compilation préliminaire des décisions rendues

Transcription

1
COMPILATION PRÉLIMINAIRE DES DÉCISIONS RENDUES AU CANADA EN
2000 EN MATIÈRE DE DROIT D’AUTEUR
A COMPILATION OF THE DECISIONS RENDERED IN CANADA WITH RESPECT TO
COPYRIGHT IN 2000
by
Laurent Carrière*
LEGER ROBIC RICHARD
Lawyers, Patent & Trademark Agents
Centre CDP Capital
1001 Square-Victoria - Bloc E – 8th Floor
Montreal, Quebec, Canada H2Z 2B7
Tel.: (514) 987 6242 - Fax: (514) 845 7874
www.robic.ca * [email protected]
1. 1246798 Ontario Inc. v. Sterling
(2000), 51 OR (3d) 220, 139 OAC 27, [2000] OJ 4261 (Ont Ct - Div Ct) Heeney J.
2. ACCPAC International Inc. v Softrak Systems Inc.
(2000), 8 CPR (4th) 189, 186 FTR 279, [2000] CarwellNat 1610, [2000] FCJ 1240,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27124.o.en.html (FCTD-Costs) Lafrenière
Prothonotary
3. Alexis Jewellery & Accessories Inc. v. Suzy Shier
(2000),
[2000]
REJB
2000-21238,
[2000]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200011fr.html (Que CA)
JQ
5189,
[2000-11-22]
4. Anderson Preece v Dominion Appraisal
(2000), 264 AR 177, [2000] AJ 459, [2000] AR TBEd AP146, 2000 ABQB 254 (Alta QB) Veit J.
5. Anne of Green Gables Licensing Authority Inc. v. Avonlea Traditions Inc
(2000), 4 CPR (4th) 289 & 5 CPR (4th) iii, [2000] OJ 740, [2000] LWD 1944-023, [2000] CarswellOnt
731, [2000] OTC 133 (Ont SC); (2000), 6 CPR (4th) 57 (Ont CA - Stay); appeal abandonned
(2000), 5 CPR (4th) iii (Ont CA)
6. Asher Consultants Ltd v Walter
(2000), [2000] SJ 107, [2000] SKQB 30, [2000] Sask R Uned 39, [2000] CarswellSask 101, 2000
SKBD 30, http://www.canlii.org/sk/cas/skqb/2000/2000skqb30.html (Sask QB) Klebuc J.
7. AVS Technologies Inc. v. Canadian Mechanical Reproduction Rights Agency
© Laurent Carrière, 2001.
* Avocat et agent de marques de commerce, Laurent Carrière est l'un des associés
principaux des cabinets d'avocats et d'agents de brevets et de marques de commerce
LEGER ROBIC RICHARD. Les grasses indiquent le recueil duquel les notes de l’arrêtistes ont été
tirées. Lawyer and trademark agent, Laurent Carrière is one of the senior partners of the
lawfirm and of the patent and trademark agency firm LEGER ROBIC RICHARD. The bold
character indicates in which case series the headnotes have been taken. Publication 266.
2
(1999), [1999] CBD 8 (CB), 4 CPR (4th) 15 (CB) sub nomine Private Copying 1999-2000,
Tariff of Levies to be Collected by CPCC (Re); affd (2000), 7 CPR (4th) 68, 257 NR 283,
[2000]
FCJ
960,
[2000]
CarswellNat
1304,
[2000]
4
FC
D-10,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26945.o.en.html (FCA) Linden J.
8. Bergeron v Sogidès Ltée
(1998), [1998] AQ 2384 (QueSupCt); revd (2000), [2000] JQ 3088, REJB 2000-20192, [2000-09-20]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200009fr.html (QueCA) Robert J.
9. Bioteau v Communications Quebecor Inc
(2000), [2000] JQ 1753, BE 2000-1098, REJB 2000-18596 (QueCt) Marengo J.
10. Birshtein v Royz
(2000), [2000] OJ 957, [2000] OTC Uned 144 (Ont Sup Ct) Pitt J.
11. Blazik v Brown
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 303, [2000] FCJ 225, [2000] ACF 225, [2000] FTR Uned 199,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26068.o.en.html,
en
français
à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26068.o.fr.html (FCTD) Dubé J.
12. Blondeau v Croisières AML Inc
(2000), [2000] BE 2000-559; REJB 2000-17734, [2000] JQ 1267 (QueCt) Lamoureux J.
13. Brisson v Unibroue Inc
(2000), [2000] JQ 1118 (QueSupCt - Venue) Morneau J.; (2000), [2000] JQ 1118, JE 2000-2159,
REJB 2000-21353 (QueSupCt - Option) Mayrand J.
14. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions (Re)
(2000), [2000] CBD 4, DCDA 4 (CB)
15. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions (Re)
(2000), [2000] CBD 23 (Copyright Board)
16. Candow v Savory
(2000), 8 CPR (4th) 219, [2000] CarswellNat 232 [2000] NJ 228, [2000] Nfld & PEIR Uned 69 (Nfld
SC-TD)
17. CCH Canadian Limited v The Law Society of Upper Canada
(1999), REJB 99-15185, [1999] FCJ 1647, [1999] ACF 1647, [1999] FTR TNEd NO060, 2 CPR (4th)
129, 179 DLR (4th) 609, 169 FTR 1, [2000] 2 FC 451 & [2000] 3 FC ii, [1999] CarswellNat 2163, 72
CRR (2d) 139, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/vol2/html/2000fca25519.p.en.html (FCTD);
(2000), 4 CPR (4th) 129, [2000] FTR Uned 46, [2000] FCJ 92, [2000] ACF 92, 184 DLR (4th) 186, en
français à http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/1999/orig/html/1999fca25911.o.fr.html; (2000), (FCTD Costs); (2000), 6 CPR (4th) 500, [2000] FCJ 949, [2000] ACF 949, 189 DLR (4th) 125, 258 NR 241,
[2000] CarswellNat 1468, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26934.o.fr.html
(FCTD - Leave to intervene in appeal) Sharlow J.A.
18. Cengig c. Québec (Sous-ministre du Revenu
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 2587 (C.Q.), le juge Bossé
19. Construction RMR Leblanc Inc v Robert
(2000), JE 2000-1114, REJB 2000-19037, [2000] CarswellQue 1307 (QueCt), j. Boyer
3
20. Dessins Drummond inc. c. Publicités Brigil inc.
(2000), REJB 2000-22272 (Que Sup Ct) Isabelle J.
21. Devon Studios Ltd v Scarponi
(2000), [2000] OJ 2559 (OntSupCt); (2000), [2000] OJ 2562 (OntSupCt - Costs) Boutet J.; motion
for leave to appeal dismissed (2000), [2000] OJ 2015 (OntSupCt - DivCt) O’Leary
22. D & G Enviro-group Inc. v Bouchard*
(2000),
JE
2000-1352,
REJB
2000-18862,
[2000]
JQ
2048,
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200006fr.html (QueCA) Beauregard J.
[2000-06-21]
23. Drapeau c. Carbone 14
(2000), [2000] RJQ. 1525, [2000] JQ 1171, REJB 2000-1776, JE 2000-1115 (Que Sup Ct) Guthrie J.;
in appeal 500-09-009594-003
24. Dueck (Re Hilda M.)
25. Dueck (Re Judy)
26. Éditions du Vermillion (Re)
(2000), [2000] DCDA 8 (CB)
27. Éditions Triptyque (Re)
(2000), [2000] DCDA 9 (CB)
28. Édutile Inc v Association pour la protection des automobilistes (APA)
An unreported judgment rendered 19960522 by Mr Justice Dubé, court docket T-1151-96
(FCTD-interlocutoy injunction); an unreported judgment rendered 19960619 by prothonotary
Morneau (FCTD-Proth - Evidence); [1996] FCJ 1203 (FCTD-Interlocutory Injunction); (1997), 143
FTR 210, 81 CPR (3d) 338, [1998] 2 FC D-24, [1997] FCJ 1788 (FCTD – Merits); revd (2000), 6 CPR
(4th) 211, [2000] FCJ 513, [2000] ACF 513, 188 DLR (4th) 132, 255 NR 1476 CPR (4th) 211, [2000] 4
FC 195 (FCA); motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed on
2001-01-25 [2000] CSCR 302, [2000] SCCA 302 (SCC)
29. Fitzgerald v R.
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 554, [2000] 3 CTC 2011, [2000] GTC 2078 (Tax Ct) Bowman J.
30. Fox v Von Huene
(2000), [2000] JQ 3023, [2000] CarswellQue 1836, JE 2000-1813, REJB 2000-20174 (QueSupCt)
Langlois J.
31. Grinshpun v University of British Columbia
(2000), [2000] FCJ 1446 , [2000] CarswellNat 1942, [2000] FTR TBEd SE024 (FCTD) Aronovitch,
Prothonotary
32. Guérin Éditeur Ltée v Harcourt Brace & Co.
(2000), JE 2000-905, REJB 2000-17500, [2000] JQ 1058 (QueSupCt) Jolin J.; in appeal 500-09009515-008).
33. Harcourt Brace & Co. (Re)
(2000), [2000] CBD 7 (CB)
4
34. Harcourt Canada Ltd. (Re)
35. Haupt v Eco-Nova Multi-Media
(2000), [2000] NSJ 414 , [2000] CarswellNS 406, [2001] NSR (2d) TBEd JA008 (NSSC) Davison J.
36. Horn Abbott Ltd. v Reeves
(2000), 182 NSR (2d) 357, 45 CPC (4th) 353, [2000] NSJ 34. [2000] CarswellNS 35, 563 PEIR 357,
[2000] NSR(2d) TBEd FE021 (NSSC) Hood J.
37. Imax Corp. v Showmax, Inc.
(1999), [1999] FCJ 1275 (FCTD-Amendment); (1999), FCJ 1733 (FCTD-Practice); (2000), [2000]
FCJ
69,
5
CPR
(4th)
81,
182
FTR
180,
[2000]
CarswellNat
135,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca25888.o.en.html
(FCTD-Interlocutory
Injunction) Teitelbaum J. [Justice Rouleau granted a permanent injunction against the
Showmax defendants on May 16, 2000.]
38. Infinitec Marketing Group Inc v [Yours Industries Corp
(1999), [1999] Man.R.(2d) Uned. 51 (ManQB) Schulman; J.; (1999), [1999] Man.R.(2d) Uned.
161, [1999] ManR (2d) TBEd SE 029 [1999] MJ 164, [2000] 5 WWR 283, 41 CPC (4th) 342 (Man QB)
Kennedy J; each affd (2000), [2000] CarswellMan 220, [2000] ManR Uned 45, 2000 MBCA 25,
[2000] 7 WWR 297 (Man CA) Huband J.
39. Inhesion Industrial Co Ltd v Anglo Canadian Mercantile Co Ltd
(2000), 6 CPR (4th) 362, [2000] CarswellNat 687, [2000] FCJ 491, [2000] ACF 491, [2000] FTR
Uned 354, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26359.o.en.html, en français
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26359.o.fr.html
(FCTD-Summary
à
Judgment)
40. Island View Beach Estates Corp. v. J.E. Anderson & Associates
(2000),
[2000]
BCJ
1553,
[2000]
CarswellBC
1560,
[2000]
BCSC
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/00/11/s00-1121.htm (BCSC) Quijano J.
1121,
41. Jolian Investments Ltd. v Gatien
(2000), [2000] CarswellOnt 3484, [2000] OJ 3719, [2000] OTCTBEd SE016 (Ont Sup Ct) Juriansz J.
42. Keddy Motor Inns Ltd (Bankrupt) Re
(2000), [2000] CarswellNS 286, [2000] NSJ 307 [2000] NSR Uned 33 (NBSC) Nunn J.
43. Lepage v Litalien
(2000), REJB 2000-18050, [2000] JQ 1520, BE 2000-830 (QueCt-Small Claims) Bécu J.
44. Levasseur c. Pelmorex communications inc.
(2000), [2000] JQ 2945 (QueSupCt) Gomery J.
45. Long Shong Pictures (HK) Ltd v NTC Entertainment Ltd
(2000), [2000] FCJ 625 (FCTD-Anton Piller) Reed J.; (2000), [2000] FCJ 557,
(FCTD-Contempt
Norasia 2000-05-01); (2000), 6 CPR (4th) 509, [2000] FCJ 1813, [2000] CarswellNat 818, [2000]
FTR TBEd MY099, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26451.o.en.html, en
français
à
(FCTDContempt Melody Min Lu 2000-05-05)
5
46. L.S. Entertainment Group Inc. v. 37 Degrees Enterprise Inc.
(2000), [2000] FCJ 624, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26492.o.en.html,
en français à http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26492.o.fr.htm (FCTD) Reed
J.
47. L.S. Entertainment Group Inc. v. 552436 B.C. Ltd.
(2000), http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26491.o.en.html, en français à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26491.o.fr.html (FCTD) Reed J.
48. L.S. Entertainment Group Inc. v. Sixty-six International Trading Inc.
(2000), http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26493.o.en.html (FCTD) Reed J.
49. LS Entertainment Group v. Wong
(2000), BCJ 2518, [2000] BCTC TBEd JA020, 2000 BCSC 1789,[2000] FCJ 625,
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/00/17/s00-1789.htm (BCSC-Disqualification) Bennett
J.
50. Lyons Partnership v MacGregor
157,
186
FTR
241,
[2000]
FCJ
341,
(2000),
5
CPR
(4th)
en
français
à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26207.o.fr.html (FCTD-Contempt) Lemieux
J.
51. Malo c. Laoun
(2000), [2000] RJQ 458, [2000] RRA 204 (rés.), JE 2000-273, [2000] JQ 7, REJB 2000-15944
(Que.Sup.Ct.), Courteau J.; in appeal 500-09-009227-000
52. Milliken & Company v Interface Flooring Systems (Canada) inc
(1998), [1998] 3 FC 103, 143 FTR 106, [1998] FCJ 135, 83 CPR (3d) 470 (FCTD-Merits); affd. (2000),
5 CPR (4th) 209, [2000] FCJ 129, [2000] ACF 129, [2000] 2 FC D-22, [2000] CarswellNat 1777, 251
NR 358, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca25960.o.en.html, en français à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca25960.o.fr.html (FCA)
53. M.M. International Business Directories Ltd. v. International Business Index
515,
[2000]
FTR
Uned
394,
[2000]
FCJ
1338,
(2000),
8
CPR
(4th)
en
français
à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27455.o.fr.html (FCTD) Rothstein J.
54. Modern Houseware Imports Inc v International Sources Ltd
(2000), 4 CPR (4th) 155, 180 FTR 253, [2000] FCJ 45, [2000] ACF 45,
en
français
à
(FCTD)
Hargrave,
Prothonotary
55. Multi-Level Technologies Inc. Previse Inc.
(2000), [2000] CarswellOnt 2395, [2000] OTC Uned 596 (SC) (Ont Sup Ct) Cameron J.
56. National Archives of Canada (Re)
57. National Library of Canada (Re)
(2000), [2000] CBD 10 (CB)
6
58. National Library of Canada (Re)
59. Natural Waters of Viti, Ltd v CEO International Holdings Inc.
(2000), 5 CPR (4th) 321, [2000] ACF 452, [2000] FCJ 452, [2000] FTR TBEd MY020,
en
français
à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26319.o.fr.html (FCTD Prot. - Motion to
Strike) Lafrenière, Prothonotary
60. Neudorf v Nettwerk Productions Ltd
(1998), [1998] BCJ 2690 (BCSC – Expert Evidence of plaintiff); (1998), [1999] BCJ 2904 (BCSC –
Expert Evidence of Defendant); (1999), [1999] BCJ 2832 (BCSC –Amendments to Defence);
(1999), [1999] BCJ 2831, 3 CPR (4th) 129, [2000] 3 WWR 522, 71 BCLR (3d) 290, [1999]
CarswellBC 2774 (BCSC – Merits); appeal CA 026717; (2000), 8 CPR (4th) 154, 48 CPC (4th) 140,
[2000] CarswellBC 1711, [2000] BCJ 1705, [2000] BCTC TBEd AU065, 2000 BCSC 1257,
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/00/12/s00-1257.htm (BCSC-Costs) Cohen J.
61. Nuri’s Watercolour Designs Co. v. Fifth Avenue Collection Ltd
(2000),
[2000]
CarswellNat
1771,
[2000]
FCJ.
1330,
en
français
à
(FCTD-Costs)
Pilon
,
Assessing Officer
62. Oakley, Inc v Jane Doe
(2000), 8 CPR (4th) 506, [2000] CarswellNat 1995, [2000] FCJ 1388, [2000] TBEd SE095,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27256.o.en.html (FCTD) Pelletier J.
63. Office national du film du Canada (Re)
(2000), [2000] DCDA 5 (CB)
64. Programmation Gagnon Inc v Lemay
(2000), REJB 2000-17795, JE 2000-738 (QueSupCt-Interlocutory Injunction) Hardy Lemieux J.
65. Retransmission of Distant Radio and Television Signals During 2001
(2000-12-08), http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/tocretrans-e.html (CB-Interim)
66. Retransmission of Distant Radio and Television Signals, in Canada, in 1998, 1999, and 2000
(Re)]
(2000),
5
CPR
(4th)
440,
[2000]
CBA
3,
,
[2000-02-25]
http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocretrans-e.html (Copyright Board)
67. R v Bonamy
(2000), 6 CPR (4th) 1, 137 BCAC 298, 223 WAC 298, [2000] BCJ 960, [2000] CarswellBC 992,
2000 BCCA 308, http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/ca/00/03/c00-0308.htm (BCCA);
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed (2000), [2000]
SCCA 345
68. R. v Kazemian
(2000), [2000] CarswellOnt 5166 (Ont Ct) Gorewich J.
69. Rothery v Grinnel
7
(2000), 81 Alta LR (3d) 270, 47 CPC (4th) 94, 262 AR 182, [2000] AJ 162, [2000] CarswellAlta
148, [2000] AR TBEd MR029 (Alta QB) LoVecchio, J.
70. Rutherford (Re Donald)
(2000), [2000] CBD 6 (CB)
71. Rutherford (ReDonald)
72. Saxon v Communications Mont-Royal Inc.
(2000) [2000] JQ 5634 (QueSupCt) Denis J.
73. Seaward Kayaks Ltd. v. Ree
(2000), [2000] CarswellBC 2596, [2000] BCSC 1742, http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdbtxt/sc/00/17/s00-1742.htm (BCSC) Shabbits J.
74. Shareline Systems Ltd. v N.B.
(2000), [2000] NBJ N 350, [2000] CarswellNB 342, [2000] NBR (2d) TNEd SE014 (NBQB) Rideout J.
75. Sheridan Gymnasium Equipment Ltd. v Gymnasium & Heath Equipment Ltd.
)
26,
[2000]
FCJ
1583,
[2000]
FTR
TBEd
OC177,
(2000),
9
CPR
(4th
en
français
à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27476.o.fr.html (FCTD) O’Keefe
76. SOCAN Statement of Royalties, Tariff 9 (Sports events), 1998-2001 (Re)
(2000), 9 C.P.R. (4th) 36, [2000] CBD 12, [2000] DCDA 12, [2000-09-15] http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocmusic-f.html (CB)
77. Société du droit de reproduction des auteurs compositeurs et éditeurs du Canada
(SODRAC) v L’Association québécoise de l’industrie du disque, du spectacle et de la vidéo
(ADISQ)
(1999), 2 CPR (4th) 341 (CB-Interim); (2000), [2000] CBD 1, [2000] CBDA 1, 4 CPR (4th) 287, [200001-19] http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/tocarbit-e.html (CB – Application to reassess the
Interim); (2000), [2000] CBD 2, [2000] CBDA 2, [2000-12-24] http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocarbit-e.html (CB-Application to modify the Interim)
78. Société du droit de reproduction des auteurs compositeurs et éditeurs du Canada
(SODRAC v. MusiquePlus inc
(2000),
[2000]
CBD
14,
[2000]
DCDA
14,
[2000-11-16]
http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocarbit-e.html (CB)
79. Société des auteurs, recherchistes, documentalistes et compositeurs (SARDEC) (Re
Application by)
(1999), 87 CPR (3d) 481, [1999] CBD 1 (CB); application for judicial review dismissed (2000), 9
CPR (4th) 415, [2000] FCJ 1351, [2000] ACF 1351, [2000] ACF 1259, [2000] CarswellNat 1859,
[2000] NR Uned 146, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27242.o.en.html, en
français à http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27242.o.fr.html (FCA) sub
nomine Canadian Retransmission Right Association v Société des auteurs, recherchistes,
documentalistes et compositeurs, Létourneau J.
80. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v 728859 Alberta Ltd
(2000), 6 CPR (4th) 354, [2000] FCJ 590, [2000] ACF 590, [2000] CarswellNat 834, 6 CPR (4th) 354,
[2000]
3
FC
D-37,
[2000]
FTR
TBEd
MY099,
8
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26471.o.en.html, en français à
(FCTD-Reference)
Hargrave, Prothonotary
81. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v 1007442 Ontario Ltd
(2000), [2000] FCJ 191, [2000] ACF 191, [2000] CarswellNat 176, [2000] FTR Uned 128,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca25995.o.fr.html (FCTD-Practice) Cullen J.
82. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Landmark Cinemas of
Canada Ltd.
(2000),
9
CPR
(4th)
353,
[2000]
FCJ
1626,
[2000]
FTR
TBEd
OC180,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27511.o.en.html (FCTD-Disqualification)
Aronovitch J.
83. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Runway 66 Enterprises
Ltd.
(2000),
[2000]
CarswellNat
845,
[2000]
FTR
Uned
624,
[2000]
FCJ
556,
en
français
à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26416.o.fr.html (FCTD)-Practice) Hugessen
J.
84. Statement of royalties to be collected by NRCC for the public performance or the
communication to the public by telecommunication, in Canada, of published sound
recordings embodying musical works and performer'
s performances of such works in 1998 to
2002 for Tariff 1.C
(2000),
[2000]
CBD
13,
[2000]
DCDA
13,
[2000-09-29]
http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocmusic-e.html (CB)
85. Statement of Royalties to be Collected for the Retransmission of Distant Radio and
Television Signals During 1998, 1999 and 2000
(2000),
[2000]
CBA
3,
[2000]
DCDA
3,
[2000-02-25]
http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocretrans-e.html (CB)
86. Sullivan Entertainment Inc. v Anne of the Green Gables Licensing Authority Inc
(2000), 7 CPR (4th) 532, [2000] CarswellNat 1098, [2000] FCJ 822, [2000] FTR TBEd JN185,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26693.o.en.html (FCTD-Pleadings) Giles,
Prothonotary;
affd
(2000),
[2001]
1
FC
D-31,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27555.o.en.html, en français à [2001] 1
CF F39 http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27555.o.fr.html (FCTD) Muldoon J.
87. Supreme Court of Canada (Re)
(2000), [2000] CBD 11 (CB)
88. Tariff of Levies to be Collected by CPCC (Re)
(2000), 7 CPR (4th) 68, [2000] CarswellNat 1304, [2000] CBD 16, [2000] DCDA 16, [2000-12-08]
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/toccopy-e.html (FCA)
89. Tag Heuer S.A. v. John Doe
(2000), 4 CPR (4th) 177, [2000] CarswellNat 1132, [2000] FCJ 21, [2000] FTR Uned 27,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27226.o.en.html (FCTD) Pelletier J.
90. Télé-Vision 84 Inc v Corporation des célébrations du 350ième anniversaire de Montréal
(1642-1992)
9
(2000), REJB 2000-17589, [2000] JQ 845, [2000] CarswellQue 455, JE 2000-925 (QueSupCt)
Tingley J.
91. Théberge c Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain
(1999), JE 99-1991 REJB 99-14552, [1999] JQ 4472 (QueSupCt); revd (2000), JE 2000-531, REJB
2000-16584, [2000] JQ 412, [2000] CarswellQue 133, 9 CPR (4th) 259, [2000-02-22]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200002fr.html (Que CA); motion for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada granted [2000] CSCR 198 (CSC)
92. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. et al. v. Jane Doe
(2000), 8 CPR (4th ) 194, [2000] CarswellNat 1719, 188 FTR 68, [2000] FTR TBEd AU141, [2000] FCJ
1267 (FCTD) Pelletier J.
93. Toronto.com v Sinclair
(2000), 6 CPR (4th) 487, [2000] FCJ 795, [2000] CarsellNat 1105, [2000] FTR TBEd AU146,
en
français
à
(FCTD-Interlocutory
Injunction) Heneghan J.
94. Viacom Ha! Holding Co. v. Jane Doe
36,
187
FTR
305,
[2000]
CarswellNat
689,
(2000),
6
CPR
(4th)
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26355.o.en.html (FCTD) Tremblay-Lamer
J.; notice of appeal was filed by Mr. Tejani on April 20, 2000 (Court File No. A-254-00); (2000),
[2000]
FCJ
2095,
[2000]
CarswellNat
3081,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27974.o.en.html (FCTD-Default) Pelletier
J.
95. Wall v Van Brunell
(1996), [1996] FCJ 1149 (FCTD Prothonotary - Practice); (1997), 75 CPR (3d) 429, [1997] FTR
Uned 237, [1997] FCJ 608, 71 ACWS (3d) 552 (FCTD-Summary Judgment); affd (2000), 7 CPR
(4th) 321, [2000] FCJ 841, [2000] CarswellNat 1184, [2000] NR Uned 118, 184 FTR 313n
en
français
à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26736.o.fr.html (FCA) Malone J.
