Multiplayer cost games with simple Nash equilibria
Transcription
Multiplayer cost games with simple Nash equilibria
MULTIPLAYER COST GAMES WITH SIMPLE NASH EQUILIBRIA le 2 avril 2013 de 15h30 à 17h00 ENS Rennes Salle du conseil Plan d'accès Intervention de Thomas Brihaye (Université du Mons, Belgique). Séminaire du département Informatique et télécommunications. After an introduction to the model-checking problem, we will see that multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded-systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We show that a large class of these games, including games where the individual objectives are mean- or discounted-payoff, or quantitative reachability, does not only have a solution, but a simple solution. More precisely, we establish the existence of simple Nash equilibria. Realistically, agents have to decide on their moves with very limited resources, and complicated strategies that require exponential or even non-elementary implementations cannot realistically be implemented. The existence of simple strategies therefore holds a promise of implementability. THÉMATIQUE(S) Formation, Recherche - Valorisation CONTACT François Schwarzentruber Mise à jour le 25 mars 2013 À LIRE AUSSI Visite de laboratoire à Bordeaux Page 1 Réalité virtuelle et jeux vidéo commandés "par la pensée" ? Introduction à la cryptographie reposant sur les réseaux euclidiens ARCHIVES Séminaires 2015-2016 Séminaires 2014-2015 Séminaires 2013-2014 Séminaires 2012-2013 Séminaires 2011-2012 Séminaires 2010-2011 Séminaires 2009-2010 Séminaires 2008-2009 Séminaires 2007-2008 Séminaires 2006-2007 Séminaires 2005-2006 Séminaires 2004-2005 Séminaires 2003-2004 Séminaires 2002-2003 Page 2