint representative consumers’
action requirements. However, if an approved association brings an action for
damages before civil or commercial courts, the presiding judge of the court may
issue a summary order authorizing it to solicit a power of attorney from the
investors empowering it, at its own expense, to act on their behalf and have
recourse to the advertising channels mentioned above (article L. 452-2, al. 3 of
the Monetary and Financial Code).
Features common to all joint representative actions. The right to commence
these actions is only open to national nonprofit organizations representing consumers or investors at a national level that are authorized to do so by agreement
of the French administration. To gain governmental approval, the associations
must meet various criteria, have existed for at least six months, and have a certain
number of members.
To bring any action, the organization needs a special instruction. At least two
individuals (consumers or investors) must give their prior written authorization to
sue in their name and on their behalf. Each defendant’s name and identity must
appear on every writ. Agreements are easily revocable, without explanation.
Moreover, the representative is only allowed to appeal for proxies through the
press (newspapers and magazines), but not via TV or the radio (except where
approved by the court in securities joint representative actions). In France, the
judgment based on a joint representative action is aimed at compensating personal and direct damages only. In particular, the judge cannot issue any injunction. Each claim for damages and interest will then be examined separately, like
any individual case. Depending on which court is seized, conclusions and compensations can differ from one to another. To obtain compensation, the plaintiff
must prove a personal and direct harm. Therefore, judges will compensate each
plaintiff according to personal harm. Joint representative actions may entail compensation either in criminal or in civil courts.
Since only an authorized association can bring a joint representative action,
the association itself funds the litigation in most cases. Occasionally, the association will ask the victims to fund it on their own (by a special term included in the
instruction). The association will bear the entire responsibility of the costs of the
procedure (without insurance). If the action fails, the consumers or investors who
were represented lose their individual rights of recourse. On the other hand, if
the defendant professional is found liable, the damages and interest that that professional is ordered to pay must be attributed to the injured consumers or
investors, since the sole purpose of this action is to gain compensation for their
individual injuries.
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Joint representative actions in practice. France faces a situation where remedies for anticompetitive practice or personal injury are underused by consumers.
The joint representative action, being the only procedure that allows consumer
associations to ask for multiple but personal compensation, has only been initiated five times since its creation in 1992. So far, the joint representative action
for investors has never been used at all,12 and as will be seen below, French
investors may prefer to join a foreign class action (as in the Vivendi case).
Special Issues
Constitutional principles and no representative group litigation
The debate over the French judicial system’s right to allow an action involving
opting out is long running. In a 1989 decision, the Conseil constitutionnel held
that although labor trade unions are by law permitted to bring group cases on
behalf of their members concerning the interpretation of collective agreements
in the labor market, they may only do so provided that any employee be “afforded
the opportunity to give his assent with full knowledge of the facts and that he
remained free to conduct personally the defense of his interests.”13 The individual must have the possibility of leaving the group and bringing his own action on
an individual basis. The Conseil constitutionnel insisted that “the employee concerned must be informed by registered letter with a form of acknowledgement of
receipt in order that he may, if he desires so, object to the trade union’s initiative.” The heart of this decision involves the freedom of bringing, or not bringing, one’s own action. Most scholars have interpreted it as condemning any
opt-out system, whether it applies to employees or consumers.14
ECHR principles and the opt-out system (the Vivendi case)
Principles of universal justice were underlined in the Vivendi Universal SA
case.15 In deciding what effect a French court would give to a U.S. class action
judgment, the U.S. District Court of New York noted that the French doctrine
“nul ne plaide par procureur” requires all those involved in a lawsuit to have their
identity known. On that basis, an opt-out class action would offend the doctrine.
However, the U.S. court found that the justification for the doctrine was to allow
the defendants to properly develop their strategy and that this should not apply
in a securities fraud case. The court held that the opt-out provision of the class
action would not offend the doctrine nul ne plaide par procureur and would provide the opportunity for individual French members to appear or not.