96. Wic Premium Television Ltd v Levin
(1999), [1999] FCJ 652, [1999] ACF 652, [1999] FTR Uned 295, 1 CPR (4th) 467 (FCTD); (2000),
[2000] FTR Uned 131, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26060.o.en.html
(FCTD - Time Table) Pelletier J.; (2000), [2000] FCJ 1259, [2000] FTR TBEd AU141, 99 ACWS (3d)
145, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27134.o.en.html (FCTD-Interlocutory
Injunction) O’Keefe J.
97. WIC Premium Television v. General Instrument Corporation
(1999), [1999] AJ 639, [1999] CarswellAlta 452, 1 CPR (4th) 467, 243 AR 329, 73 AltaLR (3d) 365,
[2000] 2 WWR 417 (Alta QB - Ex juris service]; (1999), [1999] AJ 696 (Alta QB - Ex juris service
Supplemental); affd. (2000), 8 CPR (4th) 1, 266 AR 98, [2000] AJ 977, [2000] CarswellAlta 878,
2000 ABCA 233 (AltaCA) sub nomine United States Satellite Broadcasting co. v. WIC Premium
Television Ltd.; (1999), [1999] AJ 1251 (Alta QB - Motion to Strike); (1999), [1999] AJ 1254 (Alta
QB - Summary Judgment); (2000), 8 CPR (4th) 308, [2000] AJ 1063, 272 AR 201, [2000]
CarswellAlta 969, 2000 AQBD 628 (Alta QB - Interlocutory Injunction)
98. Wilson & Lafleur Ltée v La société québécoise d’information juridique
10
(1998), REJB 98-8110, [1998] AQ 2762 (Que Sup Ct); revd (2000), JE 2000-856, REJB 200017728, [2000] 12-10 Le monde juridique 13, [2000] RJQ 1086, [2000] JQ 1215, [2000-04-20]
99. Wing v Van Velthuizen
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 2873, [2000] FCJ 1940, [2000] FTR TBEd NO120,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27801.o.en.html (FCTD) Nadon J
100.
Wolanski v Rhombus Media Inc
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 2308, [2000] FCJ 1582, [2000] FTR Uned 128,
en
français
à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27452.o.fr.html (FCTD) Nadon J.
11
1246798 Ontario Inc. v. Sterling
(2000), 51 OR (3d) 220, 139 OAC 27, [2000] OJ 4261 (Ont Ct - Div Ct)
Heeney J.
In 1998, the respondents (the "owner") retained Sterling Finlayson Architects (the "architects")
to design a building for land in the City of Kitchener, Ontario. The architects prepared a
Canadian Standard Form of Agreement, which they alleged was orally accepted by the
owner. The architects prepared plans and drawings and submitted them to the City for site
plan approval under the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13. The City granted approval subject
to the owner signing a development agreement and subject to a condition that if a building
permit was not issued by October 22, 1998, changes to the approved site plan might be
required as a result of new City policies or changes to zoning by-laws or standard conditions.
On May 28, 1999, the owner terminated the architects' retainer. The architects responded by
withdrawing the building permit application and by advising the City that they had copyright
in the drawings, which were not to be used without their permission. On July 9, 1999, the
architects registered a claim for lien. The owner then moved under s. 47(1) of the
Construction Lien Act for an order vacating the registration of the lien. The motions court
judge held that the architects did not have lien rights because the services they had
rendered did not in themselves enhance the value of the owner's interest in the land, and
therefore their services were not a "supply of services" as defined in s. 1(1) of the Construction
Lien Act. The architects appealed.
Held, the appeal should be allowed.
A motion under s. 47(1) is analogous to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, and there were genuine issues of fact that should have been left to
be resolved by the trial judge. The motions judge misapprehended the evidence and
exceeded his jurisdiction in concluding (1) that the parties did not enter into a Canadian
tandard Form of Agreement or any written contract; (2) that the site plan approval would
necessarily lapse on October 22, 1999; and (3) that the architects owned copyright in the
plans. These factual errors were significant because the terms of the contract between the
parties defined the rights of the parties concerning ownership and the use of the plans
pending payment, and the errors played a role in the crucial finding that the services
rendered by the architects did not enhance the value of the owner's interest in the land. In
any event, copyright was not an issue and the real issue was ownership of the drawings and
related documents. Further, the mo tions judge erred in finding that the architects' services in
obtaining the site plan were fully paid for. Obtaining site plan approval does enhance the
value of the owner's interest in the land, at least to some degree. To meet the definition of
"supply of services", it is not necessary that the enhancement of the owner's interest be
proportionate to the price being charged by the architect for the services. A lien will arise for
obtaining site plan approval and for the cost of preparing the documentation that supports
the application.
The foregoing was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, but for the guidance of the trial judge,
it was appropriate to resolve two additional questions raised by the appeal. The first issue was
whether services rendered by the architects other than "designs, plans, drawings or
specifications" were lienable, where the planned project does not proceed. The second issue
was what point in time should be used for determining "enhancement". As for the first issue,
even if nothing physical is built, if the preparation and approval of the plans increases the
value of the land, then the land has been improved. Work enhancing the value of the land is
deemed to be an improvement. Therefore, the general rule is that services rendered in
12
connection with a planned improvement that does not proceed are not lienable;
however, there is an exception for the preparation of designs, plans, drawings or
specifications that, in themselves, enhance the value of the owner's interest in the land. As for
the second issue, the wording of the Act requires that the issue of whether the architects'
services have or have not enhanced the owner's interest of land must be assessed as at the
precise point in time when services are rendered.
13
ACCPAC International Inc. v Softrak Systems Inc.
(2000), 8 CPR (4th) 189, 186 FTR 279, [2000] CarwellNat 1610, [2000] FCJ
1240,
(FCTD-Costs) Lafrenière Prothonotary
The plaintiff had moved for an interlocutory injunction for infringement of copyright in its
computer program. The plaintiff brought the motion in Toronto against the Vancouver based
defendant on six days' notice and refused to adjourn the motion. The court had adjourned
the motion and provided for a schedule for the delivery of affidavits and for crossexaminations. Approximately one week before the hearing of the adjourned motion, the
plaintiff wholly abandoned the motion.
The defendant moved for its costs payable forthwith on a solicitor and client basis.
Held, the motion should be allowed in part with costs fixed on a solicitor-client basis payable
forthwith.
Rule 402 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, provides that costs are payable
forthwith against a party abandoning a motion unless otherwise ordered by the court.
The initial bringing of the motion was on relatively short notice in view of the complex issues of
fact and law involved. The bringing of the motion in Toronto also substantially increased the
costs for the defendant to hire Toronto counsel and have witnesses travel to Toronto.
The issues on an interlocutory injunction are different than those at trial. The plaintiff failed to
displace the presumption of Rule 402. As an injunction is an extraordinary relief to be used
sparingly, the defendant should not be obliged to wait to recover its reasonable costs.
Reasonable costs were fixed on a solicitor and client basis payable forthwith.
14
Alexis Jewellery & Accessories Inc. v. Suzy Shier
(2000), [2000] REJB 2000-21238, [2000] JQ 5189,
[2000-11-22]
Les juges Rochon et Beauregard. L'absence d'affidavit au soutien de la requête pour mesures
additionnelles contrevient à l'article 88 C.p.c. et est en soi fatal. De plus, une saisie en main
tierce se doit d'être conforme aux articles 625 et 641 C.p.c. Ce n'est pas le cas en l'espèce.
Non seulement il n'y avait ni réquisition, ni affidavit, ni bref autorisant la saisie chez des tiers,
mais aucun avis de comparaître n'a été remis au tiers-saisi. L'endroit où seront effectuées les
saisies et la nature exacte des biens à saisir ne sont pas non plus déterminés. La simple
mention que les biens à saisir sont ceux que la demanderesse a le droit de revendiquer à titre
de propriétaire ne constitue pas une description suffisante des biens.
L'autorisation donnée à l'huissier de fouiller, avec l'assistance de deux représentants de
l'intimée, tous les documents des défenderesses n'a aucun appui juridique. La saisie avant
jugement, à titre de mesure provisionnelle exceptionnelle, doit s'exercer dans un cadre strict.
Elle ne peut être utilisée pour rechercher une preuve. Telle qu'autorisée, la perquisition est
abusive.
La juge de première instance a erré en permettant à l'huissier d'interroger un nombre
indéterminé de personnes et en obligeant ces dernières à répondre à ses questions. Un tel
interrogatoire n'a aucun fondement juridique. L'huissier a l'obligation de s'acquitter de ses
tâches de façon impartiale. L'ordonnance attaquée en fait un enquêteur agissant pour le
compte d'une seule partie. De plus, l'intervention des représentants de l'intimée dans la saisie
contrevient à la Loi sur les huissiers de justice, qui interdit à toute personne d'accomplir un
acte réservé à cette profession. Le droit de toute personne de garder le silence à moins
d'une disposition législative contraire s'applique aussi en droit civil. L'ordonnance, en ayant
pour effet de rendre les personnes interrogées passibles d'outrage au tribunal si elles se
prévalent de ce droit, contrevient aux droits protégés par l'article 1 de la Charte des droits et
libertés de la personne. Elle nie également le droit à l'assistance d'un avocat. L'ordonnance
est également susceptible de porter atteinte au principe de l'inviolabilité de la demeure, en
ce qu'elle ne précise pas les lieux où sera effectuée la saisie. S'il n'est pas nécessaire que la
saisie avant jugement effectuée conformément à l'article 38.1 de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur
respecte les conditions propres à l'injonction de type Anton Piller, il importe néanmoins qu'elle
s'exerce sous contrôle judiciaire et qu'elle ne porte pas atteinte aux droits fondamentaux des
parties. Il y a lieu d'annuler les saisies pratiquées.
La juge Rousseau-Houle, dissidente. L'ordonnance ne peut être qualifiée d'injonction de type
Anton Piller. Suivant l'article 735 C.p.c., l'affidavit sur lequel s'appuie la saisie doit affirmer
l'existence de la créance et les faits donnant ouverture à la saisie. En l'espèce, l'affidavit
indique que l'intimée est propriétaire des droits d'auteur relatifs aux oeuvres artistiques qui
auraient été reproduites sans droit par les défenderesses sur des vêtements. De nombreuses
photos illustrant les dessins en litige y sont également jointes. Il est donc faux de prétendre
que l'affidavit déposé au soutien de la saisie est insuffisant. La juge de première instance n'a
pas erré en décidant que les descriptions et les pièces fournies par l'affiant permettaient
d'identifier d'une façon suffisante les biens à saisir. De plus, il est possible que des mesures
particulières d'assistance à l'huissier soient requises dans les cas d'une saisie avant jugement
par le titulaire présumé d'un droit d'auteur ou d'une saisie relative à des données
informatiques et électroniques. L'article 38.1 de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur permet, dans la
mesure autorisée par le Code de procédure civile, d'engager des procédures de saisie avant
jugement afin de recouvrer la possession des exemplaires contrefaits et des planches qui ont
servi ou sont destinées à servir à la confection de ces exemplaires. Or, la permission donnée à
15
l'huissier d'interroger les représentants et les employés des défenderesses afin de
connaître les noms et adresses des tiers qui pourraient être en possession des dessins et
des planches d'impression n'entre pas dans le cadre législatif et procédural de la saisie avant
jugement. En effet, cette dernière ne constitue pas un moyen d'obtenir des preuves. De
même, l'autorisation de saisir des biens chez ces tiers contrevient aux dispositions régissant la
saisie en main tierce et n'est pas appuyée par l'affidavit. Il y aurait lieu de biffer ces deux
autorisations de l'ordonnance.
16
Anderson Preece v Dominion Appraisal
(2000), 264 AR 177, [2000] AJ 459, [2000] AR TBEd AP146, 2000 ABQB 254
(Alta QB) Veit J.
The individual defendants left their employment with the plaintiff real estate appraisal firm
and set up a competing firm. They took a multitude of the plaintiff's documents. The plaintiff
sued the defendants, alleging theft of trade secrets and confidential business information,
breach of fiduciary duty, the tort of conspiracy, trespass to goods, conversion, a breach of
the duty of fidelity and good faith, infringement of copyright, breach of employment
contract, unjust enrichment and, in relation to the defendant Weidman, the tort of
negligence. The plaintiff sought further and better document disclosure.
21] How are these general rules to be applied in this case? The defendants allege that the
property removed from the plaintiff was not very valuable, and was not as valuable as, for
example, the recipe for Coca-Cola. They also argue that there was no formal copyright in
the documents and that some of the documents which they converted were not
sophisticated. They argue that, because the documents that were stolen were the plaintiff's
documents, the plaintiff knows exactly what documents were taken, and no further discovery
is required.
[22] It is true, of course, that the mere theft by the respondents of the plaintiff's paper, and
even of its computer disks, does not entitle the plaintiff to much in the way of money
damages. But it would be disingenuous for the defendants to ignore that information can be
valuable and that the value of information that can be taken on $10 worth of computer disks
can exponentially exceed that amount. It would be equally inappropriate to ignore that the
defendant employees essentially copied their employer's "intellectual capital".
[24] The defendants would like the court to determine their legal obligations before they are
required to produce their documents. With respect, they are attempting to put the cart
before the horse. The issues of fiduciary duty, trade secret, confidential business information,
duty of fidelity and good faith, copyright, employment contract and unjust enrichment are all
intertwined in this case. It is not possible to carve out certain issues and to decide them. At
this stage of the proceedings, it is not possible to say that the plaintiff has no cause of action.
The plaintiff is entitled to discovery of documents. Indeed, one of the purposes of discovery is
to advance the adverse party's position; it would be wrong in principle to make any definitive
finding about the strength of the plaintiff's position until discovery is complete.
17
Anne of Green Gables Licensing Authority Inc. v. Avonlea Traditions Inc
(2000), 4 CPR (4th) 289 & 5 CPR (4th) iii, [2000] OJ 740, [2000] LWD 1944-023, [2000]
CarswellOnt 731, [2000] OTC 133 (Ont SC) Wilson J.; (2000), 6 CPR (4th) 57 (Ont CA - Stay);
appeal abandonned (2000), 5 CPR (4th) iii (Ont CA)
Merits
The literary work Anne of Green Gables was published in 1908. In the same year, the
publisher, as assignee of the author, registered copyright in the work at Stationer's Hall under
the Copyright Act, 1842 (U.K.), 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45. The work [page290] focused on the
character Anne Shirley who was described as "the outspoken morsel of neglected humanity",
with a little pointed chin, freckles, carrot red hair and unquenchable spirit.
The author died in 1942 and, in the mid-1980s, the plaintiff heirs of the author first became
aware of, and asserted, a reversionary copyright interest in the work.
In 1988 the heirs entered into a copyright and trade-mark licence agreement with the
predecessor of the defendant ("the Tall Ships Agreement") which was assigned to the
defendant in 1989. The Tall Ships Agreement granted to the defendant the exclusive right to
manufacture, distribute and sell merchandise and services based on the work and the
character Anne Shirley, including the right to sublicence such right to others. The exclusive
right was limited by the right of craftspeople of a province to manufacture and sell such
merchandise. In the agreement the heirs warranted that they were the sole owners of
copyright in the work and that that they had the full and unrestricted right to grant the
licence to sell the merchandise under the name ANNE OF GREEN GABLES. The agreement
provided for a right of the heirs to terminate the agreement for cause, including for failure to
pay royalties.
Commencing in 1989, the defendant carried on the business of manufacturing, distributing
and selling dolls, articles of clothing and other wares which incorporated references to the
work and the name and character of Anne Shirley.
In 1990 the heirs filed applications to register the trade-marks ANNE OF GREEN GABLES and
ANNE OF GREEN GABLES & Design and an application to register the certification mark THIS
PRODUCT IS OFFICIALLY LICENSED BY THE HEIRS OF L.M. MONTGOMERY.
In 1992 copyright in the author's literary work expired in Canada and in November 1992 a
provincial government caused six notices to be published under s. 9(1)(n)(iii) of the Trademarks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13. Five of these notices were for the mark ANNE OF GREEN
GABLES in respect of services and the sixth notice was for the mark ANNE OF THE ISLAND &
Design in respect of wares and services.
The defendant failed to pay royalties pursuant to the Tall Ships Agreement. In April 1994, the
heirs terminated the agreement but granted the defendant a temporary licence for a further
six months to enable an orderly transition. As of the date of termination, the defendant owed
$255,042.66 for outstanding royalties. After termination of the agreement, the defendant
continued its business activities, except in 1998 it discontinued use of the certification mark.
In August 1995, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendant for breach of
contract in respect of failure to pay royalties and for passing off at common law, and
pursuant to ss. 7(b) and (c) of the Trade-marks Act, in respect of the defendant's continued
use of the plaintiffs' marks and indicia of the character Anne Shirley. The defendant
acknowledged the amount owing under the Tall Ships Agreement in respect of royalties but
18
subject to the defendant's defences. These defences were based on allegations that
the heirs breached their warranty of ownership of copyright in the work, that if the
plaintiffs owned the copyright it did not [page291] extend to three-dimensional reproductions
of the author's literary work, that the publication of the s. 9 notices of the province frustrated
the agreement, that the claim to passing off could not succeed as the marks at issue were
not distinctive, and that the heirs terminated the agreement in bad faith. By way of
counterclaim, the defendant sought to offset expenses incurred against the amount of
royalties owing. These expenses were alleged to be the cost of the time spent by the
principal of the defendant in seeking to police and enforce the marks of the heirs. At trial, the
defendant consented to an injunction with respect to the certification mark.
In 1996 the heirs secured registration of the certification mark and subsequently entered into
an agreement with the province permitting the plaintiff authority to market merchandise
relating to the work and in association with the marks. The heirs assigned the trade-marks and
certification mark to the authority in 1998 and in 1998 the authority secured registration of the
trade- marks.
Held, judgment should be granted to the plaintiffs and the defendant's counterclaim should
be dismissed.
A licensee is estopped from contesting the validity of a trade- mark licensed to it during the
term of the licence agreement. This disability does not affect the licensee after the
agreement is terminated. Unless there was another valid contractual defence, the defendant
was, therefore, estopped from contesting the validity of copyright in the trade-marks and
certification mark of the heirs to excuse payment of royalties.
Whether the plaintiffs held a reversionary interest of copyright in the work was dependent on
whether proper notice was given by the assignee of the author or its successor pursuant to s.
60(2) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42. As the author had assigned her copyright in
the work before the coming into force of the Copyright Act, 1921, S.C. 1921, c. 24, the owner
of the copyright as of the date that the original copyright would have expired would only
have retained substituted copyright under the Act if it had given notice to the author in
accordance with s. 60(2). There was no evidence that such notice was given and, therefore,
in view of the presumption of subsistence and ownership of copyright established by s. 34.1(1)
of the Act, the defendant failed in its defence of denying the ownership by the heirs of
reversionary copyright.
Copyright in a literary work extends to protect not only the literary work itself but also the
characters from the work whose descriptions are distinctive, thorough and complete. The
character Anne Shirley was clearly delineated, distinctive, thorough and complete in the
work and was therefore protected by copyright. Such copyright extended to two- and
three-dimensional images based on the descriptions of the character and situations found in
the work.
After copyright in the work expired and until the trade-marks and certification mark were
registered, the plaintiffs relied on unregistered trade-marks and the common law principles of
passing off. In its defence, the defendant attacked the distinctiveness of the unregistered
trade-marks. The distinctiveness of the marks was determined as of the date that the
defendant challenged the marks in the action. The [page292] defendant embarked on a
tenacious licensing and enforcement program pursuant to the Tall Ships Agreement. The
defendant did not present any credible evidence that the marks were not distinctive from
marks from other sources. Although the heirs would have had difficulty in establishing
19
distinctiveness in their marks in the mid-1980s, through the assistance of the defendant,
the heirs had by such date established common law trade-marks.
As the plaintiffs had valid trade-marks, the issue of passing off arose both at common law and
under ss. 7(b) and (c) of the Trade- marks Act. Passing off extends to the wrongful association
of wares with an image belonging to another person. There is no reason to limit passing off to
those who market or sell the pertinent wares themselves. The plaintiffs had established that
the trade-marks had acquired goodwill or a public recognition and had met the other
requirements to prove passing off at common law and pursuant to s. 7 of the Act.
Whether the plaintiff authority is a public authority within the meaning of s. 9(1)(n)(iii) of the
Trade-marks Act, and whether the assignment of the s. 9 notices from the province to the
plaintiff authority was not determinative because the heirs and the province had assigned all
their trade-mark rights to it. Nevertheless, as the province had significant influence and
control over the plaintiff authority and an objective shared with the plaintiff authority of
protecting the local craft industry, the plaintiff authority was a public authority under s. 9(1)(n)
(iii).
The publication of the province's s. 9 notices had the effect or preventing the heirs and the
defendant from pursing registration of the heirs' trade-marks for services. For the publication
of the notices to have frustrated the Tall Ships Agreement, the publication must have gone to
the root of the agreement such that performance of the agreement ought to have been
excused. Although the publication of the notices was unexpected, the publication did not
have a significant practical effect. There was no evidence that the publication affected the
sales of the defendant. The publication did not frustrate the agreement because (1) the
agreement contemplated a remedy of renegotiation in the event that the copyright expired
before the trade-marks were registered; (2) the registration of the marks was not guaranteed
and the parties had been advised that registration was not certain; and (3) the subsequent
conduct of the defendant in acknowledging the amount of the royalties owing affirmed the
agreement.
In the alternative to its claim that the Tall Ships Agreement was frustrated, the defendant
alleged that the s. 9 notices caused the plaintiffs to breach their warranty that they held the
exclusive rights granted to the defendant under the Agreement. Any breach of exclusivity
was confined to the s. 9 notice for the mark ANNE OF THE ISLAND, the only notice that
extended to wares. The notice for the mark ANNE OF THE ISLAND did not offend the warranty
because of the distinction between marketing the wares and service under the mark ANNE
OF GREEN GABLES and the wares and services under the mark ANNE OF THE ISLAND, and
because the mark ANNE OF THE ISLAND was specifically excluded from the Tall Ships
Agreement in respect of wares of the province's craftspeople.
There was no evidence to support the defendant's claim that the plaintiffs' termination of the
Tall Ships Agreement was in bad faith. [page293]
The owner of an intellectual property right will ordinarily be entitled to an injunction to protect
such rights. A court may also issue an injunction to enforce contractual terms relating to the
use of a property right. The plaintiffs were entitled to the injunction requested, including the
injunction on consent relating to the plaintiffs' certification mark.
The plaintiffs were entitled to enforce the royalty obligations under the Tall Ships Agreement in
respect of the $255,042.66 royalties owing. As to damages for the continued sales after
termination of the Tall Ships Agreement, the proper measure was what the defendant would
have paid based on evidence of actual licence fees accepted by the plaintiffs. The
20
defendant continued to produce its wares as if it had implicitly and unilaterally extended
the terms of the Tall Ships Agreement. The measure of damages was therefore based on
the royalty terms of the
agreement.
The defendant's counterclaim for expenses for time spent pursing infringements was
dismissed. The defendant could only claim as an expense an amount actually paid to a third
party.
Stay
The trial judge had issued judgment to the plaintiffs restraining the defendant from, inter alia,
selling, offering for sale and distributing goods bearing the name [page58] Anne of Green
Gables. The defendant filed a notice of appeal from the decision and moved for a stay of
the injunction pending the hearing of the appeal.
Held, the motion should be dismissed.
The test for a stay pending appeal is whether (1) the appeal presents a serious issue for
adjudication, (2) the appellant would suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted, and
(3) the balance of convenience favours the appellant.
At trial the issues were fully canvassed and many of the defendant's arguments were rejected
as not sustainable on the evidence. To the extent that the appeal reiterates those same
arguments, it does not present a serious issue to be determined. However, as some of the
legal issues appeared to be arguable, the court was prepared to accept that the appeal
raised sufficient merit to warrant consideration of the balance of the test.
The defendant alleged that without a stay the continued injunction would force the
defendant out of business. The defendant's financial difficulties were, however, not recent.
Even if successful on the appeal, the chances of any financial recovery appeared to be
slight. The irreparable harm envisaged was not one that could be avoided by granting the
stay.
The balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs. A stay would cause the plaintiffs
irreparable harm because the ongoing failure of the defendant to pay royalties would impair
the ability of the plaintiffs' licensees to fairly compete, and undermine the plaintiffs' licensing
program.
21
Asher Consultants Ltd v Walter
(2000), [2000] SJ 107, [2000] SKQB 30, [2000] Sask R Uned 39, [2000]
CarswellSask
101,
2000
SKBD
30,
http://www.canlii.org/sk/cas/skqb/2000/2000skqb30.html (Sask QB) Klebuc J.
[2] The issues arising out of the positions taken by the respective parties are: […]
(2) May a partnership create and own a copyright under the provisions of the
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
(3) May a licensee maintain an action for copyright infringement without
pleading the particulars of its licence of the copyright upon which its claim is
founded, including whether its licence is in writing?
(4) Are the applicants entitled to further and better particulars with respect to the
facts pleaded in paragraphs 9, 10 and 16 concerning: (a) the parts of the
plaintiffs' work that the applicants improperly copied; (b) the parts of the work
allegedly copied by the applicants which constitute original artistic works of the
plaintiffs; (c) the dates upon whichthe alleged artistic works were authored,
published and distributed?
