DISCLAIMER

The Cahiers of the CoR
Vers une gouvernance à plusieurs
niveaux en Europe?
♦
Towards Multi-Level Governance in Europe?
Volume I - 2009
Le Livre blanc sur la Gouvernance à multi niveaux a été adopté par le Comité des régions
qui est l’Assemblée de l'UE des représentants régionaux et locaux. Cette Assemblée politique
est composée d'élus régionaux et locaux au service de l'intégration européenne et assure la
représentation institutionnelle de l'ensemble des territoires, régions, villes et communes de
l'Union européenne. Sa mission consiste à les impliquer dans le processus décisionnel
européen et à favoriser ainsi une meilleure participation des citoyens. Son action est fondée
sur la conviction que la coopération entre les niveaux européen, national, régional et local
est indispensable pour construire une Union sans cesse plus étroite et solidaire entre les
peuples d'Europe et relever les défis de la mondialisation. Le CdR vote des recommandations
politiques sur les stratégies européennes et participe à l'élaboration de la législation
communautaire. Déjà en amont de leur conception, il propose des approches et des
orientations politiques tirées de l'expérience et de l'expertise des autorités régionales et
locales qui sont le plus souvent chargées de les mettre en oeuvre. Il veille à respecter les
principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité afin que les décisions européennes soient
prises et appliquées au plus près des citoyens et au niveau le plus adéquat.
----------------------------
The White Paper on Multilevel Governance was adopted by the Committee of the Regions,
which is the EU's assembly of regional and local representatives. This political assembly is
made up of regional and local representatives working together for European integration and
ensures the institutional representation of all the territories, regions, cities and municipalities
of the European Union. Its mission consists of involving them in the European decisionmaking process and thus encouraging better public participation. Its actions are based on the
conviction that cooperation between the European, national, regional and local levels is
essential to building an ever closer and more interdependent Union between the people of
Europe and facing the challenges of globalisation. The CoR votes for political
recommendations on European strategies and takes part in the framing of EU legislation.
From its position upstream from the design stage, it proposes political approaches and
guidelines based on the experience and expertise of regional and local authorities, which are
generally responsible for implementing such legislation. It sees that the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality are respected so that European decisions are taken and
applied closer to the public and at the most appropriate level.
2
THE CAHIERS OF THE COR
TABLE DES MATIERES / TABLE OF CONTENTS
"Vers une gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux en Europe?
Towards Multi-Level Governance in Europe?"
−
"The Committee of the Regions' White Paper on Multilevel Governance:
Building Europe in Partnership",
Mr. Luc van den Brande, President of the Committee of the Regions of
the European Union
p. 5
−
"Des déclinaisons concrètes de la gouvernance à multi-niveaux",
M. Michel Delebarre, premier Vice-Président du Comité des Régions,
Maire de Dunkerque
p. 9
−
"Speech pronounced during the conference on "Multi-Level Governance
in Europe", 22 September 2009, Bruges,
Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, President of the Reflection Group on the Future
of Europe
p. 13
−
"Rise of Regions",
Prof. Lisbeth Hooghe, Chair in Multilevel Governance, VU Amsterdam
& Zachary Taylor Smith Professor of Political Science, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Prof. Gary Marks, Chair in
Multilevel Governance, VU Amsterdam & Burton Craige Distinguished
Professor in Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill
p. 19
−
"Participation et partenariat en Europe",
M. Claudio Martini, Président de la commission CONST du Comité
des Régions, Président de la région Toscane
p. 23
−
"The White Paper on Multilevel Governance: Relevance and Challenges
of Implementation",
Prof. Dr. Jörg Monar, Director of Studies, European Political and
Administrative Studies Department College of Europe, visiting professor
University of Sussex
p. 27
−
"The Paradigm of Multi-Level Governance",
Prof. Dr. Frank Delmartino, University of Leuven, visiting professor
College of Europe
p. 33
3
−
"The Increasing Importance of Territorial Governance to European
Integration",
Dr. Michael Schneider, President of the COTER commission of the
Committee of the Regions, Secretary of State of Saxony-Anhalt
p. 37
−
"La législation européenne",
M. Paolo Ponzano, Senior Fellow at the European University Institute,
Florence
p. 41
−
"Une dynamique multidirectionnelle de la gouvernance à multi niveaux",
Prof. Nicolas Levrat, Professeur de droit européen et Directeur de
l’Institut européen de l’Université de Genève
p. 49
−
"Contribution to the conference on "Multi-Level Governance in Europe",
First Session "Towards a Renewed Version of the Community Method
Based on Partnership?", 22 September 2009, Bruges,
Prof. Em. Dr. Rudolf Hrbek, University of Tübingen and College of
Europe
p. 55
−
"Gouvernance à multiniveaux: pour une approche coordonée face aux
enjeux socio-économiques de la mondialisation",
Mme Marjorie Jouen, conseillère, Notre Europe
p. 61
−
"The Committee of the Regions' White Paper on Multilevel Governance:
Some Reflections",
Prof. Simona Piattoni, University of Trento
p. 67
−
"Federalism and Multi-Level Governance: Comparing the EU with
Other Federal States",
Mr. Felix Kneupling, Director Europe, Forum of Federations
p. 75
−
"Regional Perceptions of the Subnational Dimension of Multilevel
Governance",
Prof. Dr. Michael Bauer, Humboldt University
p. 81
−
"Multilevel Governance: Challenges and Opportunities for the EU in the
XXI Century",
Mr. Francesco Napolitano, College of Europe
p. 85
4
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS' WHITE PAPER ON
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE: BUILDING EUROPE IN
PARTNERSHIP
MR LUC VAN DEN BRANDE
PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
In a world which is becoming more and more interdependent and competitive, Europeans
have to face up to new challenges. Just a year ago, the world was brutally shaken by a
systemic crisis, and its shock waves are still being felt today. Indeed, the changes that are
inevitably related to progress and their consequences are accelerated; the imbalances in the
current economic and financial system are being highlighted, as is the vulnerability of many
of our fellow-citizens. Above all, there is a need for a new form of governance.
It is all about the issues lying ahead of us in the years ahead: climate change and energy
needs are forcing the international community to conclude an "ecological new deal";
demographic changes and migratory pressures are key factors in developing a new concept of
solidarity and international relations; the need to find new sources of growth is pushing us to
search for a new world balance between traditional powers and emerging countries, to make
changes and invest in a knowledge-based society and in technological progress.
Therefore, it is vital for Europe to be in a position to put forward, defend and adapt its
development model and its governance system.
Right from the start of the European integration, nothing would have been possible without
the combination of a common vision and ambition. As the Reverend Father Karel Verleye,
one of the founding fathers of the College of Europe, liked to emphasise: "European unity
must not only be sought in the continent's historical past and traditions: it can only be
alive if there is the prospect of a new collective task."
"Where there is no prospect, no vision for the future, the people perish." This idea has
never been as relevant as it is today. It is the responsibility of all politicians at the European,
national, regional or local level to move the integration process forward. The Committee of
the Regions has tried to shoulder this responsibility fully within its own sphere of influence
by publishing the White Paper on Multi-level Governance. In this paper, it submits its idea
for a Community method based on a system of governance which involves local authorities in
the framing and implementation of Community policies.
For the Committee of the Regions has been defending the advances in European integration
since 1994 and pleading for greater democratisation in public affairs. It is therefore essential
5
that in the decisive phases of the Union's political process, Europe should be built in
partnership. I have been asked many times if this is a call to replace a Europe of nation-states
by a "Europe of regions." My answer is quite clear: we need a "Europe that is built with the
regions, with the towns and cities and with the local authorities."
It is essential to abandon the hierarchical and pyramid-like approach which places Europe
above the Member States, the Member States above the regions, the regions above the towns
and local communities. Instead of this constraining system, we need a new partnership in
order to respect the constitutional rules in force in the Member States and Community law –
"a partnership for the future" – between these different levels of power and legitimate centres
of democracy.
I think that we have shown, with this White Paper, that multi-level governance was not a
utopia or just an ideal or a model. It is a method and a solution for:
•
making the Community method more inclusive and efficient;
•
developing a culture of inter-institutional cooperation; and
•
stimulating participation in the European process.
During the Committee of the Regions workshops, we entered into dialogue with the academic
world, and particularly the teaching staff at the College of Europe. It allowed us to involve
more than 70 specialists and experts from several fields in the drafting of this White Paper.
This, in turn, strengthened our conviction that European and global strategies can only
succeed as part of coordinated action between the various levels of power.
Multilevel governance was introduced in the EU lexicon as a form of ‘good governance’ that
improves the EU's legitimacy by sharing its making through real co-ownership, either in the
pre-legislative 'shaping' phase or later, during the decision-making mechanisms, when the
most appropriate. Multilevel governance is therefore not a theory, which seeks to clarify
complex decision-making processes; rather, it is an approach to make EU decisions better
shared. It also represents an instrument of analysis, whilst it does not address the sovereignty
of states or the 'communitarian method'. In other words: multilevel governance removes the
grey area between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, leaving a descriptive structure
in its place.
Today, it is important to understand multilevel governance in the context of globalisation.
The vertical dimension covers all levels of policy-making: from the global to the local. It
highlights the increasingly fading distinction between domestic and international politics.
Furthermore, all levels cannot be neatly pigeonholed. This image is misleading: levels are
essentially interlocking. Indeed, when implementing a strategy commonly agreed upon as the
Lisbon or Climate Change Strategy, all actors – public and private – should take the proper
responsibility, assigned to them in a democratic society. In an EU context, especially the
involvement of the regions and cities enhances legitimacy.
6
Multilevel governance should not be confused with ‘decentralisation.’ This is the term we
normally use to talk about the shift of power from the central state towards other kinds of
governance. Multilevel governance, therefore, is not a threat but an opportunity for
decentralised institutions, since they are being given access to the policy-making process in
the EU at the conceptualisation phase, and not just at the moment of implementation.
Consequently, the principle of subsidiarity is enhanced by a dynamic understanding of
multilevel governance. This principle, enshrined in the Treaties, means that decisions within
the European Union should be taken at the closest practical level to the citizens. The EU
should not take on tasks which are better suited to national, regional or local level. On the
flipside, the European Union must take action in case where it represents the best level for
pursuing common objectives. I’m against any form of strict delineation of competences or
‘Kompetenz Abbachnung’. Multilevel governance is about sharing competences, rather than
splitting competences. The legitimacy of the EU lies in its efficiency, in its openness, its
participation, accountability, effectiveness, delivery and coherence. Multilevel governance
strengthens all of these principles and guarantees their interconnectivity.
Finally, multilevel governance in the EU is essentially multi-channelled as well. Regions and
cities must have the opportunity to choose freely through which gateways they voice their
concerns, ideas and interests. This idea is intrinsically linked to participative democracy as
society is becoming more pluralistic. People want to participate, decision-making is scattered,
and top-down or unilateral decisions are simply no longer acceptable in our democracy.
Multilevel governance offers a participatory answer in providing tools for participation to
regions, cities, and ultimately the citizen.
In 2001, the European Commission paved the way with the White Paper on European
governance, highlighting the role of consultation. Today, a new stage is necessary since,
instead of favouring confrontation between various sovereign entities, multi-level governance
encourages a more inclusive approach. This will enable the development of a new dynamic in
the EU policy-making by allowing for a genuine partnership between all levels of
government (vertical subsidiarity), including socio-economic partners (horizontal
subsidiarity).
Multi-level governance is also a valid way to strengthen the democratic debate in Europe. I
fully support the call for the European debate to be politicised. So far, the working methods
of the institutions, which encourage a consensus culture, have impeded the European debate
from being sufficiently politicised. This is currently Europe's greatest weakness.
When we look towards 2020 - 2030 and the global challenges becoming crucial factors which
should be considered by all European policy makers, good Governance and Solidarity are the
two essential issues that stand out for the future of Europe. They must be at the heart of our
concerns, especially if we want to extend the outlandish dream of the founding fathers of this
century and go beyond the union of a whole continent and the building of a single market.
7
The next step we should move towards should be delivering the ownership of the European
project to citizens. The Committee of the Regions' offer to build Europe in partnership
answers this necessity. "A political European Union is built on common values and
inclusive governance".
After eight years of institutional reforms (to which the Committee of the Regions has largely
contributed in its initial phase, during the European Convention), we must acknowledge that
the European Union finally has a stable institutional base which we will live with for a long
time thanks to the Lisbon Treaty.
It is my conviction that the EU's multilevel governance, as a form of "intelligent
organisation", is the best way to co-govern globalisation in an increasingly interdependent
and network-oriented world. I am confident that multilevel governance through innovative
participatory mechanisms will help the EU establish a fruitful partnership approach for
improving citizens' quality of life.
It is the responsibility of all politicians at the European, national, regional or local level to
move the integration process forward in this direction.
The development of a European culture of multilevel governance is an ongoing
challenge. Indeed, Europe is every day the mission of regional and local representatives.
Above all, it is the mandate of the members of the Committee of the Regions.
8
DES DECLINAISONS CONCRETES DE LA GOUVERNANCE
A MULTI-NIVEAUX
MICHEL DELEBARRE
PREMIER VICE-PRESIDENT DU COMITE DES REGIONS 1
Sur le réseau social Facebook circule actuellement une pétition pour la reconnaissance du
terme "subsidiarité" dans les dictionnaires des langues de l'Union Européenne et cette pétition
connaît un certain succès. Nous n'en sommes pas au stade des pétitions pour la gouvernance à
multi-niveaux et probablement cette notion n'a-t-elle pas vocation à devenir un slogan
politique mobilisateur des foules. Néanmoins, elle a des implications concrètes importantes.
En effet, si la subsidiarité commence à signifier quelque chose – peut-être d'ailleurs parce que
le terme est suffisamment large pour ne pas recouvrir qu'une notion juridique -, la
gouvernance à multi-niveaux est une notion encore jeune et peu répandue. Il est vrai qu’elle
doit faire ses preuves d'autant qu'elle continue de susciter d'intenses débats dans la
communauté scientifique et le monde politique. J'en veux pour illustration la sentence rendue
au début du millénaire par le sociologue Pierre BOURDIEU: "La gouvernance est un de ces
nombreux néologismes qui, produit par des think tanks et autres cercles technocratiques et
véhiculés par les journalistes et les intellectuels branchés, contribuent à la mondialisation du
langage et des cerveaux" 2 .
Pour ma part, ayant été à trois reprises rapporteur du Comité des régions (CdR) sur le sujet de
la gouvernance européenne, je persévère à ne pas considérer la réflexion sur la gouvernance
comme une mode. Il s'agit au contraire de penser la régulation au niveau européen au-delà
des seules règles et procédures écrites qui figurent dans les traités. C'est une question de
méthodologie qui a une acuité particulière dans le contexte actuel où s’exprime un besoin de
nouvelles formes de régulation européenne face à la crise économique, financière, sociale et
climatique.
En ce sens, subsidiarité et gouvernance à multi-niveaux sont indissociables et
complémentaires. Selon le Livre Blanc sur la gouvernance proposé par le CdR, la première "a
trait aux compétences des différents niveaux de pouvoir, l'autre met l'accent sur leur
interaction" et encore "la gouvernance à multi niveaux représente (…) une « grille d’action »
politique plutôt qu’un instrument juridique (…)" 3 .
En effet, aux yeux du CdR, l'enjeu du pouvoir politique – législatif comme exécutif aujourd'hui en Europe n'est plus seulement ni le qui fait quoi, ni le quoi faire mais bien le
1
2
3
Co-rapporteur du Livre Blanc du CdR sur la gouvernance à multi-niveaux, Maire de Dunkerque
Pierre Bourdieu dans Les structures sociales de l'économie, p.22
CdR 89/2009, pp. 6 et 7.
9
comment faire. En d'autres mots: l'aval et l'amont de la décision sur une proposition
législative européenne comptent ou devraient compter autant que la prise de décision ellemême; il s'agit plus exactement d'un processus dont la qualité se mesure à l’aune de critères
comme la participation, le partenariat, la responsabilité, la cohérence, l'évaluation, la
subsidiarité et la proportionnalité.
Mais la gouvernance à multi-niveaux a aussi, au regard de la subsidiarité, un caractère
préventif: elle est en effet une garantie pour éliminer les suspicions et avoir le moins possible
recours à la dimension "coercitive" de la subsidiarité, c'est-à-dire le déclenchement des
mécanismes et des procédures de mise à l'arrêt de telle ou telle législation. En effet, devoir les
déclencher, c'est engager autant d'énergies politiques et administratives investies pour un
résultat incertain.
Situer la subsidiarité dans le contexte de la gouvernance à multi-niveaux c'est aussi faire
l'effort de la transversalité et du décloisonnement de l'action politique européenne.
De plus en plus de défis qu'affrontent l'Union Européenne, les Etats-membres et les acteurs
territoriaux – le développement durable, la cohésion territoriale, la mise en œuvre de la
Stratégie de Lisbonne - font appel à un traitement transversal et pluridisciplinaire. D'autres
politiques n'ont pas (encore) trouvé de place explicite parmi les compétences de l'Union
comme par exemple la politique maritime 4 , la politique du logement ou encore les services
publics. Cependant, la réflexion, l'action et les pratiques politiques restent cloisonnées dans
des approches sectorielles et qui peinent à communiquer l'une avec l'autre. Le travail de
réflexion sur la gouvernance est donc aussi un exercice de décloisonnement, un test pour
notre capacité à penser la transversalité des politiques et à prévoir les outils adéquats. Nous
voulons également ouvrir des perspectives pour un processus de décision européen qui aille
au-delà d’une lecture simplement notariale des compétences des uns et des autres, source
possible de polarisations ou de cloisonnements inutiles, et défendre une approche inclusive et
coopérative de tous les niveaux de gouvernement.
Ces revendications ne sont pas des incantations mais reposent sur des pistes d'action
concrètes:
Une première revendication porte sur l'outillage européen de la politique de gouvernance et
plus précisément sur les études d'impact. Si nous nous sommes félicités de l’introduction en
2004 d’une nouvelle méthode d’analyse d’impact pour les initiatives majeures de la
Commission européenne et de l'utilisation d'un instrument qui permet l'examen des
incidences économiques, environnementales et réglementaires d'une proposition, et prévoit la
consultation des parties concernées et des experts compétents, nous continuons à revendiquer
4
Voir avis du 17 juin 2009 "paquet maritime et côtier" (CdR 416/2008, rapporteur: Michel Delebarre)
10
que soit également pris en compte l'impact territorial des principales initiatives de la
Commission européenne afin de renforcer la cohérence de l'intervention communautaire 5 .
Cette revendication est devenue encore plus légitime dans la perspective de l'entrée en
vigueur du traité de Lisbonne qui érige la cohésion territoriale au rang d'objectif de l'Union.
La gouvernance à multi-niveaux signifie d'abord aller au maximum des potentialités
consultatives et participatives du Traité de Lisbonne.
En tant qu'objectif de l'Union Européenne, la cohésion territoriale devient d'ailleurs une
priorité transversale pour l'Europe. En ce sens, elle présente des analogies avec la clause
sociale horizontale, autre grande innovation de cohésion du Traité de Lisbonne aux yeux du
Comité des régions dont les modalités d'application doivent-elles aussi être spécifiées.
Cette novation requiert selon nous un saut qualitatif dans le travail sur les analyses d'impact
territorial de la législation communautaire.
Je voudrais en donner une illustration concrète: si l'ultime étape de la libéralisation du secteur
postal avait été proposée par la Commission sous le régime du traité de Lisbonne, elle n'aurait
peut-être pas abouti au même texte que celui qui a été adopté en juillet 2008 par le Parlement
et le Conseil car la proposition de la Commission aurait dû être assortie d'une analyse
beaucoup plus précise sur les conséquences possibles des différents scénarios de financement
du service universel proposés par la Commission et qui sont susceptibles de remettre en cause
le modèle de péréquation territoriale des coûts du service postal.
Bref, nous revendiquons la reconnaissance de la cohésion territoriale non pas seulement
comme outil d'aménagement du territoire mais aussi comme instrument de la gouvernance à
multi-niveaux et d’une meilleure action législative!
Le CdR n'est pas seul dans cette démarche et son ambition d'une gouvernance à multiniveaux au niveau de l'Union Européenne est partagée.
Rappelons que les États membres se sont engagés à l'occasion de l'adoption du premier
programme d'action pour la mise en œuvre de « l'Agenda territorial de l'Union européenne 6 »
à développer notamment dans le cadre de sa ligne 3.1. des actions concrètes pour renforcer la
gouvernance à multi-niveaux.
Pour sa part, dans un rapport sur la gouvernance et le partenariat aux niveaux national et
régional 7 présenté par Jean-Marie Beaupuy puis adopté par la session plénière en octobre
2008, le Parlement Européen a invité le CdR "à renforcer ses actions pour développer la
pratique de la gouvernance tant d'un point de vue quantitatif que qualitatif".
5
6
7
Voir avis du 12 octobre 2005 "mieux légiférer 2004" (CONST 029, rapporteur: Michel Delebarre)
Adopté à l'occasion de la réunion informelle des ministres responsables de l’aménagement du territoire et de
la politique régionale les 23 et 24 novembre 2007 aux Açores.
Point 31 du rapport de Jean-Marie Beaupuy (ADLE/FR), A6-0356/2008
11
Mais c'est essentiellement dans le débat sur l'avenir de la politique de cohésion que le CdR
espère nouer des alliances pour la gouvernance à multi-niveaux et obtenir des engagements
concrets.
"La politique de cohésion de l'Union Européenne est l'endroit où la gouvernance à multiniveaux s'est épanouie grâce à une tradition culturelle forte de soutien au rôle des
collectivités territoriales et à la conscience des limites de la Commission dans une gestion
directe des interventions", dit le Rapport Barca sur la réforme de la politique de cohésion
pour la période après 2013 commandité par la Commission Européenne à des experts
indépendants sous la houlette de Fabrizio Barca, directeur général au Ministère de l'Economie
et des Finances italien, et présenté en avril 2009 8 .
La gouvernance et plus précisément la gouvernance à multi-niveaux y occupent en effet une
place centrale illustrée par le fait que les deux termes sont cités dans le rapport
respectivement 103 et 26 fois. Et le rapport va même jusqu'à proposer une grille d'évaluation
pour déterminer le degré de succès de la gouvernance à multi-niveaux dans la politique de
cohésion.