From a French point of view, it is not clear that the doctrine nul ne plaide par
procureur was the only argument relevant to the case, because the rule on “a dispute over a right,”16 along with the abovementioned decision of the Conseil constitutionnel, could have been developed. Under French law, the American
procedure contravenes the rule “a dispute over a right” in two ways.17 Since any
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unidentified French plaintiff had not appeared in court and had not been heard
by the court, she or he would be bound by the decision; the defendants could not
properly develop their strategy in front of the unknown French victims, as they
did not appear in court.
Competition law and compensation for consumers (the mobile phone case)
In a decision of November 30, 2005, the Competition Commission found
three mobile phone operators guilty of conspiracy to fix market shares and fined
them a total of €534 million.18 The consumer association UFC-Que Choisir set
up a Web site to encourage consumers to bring legal proceedings for compensation for price fixing. It did not bring a joint representative action because of the
cost, but chose to appeal to the system of common rules, based on civil actions
for damages due to unfair practice.19 The Tribunal de grande instance de Paris
received four thousand plaintiffs’ files, which had to be dealt with separately even
if some plaintiffs were represented by the same lawyer. Among the many practical obstacles met by court clerks, entering the four thousand names into the software was a real challenge! The case has encountered similar problems in needing
judges to deal individually with compensation for each claimant’s damage.
Conclusion
Most protagonists recognize that France will come to adopt some kind of class
action, either by national or European means. But the introduction of such class
actions in French procedure has generated and still generates different and varying reactions among French specialists. Theoretically, a class actions device
would blur public/private and civil/criminal distinctions. So far, a solution has
mainly been sought through the modification of behavior and practices.
Consumer associations would welcome a genuine class action, initiated by associations only and without formal proxies, with great incentives for consumers
such as an opting-out mechanism. Four main additional issues can be identified,
though, that would need an answer before a class action reform could be introduced in French law: lawyers’ ethical standards regarding fees20 and publicity,21
punitive damages,22 the domain of the action,23 and access to evidence.24
Notes
1. For a thorough comparison between the American and French judicial systems, see Garapon and
Papadopoulos (2003).
2. For the first time, a French report presented a comparative assessment of the different European
jurisdictions systems focusing on economic matters and questioned the need for more harmonization in this
field: «Quelles juridictions économiques en Europe?, Du règne de la diversité à un ordre européen», Prof.
R. Badinter, concl. G. Canivet, Litec, nov. 2007.
3. Cour de cassation, Multiparty actions: similarities and divergences of the American and European
experiences, July 2005; Cour de cassation, les «class actions» devant le juge français: rêve ou cauchemar
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(dir. F. LAROCHE-GISSEROT, Petites affiches, 10 juin 2005, n°115 ; Les actions de groupe.
Implications processuelles et substantielles, Rev. LAMY, Droit civil, nov. 2006, 51; MEDEF, Faut-il ou
non une class action à la française? Apr. 2005; Société de législation comparée, Les recours collectives:
étude comparée, Jan. 2006; UFC-Que Choisir, Pour de véritables actions de groupe: un accès efficace et
démocratique à la justice (pres. A. BAZOT), nov. 2005; L’opportunité d’une action de groupe en droit des
sociétés (dir. V. MAGNIER), PUF, 2004.
4. Chambres réunies, 5 avril 1913, Syndicat National de la Viticulture Française.
5. As they were inspired by the American class action model, the reports proposed two different procedures depending on the victims and the possibility to identify all of them previously. If all the victims
were not identified, a two-step procedure was recommended whereby judges were first to rule on whether
liability could be attributed to the professional concerned and, if so, were to make their decision public
and wait for potential injured third parties to manifest themselves before enforcing the sentence, each
claim for damages and interest then being examined separately. The proposal was very similar to an optout class action system.
6. “Consumers must at long last be given the means to defend their rights: means that were unavailable to them up to now since, when taken separately, each individual injury suffered is not big enough to
cover the cost of legal action. This is why I am asking the Government to draft changes to current legislation so that consumer groups and their associations can bring class actions against the unfair practices
going on in certain markets.”
7. Rapport sur l’action de groupe- Groupe de travail présidé par Guillaume Cerutti, Directeur
Général de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (DGCCRF) et Marc
Guillaume, Directeur des Affaires Civiles et du Sceau, http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise
.fr/BRP/054004458/0000.pdf).