[8] In my view, the applicants have failed to meet the requisite threshold. The Copyright Act
contains no provision specifically prohibiting partnerships from creating or owning a copyright
nor do any of the authorities cited state that partnerships at common law are denied such
right. The issue is a complex one which will require the provisions of the Copyright Act to be
considered in the context of The Partnership Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-3, the common law, and
Queen's Bench Rule 51(a) which provides that partnerships may commence actions in their
partnership name. Such analysis is best conducted in a factual context following full
argument. I therefore conclude that the issue should be left for the trial judge, particularly
since striking out paragraph 10 would not bring the action to an end.
[9] Notwithstanding my conclusion regarding the ultimate disposition of the issue, a
partnership is not a legal person distinct from its partners but rather an association composed
of individuals or corporations, or both, carrying on business in common with the objective of
earning a profit. […]
[12] In the instant case, Asher claims an exclusive licence without providing particulars of the
licence including whether the licence is evidenced in writing. In my view such pleading is
inadequate and would require paragraph 10 to be struck out unless the deficiency is
remedied by Asher within 21 days of the date hereof.
[14] In order to determine whether they may legitimately challenge the validity of the
copyright claimed the applicants, the defendants require copies of the alleged artistic works
and further particulars concerning when such works were authored, published and
distributed. Accordingly an order will issue requiring the plaintiffs to deliver such information
within 21 days of such order issuing.
22
AVS Technologies Inc. v. Canadian Mechanical Reproduction Rights
Agency
(1999), [1999] CBD 8 (CB), 4 CPR (4th) 15 (CB) sub nomine Private Copying
1999-2000, Tariff of Levies to be Collected by CPCC (Re); affd (2000), 7 CPR
(4th) 68, 257 NR 283, [2000] FCJ 960, [2000] CarswellNat 1304, [2000] 4 FC D-10,
(FCA)
Linden J.
The applicants applied for judicial review of a decision of the Copyright Board relating to Part
VIII of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, concerning the levy imposed on a blank audio
recording medium. The board had interpreted the term "ordinarily used" in the definition of
"audio recording medium" as including all non-negligible uses. The board had concluded
that a CD was ordinarily used to reproduce sound recordings and was therefore leviable as a
blank audio recording medium. The applicants alleged that the term "ordinarily used" should
be interpreted by looking at the products generally and not the usage of the products by
individual consumers. The applicants contested that the term "ordinarily" should be construed
as meaning "chiefly" or "mainly".
Held, the application should be dismissed.
The issue raised by the applicants was mainly a question of law interpreting the legislation
administered by the board. The purpose of Part VIII of the Copyright Act is mainly an
economic one within the expertise of the board to decide. The proper standard of review on
the issue was, therefore, patent unreasonableness.
It is the usage of the products by individual consumers that must be ordinary for the products
to fall within the definition of "audio recording medium". Part VIII of [page69] the Act provides
for a system to estimate the value of copyright infringed by individuals who ordinarily copied
music on those products. The interpretation asserted by the applicants would not be
consistent with the object of the Act. The applicants had failed to demonstrate that the
board's approach was obviously or clearly wrong. The board's decision was not, therefore,
patently unreasonable.
23
Bergeron v Sogidès Ltée
(1998), [1998] AQ 2384 (QueSupCt); revd (2000), [2000] JQ 3088, REJB
2000-20192,
[2000-09-20]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200009fr.html
(QueCA) Robert J.
Les juges Robert, Chamberland et Thibeault. L'auteur appelant a rempli toutes les conditions
de l'article 1003 C.p.c. nécessaires à l'autorisation du recours collectif. En effet, il était
prématuré pour le juge de première instance de conclure que les questions de droit ou de
fait soulevées ne sont pas identiques, similaires ou connexes. La preuve présentée par l'auteur
au stade de l'autorisation aurait pu être plus convaincante mais, à cette étape, il faut tenir
les faits allégués pour avérés. Ces derniers supportent la thèse du contrat d'adhésion et du
caractère abusif de la clause de droit de passe. La preuve de l'existence d'un contrat
d'adhésion ne demande pas nécessairement une preuve individuelle pour chaque auteur,
comme le prétend le juge de première instance. Il est possible de faire cette preuve en
démontrant que l'éditeur a adopté une pratique générale.
Le juge de première instance a conclu que le recours de l'auteur est prescrit. Celui-ci ne
pouvait conclure de la sorte sans avoir entendu unepreuve complète. L'éditeur doit rendre
compte à ses auteurs annuellement pour chaque contrat signé. La prescription des
paiements dus à l'auteur court à chaque échéance. Il est probable que certains recours
soient prescrits, mais seule une enquête permettra d'en juger. Un seul contrat et une seule
application de ce contrat suffisent pour soulever les questions proposées.
La possibilité de procéder par les dispositions des articles 59 ou 67 C.p.c. n'exclut pas le droit
d'exercer un recours collectif. Le nombre potentiel de personnes et le caractère modeste de
la réclamation de chacun rendent le recours sous l'article 59 C.p.c. difficile et peu pratique,
tout comme l'exige l'article 1003 C.p.c. L'auteur, qui a fait une enquête partielle pour
prétendre à la similitude des contrats et des paiements de redevances, qui a reçu l'appui de
l'Union des écrivaines et écrivains du Québec et du Fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs,
semble avoir la capacité de diriger le dossier et d'assurer une représentation adéquate du
groupe visé.
24
Bioteau v Communications Quebecor Inc
(2000), [2000] JQ 1753, BE 2000-1098, REJB 2000-18596 (QueCt) Marengo J.
Le demandeur est photographe professionnel. En février 1994, un contrat de production et
de licence est intervenu entre ce dernier et les Éditions Stanké pour la production d'une
photographie devant servir pour la couverture du livre " Gilles Proulx, Portrait d'un tirailleur
tiraillé ". Une séance de photos s'est ensuivie et, en mars 1994, le demandeur a remis le
résultat de son travail à Stanké. Quelques jours plus tard, le défendeur Proulx a demandé au
demandeur, pour son usage personnel, une reproduction des photos prises lors de la séance
de photos. Proulx a par la suite remis une de ces reproductions au magazine " Le Lundi ",
publié par la défenderesse, Communications Quebecor, afin de remplacer la photographie
utilisée dans sa chronique. Proulx n'a alors mentionné à Quebecor ni le nom du photographe,
ni la provenance de la photo. En février 1996, le demandeur a découvert qu'une des photos
prises en mars 1994 avait été publiée dans le magazine, sans toutefois faire mention de son
nom. Or, la photo serait parue dans le magazine à au moins 31 reprises entre le 14 avril 1995
et le 16 mars 1996.
Le demandeur allègue que les défendeurs ont, ainsi, violé de façon répétée son droit
d'auteur sur la photographie prise. Il leur réclame donc la somme de 3000 $ en dommagesintérêts, ventilée comme suit : 30 $ de revenus perdus par publication, soit 930 $; 279 $ à titre
d'intérêts sur cette dernière somme; 1 262 $ à titre de dommages et inconvénients divers, soit
750 $ pour les frais de recherche et 512 $ pour les honoraires extrajudiciaires; et, finalement,
529 $ à titre de dommages moraux.
L'action est accueillie en partie. Il appert de la preuve que le demandeur est bien l'auteur de
la photographie en question. Il appert également que ni Proulx ni Quebecor ne sont les
premiers titulaires du droit d'auteur de cette photographie. De plus, le demandeur n'a pas
cédé son droit d'auteur sur son oeuvre à un ou l'autre des défendeurs. En l'espèce, il faut
considérer que le demandeur est le premier titulaire du droit d'auteur sur la photographie, et
ce, même si son nom n'apparaissait pas au dos de celle-ci et qu'il n'y avait aucune mention
d'interdiction de reproduction. Quebecor n'avait donc pas le droit d'utiliser l'oeuvre du
demandeur à son insu et sans son autorisation. Par conséquent, en utilisant la photographie à
des fins commerciales et en la faisant publier et circuler sans l'autorisation du demandeur, les
défendeurs ont violé son droit d'auteur. Par ailleurs, dans les contrats soumis par Quebecor
dans sa défense, cette dernière était autorisée par les auteurs à utiliser les photographies, ce
qui n'est pas le cas en l'espèce. En effet, seule Stanké était autorisée à utiliser la
photographie en question. Le demandeur a donc le droit d'être indemnisé pour les
dommages subis, lesquels sont évalués comme suit : 1 000 $ pour la perte de revenus subie;
750 $ pour les troubles et les inconvénients subis; 379,52 $ pour les honoraires extrajudiciaires,
lesquels, ayant été engagés dans le but de sauvegarder le droit d'auteur du demandeur,
sont des conséquences directes et immédiates de la faute des défendeurs; et, finalement,
1,55 $ pour les frais de photocopies. Il n'y a cependant pas lieu de faire droit à la réclamation
pour dommages moraux, étant donné qu'il n'y a pas eu de preuve d'une atteinte à ces
droits.
25
Birshtein v Royz
(2000), [2000] OJ 957, [2000] OTC Uned 144 (Ont Sup Ct) Pitt J.
[4] The issue for immediate determination is whether the manuscript which was written by the
defendant in the Russian language ought to be translated immediately at the Plaintiffs'
expense.
[5] The Plaintiffs' position is that such an expenditure at this stage of the proceedings is
unwarranted, and in any event the defendant being the writer, ought to do the translation
himself.
[6] The defendant's position is that the Plaintiffs have made the manuscript an issue in the
litigation and that the court and the defendant are entitled by practice and principle to
have an English translation at their disposal.
26
Blazik v Brown
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 303, [2000] FCJ 225, [2000] ACF 225, [2000] FTR
Uned
199,
en
français à http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26068.o.fr.html
(FCTD) Dubé J.
[1] This appeal is from the Report of Referee Peter A.K. Giles, Associate Senior Prothonotary
dated July 16, 1998, by which he assessed the damages of the plaintiffs ("Travel Training")
against three of the Ontario numbered defendants.
[22] A comparative method can therefore not be used". This Court held in Wellcome
Foundation v. Apotex [(1997), 82 C.P.R. (3d) 466 at 480-482 (F.C.T.D.)], a rather recent
decision, that the differential cost accounting approach and not the comparative method is
now the proper approach. Consequently, I cannot find that the Referee erred in law when
he ruled in accordance with a very recent decision of this Court and did not follow an old
English case dating back to the time of the industrial revolution. Not reviewable.
[27] Finding (h) - It was necessary to find the expenses of the Defendants which were properly
deductible by referring to original invoices, and, without such invoices, expenses were not
properly deductible.
[para28] Decision - The Referee states in his paragraph 9 that the plaintiffs have retained their
own chartered accountant who investigated the background materials provided by the
defendants. The accountant gave evidence that "he was unable to justify the figures shown
in the defendant Toronto's accounts because he did not have the background material". In
some cases the background material could not be found. In addition, there were some 62
adjusting entries which were not explained. Clearly, the onus of establishing expense is on
the defendants. Under the circumstances, the Referee was justified in arriving at that
conclusion. Not reviewable.
[37] Finding (m) - The estimated retail value of $50 per book is the proper value to place on
the infringing books, in determining damages for conversion.
[38] Decision - In his paragraph 16, the Referee deals with damages for conversion and finds
that the 25 books not returned to the plaintiffs have been converted and the plaintiffs are
entitled to "their value". He accepts that the actual costs of each book was something less
than $7 a book, although the retail value of some similar texts were shown to be in the $50
dollar range. He notes that the plaintiffs had no intention of selling the infringed material and
yet he finds that the proper value to put on these books is $50.00 for each book. In my view,
that is an error. If neither of the parties intended to sell the books, the retail value is not to be
taken in consideration. The actual cost of $7 a book should have been assessed for the 25
books not delivered to the plaintiffs. Reviewable.
[43] The profits attributable to infringement are the revenues generated by student fees for
the course in question, less the expenses. The relevant expenses must include the fractions of
the total expenses of the school as apportioned by the Referee for the particular course. But
student fees for that course were not paid exclusively for the Travel Course Materials, they
were paid for the course itself which includes teaching by a qualified instructor, other
materials and class room facilities.
Consequently, the profits must be apportioned
accordingly. It is not easy to determine a precise apportionment. In my view, fairness would
27
dictate that the percentage of profits attributable to the Travel Course Materials be no
more than 50%. Thus, the findings of the Referee on profits attributable to the infringing
material are reviewable.
28
Blondeau v Croisières AML Inc
(2000), [2000] BE 2000-559; REJB 2000-17734, [2000] JQ 1267 (QueCt)
Lamoureux J.
[14] Pour réclamer des dommages au motif que son droit à l'image a été violé, Blondeau
devait établir qu'elle était reconnaissable sur la photographie utilisée par Info-Croisières1.
[15] Or, Blondeau n'est pas reconnaissable sur la photographie et, dans les circonstances,
Hamel n'a pas commis de faute en utilisant la photographie trouvée parmi les actifs achetés
en août 1995.
[16] De plus, si la photographie utilisée par Info-Croisières est une illustration produite par
infographie à partir de la photographie appartenant à Novergian Cruise Line, c'est cette
dernière qui, en tant que titulaire du droit d'auteur, aurait possiblement un recours en
dommages en vertu de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur (L.R.C. 1985 ch. C-42 art. 13(2) 34).
29
Brisson v Unibroue Inc
(2000), [2000] JQ 1118 (QueSupCt - Venue) Morneau J.; (2000), [2000] JQ
1118, JE 2000-2159, REJB 2000-21353 (QueSupCt - Option) Mayrand J.
Venue
[7] Invoquant l'article 68(1) C.p.c., Unibroue fait valoir que Brisson aurait dû intenter son
action dans le district de Longueuil où se trouve son domicile réel, savoir, son siège social. Elle
plaide que l'article 68(1) constitue le principe, l'article 68(2) C.p.c. relatif au tribunal du lieu où
toute la cause d'action a pris naissance constituant la seule exception disponible pour la
demande, à la condition toutefois que s'y retrouvent les trois éléments, savoir, la faute, le
dommage et le lien de causalité . Unibroue ajoute que même si les bières "U" ou "Don de
Dieu" sont distribuées à Montréal, cela ne justifie pas le demandeur d'intenter son action dans
ce district.
[9] Insistant sur le fait que son action est fondée sur la responsabilité extracontractuelle
d'Unibroue en vertu du Code civil du Québec et de la Loi sur les droits d'auteurs, vu
l'appropriation illégale de ses productions ou créations, Brisson souligne que plusieurs fautes
sont alléguées dans son action, le droit d'auteur étant sujet à démembrement. Il ajoute que
les dommages moraux qu'il réclame ont été subis par lui, à son domicile, dans le district de
Montréal. L'argument fondé sur les dommages moraux et l'endroit où prétend les avoir subis
la demande doit être rejeté immédiatement puisqu'il aurait évidemment pour effet de
rendre inopérantes plusieurs dispositions du chapitre relatif au lieu de l'introduction de
l'action.
[10] Bref, on peut résumer les prétentions de Brisson de la façon suivante :
[11] Même si la majorité des fautes sont commises dans le district de Longueuil, il suffit que la
distribution des bières en cause soit faite dans divers districts, dont celui de Montréal, pour lui
permettre d'intenter son action dans le district de son choix, ici, Montréal. […]
[12] L'on se rappelle que suivant la jurisprudence la cause d'action délictuelle ou quasidélictuelle (extracontractuelle) comporte trois éléments : la faute, le dommage et le lien de
causalité. Pour satisfaire aux exigences de l'article 68(2) C.p.c., chacun des trois éléments
doit avoir pris naissance dans le district judiciaire donnant compétence au tribunal. Dans le
cas contraire, et c'est malheureusement le cas de la présente action, elle devra se poursuivre
conformément l'article 68(1) C.p.c., dans le district du domicile de la défenderesse, c'est-àdire le district de Longueuil.
Requête pour option de recours. Rejetée.
Le demandeur, un artiste concepteur et idéateur, poursuit la défenderesse, qui aurait utilisé,
à son insu, l'étiquette et le projet de campagne publicitaire qu'il lui avait soumis dans le
cadre d'une demande d'emploi. À la demande expresse de la défenderesse, et après avoir
obtenu l'assurance que ses propositions ne seraient pas utilisées s'il ne décrochait pas l'emploi
sollicité, le demandeur aurait créé un concept publicitaire sans qu'aucune rémunération lui
soit versée. La défenderesse n'a pas retenu la candidature du demandeur mais, selon lui, elle
aurait commercialisé deux de ses bières en utilisant les illustrations qu'il lui avait soumises. Le
demandeur requiert qu'il soit enjoint à la défenderesse de cesser l'utilisation de son oeuvre sur
ses bouteilles de bière et dans sa publicité. Il réclame également des dommages-intérêts de
400 000 $ et une reddition de compte concernant les revenus et les profits que la
défenderesse aurait tirés de l'utilisation illégale de son travail. La défenderesse prétend que
les conclusions recherchées par le demandeur sont incompatibles et, par conséquent, elle
30
demande qu'il opte entre les différents recours contradictoires qu'il a réunis dans la
présente affaire.
Décision
La défenderesse se fonde sur l'article 13 de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur pour prétendre que le
demandeur ne peut s'opposer à l'utilisation de son oeuvre en même temps qu'il réclame une
rémunération pour son travail. Cette position pourrait être valable si un mandat, même
tacite, liait les parties ou si les circonstances permettaient de croire qu'il y a eu cession des
droits du demandeur en faveur de la défenderesse. Or, en tenant pour avérées les
allégations de la déclaration, on ne peut en venir à une telle conclusion. Tous les recours du
demandeur viennent de la même source d'action, soit l'utilisation illégale, voire frauduleuse,
de son oeuvre. La réclamation en dommages-intérêts pour la réalisation de l'oeuvre de
même que pour son utilisation illégale n'est pas incompatible avec le désir du demandeur de
faire cesser cette utilisation. Il appartiendra au juge qui tranchera le litige au fond de voir à
ne pas accorder une double indemnité pour le même préjudice. En l'espèce, il n'y a pas de
contradiction entre les conclusions recherchées par le demandeur et celui-ci a un droit prima
facie à l'injonction. Il faut également tenir compte de l'affaire Robinson c. Films Cinar inc., où
l'on a décidé que la réclamation en dommages-intérêts et la demande de destruction des
éléments qui avaient servi à la réalisation d'exemplaires contrefaits n'étaient pas
incompatibles. Au surplus, les parties ne subiront aucun préjudice de l'audition commune de
toute l'affaire, et il semble que l'intérêt de la justice sera mieux servi par le rejet de la présente
requête.
31
Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions (Re)
(2000), [2000] CBD 4, DCDA 4 (CB)
Pursuant to the provisions of subsection 77(1) of the Copyright Act, the Copyright Board issues
the following licence to the Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions:
(1) The licence authorizes the reproduction, in print form, microfiches or CD-ROMs,
of the works listed in the appendices to the January 17, 2000 application (of
which 28 titles have been removed by the applicant on January 21, 2000). The
total number of copies of each work shall not exceed 75.
32
Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions (Re)
the following licence to the Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions:
(1) The licence authorizes the reproduction, in print form, microfiches or CD-ROMs,
of the works listed in the appendices to the October 24, 2000 application (of
which 6 works have been removed by the applicant on November 10, 2000). The
total number of copies of each work shall not exceed 75.
33
Candow v Savory
(2000), 8 CPR (4th) 219, [2000] CarswellNat 232 [2000] NJ 228, [2000] Nfld &
PEIR Uned 69 (Nfld SC-TD)
The plaintiff composed the musical work "Some Shockin' Good". In 1986 the plaintiff recorded
the song and, at the plaintiff's request, the defendants made a master recording and
produced the recording as a 45 record. The plaintiff also asked the defendants to include his
song in an album which the defendants were planning to release. The song was recorded on
the album together with works of other song writers. The album was released in 1987,
containing an acknowledgement of the [page220] plaintiff as composer of the song. The
plaintiff was paid royalties for the public performance of the song on the album.
In 1996 the defendants produced a compact disc version of the 1987 album. The plaintiff
brought an action claiming that the album and compact disc infringed copyright in his song.
Held, the action should be dismissed.
The album was recorded at the plaintiff's request and with his knowledge and consent. The
initial recording made by the defendants did not therefore infringe copyright. The compact
disc was merely a different format of the 1987 album recorded with consent and, therefore,
was also not an infringement of copyright.
In any event, the plaintiff's action was barred by the limitation period under the Copyright
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
34
CCH Canadian Limited v The Law Society of Upper Canada
(1999), REJB 99-15185, [1999] FCJ 1647, [1999] ACF 1647, [1999] FTR TNEd
NO060, 2 CPR (4th) 129, 179 DLR (4th) 609, 169 FTR 1, [2000] 2 FC 451 & [2000] 3
FC
ii,
[1999]
CarswellNat
2163,
72
CRR
(2d)
139,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/vol2/html/2000fca25519.p.en.html (FCTD);
(2000), 4 CPR (4th) 129, [2000] FTR Uned 46, [2000] FCJ 92, [2000] ACF 92, 184
186,
en
français
à
DLR
(4th)
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/1999/orig/html/1999fca25911.o.fr.html;
(2000),
(FCTD - Costs); (2000), 6 CPR (4th) 500, [2000] FCJ 949, [2000] ACF 949, 189 DLR
125,
258
NR
241,
[2000]
CarswellNat
1468,
(4th)
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26934.o.fr.html (FCTD Leave to intervene in appeal) Sharlow J.A.
Trial - Costs
In each of three actions for copyright infringement, the plaintiffs achieved limited success
and the defendant was wholly unsuccessful in its counterclaims. In his judgment, the trial
judge invited the parties to make written submissions as to costs.
Held, a supplementary judgment should issue in each action providing that there would be
no order as to costs.
Rule 400 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, gives the court full discretion over the
determination and allocation of costs, having regard to the non-exclusive factors listed in the
rule. As a general rule, costs should follow the event. Where success is fairly evenly divided,
normally there should be no order as to costs.
In the actions, the defendant was more successful than the plaintiffs, although none of the
parties was fully successful. The issues raised in the actions were of general importance and
significant complexity, with a substantial public interest both in policy and at law.
Having regard to the divided result, the complexity of the legal issues, the lack of Canadian
jurisprudential guidance and the public interest in having the actions litigated, it was
appropriate for each of the parties to bear its own costs.
Appeal - Leave to Intervene
The collective society moved for leave to intervene in appeals in three actions for
infringement of copyright in legal materials published by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant law society infringed their copyright in the operation of its custom
photocopying service. In the actions the defendant counterclaimed for declarations that its
activities constituted fair dealing and were exempt from infringement by reason of public
policy. The defendant also based its counterclaim on constitutional and other legal
principles. The trial judge found that copyright subsisted in the plaintiffs' texts and other
reference materials but that there was no copyright in reported judicial decisions. After trial
the library exceptions in the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, were proclaimed into force.
[page501]
The collective society represented authors and publishers including the plaintiffs. The
evidence at trial showed that the collective society had offered a licence to the defendant
in respect of the plaintiffs' works.
35
Before the trial of the action, the defendant had commenced an action in the Ontario
courts against the plaintiffs and the collective society seeking a declaration of noninfringement similar to the declaration subsequently entered in the Federal Court action. The
Ontario action was stayed by consent.
The collective society sought leave to intervene on issues confined to the fair dealing, library
exceptions, public policy and constitutional issues raised by the defendant.
The questions to be considered where a party seeks leave to intervene include whether the
proposed intervener will be directly affected by the action and whether the merits of the
case can be decided without its participation.
The status of the collective society in the Ontario action was not sufficient to justify its
intervention in the appeals. Its interest in the Ontario action was merely as agent for the
plaintiffs. Furthermore, the collective society's interest in the issues in the appeals was nothing
more than a jurisprudential interest. There was no doubt that the plaintiffs were fully capable
of addressing the issues raised by the collective society in the hearing of the appeals.
36
Cengig c. Québec (Sous-ministre du Revenu)
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 2587 (C.Q.), le juge Bossé
[Relativement à l’article 726.26 de la Loi sur les impôts]
4 L'appelant soumet qu'il a un droit d'auteur sur la plaque qui contient l'oeuvre qu'il a
conçue et qu'il y a gravée et qui ne fait pas l'objet de vente.
5 Il plaide qu'il fait un revenu par l'usage qu'il fait de son droit d'auteur .
6 L'appelant ajoute que la conception, la gravure et l'impression des « estampes » constituent
des activités qui sont effectuées d'une façon distincte de la vente des « estampes » qu'il fait
faire par des préposés.
7 Enfin, l'appelant soumet que l'expression « revenu provenant de droits d'auteur » n'est pas
définie dans la Loi sur les impôts et que, partant, l'intimé ne peut baser sonargumentation sur
la Loi sur le droit d'auteur 2.
8 Deux principes d'interprétation me font conclure à l'opposé: celui de la cohérence entre les
lois et celui de l'usage interprétatif constant.
10 Dans l'espèce, l'expression « droit d'auteur » se trouve dans une loi connexe fédérale qui
reprend d'ailleurs des principes utilisés internationalement. Si le législateur québécois avait
voulu diverger de la définition se trouvant dans la Loi sur le droit d'auteur , il aurait, dans
l'espèce, adopté une définition divergente.