Mais le Rapport Barca met surtout en exergue que la capacité d’un territoire à tirer le meilleur
parti de ses ressources est déterminée, non pas par les conditions technologiques données,
mais par l’interaction d’institutions et de décisions privées et publiques, économiques et
politiques…c'est-à-dire en d'autres mots la gouvernance à multi-niveaux.
Et ce constat vaut tout autant pour les territoires dont nous sommes les élus que pour l'Union
Européenne.
8
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/barca_en.htm
12
SPEECH PRONOUNCED DURING THE CONFERENCE ON
"MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE", BRUGES,
22 SEPTEMBER 2009
MR. FELIPE GONZALEZ
PRESIDENT OF THE REFLECTION GROUP ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
Good morning Mr Rector
Mr. President of the Committee of the Regions
Ladies and gentlemen,
I think this is the ideal location to discuss multilevel governance problems. I'll be brief
because I want to have more time for the debate, but I want to start by saying that right now
we are in the midst of a global financial crisis that has drastic consequences on the
employment, and this crisis is a total crisis – a global one. It also has an impact on our society
as a whole. The world that we have left behind is no longer the world that we knew 20 years
ago: the world of the seventies or eighties. No, we're talking about a drastic change in society
which shifts power on a global level.
New superpowers have come into being on a worldwide level. The US within the context of
this crisis have considered this to be a national state of emergency and the crisis has been
experienced in the same way by Japan. It's been kind of a turnaround; so we have transited to
a completely new economic and civil society. We have changed direction completely. It is
considered to be a global worldwide state of emergency but also on a European level and we
also have to be a bit critical about this because on the European level, we can not really say
that we considered this to be an emergency situation which resulted in a complete change
but…..
We have to say that Europe has a couple of problems in adjusting and introducing changes
and Europe really holds on to this system; the structure that has proved to be successful after
the 2nd World War particularly for countries that were part of different communities within
Europe. On different levels the different regions involved, but I don't think that Europe needs
a complete turnaround, a complete reform in order to face this crisis. However, I do have the
impression that we failed to really develop a true community in Europe. When I work with
my colleagues from Asia, the US and Japan, then I see that they consider this crisis to be
much more serious than we do in Europe but in the context we need to think about this new
development, including new knowledge society, the new shifts in power on a worldwide
13
scale … Because if we fail to do that, I don't think that we will be able to find a solution to
our problems.
In the past 20 years, since the fall of the Berlin wall, I think that we have seen a number of
interesting developments and I think that these sorts of events were the reason for us to be
here. I sincerely think that we should not be afraid to think about the crisis on a national and
international level.
The nation was always a sovereign nation, the basis of democracy in the western European
countries and I think that we should also consider that in the overall context. Because this
results in the decentralisation of the concept of Nation State concept. This is is a kind of
bottom-up approach. In that way, we want to share things with one another and we have had
the European Union, we have this single currency which is not only a single currency, but a
unique currency. We tried to get some kind of economic and monetary unity, but we left out a
number of elements and that is the normal consequence of a bottom-up decentralisation of the
Nation State. In that way we want to share things with one another, while we also want to be
really present in this multipolar world. This bottom-up decentralisation was also linked to
giving powers to various sub-levels, to regions. And this has been a continuous process that
started even before 1989, before the fall of the Berlin wall. However, since 1988, we have
gathered some kind of momentum. This accelerated process of top down decentralisation
contains a couple of fundamental elements and one of them is that the governments are closer
to the citizens. They are also more flexible in providing answers to local solutions and
challenges. And then there is a third reason that is local regional governments can match the
diversity of perceptions and identities that exist within Europe.
So three reasons: being closer to the citizens, being more efficient because they have more
knowledge in the field and flexibility (being better able to adapt to all sorts of changes), and
the sense of diversity of the different identities in the different states of Europe.
This Europe of the Nations is really transnational and not bound by state borders. What was
the implementation criterion that was used really within the context of this decentralisation
process? Well, we have talked a lot about this. I remember a debate with M. Helmut Kohl
when preparing the reform of the EU Treaty, and the European Union was considered to be a
unity of people and not of States. So the nation-states remain the same, but we also stipulated
that before everything else we wanted to have some set of guidelines through which we could
integrate the concept of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity, you have to understand that really well.
This concept is a concept looking at the competences, so we need to know what has to be
done on what level. The level that matches the needs and interests of the people best. So it
should be the level that is closest to the people.
Nowadays, I think that the big powers should come together. We have the G20, we have the
US, Russia, Japan, China, etc. We have this whole group of powers and if they could talk to
Europe that in turn could speak with one voice, that would be much more understandable for
14
the EU citizen and we would become more relevant on a worldwide level. That should be the
definition of a better representation of the EU citizens and I think that is a decisive element to
face this crisis, because this is also a crisis of global governments. In Europe we've got four
governmental levels: the European level, the national, the regional and the local authorities'
level.
We also have the G20, which is a very heterogeneous group and they do not have a really
clear direction for the future, because they think that we have seen the worst of the crisis
already and what we should avoid is of course a global recession. Of course there are still a
lot of elements of crisis present on the European level, and the G20 probably don't really feel
like implementing the necessary reforms. The financial flows should be better prepared in
order to avoid ending up in the same situation. In the past 20 years, we have gone through
two crises: the crisis of 2000 which can be summarised as follows: That was a crisis of
certain things that had to be put in place. It's a bit ridiculous; it's not that the countries from
Asia do not have to reform because of the crisis. For example, we have got Brasil which has
experienced a number of problems and in 2000 for the very first time, we had this financial
crisis and at that time, the big powers just needed to reform a bit better in order to become
stronger but we can never return to the high level situations that we were in before and now,
we already are facing a next financial implosion. I think we should look at things in a
different way.
I would like to repeat the idea of subsidiarity which is very important because we are talking
about the decentralisation of power. Subsidiarity should be considered as being at the service
of citizens. So that each level of power has the necessary competences to meet the needs of
the citizens in the most efficient way. One thing in that context seems to be very relevant to
me: we need to make sure to keep this whole process coherent. I'm not talking about the
territorial or material cohesion; I'm not talking about a concept that is too abstract or
theoretical. In fact, I am talking about very specific elements being part of this cohesion. This
type of decentralisation should not be translated into an uncontrolled centrifugal movement.
We have to both take into account the several sub-elements that apply to the subsidiarity
principle and we also need to make sure that we safeguard cohesion within the EU.
I want to stress once again that it is very important to keep this cohesion. So I can only say
that I completely agree with what the President just said and I also think that he understood
really well what the elements of this subsidiarity were. I think that it is also necessary to point
out right now that the implementation of this subsidiarity principle, particulary in Spain with
the distribution of power, in spite of the current financial crisis, really created some kind of
dynamism. Some complain about that because they want to keep a more centralist view of
power; because they want to criticise certain excesses, but it really created certain dynamism.
In Spain, we are in the midst of a really huge crisis.We have got an unemployment rate of
18% even though, in the last 20 to 25 years, we have achieved tremendous development. The
15
growth domestic product is very high indeed and I do think that we have enabled business to
achieve record figures particularly compared to the rest of the previous century. In 1980, the
GDP was 4000 dollars per year and now - in this time of crisis- it is 30,000 dollars per capita
and that has got to do with this dynamism of the decentralisation process. And I do think it is
a real success story. I would like you to remember this because it required a lot of different
institutional reforms, and I was involved in them. I know from personal experience that a lot
of problems can be solved with legislation, but that is only part of reality.
Another thing that I would like to share with you is that the think-tank taskforce reflecting on
the future of Europe can not talk about institutional reforms. Why? This taskforce was set up
immediately after the Lisbon Treaty and nobody could have predicted what would happen.
Nobody could predict there would be an institutional crisis. So someone in this group said
that this would never apply to the 27 MS, but apparently it has been the case and that is why
we did not get that mandate. The students in the room probably know that well. So we can
not talk about institutional reforms. I'm not that passionate about institutional reforms after
Lisbon Treaty, but we can not talk about budgetary problems either. What we can talk about
is the principle of subsidiarity and multilevel governance, and this means that we have to be
able to explain to the people that we can make progress, huge progress in the field of
multilevel governance. However, that would require institutional reforms. It would also
require a clear vision on what we want to achieve and we also need a willingness to apply the
principle of subsidiarity. That actually has already been included in the general debates on the
European institutes and actually I think it is pretty easy to elaborate something in that respect.
The Commission as well as the Parliament could work on this, but it would be a bit harder
particularly on the level of the European Council because of a lack of dynamism. In spite of
the Council's standpoint, we still have to work with the Council in order to develop some
kind of dynamism in that respect. I would like to remind you of a very well known Italian
who once said "You can be intelligent and pessimistic, but if you need to be really optimistic
and you need to have this willingness". I do think that, regarding Europe, if you are
intelligent enough, you can be optimistic, but you cannot understand everything. It think that
the situation is very clear: we've got a lack of multilevel governance and we need to do
something about it. We can be optimistic, but we cannot be too optimistic about the
willingness of elites, because there is a lack of willingness to solve these European problems.
For instance, we are facing a lot of challenges due to the economic crisis which brings me
back to the introduction that I gave: we failed to react to the state of emergency. We thought
it was a US problem. A problem with the joint credits and it was only later that we realised
that we also needed to do something. But we were quite divided. The UK, France, everybody
did something on their own and it was only afterwards that they called in the European
institution; they asked the Commission whether there was some kind of umbrella that they
could use, but, let me be very clear on that,– it's not the language we should have been using.
But this, ladies and gentlemen, that is exactly our challenge. If we fail to react to this global
16
crisis in which we find ourselves, then Europe will be unable to address our problems
accurately and adequately. In that way, we would be unable to find or provide answers to
other problems that we face on other European issues.
I think that the President of the CoR has already mentioned knowledge-based society that we
need to concentrate on. But we should also focus on innovation. We can not have innovation
without proper research and development. Innovation is the quality element of this entire
process. It's not only research that is required. You could also require creativity. You need a
new vision in order to come from one place and start thinking about the global situation using
innovation and creativity. Unfortunately, we Europeans do not have this real culture. We are
equally unable to centralise that. We can't go up - we can't go down. A lot of initiatives are
being taken to build the knowledge-based society in the field of ICT, communication, traffic ;
biotechnology and whatever. We have the best researchers in the field of biotechnology here
in Europe, but many initiatives have been taken on a very small scale by very small mediumsized enterprises, and, ironically enough, they are not European companies. Of course, if they
are small companies, they will strongly focus on the local market. Parallel to this, now we
have the Chinese, Asian and Japanese companies coming to Europe. Do European companies
not have enough creativity, education and training? The answer is no. We have a lot of people
who are able to innovate and who are creative and most of them are young. However, they do
not have access to risk capital, to public support because this public support usually goes to
the bigger companies. So we need risk taking, or we will not have Google, Microsoft or Bill
Gates or other huge inventors in Europe, and this has nothing to do with knowledge and
training. It has got chiefly to do with culture and this cultural issue is very hard to solve. It's
not that innovative initiatives will require huge budgets to implement, but we do not know
how to do it, how to get through the administrative maize and once researchersdo get a
funding, they would most probably get it because of some scholarschip granted by some
college. So right now, I don't think that we have this kind of collaborative spirit in Europe. I
think that we should support risk, in order to really boost creativity. Because, otherwise, Mr
President, we will never be able to adapt to the knowledge-based society and to globalisation.
Thank you for your attention.
17
18
RISE OF REGIONS
LISBET HOOGHE 9 AND GARY MARKS 10
European integration has gone hand in hand with decentralization. Since 1950, 19 of the 27
countries of the European Union have seen stronger, more authoritative, regional
governments handling a greater variety of policy responsibilities. 11 Only two countries with
populations greater than two-and-one-half million have escaped this trend. 12 Since 1950, new
regional levels of government have been created in 14 EU countries. Eighteen regions in
seven countries have been given special autonomous status or new special statutes, not
counting the Belgian communities and regions or the Spanish historical comunidades.
At the end of World War II, Europeans were living in national states geared to war and postwar scarcity. States were hardened shells—uniform, centralized, autonomous. Today
Europeans live in soft states — diverse, decentralized, interdependent. Authority has shifted
away from central states both up to international organizations, chiefly the European Union,
and down to regions and localities. This is why it makes sense to describe the current era as
one of multilevel governance: governance exercised across vastly diverse scales from the
local to the global.
There are three fundamental reasons for multilevel governance. The first is efficiency. The
basic principle of public goods analysis is that a jurisdiction should encompass those who are
positively or negatively affected by a policy. Because the public goods that citizens need
vary, the scales at which they are most efficiently provided vary as well. Some policies, such
as town planning or fire protection, are best handled at a population scale of tens of
thousands, some, such as secondary education or hospitals, are best handled at a scale of
hundreds of thousands, others, such as tourism promotion or transport infrastructure, at a
scale of millions, while yet other problems require jurisdictions that are vastly larger.
Economists argue that the virtues of centralization and decentralization differ from policy to
policy. Centralization can exploit economies of scale, for example in providing security,
property rights, trade, redistribution, and clean air – where the fixed costs of the policy can be
spread over more taxpayers or where provision over a larger population allows for increasing
9
Chair in Multilevel Governance, VU Amsterdam & Zachary Taylor Smith Professor of Political Science,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
10
Chair in Multilevel Governance, VU Amsterdam & Burton Craige Distinguished Professor in Political
Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
11
These and subsequent data are drawn from: Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, The Rise of
Regional Authority in 42 Democracies, 1950-2006, Routledge, 2010. The data is available at
http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe.
12
In Sweden more autonomy and direct elections for the Län was offset by the abolition of the upper chamber
of the Riksdag in 1971, which represented Län. Bulgaria has deconcentrated regions.
19
returns to scale. But there are few economies of scale in pre-school education or household
refuse collection or maintaining parks and public libraries.
Where externalities or economies of scale exist, the virtues of centralization must be balanced
with the virtues of decentralization. Decentralized government is closer to the citizen and
therefore has better information about what citizens want. Decentralization multiplies policy
arenas, and therefore raises the possibility that alternative solutions to common problems can
be tried and tested. In short, the efficiency benefits of multilevel governance appear
compelling. No single scale of government is best for all policies.
Recent decades have seen an unparalleled expansion of government portfolios to welfare,
microeconomic, environmental, educational, health, and transport policies. These policies
have enlarged the responsibilities of the state, but, unlike war, they do not compress policy
making to the national level. On the contrary, each of these policies requires coordination
among governments at diverse levels. As the policy portfolio has expanded, so has the need
to synchronize local, regional, national, and European policy.
A second reason for multilevel governance is democracy. Multilevel governance results from,
and contributes to, democracy. Democratic leaders may shift decision making away from the
central state if this is efficient or brings them votes; dictators, by contrast, centralize power to
stifle opposition. At most, authoritarian regimes deconcentrate authority in local outposts of
the central state which provide information to their masters and put central directives into
operation. The upshot is that democratization in Southern Europe and in central and Eastern
European countries has been a major source of multilevel governance. These countries have
decentralized at the same time that they have joined the European Union.
Fifteen EU member states became democracies after 1970, beginning with Greece, Portugal,
and Spain and encompassing eight former communist countries after 1989. These countries
regionalized at twice the pace of the established democracies in the decade after they
overthrew dictatorship. The third wave of democratization generated a wave of
regionalization.
Multilevel governance enhances democracy because it multiplies opportunities for citizens to
influence government.
•
Local and regional democracy reduces the distance between the government and the
individual citizen. The smaller the population of a jurisdiction, the greater the influence that
can be exercised by each individual. It is one thing for a citizen to contact her local or
regional government to complain about a problem; it is another for her to contact the national
government.
•
Multiple arenas provide citizens with ways to constrain government at one level by
voting for a different party at another level. Similarly, multiple arenas enable interest groups
20
or social movements to take their concerns to another level if they find a government
unresponsive.
•
Regional and local democracy allows distinct communities—people bound together
through distinct norms—to achieve self-rule. Multilevel governance caters to heterogeneous
policy preferences on the part of different communities, but without sacrificing the benefits of
larger jurisdictions.
Some argue that multilevel governance clouds responsibility for policy and therefore
weakens democracy at the national level. But national elections in a centralized state are no
panacea. National politicians would be the first to claim that they cannot be held responsible
for international or local problems over which they have no control. Multilevel governance
extends the control that humans have over the problems that confront them. The alternative to
multilevel democracy is not simple democracy but ineffective democracy.
Surveys show that European citizens want more local and regional democracy.
Representative regional institutions have always been a facet of federal polities, but the idea
has spread. In 1950, just five countries that are now part of the EU had directly elected
regional assemblies covering the country as a whole; today, 16 EU countries do. The demand
for local and regional democracy has been an important pressure for multilevel governance.
Finally, European integration has strengthened decentralization. European integration has
broken the mould of the centralized state. The creation of a new level of supranational
government implies that the allocation of authority is a matter of choice – not tradition or
fate. Regionalization is sometimes resisted on the grounds that it leads to insulated and
inefficient markets, but European integration punctures this line of argument because it
provides an overarching market within which regions and localities compete and prosper.
European integration intensifies economic competition at the regional level. EU rules curbing
state aid and prohibiting national discrimination in public procurement make it difficult for
national governments to insulate regions from market competition. Authoritative regions are
perceived to be better at exploiting their comparative advantage in the international division
of labour.
No government is an island. No single policy can be isolated from the array of policies that
sustain civilized life. Decisions taken at one level of government affect decisions taken at
another. Most policies require coordination among international, European, national,
regional, and local governments. Climate policy, for example, will work only if local and
regional governments develop innovative land use, industrial, and transport policies for
particular populations in particular places.
The White Paper on Multilevel Governance sets out some practical steps. It proposes
Territorial Pacts which extend the practice of partnership from its base in cohesion policy to
health policy, training, research, integration policy, social inclusion, and civil defence. It calls
21
for more policy experimentation by including local and regional governments in the open
method of coordination, and by enlisting regional governments in studying the territorial
effects of European policies. And it suggests ways in which the Committee of Regions broker
working relationships between regions, localities, and the European Union. Government
across scale appears to be an ineluctable feature of modern society. The White Paper on
Multilevel Governance seeks to strengthen coordination among public institutions in an effort
to achieve community in diversity.
22
PARTICIPATION ET PARTENARIAT EN EUROPE
CLAUDIO MARTINI ∗ AND AGOSTINO FRAGAI 13
L'Union européenne compte près de 500 millions d'habitants. Nous savons que nombreux
sont ceux pour qui l'Europe pourrait n'apparaître que comme une entité lointaine et que
certains ne la perçoivent que comme un échelon bureaucratique supplémentaire. Il faut être
conscient du risque (réel) de désillusion et de désaffection. Pourtant, l'Europe peut représenter
quelque chose de véritablement concret. Mais elle doit être vécue (et perçue) dans la vie
quotidienne et dans les activités de gestion des collectivités les plus proches des citoyens.
Une transparence en ce qui concerne les objectifs et les actions peut y contribuer. Sans une
véritable concordance de vues, le risque est de déployer beaucoup d'efforts pour des résultats
dérisoires. C'est pourquoi la première étape doit consister à définir les priorités et s'accorder
sur celles-ci, pour ensuite concourir tous ensemble, chacun à son niveau de compétence, à
leur réalisation.
Les régions ont besoin de l'Europe, mais l'Europe a elle aussi besoin des régions. Je dirais
même plus, l'Europe ne peut exister qu'à travers les gouvernements nationaux, les régions et
les collectivités locales. J'entends par là que si l'Europe veut être proche des citoyens, elle ne
peut se passer des régions et des collectivités locales. Seules les régions peuvent combler le
dangereux fossé qui s'est creusé entre les idéaux européens et l'adhésion des citoyens à ceuxci. Par ailleurs, pour pouvoir être menées à bien, les grandes politiques communautaires ont
de plus en plus besoin que les citoyens adoptent de bons comportements. De tels
comportements seront possibles à condition d'une part que soient établies des lois claires et
des orientations fermes et d'autre part que celles-ci rencontrent l'assentiment des citoyens
devant les appliquer. Des économies d'énergie au recyclage des déchets, de l'agriculture
durable à la mobilité, le succès des politiques dépend de plus en plus de la convergence des
actions et des comportements de la part des gouvernements à tous les niveaux et des acteurs
privés, qu'il s'agisse d'entreprises ou d'individus. Cette exigence est du reste au cœur des
préoccupations des institutions communautaires, à commencer par le Parlement européen, qui
s'est prononcé à plusieurs reprises en faveur de la promotion de la citoyenneté européenne
active. Il ne faut pas non plus oublier la Commission, qui a encouragé ces dernières années, y
compris financièrement, la diffusion de pratiques participatives, en expérimentant des
technologies et des méthodes innovantes destinées à favoriser la participation des citoyens.
La gouvernance en Europe est aujourd'hui un processus extrêmement complexe. Les niveaux
de gouvernement se sont multipliés et le développement et la complexité des instances
∗
Président de la commission CONST du Comité des Régions, Président de la région Toscane
Assesseur aux réformes institutionnelles, à la participation et aux relations avec les collectivités locales
13
23
locales, régionales, nationales et européennes nécessitent, pour pouvoir être compris et
acceptés, l'établissement de liens forts avec les citoyens. Qui plus est, sans transparence,
information et participation, il est difficile d'instaurer une gestion à plusieurs niveaux, gestion
étant ici entendue au sens de gouvernance multi niveaux. Cette dernière repose sur un réseau
dense de relations, de décisions et de mesures d'application des politiques publiques de la part
d'acteurs qui sont souvent aussi bien publics que privés. En soi, ce réseau n'est pas un facteur
négatif; il constitue au contraire une valeur ajoutée. Mais il doit être organisé et coordonné.
C'est à cette seule condition que l'approche multi niveaux pourra être de qualité et permettre
la prise de bonnes décisions, tout en étant enracinée dans la société. Derrière ce
raisonnement, il y a non pas une critique, mais un défi: lorsque l'enjeu est véritablement de
taille et complexe, ce n'est pas en réunissant quelques personnes à huis clos que l'on pourra
trouver les bonnes solutions, mais en consultant, avant de prendre toute décision, l'ensemble
des acteurs informés, ceux qui côtoient les problèmes, ceux qui peuvent contribuer à prendre
des décisions plus informées et donc plus efficaces. Bien entendu, cette approche fondée sur
la transparence et la participation à la prise de décision nécessite des décideurs forts et faisant
autorité qui, à l'issue de ce processus, puissent assumer la responsabilité de la décision en
sachant pouvoir s'appuyer sur une meilleure information que dans le cas des méthodes plus
traditionnelles.