8. In the so-called “Class Action.fr” Web site affair, a Web site was created in May 2005 so that any
member of the general public could go online to join in court proceedings already in progress relating to
copies of DVDs. Parties joining the proceedings paid a contribution of €12 to claim damages of €1,000.
9. On June 3, 2005, the law firm ADNS took legal action against the administrators of the Web site
and against the company Class Action.fr. Its main objective was to request the Lille first instance civil
court, ruling in matters of urgency, to rule that defendants are not allowed to make any offers of services
whatsoever and to stop all illegal solicitation and legal advice. The main part of the judgement ruled that
“advertising Class Action.fr’s legal services through the website, this being a commercial company and not
a legal entity authorised to provide legal advice, was clearly illegal and that the offers made on the website
were illicit acts of solicitation which amounted to unfair competition with the rest of the legal profession.”
Consequently, the court of Lille ordered Class Action.fr to withdraw from the Web site all advertising,
offers of services, and solicitation aimed at providing legal advice, drafting legal documents, and legal assistance contracts, within forty-eight hours of the court order being notified, under threat of a €1,000 fine
per day of lateness for two months.
10. The lawyers were reminded that they had to “show moderation in how they presented the website”;
“abstain from any solicitation of the general public to join in the legal actions either “anticipated” or in
progress”; refrain from putting writs of summons onto the Web site for legal actions already initiated or
“anticipated” by the promoters of the Web site itself acting in a capacity as claimants in those actions;
ensure that the general conditions of the website comply with the internal rules of the Paris Law Society
relating to attorney-client relationships in legal proceedings; not enter into negotiations with the defense
without informing their clients; obtain prior, written authorization from the clients; and so on.
11. Legal action was taken on July 13, 2005, by several consumer associations. Their main complaint was
that the services offered by the Web site Class Action.fr constituted illicit solicitation. In a judgment rendered on December 6, 2005, the court granted the claimants’ requests and prohibited mandates to sue from
being collected online. This prohibition was accompanied by a 15,000 euro fine for any offence observed.
The judgment also banned all advertising from the Web site likely to induce consumers into error and ruled,
subject to the same fine, that certain conditions offered to consumers were unfair and illegal.
12. In securities joint representative actions, plaintiffs meet an additional obstacle, linked to judicial
attitudes. In addition to all the constraints imposed on the association, the representative must prove a
direct and personal damage has been suffered. In practice, this proof is difficult to provide for investors,
as many courts consider that the decrease of the company stock is not a sufficient ground to constitute evidence of such an injury. Most of the time, judges decide that the company itself has been personally
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injured, the investors being so only indirectly. By exception, some injuries due, for example, to false statements in connection with a managers’ decision can sometime be taken into account and legitimate compensation for investors; but generally, high courts are more reluctant to do so than lower courts: for
example, see Paris TGI, September 12, 2006, Sidel.
13. Dec. Cons. Const. N°89-257 DC, July 25, 1989, pt 24 & 25.
14. In addition, some of the universal principles inspired by the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) deter representative litigation with no proxy. First,
the “due process” rule requires that an individual cannot be made a plaintiff without his or her knowledge;
second, the doctrine of nul ne plaide par procureur requires all those involved in a lawsuit to have their
identity known. Hence, members of the class have to be preliminarily identified (i.e., before the beginning
of the action). Contrary to the situation in the United States and other countries, membership to the group
would require that a member should personally agree to join the action. Therefore, the members of the
group shall be parties to the action. Consequently, those who do not opt in will not be bound by a future
decision in the case. This is the so-called “autorité relative de la chose jugée” (limited-to-parties authority of
a judgement), under Article 5 of the Civil Code. On constitutional ground, an opting-out system resembling
U.S. class action could not be adopted in France.
15. In Re Vivendi Universal, SA Securities Litigation, Case 02 Civ. 5571, 23 March 2007.
16. A “contestation” (dispute) over a right (principe du contradictoire) allows each person in a suit to
appear in court and be heard. This doctrine, based on the ECHR, has multiple consequences. According
to the European Court, there is no dispute over a right when “the President of the Court did not hear the
plaintiff and did not invite him/her to present his/her own arguments in defence.” Therefore, a defendant
could legitimately argue that any unidentified plaintiff has not appeared in court and has not been heard
or was not allowed to hear his or her own arguments against the plaintiff. The defendants have the right
to properly develop their strategy. This is especially important where the plaintiff’s behavior is partly
responsible for the damage.
