Ideology, Sociology of

Ideology, Sociology of
internal configurations; and other ideological clusters,
such as the New Right, may exhibit fleeting or hybrid
structures, or be less comprehensively systemic, as in
nationalism. Political ideologies possess loose family
resemblances and vary by dint of the different internal
conceptual morphology each family exhibits. Continuities of time, space, political reasoning, and
psychological dispositions hold together what could
otherwise be, from a postmodernist viewpoint, a fragmentary and elusive form. In parallel, discourse
analysis has located political ideology in ordinary
language and communication—text and conversation—illuminating forms of human interaction. Such
approaches have partly replaced the classification of
political ideologies on a left–right continuum, which is
too simplistically based on dichotomies such as individualism versus collectivism. They regard ideology
not as coterminous with political thought, but as one
of its dimensions.
See also: Ideology: History of the Concept; Ideology,
Sociology of; Marx, Karl (1818–89); Marxism and
Law; Marxism in Contemporary Sociology; Marxism\
Leninism
Bibliography
Athusser L 1984 Essays on Ideology. Verso, London
Bell D 1962 The End of Ideology. Collier Books, New York
Freeden M 1996 Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual
Approach. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Geertz C 1964 Ideology as a cultural system. In: Apter D E (ed.)
Ideology and Discontent. The Free Press, London, pp. 47–76
Gramsci A 1971 Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio
Gramsci. In: Hoare Q, Nowell-Smith (eds.) Lawrence and
Wishart, London
Hamilton M B 1987 The elements of the concept of ideology.
Political Studies 35: 18–38
Laclau E, Mouffe C 1985 Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
Verso, London
Mannheim K 1936 Ideology and Utopia. Paul, Trench, Trubner
London
Marx K, Engels F 1974 The German Ideology. In: Arthur C J
(ed.) Lawrence and Wishart, London
Van Dijk T A 1998 Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach.
Sage, London
M. Freeden
Ideology, Sociology of
The concept of ideology constitutes a significant
chapter of social sciences in general and sociology in
particular. The exact localization of this chapter
remains, however, uncertain. Linked from the point of
view of its emergence and its development to the
Marxist tradition, the analysis of ideological phenom-
ena overflows very quickly and very largely this
tradition. Producing, under certain conditions, positive knowledge about the social order, the analysis of
ideologies intends sometimes to fulfill a ‘performative’
function, i.e., contribute to the transformation of this
social order. Finally, constitutive of various considerations concerning the social determinants of
beliefs, the sociology of the ideologies is quickly led to
define its own condition and, through this reflexive
movement, to appear on a level quite as empirical as
epistemological.
This pluridimensionality of the sociological analysis
generates the feeling of confusion characteristic of
many debates relating to ideology, its causes and
consequences. This feeling is reinforced since more
than 15 possible definitions of the very concept of
ideology correspond to the diversity of the manifestations of the ideological phenomena through contemporary sociological writings (Eagleton 1991). After
having briefly made sensitive the nature of this
diversity, we will approach the way in which sociologists have tried to characterize and to explain the
ideological phenomena. Three interdependent aspects
will be successively considered: the referent, the
structure, and the value of truth of ideologies. We will
be interested finally in revival of the sociological
analysis on the relationship between science and
ideology.
1. The Diersity of Ideological Phenomenon
The origin of the sociological use of the concept of
ideology can be found in Marx’s writings. Admittedly,
as reminded by many commentators, the concept of
ideology existed before Marx. One thus finds a
particular form of this concept at the end of the
eighteenth century with the French tradition of the
ideT ologues who, led by Destutt de Tracy, saw in
the Ideologie a new discipline: the science of the ideas.
Further still the theory of the idola developed by the
English philosopher Francis Bacon in his Noum
Organum anticipates certain aspects of both science of
the ideas of the French ideT ologues and the modern
theory of the ideologies. But it is with Marx that a
certain use of this concept appears. Its well-known
analysis of the coup d’etat of Louis Bonaparte is from
this point of view very instructive (Marx 1852). The
important part of its argument consists of showing how, once the riots of June 1848 were over,
dissensions within the aparti de l’ordre—the right wing
of the French parliament—helped make this coup
d’etat unavoidable. This party was composed
of many fractions which all, Marx affirms, have
a ‘superstructure of impressions, illusions, ways of
thinking, and some philosophical conceptions.’ To
understand the origin of these ‘ways of thinking’ it is
essential to identify the ‘competition of interest,’ the
will of each fraction ‘to restore its own supremacy.’