L'expérience de la Toscane nous enseigne que les citoyens peuvent contribuer à la prise de
bonnes décisions dans des délais définis. La Toscane a été la première (et jusqu'ici la seule)
région italienne à élaborer et adopter en 2007 une loi promouvant la participation des
citoyens aux décisions des institutions, et ce au niveau local et régional. Nous nous sommes
inspirés du débat public français, mais aussi de modèles anglo-saxons ou sud-américains de
démocratie participative et délibérative. Nous avons créé une autorité indépendante chargée
de la participation, à laquelle des communes, des associations ou des groupes de citoyens
peuvent s'adresser pour solliciter une aide économique ou un conseil en vue de l'organisation
d'un processus participatif local concernant un projet ou une décision importante pour une
communauté locale. Nous avons essayé avec humilité et beaucoup de curiosité
d'expérimenter des formes et des modes de participation des citoyens à la prise de décision et
à l'issue de chacune de ces expériences, nous avons toujours eu la confirmation que ces
instruments permettent de comprendre la position des autres parties prenantes et de
rechercher des solutions plus avancées et innovantes. En trois ans et demi, nous avons
organisé quatre assemblées participatives électroniques ("electronic town meeting"): l'une de
celles-ci, grâce notamment à un financement de la Commission européenne, a porté sur les
questions liées aux énergies renouvelables et au changement climatique. Des jeunes de
Toscane, mais aussi de Catalogne et de la région française du Poitou-Charentes ont pris part à
cet événement participatif paneuropéen. Cela a représenté un défi important que de traiter une
grande question d'intérêt général (et non pas la construction d'un pont ou d'une place), avec la
participation de jeunes issus des écoles et des universités de nos trois régions. Cela a montré
24
qu'il est possible d'élargir l'éventail des parties prenantes et que même les grands débats
peuvent se dérouler dans des enceintes où les citoyens peuvent s'exprimer, nous permettre de
prendre des décisions optimales et d'accueillir des informations et des avis susceptibles
d'aider à la fois ceux qui doivent établir des règles générales et ceux qui doivent agir au
niveau individuel.
Sur la base de ces premières années d'expérience et de travail, nous avons acquis la
conviction que consacrer six mois à l'examen d'un projet n'est pas une perte de temps. Cela
permet de prévenir les conflits et les contestations, évitant ainsi que les chantiers ne soient
bloqués par la suite. Cela contribue à la prise de meilleures décisions (ou en tout cas de
décisions plus éclairées) et à l'avancement plus rapide des travaux nécessaires à la
collectivité.
Nous avons déjà eu recours à l'instrument de la participation dans le cadre de la planification
territoriale, de la définition de certaines orientations en matière de politique sanitaire mais
aussi de l'élaboration de la loi sur la participation elle-même.
Et en l'espace d'un an, nous avons déjà reçu en provenance des régions plus de trente
demandes d'ouverture de processus de participation locale.
La participation et le partenariat sont au fond deux piliers qui ne peuvent agir que de concert
pour soutenir la mise en place de processus de décision démocratiques, de qualité et efficaces.
L'un ne va pas sans l'autre.
Conformément au principe de subsidiarité, la gestion d'un service ou les compétences de base
relèvent du niveau de gouvernance le plus proche du citoyen. Si ce niveau ne parvient pas à
s'acquitter de sa tâche, l'on passe au niveau supérieur. En réalité toutefois, dans l'Europe
d'aujourd'hui, les niveaux de gouvernance se recoupent beaucoup plus que ne le prévoit la
théorie.
L'Union promeut et fixe certaines grandes orientations. Ces propositions sont ensuite
déclinées par les gouvernements nationaux et dans leur sillage par les collectivités
territoriales. Mais sans l'avis des territoires, il serait difficile de définir les bonnes priorités. Et
sans transparence et participation éclairée des citoyens, de nombreux objectifs - nous pensons
aux politiques environnementales - risqueraient de ne jamais être atteints. De plus, la
gouvernance de l'Europe ne fonctionne pas toujours selon la voie hiérarchique. Il existe des
relations directes entre l'Europe et les régions, l'Europe et les communes, ainsi qu'entre les
régions elles-mêmes.
Il s'agit là d'un édifice dont le partenariat et la participation sont les pierres angulaires, et dont
nous voudrions que les parois soient transparentes, afin que le travail réalisé entre ses murs
soit visible aux yeux de tous.
25
La terminologie des institutions européennes a vu s'imposer des termes et des concepts qui
ont conduit à de grandes innovations politiques et institutionnelles à tous les niveaux:
subsidiarité, gouvernance, approche multi-niveaux, pour n'en citer que quelques-uns.
Le défi de la participation recèle en soi, entre autres choses, la possibilité de faire vivre et
croître ces innovations dans le vocabulaire et dans la vie de tous les jours des citoyens
européens.
26
THE WHITE PAPER ON MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE:
RELEVANCE AND CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION
PROF. DR. DR. JÖRG MONAR 14
1. The centrality of multi-level governance to the delivery of public goods to citizens
Public authorities have ultimately only one reason of being: to deliver public goods to
citizens. In Europe the range of these public goods has grown dramatically over the last two
centuries, extending – especially through the growth of the welfare state during the second
half of the last century 15 - well beyond the essentially security and order providing functions
of public authorities in earlier times. 16 In parallel to the extension of the public goods
provided citizens in Europe have had to accept a no less dramatic increase of their obligations
towards ‘the public good’, both in terms of a myriad of rules they have to comply with and
taxes and fees they have to pay. Any European of the beginning of the 19th century could
hardly have imagined both what his descendants two centuries later could and would expect
public authorities to provide and what they have to comply with in return to make this
possible.
As a result of the massive growth in demand for as well as offer of public goods the link
between the individual citizen and his public authorities occupies today a much larger space
in European citizens’ life than in any previous period in history. This link – which is in many
cases takes the form of vital dependency - is not only much more extensive because of the
wide range of public goods now covered by public policies and delivered – to a greater or
lesser extent – by public authorities, it has also become much more multi-dimensional as
there is now an enormous variety of public authorities – from rule-making over executive and
administrative to monitoring and advisory ones – involved in serving the citizens. Adding to
the complexity is the fact that these authorities are located at different levels from the local,
over the regional and national to – and this makes the case of the European Union special –
14
Director of Studies, European Political and Administrative Studies Department College of Europe, visiting
professor University of Sussex
15
A useful survey of the expansion of the public goods provided by the European welfare state is provided in
Peter Flora/Arnold J. Heidenheimer: “The Historical Core and Changing Boundaries of the Welfare State”, in:
Peter Flora/Arnold j. Heidenheimer (eds.): The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, New
Brunswick (Transaction Publishers) 1981, pp. 17-36.
16
The very concept of ‘public goods’ has changed and expanded – and keeps doing so – as a result. See
Meghnad Desai: “Public Goods: A Historical Perspective”, and Inge Kaul and Ronald U. Mendoza: “Advancing
the Concept of Public Goods”, in: Inge Kaul et al. (eds.): Providing Global Public Goods, Oxford (Oxford
University Press) 2003, pp. 63-77 and 78-111 respectively.
27
the European level. In order to provide public goods to citizens all these authorities with their
respective roles and at their different levels have to interact – and this as effectively and
efficiently as possible. It is with regard to this interaction that the term ‘governance’ gains its
full importance:
‘Governance’ as a term and concept can and should be defined broad enough to cover all
aspects of the exercise of power by public authorities for the delivery of public goods,
whatever institutional and procedural form this may take – and at whatever level of national
or supranational hierarchy. 17 Understood in this sense ‘governance’ comprises the totality of
the operation of and interaction between public authorities in their efforts to deliver public
goods to citizens – an enormously wide field of institutionalised human activity which is
crucial to the sustainability and legitimacy of our political and socio-economic systems.
The White Paper on Multi-Level Governance of the Committee of Regions constitutes a
major document of analysis, reflection and political advocacy on the nature, challenges and
possible ways to improve governance in the European Union. This in itself can be regarded as
a major point of merit as the intricacies of day-to-day policy-making and implementation
normally absorb so much time and energy of decision-makers at both the EU and the national
level that fundamental questions about the nature, strengths, weaknesses and improvement of
the European governance system as interaction between public authorities are rarely, if ever,
thematised as such. The last major effort of an EU institution to do so goes back to the
European Commission’s White Paper on “European Governance” 18 at the beginning of this
decade. While not without substance in its emphasis on the need for more openness,
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence, this White Paper was not
particularly innovative and perhaps too wide-ranging and EU Commission-focused to leave a
lasting impact on EU governance evolution since. 19 The Committee of the Regions has
certainly been justified in taking the initiative for another White Paper taking up fundamental
issues of European governance anew after nearly a decade – and this with a different
perspective.
It is this different perspective which constitutes the second point of merit of the Committee of
the Regions’ White Paper - and gives to its full measure of originality: The European Union
has invested a lot of time and effort in a series of treaty revisions which have certainly partly
been driven by governance reform objectives. Yet revisions of the EC and EU Treaties cover
only certain framework rules for the operation of and interaction between public authorities,
17
For a discussion of the meaning of the term and its application to the European Union see Jörg Monar: The
Future of European Governance”, in: O. von der Gablentz/D. Mahncke/P.-C. Padoan/R. Picht (eds.): Europe
2020. Adapting to a Changing World, Baden-Baden (Nomos) 2000, pp. 19-20.
18
COM(2001) 428, 25.7.2001.
19
For a critical assessment see Marcus Höreth: “Neither Breathtaking Nor Pathbreaking. The
European Commission's White Paper on Governance”, in: Journal of International Relations and
Development, vol. 5, no. 1 (2002), pp. 6-23
28
and they leave large parts of the involvement of public authorities in the policy-making and
policy-implementation process outside of their range. This is particularly true for the
authorities at the local and the regional level whose involvement in political processes
relating to the EU is largely left to the discretion of the individual Member States. Yet – as
pointed out above - “governance” is a holistic concept involving public authorities and their
interaction at all levels, and any approach to governance reform focusing only on the upper
levels of governance remains necessarily unbalanced and incomplete, with at least partial
ineffectiveness and inefficiency as a result. The Committee’s White Paper is based on the full
recognition of the centrality of an effective system of multi-level governance, in which all
levels interact and cooperate, for the effective and efficient delivery of public services to
citizens. With its particular emphasis on partnership and participation of local and regional
authorities the Committee’s White Paper compensates the relative lower level governance
“blindness” of both the existing EU policy process and EU treaty reforms.
One could, to be fair, hardly expect the Committee of the Regions not to advocate a stronger
participation of local and regional authorities. But this obvious consideration does not detract
from the importance – and the merit – of this major initiative to bring the involvement of the
lower levels of European governance to the core of the debate on the further development of
the European construction. This is all the more justified in the light of the fact that local and
regional authorities are in many fields the “frontline” authorities in the delivery of public
goods to citizens. For obvious reasons they are much closer to the needs, concerns and
demands of citizens than national or European authorities, and most of the “bread and butter”
elements of public goods – such as social benefits, local economic development and security
in the streets – continue to be delivered by local and/or regional authorities. This gives them a
direct concern and a direct expertise regarding the needs and demands of citizens in terms of
public goods which national and European authorities – for equally obvious reasons – have to
a much lesser extent. Bringing this concern and expertise more into European governance is a
central element of the rationale of this White Paper – and one which should be taken
seriously by a European Union whose distance from the citizens has long been identified as
major challenge.
2. Challenges of implementation
While in the light of the above there can be no question about the justification and relevance
of the White Paper on Multilevel Governance, its ultimate success or failure will be decided
by its implementation. 20 The example of the Commission’s aforementioned 2001 White
20
As other contributions to this volume have already identified and commented upon the key elements of the
White Paper this section moves directly on to the question of implementation.
29
Paper has shown that there is always a risk of a major political communication not going
much beyond the mainly intellectual merit of attracting attention to governance challenges
and possible responses to them.
The fact that the White Paper of the Committee of the Regions does not remain purely at the
level of principles but makes an impressive range of concrete suggestions how to implement
partnership and participation in a multilevel governance context increases the chances of the
White Paper eventually translating into actual governance changes. However, there are a
number of more general challenges which will need to be addressed:
A first one relates to the need of keeping up a certain political momentum (or even
“pressure”) on the implementation side. The “consultations” referred to at the end of the
White Paper 21 may not be enough to ensure that the message and recommendations of the
White Paper are kept on the political agenda of the EU and the national political settings
sufficiently for real action on the implementation side. The Committee should consider the
introduction of a “Scoreboard of multilevel governance” which would indicate – on an annual
basis – progress made or not made with regard to the undertakings and recommendations of
the White Paper. On the basis of such an annual scoreboard report the Committee could adopt
an annual “Resolution on Multilevel Governance” highlighting both progress and remaining
deficits. Scoreboard identified – and in the resolution suitably underlined – failures to give
any follow-up to White Paper recommendations could well exercise a certain amount of
pressure on other actors – such as the European Commission.
A second challenge relates to the sheer number of undertakings made by the Committee of
the Regions itself and the demands formulated with regard to the Commission, the Member
States and representatives of local and regional authorities. While each of those has its own
merit their large number will make it very difficult to focus on all of them simultaneously and
to pursue all of them at the same time. This could result in rather fragmentary and poorly
coordinated efforts to ensure implementation. The absence of an indicative timetable for
implementing the undertakings and recommendations – even for the Committee’s
undertakings few deadlines are set 22 - does not help. The Committee should consider
identifying priorities for the implementation of undertakings and recommendations as not all
of them are, surely, of the same political relevance. In deciding on these priorities the
Committee would need to consider whether some initiatives might not need a bigger
investment of political capital and time than their probably rather limited political impact and
practical results in the end might justify. 23 The combination of priority objectives with the
21
White Paper on Multilevel Governance, p. 33.
The undertaking of the Committee to present to the European Council in March 2010 the results of the
consultation with local and regional authorities on the future of the Lisbon Strategy (White Paper on Multilevel
Governance, p. 22) is one of these few cases.
23
Such a consideration might be advisable regarding the “European Union Charter on Multilevel Governance”
(White Paper on Multilevel Governance, p. 8) whose broad reach (including candidate countries and
neighbouring states) could drastically reduce its actual substance.
22
30
introduction of deadlines for achieving them could be a further step, although in some cases
deadlines may clearly be neither advisable nor realistic. 24 The aforementioned scoreboard
should take into account these priorities and deadlines.
A third challenge concerns the role and capacity of local and regional authorities within the
EU’s multilevel governance context. A large number of the undertakings and
recommendations of the White Paper implicitly relies on local and regional authorities being
sufficiently aware of the opportunities which partnership and cooperation with authorities in
other Member States and at the European level can offer and on them being willing to
actively engage in such partnership and cooperation. Yet the European governance context
remains a fairly remote framework for most of the smaller local, as well as quite a few of the
regional authorities vested with rather limited autonomy and constitutional powers within
their national setting. “Shared” governance in the European context might appear to them as a
rather abstract concept of little practical use as long as they perceive their national
governments as their only really relevant link to the European level and as long as knowledge
about European institutions, policies and cross-border cooperation possibilities remains
limited. Reinforcing the effectiveness and efficiency of multilevel governance through
partnership and cooperation can only succeed if there is also a broad and strong interest of the
lower level governance authorities in seeking and exploiting partnership and cooperation
possibilities right up to the top of the governance hierarchy. This interest will need to be
encouraged, stimulated and – in many cases –in the first place awakened. A number of the
White Paper recommendations go in that direction, 25 and the “Covenant of Mayors” is an
interesting example of such mobilisation. More openness and reaching out of EU institutions
towards local and regional authorities are surely important facilitators, but the bulk of the
mobilisation effort would need to be carried by the local and regional authorities themselves
through enhanced information and networking efforts, more pressure on their national
authorities regarding enhanced participation possibilities in European matters, the creation of
new cooperation structures amongst themselves which can reach across borders and up to the
level of the EU, 26 and quite often also a certain change in political perception and mentality
by looking systematically for the European dimension in all things local and the local
dimension in all things European.
A fourth challenge relates to the organisation of the work and the outreach activities of the
Committee of the Regions itself. With the launch of its White Paper the Committee has taken
24
It would obviously be hardly realistic, for instance, to set deadlines for Member States to invite the
Committee to participate systematically in Council meetings or for them put into place the new internal
processes of consultation and cooperation with local and regional authorities recommended on p. 10 of the
White Paper.
25
Such as that of councils of local and regional elected representatives devoting special sessions to European
integration and European policies in which they also involve representatives of the EU institutions (White Paper
on Multilevel Governance, p. 12).
31
a major political initiative. In order to sustain it the Committee will need to make the
implementation of this initiative a long-term priority with follow-up issues becoming a
regular part of its annual agenda-setting. The scoreboard and annual resolutions suggested
above could be major elements of this agenda-setting. Elements of the White Paper should be
systematically recalled in the Committee’s reports and resolutions on other matters. The
Committee’s Forward Studies Unit, which has contributed much to the elaboration of the
White Paper, could be entrusted with the elaboration of strategies on how to “mainstream”
key White Paper ideas in the Committee’s internal work – especially also those of the
Commission’s - and relations with other institutions and organisations. The Committee’s
advocacy of multilevel governance built on partnership and cooperation would gain
additional strength and credibility if the Committee could further reduce within its own
framework the often visible divide between the interests of (big) regions and (small) local
authorities. The Committee should also seek more systematically strategic partners for its
multi-level governance agenda: The European Parliament, many of whose Members have
strong local and regional political interests, should be one of those. Cross-border cooperation
structures at the local and regional level – such as the “Euregions” - could be important
intermediaries and transmitters of mobilisation at the local and regional level.
The challenges of implementation of the White Paper, of which those mentioned above
constitute only the more strategic ones, are not small – but they can be met. At a time when
the era of frequent major treaty reforms of the EU as a major instrument of governance
reform seems to be coming to an end, it is all the more important to seek improvements of
effectiveness and efficiency in European governance through practical forms of partnership
and cooperation between public authorities at all levels of governance which do not require
further and potentially highly controversial constitutional change. The White Paper is very
rich in undertakings and recommendations regarding such enhanced synergy many of which
constitute bridges across the often all too rigid and hierarchical dividing lines between levels
of governance. For the sake of delivering public goods more effectively and efficiently to
European citizens, the opportunities brought out in the White Paper should not be missed.
26
The Covenant of Mayors, referred to the White Paper, is an interesting example in this respect (White Paper
on Multilevel Governance, p. 12).
32
THE PARADIGM OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
FRANK DELMARTINO 27
Sixteen years after Gary Marks introduced the novel concept of multi-level governance (
MLG ) in view of characterizing the specific policy-making process regarding the structural
funds, the term has been so broadly applied and has gained such a wide acceptance that the
focal point of the proposition needs to be clarified ( 1 ). MLG should not become a victim of
its success.
Indeed, whereas the issue of governance has been introduced as a benchmark for qualitative
government in dialogue with all relevant stakeholders in society, the multiplicity of layers of
decision-making involved in dealing with complex societal problems is nowadays a
universally recognized phenomenon. A striking example of the breakthrough of both
concepts is offered by the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance ( 2001 ) on
the one hand, and the recent White Paper on Multi-level Governance ( 2009 ), submitted by
the Committee of the Regions, on the other ( 2 ). Rarely an academic terminology has found
such a broad audience and acceptance. Apparently, the paradigm of MLG touches the new
reality of policy-making in the European and global context.
Shifts in territorial governance
As leading authors, such as John Loughlin and Michael Keating have indicated, the new
understanding of multi-actor and multi-level policy-making is not just the result of grand
theorizing ( 3 ). Beyond the development of a new conceptual framework, we have to point at
the shifts in territorial governance resulting from the reconfiguration of the nation state in the
post-Welfare State era. In the aftermath of the Second World War, national politics were
mainly aiming at a better distribution of resources to individuals, groups and backward
territories. At that time, emphasis was laid on the mobilisation at national level, implying
political and territorial centralisation. However, since the mid-eighties, the role of the state
and the public authorities in general has been reassessed: the societal objectives are nowadays
pursued in a public-private partnership perspective, involving all kind of stakeholders, such
as the business community, civil society and –last but not least- the regional and local
authorities.
The basic principles of the EC/EU’s cohesion policy eloquently illustrate this fundamental
shift in approach. Partnership of all levels of government involved and of all stakeholders in
27
University of Leuven, visiting professor College of Europe
33
society haS become a crucial prerequisite for European support. Gradually this ‘philosophy’
has inspired most other policy fields whose success depends on societal mobilisation: social
policy proper, environmental issues, education, health, etc. Therefore we would like to argue
that MLG is less a normative theory focused on prescribing institutional formulas, but rather
an instrument for the analysis of actual developments in dealing with complex issues in
society.
Rather a paradigm than a theory
So, MLG is not at all a blueprint for any wishful thinking regarding the division of powers
between levels of government. It does not have its origin in speculative reflection, but rather
in careful observation. It’s the reality on the ground, i.e. the policy developments of the last
twenty years, that urge policy analysts to rethink a static conception of a division of
competences in an exclusively state-oriented perspective. The challenge of having to deal
with a multiplicity of public and private actors on diverse levels has prompted political
leaders to innovate their approach, leaving behind an obsolete assumption of exclusive
competence. Shared responsibility, accountability, partnership, pro-active policies, etc., have
become the new key principles of good governance.
Therefore, by referring to the paradigm of MLG, one acknowledges “the existence of
overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of
political actors across those levels “ ( Gary Marks ) ( 4 ). In other words, MLG is realityoriented, wants to learn from good practices, is flexible in conceiving settings for dialogue
and even negotiation, however without infringing on the preconditions for legitimate
governance, such as political responsibility and democratic control. On the contrary, the
MLG scheme of reference contributes to the transparent functioning of democratic
institutions in the present-day European context.
Input and output legitimacy
Fully in line with the provisions expressed in the Constitutional Treaty, taken over by the
Lisbon Treaty, the EU considers representative democracy to be the cornerstone of its
functioning (5). Quite some attention, however, is given to participatory democracy,
stressing the crucial contribution of individual and collective views and interest
representation to the quality of policy-making. More than most national constitutional
charters do, the momentum of consultation and participation is highlighted in the EU treaties.
So, the widespread, although still imperfect, practice of broad mobilisation of all stakeholders
34
in society in view of new policy initiatives, has been given formal approval by the member
states, signatories of the treaties. Consequently, the ‘input’ side of legitimate policy-making
in this trans-national system of governance has a solid basis.