11 Par ailleurs, « c'est un principe largement admis que lorsque deux interprétations d'un texte
sont susceptibles d'être retenues, les tribunaux hésiteront à rejeter celle qui a été consacrée
par l'usage »4. Or la définition contenue dans la Loi sur le droit d'auteur et l'objet même de la
loi correspondent, je l'ai déjà mentionné, à l'usage international.
12 Le « droit d'auteur » s'entend « du droit exclusif de produire ou de reproduire une oeuvre »,
selon l'article 3 de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur .
13 L'auteur d'une oeuvre est généralement, selon l'article 13 de cette loi, qui trouve
application au Québec, le premier titulaire du droit d'auteur sur cette oeuvre. Dans le
présent cas, l'appelant réalisant ses plaques pour lui-même, il est en principe titulaire du droit
d'auteur .
14 Toutefois, ce droit ne constitue pour lui qu'un droit exclusif personnel de produire et de
reproduire une oeuvre que les tiers doivent respecter dans le cadre des prescriptions de la Loi
sur le droit d'auteur .
15 Il n'en tire aucun revenu à moins de le céder moyennant rémunération ou d'autoriser la
production ou la reproduction d'une oeuvre moyennant paiement. L'appelant tire son
revenu de la vente d'une oeuvre provenant de son travail de conception et d'édition
protégé par un droit exclusif.
16 S'agirait-il d'une oeuvre conçue et réalisée dans des conditions faisant qu'aucun droit
d'auteur ne s'y rattacherait, que l'appelant aurait fait exactement le même revenu
provenant de la vente du produit final.
37
Construction RMR Leblanc Inc v Robert
(2000), JE 2000-1114, REJB 2000-19037, [2000] CarswellQue 1307 (QueCt), j.
Boyer
Résumé
Action en réclamation de dommages-intérêts. Accueillie (20 000 $).
La demanderesse construit des immeubles résidentiels selon des esquisses préparées par son
représentant et dont les plans définitifs sont réalisés par une firme spécialisée. Après avoir
apporté plusieurs modifications à l'intérieur du modèle La Tourmaline que leur avait proposé
la demanderesse, les défendeurs Robert ont signé une promesse d'achat préliminaire, dont ils
se sont toutefois dédits quelques jours plus tard. Dans les semaines qui ont suivi, le
représentant de la demanderesse a constaté que la maison que ces derniers se faisaient
construire par la défenderesse Les Constructions De Castel inc. ressemblait au modèle qu'il
leur avait proposé. Invoquant la contrefaçon de son esquisse, la demanderesse leur réclame
la perte de profit que ce plagiat lui a fait subir (10 000 $) ainsi qu'une indemnité à titre de
dommages moraux (10 000 $). Reconnaissant qu'il existe certaines similitudes entre les deux
maisons, les défendeurs nient toutefois le caractère exclusif de l'esquisse de la
demanderesse, qui comporterait de nombreux éléments communs à la plupart des maisons
québécoises contemporaines.
Décision
Il n'est pas nécessaire d'atteindre le niveau d'originalité des grandes oeuvres architecturales
pour prétendre à un droit d'auteur. En effet, la Loi sur le droit d'auteur accorde un tel droit de
propriété intellectuelle sur l'expression de toute oeuvre artistique originale. Les modifications
législatives de 1988 et de 1993 ont fait disparaître l'exigence d'un aspect artistique de la
définition de l'oeuvre d'art architecturale. En l'espèce, le style extérieur de l'esquisse de la
demanderesse reprend des concepts très communs, de sorte qu'il ne peut être qualifié
d'original. L'aménagement intérieur de la maison des Robert est toutefois spéculaire à celui
de l'esquisse de la demanderesse. Sans pouvoir prétendre à une haute valeur architecturale,
cette esquisse est néanmoins le fruit de la réflexion, des connaissances, des efforts personnels
et de l'habileté du représentant de la demanderesse. Il ne s'agit pas d'un simple collage de
morceaux épars, mais plutôt d'une oeuvre nouvelle et originale. Or, la réalisation spéculaire
de cette esquisse par les défendeurs ne comporte pas de différence fondamentale sur le
plan de la reproduction. En effet, les similitudes concernent non seulement la disposition
générale des pièces, la forme de l'intérieur, les escaliers, les angles de corridor mais aussi les
armoires, les placards et les commodes. Comme les défendeurs ne se sont pas déchargés du
fardeau qui leur incombait de prouver l'absence de droit d'auteur de la demanderesse et
qu'ils ont reproduit une partie substantielle du plan de l'intérieur de maison que celle-ci a
conçu, il faut conclure à une contrefaçon. De Castel devra assumer seule la perte de profit
subie par la demanderesse (10 000 $) tandis qu'elle supportera à parts égales avec les Robert
l'indemnité pour dommages moraux (10 000 $).
38
Dessins Drummond inc. c. Publicités Brigil inc.
(2000), REJB 2000-22272 (Que Sup Ct) Isabelle J.
Malgré ce que prétend la défenderesse (Brigil), la demanderesse (Drummond) n'a pas violé
la Loi sur les architectes. Il semble en effet probable que la maison apparaissant sur le plan
no 2442 pourra être construite pour un montant inférieur à 100 000 $. Le plan n'avait donc pas
à être signé et scellé par un membre de l'Ordre des architectes.
Le plan de maison no 2442 préparé par Drummond doit être considéré comme une oeuvre
artistique au sens de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur. Ce plan provient d'une idée des employés de
Drummond. Bien que l'auteur de ce plan se soit inspiré de ce qui se faisait à l'époque dans le
domaine de la construction, il reste que l'oeuvre émane de l'auteur lui-même. Celle-ci a
nécessité des connaissances dans le domaine de la construction et de l'architecture. Elle a
également nécessité des heures de préparation et de conception. Enfin, l'oeuvre jouit de
certaines caractéristiques distinctes permettant de la rattacher à un auteur en particulier.
Cela en fait donc une oeuvre originale, qui bénéficie par conséquent de la protection
accordée par la Loi sur le droit d'auteur.
La preuve révèle cependant que Brigil n'a aucunement violé les droits que détient
Drummond sur ce plan, puisque, avant de l'utiliser, elle a obtenu du mandataire de
Drummond une autorisation expresse pour ce faire. C'est en effet une des succursales de
Drummond qui a vendu à Brigil le plan en litige. Cette succursale a de plus elle-même
modifié le plan selon les exigences de Brigil. Or, le mandant est tenu envers les tiers pour les
actes accomplis par son mandataire dans l'exécution et les limites de son mandat. Au
surplus, lorsque l'oeuvre fait partie du contrat intervenu entre les parties, comme c'est le cas
en l'espèce, il existe une autorisation implicite de l'auteur à la reproduction de son oeuvre.
Par l'entremise de sa succursale, Drummond a donc autorisé Brigil à utiliser le plan de maison
no 2442.
Il existe certes une distinction entre la cession d'un droit d'auteur et la simple permission
d'utiliser une oeuvre appartenant à l'auteur. La preuve démontre toutefois ici que Brigil n'a
pas outrepassé l'autorisation reçue, ni commis d'abus quelconque à cet égard. Il n'y a donc
pas lieu de faire droit à la demande de Drummond.
39
Devon Studios Ltd v Scarponi
(2000), [2000] OJ 2559 (OntSupCt); (2000), [2000] OJ 2562 (OntSupCt Costs) Boutet J.; motion for leave to appeal dismissed (2000), [2000] OJ 2015
(OntSupCt - DivCt) O’Leary
Trial
[1] The plaintiff claims against the defendant Mr. Scarponi damages and punitive damages
for copyright infringement for images produced and owned by the plaintiff which were used
by the defendant Scarponi and Blockbuster for promotional material without the plaintiff's
permission. The plaintiff's other claims such as an accounting and an injunction are outside
the jurisdiction of This Court, being of an equitable nature.
[28] I make the following finding of facts without hesitation: the defendant knew that the
price of each transparency was $15.00, he authorized the plaintiff to keep taking
photographs even if the defendant was reminded of the high price of this exercise, the
plaintiff owns the copyright of the transparencies until the account has been satisfied in full,
the defendant has only paid a fraction of the account by deposit of $100.00, the defendant
mandated Ms. Dimon to pick up some of the transparencies, Ms. Dimon was informed of the
copyright on the said transparencies and was told to ask the defendant to contact the
plaintiff on the issue, Ms. Dimon notified the defendant of the copyright, the defendant
willingly ignored the copyright and authorized Blockbuster, among others, to illegally
reproduce the transparency in promotional materials, and the plaintiff suffered damages for
copyright infringement as a result.
[31] Assessing damages suffered by the plaintiff is a difficult task and it is even more so in this
case because there was no profit to measure. I assess the plaintiff damages at $3,200.00. This
amount comprises of payment of the outstanding invoice in the amount of $1,604.88 and the
balance in general and punitive damages. I took into consideration the fact that the plaintiff
already received $2,800.00 from Blockbuster. I order punitive damages as I believe the
defendant acted recklessly in using the transparencies knowing the plaintiff had retained
copyright over them. I am firm in this belief which is supported by the evidence of Mr. Ellis, the
sworn statement of Ms. Dimon, who has no pecuniary interest in this litigation, and by the fact
that the defendant is an experienced businessman in the field of entertainment and he knew
of the importance of copyright in the field of entertainment.
40
D & G Enviro-group Inc. v Bouchard*
(2000), JE 2000-1352, REJB 2000-18862, [2000] JQ 2048, [2000-06-21]
http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200006fr.html (QueCA) Beauregard J.
Appel d'un jugement de la Cour supérieure ayant annulé trois saisies avant jugement. Rejeté.
Ex-employeur des intimés, et prétendant que ces derniers sont en possession de documents
ou d'informations lui appartenant, l'appelante, s'autorisant de l'article 734 du Code de
procédure civile (C.P.C.), est entrée chez les intimés et a fouillé dans leurs ordinateurs. Les
intimés étaient absents et les portes de leurs résidences ont été ouvertes par un serrurier. Le
premier juge a annulé les saisies aux motifs que les biens saisis étaient insuffisamment décrits,
que les procès-verbaux ne mentionnent pas que l'intervention d'un serrurier s'est faite en
présence de deux témoins, que l'exécution des saisies était irrégulière puisqu'on ne s'est pas
limité à saisir des biens précis mais qu'on a fait une véritable recherche de choses à saisir et,
finalement, qu'il est impossible de recourir à l'article 734 C.P.C. pour fouiller les ordinateurs.
Décision
M. le juge Beauregard: Les biens physiques à saisir n'étaient pas suffisamment décrits. De plus,
le bref de saisie commande à un huissier de saisir un bien physique: il ne s'agit pas d'une
autorisation donnée au créancier saisissant d'entrer chez le saisi pourvu qu'il soit
accompagné d'un huissier et de fouiller lui-même parmi les biens qui se trouvent sur les lieux.
Enfin, l'article 734 C.P.C. ne permet pas de saisir le contenu d'un ordinateur. Une telle
machine ne peut faire l'objet d'une fouille sans la permission d'un juge.
41
Drapeau c. Carbone 14
(2000), [2000] RJQ. 1525, [2000] JQ 1171, REJB 2000-1776, JE 2000-1115
(Que Sup Ct) Guthrie J.; in appeal 500-09-009594-003
Résumé
Action en injonction permanente, reddition de compte et réclamation de dommagesintérêts, et intervention volontaire. Rejetées.
En 1988, la défenderesse Carbone 14, une compagnie théâtrale fondée en 1980 par le
défendeur Maheu, a créé sur scène le spectacle Le Dortoir. Cette oeuvre scénique de type
multimédia a été inspirée des années pendant lesquelles Maheu était pensionnaire. Celui-ci
a imaginé et écrit le scénario qu'il a mis en scène. Il est également intervenu dans la
scénographie et les nombreuses chorégraphies qui font partie intégrante du spectacle.
Maheu a eu recours aux services de plusieurs artistes, au nombre desquels se trouve le
demandeur, un auteur-compositeur qui a créé la musique originale de certaines scènes du
spectacle. La trame musicale du demandeur a été utilisée conformément aux termes de la
convention d'utilisation de droits d'auteur rédigée à sa demande par son avocat. En juillet
1990, il a cédé ses droits d'auteur à l'intervenante, une société de gestion au sens de l'article
70.1 de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur. Au cours du même été, Carbone 14, Maheu et la
défenderesse Rhombus Media inc. ont convenu de produire une adaptation
cinématographique du Dortoir, dont la réalisation a été confiée au défendeur Girard, qui a
insisté pour que la trame musicale soit modifiée. La composition de la musique du film a été
confiée au défendeur Gravel. Le demandeur prétend que Le Dortoir est une oeuvre qu'il a
créée en collaboration avec Maheu et que l'adaptation cinématographique qui en a été
faite sans son consentement constitue une contrefaçon. Il soutient de plus que ses droits
moraux ont été violés par la substitution de la trame musicale du film. Le demandeur exige
des dommages-intérêts ainsi qu'une reddition de compte de toutes les redevances perçues
par les défendeurs. Il réclame également la délivrance d'une ordonnance interdisant aux
défendeurs de permettre la diffusion du film Le Dortoir. Les défendeurs allèguent que les
droits d'auteur du demandeur portent uniquement sur la musique qu'il a composée et qui
constitue un travail autonome et distinct de celui de Maheu.
Décision
La convention d'utilisation des droits d'auteur du demandeur démontre que sa contribution
se limitait exclusivement à la composition d'une partie de la trame musicale du spectacle.
Cette musique constitue une oeuvre autonome, dissociable des autres composantes du
spectacle. Le demandeur l'a d'ailleurs confirmé par l'enregistrement de ses droits auprès de
l'intervenante, enregistrement qui vise uniquement la musique. Les faits entourant la paternité
de l'oeuvre ont créé une présomption légale que seul Maheu est l'auteur du spectacle sur
scène (art. 34 (4) a) de la loi). Le demandeur n'a pas réussi à repousser cette présomption
(art. 2847 du Code civil du Québec). Même si l'on n'avait pas conclu que tous ces faits
constituent une fin de non-recevoir à l'action du demandeur, il faudrait rejeter sa prétention
voulant que Le Dortoir constitue une oeuvre créée en collaboration (art. 2 de la loi). En effet,
la musique du demandeur est autonome et distincte de toutes les autres parties du
spectacle. Elle a d'ailleurs été facilement remplacée pour l'adaptation cinématographique
du spectacle. En outre, l'enregistrement vidéo du spectacle montre que le langage corporel
de ses interprètes ne dépend pas de la musique qui accompagne les différentes
chorégraphies, qui ont d'ailleurs été créées plus tôt. L'originalité du spectacle résulte du
travail du metteur en scène et des choix qu'il a faits concernant les acteurs, les décors, les
costumes, l'époque, les lieux et tous les éléments qui ont créé son atmosphère particulière. Le
demandeur n'a pas participé à la création de ces autres éléments artistiques non plus qu'à
leur assemblage. Maheu, qui s'était réservé le droit d'accepter ou de refuser la musique du
42
demandeur, n'a jamais eu l'intention de créer une oeuvre en collaboration avec celuici. Il est le seul et unique auteur du spectacle, qui a été inspiré par sa jeunesse et au
travers duquel il a exprimé ses idées, son talent et sa vision du monde. L'intervention de la
SODRAC est également vouée à l'échec puisque le film est une adaptation du spectacle et
non une simple reproduction. Comme la SODRAC ne détient que le droit d'autoriser ou
d'interdire la reproduction des oeuvres du demandeur, elle n'a aucun intérêt juridique dans
la présente procédure.
43
Dueck (Re Hilda M.)
Pursuant to the provisions of section 77(1) of the Copyright Act, the Copyright Board grants a
licence to Hilda M. Dueck as follows:
(1) The licence authorizes the reproduction of prints of Elwin (or Edwin) Edwards' paintings "A
June Morning" and "September Eve" published by The Artistic Publishing Company (year of
publication unknown).
A single copy of each of the works shall be reproduced.
44
Dueck (Re Judy)
licence to Judy Dueck as follows:
(1) The licence authorizes the reproduction of a print of Elwin (or Edwin) Edwards' painting
"September Eve" published by The Artistic Publishing Company (year of publication unknown).
A single copy of the work shall be reproduced.
45
Éditions du Vermillion (Re)
(2000), [2000] DCDA 8 (CB)
Conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 77(1) de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur, la
Commission du droit d'auteur accorde une licence aux Éditions du Vermillon comme suit :
1) La licence autorise la reproduction d'un extrait d'un article de Roger Cyr intitulé
Jean Duceppe dénonce les
sociétés secrètes paru dans La Patrie ("La Patente se meurt") en mai 1964, dans
un roman de Jean Taillefer intitulé "Ottawa, P.Q.".
Le tirage ne devra pas dépasser 500 copies.
46
Éditions Triptyque (Re)
(2000), [2000] DCDA 9 (CB)
Commission du droit d'auteur accorde une licence aux Éditions Triptyque comme suit :
1) La licence autorise la production et la publication d'une traduction de l'oeuvre
de Juan Butler intitulée Cabbagetown Diary: A Documentary publiée par Peter
Martin Associates Limited en 1970.
Le tirage ne devra pas dépasser 800 copies.
47
Edutile Inc v Association pour la protection des automobilistes (APA)
An unreported judgment rendered 19960522 by Mr Justice Dubé, court
docket T-1151-96 (FCTD-interlocutoy injunction); an unreported judgment
rendered 19960619 by prothonotary Morneau (FCTD-Proth - Evidence); [1996]
FCJ 1203 (FCTD-Interlocutory Injunction); (1997), 143 FTR 210, 81 CPR (3d) 338,
[1998] 2 FC D-24, [1997] FCJ 1788 (FCTD – Merits); revd (2000), 6 CPR (4th) 211,
[2000] FCJ 513, [2000] ACF 513, 188 DLR (4th) 132, 255 NR 1476 CPR (4th) 211,
[2000] 4 FC 195 (FCA); motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada dismissed on 2001-01-25 [2000] CSCR 302, [2000] SCCA 302 (SCC)
The plaintiff prepared and published a price guide for automobiles targeted at consumers.
For its guide the plaintiff selected three types of transactions namely, trade-in, private sale
and retail sale. It set out the value for each of these transactions [page212] in three columns.
The private sale column was in the middle, the trade-in column was on the left and the retail
column was on the right. At the time the plaintiff published its guide, other guides were
available but were targeted more at dealers of automobiles. After publishing its guide, the
plaintiff arranged for the defendant to verify the prices determined by the plaintiff and
entered in its guide.
The defendant published a price guide for automobiles which contained three columns, two
of which, including private sale, the defendant adopted from the plaintiff. The prices entered
in the defendant's guide differed from the prices entered in the plaintiff's guide and were the
result of the defendant's independent labour.
The plaintiff commenced an action claiming that the defendant's guide infringed the
plaintiff's copyright. At trial the defendant's president testified that the plaintiff's selection of a
private sale column in its guide was an innovative idea and that the assembling of the data
in the plaintiff's guide in three columns was original.
The trial judge found that the plaintiff's guides did not have the necessary creativity to attract
copyright and that, even if copyright subsisted in the plaintiff's guide, the defendant's guide
did not infringe the plaintiff's copyright. The plaintiff appealed.
Held, the appeal should be allowed.
The plaintiff claimed copyright in a subcompilation of the guide being the selection and
presentation of the three columns which were previously unavailable in other guides.
It is not easy to draw a line between a minimal degree of skill, judgment and labour and no
creative element. As a result of the testimony of the president of the defendant, the court
had no choice but to find in favour of the plaintiff. Copyright subsisted in the plaintiff's guide,
not for the three-column layout nor the selection or designation of the three markets used by
the plaintiff, but from the selection and layout of two of the columns, one dealing with private
sale and the other dealing with the retail market.
Copyright is infringed by reproducing a copyright work or any substantial part of the work.
What is substantial depends more on the quality and nature of what is reproduced than the
quantity of what is reproduced. The essence of the plaintiff's work was the three-column
layout, which was precisely what was taken by the defendant.
48
Fitzgerald v R.
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 554, [2000] 3 CTC 2011, [2000] GTC 2078 (Tax
Ct) Bowman J.
5 Where was this money to come from? It was allegedly to come from another mysterious
offshore company and it was said this money was borrowed and interest was paid. I do not
suggest that Mr. Fitzgerald was not acting in good faith, but I do think that he was sold, if I
may put it colloquially, a bill-of-goods. I think Mr. Thill was a con-artist and I think the schemes
that he was promoting went beyond mere aggressive tax planning. I think the partnerships,
though they may have had a patina or a façade of commerciality -- apparently some
magazines were produced -- their real object was to obtain a tax write-off. The printing of,
say, 100,000 copies of a magazine, when in fact millions and millions of copies were supposed
to be printed and sold, seems to me to be so insubstantial as evidence of a commercial
intent as to be virtually worthless. The Minister of National Revenue and counsel for the
Attorney General used the term "sham" and, I must say, I think the term is appropriate in these
circumstances. I do not think that it was ever intended to carry on a business with any view of
creating a profit. The real object seems to me to have been to get a tax write-off.
6 My reasons for dismissing these appeals are: first, I think the partnerships were shams;
secondly, I do not think the partnerships carried on a business or ever intended to carry on a
business; thirdly, I do not think that the amounts claimed by the partnership as advance
royalties, interest, insurance, and many other expenses, were ever, in fact, incurred or spent
or was any money ever changed hands. I do not think that any money was borrowed from
this mysterious offshore banking institution or lender. There was no commercial purpose
behind these various partnerships beyond getting a tax write-off and that is what Mr. Thill was
selling. There was no substance, in my opinion, to the partnerships and the publication was
merely a vehicle around which the partnership was structured in order to create the
impression of commerciality. It is significant that there was no evidence of any money being
set aside to carry on production, even though it was said that some 10 million-odd issues of
the magazine were supposed to be produced in the second year.
49
Fox v Von Huene
(2000), [2000] JQ 3023, [2000] CarswellQue 1836, JE 2000-1813, REJB 200020174 (QueSupCt) Langlois J.
Requête en injonction interlocutoire visant la cessation de l'utilisation d'un site Internet.
Accueillie.
L'intimé a développé l'idée de créer un site Internet visant à permettre les contacts entre
anciens camarades de classe. Il est entré en communication avec le requérant, qui est
consultant dans le domaine des ordinateurs et concepteur de sites Internet. Ils se sont adjoint
les services d'un informaticien. Pour la somme de 3 000 $, le requérant et l'informaticien ont
procédé à la programmation des données de base ainsi qu'à la présentation et au montage
du site, dont l'intimé est le propriétaire enregistré. Pendant un peu plus d'un an, des
discussions ont eu lieu entre les parties quant à la nature et à l'étendue de leurs relations
d'affaires. Finalement, l'intimé a mis fin à celles-ci a interrompu l'accès au site, craignant que
le requérant ne le démantèle. Il a communiqué avec un autre concepteur de sites Internet
et lui a demandé de recréer un site semblable sur le serveur utilisé à l'origine. Le requérant a
obtenu la délivrance d'une injonction provisoire ordonnant à l'intimé de lui transmettre le
code d'identification du site, le mot de passe y donnant accès et différentes données. Le
requérant soutient ne pas avoir reçu toutes les copies de l'oeuvre que constitue le site et ne
plus y avoir accès. Par le biais de sa demande d'injonction interlocutoire, il réclame les
mêmes conclusions que lors de sa demande d'injonction provisoire, et plus particulièrement
l'accès au site desservi par un serveur différent. L'intimé allègue essentiellement que le site
qu'il exploite est différent de celui créé par le requérant et le tiers informaticien.
Décision
La définition de l'expression «oeuvre littéraire» qu'on trouve à l'article 2 de la Loi sur le droit
d'auteur édicte que les programmes d'ordinateur sont couverts par cette définition. L'auteur
d'une oeuvre originale visée par la loi bénéficie des droits accordés par celle-ci. En l'espèce,
le concept du site faisant l'objet du litige provient de l'intimé, mais l'expression du concept est
le fruit du travail du requérant et d'un tiers informaticien, qui lui a cédé ses droits. Ils en sont
donc les auteurs. Le fait qu'ils se soient engagés envers l'intimé à créer le site moyennant
rémunération ne leur a pas fait perdre les droits qui s'y rattachent. De plus, on n'a pas établi
l'existence d'une cession de droit ou de licence en faveur de l'intimé. Conformément à
l'article 27 (1) de la loi, nul ne peut s'emparer du travail d'autrui, c'est-à-dire du titulaire du
droit d'auteur, sans son autorisation. En vertu de l'article 34.1 de la loi, il y a présomption que
l'oeuvre est protégée par le droit d'auteur et que le requérant est titulaire de ce droit. L'intimé
devait donc démontrer que le site conçu par le nouvel informaticien qu'il a embauché est
différent. Or, la preuve ne permet pas de conclure à l'originalité de cette oeuvre par rapport
à celle du requérant. La présomption n'est donc pas repoussée. L'utilisation par l'intimé d'une
oeuvre qui comprend plusieurs caractéristiques propres à celle du requérant constitue une
violation du droit de celui-ci à titre d'auteur. La requête est en conséquence accueillie. Le
tribunal fixe la caution que l'intimé devra fournir à 5 000 $ et ordonne l'exécution provisoire du
présent jugement nonobstant appel.