The land aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie
7177
Ideology, Sociology of
develop different political representations thus: the
former theorizes the benefits of the absolute monarchy, the latter those of parliamentary monarchy. In
both cases, Marx suggests, they tend to give a general
value to ‘ways of thinking’ which actually constitute
only the formulation of objective conditions which
ensure the domination of a social group over another.
The analysis of Marx does not end with this comparison between particular ‘interests’ and ‘ways of
thinking,’ it also underlines the way in which certain
individuals embody ideologies. Describing the ‘ideologists’ consists mainly for Marx of studying the
‘writers,’ the ‘press,’ and more largely ‘representatives’
of the bourgeoisie. In the present case, the inability of
these ideologists to express the real opinion of those
they should represent: little before the coup d’etat,
Marx points out, ‘the representatives and represented
had become strangers to each other.’
The argument is simple and easily acceptable: when
an institution—here a political mode—appears in
conformity with the particular interest of a social
actor, individual, or collective, this actor generates,
directly or indirectly, a whole set of ideas, representations, and theories intended to make the value of
this institution acceptable by the greatest number.
Also, even if the value objectively makes real sense
only for the social actor considered. When K.
Mannheim looks back to this argument in Ideology
and Utopia (1929\1991), he presents it as a fundamental stage towards the formation of the sociology
of knowledge: the first attempt to stress ‘the role of the
position of class and the interests of class in the
thought.’ This attempt rests, however, on a confusion
between two conceptions of the ideology which is
necessary to identify. In the first—particular conception—the ‘ways of thinking’ are ‘mystification more
or less conscious of the real nature of a situation whose
exact recognition would not be in agreement with the
interests of the ideologist’; they are reducible to a
psychology of the interests, concern primarily the
individuals, and are connected with lies on the moral
level or errors on the epistemological level. In the
second—total conception—the same ‘ways of thinking’ are not ‘illusions’ deliberately maintained by the
individuals according to their more or less immediate
interests, but elements of a total ‘system of significance,’ ‘knowledge grown out of our experience in
the real situations of the life.’ One of the rare examples
of ideological ‘knowledge’ in this ‘total’ conception
suggested by Mannheim is the moral judgement
related to the loan of money with interest. Formulated
and assimilated by the Church like an ethical standard,
the morally reprehensible character of the loan with
interest becomes ideological, affirms Mannheim, since
the social actors try to maintain it out of the social
framework to which it is ‘adapted’: a precapitalist
society based, economically and socially, on personal
relations of intimacy. Through its attachment to this
judgement, the Church expresses its difficulty in
7178
thinking of social reality independently of a ‘system of
significances’ adapted to a disappeared social framework from now on.
This total character of the ideology described by
Mannheim acquires a new meaning with the compared
analysis by Raymond Aron (1964) devoted to the
contemporary political modes. In its nouelles lecm ons
sur les socieT teT s industrielles, Aron identifies in an ideal
typical way each political mode by an ‘official
ideology,’ i.e. a ‘complex doctrinal system,’ made up
on the one hand of general principles resulting ‘from
theoretical analysis of what really occurs’ and on the
other hand of proposals qualified as ‘misleading,’
‘distorted,’ or even ‘absurd.’ More than the simple
critical census of these proposals, Aron underlines the
specificity of all ‘official ideology’: the will of its
promoters to withdraw it from any critical discussion.
Why, Aron asks, do the partisans of the socialist
ideology generally refuse to talk on a reasonable basis
about the advantages and disadvantages of their
conception of the individual and society? The answer
is to be found in the ‘universal’ vocation of the studied
ideology: it is given for its partisans as for its detractors
as a global system of interpretation of the historicopolitical world.
2. Sociological Characterization of Ideologies
As suggested by these examples, the sociologists use
the concept of ideology to describe a phenomenon of
‘belief’: belief in the value of the absolute monarchy
for the land aristocracy (Marx), belief in the morally
reprehensible character of the loan with interest for
the Church (Mannheim), belief in the universal vocation of the collectivist mode for the Socialists (Aron).