On the other hand, more attention should be given to the ‘output’ side of the policy-making
process. Despite institutional innovations such as the strengthening of parliamentary powers,
the Eurobarometer reveals that quite a number of citizens do not perceive the EU’s
achievements as consistent with their expectations. Citizens’ demands, e.g. for security,
employment, safe food and a healthy environment, clearly cross-cut with the existing
horizontal and vertical division of tasks. They want consistency in overall policy
development, pointing at the need of coordination among all public and private actors
involved.
Since the EU is not favouring centralisation, but instead preconizes the principle of
subsidiarity, output legitimacy can only be achieved by an elaborated system of consultation,
negotiation and cooperation, respecting the specific responsibility of all partners around the
table. In other words, MLG is not a buzzword, but a conceptual framework for understanding
and organizing the multi-level interactions required for achieving input and output
legitimacy.
Regions and local authorities in a MLG perspective
It is not by coincidence that the sub-national actors happen to be particularly sensitive to a
scheme of reference for positioning themselves in this process of enhanced Europeanization
and globalization. For sure, in most cases, national constitutional guarantees are available visà-vis local and regional self-government. Moreover, the status of the
principle of subsidiarity has been reinforced in the recent treaty amendments, but this is only
one side of the coin. Regional and local authorities not only want to defend themselves, but,
first and foremost, want to participate in this intertwined world. They have solid arguments
for doing so, referring to the emerging reality of participation in so many policy fields and to
numerous new initiatives. The White Paper on MLG, drafted by the Committee of Regions,
can therefore build on the experience of the sub-national actors and argue in favour of their
systematic participation in all phases of the policy-making process, from the
conceptualization to the implementation.
Out of the many illustrations and suggestions offered by the White Paper, we would like to
highlight the increased awareness of the territorial dimension of governance ( 6 ). The very
concept of territorial cohesion, introduced in the treaties, has given rise to a multiplicity of
initiatives supported by a wide array of actors, such as the local and regional ones in the
framework of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation ( EGTC). Recently the
35
scope has been broadened to a macro-regional approach, as in the case of the Nordic
perspective, the Baltic strategic cooperation or the Danube initiative. In some cases the local
level meaningfully complements the macro strategies, such as the Euro-Mediterranean
regional and local assembly (ARLEM) and the Covenant of Mayors committing and
cooperating in the fight against climate change.
The common experience in all these partnership agreements can be summarized by stressing
the effective participation of all actors in reflecting on and in shaping and implementing
policies. Based on these ongoing developments, one could say that the MLG approach has
not only contributed to a more effective outcome, but as well to the valorisation of each and
every partner. Summarizing, if the principle of subsidiarity has provided an institutional
guarantee to each public actor with regard to its ‘core business’, MLG has offered a scheme
of reference for positioning public and private actors vis-à-vis their crucial role of interacting
agents across multiple levels of governance.
Notes
1. Gary Marks, Structural Policy and Multi-Level Governance in the EC, in : A. Cafruny
and G. Rosenthal (eds.), The State of the European Community, vol.2, The Maastricht
Debates and Beyond, Boulder (Co.), Lynne Riemer, pp. 391 – 410.
2. European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, 25 July 2001. COM
(2001), 428 final.
Committee of the Regions, White Paper on Multi-level Governance, 17 – 18 June
2009. CoR 89 / 2009, final.
3. John Loughlin, Reconfiguring the State: Trends in Territorial Governance in
European States, in : Regional and federal Studies, vol. 17, nr. 4, December 2007, pp.
385 – 403.
Michael Keating, A Quarter Century of the Europe of the Regions, in : Regional and
Federal Studies, vol. 18, nr. 5, October 2008, pp. 629 – 635.
4. Gary Marks et al., Competencies, Cracks and Conflicts : Regional Mobilization in the
European Union, in : Comparative Political Studies, vol. 29, nr. 2, 1996, pp. 164 –
192.
5. Art. 10 and 11 in the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty (TEU).
6. Art. 3, point 3, in the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty (TEU).
36
THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF TERRITORIAL
GOVERNANCE TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
MICHAEL SCHNEIDER 28
Europe as a political Union lives on the involvement of its citizens in consensus-building
processes at European level. This participation takes place through the election of Members
of the European Parliament. Of course, the citizens of the EU also help to determine its
policies through national elections, as the EU is still fundamentally based on its peoples, who
live in the Member States – a principle that was confirmed by the German Constitutional
Court in its ruling on 30 June 2009.
If one takes a superficial look based on the methods used in political science in the 20th
century, this means that democratic participation is secured. However, with the increasing
integration of the European Union on the one hand, and the rise of globalisation on the other,
policy areas are becoming increasingly difficult to separate from one another as they become
more and more interdependent; international, national and regional spaces are harder than
ever to see in isolation. The influence of non-state organisations and actors is also increasing
significantly in the international arena. As a result of these processes, old-style political
science faced a dilemma: the EU and its policymaking methods could be accurately identified
and described neither with the conventional instruments for analysing domestic policy, nor
with the schemes for explaining international policy.
From this dilemma, the new concept of multi-level governance arose, which covers the multilevel interdependency of political structures through supranational, but also
intergovernmental, levels of decision making involving a large number of national and subnational actors. With the multi-level governance model, it was possible to portray clearly the
complexity of how multiple levels of decision-making are related and intertwined, both
within the Member States and at EU level.
The European public faces the same dilemma as academia. The necessarily complex system
of European decision-making processes has made it increasingly difficult for people to
understand exactly at which level decisions are taken, how and by whom these are prepared
and discussed and why it is necessary to reach compromises. A particularly grave
consequence of this development is that the complicated decision-making mechanisms at
European Union level are no longer understood by the public, which rapidly leads to the
feeling of being ruled by an overbearing bureaucracy. "Europe" is often perceived more than
28
President of the COTER commission of the Committee of the Regions, Secretary of State of Saxony-Anhalt
37
anything as a distant centre that issues numerous regulations that have nothing to do with
people's lives and concrete issues on the ground. The most visible evidence for the public's
difficulties with the European Union and its institutions is the shrinking turnout at elections to
the European Parliament, and indeed the fact that a key issue in European integration, the
ratification of the Lisbon treaty that is due to happen shortly, passed most Europeans by.
The political science model of multi-level governance, which, initially through a largely
functional differentiation between the various levels (municipality, region, country, EU),
analyses the interdependency and mutual influence of these levels, then takes a wider view
and offers approaches for overcoming the dilemma described above, which is perceived by
the public as a lack of legitimacy. What is also becoming clear is that European policy is not
just made from the Member State level upwards. Since the Committee of the Regions was set
up in 1994 – or possibly even before this – decisions in Brussels have not been taken without
regard for local and regional interests. However, regional players are increasingly making
themselves heard and pushing for their interests to be taken into account through a wide
range of direct contacts with the European institutions. The large number of regional
representations in Brussels bear witness to this, as do the numerous European regional and
local associations and networks.
Thus, the term multi-level governance is now also used for a model of government that
reflects these different voices and focuses heavily on the need for European policy to be
rooted locally in the regions and with the public.
Whilst the European Union's global action has a high degree of public acceptance, many
studies and surveys tell us that the local and regional level is the one that people most identify
with, especially when it comes to day to day politics. People have a direct awareness of the
effects of policies in their immediate surroundings, and this shapes their preferences and
fundamental beliefs.
Therefore, if Europe is truly to engage with the public, cities and regions need the
representation of their interests at European level to be strengthened, and to be more involved
in shaping and communicating the EU's policies.
One of the pillars on which the EU is based is Community solidarity. This is what makes it
different from all the other confederations of states that have existed in history. The main way
in which this solidarity is expressed is through European cohesion policy. European regional
funding is also the best example of how the added value of the European Union can be seen
at local level. Through regional funding, EU citizens experience the advantages of European
solidarity in their immediate surroundings. The creation of jobs, the renovation of schools
and the construction of new ones, the setting up of research institutes, the development and
marketing of innovative products or technologies, the improvement of roads and
environmental projects all improve life on the ground. The concept of solidarity becomes
tangible at local level.
38
However, this added value only has its full impact if citizens are able to decide autonomously
in their local area – town, city, region – about how and when the relevant European
instruments are used. Moreover, it is only then that one can do justice to the nature of these
instruments, which are not alms that are given to the poor and needy, but are instead designed
by the Community as a means of self-help whose ultimate aim is to make itself redundant.
Thus, these funds only have their truly intended effect if the recipients of them are able to
decide autonomously about how they are used.
This makes clear why the principle of subsidiarity is key to public acceptance of the EU.
Subsidiarity means that the European Union only legislates where it can act demonstrably
better than countries, regions and municipalities. More importantly, however, subsidiarity
means that, throughout the EU, decisions should be taken by the level that is most familiar
with the issue at hand. Subsidiarity does not therefore mean a conflict of competences, but a
sensible approach appropriate to each case.
The Committee of the Regions firmly believes that the local and regional level makes a key
contribution to strengthening Europe's economy and its competitiveness and is of the utmost
importance in shaping European identity. Since it was set up, it has worked for the interests
of local and regional authorities to be consistently taken into account. Cities, towns and
regions, as the level of government closest to the citizen, are the backbone of the EU and
have the potential to make a major contribution to the success of EU integration. Potential,
specific circumstances and priorities for economic development can be more effectively
identified and defined by means of autonomous decisions taken at local level.
For this reason, Europe must allow more scope for freedom in the implementation of shared
goals, especially in the regions and municipalities. The Committee of the Regions is therefore
a vociferous advocate of the subsidiarity principle. The Lisbon Treaty provides that the
Committee of the Regions has the right to refer matters of compliance with the subsidiarity
principle to the European Court of Justice. This would represent a significant step on the road
to a Europe of the regions.
European identity rests on the shared values of respect for people, their freedom, rights and
dignity, on the principle of solidarity and responsibility, on equality before the law, cultural
diversity, and local and regional self-government. These values are the basis for the pact of
trust between the EU, its various levels of government and administration, and the European
public. This identity can best be fostered when the actions that flow from the EU's solidarity
are managed autonomously at the most appropriate level.
39
40
LA LEGISLATION EUROPEENNE
PAOLO PONZANO 29
1. Introduction
Les dernières élections européennes de Juin 2009 n’ont fait que confirmer le défaut
d'information et la méconnaissance du fonctionnement de l'Union européenne qui caractérise
une large fraction de l'opinion publique européenne, voire même de sa classe politique.
Si l'on peut convenir que la légitimité démocratique de l'Union européenne peut et
doit être améliorée – d'ailleurs le Traité de Lisbonne finalement ratifié constituera un pas en
avant majeur à cet égard – il serait grand temps que les citoyens européens soient informés
plus correctement de la réalité institutionnelle de l'Union (voir l'article du Financial Times
après le referendum français de Mai 2005 : "Stop lying about European Union").
A titre d'exemple, il faudrait cesser d'argumenter que les Institutions européennes ne
sont pas démocratiques car elles ne sont pas élues directement par les citoyens. Il est vrai que
le Parlement européen – directement élu par les citoyens – ne dispose pas de l'entièreté du
pouvoir législatif car il est obligé de le partager avec le Conseil des Ministres (et uniquement
pour 60% environ de la législation européenne). Le Traité de Lisbonne aura l'avantage de
relever ce pourcentage à environ 90%. En revanche, le fait que le double exécutif de l'Union
(Commission et Conseil) ne soit pas élu directement par les citoyens est conforme à la
tradition parlementaire de la plupart des pays européens (les citoyens élisent leur Parlement
qui contrôle à son tour l'action de l'exécutif et peut contraindre celui-ci à la démission). Par
ailleurs, le Traité de Lisbonne lui-même prévoit que le Président de la Commission soit élu
par le Parlement européen, sur proposition du Conseil européen, en tenant compte du résultat
des élections européennes (ce qui renforcera la légitimité politique du Président de la
Commission et donnera aux citoyens européens une influence plus directe sur le choix).
Une autre critique récurrente est que, dans l'Union européenne, une des deux
branches de l'action exécutive, à savoir la Commission européenne, dispose du quasi
monopole de l'initiative législative, avec une exception dans le domaine de la justice, liberté
et sécurité – à savoir ce qu'on appelle le troisième pilier – où les Etats membres disposent
aussi du droit d'initiative législative.
2. Pourquoi la Commission dispose-t-elle du quasi monopole de l'initiative législative?
41
a)
La première raison est que l'élaboration des "lois européennes" exige l'identification
préalable de l'intérêt général de l'Union moyennant la connaissance et la prise en
considération des législations nationales et des intérêts de ses Etats membres. Or, cela serait
difficilement réalisable sans disposer d'une administration plurinationale chargée de traiter
un problème et ses possibles solutions en examinant les législations nationales existantes et
les intérêts spécifiques de tous les Etats membres. C'est pour cela que la Commission
européenne dispose d'une administration composée d'environ 25.000 fonctionnaires (mois
que l'administration d'une grande ville européenne) et qu'elle consulte avant d'élaborer une
proposition législative un vaste réseau d'organismes et d'experts nationaux. 30
La Commission ne se limite pas à consulter les experts nationaux et les organisations
de la société civile compétents ratione materiae. Elle a mis en place toute une série de
mécanismes internes et externes lui permettant de recueillir le maximum d'informations et de
connaissances avant d'adopter un projet de "loi européenne" (voir ci-dessous sub 4). 31
b) La deuxième raison, moins connue, pour l'octroi à la seule Commission du droit
d'initiative (avec l'exception des Etats membres pour l'espace de liberté, sécurité et justice) –
contrairement aux systèmes nationaux dans lesquels le Parlement partage avec l'exécutif le
droit d'initiative législative – est qu'il serait difficile d'octroyer le même pouvoir au Parlement
européen dans la mesure où celui-ci devrait soumettre son projet à l'approbation de l'autre
organe législatif, à savoir le Conseil des Ministres, dont la composition et la représentativité
sont bien différentes de celles du Parlement européen. 32
En effet, alors que le Parlement européen a une composition dégressivement
proportionnelle (chaque Etat membre dispose d'un nombre de députés en fonction de son
poids démographique avec une correction en faveur des pays moins peuplés), le Conseil des
Ministres est composé d'Etats membres disposant de droits de vote en fonction de leur taille
mais avec une pondération différente (plus favorable aux moyens et petits Etats membres).
Avec le Traité de Lisbonne, la représentation des Etats au Conseil sera intégralement
proportionnelle à la population, mais toujours différente par rapport à celle du Parlement
européen.
29
Senior Fellow auprès du Centre Schuman de l’Institut Universitaire Européen de Florence.
La Commission consulte, avant d'élaborer ses propositions, environ 1400 groupes d'experts nationaux dont la
liste est reprise dans un registre publié sur un site informatique. Elle consulte, en outre, les organisations de la
société civile concernées par le projet d'une éventuelle réglementation.
31
L'expression "loi européenne" est utilisée aux fins de faciliter la compréhension du lecteur non-initié aux
mécanismes de l'Union européenne. En fait, il s'agit de projets de règlements (actes législatifs ayant un effet
direct et immédiat sur les droits et obligations des citoyens), de directives (actes obligatoires pour ce qui
concerne les objectifs à atteindre, mais qui laissent au législateur national le choix des moyens pour leur mise en
œuvre) ou de décisions (actes obligatoires ayant pour destinataire, dans la plupart des cas, une personne
physique ou morale, voire les Etats membres eux-mêmes).
32
Dans les systèmes nationaux, peu importe que le projet de loi soit présenté par le gouvernement ou par les
membres du parlement dans la mesure où la décision relève toujours de ce dernier.
30
42
Par conséquent, il serait difficile d'imaginer que le Conseil puisse statuer à la
majorité qualifiée des Etats membres sur base d'un projet législatif émanant du Parlement
européen à partir d'une représentation différente des Etats membres. L’on voit mal en effet
comment les intérêts des « petits » pays pourraient-ils être pris en considération dans un
Parlement européen composé sur la base d’une stricte proportionnalité. Le problème ne se
pose pas par rapport à la Commission européenne car celle-ci est censée élaborer sa
proposition législative de manière indépendante et sur base d'un intérêt général européen sans
aucun lien avec la représentativité des Etats membres (par exemple, la Commission pourrait
estimer que, dans le domaine des services de téléphonie mobile, la législation finlandaise est
la plus avancée et que, par conséquent, elle se prête mieux à être généralisée au niveau
européen). C'est d'ailleurs ce principe d'identification de l'intérêt général européen qui
justifie la règle selon laquelle le Conseil doit statuer à l'unanimité s'il entend s'écarter de la
proposition de la Commission, alors que la majorité qualifiée est suffisante dans la plupart
des cas pour procéder à son adoption.
3.
La procédure législative au sein de l'Union
La méconnaissance très étendue du fonctionnement de l'Union européenne s'applique
aussi à la procédure législative. Il est vrai que l'adoption des lois européennes n'est pas
soumise à une seule procédure, car les compétences des deux branches du pouvoir législatif
de l'Union (le Conseil des Ministres et le Parlement européen) varient en fonction du
domaine concerné. En résumé, la procédure de codécision est celle qui régira l'adoption
d'environ 90% des actes législatifs avec l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne. La
procédure de codécision s'applique à la plupart des domaines relevant de la compétence de
l'Union européenne (notamment, le marché intérieur, la politique des transports, la protection
de l'environnement, une partie de la politique sociale, etc.). Dans les autres cas, le Conseil des
Ministres décide lui-même du contenu des lois européennes, soit après avis obligatoire du
Parlement européen (par exemple, dans le domaine fiscal ), soit même sans recueillir
nécessairement l'avis de celui-ci ( cette procédure deviendra l’exception avec l’entrée en
vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne ).
Au-delà de son apparente complexité, la procédure de codécision entre le Conseil et
le Parlement européen est assez simple. Aucun acte législatif relevant de la codécision ne
peut être adopté sans l'accord conjoint du Parlement européen et du Conseil. Cet accord peut
être obtenu au cours de l'une des trois lectures successives du texte, la troisième lecture étant
43
précédée de la réunion d'un Comité de conciliation composé prioritairement de membres du
Conseil et d'un nombre égal de parlementaires. 33
Au début de la procédure de codécision, les deux organes législatifs avaient du mal à
se mettre d'accord au cours de la première lecture (seulement dans 25% des cas).
Aujourd'hui, grâce à une pratique de contacts informels constants entre le Parlement européen
et le Conseil, avec la participation de la Commission, environ 70% des lois européennes sont
adoptées au cours de la première lecture, alors que le recours au Comité de conciliation
devient de moins en moins fréquent et limité à des lois politiquement sensibles (programmes
ayant un financement communautaire important, lois impliquant un choix de société telles
que les inventions biotechnologiques ou ayant des implications juridiques ou économiques
significatives telles que les offres publiques d'achat).
Le présent article n'est pas le lieu pour décrire le fonctionnement pratique des trois
lectures éventuelles. Il suffit de noter que les décisions intervenues en première lecture ont
"un taux de démocraticité" moins élevé dans la mesure où le Parlement européen n'a besoin
que d'une majorité simple des voix pour voter ses amendements, alors qu'à partir de la
deuxième lecture, tout amendement du Parlement européen requiert la majorité absolue de
ses membres.
Le Parlement européen a accru sensiblement son influence dans l'adoption du texte
définitif de la loi européenne. Alors qu'initialement, le Conseil avait essayé de limiter au
maximum le nombre d'amendements du Parlement européen qu'il était disposé à accepter,
dernièrement il est prêt à faire des concessions dès la première lecture afin de clôturer la
procédure. En ce qui concerne le contenu législatif, il faut constater que le texte final d'une loi
européenne est, en règle générale, plus "lourd" et complexe que la proposition initiale de la
Commission, car le législateur européen a tendance à surcharger l'acte législatif en vue
d'introduire certaines garanties ou dérogations en faveur des Etats membres, voire de limiter
le contenu des actes d'exécution délégués à la Commission européenne. Cette dernière
tendance va se réduire à l'avenir car le Parlement européen a obtenu un véritable "droit de
véto" sur le contenu des mesures déléguées à la Commission qui revêtent un caractère quasi
législatif (mesures qui complètent ou modifient l'acte législatif lui-même).
4.
Les instruments de la "better regulation"
33
Cette procédure n'a d'ailleurs pas été inventée par l'Union européenne. Elle existe, avec une seule différence
notable, entre les deux Chambres législatives en Allemagne, à savoir le Bundestag et le Bundesrat. La
différence est qu'en cas de conflit persistant, la volonté du Bundestag prévaut, alors qu'au niveau européen il
faut l'accord des deux organes législatifs sur le même texte.
44
La Commission européenne a mis en place progressivement depuis 2002 une série
d'instruments visant à améliorer le mode d'élaboration des nouvelles lois européennes ainsi
que le contenu des lois existantes. Il faut noter, tout d'abord, que les lois européennes
actuellement en vigueur sont au nombre d'environ 11.000 (à comparer avec le chiffre estimé
d'environ 120.000 lois italiennes), dont environ 6.500 constituent des lois européennes
indépendantes, à l'exclusion de celles visant à modifier la législation existante.
Comme indiqué ci-dessus, les initiatives visant à mieux légiférer au niveau européen sont les
suivantes:
a) la Commission a adopté dès 2002 des normes minimales pour la consultation de tous
les milieux concernés par une loi européenne. A cet effet, par exemple, toutes les
parties intéressées disposent d'un délai minimum de huit semaines pour se prononcer
sur un projet de loi européenne. En outre, la Commission s'est obligée à donner un
"feedback" du résultat des consultations, c'est-à-dire à informer les organisations
consultées des conclusions qu'elle tire de la consultation et de la suite qu'elle entend y
donner. Ces normes minimales ont été réexaminées en 2007 et la Commission s'est
engagée à les appliquer plus efficacement en améliorant son "feedback" et en assurant
la pluralité des opinions;
b) la Commission a commencé à évaluer plus systématiquement depuis 2003 l'impact
économique, social et environnemental de ses propositions de loi avant leur
approbation par le Collège des Commissaires. A ce jour, elle a complété et publié
environ 500 analyses d'impact de ses propositions. De telles analyses sont réalisées
par les services compétents de la Commission, avec l'assistance d'une expertise
externe là où celle-ci s'avère nécessaire, sur la base de lignes directrices publiées au
Journal officiel de l'Union européenne et périodiquement revues. En outre, la
Commission a mis en place un organe interne de contrôle (Impact Assessment
Board), sous l'autorité du Président de la Commission, en vue d'assurer que les
analyses d'impact soient effectuées conformément aux normes de qualité requises et
en s'appuyant sur une expertise externe là où celle-ci s'avère nécessaire. La
Commission a également fait procéder à une analyse externe indépendante de ses
mécanismes internes et y a apporté des améliorations en fonction de cette
analyse (voir les nouvelles lignes directrices publiées au Journal Officiel de l’Union
en 2007) ;
c) dans le cadre de ses analyses d'impact, la Commission a renforcé le contrôle du
respect du principe de subsidiarité inscrit dans les Traités en vue d'examiner si une
loi européenne est véritablement nécessaire et si elle apporte une valeur ajoutée par
rapport à ce que les Etats membres pourraient faire eux-mêmes au niveau national.