50
Grinshpun v University of British Columbia
(2000), [2000] FCJ 1446 , [2000] CarswellNat 1942, [2000] FTR TBEd SE024
(FCTD) Aronovitch, Prothonotary
[2] This is a simplified action in which Mr. Grinshpun claims general and punitive damages for
the infringement or conversion by the defendant of his copyright in certain programs being a
Boxercise and Boxing Program.
[12] As I find no evidence of copying, emulation, or conversion by the defendant either as it
relates to the descriptions or the programs, I must conclude that Mr. Grinshpun has not met
his burden of making out a prima facie case of infringement. I therefore need not go on to
consider the proprietary rights of Mr. Grinshpun, if any, in his Boxing and Boxercise Programs
including specifically the regimen described in the 7-page handwritten notes.
[14] More importantly, it is impossible to ascertain whether as described it falls within the ambit
or scope of the copyright certificate. Of his own admission, Mr. Grinshpun did not attach any
documentation to his application for registration with the Canadian Intellectual Property
Office. The copyright certificate issued to him has the title and nature of the work in precisely
the terms submitted by Mr. Grinshpun in his application. The title of the work is "Recreational
Boxing and Fitness." The nature of the work is described as "artistic (unique sports program)". It
is further indicated to be unpublished. There is not enough specificity to conclude what
artistic work is in fact covered by the certificate.
[15] I am therefore satisfied that Mr. Grinshpun has neither successfully proven the entitlement
or rights he claims with respect to his programs, or the descriptions, nor any violation of those
rights by UBC. Accordingly I hereby dismiss Mr. Grinshpun's action with costs.
51
Guérin Éditeur Ltée v Harcourt Brace & Co.*
(2000), JE 2000-905, REJB 2000-17500, [2000] JQ 1058 (QueSupCt) Jolin J.;
in appeal 500-09-009515-008).
Action en dommages-intérêts. Rejetée. Demande reconventionnelle en dommages-intérêts.
Rejetée.
En septembre 1991, les parties ont signé un contrat en vertu duquel la demanderesse s'est
engagée à traduire un ouvrage de référence en matière de comptabilité sur lequel la
défenderesse détenait tous les droits d'édition et de vente. En mai 1993, estimant que la
demanderesse n'avait pas respecté ses obligations, la défenderesse a mis fin au contrat. La
demanderesse lui réclame des dommages-intérêts de 259 474 $ pour cette résiliation. La
défenderesse soutient que, contrairement à ce qui avait été convenu, la demanderesse s'est
permis de faire une adaptation de l'ouvrage, et ce, malgré le fait qu'elle lui ait rappelé à
plusieurs reprises qu'elle devait s'en tenir à la traduction. La demanderesse prétend que le
contrat ainsi que les usages dans le milieu de l'édition lui permettaient d'effectuer certaines
adaptations. Elle ajoute que la défenderesse ne pouvait résilier le contrat sans une mise en
demeure préalable d'au moins 30 jours.
Décision
Il ne fait aucun doute que la demanderesse a procédé à certaines mises à jour et
adaptations de l'ouvrage, avec des ajouts et des retraits au texte original. Selon l'opinion d'un
expert en traduction, le travail de la demanderesse ne constitue pas une traduction fidèle de
l'oeuvre originale. Dans certains cas, la preuve de l'usage ou de la pratique commerciale
peut être admise, par exemple lorsque le contrat est silencieux sur un aspect particulier ou
qu'il est incomplet ou ambigu. Dans le cas présent, le contrat est suffisamment clair et il n'est
pas nécessaire de recourir à des sources extérieures pour l'interpréter. Quand il s'agit d'une
oeuvre littéraire, le traducteur peut bénéficier d'une certaine latitude pour traduire un texte
original, mais ce n'est pas le cas pour la traduction d'un ouvrage scientifique ou d'un traité de
comptabilité. D'autre part, il s'agit ici d'un contrat civil et, par conséquent, il n'y a pas lieu de
recourir aux dispositions de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur pour connaître la portée du mot
«traduction». La demanderesse ne s'est pas conformée à ses obligations. Elle a apporté des
modifications importantes à l'ouvrage. Si elle croyait ne pas pouvoir traduire le texte tel quel,
elle devait éviter de s'engager à le faire. De plus, dès qu'elle a compris que la défenderesse
n'accordait pas la même portée au contrat, elle devait en suspendre l'exécution pour
clarifier la situation avant de continuer. Elle devait traduire l'ouvrage et non le mettre à jour.
Si le contrat pouvait laisser subsister un doute sur le mandat confié à la demanderesse, la
défenderesse lui a précisé à plusieurs reprises la portée du mandat qu'elle lui avait confié.
Même si la défenderesse ne l'a pas mise en demeure, elle savait depuis plusieurs mois que la
défenderesse ne partageait pas son interprétation de la nature de ce mandat et qu'elle
s'opposait à l'adaptation de l'ouvrage. Plusieurs semaines, sinon plusieurs mois, avant que la
défenderesse décide de mettre fin au contrat, la demanderesse savait ce que celle-ci
exigeait et elle a eu amplement le temps de s'y conformer. Or, elle est restée sur ses positions.
Elle n'a pas droit aux sommes qu'elle réclame.
52
Harcourt Brace & Co. (Re)
(2000), [2000] CBD 7 (CB)
licence to Harcourt Brace & Company, Canada as follows:
(1) The licence authorizes the reprint of the following works:
- Barney written by Will Stanton, originally published in "Fifty Short Science Fiction
Tales" in 1951 by MacMillan Publishing;
- The Inheritor written by Frank Roberts, originally published in the Australian
magazine "Man" in 1963;
- The Curlew's Cry, written by J. Leslie Bell, originally published in "Alberta Bound:
Thirty Stories by Alberta Writers", edited by Fred Stenson and published in 1986 by
NeWest Press as originally published.
The number of copies printed for each work shall not exceed 25,000.
(2) The authorized reproduction of the above works is for inclusion in a textbook anthology of
short stories for high school English classes by Harcourt Brace entitled Inside Stories I (2nd
edition) and Inside Stories II (2nd edition).
53
Harcourt Canada Ltd. (Re)
licence to Harcourt Brace & Company, Canada as follows:
(1) The licence authorizes the reprint of the work entitled Racist Stereotyping in the
English Languagewritten by Robert B. Moore, reprinted in 1976 by the Council on
Interracial Books for Children from the book Racism in the English Language by
Robert B. Moore.
The number of copies printed shall not exceed 17,000.
The issuance of the licence does not release the applicant from the obligation to obtain
permission for any other use not covered by this licence.
54
Haupt v Eco-Nova Multi-Media
(2000), [2000] NSJ 414 , [2000] CarswellNS 406, [2001] NSR (2d) TBEd JA008
(NSSC) Davison J.
[1] This application was initiated by an originating notice (application inter partes) whereby
the plaintiff sought "delivery of possession ... of the stock footage for the television series
'Oceans of Mystery'."
[17] For the foregoing reasons the application should be dismissed. I would add the clause in
the schedule to the agreement, to which counsel for the plaintiff and defendants refer,
cannot be interpreted by any rule of construction because it is incomplete. It is written "the
parties to have joint access and control of the footage as the parties shall agree." (emphasis
added) This is an agreement to make an agreement. The parties have agreed to negotiate.
As stated by Chittey on Contracts 28th Edition at p. 145:
A further possibility is that the parties have simply agreed to negotiate. In spite of
dicta to the contrary, it has been held that a mere agreement to negotiate is not
a contract "because it is too uncertain to have any binding force." It therefore
does not impose any obligations to negotiate, or to use best endeavours to reach
agreement or to accept proposals that "with hindsight appear to be reasonable."
Nor, where an agreement fails to satisfy the requirement of certainty, can this
defect be cured by implying into it a term to the effect that the parties must
continue to negotiate in good faith.
[18] The application has been decided on issues raised in the hearing by the court. Both
counsel for the plaintiff and defendants expressed the view the court should adjudicate a
solution to the differences between the parties. In my respectful view, this would constitute a
mediation unsupported by any rule of law.
55
Horn Abbott Ltd. v Reeves
(2000), 182 NSR (2d) 357, 45 CPC (4th) 353, [2000] NSJ 34. [2000] CarswellNS
35, 563 PEIR 357, [2000] NSR(2d) TBEd FE021 (NSSC) Hood J.
A defendant applied to have an action brought against him by the plaintiffs struck or stayed
pending a decision in another case. [The subject matter of the Reeves matter is fraud and
conspiracy; the Wall action has a number of other causes of action, including a breach of
copyright claim.]
The Nova Scotia Supreme Court dismissed the application, but asked for further submissions
regarding whether the court could, on its own motion, order that the two actions should be
tried together or one after the other under Civil Procedure Rule 39.02. The court ruled that it
had the authority to make such an order but declined to do so on the evidence in this case.
Judges - Powers - Authority to act ex mero motu (on own motion) - A defendant applied to
have an action brought against him by the plaintiffs struck or stayed pending a decision in
another case - The Nova Scotia Supreme Court dismissed the application, but asked for
further submissions regarding whether the court could, on its own motion, order that the two
actions should be tried together or one after the other under Civil Procedure Rule 39.02 - The
court ruled that it had authority to make such an order but declined to do so on the
evidence in this case.
Judges - Powers - Authority to act ex mero motu (on own motion) - The Nova Scotia Supreme
Court, per Hood, J., discussed when it could act on its own motion to order that two matters
be tried at the same time or one immediately after the other under Civil Procedure Rule 39.02
- The court stated that "the circumstances under which the court could consider doing so
include: a) where the application before the court is for a similar remedy; b) where the
parties have had an opportunity to address the issue; and c) where the court is satisfied that
clause (a), (b) or (c) of Civil Procedure Rule 39.02 is met. Under these limited circumstances, it
is my view that the court is not entering 'the arena' of a litigation. Under these limited
circumstances, the court is simply trying to achieve the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of the proceedings which are contemplated by Civil Procedure Rule 1.03." -
56
Imax Corp. v Showmax, Inc.
(1999), [1999] FCJ 1275 (FCTD-Amendment); (1999), FCJ 1733 (FCTDPractice); (2000), [2000] FCJ 69, 5 CPR (4th) 81, 182 FTR 180, [2000] CarswellNat
135,
(FCTD-Interlocutory Injunction) Teitelbaum J. [Justice Rouleau granted a
permanent injunction against the Showmax defendants on May 16, 2000.]
The plaintiff owned a number of trade-marks comprising the word "IMAX", including the
registered trade-mark IMAX used in association with a variety of motion pictures and related
wares and services including motion picture theatre services. The plaintiff had invented and
developed the large-format cinema industry and had engaged in a range of activities in that
field for over 30 years. It operated 28 large-format cinemas in Canada.
The defendant announced its intention to operate large-format theatres in Toronto and
Vancouver, all in association with the trade-mark SHOWMAX. It had used the trade-mark
SHOWMAX on banners and magazines advertising the Montreal theatre and on its website. It
also exhibited an image of an Imax theatre in its promotional materials. Finally, the
defendant's Showmax website had offered a link, framed by a page of the Showmax site,
which led viewers to the Old Port of Montreal website which contained information about
and an image of the plaintiff's Imax cinema.
The plaintiff had commenced an action for trade-mark infringement, passing off,
depreciation of goodwill contrary to s. 22(1) of the Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13,
making false and misleading statements contrary to s. 7(a) of the Trade- marks Act, and
infringement of the plaintiff's copyright in its website. It brought a motion for an interim and
interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant from using the word "Showmax" as the name
of the large-format motion picture theatre it proposed opening in Montreal. In support of its
motion, the plaintiff filed an [page82] affidavit evidencing the results of a survey showing that
about half the people surveyed believed that Showmax theatres would be owned, operated
by or have some connection with the company that owned the Imax theatres. In response,
the defendant filed an affidavit that criticized the methodology of the plaintiff's survey
evidence, but did not provide evidence that the results would have been any different had a
more appropriate method been used. The plaintiff also filed an affidavit from an associate
dean of a business school who concluded that, if the defendant used the name SHOWMAX
with a large-format theatre in Montreal, confusion would result not only in lost sales but cause
damage to the goodwill and value of the mark IMAX, and that this latter type of damage
could not be calculated in monetary terms. The defendant did not file any evidence to
contradict the expert opinion as to irreparable harm.
Held, the motion should be granted with costs.
The plaintiff must establish that there is a serious issue to be tried, that it will suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction is not granted and that the balance of convenience favours the grant
of the injunction.
Serious issue
There are no specific requirements which must be shown to satisfy this test: the threshold is a
low one. The plaintiff's survey evidence showed that an arguable case existed on the issue of
in Canada.
Balance of Convenience
57
As the defendant had not commenced doing business in Canada and had incurred
only relatively insignificant costs in promoting the proposed opening of its large-format
theatre, the balance of convenience favoured the grant of the injunction.
58
Infinitec Marketing Group Inc v [Yours Industries Corp
(1999), [1999] Man.R.(2d) Uned. 51 (ManQB) Schulman; J.; (1999), [1999]
Man.R.(2d) Uned. 161, [1999] ManR (2d) TBEd SE 029 [1999] MJ 164, [2000] 5
WWR 283, 41 CPC (4th) 342 (Man QB) Kennedy J; each affd (2000), [2000]
CarswellMan 220, [2000] ManR Uned 45, 2000 MBCA 25, [2000] 7 WWR 297
(Man CA) Huband J.
There are two separate appeals in these two related actions. In the first, Schulman, J., denied
an application
for interim injunctive relief to Infinitec Marketing Group Inc. (Infinitec), and in the second,
Kennedy, J., granted an interim injunction to Essentially Yours Industries Corp.
59
Inhesion Industrial Co Ltd v Anglo Canadian Mercantile Co Ltd
(2000), 6 CPR (4th) 362, [2000] CarswellNat 687, [2000] FCJ 491, [2000] ACF
491,
[2000]
FTR
Uned
354,
en
(FCTD-Summary Judgment)
In December 1990 an employee of the plaintiff's subsidiary created a poinsettia design for
tableware. The plaintiff alleged that the copyright in the design as an artistic work was
assigned to the plaintiff in August 1998.
In 1993 the plaintiff commenced exporting and selling tableware featuring the poinsettia
design to a Canadian retailer. In 1998 the retailer requested that the plaintiff supply the
tableware for a reduced price. The plaintiff refused to decrease its price and the retailer
advised the plaintiff that it would source a new pattern of tableware from another
manufacturer.
In May 1998 the plaintiff learned that tableware bearing the poinsettia design was being
manufactured in China at the request of the defendant for resale to the Canadian retailer.
The design of the tableware was deliberately copied from the plaintiff's tableware. In August
1998 the plaintiff forwarded a cease and desist letter to the defendant. The defendant
refused to comply with the terms of the letter, imported the tableware into Canada and sold
the tableware to the retailer for the 1998 Christmas season.
In January 1999 the parties and the retailer met and attempted to settle the dispute.
In an action for infringement of copyright in the poinsettia design the parties moved for
summary judgment. In seeking summary judgment the defendant claimed that the dispute
between the parties was settled. The plaintiff filed two affidavits of an individual who had no
actual knowledge of the alleged assignment of the copyright. The assignment document
was merely attached to one of the affidavits as an exhibit. The affidavits were based on the
affiant's personal knowledge and business records of the plaintiff.
Held, the motions should be dismissed.
In a motion for summary judgment both the moving and responding parties must file their
best evidence. The onus is on the moving party to establish the facts necessary to obtain the
summary judgment sought.
The court was unable to determine from the plaintiff's affidavits from which records or persons
the affiant received the
information for the statement in the affidavit regarding the assignment of the copyright to the
plaintiff. Documents must be proven to be admitted into evidence. A document is not
admissible merely because it is attached to an affidavit. The presumptions set out in s. 34.1 of
the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, did not assist the plaintiff. By s. 34.1 copyright was
presumed to subsist in the poinsettia design and the burden then shifted to the defendant to
show that the work was not the proper subject of copyright. However, [page364] there was
no presumption that the copyright was owned by the plaintiff. The court was not therefore
able to find the facts necessary to decide that copyright in the poinsettia design was owned
by the plaintiff. There was a genuine issue for trial on the ownership of the copyright.
60
With respect to the alleged settlement, there was conflicting testimony concerning what
took place during the settlement negotiations. Credibility of the witnesses was therefore
an issue which would be better determined by the judge at trial.
61
Island View Beach Estates Corp. v. J.E. Anderson & Associates
(2000), [2000] BCJ 1553, [2000] CarswellBC 1560, [2000] BCSC 1121,
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/00/11/s00-1121.htm (BCSC) Quijano J.
[1] The plaintiff seeks an order of replevin pursuant to s. 57 of the Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 253 and Rule 46(4) of the Rules of Court, to recover from the defendant certain
survey plans.
[18] As I have said, there is no question that the defendant has copyright in the plans and
that it impliedly consented to the plaintiff's use of the plans when they were first delivered in
June or July or 1998. The plans were returned by the plaintiff to the defendant earlier this year
with a request that the defendant correct the plans in order to satisfy the requirements of the
Land Title Office. To that time there is no evidence that the defendant gave notice to the
plaintiff of any withdrawal of consent to the use of the plans. The defendant says that it has
the right to withdraw its consent to the use of the plans, and that the withdrawal of consent is
implicit in their refusal to return the plans to the plaintiff.
[19] According to the case of Koch v. Lloyd, [1985] B.C.J. No. 2112, (22 April 1985),
Vancouver Registry CA002093 (B.C.C.A.) the consent can be withdrawn only if there has
been no consideration for the consent given in the first place.
[20] When the plans were returned to the defendant for the correction services an
agreement was reached whereby the defendant would correct the plans to the satisfaction
of the Land Title Office provided the cost for doing so was paid in advance. That cost was
paid in advance and I conclude that it was a logical inference from those arrangements that
once the plans were corrected the plaintiff would be entitled to file them with the Land Title
Office, with the consent of the defendant.
62
Jolian Investments Ltd. v Gatien
(2000), [2000] CarswellOnt 3484, [2000] OJ 3719, [2000] OTCTBEd SE016
(Ont Sup Ct) Juriansz J.
[1] This case raises the question of whether the costs of an abandoned summary judgment
motion are to be determined by reference to rule 20.06(1) or rule 37.09(3).
[15] In this case it is unnecessary to review all the facets of the litigation and the summary
judgment motions. It is sufficient to note that the plaintiff claimed copyright infringement in its
action. The summary motions were filed on the basis of the plaintiff's responses to Requests to
Produce Documents. The plaintiff, in its responding material to the motions, produced nunc
pro tunc assignments of copyright to the plaintiff which were prepared and executed after
the motions were filed. In my view it was not unreasonable for the defendants to assume
they would obtain relief at least on this issue on the return of the summary judgment motions.
There was no evidence that the motions were brought for any of the improper purposes
identified by Belleghem J. in Innovative Automation Inc. Therefore, I refuse the plaintiff's
request for an order of costs in its favour on a solicitor client scale.
63
Keddy Motor Inns Ltd (Bankrupt) Re
(2000), [2000] CarswellNS 286, [2000] NSJ 307 [2000] NSR Uned 33 (NBSC)
Nunn J.
[1] This is an appeal by the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada
("SOCAN") from the disallowance by the Trustee of a claim against the bankrupt estate by
SOCAN.
[17] It is not unreasonable to conclude that the acceptance of the post-dated cheques and
a cheque for costs would, in these circumstances, amount to a complete satisfaction of that
part of the settlement agreement. The result, of course, is that the bankrupt is entitled to a
satisfaction piece releasing the whole of the judgment and no claim for profits under the
judgment survives.
[18] If I am wrong in my interpretation of the contract I would still find against SOCAN on the
basis of estoppel. SOCAN's conduct throughout the period involved here with regard to the
agreement, already discussed, and its failure to invoke any of the provisions for the timely
resolution of any problems relating to past amounts with which it was concerned together
with the acceptance of the various post-dated cheques and the cheque for payment of
costs, its failure to submit to the Reference directed in the judgment, and its failure to even
mention any intention to pursue a claim for profits under the judgment directly until very late
in the relationship all operate to create an estoppel. It would not be just to permit SOCAN to
claim this very large sum of money under the aegis that a claim for profits under the
judgment still exits. In my view SOCAN is estoppel from asserting this claim.
[23] In my view it would be most unfair to simply assess the amount claimed by SOCAN as the
amount of damages under the profits aspect of the judgment. It would be unfair to the
bankrupt when other evidence might very well be produced by the Trustee but also it would
be unfair to the other creditors.
[24] Therefore, to conclude, rather than assess this damage claim I would order, if my
dismissal of the claim were set aside, that there be an assessment of damages in the
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia to determine the actual profits earned which are attributable
to the profits aspect of the judgment for the period it related to.
64
Lepage v Litalien
(2000), REJB 2000-18050, [2000] JQ 1520, BE 2000-830 (QueCt-Small Claims)
Bécu J.
[9] À l'analyse, il est manifeste que la requête s'appuie sur l'inexécution d'une obligation imposée
par la Loi sur le droit d'auteur précitée; elle constitue une réclamation découlant de la loi seule
et partant, n'est pas une petite créance au sens de l'article 953 du Code de procédure civile.
Elle est recouvrable uniquement à la Division régulière de la Cour du Québec.
[10] Le Tribunal se rallie à la décision de monsieur le juge Marcel Blais sur une réclamation de
même nature dans l'affaire Guillemette c. Centre coopératif de loisirs et de sports du MontOrignal [C.P. Beauce (Saint-Joseph de Beauce), 350-32-000484-859, le 18 septembre 1985], et,
par analogie, à celle de monsieur le juge Denis Lavergne dans l'affaire 3120589 Canada inc. c.
Belzile [C.Q. Abitibi (Val-D'Or), 615-32-000512-960, le 7 avril 1997, B.E. 97BE-451] se rapportant à
une réclamation en dommages-intérêts fondée sur la Loi sur les brevets. [S.R.C. 1970, C. P-4
(maintenant L.R.C. (1985), c. P-4)]
[11] La Cour du Québec, division des petites créances, n'a pas compétence pour entendre une
telle requête. Il y a lieu toutefois de réserver les recours de la requérante.
65
Levasseur c. Pelmorex communications inc.
(2000), [2000] JQ 2945 (QueSupCt) Gomery J.
[1] La partie défenderesse, qui a reçu signification d'un avis de communication d'un rapport
d'expert selon l'article 402.1 C.p.c., réclame le rejet du dossier dudit rapport. Elle prétend qu'il
constitue tout simplement une opinion juridique quant au bien-fondé de la cause, et qu'il ne
met en lumière aucune donnée technique ou scientifique dépassant les connaissances et
l'expérience du juge qui aura à statuer sur le fond du litige.
[6] Le procureur du demandeur plaide que le rapport de Me Tamaro démontre sa
connaissance profonde de certains aspects techniques reliés à l'enregistrement d'une
émission pour la télévision, et qu'on devrait l'admettre à témoigner a titre d'expert sur le droit
d'auteur tel qu'il s'applique à cette industrie. Il plaide aussi que toute question de
l'admissibilité de son expertise serait mieux laissée à la discrétion du juge qui sera
éventuellement saisi de la cause au fond, et qu'il serait prématuré de la décider maintenant.
[7] Sur le premier moyen, après avoir lu le rapport en question, le Tribunal n'est pas persuadé
que Me Tamaro l'a écrit pour des fins autres que juridiques. Ni le rapport ni l'avis de sa
production ne le décrit comme expert sur des questions techniques. Son domaine d'expertise
n'est que le droit, une matière réservée exclusivement au juge.
[8] Quant au deuxième moyen, il est vrai qu'en cas de doute, il est toujours préférable de
laisser l'appréciation des qualifications de l'expert et la question de l'utilité de son expertise
au juge du procès […] Toutefois il y a lieu d'intervenir immédiatement où l'inadmissibilité de
l'expertise est évidente […]
66
Long Shong Pictures (HK) Ltd v NTC Entertainment Ltd
(2000), [2000] FCJ 625 (FCTD-Anton Piller) Reed J.; (2000), [2000] FCJ 557,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26414.o.en.html (FCTDContempt Norasia 2000-05-01); (2000), 6 CPR (4th) 509, [2000] FCJ 1813, [2000]
CarswellNat
818,
[2000]
FTR
TBEd
MY099,
en
(FCTD-Contempt Melody Min Lu 2000-05-05)
In an action for copyright infringement, the court granted an injunction enjoining the
defendants from dealing with films which infringed the plaintiff's copyright. Based on
evidence that the defendant operator of a video retail store continued to offer for sale
infringing copies of the films, the plaintiff successfully moved for a hearing requiring an
individual who was the director/ manager of the defendant to appear to show cause why
she should not be found in contempt of court. The individual testified that she had instructed
the store's salesperson to sell no further copies of the prohibited films.
Held, the individual should not be found guilty of contempt.
The individual was bound by the injunction even though it was not directed to her personally.
A finding of contempt must be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the burden
to prove all elements of the contempt is on the party alleging it. The standard of intention
required for breach of a court order is knowledge of the reasons for order and contravention
of the order. If it is clear that a director or officer of an enjoined corporation did all he or she
could to ensure that the injunction would be abided by, and the breach occurred without
fault on the part of the director of officer, that director or officer is not guilty of contempt. The
law of contempt does not require a director or officer to be an insurer or to stand over the
shoulder of every employee and supervise an employee who is in charge of the business.