To speak about belief is to describe an ethical or
cognitive reality—principle, idea, theory, doctrines,
etc.—which not only makes ‘sense’ for an individual
or collective actor, but a reality about which this actor
may develop a deep feeling of conviction. It also
describes a factor likely to influence the behavior of
this actor. Innumerable sociological and anthropological work made it possible to identify the diversity
of the beliefs and their consequences according to the
social systems considered. The difficulty which arises
consequently is that of the specificity of the ideological
phenomenon as belief compared to the arious possible
registers of the general phenomenon of the belief.
Sociologists generally approach this specificity in
terms of degree and not of nature under three
interdependent aspects: (a) referent of the belief, (b)
forms of the belief, and (c) value of truth of the belief.
2.1 Referent
The ideology as belief is singular by the centrality
which it accords to the nature and becoming of
Ideology, Sociology of
politico-social organization. The referent is actually
double. The ideologist aims by his discourse not only
at describing the legitimate social order but also and
especially at directing the consequently collective
action. He proposes more than one simple explanation
of observable social reality: a program to transform it.
The direction of this transformation can be multiple.
When Mannheim defines the ideology in opposition to
utopia, by making the former an exclusive vector of
conservatism (a barrier to the rise of capitalism in the
case of the taboo of the loan with interest) where the
latter would be progressist, he only preserves the initial
views of Marx. This vision of the ideology is, however,
too restrictive. Not only are the ideologies not the
prerogative of the conservatives—T. Parsons (1959)
distinguishes four types of ideologies: conservative,
counter-, reform, and revolutionary—but one ideology can, according to social and historical circumstances, serve various social purposes. Liberalism,
Socialism, or various contemporary forms of
Nationalism (E. Gellner 1983, P. Birnbaum 1997)
appear, at a given time of their history, as vectors of
social emancipation as well as general principles of
immobilism or conservatism.
This double referent—sociopolitical and practical—makes it possible to differentiate ideology from
other types of beliefs, religious ones in particular. If
the majority of the religions contain a representation
of the social organization, they define only rarely a
collective action plan. This representation is generally
the consequence of a reality considered to be more
central: a transcendent realm revealed by the faith.
The ideologist speaks in the name of reason. Its truth
claims positive values of science and is diffused by
suggestion, persuasion, but much more rarely by
revelation. Many sociologists (R. Bendix 1964, A.
Gouldner 1976) thus establish a strong parallelism
between the development of the ideologies at the end
of the eighteenth century and the emergence of
Modernity defined as a ‘rational’ social order in
opposition to a ‘traditional’ social order. This by no
means implies that the religious, mythical, or more
largely traditional elements disappear from the ideological discourse, but that these elements occupy a
peripheral place in this discourse.
2.2 Forms
When Aron analyzes the contemporary political
modes, he considers ideology as an explicit system of
beliefs developed around a core of descriptive and
prescriptive proposals. The dominant features of the
system are unity, coherence, and totalizing
character—the capacity to potentially bring a response
to any interrogation.
This traditional representation of ideology as a
‘monolithic’ block needs to be tempered: all ideologies
contain irreducible tensions and contradictions. On
the one hand, because any ideology contains irreducible tensions and contradictions. The goal of any
ideologist is certainly to give an overall coherence to
what he perceives as real and necessary, but one
cannot judge the nature of a system of beliefs only on
the base of how it wishes to appear. Sociologists insist
thus on the ‘compromises’ and the ‘adjustments’
necessary to hold in the same unit theoretical logic and
the principle of action (M. Seliger 1976). Other
sociologists proposed to consider the production of
ideology as a ‘tinkering’ process during which the
ideologist tries to satisfy the demand of meaning of his
public without ever being able to exert a true control
on his resources (F. Bourricaud 1980).
Moreover, the contemporary ideologies no longer
have the width of the all-encompassing ideological
systems of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning
of the twentieth centuries. If it still appears illusory to
regularly announce the ‘end of the ideologies’ (D. Bell
1960, M. Lipset Seymour 1960), it is undeniable that
the form under which they appear evolves. For
R. Boudon (1999), modern ideologies evoke the image
of archipelago, while the old ideologies evoked rather
the idea of a continent. ‘We have ideologies,’ writes
Boudon, ‘as to what should be done about unemployment, educational opportunities, fighting against
crime or drug addiction and on a myriad of subjects, as
well as how it should be done. But these theories are
weakly related to one another. We have ceased to
believe that they could be derived from an allencompassing theory. We have all kinds of local
ideologies; we no longer believe in general ideologies.’