C'est ainsi qu'en 2007, par exemple, la Commission a renoncé à proposer une loi
45
européenne dans trois domaines (droit des sociétés, services financiers, protection des
témoins) où la valeur ajoutée d'une initiative européenne n'a pu être démontrée ;
d) la Commission a engagé une stratégie ambitieuse de simplification des lois
européennes existantes en vue de rendre celles-ci plus conformes aux standards d'une
bonne réglementation. A ce titre, elle a proposé d'abroger ou de remplacer environ
500 actes législatifs jugés obsolètes et de simplifier le contenu d'environ 200 lois
européennes existantes ;
e) la Commission a lancé également un programme d'actions visant à réduire de 25%,
d'ici 2012, le coût des charges administratives imposées aux entreprises par la
législation européenne (objectif repris à son compte par le Conseil européen) ;
f) sur un plan plus général, la Commission a renforcé la consultation préalable à
l'élaboration de ses propositions par la conclusion d'accords de coopération avec le
Comité des régions et le Comité économique et social européen, par la publication de
Livres blancs, Livres verts et autres documents de consultation, par la mise sur
Internet de ses avant-projets de lois européennes, etc.
5. Conclusions
Cette énumération non exhaustive des procédures et instruments appliqués au niveau
de l'Union européenne pour l'élaboration des lois européennes permet de démontrer que le
système législatif européen, s'il n'est pas parfait, remplit les critères de qualité et d'efficacité
dont disposent les meilleurs systèmes nationaux.
Du point de vue de la "démocraticité" du système législatif européen, des
améliorations peuvent y être apportées, dont la plupart se retrouvent d'ailleurs dans le Traité
de Lisbonne :
a) un renforcement de l'influence législative du Parlement européen jusqu'au niveau de
90% des lois européennes ;
b) l'intervention des Parlements nationaux dans le contrôle du respect du principe de
subsidiarité par les Institutions européennes ;
c) une plus grande influence politique du Parlement européen sur l'exécutif de l'Union
moyennant l'élection du Président de la Commission sur base des résultats des
élections européennes ;
d) l'introduction de nouveaux mécanismes de démocratie participative, tels que l'octroi
à un million de citoyens européens du droit d'initier le processus législatif ;
46
e) enfin, l'introduction d'une garantie juridique par laquelle les lois européennes ne
pourront pas violer les droits des citoyens contenus dans la Charte des droits
fondamentaux.
En conclusion, si la démocratie législative européenne n'est pas encore achevée, elle
est néanmoins sur la bonne voie.
47
48
UNE DYNAMIQUE MULTIDIRECTIONNELLE DE LA
GOUVERNANCE A MULTI NIVEAUX
NICOLAS LEVRAT 34
Apparu sous la plume de Gary Marks en 1993 35 afin de décrire le processus mis en place
depuis 1988 par la Commission européenne pour coordonner l’action des fonds structurels 36 ,
le concept de « multi-level governance » (gouvernance à multi-niveaux 37 en français), prend
en moins de deux décennies une place centrale dans l’organisation même du processus
d’intégration européenne. C’est une dynamique pour le moins étonnante. Elle s’accompagne,
non sans paradoxes, d’une institutionnalisation progressive combinée à un étonnant mariage
avec le principe de subsidiarité. De plus, la déclinaison et la mise en œuvre de cette
gouvernance pourrait relancer une dynamique institutionnelle positive laquelle, après les
interminables tergiversations liées aux difficultés de la réforme des Traités, placerait la
dernière née des institutions européennes – le Comité des régions – au coeur du processus
d’intégration par une proposition de partenariat institutionnel original avec la Commission.
Le passage de l’analytique au normatif
D’un point de vue académique, la distinction entre une approche analytique et une approche
normative se doit d’être soigneusement respectée. La première est, du point de vue des
chercheurs, légitime, parce qu’axiologiquement neutre; la seconde est, du point de vue des
acteurs, utile, puisque vecteur d’orientation d’une politique. En l’espèce, la gouvernance à
multi niveaux remplit à son origine une fonction strictement analytique, permettant de décrire
un phénomène d’interaction entre différents niveaux de gouvernements dans l’élaboration et
la mise en œuvre d’une politique régionale en Europe, grâce à l’impulsion de la Commission
européenne. C’est notamment le principe de partenariat 38 qui retient l’attention de
l’observateur, ainsi que la capacité que la mise en application de ce principe offre à la
Commission pour construire et mettre en œuvre des politiques de développement
34
Professeur de droit européen et Directeur de l’Institut européen de l’Université de Genève
MARKS, G., « Structural Policy and Multi-Level Governance in the EC », in CAFRUNY A. and ROSENTHAL G.
(eds), The State of the European Community II: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond, Boulder (Co), Lynne
Riener.
36
C’est une nouvelle exigence que pose l’Acte unique européen, en insérant un article 130D dans le Traité
instituant la Communauté européenne.
37
C’est la terminologie retenu par le Livre blanc du Comité des régions sur la gouvernance à multiniveaux »
(CdR 89/2009). On trouve aussi en français les termes gouvernance multi-niveaux, et gouvernance à multiples
niveaux ».
38
Qui apparaît pour la première fois à l’article 4 du « Règlement (CEE) 2052/88, concernant les missions des
Fonds à finalité structurelle, leur efficacité ainsi que la coordination de leurs interventions entre elles et celles de
la Banque européenne d'investissement et des autres instruments financiers existants », JOCE n° L 185/12 du 18
juillet 1988.
35
49
territorialisées, en s’affranchissant des limites strictes de l’attribution des compétences, tant
au niveau communautaire qu’au sein des Etats membres.
Le caractère principalement descriptif des études se revendiquant de cette approche a
fréquemment conduit les politologues à considérer la méthode comme peu pertinente ; cette
dernière permettrait certes une mise en évidence des spécificités du système communautaire –
l’absence de gouvernement central, le rôle des réseaux dans le processus décisionnel, etc. –
sans pour autant apporter d’éléments explicatifs ou prédictifs forts 39 . Ces critiques n’ont pas
pour autant empêché les acteurs du système communautaire de trouver en ce modèle, au-delà
d’une description à la fois holiste et détaillée du fonctionnement effectif du système
décisionnel et de mise en œuvre des politiques communautaires, un instrument à mettre en
évidence pour tenter d’offrir un narratif crédible au processus de policy-making au sein de
l’UE. Lequel pourrait, le cas échéant, permettre de pallier le déficit de légitimité que les
modèles classiques de la démocratie – représentative ou participative – ne parviennent pas à
offrir à l’UE.
Ainsi en 2001, après plus d’une année de travaux scientifiques et de consultations tous
azimuts, la Commission européenne publie un Livre blanc sur la gouvernance européenne,
dont le but affiché est de permettre aux citoyens européens de « percevoir plus clairement
comment les Etats membres, agissant ensemble au sein de l’Union européenne, sont en
mesure de répondre plus efficacement à leurs préoccupations »40 . Cette gouvernance
européenne, directement inspirée de la gouvernance multi niveaux 41 , acquiert ainsi suite à
son adoption par la Commission européenne, une dimension normative.
Le Livre blanc du Comité des régions : deuxième étage de la fusée ou transformation de
l’essai
39
Ainsi p. ex. SCHWOK, R., dans son bref ouvrage, Théories de l’intégration européenne, (Paris :
Montcherstien, 2005) affirme : « Cette expression n’est certes pas une théorie, au sens nomothétique, mais c’est
une conceptualisation fructueuse qui ouvre l’UE à une large palette de théories du politique » ; plus dépréciatif
encore : « d’un point de vue épistémologique, les critiques se sont focalisées sur la portée véritablement
théorique de la notion degouvernance multi niveaux. En effet, cette notion n’apporte pas de réponses aux
questions fondamentales comme : quels sont les facteurs explicatifs du caractère spécifique de l’UE ? Comment
s’opèrent les relations de causalité entre les différentes variables ? Et quelle pourrait être l’évolution future de
l’UE ? » (pp. 136-137).
40
La citation complète se lit comme suit : « Le livre blanc sur la gouvernance européenne porte sur la manière
dont l’Union européenne utilise les pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés par ses citoyens. […] Le livre blanc propose
d’ouvrir davantage le processus d’élaboration des politiques de l’Union européenne, afin d’assurer une
participation plus large des citoyens et des organisations à leur conception et à leur application. Il encourage une
plus grande ouverture et la responsabilisation accrue de tous les participants. Les citoyens devraient ainsi
percevoir plus clairement comment les Etats membres, agissant ensemble au sein de l’Union européenne, sont
en mesure de répondre plus efficacement à leurs préoccupations. » JOCE,n° C 287/2 du 12 octobre 2001.
41
Le terme n’est jamais expressément utilisé, mais une grande part du livre blanc traite expressément de
l’association des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux à l’élaboration et à la mise en œuvre des politiques
communautaires, en se fondant sur l’expérience du partenariat de la politique structurelle de la CE ; ce qui
constitue le schéma à partir duquel a été élaborée la théorie de la gouvernance multi niveaux.
50
Que l’on privilégie la métaphore spatiale ou sportive, force est de constater que la reprise en
2009 du concept de gouvernance à multi niveaux dans un Livre blanc du Comité des régions
ne fait qu’accroître cette dimension prescriptive et normative. Ainsi peut-on lire dès l’entame
de ce nouveau Livre blanc : « La gouvernance est l’une des clés principales de la réussite du
processus d’intégration européenne. L’Europe sera forte, ses institutions légitimes, ses
politiques efficaces, ses citoyens se sentiront impliqués et concernés, si son mode de
gouvernance garantit la coopération entre les différents niveaux de pouvoirs pour mettre en
œuvre l’agenda communautaire et répondre aux défis globaux. » 42 Ce sont les premières
lignes de ce nouveau Livre blanc ; elles projettent des attentes importantes et assignent une
fonction claire à cette gouvernance à multi niveaux. D’ailleurs, et sans plus aucune ambiguïté
possible, le Comité des régions l’affirme : « La gouvernance à multi niveaux représente
par conséquent une « grille d’action » politique plutôt qu’un instrument juridique […] » 43
Ainsi la gouvernance multi niveaux, d’un concept analytique mal reconnu par les milieux
académiques, a progressivement glissé vers un outil de mobilisation politique, revendiqué par
plusieurs acteurs dans le cadre du processus d’intégration européenne. Ce succès, hors de son
champ initial, mérite réflexion ; ainsi aucun livre blanc – ni même de document aux
ambitions plus modestes – n ’est produit par les institutions sur le fédéralisme européen, ou
l’Europe des institutions ; on se rappelle certes de la tentative « de concilier la carpe et le
lapin » en promouvant l’idée d’une « fédération d’Etats nations » 44 ; si la formule a connu
son heure de gloire – elle correspond d’ailleurs assez bien à la réalité actuelle de l’UE – et se
veut à équidistance du paradigme réaliste (qui privilégie les Etats) et des modèles fédéraliste
ou institutionnaliste (qui privilégient les institutions supranationales), elle ne suscite plus
aujourd’hui une adhésion large. Au contraire, le modèle de la gouvernance multi niveaux, qui
ne paraît pas a priori orienté vers une vision prédéterminée de l’intégration européenne,
supranationale ou intergouvernementale, connaît un grand succès ; c’est probablement parce
qu’il propose une approche plus subtile, bien que tout aussi ambivalente. C’est
vraisemblablement cela qui en explique l’attrait et la large acceptation.
Quelques conséquences qui sont autant de chantiers :
Cette instrumentalisation de la gouvernance à multi niveaux se réalise aussi grâce au mariage
inattendu – et dont les conséquences mériteront une analyse et une réflexion poussées dans
42
« Livre blanc du Comité des régions sur la gouvernance à multiniveaux » (CdR 89/2009), § 1.1. On peut
dans le même sens et par ailleurs lire : « Le livre blanc s’inscrit dans une démarche politique volontariste afin de
« Construire l’Europe en partenariat » et fixe deux grands objectifs stratégiques : favoriser la participation au
processus européen et renforcer l’efficacité de l’action communautaire. » (§ 1.12).
43
Ibid., § 2.3. (c’est nous qui soulignons).
44
On doit l’expression à Jacques Delors, qui essaye ainsi de ne pas opposer les perspectives
intergouvernentalistes et fédéralistes quant à l’avenir de l’Europe.
51
les années à venir – au principe de subsidiarité 45 . Cette union n’est conceptuellement pas
simple, et une matrice des interactions entre ces deux dynamiques devrait être élaborée, en
vue d’en mesurer le potentiel sur l’élaboration des politiques de l’Union.
Deuxièmement, cette instrumentalisation du concept est le fait des institutions
communautaires; ce qui conduit inéluctablement à une institutionnalisation de cette
gouvernance 46 , qui s’était pourtant développée pour décrire des processus s’affranchissant
des contraintes institutionnelles. Cette apparente antinomie, sous la forme d’un défi aux
analyses institutionnalistes de l’intégration européenne, ouvre chantier qui obligera
certainement à creuser profond.
Troisièmement, cette dynamique paraît profiter au Comité des régions, qui par une habile
combinaison des exigences nouvelles que pose à la Commission l’extension par le Traité de
Lisbonne du principe de subsidiarité aux dimensions régionale et locale d’une part, et la
reprise des principes de gouvernance développés par la Commission dans son propre Livre
blanc de 2001 d’autre part, propose en filigrane à la Commission européenne un partenariat
nouveau et original 47 . Ce partenariat s’inscrirait en amont de l’initiative communautaire – de
ce point de vue là, la rédaction d’un Livre blanc par le Comité des Régions (alors que dans le
contexte communautaire, c’est une pratique que seule la Commission avait jusque là utilisée)
est loin d’être anodine – et se fonderait sur une coopération pour le monitorage du principe de
subsidiarité 48 et l’évaluation de l’impact territorial des politiques communautaires (qui avec
l’entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne devient une des composantes de la subsidiarité) 49 …
Dernier paradoxe, la subsidiarité, conçue initialement pour empêcher tout développement
rampant des compétences que les Traités attribuent aux institutions au détriment des
compétences des Etats, se retrouve par son développement et sa mise en œuvre, permettre au
Comité des régions de s’affirmer comme une institution communautaire de plein exercice.
Ainsi la subsidiarité conduit au renforcement institutionnel de l’Union ! Ce ne serait on le
voit pas là le moindre des paradoxes de cette gouvernance à multi niveaux, à l’origine conçue
dans une perspective d’affranchissement des contraintes institutionnelles, et qui se
retournerait pour affirmer l’émergence d’une institution communautaire. En sorte une
45
« Respect du principe de subsidiarité et gouvernance à multi niveaux sont indissociables : l’une a trait aux
compétences des différents niveaux de pouvoir, l’autre met l’accent sur leur interaction. » Livre blanc du
Comité des régions, loc. cit., § 2.5.
46
En ce sens, le Livre blanc du Comité des Régions affirme : « L’enjeu de la gouvernance à multi niveaux se
situe par conséquent dans la complémentarité et l’articulation entre la gouvernance institutionnelle et la
gouvernance partenariale. » Loc. cit., § 2.1.
47
Voir les paragraphes 3.1.2, 3.1.3 et 3.1.4. du Livre blanc du Comité des Régions.
48
L’article 8 § 2 du Protocole n° 2 sur l’application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité,
JOUE n° C 115/208 du 9 mai 2008.
49
Voir l’article 2 du Protocole n° 2 sur l’application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité,
JOUE n° C 115/206 du 9 mai 2008.
52
dynamique multidirectionnelle, somme toute aussi originale qu’une gouvernance
multiniveaux…
Peut-être ai-je tort de m’étonner.
53
54
CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONFERENCE ON "MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE", FIRST SESSION:
"TOWARDS A RENEWED VERSION OF THE COMMUNITY
METHOD BASED ON PARTNERSHIP?", 22 SEPTEMBER
2009, BRUGES
PROF. EM. DR. RUDOLF HRBEK 50
The remit of this panel is the renewal and improvement of the so-called Community method
provided for in the treaties. To this end, its reflections focus on the question "What role can
and must the inclusion of regional and local authorities play under the heading of
partnership." This aspect forms the central theme of the Committee of the Regions' White
Paper on Multilevel Governance of 4 September 2009.
The inclusion of regional and local authorities generally pursues two closely related principal
goals: for the first, the efficiency and effectiveness of community trade should thereby be
improved and strengthened and for the second, the democratic legitimacy of the decisionmaking process and the content of such decisions should be enhanced and improved. If we
think of the European Union as a multi-level system, with the Member States at the national
level, the regional and local authorities at the sub-national level and "Brussels" at the supranational level, then the concept of multilevel governance is the interplay between these levels
and the institutions and actors established at these levels.
The focus of the White Paper – and consequently of this panel - is directed at the sub-national
levels of the regional and local authorities; it asks questions about their functions in
"governing" under the EU multi-level system and thus under "multi-level governance". In this
respect, a distinction should be made between two aspects:
1.
The institutional aspect, in which firstly the Committee of the Regions (CoR) is
considered as an institution at Union level and secondly the regional and local authorities
are considered as institutional actors at the national level
2.
The socio-political aspect, in which the regional and local authorities are considered as
political arenas close to the people and whose actors include citizens, social
organisations and representatives of civil society. In this context, these arenas at subnational level are diversely linked with arenas at national and supra-national levels in
which individuals, socio-political organisations and representatives of civil society are
also active.
50
Universität Tübingen und College of Europe
55
This panel is focusing on the role of these regional and local authorities in the EU lawmaking process; the treaties have provided the so-called community method for this purpose
which – and hence the panel's premise – is to be enhanced through stronger partnership with
these authorities. In the following, we provide a series of tips and proposals as to how the
regional and local authorities' role in law-making can be strengthened. The first part looks
primarily at the institutional aspect, in other words, the role of regional and local authorities
in the formal decision-making process. The second part looks essentially at the socio-political
aspect; the authorities are viewed as political entities with an array of political actors whose
real political role is to play an effective part in the formal law-making process.
I.
The institutional aspect
1. The Committee of the Regions (CoR), which was set up by the Treaty of Maastricht,
is an institution at Community level through which regional and local authorities can
take part directly in the decision-making process. The CoR is limited to a consultative
role (with compulsory or only optional consultation depending on the circumstances
and also the option of issuing own-initiative opinions). In the light of this
institutionally and procedurally weak position in the community decision-making
process, the CoR should concentrate on few issues and then systematically and
steadfastly pursue them. The juxtaposition of regional and local authorities within the
CoR can lead to problems, as experience has shown, as the respective interests of both
groups do not always coincide.
2. In spite of its previously technically weak position, the CoR should try to establish
and assert itself as a recognised player and partner in the interinstitutional dialogue
with the Commission, Council and European Parliament.
¾ Vis-à-vis the Commission, its role is above all to serve the Commission as a
communication link. The CoR can make both a formal and informal input in this
respect based on its specific experience of the regional and local authorities and
their proximity to the people and their problems. At the same time, the regional
and local authorities are promoting both efficiency and democratic legitimacy.
¾ Vis-à-vis the Council, the CoR should make an effort to be drawn into the
extremely important informal Council configurations. This aspect also reflects the
significance of the national level: the possibilities for involvement in EU matters
follow very different paths for the regional and local authorities in the Member
States.
¾ The CoR should also develop closer relations with the European Parliament
which initially saw the CoR as a competitor and rival. The political groups and
56
thus the "party" factor are primarily suited for this purpose: the political groups
within the CoR could and should cooperate at party level with the corresponding
groups in the EP. The statute governing parties and their financing at European
level, which was decided on in 2003 and entered into force in 2004 (the
corresponding regulation was already supplemented in 2006/07) has considerably
strengthened the role of the "party" factor in the EU system.
3. Furthermore, the CoR should try to play a part in the context of the open coordination
method which can increasingly be used to deal with a series of questions that are
important to regional and local authorities.
4. Finally the regional and local authorities should work towards playing a stronger and
more substantial role at Member State level in the domestic handling of EU affairs.
The regulations in this respect vary greatly from one Member State to another: in the
established federal stats (Belgium, Germany and Austria) the sub-national entities
have a very strong role to play in this area. In terms of best practice, such rules and
practices could serve as a model or reference for other Member States in which the
regional and local authorities have hitherto had a much weaker position.
II.
The socio-political aspect
1. The representatives of the regional and local authorities in the Committee of the
Regions should see themselves much more than they have previously as genuine
political actors and not so much as experts or mere lobbyists.
¾ For this, it is essential that the CoR members firstly have an electoral mandate or
are accountable to an elected assembly. This requirement is largely fulfilled.
¾ Secondly, the CoR mandate should not just be an accessory that can be managed
without major effort or expenditure. A dual mandate is so significant - CoR
members are both officials or mandate holders within a regional or local authority
in the relevant member state and can therefore effectively bring together the
various levels – that the CoR mandate should carry greater weight and demand
and also receive more commitment from the mandate holders. The CoR's general
working pattern to date of just a few plenary sessions each year and
correspondingly few commission and political group meetings should be
reformed. A political mandate specifically demands much more time and,
moreover, better equipment with support staff and materials.
¾ Thirdly, the CoR should be endowed with strong personalities with the
corresponding political clout as members. The CoR as an institution will only
57
benefit from the prestige and profiles of its members through consistently modest
and primarily merely consultative powers.
¾ In the future, besides the representatives of the respective executives at subnational levels, CoR members should also be reinforced by parliamentarians from
local or regional elected assemblies. This fourth point should, moreover,
correspond to the greater weight of the parliamentary component in the EU
decision-making system as provided for in the Lisbon treaty, particularly as
regards the role of the national parliaments in monitoring the implementation of
the subsidiarity principle. In this respect, the regional parliaments in the individual
Member States should become more important.