Here, the breach of the order occurred because the salesperson disobeyed the individual's
instructions. The individual had clearly explained the order to the salesperson and the
importance of adhering to it. There was no evidence to satisfy the court beyond a
reasonable doubt that the individual was in contempt of court. [page510]
67
L.S. Entertainment Group Inc. v. 37 Degrees Enterprise Inc.
(2000),
[2000]
FCJ
624,
en
français à http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26492.o.fr.htm
(FCTD) Reed J.
[1] I have not been persuaded that grounds exist for granting an Anton Piller Order. The
appropriate course of action is for the plaintiffs to proceed by way of a motion for an
interlocutory injunction, on notice to the defendants, on the basis of the evidence (affidavit
and physical) that the plaintiffs already possess.
[2] This will allow for an examination of the rights the plaintiffs assert, in a contested
proceeding, in open Court, rather than the issuing of an order (Anton Piller Order) that can
do extensive damage to the defendants' business, perhaps even closing it down, without an
assessment of the merits of the plaintiffs' claim ever having been made.
[3] If the plaintiffs are successful in obtaining an interlocutory injunction, they can of course,
thereafter, proceed by way of contempt proceedings, should any continued infringement
occur.
68
L.S. Entertainment Group Inc. v. 552436 B.C. Ltd.
(2000),
en
(FCTD) Reed J.
occur.
69
L.S. Entertainment Group Inc. v. Sixty-six International Trading Inc.
Reed J.
(2000),
(FCTD)
occur.
70
LS Entertainment Group v. Wong
(2000), BCJ 2518, [2000] BCTC TBEd JA020, 2000 BCSC 1789,[2000] FCJ 625,
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/00/17/s00-1789.htm
(BCSCDisqualification) Bennett J.
[24] The conflict of the evidence in relation to the present application to have the
respondents removed from as counsel for the Defendants, is as to the relevancy of the
information received. On my reading of the affidavits, it does not appear that Mr. Pederson
conclusively denies that he received information regarding LS Entertainment, rather he
disputes that, of the information he can recall receiving from Mr. Leung, it is not relevant to
the present copyright infringement action of the Plaintiffs. The other conflicts in the evidence,
such as the conflict as whether the C & H Video proceedings were settled or not, is not strictly
relevant to the determination of the applicants' petition.
[56] The solicitors, Lawrence Wong & Associates, were defending Mr. Leung's company,
Richmond Dreams Laser & Video. During the course of conducting that defence, Mr. Leung
discussed some of the operations of the plaintiff's companies. Mr. Leung is a shareholder of
only one of the plaintiffs. Both actions relate to copyright infringement in relation to the Asian
movie industry. I cannot conclude that the previous relationship with Mr. Leung and the Firm
is sufficiently related to the Firm's present retainer, that is representing the defendants in this
action.
[72] The information Mr. Leung says passed between himself and Mr. Pederson occurred in an
unrelated copyright action. The information could not be relevant to the present action. The
information relied on by Mr. Leung is of a nature which is substantially different from the issues
enjoined in the present law suit. While both involve copyrights of Asian movies, the similarity
ends there.
71
Lyons Partnership v MacGregor
(2000), 5 CPR (4th) 157, 186 FTR 241, [2000] FCJ 341,
en
(FCTD-Contempt) Lemieux J.
The plaintiff held proprietary rights to the children's television character "Barney", a purple
dinosaur. The defendant was a children's entertainer, against whom an interlocutory
injunction had been granted, restraining him from further unauthorized use of the "Barney"
character, the related trade- marks and names, the passing off of his services as those of the
plaintiff and violation of s. 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
A private investigator, retained by the plaintiff, testified that he attended a performance
advertised as featuring "a famous purple mystery guest". He met the defendant backstage
and observed him dressing in a purple dinosaur costume, following which, he watched the
costumed figure perform a song and dance routine. Balloons bearing a representation of
"Barney" and the plaintiff's name were sold at the performance.
The defendant did not testify. His counsel informed the court that in earlier negotiations, the
defendant had been unwilling to pay a licence fee proposed by the plaintiff, on the ground
that the fee was excessive in amount.
Held, the defendant should be found guilty of contempt. [page158] It was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant performed in costume as "Barney" on this occasion, in
breach of several paragraphs of the outstanding injunction. He had knowingly breached the
injunction. There were no strong mitigating factors in the defendant's favour. A fine was
appropriate. Taking into account the amount of revenue earned by the defendant from the
performance and considering that this was his first contempt offence, a fine of $3,000.00 was
assessed, with an award of solicitor-client costs to a maximum of $2,000.00. These amounts
were intended to deprive the defendant of any profit from the performance and to be an
incentive not to repeat the unauthorized practice.
72
Malo c. Laoun
(2000), [2000] RJQ 458, [2000] RRA 204 (rés.), JE 2000-273, [2000] JQ 7, REJB
2000-15944 (Que.Sup.Ct.), Courteau J.; in appeal 500-09-009227-000
Résumé
Action en dommages-intérêts. Accueillie (30 000 $).
La demanderesse est une comédienne québécoise bien connue qui était mannequin
auparavant. En 1990, le défendeur, un opticien, a utilisé dans son commerce le matériel
promotionnel de la marque de montures de luxe Silhouette, dont une affiche dans la vitrine
de son commerce. En janvier 1996, il a consenti, à certaines conditions, à ce que le
promoteur d'un annuaire commercial utilise le matériel de Silhouette, principalement la
photo de la demanderesse, pour créer son annonce dans cet annuaire. Le promoteur est
allé de l'avant et a imprimé l'annuaire sans requérir d'autorisation de qui que ce soit, même si
le défendeur lui avait dit de communiquer avec l'agent de la demanderesse. Cette dernière
réclame 45 000 $ sous différents chefs de dommages-intérêts et 5 000 $ à titre de dommages
exemplaires. L'Union des artistes veut intervenir à l'action. Le défendeur, rejetant toute la
responsabilité sur le promoteur, qui a outrepassé ses instructions, s'oppose en outre à ce
qu'on interroge la demanderesse sur les circonstances entourant le contrat de photo pour
Silhouette parce qu'il contredit la facture qui constate ce contrat.
Décision
L'Union des artistes, dont est membre la demanderesse, a un intérêt suffisant pour participer
au débat afin de faire valoir son point de vue concernant l'utilisation de l'image des artistes à
des fins publicitaires. C'est un syndicat professionnel qui, selon ses statuts et règlements, «a
pour objet l'identification, l'étude, la défense et le développement des intérêts économiques,
sociaux et moraux de ses membres». La Loi sur le statut professionnel et les conditions
d'engagement des artistes de la scène, du disque et du cinéma prévoit la possibilité pour
une association d'artistes reconnue de «représenter les artistes chaque fois qu'il est de l'intérêt
général de le faire». Par ailleurs, l'objection à la preuve est rejetée. La demanderesse n'est
pas partie à la facture et la prohibition édictée à l'article 2863 du Code civil du Québec
(C.C.Q.) ne s'applique qu'à l'écrit instrumentaire qui constate un acte juridique. La facture,
ici, est un écrit pur et simple qui peut être contredit par tout moyen, dont le témoignage
(art. 2836 C.C.Q.). Enfin, la prohibition ne viserait qu'à éviter la preuve d'un contrat différent,
ce qui n'est pas le cas en l'espèce puisque le témoignage de la demanderesse ne fait
qu'informer le tribunal des détails du contrat qu'elle a conclu à l'époque avec Silhouette et
du cachet qu'elle avait alors reçu.
On ne peut retenir la prétention du défendeur voulant que, selon l'article 13 de la Loi sur le
droit d'auteur, seule Silhouette détienne quelque droit que ce soit sur la photo. Cette loi
reçoit application dans un contexte bien précis qui n'est pas celui du présent litige. De plus,
elle ne traite pas du droit de propriété relatif à la photographie elle-même ni du droit d'un
individu à son image dans le cas où la photographie a été commandée contre
rémunération. D'autre part, le droit d'auteur existe et il pourrait appartenir à Silhouette, qui
cependant n'exerce aucun recours. Ce droit n'a toutefois pas pour effet d'interdire à la
demanderesse de faire valoir son recours eu égard à la protection de son image (art. 3
C.C.Q.), qui est un droit incessible. En l'espèce, l'image de la demanderesse a été utilisée
sans son consentement, imprimée sur la couverture arrière d'un annuaire, et ses droits ont été
lésés. Par ailleurs, le défendeur a commis une faute en permettant au promoteur de
reproduire la photo de la demanderesse à des fins publicitaires. Le fait qu'il ait voulu faire une
publicité pour Silhouette, qu'il ait demandé à approuver la page publicitaire avant que le
promoteur procède à l'impression, que ce dernier ait dénaturé ses instructions ou outrepassé
73
à l'autorisation n'y change rien. Le défendeur était le détenteur de la photographie et il
ne pouvait la réutiliser sans le consentement explicite de la demanderesse. La photo
était destinée à la campagne de promotion 1990 de Silhouette; son utilisation était limitée et
il n'était pas autorisé à la reproduire dans les médias à d'autres fins. En outre, le défendeur a
tort de prétendre que la demanderesse, par choix professionnel, a consenti à ce que son
image soit diffusée en public et que la rediffusion d'une photographie déjà publiée et déjà
connue du public ne peut constituer une intrusion dans sa vie privée. Il existe un droit
autonome à l'image, jouissant d'un statut juridique propre, et l'artiste connu jouit d'une
protection particulière à cet égard. En effet, en droit français, la distinction entre le droit à
l'image et le droit à la vie privée est bien établie et les principes qui sous-tendent ce principe
s'appliquent en droit québécois. Le droit à l'image se rattache aussi bien à l'article 5 qu'à
l'article 1 de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, ce dernier protégeant la liberté
de la personne. Lorsqu'on utilise la photographie d'un artiste connu, l'atteinte touche
directement le droit à l'image sans nécessairement toucher le droit à la vie privée. Toutefois,
la personnalité publique bénéficie aussi de la protection de son image, soit afin d'en
empêcher la diffusion dans un contexte qui ne lui convient pas ou encore afin d'exiger une
compensation financière pour le bénéfice commercial rattaché à sa notoriété et à sa
réputation.
Au chapitre des dommages, la demanderesse a droit à 10 000 $ pour utilisation sans
autorisation de sa photo dans l'annuaire compte tenu du fait qu'au moment où le défendeur
a prêté la photo elle n'était pas la vedette qu'elle est aujourd'hui et qu'on ne connaît pas la
diffusion exacte de l'annuaire. Une somme de 15 000 $ est accordée au chapitre de
l'usurpation de l'identité artistique. En associant un artiste à une campagne publicitaire
contre son gré, on lui nie le droit de mener sa carrière comme il l'entend et on lui impose des
choix qui ne s'inscrivent pas dans son cheminement artistique. La demanderesse a aussi,
compte tenu du soin méticuleux qu'elle porte à sa carrière, droit à 5 000 $ à titre de
dommages moraux vu l'anxiété vécue à la suite de la publication. Enfin, il n'y a pas lieu
d'accorder d'indemnité pour dommages exemplaires, le défendeur n'ayant pas eu l'intention
de nuire. S'il s'est comporté de façon insouciante et sans considération pour les
conséquences de son geste, il croyait avoir le droit de reproduire dans un autre média une
photo déjà exposée au public.
74
Milliken & Company v Interface Flooring Systems (Canada) inc
(1998), [1998] 3 FC 103, 143 FTR 106, [1998] FCJ 135, 83 CPR (3d) 470 (FCTDMerits); affd. (2000), 5 CPR (4th) 209, [2000] FCJ 129, [2000] ACF 129, [2000] 2 FC
D-22,
[2000]
CarswellNat
1777,
251
NR
358,
en
(FCA)
A designer created a textile design and exhibited the design at an exhibition in January 1989,
where the designer met a representative of the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereafter purchased the
design for its commercial carpet business. The defendant copied the plaintiff's design for
carpet tiles that it installed at the Calgary airport.
The plaintiff commenced an action for copyright infringement and at the trial the plaintiff
failed to call the designer to testify as to the date of creation of the design. The trial judge
found that the design was created prior to June 8, 1988, that s. 64(1) of the Copyright Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, in force prior to June 8, 1988, applied and that by reason of that section
the design could not be protected by copyright. The plaintiff appealed.
Held, the appeal should be dismissed.
Per Rothstein J.A., McDonald J.A. concurring: The issue was whether the design was created
prior to June 8, 1988 and s. 64 of the Copyright Act as it existed prior to that date applied to
the design. If the design was created prior to that date and s. 64 as it so existed applied,
copyright protection was not available and the appeal could not succeed.
The presumption that copyright subsists did not apply because the issue for the purposes of s.
64 was when the design was created, not whether copyright subsisted. Even if the
presumption had applied, the plaintiff's failure to call the designer to testify as to the date of
creation of the design, led to the inference that, if called, the designer would have testified
to facts unfavourable to the plaintiff. The trial judge was entitled to draw an adverse
inference from the failure of the plaintiff to call the designer and to conclude that the design
was created prior to June 8, 1988.
Whether the textile design was a design for the purpose of s. 64 of the Copyright Act
depended on the application of the relevant law. As the textile design was created prior to
June 8, 1988, the plaintiff was not entitled to resort to the provisions of new s. 64. The plaintiff's
argument on the application of new s. 64 was directed solely at avoiding the clear intent of
Parliament that the law prior to June 8, 1988 continued to apply to designs created prior to
that date.
Per Isaac J.A.: The trial judge was correct in her conclusions as set out in her reasons for
judgment.
75
M.M. International Business Directories Ltd. v. International Business Index
(2000), 8 CPR (4th) 515, [2000] FTR Uned 394, [2000] FCJ 1338,
en
(FCTD) Rothstein J.
The plaintiffs, publishers of a business directory, had secured and executed an Anton Piller
order in an action for trade-mark and copyright infringement. The plaintiffs alleged that one
of the individual defendants took proprietary data from the plaintiffs which was sued by the
co-defendants to compile a competing directory. The plaintiffs moved to continue the Anton
Piller order and to convert the interim injunction into an interlocutory injunction.
The continuation of an Anton Piller order requires that a plaintiff show an extremely strong
prima facie case and very serious damages. There was doubt that the evidence
demonstrated an extremely strong prima facie case and there was no evidence of the
extent of harm suffered by the plaintiffs. An inference of lost revenue could not be inferred
from evidence of the defendant's revenue figures. The Anton Piller order was therefore
vacated.
With respect to the interlocutory injunction requested, the only irreparable harm alleged was
that the defendants would not be able to pay damages awarded to the plaintiffs at trial. As
there was no evidence from the plaintiffs of actual or potential [page516] damages, it was
not possible to determine whether the defendants were capable of paying such damages.
76
Modern Houseware Imports Inc v International Sources Ltd
(2000), 4 CPR (4th) 155, 180 FTR 253, [2000] FCJ 45, [2000] ACF 45,
en
(FCTD) Hargrave, Prothonotary
In an action for copyright and trade-mark infringement relating to packaging for potscrubbers, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants had infringed and threatened to
continue their activities unless restrained by the court. Two days after the statement of claim
was issued, counsel for the defendants wrote counsel for the plaintiffs with prejudice advising
that the defendants had taken steps to immediately stop the sale of the pot-scrubbers, had
taken steps to retrieve the impugned packaging from the distribution chain and would not
use such packaging in the future. The letter also offered a written undertaking to refrain from
such use.
In their statement of defence, the defendants alleged in paragraph 29 that the plaintiff had
not given the defendants notice of their claim, and in paragraph 30 referred to their counsel's
with prejudice letter and alleged that, if the plaintiff proceeded with the action, the
defendants would draw the court's attention to the letter on the issues of liability and
remedies. The defendants also alleged that the plaintiff had failed to take reasonable steps
to mitigate its damages.
The plaintiff moved to strike out paragraphs 29 and 30 of the statement of defence, and for
particulars of the plea regarding mitigation and the mere denials that the packaging
constituted original artistic and literary works protected by copyright of which the plaintiff was
the owner. With respect to paragraph 30, the plaintiff alleged that the letter from counsel for
the defendants was written as part of settlement negotiations and was privileged from
production in litigation.
Held, the motion to strike out should be dismissed; particulars should be ordered of the plea
regarding mitigation, but within 30 days after discovery, and particulars should be ordered of
the allegations regarding the subsistence and ownership of copyright.
Paragraph 29 presents a contrasting view of the facts, and answers some of the remedies
sought by the plaintiff.
Generally, communications attempting to effect settlement of litigation are privileged,
whether or not they are marked without privilege. The automatic claim for privilege in
settlement negotiation does not extend to correspondence clearly marked as being with
privilege. The letter of counsel for the defendants had none of [page157] the hallmarks of
negotiation. Both paragraphs 29 and 30 were permitted to remain in the statement of
defence.
The defendants had no particulars of the allegation regarding mitigation. If the action were
to proceed to trial, the
defendants might by that time have views on what the plaintiff failed to do to avoid loss. A
deferral of particulars can be reasonable and useful. The defendants were ordered to
provide particulars 30 days after discovery.
A mere denial as a traverse of an opposing party's allegation in a pleading does not give rise to
a right to particulars. If, however, the denial raises questions of law without support of any facts,
particulars ought to be ordered. In view of the presumptions as to the subsistence and ownership
77
of copyright in section 34.1 of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, the defendants' mere
denials of the subsistence and ownership of copyright were inadequate.
78
Multi-Level Technologies Inc. Previse Inc.
(2000), [2000] CarswellOnt 2395, [2000] OTC Uned 596 (SC) (Ont Sup Ct)
Cameron J.
[1] The Applicant seeks: (1) to determine its rights under the Joint Venture Agreement
respecting an ownership interest in and the right to market the OPsCon software; (2) a
declaration that it is a 50% owner of the OPsCon software; and (3) an order that the
Respondent deliver a copy of the intellectual property sufficient to reproduce the OPsCon
software.
[4] Whether the Joint Venture Agreement subsists or is terminated, Article 7 provides that
Article 5 respecting ownership of property survives the termination.
[5] Article 5 provides that the ownership of intellectual property developed by Previse and
that developed by MLTI shall vest with and be owned by that party.
[6] Article 5(b) further provides: "Notwithstanding this clause, at no time shall any portion of
the intellectual property of the OPsCon product, nor any component nor accompanying
element thereof, where such was NOT produced entirely at MTLI, be considered to be owned
by MTLI, unless specific prior provision for such ownership is jointly made in writing."
[7] While contained in paragraph 5(b) which deals with the property entitlement of MTLI, it
effectively creates an exclusion from MTLI ownership of OPsCon products unless the
conditions are met. There is no real dispute on the evidence. There has been no written
provision for ownership. The OPsCon software was not produced entirely at MTLI. The OPsCon
software was developed substantially by Previse with some recommendations and
suggestions and advice on technical specifications by MTLI.
9] This interpretation is confirmed by the negative covenant in paragraph (p) on page 6 of
the Distribution Agreement which the parties signed but have since terminated. Under that
agreement MTLI agreed to:
"(p) Not claim any rights or title in, or ownership of any Previse Product ..."
[10] Interpreting the first recital in the Distribution Agreement and its reference to Schedule A,
Previse Product includes OPsCon versions 1.4 and 1.6. There is no evidence whether later
versions were added to Schedule A.
79
National Archives of Canada (Re)
licence to the National Archives of Canada as follows:
(1) The licence authorizes the digital reproduction and the communication to the
public of excerpts of the following works on the National Archives of Canada's
Internet site at:
www.archives.ca in the exhibition entitled "The Canadian Memory":
The Canadian Girl Who Has Won World-Wide Fame by Carol Lawrence, as
published in 1916 by the National Council of Women of Canada in Women's
Century, Volume 4, No. 1, page 8;
Two pages from John T. Winterich's book Mademoiselle from Armentières,
published by Peter Pauper Press of Mount Vernon, New York, in 1953.
Issuance of this licence does not release the applicant from the obligation to obtain
80
National Library of Canada (Re)
(2000), [2000] CBD 10 (CB)
licence to the National Library of Canada as follows:
(1) The licence authorizes the use, the reproduction and the communication to the public
via the Internet of the following works:
- Photograph of Oscar Peterson published in Sound Magazine in November 1974
in an article written by Ted O'Reilly;
- Advertisement of Oscar Peterson's concert at The Blue Note, November 30 to
December 20 (year unknown);
- Front cover of Modern Keyboard Review, March/April 1971;
- Front cover of Metronome Magazine, October 1954.
(2) The authorized one-time use, reproduction and communication to the public via the
Internet of the above works is for an exhibition on Oscar Peterson on the Web site of the
National Library of Canada.
81
National Library of Canada (Re)
licence to the National Library of Canada as follows:
(1) The licence authorizes the digital reproduction and the communication to the public of
the book cover illustrations of the following works on the National Library of Canada's
Internet Web site at: www.nlc-bnc.ca in the exhibition entitled The Secret Self: An Exploration
of Canadian Children's Literature:
Le Loup de Noël by Claude Aubry, illustrated by Edouard Perret and published by
the Centre de psychologie et de pédagogie in 1962 (copyright in book cover
owned by Edouard Perret);
The Guardian of Isis by Monica Hughes, illustrated by Andrew Rhodes and
published by Atheneum in 1981 (copyright in book cover owned by Andrew
Rhodes);
The Isis Pedlar by Monica Hughes, illustrator unknown and published by Methuen
Books in 1983 (copyright in book cover unknown);
The Keeper of the Isis Light by Monica Hughes, illustrated by Terry Oakes and
published by Methuen Books in 1981 (copyright in book cover owned by Terry
Oakes);
Crisis on Conshelf Ten by Monica Hughes, illustrated by Graham Humphreys and
published by Copp Clark in 1975 (copyright in book cover owned by Graham
Humphreys);
Please Michael, That's My Daddy's Chair by Susan Elizabeth Mark and illustrated
by Winnie Mertens and published by Before We are Six in 1976 (copyright in book
cover owned by Winnie Mertens);
The Druid's Tune by O.R. Melling and illustrated by Siobhan McCooey and
published by Puffin Books in 1983 (copyright in book cover owned by Siobhan
McCooey);
Fresh Fish...And Chips by Jan Andrews, illustrated by Linda Donnelly and published
by Canadian Women's Educational Press in 1973 (copyright in book cover
ownedby Linda Donnelly).
Issuance of this licence does not release the National Library of Canada from the obligation to
obtain permission for any other use not covered by the licence.
82
Natural Waters of Viti, Ltd v CEO International Holdings Inc.
(2000), 5 CPR (4th) 321, [2000] ACF 452, [2000] FCJ 452, [2000] FTR TBEd
MY020, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26319.o.en.html,
en
français
à
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26319.o.fr.html (FCTD Prot.
- Motion to Strike) Lafrenière, Prothonotary
The plaintiffs commenced an action for passing off of the trade- mark FIJI, used in association
with bottled water, and infringement of copyright in label designs. The foreign manufacturer
and the exclusive Canadian distributor were named as co-plaintiffs. The defendants brought
a motion to strike the Canadian distributor as a co-plaintiff for lack of standing, to strike the
copyright claim for failure to plead an assignment in writing pursuant to s. 13(4) of the
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, and to strike a claim based on s. 7(d) of the Trade- marks
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, as a bare allegation of a breach of the statute.
Held, the exclusive distributor should be struck as a co- plaintiff, and the motion should
otherwise be dismissed.
A mere exclusive distributor cannot sue for infringement of trade-mark rights in the absence
of some goodwill owned by it, or of the trade-mark at issue being distinctive of it at least in
part. A person dealing with the goods of another may have goodwill in the business in
dealing with them, but such goodwill must be distinct from that of the owner to found a
cause of action. Generally, a trade-mark is that of a manufacturer and not that of the
Canadian distributor. Only an owner of the goodwill associated with a trade-mark can bring
a statutory passing off action. The facts as pleaded in the statement of claim did not establish
that the exclusive distributor had a shared reputation and goodwill with the manufacturer,
nor that the distributor had been licensed by or with the authority of the manufacturer as
provided under s. 50 of the Trade-marks Act.
The copyright claim was not struck for failure to plead an assignment in writing. The statement
of claim alleged ownership of copyright in the plaintiff manufacturer and the facts on a
motion to strike must be taken as proven.
The claim based on s. 7(d) disclosed a reasonable cause of action as it contained sufficient
detail that the defendants intentionally created a product look which would lead the
customer to the false conclusion that the defendant's product was the same or originated at
the same place as that of the plaintiff manufacturer.
83
Neudorf v Nettwerk Productions Ltd
(1998), [1998] BCJ 2690 (BCSC – Expert Evidence of plaintiff); (1998), [1999]
BCJ 2904 (BCSC – Expert Evidence of Defendant); (1999), [1999] BCJ 2832
(BCSC –Amendments to Defence); (1999), [1999] BCJ 2831, 3 CPR (4th) 129,
[2000] 3 WWR 522, 71 BCLR (3d) 290, [1999] CarswellBC 2774 (BCSC – Merits);
appeal CA 026717; (2000), 8 CPR (4th) 154, 48 CPC (4th) 140, [2000] CarswellBC
1711, [2000] BCJ 1705, [2000] BCTC TBEd AU065, 2000 BCSC 1257,
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/00/12/s00-1257.htm
(BCSC-Costs)
Cohen J.