2.3 Value of Truth
The link established by the Marxist tradition between
the concepts of ideology, alienation, and ‘false conscience’ led many sociologists, Marxist and nonMarxist, to identify the ideological phenomenon with
false beliefs. The ideologist produces a representation
of the social order he wishes to be socially considered
as the unique depository of a true meaning, but both
representation and meaning are mainly illusory. The
ideology, according to the formula of T. Parsons,
should be regarded as a ‘deviation compared to
scientific objectivity.’ The relative disaffection of the
category of ideology in the poststructuralist and
postmodernist currents of thought is thus principally
due to the fact that this category seems to imply a
naive conception of truth as correspondence, but also
a rigid demarcation between the science and the other
discursive registers.
The reality of the ideological phenomenon is,
however, more complex. From a theoretical point of
view, some sociologists propose to define it inde7179
Ideology, Sociology of
pendently of any reference to science and objective
knowledge. C. Geertz (1964) for example conceives the
discourse of the ideologist as a ‘symbolic act’ intended
to produce an effect of mobilization: the ‘cognitive’
function of ideology is consequently second behind its
‘pratico-social’ function. This approach is not however
without difficulties: it gives of ideology a hypertrophied representation, and especially misses the fact
that even when conceived as a symbolic act, ideology
remains open to judgements of truth and falsehood.
From a more empirical point of view, many studies
show that ideologies grant a universal validity to
proposals whose validity is only limited; or more
simply that they mix doubtful or fragile proposals with
more solid, quasiscientific proposals. General ideologies as Marxism, liberalism, or certain forms of
conservatism or developmentalism are based explicitly
on scientific argumentations. More local ideologies
such as the widespread belief that mechanization or
globalization are the main cause of unemployment can
be seen as grounded on factual evidence, but evidence
of limited validity. If ideology cannot be conceived as
a delirious thought, it appears from now on quite as
imprudent to accept it in block as to reject it in block.
3. Sociological Explanation of Ideologies as
Collectie Beliefs
Ideology being only one particular case of the general
phenomenon of belief, its sociological explanation
relies on the same principals as the explanation of
other beliefs. When a sociologist explains an enigmatic
phenomenon, he tries not only to infer the existence of
relations between a whole set of variables (dependent
an independent) but also to test, according to multiple
modalities, the validity of his inference. There is not,
however, a single way to conceive the factors to
consider nor even the type of relations likely to be
tested. Sociologists considered the production and the
diffusion of the ideological phenomenon in three
different ways: first as the consequence of a ‘causal’
process; second as a response to a ‘functional’ requirement, and finally as the product of a ‘subjective
rationality.’
The first general type of explanation considers the
production and diffusion of ideological belief as the
consequence of ‘forces’ on which the social actor has
no control. These forces can be of various types. The
Marxist tradition closely associates the production of
ideology with the existence of class ‘interests’ which
dominates the conscience. According to this tradition,
the fact for an individual of belonging to a class is
enough to mechanically impose a set of collective
beliefs on his conscience. The general thesis is that
if the dominated class accepts blindly social representations which contribute to reproduce its
subordination, the dominant class generates social
representations which maintain its domination. The
7180
example of the study of the 18 brumaire shows,
however, that Marx develops, in certain empirical
writings, a less simplistic vision of the production
process of ideologies. Those ideologies are described
as more than strategical theories imposed on social
actors: representations of limited validity inspired by
reality such as can be observed from a given social
position. From a different point of view, the forces
which drive the actors to produce or adhere to
ideologies are also sometimes conceived as ‘passions.’
In its classical TraiteT de sociologie geT neT rale, Pareto
considers thus that the ideologies—he speaks of
‘derivations’—are primarily the effect of feelings remaining inaccessible to the conscience. More precisely,
Pareto affirms that the social actor wants to be
convinced of the value of his passion, and produces
derivations for this purpose only. The ideologies
would thus be the epiphenomenal expression of
dominant passions. Such a representation, however,
remains not easily generalizable insofar as on the one
hand the ideologies are seldom lived by those which
produce them or diffuse them like simple feelings, and
on the other hand the rationalization process that
characterizes ideologies is hardly reducible to a simple
‘logical varnish.’