¾ Finally, the political groups in the CoR, which already play an important and
influential part in the organisation of its work, will become more visible and thus
emphasise the political nature of this institution.
2. In the past, regional and local authorities have made full use of their potential for
horizontal cooperation and partnership as clearly demonstrated by the many and, by
nature, very varied forms of inter-regional cooperation. This also includes bilateral or
multilateral forms of cross-border cooperation, as well as cooperation between regions
and districts that are not immediate neighbours. So there are forms of regional (and
district) cooperation that are primarily organised on a sectoral basis, but there are also
macro-regions (such as the cooperation between coastal regions or the cooperation
in the Mediterranean, in the Baltic Sea area and recently in the Danube area) which
are determined on a primarily geographical basis. Such arrangements also include the
cooperation of socio-political organisations and representatives of civil society and
the more closely integrated they are, the more committed they become and the
resulting cooperation is all the more successful. Corresponding networks of non-state
actors at sub-national level have a huge political potential. All of these existing and
successfully implemented forms of cooperation and partnership can and should be
consolidated and further developed.
3. Regional and local authorities have an important function as sounding boards for the
EU and its policies.
¾ The established political and social actors (civil society) at sub-national level play
an important role in this respect; the corresponding organisations and their
members are directly affected by EU policy measures and will react to such
measures in the appropriate manner. Agreement or criticism has a definite impact
on the legitimacy of such policies. And when it comes to implementing these
58
policies, i.e. the EU measures and decisions, much depends on the cooperation of
those directly affected.
¾ In this respect, consideration should also be given to the activities of nongovernment organisations (NGOs), which are engaged more specifically in
matters relating to the environment, human rights, social affairs and also
consumer protection. They have enormous potential for influencing the climate of
opinion and are active at local and regional levels, since people can be more
directly and thus more effectively approached and reached in this way. These
organisations understand how to effectively link the different levels (local,
regional, national and EU) through their activities.
¾ Particular importance should be given to the media: the local and regional press,
as well as local radio and television programmes, reach people directly with their
news and commentaries and thus subjective judgements and assessments of EU
policies in general and in detail and, in many cases, of very specialised political
areas.
¾ Opinion polls and thus survey data give us information about people's views, but
also their response to individual questions. Knowledge of such polls and opinions
forms an important basis for preparing projects in the various political fields.
However, questions for polls of this kind should be organised more rigorously
than in the past around specific topics of relevance to the local and regional levels.
Clearly that also applies to "Eurobarometer", a polling project for which the
European Commission is responsible.
¾ Knowledge about the EU is an essential prerequisite for any rational assessment of
EU-related questions. Polls from the widest variety of sources are increasingly
coming to the unanimous conclusion that there is a major knowledge gap: people
know far too little about the complex structures of the EU and its policies. We
should consequently look at whether and to what extent the various types of
school curricula pay attention to EU topics. Since questions relating to schools,
training and education in many cases come under the responsibility of regional
and local authorities, the appropriate initiatives and reforms can be put in motion
at this level.
¾ A further point is worthy of attention: the Lisbon Treaty provides for the option of
citizens' initiatives; the relevant provision stipulates that at least one million
citizens of the Union from several member States (the Treaty says nothing about
the exact number) may call upon the European Commission to take up a specific
initiative to make into legislation. It needs cooperation and coordination to
mobilise one million citizens of the Union. Regional and local authorities, that is
to say, the established socio-political organisations and actors at these sub59
national levels, could undoubtedly make an important contribution to this effect,
or even independently prepare a citizens' initiative of this kind.
In the draft of the constitutional treaty, "Symbols" of the European Union were presented
in one of the articles. One of these symbols was the slogan "United in Diversity". Even
though this article no longer appears in the Lisbon Treaty, the message expressed in the
slogan is still valid. The EU encompasses an enormous diversity: traditions, structures
and identities. The Lisbon Treaty also stipulates that everything relating to the identity of
the Member States and their citizens must be recognised and respected. One aspect of this
is the territorial structure of the Member States and their regional and local authorities. At
the same time, this also means that they must fully use their specific potential in the
context of multi-level governance in the EU. In this way they will make a welcome and
important contribution to achieving the two main goals of multi-level governance, namely
a high level of efficiency and a high quality of democratic legitimacy.
60
GOUVERNANCE A MULTI NIVEAUX:
POUR UNE APPROCHE COORDONNÉE FACE AUX
ENJEUX SOCIO-ÉCONOMIQUES DE LA
MONDIALISATION
MARJORIE JOUEN 51
Pour l’Union européenne, la crise financière de l’automne dernier a marqué la fin d’une
décennie de croissance basée sur la globalisation, croissance qui a permis de réduire
significativement le chômage mais qui s’est aussi accompagnée d’un creusement des
inégalités sociales et territoriales et d’une accélération de la pression sur l’environnement
naturel, dont le réchauffement climatique constitue l’illustration la plus marquante.
Avec l’annonce de la perte de 8,5 millions d’emplois en 2009-2010 et le doublement des
déficits publics en 2009, le spectre de régions sinistrées en raison de la fermeture massive
d’entreprises ou de la crise immobilière réapparaît. La question de l’épuisement du modèle de
croissance exogène qui a été suivi pendant les 10 dernières années est ouvertement soulevée.
En effet, sur le terrain, le tropisme quasi-exclusif vers l’exportation et la recherche sans fin
d’attractivité ont souvent entraîné une réduction des moyens publics affectés à l’amélioration
de la qualité de vie locale et à la lutte contre l’exclusion sociale. En définitive, la concurrence
entre les territoires s’est souvent soldée par un jeu à somme nulle, voire même négative.
En plus des appels à une gestion plus raisonnable des ressources humaines et naturelles qui se
sont multipliés récemment, la contribution des niveaux de gouvernance infra-nationaux à la
reprise économique et à l’évolution vers un nouveau modèle de développement doit être prise
en considération sérieusement. Cette option répond à un double souci d’efficience et de
légitimité, dans le prolongement de la tradition des « Pères Fondateurs » de l’Europe, qui ont
toujours cherché par des innovations institutionnelles et une bonne dose de pragmatisme à
accroître l’efficacité de l’action publique.
Face aux défis socio-économiques qui se présentent à court et moyen terme à l’UE, la
gouvernance à multi-niveaux (GMN) peut faire la différence. Plus qu’une théorie, elle
représente un guide pour l’action (Delmartino) et elle trouve aisément à s’illustrer
concrètement dans 3 grands chantiers inscrits dans l’agenda politique européen : la stratégie
post-Lisbonne, la cohésion territoriale et les futures politiques territorialisées de l’UE.
51
Conseillère, Notre Europe
61
1 – La stratégie post-Lisbonne
La stratégie de Lisbonne, lancée en 2000 et complétée à Göteborg par un volet
environnemental en 2001, avait pour ambition de faire de l’UE l’économie de la connaissance
la plus compétitive et la plus dynamique du monde d’ici 2010. Elle avait suscité beaucoup
d’espoir et un réel soutien de la part des autorités locales et régionales, soucieuses de pouvoir
y apporter leur contribution.
Force est de constater que, malgré le recentrage à mi-parcours sur les priorités de croissance
et d’emploi, le bilan s’avère décevant tant sur le plan des résultats obtenus que sur celui de la
gouvernance 52 . Entre autres, la stratégie de Lisbonne aurait dû enclencher un vaste
mouvement de mobilisation mais, après dix ans d’existence, elle continue de souffrir d’une
faible appropriation par les acteurs de terrain (entreprises, collectivités locales, organismes de
formation, syndicats, etc) et par l’opinion publique. La méthode ouverte de coordination,
nouvelle technique de gouvernance sur laquelle elle repose, a été appliquée de manière
bureaucratique, sans grande efficacité car limitée aux politiques nationales formelles et peu
contraignante en l’absence de sanctions pour les pays ne faisant pas d’effort. Elle a souffert
d’un déséquilibre politique manifeste, la compétitivité primant sur tous les autres objectifs
sociaux et/ou environnementaux. Ce biais s’est révélé particulièrement handicapant face aux
multiples crises que l’UE doit affronter depuis plusieurs années (crise économique et
financière, bien sûr, mais aussi crises énergétique, alimentaire, sociale, écologique). Il reflète
de la part de certains décideurs publics une confiance exagérée dans les vertus du marché,
dénoncée par de nombreux économistes comme Acemoglu 53 , Stiglitz et Galbraith 54 , et
surtout d’une absence de prise en compte des contributions des acteurs du développement
économique et social sur le terrain.
La re-formulation de la Stratégie de Lisbonne pour la période post-2010, que le Président de
la Commission semble avoir déjà esquissée sous le nom « UE 2020 », devrait permettre
d’ouvrir la réflexion sur la manière dont l’UE entend conduire son développement
économique et social, en tenant compte des phénomènes de globalisation et en promouvant
une meilleure articulation avec la stratégie européenne pour le développement durable, en
particulier dans les domaines du changement climatique et de l’énergie. Cette réorientation
devrait aussi amener à la poursuite, dans des conditions optimales, des objectifs de cohésion
et d’inclusion sociales. C’est pourquoi la proposition d’un « Agenda social territorialisé »,
52
Comité des régions, Réaliser les objectifs de Lisbonne grâce à des politiques territoriales coordonnées et
intégrées, novembre 2008
53
Daron Acemoglu, The Crisis of 2008: Structural Lessons for and from Economics, MIT. Mimeo 2009
54
James K Galbraith, L'État prédateur. Comment la droite a renoncé au marché libre et pourquoi la gauche
devrait en faire autant, Le Seuil, 2009
62
formulée par Barca 55 dans son rapport, mérite d’être étudiée en détail. Elle ouvre la voie à un
meilleur ancrage territorial de la stratégie, une bonne exploitation des avantages d’une
coordination et d’une intégration européennes, et enfin un rapprochement plus net entre les
besoins des populations et les potentialités technologiques.
Dans cette perspective, la GMN offre une réponse en termes de moyens et méthodes. Il
conviendrait, en effet, que la stratégie UE 2020 s’appuie :
•
sur le partenariat élargi et multi-niveaux, appliqué aussi bien entre les différents
niveaux de compétence depuis le niveau européen jusqu’au niveau local, qu’entre
les différentes catégories d’acteurs de même niveau (secteur privé, secteur public,
économie sociale, société civile) ;
•
sur l’intégration multi-sectorielle, en encourageant ou même en obligeant les
administrations publiques à mener des réformes sectorielles simultanées et
coordonnées en vue d’atteindre des objectifs communs horizontaux;
•
sur la recherche de meilleures synergies entre financements et réglementations,
dans un double souci d’efficacité et de mise en cohérence des horizons temporels
– sachant que les interventions financières ont souvent des effets de plus court
terme que le cadre juridique dans lequel elles s’inscrivent, mais aussi que la
distribution des compétences juridiques entre les différents niveaux ne coïncide
pas toujours les capacités financières.
En pratique, certaines priorités de la stratégie UE 2020 pourraient fort bien s’enrichir d’une
telle approche. Par exemple, le soutien à l’activité des entreprises localisées (PME, clusters,
micro-crédit …), la promotion ou la sanction des comportements de consommation
incompatibles avec le développement durable (transports, énergie …), la lutte contre le
chômage et la réinsertion professionnelle dans une logique de continuum socio-économique
constitueraient à la fois des approches innovantes pour une stratégie post-Lisbonne et des
domaines particulièrement propices pour développer la GMN. Dans l’immédiat, la GMN met
en évidence des changements indispensables dans le traitement administratif de la reprise
économique aux niveaux européen et national : elle conduit sans aucun doute à préconiser
d’en finir avec une gestion sectorielle, compartimentée, centralisée et descendante.
55
Fabrizio Barca, An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy, A place-based approach to meeting European
Union challenges and expectations, Report to DG REGIO, European Commission, 2009
63
2 – La cohésion territoriale
Expression d’une solidarité fondée sur la géographique, la cohésion territoriale ajoute une
troisième dimension à l’objectif de cohésion économique et sociale fixé à l’UE. On peut
s’attendre à ce qu’elle soit mise en œuvre rapidement, avec l’entrée en vigueur du Traité de
Lisbonne.
Bien que le vaste débat lancé par la Commission 56 à l’automne 2008 n’ait pas permis d’en
donner une définition unique, la cohésion territoriale vise à réduire les écarts entre territoires,
afin de permettre à tous les Européens de jouir de conditions de vie et de développement
comparables, et de se sentir appartenir à une même communauté. Ceci revient à dire que la
politique en faveur de la cohésion territoriale devrait comporter un premier volet correcteur,
tendant à la réduction des disparités existantes ; un deuxième volet préventif, destiné à
améliorer la cohérence des politiques sectorielles ayant un impact territorial ; un troisième
volet incitatif, visant au renforcement de l’intégration territoriale en encourageant la
coopération 57 .
La GMN peut nourrir les nouvelles mesures ou les principes qui seront appliqués pour
renforcer la cohésion territoriale européenne. Il est possible d’en donner 3 illustrations
concrètes. Tout d’abord, l’un des enjeux majeurs posés par la cohésion territoriale déjà
identifié par le Traité d’Amsterdam est la garantie de l’accès des services publics pour tous,
que ce soient les infrastructures lourdes (transports, technologies de l’information …) et ou
les services immatériels (éducation, santé …). Or, la qualité des services et pas seulement la
quantité - même si les financements publics sont cruciaux - passe aujourd’hui par l’adaptation
aux besoins locaux et aux besoins contemporains. Force est de constater que la solution ne
réside pas dans l’application pure et simple du principe de subsidiarité, pas plus que dans la
seule définition légale (la notion de service d’intérêt général est devenue trop complexe et
peu sûre au regard des risques de revirements de jurisprudence), ni dans le recours au marché
(les privatisations sont souvent décevantes en termes d’équité). Il faut donc développer de
nouvelles méthodes de gestion et de conception des services (consultation des citoyens et des
agents sur le terrain, co-production, évaluation partagée), soutenir l’innovation sociale et
expérimenter à petite échelle.
Ensuite, l’une des innovations technique probable qu’introduira la cohésion territoriale est
l’analyse d’impact territorial des principales réformes politiques. Si l’on assiste aujourd’hui à
une généralisation progressive des analyses d’impact au niveau européen avec prise en
compte des conséquences pour les collectivités locales (charge administrative), il faut aller
au-delà. Le débat européen autour du Livre vert a fait ressortir le besoin d’élargir ces analyses
56
Commission européenne, Livre Vert sur la cohésion territoriale : faire de la diversité territoriale un atout,
septembre 2008
57
Marjorie Jouen, La cohésion territoriale, de la théorie à la pratique, Notre Europe, juin 2008
64
ex-ante aux conséquences territoriales des principales réformes sectorielles, par exemple
celles de la PAC, des politiques de santé ou de l’énergie … Par ailleurs, ces analyses doivent
être menées selon des modalités nouvelles : une approche technique et sectorielle ne suffit
pas ; il faudrait l’enrichir par le partenariat et prendre en compte les points de vue des
différents niveaux de gouvernance.
Enfin, à juste titre, l’accent est fréquemment mis sur l’apport de la coopération territoriale à
l’objectif de cohésion territoriale. Or la crise économique et sociale, tout comme la
globalisation, créent de nouveaux défis territoriaux que le cadre réglementaire actuel de la
politique de cohésion ne prend en compte. Des trois volets de l’objectif de coopération
territoriale, seuls ceux de la coopération transnationale et interrégionale sont mobilisables,
mais leurs allocations financières sont insignifiantes. La réforme en cours du Fonds européen
d’ajustement à la mondialisation n’est pas complètement satisfaisante car elle conduit à un
traitement isolé de chaque région sinistrée. Au contraire, il faudrait développer un instrument
susceptible de répondre aux besoins des régions ou autres territoires, victimes de la
globalisation, pour leur permettre d’échanger entre eux des méthodes et pratiques dans le
cadre de réseaux, sur le modèle des anciens programmes d’initiative communautaire. Il
faudrait aussi accroître les possibilités pour les autorités locales et régionales, en association
avec les partenaires économiques et sociaux, de concevoir de nouveaux modèles de
restructuration et de les expérimenter.
3 – Les futures politiques territorialisées de l’UE
Dans la perspective de la négociation du paquet financier post-2013, chaque politique de
l’UE a engagé une réflexion sur son devenir. Pour ce qui est de la future politique de
cohésion, le rapport Barca prend ouvertement position en faveur d’une approche
territorialisée 58 , définie comme 1) une stratégie de développement de long terme visant à
lutter à la fois contre la sous-exploitation du potentiel local et contre les inégalités sociales
persistantes sur un territoire déterminé, 2) centrée sur la production intégrée de biens
collectifs et de services, déterminés en fonction des préférences et des savoir-faire locaux,
selon des processus institutionnels participatifs et coopératifs, 3) soutenue par un système de
gouvernance multi-niveaux incluant des transferts financiers soumis à de fortes
conditionnalités.
En fait, l’argumentation et les propositions de Barca vont bien au-delà de la politique de
cohésion. Ils sont valables pour l’ensemble des politiques communautaires qui ont une
vocation territoriale, comme la politique de développement rural et la politique de
58
Marjorie Jouen, Le rapport Barca : le grand nettoyage de printemps dans la politique de cohésion
européenne, Notre Europe, mai 2009
65
développement maritime, et pour certaines mesures des politiques ayant de forts impacts
territoriaux, comme les indemnités de compensation de handicap naturel de la PAC,
NATURA 2000 pour la politique d’environnement, les réseaux trans-européens, etc.
Pour améliorer l’efficience et l’efficacité de ces politiques, tout en renforçant la légitimité
démocratique de l’intervention européenne, la GMN conseillerait d’adopter une approche
stratégique. Ceci reviendrait à définir des programmes d’intervention pluriannuels dans une
perspective de moyen ou long terme, à identifier des objectifs politiques clairs dans une
logique de subsidiarité, à introduire des mécanismes de surveillance de la cohérence entre
secteurs et politiques, à conditionner les allocations budgétaires à l’obtention de résultats.
Globalement, il s’agirait de retrouver les principes originaux sur lesquels se fondait la
politique de cohésion, de les moderniser et de les adapter au fonctionnement actuel des
relations entre les différents niveaux de gouvernance.
De telles stratégies ont vocation à s’imbriquer les unes dans les autres, en partant du plus
général au niveau européen, pour aboutir au plus particulier au niveau local. Pour autant, la
flexibilité d’adaptation au contexte reste de mise et il ne s’agit pas que le sous-couvert de la
stratégie se recrée un modèle hiérarchique descendant. L’approche stratégique aurait le mérite
d’offrir une assez grande souplesse pour intégrer des politiques et des mesures sectorielles et
pour faciliter une mise en œuvre partenariale incluant les collectivités locales et régionales,
les acteurs socio-économiques et les organisations issues de la société civile.
De manière très prosaïque, la GMN réclamerait aussi le renversement de l’ordre dans lequel
se déroulera la négociation budgétaire : il faudrait d’abord s’accorder sur les objectifs
politiques et ensuite seulement, sur les montants alloués aux différentes politiques et aux
bénéficiaires. Pour séduisante et simple qu’elle apparaisse à première vue, cette proposition
n’est pas aisée à mettre en œuvre. Il ne faut pas sous-estimer les obstacles à surmonter au
niveau national et au niveau régional pour sortir des comportements conservateurs.
Cette mise en garde vaut pour l’ensemble des propositions formulées dans ce texte. Les
bénéfices potentiels d’une approche coordonnée inspirée de la GMN sont évidents, tant pour
accroître l’efficience que pour asseoir la légitimité des politiques publiques de tous niveaux.
Sa mise en œuvre nécessitera toutefois une grande détermination politique car les pesanteurs
technocratiques et les intérêts particuliers de très court terme constituent des freins puissants
et des ennemis redoutables.
66
THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS' WHITE PAPER ON
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE: SOME REFLECTIONS
SIMONA PIATTONI 59
Premise
The Committee of the Region (CoR) White Paper on Multilevel Governance (WPMG) 60 is an
ambitious document that pursues several goals simultaneously. The first is to announce the
CoR’s self-apprehension as a representative assembly that is legitimated to speak for and to
European citizens and that can, on this ground, claim closer involvement in EU
policymaking. The second goal is to assert the territorial import of most EU policies and,
therefore, to claim also on this ground the importance of involving the CoR in most EU
policymaking and of taking the territorial impact of EU policies seriously. The third is to
offer its contribution to improving the quality of EU legislation not simply in terms of
increasing the efficiency of already existing legislation, but also in terms of contributing new
ideas and policy solutions. A fourth goal is to mobilize its own members and constituents (the
regional and local authorities of the EU) into action for a more legitimate, efficient, and
participated EU. The audiences that the WPMG addresses are, therefore, many and varied:
the other EU institutions, national and subnational authorities, economic and social partners,
European citizens.
In what follows I will highlight those WPMG aspects that deserve, in my opinion, greater
attention both for what they (sometimes boldly) say and for what they fail to say, and I will
then make some additional remarks drawn from personal research on the CoR and on various
multilevel policies. Let me premise my remarks by saying that the overall tone of the
document is pleasantly self-assertive: it is that of a “minor” EU institution which has “come
of age” and claims its own rightful place in the institutional architecture of the Union. I
believe that this is already a major achievement, which will make this document into an
important step in the process of “building Europe in partnership”. However, as these
documents often tend to do, also the WPMG tries to “kill too many birds with one stone” and
reads both as a constitutional paper (how the EU should be and what role the CoR should
have within it) and as a policy paper (replete with concrete suggestions and rather detailed
governance recommendations). The latter fit in such a high-flying document only to the
59
University of Trento (Italy) – [email protected]
The WPMG was released on June 16, 2009 and adopted as own-initiative opinion by the Committee during its
80th plenary session on June 17-18, 2009.
60
67
extent that they help exemplify ways in which lofty principles can be translated into practice,
but too many of them may end up cluttering the text.
What the WPMG says
The WPMG is structured into five main sections, premised by an introduction.
The Introduction states the main objectives of multilevel governance (MLG): “reinforcing the
efficiency of Community action” and “encouraging participation in the European process”.