The defendants had successfully defended an action for copyright infringement in musical
works after a 39-day trial. Prior to the trial, the defendants had made an offer to settle which
would have provided the plaintiff with increased compensation [page155] in respect of the
musical works plus costs of the action. After the trial in January 2000, the defendants furnished
the plaintiff with a draft bill of costs and in March 2000 furnished motion materials with respect
to the motion for costs. In April 2000 the plaintiff filed an assignment in bankruptcy.
The defendants subsequently moved for special costs, or in the alternative increased costs, or
in the further alternative costs on scale 5 plus double costs. The defendants also moved for an
order that s. 69.3 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, did not preclude
the defendants from proceeding with their motion to tax costs.
The defendants' actual costs were approximately $518,000, their special costs (formerly
solicitor-client costs) calculated at 80% were approximately $415,000 and their ordinary costs
at scale 5 were approximately $94,000.
Held, the motions should be granted and costs should be assessed as increased costs.
Section 69.3 prohibits a creditor from commencing or continuing an action for the recovery
of a claim provable in bankruptcy until after the trustee in bankruptcy has been discharged.
Section 69.3 did not apply because, first, the section stays an action and not each step in the
action, secondly, it is questionable whether an unquantified claim for costs is a claim
provable in bankruptcy, and thirdly, taxation of costs is merely a step to quantify a claim that
had been previously established.
Special costs will only be ordered if there is an unusual feature in the action or misconduct in
addition to significant disparity part of the plaintiff that justified rebuke by an award of special
costs.
A large discrepancy between ordinary and special costs is a major factor in determining
whether increased costs should be awarded. Where such a discrepancy exists, a court must
inquire into the extent of the disparity and determine the basis for it.
Several factors supported an award of increased costs. The plaintiff rejected the offer to
settle which resulted in the 39- day trial. At the end of the trial, the court found for the
defendants largely on the plaintiff's testimony. There was no evidence to support the
allegations of the plaintiff that one or more of the defendants were lying or misled the court.
As a result, it would have been unjust if costs were not awarded as increased costs. Increased
costs were awarded at 60% of special costs.
84
85
Nuri’s Watercolour Designs Co. v. Fifth Avenue Collection Ltd
(2000),
[2000]
CarswellNat
1771,
[2000]
FCJ.
1330,
en
(FCTD-Costs) Pilon , Assessing Officer
[Taxation upon discontinuance of a copyright action]
[6] An amount of $320.85 is claimed for corporate search charges. Mr. Green argues the
invoice from Crease & Company lists the name of ten companies and on that basis only onetenth of this account should be allowed. Mr. Brett replies the defendants were obliged to
search Nuri's Watercolour Designs Co. Inc. and any related names including Abraxas
Contemporary Jewellery Ltd. one of Nuri's operating corporations which was disclosed in the
course of the plaintiffs' production of documents. He adds that although the account of
Crease & Company refers to ten corporations, this only arises by virtue of their reporting on all
companies with similar names which were disclosed, which is a common phenomenon when
conducting corporate searches. I agree with Mr. Brett's explanation and will allow this
disbursement in full.
86
Oakley, Inc v Jane Doe
(2000), 8 CPR (4th) 506, [2000] CarswellNat 1995, [2000] FCJ 1388, [2000]
TBEd
SE095,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27256.o.en.html (FCTD)
Pelletier J.
The plaintiffs in nine actions for trade-mark and copyright infringement had secured rolling
Anton Piller orders and had co- operated in executing the orders on a defendant at the
same time with the same team of lawyers and investigators. The plaintiffs seized a significant
portion of the defendant's inventory.
The defendant did not appear on the motion for the review of the execution of the Anton
Piller order and allowed the statements of claim to be noted in default. On motions by the
plaintiffs for the assessment of damages and costs, the plaintiffs in each action claimed $3000
for nominal damages and $1750 for costs, exposing [page507] the defendant to a total
award in the nine actions of $42,750. The defendant did not appear on the motions.
Held, the motions should be granted.
Proof of damages in an action in respect of counterfeit merchandise sold at flea markets
may be difficult. It may not be possible to show damages for lost sales because a person who
buys the counterfeit merchandise may be reluctant to spend the money required to
purchase the genuine article. It is more likely that the damage is to the goodwill of the
plaintiff due to the inferior quality of the counterfeit article. A further difficulty in the
assessment of damages could arise due to the lack of sales records of the defendant. In
such circumstances, where the defendant defaults, it does not seem unfair or unreasonable
to award a fixed amount to represent damages. By convention the court has assessed
damages at $3000 per plaintiff in cases in which the defendants operate from temporary
premises such as flea markets.
Awards of $3000 as nominal damages in each of the actions was fair and was not made less
fair by the fact that the plaintiffs advanced their claims at the same time.
Multiple plaintiffs executing Anton Piller orders is, however, relevant in the assessment of costs.
The costs of the execution and review of the Anton Piller orders was assessed at $500 per
order, and costs for the entry of default judgment was assessed at $250 per order having
regard to Columns I and II of Tariff B of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106.
The court observed that fixed nominal damages would not relieve a plaintiff from proving
damages if a defendant in comparable actions put damages in issue. In future, it would be
appropriate for plaintiffs to bring to the attention of defendants the possibility of judgment
being issued and the amount of the judgment in actions in which rolling Anton Piller orders
are secured. This could be done as part of the process of explaining the Anton Piller orders
and the associated legal process at the time of execution of the orders.
87
Office national du film du Canada (Re)
(2000), [2000] DCDA 5 (CB)
Commission du droit d'auteur accorde une licence à l'Office national du film du Canada
comme suit :
1) La licence autorise la reproduction et l'incorporation d'une photographie
parue dans le Soleil de Québec du 21 juin 1969, dans un documentaire
provisoirement intitulé "Mai en décembre".
La photographie, dont le photographe est inconnu, représente un manifestant
(identifié comme M. Dudemaine par la réalisatrice du documentaire).
L'image cinématographique de la photographie durera au plus 3 secondes dans
le film documentaire de 25 minutes.
La licence autorise aussi l'exécution en public ou la communication au public par
télécommunication de la photographie ainsi incorporée ainsi que sa
reproduction sur tout support à des fins de distribution pour de la représentation
privée, comme partie de l'exploitation du film documentaire.
88
Programmation Gagnon Inc v Lemay
(2000), REJB 2000-17795, JE 2000-738 (QueSupCt-Interlocutory Injunction)
Hardy Lemieux J.
Résumé
Requête en injonction interlocutoire. Rejetée.
En août 1989, la défenderesse Tremblay a vendu à la demanderesse un logiciel de gestion
informatique des rôles d'évaluation foncière fonctionnant sur une plate-forme Unix pour des
ordinateurs de la génération Tandy 6000, 386 ou 486. En plus de lui céder tous les droits
d'auteur relatifs à ce logiciel, Tremblay et le défendeur Lemay se sont engagés à ne pas faire
concurrence à la demanderesse pendant une période de cinq ans. Depuis, ces derniers
auraient mis au point un nouveau logiciel pour la gestion informatique des rôles d'évaluation
qui fonctionne sur une plate-forme SEF+ et Windows. La demanderesse prétend que ce
nouveau logiciel constitue une contrefaçon de celui qu'elle a acquis en 1989. Elle réclame la
délivrance d'une injonction interlocutoire pour obliger Tremblay et Lemay à lui remettre tous
les logiciels de la version 1989 et ses dérivés, y compris la nouvelle version, à ne lui faire
aucune concurrence pendant les cinq prochaines années et à rompre tous les contrats
conclus en vue de la vente de leur nouveau logiciel. En plus de nier la contrefaçon, Tremblay
et Lemay ont invoqué l'expiration de leur engagement de non-concurrence.
Décision
La Loi sur le droit d'auteur accorde le statut d'oeuvre littéraire au logiciel qui peut être utilisé
directement dans un ordinateur (art. 2 de la loi). De plus, l'article 34.1 (1) a) crée une
présomption de protection de l'oeuvre sur laquelle porte la contestation. En l'espèce, l'expert
des défendeurs a semé un doute sur l'apparence de droit de la demanderesse. Selon ce
dernier, le contenu des logiciels est basé sur les exigences des guides du ministère des
Affaires municipales, qui en possède donc tous les droits d'auteur. D'autre part, cet expert
conclut que le logiciel SEF+, qui possède des caractéristiques qui lui sont propres, ne constitue
pas un dérivé ni une contrefaçon de celui vendu à la demanderesse. En outre, les
dommages-intérêts réclamés en plus de la délivrance d'une injonction interlocutoire
pourraient adéquatement compenser le préjudice subi par la demanderesse. Le long délai à
engager la présente procédure peut laisser croire que le préjudice n'est peut-être pas aussi
sérieux et irréparable que le prétend la demanderesse. Enfin, la prépondérance des
inconvénients penche en faveur des défendeurs, dont le droit au travail serait sérieusement
restreint si la présente requête était accueillie. Ils ne seraient plus en mesure d'exploiter la
mise en cause Services micro-informatique ni de mettre au point de nouveaux logiciels
d'évaluation municipale. Ils devraient renoncer à leur clientèle au profit de la demanderesse
et quitter le domaine de l'informatique pour une période de cinq ans, faisant ainsi renaître
leur engagement de non-concurrence, qui est éteint depuis octobre 1994. La requête sera
donc rejetée.
89
Retransmission of Distant Radio and Television Signals During 2001
(2000-12-08), http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/tocretrans-e.html (CBInterim)
The objection of 2000051 Ontario Inc. (JumpTV) to any interim television retransmission tariff
“that does not adequately address Internet-based retransmission” is noted. JumpTV has
requested that both the interim and final tariff deal with the offering of over-the-air signals on
the Internet. The answer to its concerns does not lie in denying retransmitters and collectives
the benefits of a stable business environment, but in dealing swiftly with its requests. The
matter will be addressed shortly.
90
Retransmission of Distant Radio and Television Signals, in Canada, in 1998,
1999, and 2000 (Re)]
(2000), 5 CPR (4th) 440, [2000] CBA 3, , [2000-02-25] http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocretrans-e.html (Copyright Board)
Eight collective societies filed joint statements of proposed royalties for the retransmission of
distant radio and television signals for 1998, 1999 and 2000. The statements included one set
of rates identical to the 1995-1997 certified tariffs and another set of higher rates taking into
account the value of compilations claimed by certain of the societies. The statements were
opposed by objectors representing cable operators and direct-to-home systems.
In February 1999, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission
required all Canadian retransmitters to carry the French language network TVA. The principal
issues raised by the proposed royalties were (1) whether the direct-to-home systems should be
entitled to a Francophone market discount, (2) whether the broadcast day compilations
should be entitled to an increase in rates, (3) whether sports programming should attract a
higher valuation than other programming, and (4) whether retransmitters who carry the TVA
service as the only distant service should be excused from paying royalties.
Held, a tariff should be certified at rates comparable to the 1995-1997 certified tariffs in
accordance with the terms and conditions fixed by the board.
A Francophone market discount for direct-to-home was inappropriate because the tariff
already ensured that systems that carried only distant signals such as direct-to-home
benefitted greatly from the tariff structure and direct-to-home subscribers subscribed to more
limited packages than cable subscribers which contained optional signals of value to them.
Two of the collective societies claimed that the amendment of the Copyright Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-42, to provide in s. 21 for broadcasters' rights deprived broadcasters from also
claiming retransmission royalties. Broadcasters' rights in their signals in s. 21 were, however,
distinct from rights in their works such as program compilations. Broadcast compilations were,
therefore, protected works entitled to remuneration under the retransmission regime.
[page441]
Certain of the collective societies alleged that the previous tariff formula failed to recognize
the true value of broadcast compilations. These societies claimed that the compilations
resulted in "inheritance", the contribution of lead-in viewers to the ratings of the next program
in the schedule, and that an appropriate proxy for the value of the compilation was the
promotion. This claim did not take into account the effect on inheritance of the practice of
simultaneous substitution. The on- air promotion in a substituted program was not seen by the
viewer and could not, therefore, affect the ratings of the promoted program. The failure of
promotion to take into account simultaneous substitution was sufficient to reject it as a proxy.
The collective societies representing sports programming claimed that the "hybrid approach"
adopted by the board in the previous tariffs to determine the allocation of royalties did not
take into account the premium value of sports programs. These societies proposed that the
royalties be divided into pools representing each program genre and that sports
programming be allocated a higher value in accordance with a recent United States
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel decision. The United States decision was of little use
because of the differences in the United States and Canadian retransmission regimes. The
societies' proposal was rejected because of potential inaccuracies of measuring cable
operators' subjective valuation of programs and because subscriber valuation through
91
viewing was the most appropriate measure of value. The previous hybrid approach was
endorsed.
The TVA service constituted a signal within the meaning of s. 31 of the Copyright Act. The
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission's order for the carriage of
the TVA signal was favourable to TVA. Without the order, TVA could not have established a
national network as the existing networks had done. The discount for carriage of TVA as the
sole distant signal should significantly exceed the Francophone market discount and was set
at 95%.
92
R v Bonamy
(2000), 6 CPR (4th) 1, 137 BCAC 298, 223 WAC 298, [2000] BCJ 960, [2000]
CarswellBC 992, 2000 BCCA 308, http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdbtxt/ca/00/03/c00-0308.htm (BCCA); application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed (2000), [2000] SCCA 345
The accused appealed convictions at a jury trial of two counts for having knowingly made for
sale or hire infringing copies of copyrighted computer software contrary to s. 42(1)(a) of the
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, and two counts of fraud contrary to s. 380(1) of the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
With respect to the first count under the Copyright Act, the Crown adduced evidence that
the accused had purchased four software packages having different serial numbers and
installed for customers copies of the software having the same or non- existent serial numbers.
With respect to the second count under the Copyright Act, the accused's company had
entered into negotiations with a US software [page2] company to become the supplied the
accused with copies of the software, codes and manuals, but no agreement was reached.
The two counts of fraud related to the supply by the accused of copies of the software
company's software to his customers.
The accused based his defence on, inter alia, the limitation period under s. 41 of the
Copyright Act, and the failure of the Crown to prove the precise ownership of copyright (with
respect to the first and second counts under the Copyright Act), and res judicata in view of
multiple convictions (with respect to the counts under the Criminal Code).
The limitation period contained in s. 41 of the Copyright Act applies in respect of civil
remedies for copyright infringement and not the summary remedies contained in s. 42 and 43
of the Act. The heading of "Summary Remedies" for ss. 42 and 43 was used in aid of such an
interpretation. The offences under the Copyright Act were not, therefore, barred by a
limitation period.
The circumstantial evidence of copying introduced by the Crown with respect to the second
count under the Copyright Act was evidence from which a properly instructed jury, acting
judicially, could convict, in absence of any explanation for the duplication of the software.
Multiple convictions can be recorded for the same activity, provided there are additional
and distinguishing elements between the offences. The elements of the offences under the
Copyright Act for knowingly making infringing copies for sale or hire were quite different from
fraud upon those to whom the copies are distributed. The risk of deprivation of the accused's
customers was the risk of action by the copyright owner to enjoin use of the software or for
destruction of the software. The customers, therefore, received less than what was
represented to them.
93
R. v Kazemian
(2000), [2000] CarswellOnt 5166 (Ont Ct) Gorewich J.
1 This is an application brought by the accused persons Manoucher Kazemian and Shahrokh
Reyhani who are each charged with 30 counts of contravening section 42(2)(a) of the
Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. C-42, as amended, as well as one count of fraud over $5000.00
contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
2 The motion brought by the Applicants requests an order granting leave to cross-examine
the Informant, Constable Carolyn Blais, with respect to an Information sworn by her on May
25/99, in support of an application for a search warrant. The order permitting Constable Blais
to be cross-examined on her Information was made on August 28/00.
3 The Applicants also request an order that the search warrant issued on May 25/99 be
quashed.
4 The Applicants further request an order that any evidence seized pursuant to the execution
of the search issued on May 25/99 be excluded at the trial of the Applicants.
89 The Information presented to the Justice of the Peace contained several inaccuracies and
material nondisclosures. I find the non- disclosures had the effect of not providing the Justice
of the Peace with an inaccurate picture, such as would not allow that judicial officer to make
a proper determination as to whether an offence had been committed. The basis for this
finding is contained in the evidence of P.C. Blais outlined above. Instances of such material
non-disclosures have been outlined in the analysis of the evidence and the Information.
90 I find, without repeating the above text, with respect to the paragraphs in the Information
analyzed above there were material non-disclosures, inaccuracies and omissions. I agree
with the Applicants' view, the judicial officer was misled.
91 In this case, find I am unable to accept the submission of the Respondent. It is unfortunate
that the officer in this case deliberately took the route of least resistance and showed a
deliberate disregard for the principles of law, and did not discharge the investigational
mandate required in these circumstances. She further included in the Information presented
to the Justice of the Peace misstatements, setting out facts in several key areas, already
referred to, as categorical facts derived as a result of police investigation, when such facts
were taken directly from correspondence and unattributable sources and sworn to as being
established findings.
92 Throughout this application, there is an attempt by the Respondent to weave a thread to
illustrate the investigation of the complainants, and the offences alleged have been
satisfactory, or at least adequate enough. The Respondent submits its sources were reliable
and trustworthy. The Information was drafted in such a way to cause the reader to believe
the material therein and the sources of information were had been thoroughly investigated. I
find such not to be the case. There was inadequate investigation by the police, not only into
the alleged offences, but as well, into the sole source of their information, the complainants
themselves
95 In addition to the deficiencies alluded to thus far, there is the material non-disclosure of the
participation of the civilian complainants and a Mr. Sweeny. As noted above there was no
reference to these people whatsoever in the material presented to the Justice of the Peace.
The police did not include the participation of the civilian assistants, even though P.C. Blais
94
testified they were necessary as the police would not know what to look for; and further
the civilian assistants could read Farsi, the language of most of the covers. The evidence
also reveals P.C. Blais knew this information prior to the preparing of the Information
presented to the Justice of the Peace.
95
Rothery v Grinnel
(2000), 81 Alta LR (3d) 270, 47 CPC (4th) 94, 262 AR 182, [2000] AJ 162,
[2000] CarswellAlta 148, [2000] AR TBEd MR029 (Alta QB) LoVecchio, J.
A defendant applied to strike out a statement of claim as an abuse of process under rule
129(1)(d).
A Master of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, in a decision not reported in this series of
reports, dismissed the application. The defendant appealed.
The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench dismissed the appeal.
Practice - Jurisdiction - General - The plaintiff professors filed formal complaints with the
university against the defendant professor - They alleged that the defendant violated the
university's Integrity and Scholarly Activity Policy because he reproduced certain of their
works in his textbook without their permission and without giving them credit - A university
investigatory committee dismissed the complaints - The plaintiffs sued the defendant claiming
that his reproduction of their works infringed their moral rights and breached copyright law They sought damages and an injunction - The defendant applied to strike out the statement
of claim as an abuse of process - The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench affirmed a Master's
decision dismissing the application - The decision of the university's investigatory committee
did not oust the court's jurisdiction.
96
Rutherford (Re Donald)
(2000), [2000] CBD. 6 (CB)
the following licence to Donald Rutherford:
(1) The licence authorizes the reproduction of various articles published in the
Wainwright Star newspaper during the years 1908 to 1918.
The total number of copies of each article shall not exceed 75.
97
Rutherford (ReDonald)
the following licence to Donald Rutherford:
(1) The licence authorizes the reproduction of various articles published in the
Wainwright Star newspaper during the years 1908 to 1918 in a book entitled
"Wainwright History" written by the applicant.
The total number of copies of each article shall not exceed 300.
Issuance of this licence does not release the applicant from the obligation to obtain
98
Saxon v Communications Mont-Royal Inc.
(2000) [2000] JQ 5634 (QueSupCt) Denis J.
[72] La preuve montre que Saxon est l'auteur des "True Stories". L'article 34.1 (1) de la Loi crée
une
présomption de droit d'auteur.
[73] Rand soumet que l'adaptation qu'il fait des historiettes écrites par Saxon fait perdre à
celles-ci leur caractère original. L'affirmation est contredite par la preuve présentée.
[74] Les textes de Saxon sont le fondement de la portion de deux ou trois minutes de
l'émission consacrée aux "True Stories". Il est vrai que Rand corrige quelques expressions ou
supprime une phrase qu'il juge inadéquate. Il est aussi vrai que lui et Tasso (le co-animateur)
ajoutent des commentaires pour agrémenter l'histoire, mais fondamentalement, cette
adaptation est bien accessoire au texte qui est l'assise de cette portion d'émission comme le
démontre la preuve et l'écoute de la cassette P-9.
[75] Bref, le texte des historiettes demeure une oeuvre originale créée par Saxon dont Rand
ne peut s'attribuer la paternité ni le titre de co-auteur au sens de l'article 2 de la Loi.
[81] On a vu que l'auteur est libre de prévoir une stipulation par laquelle l'auteur, même
employé par un tiers, peut conserver son droit d'auteur. Une telle stipulation existe en
l'instance.
[82] On a vu que la pièce P-2, une facture de Saxon adressée à Rand réserve à l'auteur la
propriété intellectuelle sur les "True Stories". La stipulation est contenue au paragraphe 31 du
présent jugement.
[83] De même, dans le contrat P-3, Saxon réitère sa réserve de droit d'auteur (paragraphe 44
du présent jugement).
[84] De façon claire, Saxon a toujours voulu conserver a propriété intellectuelle.
[85] De même, les quatre critères permettant d'établir la relation employeur-employé
commentée par le juge Macerola dans l'affaire Wiltran ne sont certes pas évidents en
l'instance.
[86] La propriété des outils : Saxon écrit les historiettes chez lui initialement sur une vieille
machine à écrire puis sur un ordinateur usagé que Rand lui donnera.
[87] Le contrôle ou lien de subordination : Saxon écrit au gré de son inspiration. Il n'accepte
aucune direction de Rand et les notes manuscrites adressées à ce dernier et accompagnant
les textes montrent à l'évidence l'absence de tout lien de subordination. On lira avec intérêt
à ce sujet la note accompagnant l'historiette P-13.
[88] Le risque de pertes ou profits : Saxon écrit quand Rand a besoin de lui. Si l'historiette n'est
pas lue en ondes, Saxon n'est pas payé.
[89] L'intégration du travailleur à l'entreprise : les histoires de Saxon sont l'un des multiples
segments de l'émission matinale de Rand. Ce dernier identifie une centaine d'éléments à son
émission dont les "True Stories" n'en seraient qu'un.
99
[90] L'ensemble de ces éléments liés aux stipulations claires et non ambigues de Saxon
se réservant la propriété intellectuelle de ses historiettes montrent que les défendeurs ne
peuvent avec succès se prévaloir de l'exception de l'article 13(3) de la Loi.
[91] La règle générale s'applique et en conséquence, Saxon est toujours demeuré titulaire du
droit d'auteur sur les "True Stories".
100
Seaward Kayaks Ltd. v. Ree
(2000),
[2000]
CarswellBC
2596,
[2000]
BCSC
1742,
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/00/17/s00-1742.htm (BCSC) Shabbits
J.
[2] The plaintiff claims that it has a unique rudder, which it markets under the trademark
"SmartRudder." It claims that its current rudder design was formalized in 1996 in copyright
protected schematics.
[8] The defendant submits that since the plaintiff has produced more than 50 rudders, it is not
an infringement of The Copyright Act for him to reproduce the design of the plaintiff's rudder.
[26] I have considered the relative strengths of the case as the matter appears from the
affidavits. The defendant's argument that the plaintiff may no longer claim copyright
protection, having failed to obtain protection under the Industrial Design Act, may prevail at
trial. However, the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant wrongfully used the plaintiff's
confidential information, and that he breached the confidentiality required by the terms of
his employment, cannot be lightly cast aside.
[27] I am of the opinion that the interlocutory injunction sought by the plaintiff ought to issue.
101
Shareline Systems Ltd. v N.B.
(2000), [2000] NBJ N 350, [2000] CarswellNB 342, [2000] NBR (2d) TNEd
SE014 (NBQB) Rideout J.
[On motion for summary judgment striking out for the statement of claims allegations relating
to copyright infringement]
[1] The Defendant Province of New Brunswick issued a call for proposals to develop and install
a computer system for the other Defendant, New Brunswick Distance Education Network Inc.
The Plaintiff responded successfully to the call for proposals and a software program was
developed and installed called "shareknowledge" which provided an online course
database system.
[2] The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendants deteriorated and a law suit was
commenced. There are a number of areas of dispute including a claim for money due and
owing to the Plaintiff as well as a counterclaim for over payment. However, the area of
dispute giving rise to this motion is an allegation that the Defendants are infringing on the
Plaintiff's copyright.
[14] It is my view, based on the pleadings and the affidavit evidence, the Defendant
Province has proved that it is not infringing the Plaintiff's copyright. There is no evidence from
the Plaintiff to the contrary only the claim for copyright infringement. I am satisfied that should
this matter proceed to trail, the Plaintiff would not be successful on the issue of copyright
infringement. In light of the guidance provided by Cannon v. Lange, I grant the summary
judgment requested by the Defendant Province of New Brunswick.
102
Sheridan Gymnasium Equipment Ltd. v Gymnasium & Heath Equipment
Ltd.