The second general type of sociological explanation
considers the production of ideologies as a response to
a double demand: demand for ‘security at an individual level, demand for ‘equilibrium at a more
general level. The insecurity is regularly described by
sociologists as a permanent aspect of the social
systems. The individuals continuously feel the need to
be able to think that ‘everything will be all right.’
Precisely, observes Parsons (1964), ‘the strains
involved in such expectations may be lessened by
displacing the fulfillment outside the immediate field
of action, either into the future as in the case of the
leader of a movement for reform, or into a transcendental sphere (…).’ At a collective level, the
absence of integration is considered a permanent risk
for the reproduction of the social system: principles,
standards, goals differ according to the social sector
considered (political, family, economical, etc.).
Ideological belief is considered, from a functional
point of view, as an ambivalent phenomenon: it
produces disintegration because any ideological expression is generally directed against a pre-existent
belief system, but it can also produce ‘solidarity’
insofar as the ideological orientation makes it possible
to maintain the collective identity of a given group.
The functional approach shows thus how a belief
makes it possible to solve an individual and collective
problem. Interpreted however in too extensive a
manner, this approach generates a certain number of
skids, among which are the identification of the society
to an ‘organism’ and of ideology to a ‘disease.’
Another contemporary skid of the functional approach consists of seeing behind any ideology a social
function, but moreover to define this function as
Ideology, Sociology of
exclusively directed towards the maintenance of the
domination of a social group on another.
The third general type of sociological explanation
consists mainly of adopting a similar attitude as M.
Weber towards the ideological beliefs for the magic
beliefs or, to a certain extent, Durkheim for the
religious beliefs: reconstruct the ‘meaning’ of the
ideological belief for the social actor by seeking
the system of reasons or preferences which this actor
produces to justify to himself his adhesion. The
rationality considered by the sociologist is not reducible to an instrumental one but is also quite
different from the ‘derivations’ described by Pareto.
The sociological analysis opens on a set of ‘subjective
reasons’ that represents the necessary conditions of the
ordinary thought. These reasons are of general but
nonuniversal validity and manifest themselves on
different levels: utilitarian, axiological, traditional, or
epistemic. Inspired by studies of A. Downs (1957) and
H. Simon (1982), the restricted theory of the ideology
elaborated by R. Boudon (1989) thus stresses the
necessary ‘comprehensive’ dimension of the sociological analysis. When some people adopt statements
or ideas that appear to the sociologist as false or
doubtful, the sociologist has to consider that this may
derive from the fact that, given the situation, these
beliefs are to them the conclusions of reason they
perceive as ‘strong.’ This explicative strategy is directly
linked to an active theory of ordinary knowledge: the
social actor produces knowledge, not simply by
contemplating reality, but by interpreting it from its
social position, and more generally from questions
which are only seldom directly provided by reality
itself. This last approach has a certain number of
objective advantages. In particular, it makes it possible
to give an account of an important subjective data: the
feeling of conviction and not of interiorization which
generally characterizes the relation of any individual
to his own ideological beliefs.
4. Science and Ideology: Extrascientific ‘Interest’
and Relatiism
The analysis of the relationship between science and
ideology is traditionally focused on the ideological
dimension of social sciences and sociology in particular. The ideologist shares in fact with the sociologist the will to produce a discourse on society. It
is not rare that certain sociologists consider their
analysis as the methodical prolongation of a preexistent ideological point of view. The historical
examples are numerous and well known: openly
conservative, Fre! de! ric Le Play theorizes the traditional
form of family—famille souche—as ‘the social unit per
excellence’; convinced liberal, Herbert Spencer proposes an evolutionary model closely associated with
the diffusion of ‘social Darwinism,’ etc. Inversely a
sociological theory or paradigm conceived indepen-
dently of any ideological commitment can, when it is
exploited out of its immediate context of validity,
generate an ideological skid. The mechanism is once
again well known: it consists mainly of projecting on
the theory or sociological paradigm the totalizing
character of ideologies and by doing so asking those
theories and paradigms to answer any possible interrogation.