Effectiveness and participation are the two ultimate goals that, it is claimed, can be reached
by “building Europe in partnership”, that is, through MLG. EU policies drawn up and
implemented through MLG, it is suggested, would be doubly legitimate: because they are
participated (input legitimacy) and because they are efficient (output legitimacy). 61 Proximity
to citizens, both in terms of soliciting input and in terms of securing output, is the ultimate
objective of MLG as presented by this White Paper, which makes no secret as to the
insufficiency of the current situation. The White Paper wants to suggest how the EU
democratic void can be filled.
Equally explicit are two critical remarks also contained in this section. The first is that MLG
“does not, however, apply to all EU policies, and when it does, it rarely applies
symmetrically or homogeneously” (4). So, the scope for MLG can and must be expanded.
The second explicit criticism is directed at higher-level institutions – EU institutions and the
Member States – for their insufficient efforts to “do away with such administrative cultures
that stand in the way of the ongoing process of decentralization” (3). This is a bold statement
for its potential institutional implications, but one that can be easily understood. Since the
CoR firmly believes that the way to improve participation and efficiency, and ultimately
democracy, in the European Union is through more extensive and meaningful involvement of
regional and local authorities, these must not only exist but also be given the political latitude
to contribute. I will not be the only one to understand this statement as an invitation to
Member States to proceed more forcefully on the road to decentralization and devolution, and
it is to be expected that some of them will react negatively to that. Clearly, this is one of the
most contentious issues of the document since many Member States, and perhaps also the
Commission, are still unconvinced that more decentralization and devolution is really what
Europe needs.
61
Obviously, the document is careful not to upset the formal decision-making procedures of the EU, particularly
the Community Method, which is repeatedly mentioned as the preferred legislative procedure, pretty much like
also
the
Commission’s
White
Paper
on
EU
Governance
had
done
(2001).
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/white_paper/index_en.htm
68
The second section is entitled “Building Europe in partnership”, which is also the core of the
whole exercise. It contains the official definition of MLG – “coordinated action by the
European Union, the Member States and local and regional authorities, based on partnership
and aimed at drawing up and implementing EU policies” (6) – and clarifies that it must be
considered as a “political blueprint rather than a legal instrument” and that it “cannot be
understood solely through the lens of the division of powers” (6). MLG then is a method, a
process - or, according to the CoR, “the” method and process – for deciding and
implementing shared and efficient EU policies. It is in this context that the WPMG offers a
novel interpretation of subsidiarity as partnership. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the concept
of subsidiarity had been caught, until this document, in a fundamental ambiguity: far from
being a univocal concept, it is rather an “inherently contested” concept. Each tier of
government, and even non-governmental actors, interpret it to suit their own agenda. To
Member States, subsidiarity means that the Union should tackle only those issues which the
Members States themselves cannot effectively handle themselves; 62 to local and regional
authorities, it means that action should be taken at the closest possible level to the ultimate
receivers of the policy, that is, at the local and regional level; 63 to non-governmental
organizations, subsidiarity means that the state, at whatever level, should avoid meddling
with issues that society can handle on its own. The concept has been, in other words, a
political tug-of-war: a restatement of the disagreement over which actors are legitimated to
decide over which issues. The WPMG puts an end to this debate and establishes that
subsidiarity implies that all these levels and actors should be simultaneously involved and
establishes a de facto correspondence between subsidiarity and partnership. The CoR
appears so committed to this new understanding of subsidiarity that it is joining forces with
the Council of Europe in order to promote a “pan-European consensus on [this understanding
of] multilevel governance” (7).
By doing so it also sends three strong signals. First, it states that local and regional authorities
must be “genuine ‘partners’ rather than mere ‘intermediaries’”: they have to accept to
participate on a par with other public and private actors and take responsibility for the process
and its results. Second, it reminds the Member States that “the conditions for this shared
governance have not yet been met in full” (7) and that good MLG implies a “widespread”,
though not necessarily “uniform” process of decentralization. In other words, MLG must first
be practiced domestically before it can be exported also at the EU level. The third signal,
taken up also in a later section, is the need to better communicate the European project to
citizens, a task for which local and regional authorities are particularly well-suited.
62
“In areas which do not fall under its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community” (TEU, Art. 3b).
63
“…decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the citizens” (TEU, Art. A).
69
The third section – “Encouraging participation in the European process” – addresses the issue
of the cognitive and affective distance between the EU and its citizens and identifies
intensified participation as the key to closing this distance. Local and regional authorities can
do a lot to help redress the EU democratic deficit because they are “invested with an
indisputable democratic legitimacy” (9). 64 It is in this context that the CoR recalls its recently
issued Mission Statement in which it clarified its own status as one of a “political assembly”.
This is another welcome bold statement that tries to put an end to a long debate about the
“nature” of the CoR, whether it was merely a “consultative” body or rather a “representative”
chamber. With this statement, the CoR is saying that, given the representative and political
mandate of its members, it cannot simply be considered as a technical consultative body but it
must be given a central role in EU policy-making as is appropriate for a representative,
political chamber. It is saying, even more boldly, that the CoR is the third representative
chamber of the Union after the chamber that represents the citizens of the Union (the
Parliament) and the chamber that represents the Member States of the Union (the Council).
Multi-level governance, thus, acquires a more precise meaning, because the levels to be
considered in the future Europe cannot be just two, but three and more.
In this context, it becomes understandable why the WPMG dwells at some length on the
formal institutional privileges that should be given to local and regional authorities for
example to allow them to participate, as part of the Members States delegations, in Council
meetings and on the relations that the CoR intends to intensify with the national
parliamentary assemblies and regional legislative assemblies, “particularly within the process
of monitoring subsidiarity” (10). But the CoR also calls on the Member States to allow local
and regional authorities to participate systematically in the formal or informal Councils on
community policies falling within areas of their interest and to grant them access to Council
documents issued in preparation of legislation. The plea is to allow local and regional
authorities to participate in the legislative process and to become full partners in the
legislative process. Where such participation is not formally possible, they ask Member
States to consult with their own local and regional authorities informally.
The boldness of this statement must be applauded, particularly as it reflects the selfapprehension of CoR members as political representatives. CoR members are political actors:
many of them have been directly elected while the others are “politically accountable to an
assembly elected by universal suffrage” (Art. 263 Treaty of Nice). Despite differences in
status and competences among them, they are political actors who feel that their task is to
contribute to the formulation and implementation of policies. With the Lisbon Treaty,
moreover, “interparliamentary cooperation” becomes a vital component of EU democratic.
The interrelations among members of political representative chambers are bound to
64
It is here possible to notice a reorientation vis-à-vis the Commission’s White Paper on Governance. While
that Paper had given the same relief to subnational authorities and to civil society organizations, the WPMG
clearly emphasizes the special status of subnational authorities.
70
multiply. Even those Members States that lack a second regional chamber will nevertheless
have to allow local and regional authorities to collaborate with the parliamentary chamber in
monitoring the subsidiarity principle. The Erasmus programme for local and regional elected
representatives exchange, thrown in at this point of the WPMG, must perhaps be understood
as suggesting that, by visiting countries where relations between local/regional and national
representatives are commonplace, local/regional representatives of more unitary countries
should learn how to interact with the national counterparts and perhaps get mobilized into
obtaining a chamber of their own. 65
The section concludes by going back to the issue of citizen participation, which is more in
line with the discussion of the CoR as a representative, political assembly. It states that
citizen participation has to be stimulated at the local level, but this statement appears only
tentative (“Multilevel governance also looks as though it could be useful for promoting…”
(16)). The section ends with several announcements – establishment of “a genuine
decentralized communication policy”, encouragement of “increased coverage by local and
regional media” (17) – and recommendations – supporting participatory democracy through
the “development of a ‘Local Agenda 21’ type mechanism”, launching a “European Citizens
initiative”, improving “European civic education”, inserting new parameters in
Eurobarometer polls in order to gauge “the real engagement of local and regional authorities
in the functioning of the European Union” (17-18). These measures, however, feel halfhearted and not fully elaborated. The main concern of the WPMG is to assert the role and
standing of the CoR and of local and regional authorities vis-à-vis other EU institutions and
the Member States (the multilevel part of MLG), whereas the need to make local and regional
authorities into genuine conduits for European citizens participation is a bit out of focus (the
governance part of MLG).
If Sections 2 and 3 address “encouraging participation in the European process”, Section 4
addresses the “reinforcing the efficiency of Community action” part of MLG (6). In actual
fact, Section 4 reads “Reinforcing the effectiveness of Community action” (18), which, as I
noted above, is truly more in the spirit of the WPMG exercise. The main argument to justify
why local and regional authorities should be more extensively and intensively involved in EU
policy-making is that “any Community measure has a direct impact on the regions and their
inhabitants. Striking a balance between the Community’s goals and the territorial impact of
these policies is thus crucial” (18). This is a question of fairness (those most directly affected
by policies should be involved in their making), of democracy (different groups of citizens
may have different preferences as to how to translate EU policies into action) and of
65
Though a nifty idea, the Erasmus programme for local and regional elected representatives become the
opportunity for a several pages (12-15) detour into horizontal agreements and initiatives among these
representatives, such as the Covenant for Mayors to fight climate change or the regional approach to the
European neighborhood policy, which are interesting initiatives, but should perhaps be moved to a different
section of the WPMG.
71
effectiveness (who better than local and regional authorities and their citizens know what
should be done in practice). In this light, the principle of partnership is recalled once more to
indicate that local and regional authorities should be involved “not only during the policy
implementation phase but also, and above all, during the preparation phase” (20).
The request that follows – to “reinforce the partnership practice, both vertically ‘between
local and regional authorities, national government and European Union’ and horizontally
between ‘local and regional authorities and civil society’” (20) – reads however somewhat
superficial as far as “horizontal partnership” is concerned. All that follows – “simplifying and
rationalizing administrative procedures”, “reinforcing administrative capabilities of local and
regional authorities” (20) – clearly goes in the direction of strengthening the local and
regional governmental levels rather than securing that these connect effectively with their
local and regional societies. The very important point is then made that partnership must be
based on trust and that economic crises test the strength of that trust. In hard times, partners
may feel tempted to renege on their commitments, thus subtracting partnership when it is
most needed.
The WPMG then goes off to denounce a few instances where partnership is not working or it
is not working as it should, and to suggest how it could be effectively improved. We thus
learn that the Lisbon Strategy has not worked because it was conceived as an exclusive topdown exercise (until the Lisbon Monitoring Platform involved some hundred plus regions in
its implementation), that the Open Method of Coordination (for employment) has not worked
because it did not involve local and regional authorities, and that even Cohesion policy could
be improved if economic, social and environmental cohesion could be combined into the
single concept of “territorial cohesion” to be then articulated differently according to local
conditions (urban/rural, central/peripheral, land/sea, etc.). These remarks clearly connect to
the Barca Report 66 that stresses the need to reform cohesion policy so as to it more to
territory (place-based development). The contribution of MLG to Better Lawmaking goes
back to the issue of securing, through the involvement of local and regional authorities,
subsidiarity and proportionality.
A bold request is then issued at this point: that each piece of Community legislation be
assessed for its territorial impact, and that this assessment be accomplished by involving local
and regional authorities more extensively and intensively in EU policymaking. The WPMG is
not too clear, though, on how exactly this assessment should be performed. It recommends
that territorial impact analysis should be accomplished “through the involvement upstream of
the policy decision of the various actors concerned in order to understand the economic,
social and environmental repercussions on the regions of Community legislative and nonlegislative proposals” (29). This is a rather vague formulation that may simply mean that
local and regional authorities should be involved formally or informally in all EU
66
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/barca_en.htm
72
policymaking (as requested also above) or that special agencies or committees should
perform ex-ante territorial evaluations and ex-post territorial audits.
Once again, the argumentative thread is broken by a rather long detour on ways to reinforce
territorial cooperation: ECGTs, macro-regions, voluntary agreements (29-30) are all
examples of reinforced cooperation that take the territorial dimension of EU policies
seriously, but they should perhaps be placed in a section of their own as illustrations of the
ways in which the principles announced in the previous sections can be put into practice.
What the WPMG does not say
In this dense and well argued Paper, few issues have been omitted or glossed over which
deserve greater attention. I will conclude by pointing to these issues as deserving greater
attention.
First, the governance side of MLG is not sufficiently developed. How does the CoR plan to
encourage local and regional authorities to create closer ties to their citizens other than
hoping that the politician-voter linkage at those level still works? Has the CoR the pulse for
the many ways in which citizen participation at the local and regional level can be obtained?
How far along is the implementation of Local Agenda 21? Are good practices being
exchanged among CoR members? Is there awareness of the fact that institutional solutions
and daily practices may not be necessarily be transposed across different statist traditions? Is
there full apprehension of the fact that what appears to some as a move towards greater
efficiency may strike others as a step towards greater inefficiency? Is really “efficiency”, and
not rather “effectiveness” (which incorporates in the evaluation the different preferences of
the local and regional societies), the concept that the CoR wants to drive home?
Second, the WPMG should fully acknowledge the unease which certain regional or local
authorities may experience if they should be involved in all EU policymaking above or below
what they are used to domestically. The WPMG clearly suggests that territorial jurisdictions
are fluid, therefore the need to combine and recombine existing jurisdictions in many
different ways. Correctly the Paper stresses the nature of MLG as a process that may take
many different configurations but may never jell around any one of them in particular. This
is all true, but are all local and regional authorities willing to let go of their traditional
understanding of what the “proper” division of institutional competences should be? MLG
implies, on the part of many a local and regional authorities, giving up their institutional,
public nature and accepting to be considered as non-institutional, private organizations that
promote the interests of a given section of the population. Once more, this transformation
may meet the opposition of many local and regional authorities on public philosophical
grounds.
73
Third, however, it is worthwhile signaling that something of the sort is already happening
even in Member States endowed with a particularly rigid statist tradition. Some Italian
regions have inaugurated a very interesting type of vertical partnership with other territorial
authorities, the provinces, that, historically, pre-existed the regions and have been their
institutional antagonists for a long time. Regions realize that they, too, may be too large to
tackle effectively certain issues, so they enlist the provinces to perform some tasks (collecting
statistics, talking to SMEs, interacting with the citizenry) that would be too cumbersome for
them.
Fourth, the communication strategy repeatedly invoked throughout the Paper still smacks too
much of top-down inculcation and propaganda and appears to be an insufficient vehicle for
bottom-up listening.
Fifth, this new understanding of the CoR as a representative assembly will objectively raise
concerns in the European Parliament which, although it has acquired increased powers during
the last two decades, has lost popular consensus and is suffering from a growing disaffection
amongst EU voters. Despite their obvious common interests, these institutions may find
themselves on a collision course unless they both succeed in understanding representation as
a positive-sum phenomenon and manage to work in partnership with one another.
74
FEDERALISM AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE:
COMPARING THE EU WITH OTHER FEDERAL STATES
FELIX KNÜPLING 67
In its recent “Whitepaper on Multilevel Governance” the Committee of the Regions puts
forward the parameters for promoting multilevel governance as the preferred model or
process of coming to binding decisions within the EU. According to the whitepaper,
multilevel governance means “coordinated action by the European Union, the Member States
and local and regional authorities, based on partnership and aimed at drawing up and
implementing EU policies.” 68
The emphasis lies on partnership. Local and regional actors are not longer seen as
“intermediaries”, but as partners and actors in shaping EU policy. Politically spoken, to
promote multilevel governance is a way of trying to increase the influence of local and
regional authorities who frequently have to implement EU legislation but feel that at the same
time they are not properly involved in the decision making process.
I will argue that the debate about the future of the EU – and therefore also about the proper
role of regions and local authorities within the EU – can be inspired by bringing in
comparative experience of non-EU federal countries. Obviously, the EU has a lot to share
because of its unique experience in multi-level governance and federalism, respectively. 69
But it can potentially also gain by looking outside the convential European context: First, by
comparing the basic nature and history of the EU with other federal states the discussions on
the future of the EU and also about the often proclaimed deficits of the EU can be enriched.
Second, new trends of informal and formal relations between the local and the federal level in
federal states across the globe can be observed which might inspire the debate about the role
of regions in the EU decision making process.
EU and Federalism
Although the EU is not a classical federation it has many federal features. It can be described
as a supranational organization, with features both of an international organization, and,
increasingly, of a federal system: Despite significant differences, the Council of Ministers
67
Director Europe, Forum of Federations
White Paper on MLG, p.5.
69
I will use the concepts of “multilevel governance” and “federalism” interchangeably.
68
75
now appears to some extent as a second chamber of the legislative power (comparable to the
German Bundesrat).
The European Parliament, whose members are directly elected, may be compared to the first
chamber of the legislative branch. For its part, the EU Commission increasingly profiles itself
as a European government: it is politically responsible and formally chosen by the European
Parliament even though national governments maintain a major influence on its composition.
Also, the EU has a central court.
One of the biggest differences between the EU and other federal systems remains that most of
the EU’s fiscal issues lie outside its competences, and are thus left for national governments.
The EU has a limited budget (less than 1% of GDP) and thus limited means to its “spending
power” in areas in which it does not enjoy formal competences.
For decades, the process of European integration has been accompanied by a debate about the
EU’s deficiencies. Critics usually refer to the opaqueness of its institutions, its remoteness
from its citizens, the lack of accountability and the democracy deficit of its institutional
arrangements and its policy making process.
Many critics of the EU argue that the most obvious way to overcome the deficits of the EU
would be to move beyond the complex “proto”-federalism of the existing EU to a “fullyfledged” European federation. This would entail a clearly set-out separation of powers
between different levels of government – EU, member states, regional and local authorities –
and a federal executive either directly elected by the people or responsible to a directly
elected legislature.
Yet, there is a paradox here. The fiercest critics of the shortcomings of the present EU
structure are almost always hostile to federalism. This is because, first, there is the
burdensome expression “federal/federalist”. Although in federal countries like Germany,
Austria and Switzerland the term refers to a strengthening of the second tier of government,
the constituent members (Länder, Cantons, Autonomous Communities), it means exactly the
opposite in Anglo-Saxon countries: namely, the strengthening of the federal government.
This goes back to the famous Federalist Papers and the founding of the United States: It was
the Federalists who argued for a strong central government. Consequently, in some countries,
especially the United Kingdom, the word “federal” has become taboo, needlessly distorting
discussions surrounding the new European constitution/the Lisbon Treaty.
Secondly, the constitutions of former centrally-governed countries such as Spain deliberately
avoid using the term “federal”. It was intended not to unnecessarily irritate adherents of the
unitary state, although, from an analytical point of view Spain is certainly a de facto
federation.
A comparative look into the history of federations can shade some light on the federalism
debate in Europe. History teaches that federations emerge and are formed through both
76
centrifugal and centripedal forces. In the academic literature, there is a well known
distinction between “coming together” or “building” federations and “holding together” or
“dis-building” federations. 70 In this literature, the nature of federalism is not so much
explained by the question of centralization versus decentralization but as a question of
balance – a balance that moves over time. The American model started very decentralized
and has moved furthest towards centralization (despite original intentions). In contrast,
Canada has perhaps gone furthest in the opposite direction. It was created as a very
centralized federation but has considerably decentralized over time.
The hostility to federalism in the EU is mainly resulting from the fact that the EU, like the
USA, is a case of “building” rather than “dis-building” federalism and the fear is that it will
end up with a centralized structure similar to the USA. However, one can argue that the EU is
grounded in a very different tradition of federalism than the USA and has also very different
roots. Here, the Swiss experience is enlightening. Similar to Switzerland, the initial objective
of EU integration has not been the creation of a strong central government but the
coordination and integration of policy fields under the subsidiarity principle. The oil in the
machinery of this model of federalism is cooperation and compromise rather than a clear
separation of exclusive powers at different levels of government.
Thus, the key question is not what power should be attributed to which level but instead what
is the appropriate balance of power-sharing among different levels of government with
regard to each policy field. Also, while American federalism is predominantly institutional or
constitutional federalism, European federalism – much like Canadian federalism – is
predominantly treaty-based procedural federalism.
If it is accepted that EU federalism has different sources of inspiration, than the EU appears
not as a case of “proto-federalism” but a case of federalism sui generis. Accordingly, in order
to address the deficiencies of the EU we might have to look for inspiration outside the
conventional wisdom: rather than focusing on a clear separation of powers and a panEuropean parliamentary system of representation and governance, the democratic deficit in
the EU might be addressed best by improving the procedural elements of European
governance: transparency of council proceedings, the further strengthening of the subsidiarity
principle, the increased involvement of civic participation; and also, the definition of a proper
role for regions and local authorities in the collective European decision making process has
to be found.
The “Whitepaper on Multi-Level Governance” of the Committee of Regions is already
addressing some of these issues mentioned above. I think that a more intense debate about the
nature of the EU and a comparison to other federal states can stimulate the European debate
even further.
70
See George Anderson, Federalism: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2008.
77
The Role of the “Third Tier Level” in Federal Systems
This holds also true if we look more specifically at the role of regional and local authorities.
A major trend concerning the EU derives from the impact of the gradual extension of EU
competencies which are detriment to national ones. In federal (or quasi-federal) member
states (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and to some extent Portugal and the UK) this
implies the transfer to the EU of a number of competencies which - in the domestic context –
lie within the sphere of the constitutive units of these national federations (Länder, regions,
Autonomous Communities). As a consequence, these subnational or constitutive units also
wish to be involved in the European relations (what in the “Whitepaper” is captured by the
expression “multi-level governance”).
A more structured involvement of regions and local authorities in the European decision
making process began in 1993 with, first, the creation of the Committee of the Regions as a
consultative EU organ comprised of constitutive units of the EU member states. Secondly,
the EU Treaty henceforth formally authorized the members states who so wish, to be
represented within the Council of Minister by a member of the government of one of their
constitutive unit (a regional Minister).
The relations within EU member states follow both a top-down as well as a bottom-up
dynamic. The first results from efforts by the European Commission to develop relations with
the governments of member States or their constitutive units, in order to ensure the effective
implementation of EU law or policies. Pursuant to EU law, the Commission is politically
responsible before the European Parliament for the proper implementation of EU law and
policies. However, the means of implementation rest solely with the national governments.
While it has no formal role in implementation, the European Commission plays a very central
role in the EU law-making process, since legislative proposals may only emanate from the
Commission. Thus, in addition to their formal representation within EU institutions,
governments of the member states or their regions develop important – bottom-up - informal
channels of influence directed at the Commission. Sub-national entities often engage in
multilateral relations, through associations which adopt common positions that are then
forwarded to the EU.