17. As a matter of fact, the U.S. judges allowed an American securities class action against VIVENDI
to include in the plaintiff class French and other non-American victims, even though they had no connection with the United States and even though they might never benefit from being included in the class.
The plaintiffs requested that a class be certified consisting of “all persons, foreign and domestic, who purchased or otherwise acquired ordinary Vivendi Universal, S.A. between October 20, 2000 and August 14,
2002.” This meant that all purchasers of Vivendi stock anywhere in the world during the period would
become a part of the class in the American class action and would be bound by the court’s decision relating to the class, unless they affirmatively notified the Court that they wished to opt out of the class.
18. The Court of Appeal of Paris confirmed the decision. The Cour de cassation partially revised the
decision. It reduced some of the financial sanctions, but confirmed most of the unfair practices.
19. So far, the Web site www.cartemobile.org, which has already had sixty thousand visitors, mainly
enables each consumer to calculate his or her loss, totaling about €1.2 billion according to UFC-QUE
CHOISIR. The consumer association also states that 18,200 files have now been opened but that they will
not be able to handle more than 40,000 if no reforms are made to the collective action procedure.
20. Regarding the amount of fees, the traditional rule is that lawyers are paid on either a fixed some,
or (more often) a percentage of an hourly rate. Contingency fees, that is fees calculated on a percentage
of the damages or sum recovered, are illegal in France as impeding competition (Article 10, Act n°71-1130,
Dec. 31, 1971, forbids every agreement on fees that would be only based according to the success of the
dispute). Legislation introduced more flexibility, when the rules authorized “complementary fees,” which
can be calculated on the results of the trial. But being complementary, they cannot exceed a reasonable
proportion of fixed fees and are under strict control of the Bar and the judge. Most actors agree that introducing class action in France would, at least, lead to an alleviation of the prohibition constraining upon
contingency fees and, consequently, incentive to group litigations.
21. As for publicity, attorneys are not allowed to canvass clients, according to section 161, al.2 of a 1991
Decree (n°91-1197, Nov. 27, 1991). However, changes are coming from the European Union. To create a
real internal services market by 2010, the “Services” directive aims to improve the quality of services for
consumers and imposes to remove legal and administrative barriers to the development of service activities as prohibition for lawyers to make publicity: Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of December 12, 2006, on services in the internal market, http://eur-lex.europa.eu.
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22. Under French law, damages are awarded according to the principle of compensation for the entire
loss. It must be underlined that, sometimes, the French Cour de cassation does not hesitate to sentence
to very large amount of financial sanctions, in particular when considering a breach of antitrust rules.
Theses financial sanctions look very similar to punitive damages; see Interview with the former First
President of the Cour de cassation, Guy CANIVET, in La Tribune, March 16, 2006.
23. On September 21, 2006, the French Competition Authority (Conseil de la concurrence) published
its opinion concerning “class actions and unfair practice,” Avis du 21 septembre 2006 relatif à l’introduction de l’action de groupe en matière de pratiques anticoncurrentielles (http://www.conseilconcurrence.fr/doc/classactions.pdf). The EU in its Green Paper and the Competition Authority in its
opinion have very different points of view and are even sometimes in opposition. See, also, the COULON
report on De-criminalization of business, Documentation française, 2008.
24. Unlike the American discovery system, French judges are not empowered to issue an injunction forcing parties to communicate all information available to prove a fact or an agreement. Only specialized judges
are allowed to search for proofs (juge d’instruction), helped by Le Parquet, and only where a criminal offence
exists. Civil court judges have no such powers. It is, however, to be noticed that French civil procedural rules
sometimes allow, under certain conditions, that disclosure become compulsory. For example, under Article
145, preparatory inquiries are admitted when there is a legitimate reason to preserve, or establish any legal
process, the evidence of the facts upon which the resolution of the dispute depends.
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