The significant development since the beginning of
the 1970s of the social studies of natural science made
it possible to highlight the importance of economic,
cultural, and political factors on the course of scientific
research. These studies show on the one hand how the
scientific institutions satisfy a social demand, and on
the other hand how the scientists integrate in the
course of their practices different cultural elements, in
particular extrascientific ‘interests’ (Barnes 1974). The
reality of these facts should not however be misinterpreted. It leads certain radical sociologists to
affirm the ideological character of all sciences and to
consequently develop a relativistic conception for
which the superiority of the scientific approach of
reality compared to other ‘representations of the
world’ is nothing but an occidental myth.
This extreme relativism rests on confusion between
the intrinsic quality of a knowledge (objectivity or
absence of objectivity) and its referential dimension
(the focus of science). Nobody rejects the fact that the
scientific practice cannot develop without a certain
number of resources. The unequal allocation of these
resources exerts a considerable influence on the choice
of the research topics, on the level of development of
the disciplines, sometimes even indirectly on the degree
of requirement of the experimental control. This social
conditioning of science does not however invalidate
the fact that a scientific knowledge has an intrinsic
validity, independent of its immediate context of
production. The sociocultural determination and the
rational determination of scientific knowledge are by
no means necessarily mutually exclusive.
See also: Alienation, Sociology of; Belief, Anthropology of; Collective Beliefs: Sociological Explanation; Collective Memory, Anthropology of; Culture,
Sociology of; Ideology: History of the Concept;
Ideology: Political Aspects; Knowledge, Sociology of;
Pareto, Vilfredo (1848–1923); Science, Sociology of;
Social Movements, Sociology of
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Barnes B 1974 Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory.
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Ideology, Sociology of
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Wishart, London
Parsons T 1959 An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge:
Transactions of the Fourth Congress of Sociology, Milan
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of Knowledge: A Reader. Gerald Duckworth, London,
pp. 25–49
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M. Dubois
Illiteracy, Sociology of
Between complete illiteracy and good literacy, different levels of abilities may be distinguished, including
quasi-illiteracy. Research from the last decades shows
that the majority of adults in highly developed
countries, as well as many men and women in the
Third World, rank somewhere among these inbetween levels. This situation seems to depend mainly
on the fact that the way of life and work for large
numbers of the population, in both less developed and,
paradoxically, developed countries, does not require
more than rudimentary or mediocre literacy skills.
1. A Look at Illiteracy Statistics
In most Western and Eastern European countries
including Russia, as well as in Australia, Canada,
Israel, New Zealand, the USA or, for instance,
Argentina, Cuba, Mongolia, the Philippines, Puerto
7182
Table 1
Percentage of illiterate adults from 1900 to 1995 in six
countries (UNESCO estimates and national statistics)
USA
Italy
Mexico
Brazil
India
Mali
1900
1950
1970
1995
11
50
78
65
94
—
3
14
43
51
81
—
1
6
25
32
66
94
—
1.8
11
17
48
68
Rico, South Korea and Tajikistan, official statistics
show that adult complete illiteracy is practically nonexistent or very rare. Almost every other country lags
somewhat or further behind these.
During the twentieth century, the absolute number
of completely illiterate adults increased in the Third
World due to population growth. In terms of percentages, however, adult illiteracy declined everywhere.
Table 1 illustrates this point as regards six countries
typical of different degrees of economic development.
The official statistics of illiteracy among adults in
many countries are notoriously imprecise. They have
another great deficiency, which is that they give no
information about the real literacy capacities of the
adults who are not counted as completely illiterate.
2. Functional Illiteracy
Third World countries are well aware of the extent of
functional illiteracy, that is, of the gravely insufficient
literacy level of many adults who are not completely
illiterate. On the other hand, in developed countries,
significantly high rates of functional illiteracy were
almost unimaginable up until recent times, following
decades of universal compulsory free education and,
in particular, since the development of postcompulsory schools following World War II. This conviction
has been steadily waning after converging results of
various research showing that functional illiteracy was
frequent in modern societies. The first international
survey was conducted in 1994–5 under the auspices of
the Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD 1995). The reports published by
the OECD in 1995 and 1997 covered 12 countries,
seven in Western Europe, plus Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Poland and the USA. The same,
extensive battery of reading, writing, and arithmetic
exercises typical of current tasks of daily life and work
was used in evaluating the literacy level of adults aged
16 to 65. This international survey gave an interesting
picture of the distribution of the adult population of
typical developed countries by literacy levels at the end
of the twentieth century.