Thus, there is a very dynamic direct relation between the EU and local and regional
governments and it could be inspiring to compare these relations with the increasing
interaction between local authorities and the federal governments in federal states and to
bring this experience into the European discourse. Recently a major comparative study about
the role of local governments in federal systems has been conducted, that identified some
important trends which could inspire the debate of the role of regions in the EU. This joint
78
project of the Forum of Federations and the International Association of Centers of Federal
Studies looks at the role of local government in Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Germany,
India, Mexico, Nigeria, Switzerland, Spain, South Africa, and United States. 71
This study shows that, much like in the EU, given the overlap in responsibilities, extensive
financial relations and the need to co-produce services, co-operation between the three orders
of government – local, regional, federal – is a necessary consequence. Moreover, extensive
collaboration is needed where local governments are required to implement policies and
legislation from the other orders of government. In local governments’ relations with both
states and federal governments, organised local government plays a crucial role in
articulating and defending their interests.
Within the dominant constitutional and statutory framework, local governments’ primary
relationship is with the second tier order. The interaction often reflects a more equal
relationship than what the formal legal structures suggest: In Australia, the contradictory
situation of municipalities being creatures of statute, yet mostly financially independent, has
led to a relationship based on partnership, as reflected in numerous co-operation protocols
concluded between local and state governments. In Canada, local governments are described
as “policy takers, not full partners,” but there are recent provincial initiatives to involve
municipalities in joint planning. Such developments are also found in Mexico and Nigeria.
At the second-tier level, organised local government plays an important role in most
countries, voicing the concerns of its members. Indeed, an emerging trend in at least six of
the 12 countries in this study is a formalized relationship between local and federal
governments. The focus of the federal government’s engagement with local government is
usually consultation on federal policy or legislation affecting local government. Different
modes of consultation can be identified: the most formal mode is local governments’
participation in federal institutions through their organised local government representatives.
Less formal is the inclusion of local governments in decision-making processes through
various consultation procedures.
For example, in Australia, local governments participate in federal intergovernmental forums.
Organised local government is a member of the Council of Australian Governments,
comprising the executives of the federal and state governments. In Switzerland, the
consultation forum is very specific in focus. The Tripartite Conference of Swiss
Agglomerations, comprising the federal government, the cantons, and organised local
government, promotes vertical co-operation in policy fields relevant to metropolitan areas.
Likewise, in Canada, the federal government has signed tripartite agreements with two cities
and their provinces (i.e., Vancouver and British Columbia, Winnipeg, and Manitoba) on key
issues of urban development.
71
See Nico Steytler (ed.), Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems – A Global
Dialogue on Federalism, McGill Queens University Press, 2008.
79
South Africa is unique in that organised local government is a non-voting member of the
second house of the national parliament, the National Council of Provinces. It is also a
member of the peak intergovernmental relations forum, the President’s Coordinating Council,
along with the provincial premiers.
In Spain, organised local government participates in two co-operative structures: the National
Commission of Local Administration and the General Conference on Local Matters, the latter
being a body that includes the autonomous communities. In the United States, Germany, and
Nigeria, the interaction is much more informal. Organised local governments act as lobby
groups rather than negotiating partners.
These are just snapshots of the intensity of relations and interaction between local authorities
and the regional as well as the federal level in 12 countries. Obviously, the EU is much more
complex and the experiences of these countries cannot be simply transferred to the EU. But
nevertheless, the comparative view outside the European context might inspire thinking about
the future role of local authorities and regions within the EU – both regarding informal as
well as formal arrangements of interaction between various levels.
80
REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF
THE SUBNATIONAL DIMENSION OF
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE
(INSIGHTS FROM A COMPARATIVE SURVEY PROJECT 72 )
MICHAEL W. BAUER, 73 DIANA PITSCHEL & PHILIPP STUDINGER
Introduction
In the aftermaths of the 1988 structural funds reform issues of regional participation in EU
policy-making have received increasing attention. The role subnational authorities should
play has also been a topic in the ongoing debate about the reform of the “constitutional order”
of the Union. One important issue in the debate about regional involvement in supranational
politics concerns the question how much importance subnational administrative elites attach
to the institutionalization of regional access opportunities to the European policy making
arena.
Modes of regional participation in EU policy-making
In this section we dealt with subnational administrative elites’ preferences on questions of
subnational governance, i.e. modes of regional participation in EU policy-making. First we
addressed aspects of institutionalized competences. Thereby we assessed the interviewees’
preferences concerning appropriate channels of access to European policy making. The
overall majority of respondents are strongly in favor of an intensification of the institutional
nexus of the regions with the EU (e.g. right to file an action at the European Court of Justice).
The national mean values are not significantly deviating from each other. Interestingly, the
German interviewees as top officials working in regional administration with probably the
highest institutional autonomy to bypass the nation state gave the least positive responses.
However, interpreting this result one has to keep in mind that the German Länder already
have in place reliable channels of representation and access to EU policy-making in the
72
This paper reports first results of a research project funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG) with the
title “Governance-Präferenzen im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Subnationale Exekutiveliten zwischen
Sozialisierung und Nutzenmaximierung”.
73
Prof. Dr. Michael W. Bauer, Chair of Public Policy and Public Administration, Humboldt-Universität zu
Berlin, Unter den Linden 6 - 10099 Berlin - Email [email protected].
81
domestic arena. Another important feature of regional participation concerns the material
policy competences of regions. The modest claims of subnational administrative elites as
regards regional involvement in distinct policies indicate a very realistic assessment of
regions’ actual (read limited) policy-making capacities. Our interviewees select very
carefully in which policies areas regions should reasonably be involved. In general, we detect
considerable differences between the countries. Whereas Spanish respondents claim regional
competences (in nine of twelve policies), the French (four policies) and Polish (five policies)
respondents are located in the middle range. The least demanding interviewees are the
Hungarians (one policy). Surprisingly, German interviewees named only three policies in
which regions should have competences. We expected them to claim far more policy-making
competences.
The second part of the analysis was concerned with subnational administrative elites’
preferences on the allocation of competences between distinct levels of government. Our data
revealed that the Spanish—and to a lesser degree also the French—interviewees prefer a
reduction in the number of involved government levels As regards the current setting of
competence allocation, we can state that by and large our respondents seem to be satisfied.
However, on average respondents want to strengthen the exclusive competences of the
subnational level in approximately two policies, but at the same time they name one policy in
which regions should share their competences with more partners than they currently do (or
even abandon it). Without overstating these results subnational administrative elites seem to
prefer the bundling of competences on fewer levels to the idea of a broad constitutionalized
version of multilevel governance, i.e. the allocation of competences on distinct levels of
governance.
Allocation of Competences among Government Levels
The general involvement of regions in a certain range of policies is one thing. Another,
equally important one is the allocation of competences between distinct levels of government
in a multilevel system. Based on a comparison between status quo and preferred distribution
of competences over distinct government levels in twelve policies we developed three
variables which capture crucial issues of competence allocation. With the first variable we
measure top-bureaucrats preferences on the “reduction in the number of government levels”
involved in the twelve specified policies. The second variable grasps individuals’ stance on
the “exclusivity of regional competences” whereas the third variable measures preferences in
regard to the “(partial) transfer of regional competences” on higher levels of government.
First, we assess in how many of the twelve policies respondents favor a reduction in the
number of government levels involved. On average our respondents favor a concentration on
82
fewer levels of governance in slightly more than one policy, i.e. they are satisfied with the
current situation. Comparing the national mean values we find the French and especially the
Spanish responses being outliers compared to the other national means. On average the
French interviewee supports a concentration in about 2.2 policies and the Spanish even in 4.9
of the twelve policies!
As regards the “exclusivity of regional competences” in twelve specified policies our
respondents want to strengthen the subnational level in about two policies. The national mean
values, however, indicate that there is a considerable cross-country variance in the responses.
Surprisingly, the largest differences in elite preferences can be observed between two states
that have both very strong regions: Spain and Germany. Whereas German interviewees seem
relatively satisfied with the current situation and abstain from claiming more exclusive
competences for the regions (mean 0.5), the average Spanish respondent wants to see the
exclusive competences of regions strengthened in six policies. Polish, Hungarian and French
responses vary between 1.3 policies (Hungary) and 2.5 policies (France).
Further, we address whether regions should (partially) transfer their competences to other
levels of government, i.e. the nation state or the EU or even want to abandon their
competences completely. In general the respondents name less than one policy in which the
regions should hand over competences. This indicates that the majority of respondents does
see a necessity for regions to share (parts) of their competences with the EU or the nation
state. To our surprise it was again the Spanish respondents that did not fit the overall scheme.
On average they named four policies in which the regions should hand over competences.
Apparently, the decisions of our respondents whether (and in which policy fields) region
should have more exclusive competences or share its competences with more partners seem
to be policy specific. Respondents are not pure power-seekers but consider rather carefully
whether the region is the most appropriate level to regulate a certain policy.
Conclusion
This paper analyzed governance preferences of subnational administrative elites in five EU
member states. The aim was to collect original data, identify systematic patterns and to
interpret observable variation. 347 high ranking subnational officials took part in our survey.
On the basis of this sample we were able to describe the individual preference structures and
look for similarities and differences in individual preference patterns.
We focused upon political exchange between subnational authorities and the supranational
level. More precisely we asked our interviewees how they wanted subnational participation in
EU matters to be organized. Our respondents want the institutional nexus of regions with the
83
EU to be strengthened. Furthermore, we found a broad consensus that regions should remain
or even be further involved in policy making.
The results, however, indicate that subnational administrative elites very carefully select the
policies for which they would like to see greater regional involvement. It depends on the
concrete policy area whether subnational officials are in favor or do oppose to share
responsibilities with other levels of government. With regard to the allocation of competences
our data revealed two important aspects. First it seems that on the whole respondents are
satisfied with the present distribution of competences among subnational, national and the
EU level. They do not urge for comprehensive competence shifts. Second, subnational
officials want to see competences “bundled” rather than shared with multiple government
levels. This means subnational officials prefer a clear attribution of competences, they do not
see the need that the regional level always have to have particular policy competences and
they rather want the allocation of competences to fewer than to all three levels of
government. In our view this does not mean that these elites oppose the emerging European
multilevel system. Rather it indicates that interviewees have a problem solving notion of
politics and subscribe to efficiency considerations as the major principle for policy making—
instead of putting power maximizing strategies first and opposing the sharing of competences
as a matter of principle.
Hence, our data suggests that the practice of multilevel governance – and the sub-national
dimension therein – must be understood from a perspective of policy areas or fields. At the
very least, policy-making across levels is and remains a dynamic undertaking. It is thus
probably impossible to aim at conceiving a new institutional architecture which would
encompass the enormous variety of sub-national constellations, needs and interests in a
simple manner. Multilevel governance remains in our view an analytical device to help
understand ongoing dynamics of government and societal relationships across state levels. It
should however not be attributed ontological quality itself. As then the risk is that it is turned
into a political ideology.
84
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EU IN THE XXI CENTURY
(OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATES AND QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE
CONFERENCE "MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE", BRUGES 22
SEPTEMBER 2009)
FRANCESCO NAPOLITANO 74
Introduction
The Conference on Multilevel Governance in Europe 75 has taken place in Bruges on 22
September 2009. The event has been organised by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in
cooperation with the Department of European Political and Administrative Studies of the
College of Europe.
On this occasion the White Paper of the CoR on Multilevel Governance 76 has been officially
presented by Mr. Luc Van den Brande, President of the CoR. 77 The presentation of the White
Paper has been followed in the morning by a roundtable on the future political programme for
Europe and in the afternoon by an open workshop dedicated to the opportunities and
challenges of Multilevel Governance (MLG).
This event represented a unique chance for discussing and reflecting on the future of
European Governance. Confronted with a world context in which mutual interrelations and
competition are becoming more and more relevant Europe has to cope with new challenges.
European citizens are still dealing today with the consequences of the recent crisis of the
economic and financial system, which has unequivocally shown the vulnerability of our
societies.
This as well as other issues like climate change, demographic changes, and migratory
pressures require effective responses that can be formulated only making use of new forms of
governance.
74
Mr Francesco Napolitano is Academic Assistant in the Department of European Political and Administrative
Studies of the College of Europe, Bruges.
75
Hereinafter indicated as “the Conference”.
76
Hereinafter indicated as the “the White Paper”.
77
The Conference gathered more than 250 participants including representatives of the CoR, of the European
Parliament, of the European Commission as well as renowned academics, experts from eminent think tanks,
exponents of the European Civil Society and several students. The great number of distinguished guests
comprised in particular: Mr Luc Van den Brande, President of the CoR; Mr Felipe Gonzalez, President of the
Reflection Group on the Future of Europe; Mr Paweł Samecki, European Commissioner responsible for
Regional Policy; Mr Michel Delebarre, First Vice-President of the CoR; Ms Mercedes Bresso, chair of the PES
Group in the CoR; Ms Flo Clucas, chair of the ALDE Group in the CoR and Mr Uno Silberg, First VicePresident of the UEN-AE Group in the CoR.
85
First, Europe needs to invest in the development of the knowledge society and in
technological progress promoting a model of economic growth that is sustainable for the
environment.
Second, the European Union (EU) ought to be more transparent and accountable towards its
citizens and this is why participatory democracy would become more and more a reference
model for decision-making.
In this respect, empowering Local and Regional Authorities would provide real added value.
This can be summed up in three keywords: more flexibility, more closeness to the citizens
and better respect of diversity.
I.
The Proposals Formulated by the Committee of the Regions in its White
Paper: the Potential of an Approach based on Multilevel Partnership
The White Paper on Multilevel Governance provides an innovative interpretation of the
Community Method 78 which better involves regions and local authorities in framing and
implementing EU policies.
More than seventy academics, specialists and experts of the field were involved in the
drafting of the White Paper. The results achieved have strengthened the conviction of the
Members of CoR that European and Global strategies can only succeed as part of coordinated
action between the various levels of power.
The CoR pleads for wider democratisation of the public sphere. The EU should take
decisions in partnership. This does not imply questioning constitutional principles and
equilibria. Many changes can happen within the framework of the current EU Treaties and
the White Paper put forward a very concrete set of proposals and innovative instruments:
The White Paper proposed that each major European strategic reform should be
accompanied by a territorial action plan agreed between the European Commission and
the CoR.
These plans should provide a political structure to facilitate the approval, implementation and
evaluation of the policies adopted and should also include a decentralised communication
plan.
78
This term designates the decision-making method introduced for the European Communities by the Treaty of
Paris and the Treaties of Rome in the fifties. In its current form, the Community Method is based on an
institutional triangle involving the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.
The Community Method currently applies to most EU policy domains.
86
The Committee calls for the close involvement of Local and Regional Authorities in the
better law making action plan and for the internal balance of responsibilities to be upheld in
the transposition and implementation of European legislation.
The CoR calls for systemic use of territorial impact analyses 79 and community action
evaluation mechanisms in order to ensure that decisions are taken and applied at the
appropriate levels, in line with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.
The CoR recommends as well the use of experimentation and contracts as being innovative
and partnership based governance methods.
These recommendations bolster on the one hand institutional representation of Local and
Regional Authorities; on the other, they equally stimulate participatory democracy and a
new contractualisation process in Europe, one which can deliver better results to the
citizens.
The initiative of the CoR goes beyond proposing a list of instruments, although this is
essential to set a clear and concrete direction for the EU in the XXI century.
The CoR is promoting a new approach aimed at developing a real European public sphere.
The consensus culture in the EU Institutions has up to now not allowed the debate on longterm objectives and on suitable policy instruments to be sufficiently politicised. Only in this
way citizens would become aware of the role of the EU in a globalised world. This implies
that the Community Method be reinterpreted, broadened and recalibrated in order to
become more inclusive.
For this purpose, the CoR has launched a public consultation process, which includes also all
other EU institutions. The aim is to draw an EU Charter for Multilevel Governance laying
down the founding principles of a new model of good governance.
It is rightly said that the richness of the EU can be found in its diversity and that this is a
source for its strength. This diversity is at and best and foremost represented by the regional
and local levels.
Regions and cities possess enormous expertise on the technical problems linked to policy
implementation that should be addressed upfront in policy design. Regional and Local
Authorities know much better how to tailor policies to different circumstances on the ground
responding as well to different citizens preferences. They are also better placed to generate
innovation. It is, therefore, true that governance in partnership would produce better policies.
79
Carrying out an impact assessment is mandatory for all major policy initiatives and legislative proposals of
the European Commission. This instrument evaluates the objectives to be pursued, the policy-options available
considering their possible impacts on the economic, environmental and social fields. Possible synergies and
trade-offs are also examined. This implies wide-ranging consultations of stake-holders at national and regional
levels.
87
A thorough reflection must concede that concrete and effective action would require also a
constructive attitude at the local and regional levels.
Subsidiarity should be at the service of the citizens in order to efficiently meet their needs.
The cohesion of the whole process must be preserved. Decentralisation should never be
translated in an uncontrolled centrifugal movement.
The future European Charter on Multilevel Governance 80 should not remain dead letter. It
can provide necessary guidelines and have a real added value in at least five domains:
First, EU regulation implies implementation costs that largely fall on Regional and Local
Authorities, but this is realised always too late. Therefore, timely, serious consultation is a
necessity. A European Charter on Multilevel Governance may establish clear criteria in this
sense.
Second, the Charter may indicate the principles to follow when conducting territorial
impact analyses.
Third, the Charter could call for the decentralisation of the structural funds.
Fourth, the Charter could clarify the notion of experimentation inviting to make a larger
use of this innovative instrument.
Finally, the Charter could strengthen the demand for more transparency shared by the
CoR and by the European citizens. Notably, the CoR and its staff still do not have access to a
large number of Council documents. Moreover, Regions and Local Authorities find it
occasionally difficult to participate in the Comitology procedure and in Council Working
Groups.
II.
Concrete Recommendations for giving a Follow-up to the White Paper
A. The Need to Resort to both Hard and Soft Tools
In order to convince people of the importance of promoting and supporting European
integration, the approach should be pragmatic and problem oriented.
Regional and local levels should become more conscious of their potential. The top-down
approach and hierarchical thinking is counterproductive in most circumstances, as has been
the case for the economic re-launch programmes. In his intervention during the Conference,
80
Hereinafter indicated as “the Charter”.
88
Commissioner Paweł Samecki underlined the willingness of the European Commission to
support the efforts of the CoR. 81 .
The most effective strategy in order to achieve results is, therefore, to combine the use of soft
tools and hard tools. Hard tools, on the one hand, are binding and they imply the use of
funding. These tools are necessary, for instance funding should be available to help Small and
Medium Enterprises obtaining credits.
Nonetheless, soft tools are equally important. They require talking with the people in order to
promote suitable solutions and best practices.
Three keywords have been highlighted during the Conference: investing, de-taxing and
educating people.
The importance of the EU budget should of course also not be overestimated. The structural
funds cannot become the main instruments to fight the socio-economic consequences of the
financial crisis. The budget is not equipped for this. The EU budget is not the main EU
instrument, although Regional and Local Authorities may have a certain bias in this sense.
Regulation and liberalisation are indeed the main policy instruments of the EU.
B. The Necessity to Streamline the Work of the Committee of the Regions
In order to see how the Community Method could be improved, we should have a look at
specific aspects of the EU institutional setting starting with the CoR itself, and then
considering the way in which Regional and Local Authorities operate in individual Member
States. Some recommendations can be formulated in the form of pointed remarks:
First, the CoR as an institution could play an active role only if it manages to identify and to
focus on a limited number of core topics.
Second, the CoR consists of two main elements: regional and local authorities. The interests
of these two categories of actors are not necessarily identical. Therefore, a balance has to be
stricken between the interests of the regional and urban centres.
Third, the CoR should make sure that it is effectively heard in the inter-institutional dialogue.
This would be achievable by establishing formal and informal communication with the
European Commission services, in order to provide a specific input. Moreover, this input
81
Commissioner Paweł Samecki mentioned in particular that the European Commission has presented a Green
Paper on Territorial Cohesion aimed at reaching a shared understanding of this concept. Cf. Commission of the
European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Green Paper on Territorial
Cohesion, Turning territorial diversity into strength, COM(2008) 616 final, Brussels, 6.10.2008.
89
could go beyond expertise, it could take the form of promoting citizens initiatives in
accordance with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.
Fourth, the CoR should also make sure that it will gain appropriate access to informal
Council meetings and to Council Bodies deliberations.
Fifth, the relationship with the European Parliament should be developed further
through the strengthening of relationships among political groups which are present in both
institutions.
Finally, the CoR should also try to make sure that it can have an enhanced role in the
framework of the Open Method of Coordination, which should become more inclusive.
C. The Importance of Improving Communication Strategies
The aspiration has been formulated during the Conference that Regions and Local Authorities
can act as a bridge helping removing the perceived democratic deficit.
Since Regions and Local Authorities play an important role in education, especially in federal
countries, they could certainly be proactive attributing more space and importance to the
study of the EU in school and university curricula.
Finally, involving citizens requires innovating old-fashioned manners of organising contacts
with the public. Besides weekly and monthly meetings with elected representatives, political
actors and institutions should rely more on the new media, i.e. on the internet. Regional and
Local Authorities could in this way better communicate on how they interact with the EU for
the well-being of their citizens.
Conclusion
The Bruges Conference has offered an opportunity to exchange views and ideas in a very
constructive way.
A consensus has emerged on the importance of Local and Regional Authorities for the
European construction, for the development of EU public policies as well as for meeting
contemporary challenges.
In all three phases of the policy process (preparation, decision-making, implementation) these
entities should find a more appropriate place. This is justified because of their experience, of
their closeness to citizens, of their richness in terms of diversity and because of their ability to
exchange best practices.
90
On the other hand, during the Conference, a caveat has been formulated from various sides
regarding the necessity to “mind the gap”. The terminology of the White Paper is indeed very
ambitious. Words like partnership, participation and solidarity appear as prominent terms.
There is therefore the risk of creating a gap between the intentions and the subsequent
implementation of the White Paper. A lot depends also on how the CoR will streamline its
internal agenda setting in order to focus on fewer priorities.
In conclusion, as Mr Felipe Gonzalez declared, inspired by Antonio Gramsci, one can be
intelligent and pessimistic, but one really needs to be optimistic and have strong willingness
in order to change the course of history.
This is certainly correct and, as President Luc Van den Brande affirmed, nothing is possible
without a common vision and a common ambition.
Europe could only be dynamised with the prospect of a new collective task. This task could
be to work in partnership, involving all levels that are relevant to the life of the European
citizens.
91