(2000), 9 CPR (4th ) 26, [2000] FCJ 1583, [2000] FTR TBEd OC177,
en
(FCTD) O’Keefe
In an action related to, inter alia, the alleged infringement of copyright in drawings for a
retractable stage assembly, the plaintiff sought to amend its statement of claim by
withdrawing a paragraph which stated that the author of the drawings was employed by a
third party and that the third party had assigned the copyright in [page27] the drawings to
"SHERIDAN", and by adding a paragraph which alleged that the plaintiff was the owner of
the copyright in the drawings and that the copyright had been registered. The defendants
contested the proposed amendments on the basis that the amended allegation did not
disclose a proper cause of action, and that the amendment would constitute a withdrawal
of an admission that the author was employed by a third party at the time of his authorship.
The plaintiff introduced a confirmatory assignment of copyright from the author to a third
party and a confirmatory assignment from the third party to the plaintiff.
The defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim of copyright
infringement. The defendants alleged that there was no written assignment to the plaintiff of
the copyright in the drawings and it therefore did not own the copyright at the material time.
Held, the plaintiff's motion should be allowed and the defendants' motion should be
dismissed.
For an amendment to be allowable, it must raise a triable issue which, in the interests of
justice, ought to be tried. The amendment must not result in an injustice to the other party not
capable of being compensated by an award of costs. In view of the alleged assignment
from the author to the third party, and the assignment from the third party to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff was entitled to claim for copyright infringement and this was a triable issue. Any
injustice which may have arisen as a result of the amendment could have been
compensated for by an award of costs.
On the motion for summary judgment, the evidence available did not satisfy the court that
the author was employed by anyone at the time he created the drawings and the
defendants' argument that there was no assignment in writing of the copyright was thereby
answered. The issue of whether infringement of copyright occurred was an issue for trial.
103
SOCAN Statement of Royalties, Tariff 9 (Sports events), 1998-2001 (Re)
(2000), 9 C.P.R. (4th) 36, [2000] CBD 12, [2000] DCDA 12, [2000-09-15]
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/tocmusic-f.html (CB)
The collective society filed with the board a statement of proposed royalties including Tariff 9
targeting the public performance of musical works at sporting events. The collective society
sought to have the royalty rates doubled from the rates certified for 1997 for each year from
1998 through 2001. An association representing six major league teams and/or their arenas
objected to the tariff. The association submitted that the proposed change in rates be
evaluated in comparison with rate increases in other tariffs.
The collective society filed limited evidence and the objector filed no evidence. No attempt
was made to rationalize the amount of the tariff among the three levels of sports, namely,
amateur, professional and major. Since 1992 the tariff for sporting events had been based on
the number of tickets for the event with both a minimum and maximum amount.
Held, a tariff should be certified in accordance with the terms and conditions fixed by the
board.
Tariff 9 grossly undervalued music in comparison with other tariffs dealing with similar uses,
including the circus tariff.
Other tariffs revealed rates 32, 64 and higher times the effective rates of Tariff 9. The maximum
100 percent increase proposed by the collective society was therefore warranted.
The tariff was fixed as a percentage of ticket prices effective as of the 2001 tariff. The rates
proposed by the collective society were divided by the corresponding average ticket prices
and a single weighted royalty rate of .05 per cent was fixed applicable to all three levels of
sports.
The minimum fee was eliminated which resulted in certain licensees paying less under the
new tariff. One half of the value of complementary tickets was included in the rate base.
104
Société du droit de reproduction des auteurs compositeurs et éditeurs du
Canada (SODRAC) v L’Association québécoise de l’industrie du disque,
du spectacle et de la vidéo (ADISQ)
(1999), 2 CPR (4th) 341 (CB-Interim); (2000), [2000] CBD 1, [2000] CBDA 1, 4 CPR
(4th) 287, [2000-01-19] http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/tocarbit-e.html
(CB – Application to reassess the Interim); (2000), [2000] CBD 2, [2000] CBDA 2,
[2000-12-24]
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/tocarbit-e.html
(CBApplication to modify the Interim)
CPR
The Copyright Board had issued an interim licence on the application of a collective society.
The collective society subsequently applied to the board for an interim decision to reassess
the interim licence fee previously fixed by the board.
Held, the application should be denied.
The board declined to issue more than one interim decision. To issue more than one interim
decision would encourage the parties to be less diligent in the presentation of their case
before the board.
CBD 2
At the request of the Société du droit de reproduction des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs
du Canada (SODRAC) and l'Association québécoise de l'industrie du disque, du spectacle et
de la vidéo (ADISQ), the Board grants the request jointly filed by both parties on February 10,
2000 as follows:
1) The proceedings are suspended until August 11, 2000.
2) The terms of the agreement referred to in the Board's interim decision of August
31, 1999, as well as the terms of SODRAC's basic licence, are modified as per the
attached document.
3) Should the parties be unable to reach an agreement before August 11, 2000,
they shall jointly file with the Board a new schedule of proceedings, starting with
the deadline of August 25, 2000 for filing responses to interrogatories.
105
Société du droit de reproduction des auteurs compositeurs et éditeurs du
Canada (SODRAC v. MusiquePlus inc
(2000), [2000] CBD 14, [2000] DCDA 14, [2000-11-16] http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocarbit-e.html (CB)
There remains the issue of fair dealing. Sections 29.1 and 29.2 of the Act provide, among
other things, that fair dealing for the purpose of criticism, review or news reporting does not
infringe copyright if the source and, if provided, the name of the author, are mentioned.
MusiquePlus inc. argues that four of its programs, representing seven per cent of the air time
of MusiquePlus, constitute fair dealing.
The programs concerned are focussed on criticism, review and news reporting. It is therefore
probable that they involve instances of fair dealing. Nevertheless, there should be no
reduction of the magnitude requested for the following reasons.
First, even if it is accepted that the programs mentioned fill the air time indicated, the
instances of fair dealing involved necessarily represent much less than the seven per cent
share of air time. To begin with, nothing shows that all of the uses that could be termed fair
dealing are actually so. After viewing the programs, the Board notes that the name of the
author is seldom mentioned; this must be done if the information has been provided, as one
may presume occurs. Further, these programs involve uses of works that do not qualify as fair
dealing, since the works in question (production music, for example) are not being criticized,
reviewed or reported upon. Finally, although music usually accounts for 90 per cent of the
services' air time, the notion of fair dealing implies a lower rate of music use during the
program concerned, precisely to make room for criticism, review or reporting.
Second, it may be assumed that TVA and TQS also practice fair dealing with the SODRAC
repertoire, but such uses have not been discounted when calculating the use of the
repertoire by these two networks.
As we shall see later, the Board will adjust the formula it applies to calculate the rate so as to
take into account the instances of fair dealing that actually occur. This rounding off results in
a rebate of one fifth of one per cent.
106
Société des auteurs, recherchistes, documentalistes et compositeurs
(SARDEC) (Re Application by)
(1999), 87 CPR (3d) 481, [1999] CBD 1 (CB); application for judicial review
dismissed (2000), 9 CPR (4th) 415, [2000] FCJ 1351, [2000] ACF 1351, [2000] ACF
1259,
[2000]
CarswellNat
1859,
[2000]
NR
Uned
146,
en
(FCA) sub nomine Canadian Retransmission Right Association v Société des
auteurs, recherchistes, documentalistes et compositeurs, Létourneau J.
[1] We are satisfied that the sole issue that the Copyright Board (Board) decided in these
proceedings is the designation of the Canadian Retransmission Right Association as the
collective society from which owners of copyrights in texts used in the production of television
programs produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) or by the Société de
télédiffusion du Québec (STQ) could make a claim for a share of royalties paid for the
retransmission of distant signals [reported 86 C.P.R. (3d) 481]. Although the Board noted that it
was not required to proceed with a designation that is based on claims that are patently
unfounded, it did not make any findings with respect to the validity of the claims advanced
by the respondent on behalf of copyright owners pursuant to subsection 76(1) of the
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, as amended by S.C. 1997, c. 24, s. 50. We are of the view
that, in coming to its conclusion, the Board made no error which warrants our intervention.
107
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v 728859
Alberta Ltd
(2000), 6 CPR (4th) 354, [2000] FCJ 590, [2000] ACF 590, [2000] CarswellNat 834,
6 CPR (4th) 354, [2000] 3 FC D-37, [2000] FTR TBEd MY099,
en
(FCTD-Reference) Hargrave, Prothonotary
The plaintiff collective society had filed tariffs with the Copyright Board for the performance
of live and recorded music. The board had approved the tariffs for 1998 and approval was
pending for 1999 and 2000. The defendant operated two lounges at its inn, in which live and
recorded music was performed. The defendant made application to the plaintiff for a
licence under the tariff in 1998 and paid a licence fee. The defendant ignored subsequent
requests for payment and did not submit applications for subsequent years despite the
continued performance of music in its lounges.
The plaintiff had commenced an action to recover the tariff licence fees as damages for
1998 and subsequent years and for punitive damages. The plaintiff had secured default
judgment and an order for a reference. The order had been served on the defendant and
the reference took place with no one attending on behalf of the defendant.
Held, the plaintiff should be awarded licence fees, interest, punitive damages and costs.
In the absence of the defendant, the referee should assess damages as best he or she can.
Damages are to be assessed in a rough and ready fashion and in a common sense way.
By s. 68.2(b) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, although tariffs are filed yearly, the
collective society may continue to collect licence fees in accordance [page355] with the
most recently approved tariff. The referee assessed the amount of the tariff owing for 1998,
1999 and 2000, less the amount paid in 1998 based on the 1998 approved tariff.
Punitive damages may be awarded where a defendant acted in a high-handed or
contemptuous manner in order to punish the defendant and make an example to deter
others. Given the ongoing breach, the ignoring of letters requesting payment of the licence
fee and the ignoring of the action, it would have been remiss not to order the defendant to
pay exemplary damages. Exemplary damages in the amount of $10,000 were ordered.
108
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v 1007442
Ontario Ltd
(2000), [2000] FCJ 191, [2000] ACF 191, [2000] CarswellNat 176, [2000] FTR
Uned 128, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/fr/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca25995.o.fr.html
(FCTD-Practice) Cullen J.
[para20]
According to the recent jurisprudence, a relevant document ought to be one
that might reasonably be supposed to contain information which may directly or indirectly
enable the party seeking the production to advance his own case or damage the case of
his adversary.
[23] The defendants argued that no profit was made as a consequence of the alleged
infringement. I must disagree with this argument. The defendants present exotic dancing, and
as such, music is part of the entertainment performance, and that performance generates
revenues to the nightclub. In Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada
v. 348803 Alberta Ltd. et al. [(1997), 79 C.P.R. (3d) 449 (F.C.T.D.)], It was held that:
It matters not that the defendants had no specific charge, for example a cover
charge at the door, for the music at their establishment. Music adds ambiance to
such establishments. The music added a value to the defendants' operation,
otherwise they would have given up playing music. Just what the value of music
might be I must now arrive at in a rough and ready manner.
[24] Since this motion arises in the context of an action for damages for copyright
infringement, the financial statements of the defendants for 1994 to 1999 are certainly
required for the purpose of calculating the possible damages and profits.
109
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v
Landmark Cinemas of Canada Ltd.
(2000), 9 CPR (4th) 353, [2000] FCJ 1626, [2000] FTR TBEd OC180,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27511.o.en.html (FCTDDisqualification) Aronovitch J.
The plaintiff, a performing rights society which grants licences for the performance of musical
works, commenced an action for copyright infringement alleging that the defendant, an
operator of motion picture theatres, performed the plaintiff's works without licence or
payment of performance rights fees. During examination for discovery, the president of the
defendant refused to answer questions concerning the operating relationship that the
defendant had with certain motion picture theatres. The solicitors for the plaintiff then
instructed a student-at-law to make inquiries into the relationship between the defendant
and the theatres, suggesting that she rely on publicly available information from licensing
bodies. Without having read the file and believing that she was looking for potential
defendants, the student made a direct telephone call to the defendant. The call was
answered by a receptionist who provided little information. The student then placed a followup call to the defendant which the president returned. The student identified herself and her
law firm and was candid in describing the reason for her inquiry. Realizing that the inquiry
might relate to the litigation, the president declined to provide answers to the questions. The
defendant brought a motion to remove the law firm as solicitors of record.
The right to counsel of one's choice ought not to be supplanted without regard to the
character, gravity and consequences of the impugned conduct. Some intimation of mischief
or the potential for injustice has to be demonstrated. Even in cases of conflict of interest,
while there is a presumption that confidential information is imparted in the case of certain
retainers, the presumption may be rebutted if the solicitor can satisfy the court that none was
in fact imparted.
While clearly in error, the student's conduct was unwitting and not deceitful or part of a
deliberate scheme designed to circumvent the court's process by improper means. The
student did not obtain any information relevant to the litigation and the defendant did not
make out any real or apprehended mischief, injustice or harm to [page354] the rights of the
parties. In the circumstances, it could not be concluded that a fair-minded member of the
public, in possession of all the facts would conclude that the fair administration of justice
required the intervention of the court in favour of the defendant.
110
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Runway
66 Enterprises Ltd.
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 845, [2000] FTR Uned 624, [2000] FCJ 556,
en
(FCTD)-Practice) Hugessen J.
[9] Finally, the last ground which I understood counsel for the plaintiff to advance for special
orders to costs, was the flagrancy of the breach of copyright which underlies the present
action. I, again, do not think that that is a ground for making a special order as to costs.
There will be a reference to determine damages and if it is appropriate to award exemplary
damages, then such an award can be made at that time. I do not think it proper for me,
here and now, to make a special award as to costs.
111
Statement of royalties to be collected by NRCC for the public
performance or the communication to the public by telecommunication,
in Canada, of published sound recordings embodying musical works and
performer'
s performances of such works in 1998 to 2002 for Tariff 1.C
(2000), [2000] CBD 13, [2000] DCDA 13, [2000-09-29] http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocmusic-e.html (CB)
Subparagraph 68(2)(a)(ii) of the Act states that the tariff may not, "because of linguistic and
content requirements of Canada's broadcasting policy set out in section 3 of the
Broadcasting Act, place some users that are subject to that Act at a greater financial
disadvantage than others". CBC's content requirements may cause it to use the eligible
repertoire more than it would if such requirements did not exist. However, the Board will not
reduce the amount of royalties on this ground.
First, CBC receives subsidies that reflect its content requirements. The amounts that CBC
invests per listener go far beyond what commercial stations can afford. A remedy is thus
already provided for any disadvantage stemming from content requirements.
Second, as noted in the commercial radio decision, the Act does not require that the
regulatory framework's impact on use patterns be disregarded. Rather, it requires that
Canada's broadcasting policy not place some users at a greater disadvantage than others.
Rights holders are not required to subsidize users on the ground that users are required to
meet regulatory requirements.
Third, CRTC policy does not have the same purpose as copyright. Copyright deals with
compensation for the use of all eligible recordings. CRTC policy meets the aims of the
Broadcasting Act and focuses mainly on the creation of Canadian works and recordings. To
reduce compensation for rights holders, based on CRTC policy, would be both inappropriate
and unfair.
112
Statement of Royalties to be Collected for the Retransmission of Distant
Radio and Television Signals During 1998, 1999 and 2000
(2000), [2000] CBA 3, [2000] DCDA 3, [2000-02-25] http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/tocretrans-e.html (CB)
On March 31, 1997, the eight collective societies who filed tariff proposals in the previous
retransmission proceedings (for 1995-1997) filed, for the first time, joint statements of proposed
royalties for the retransmission of distant radio and television signals for the years 1998, 1999
and 2000. A ninth society, the Société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques (SACD), filed
a statement for distant television signals but withdrew it upon reaching an agreement with
the Canadian Retransmission Collective (CRC) for the representation of SACD's works.
CCC, CBRA, BBC and CRRA rely on the Board's earlier decision dealing with the status of
superstations under SOCAN's Tariff 17, to argue that the TVA service being offered to the
affected retransmitters is indeed a "signal". [See Tariff 17 Decision, SOCAN Statement of
Royalties, 1990-1995 (Tariff 17), (1996) 70 C.P.R. (3d), 501, 529-31.] In that decision, the Board
ruled on four aspects of the retransmission regime that are relevant here.
Firstly, a distant signal must be available for free reception by the public in its local market.
Secondly, a signal does not cease to be a signal because it is also provided outside that
market using different technologies; in fact, a signal never ceases to be a signal. It is irrelevant
that the signal may be provided by a third party, that the third party may obtain the signal
from the terrestrial broadcaster, or that viewers may be required to pay a subscription fee to
receive it.
Thirdly, it is also irrelevant that the signal retransmitted outside the local market is not identical
to the signal transmitted by the terrestrial station.
Fourthly, the conditions specified in the retransmission regime relate to the retransmission of
the signal by the cable operator and not to the condition of the signal at the time when it is
received by the cable operator.
Despite arguments to the contrary, the Board still believes that its earlier analysis of the
retransmission regime is correct. There is no need to repeat here what was said then.
Terrestrial stations offered as distant signals are "signals" for the purposes of the retransmission
regime, whether or not any alterations are made by anyone (including the broadcaster) to
those signals, and whether or not the signal is received by the retransmitter at the same time
as the original broadcast occurs.
CCTA and SOCAN raise a number of other arguments in favour of their position, arguments
that the Board finds unconvincing. For example, they refer to the policy objectives of the
retransmission regime, which they view as facilitating copyright clearance where the signal is
being offered without the consent of the broadcaster. The Board agrees with the reasons
given by CCC and CBRA as to why this argument is irrelevant. Under the regime, all works
carried on a distant signal are entitled to compensation, whether or not the broadcaster
holds the retransmission rights or is able to acquire them.
CCTA also argues that the retransmission of the TVA service by a cable operator is not an
infringement of copyright because it is mandated by the CRTC. The Board agrees with CCC
that neither the Broadcasting Act nor the Copyright Act can be interpreted to give rise to an
exemption from liability in such a case. This is even truer now that paragraphs 32.1(1)(d) of the
113
Act provides certain exemptions for reproductions made in order to comply with the
Broadcasting Act or any rule, regulation or other instrument made under it. The provision
clearly does not extend to the retransmission of a distant signal.
CCTA finally asks that the Board have regard to the criteria adopted by Cabinet in
interpreting the Act. Those criteria, including the one regarding Canadian broadcasting
policy, may be useful in determining how much retransmitters should pay for the TVA signal.
However, being regulations made under the Act, they can be of little use in interpreting it.
Consequently, the TVA East and TVA West services are "signals" for the purpose of the
retransmission regime.
114
Sullivan Entertainment Inc. v Anne of the Green Gables Licensing
Authority Inc
(2000), 7 CPR (4th) 532, [2000] CarswellNat 1098, [2000] FCJ 822, [2000] FTR TBEd
JN185, http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26693.o.en.html
(FCTD-Pleadings) Giles, Prothonotary; affd (2000), [2001] 1 FC D-31,
en
français
à
[2001]
1
CF
F39
(FCTD)
Muldoon J.
The defendant moved to strike paragraphs of a statement of claim in which the plaintiff
claimed a declaration in respect of s. 9 of the Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, and a
declaration that there were no enforceable rights in Canada in the name, personality,
character, or image of fictional characters in a literary work. The defendant alleged that the
court had no jurisdiction to grant declarations concerning s. 9, and that with respect to the
fictional characters, the plaintiff was asking the court to exceed its jurisdiction.
Held, the motion in respect of s. 9 should be dismissed, and in respect of the fictional
characters should be granted.
Section 55 of the Trade-marks Act gives the court jurisdiction to enforce rights under s. 9 of the
Act. Where the court has jurisdiction with respect to a subject [page533] matter, the court
can give declaratory relief in respect of such a matter. The court, therefore, had jurisdiction to
grant a declaratory judgment in respect of s. 9.
With respect to the declaration concerning rights in the fictional characters, the rights
referred to in the plaintiff's claim were not limited to intellectual property rights. The claim
extended beyond the jurisdiction of the court and was therefore struck with leave to amend
within 30 days.
115
Supreme Court of Canada (Re)
(2000), [2000] CBD 11 (CB)
licence to the Supreme Court of Canada as follows:
(1) The licence authorizes the use and reproduction of a photograph of Justice
J.W. Estey, published in the Ottawa Citizen on January 23, 1956, in a
commemorative book marking the 125th anniversary of the creation of the
Supreme Court of Canada.
No more than 4,000 copies of the work shall be reproduced.
Issuance of this licence does not release the applicant from the obligation to
obtain permission for any other use not covered by this licence.
116
Tariff of Levies to be Collected by CPCC (Re)
(2000), 7 CPR (4th) 68, [2000] CarswellNat 1304, [2000] CBD 16, [2000]
DCDA 16, [2000-12-08] http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/toccopy-e.html
(FCA)
The applicants applied for judicial review of a decision of the Copyright Board relating to Part
VIII of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, concerning the levy imposed on a blank audio
recording medium. The board had interpreted the term "ordinarily used" in the definition of
"audio recording medium" as including all non-negligible uses. The board had concluded
that a CD was ordinarily used to reproduce sound recordings and was therefore leviable as a
blank audio recording medium. The applicants alleged that the term "ordinarily used" should
be interpreted by looking at the products generally and not the usage of the products by
individual consumers. The applicants contested that the term "ordinarily" should be construed
as meaning "chiefly" or "mainly".
Held, the application should be dismissed.
The issue raised by the applicants was mainly a question of law interpreting the legislation
administered by the board. The purpose of Part VIII of the Copyright Act is mainly an
economic one within the expertise of the board to decide. The proper standard of review on
the issue was, therefore, patent unreasonableness.
It is the usage of the products by individual consumers that must be ordinary for the products
to fall within the definition of "audio recording medium". Part VIII of [page69] the Act provides
for a system to estimate the value of copyright infringed by individuals who ordinarily copied
music on those products. The interpretation asserted by the applicants would not be
consistent with the object of the Act. The applicants had failed to demonstrate that the
board's approach was obviously or clearly wrong. The board's decision was not, therefore,
patently unreasonable.
117
Tag Heuer S.A. v. John Doe
(2000), 4 CPR (4th) 177, [2000] CarswellNat 1132, [2000] FCJ 21, [2000] FTR
Uned
27,
Pelletier J.
The plaintiff had secured an Anton Piller order and had executed the order on four
defendants. The plaintiff then moved for default judgment against each of the four
defendants. The plaintiff claimed as part of the default judgment the right to be at liberty to
dispose of goods seized from the defendants pursuant to the Anton Piller order.
The statement of claim did not include a claim for the right to dispose of infringing
merchandise. The Anton Piller order provided that the counterfeit goods seized [page178]
would be used solely for the purpose of civil proceedings. The order did not specify that the
goods seized might be destroyed.
Held, the motion should be granted and default judgment should be issued.
The basis for making an order to permit the plaintiff to be at liberty to dispose of the seized
goods was uncertain because there was no such claim in the statement of claim and no
notice was given to the defendant at the time of seizure that the goods seized might be
destroyed.
As the practice had been to grant such orders, it was unfair to refuse to grant the order
requested at this time without notice of a change in practice. In future, without a specific
claim for the disposition of infringing goods in the statement of claim, such an order may not
be issued particularly where the goods have some non-infringing value.
118
Télé-Vision 84 Inc v Corporation des célébrations du 350ième anniversaire
de Montréal (1642-1992)
(2000), REJB 2000-17589, [2000] JQ 845, [2000] CarswellQue 455, JE 2000-925
(QueSupCt) Tingley J.
Résumé
Action en réclamation de dommages-intérêts (250 000 $). Rejetée.
La défenderesse avait été mandatée pour organiser et coordonner les célébrations du 350e
anniversaire de la fondation de la Ville de Montréal. Répondant à l'invitation lancée en juin
1990 par la défenderesse, qui désirait obtenir des idées de projet, les demanderesses lui ont
proposé un synopsis d'un ambitieux spectacle musical dont les devis préliminaires
prévoyaient un budget de 3,7 millions de dollars. Ce spectacle devait se tenir au Stade
olympique et réunir une cinquantaine de vedettes musicales américaines puisque ses
idéateurs entendaient lier l'événement au 500e anniversaire de la découverte de l'Amérique.
Les demanderesses avaient également imaginé diffuser à la télévision les meilleurs moments
de ce grand événement. Bien qu'au départ elle se soit montrée intéressée au projet des
demanderesses, la défenderesse a finalement décidé, en mai 1991, de ne pas y donner
suite. Un an plus tard, elle a confié à un autre producteur l'élaboration et la création de
l'événement «Au rythme des Amériques», qui s'est tenu en août 1992 au parc des Îles. Ce
spectacle, d'une durée de 11 heures, regroupait plusieurs artistes musicaux venant de tout le
continent. Invoquant la contrefaçon de leur idée originale et du concept de spectacle
qu'elles avaient proposé, les demanderesses réclament les honoraires de 250 000 $ dont elles
auraient été privées à titre de productrices. La défenderesse prétend que l'idée de
spectacle des demanderesses ne jouit d'aucune protection en vertu de la Loi sur le droit
d'auteur et qu'au surplus elle n'aurait pas repris ni suivi le synopsis qu'elles lui avaient proposé.
Décision
Même si l'idée de produire un spectacle traitant de la musique d'origine des Amériques n'est
pas susceptible de faire l'objet d'un droit d'auteur, il en va autrement de la façon d'exprimer
cette idée. En l'espèce, le synopsis jouit de la protection accordée par l'article 34.1 de la loi
puisqu'il constitue l'expression d'un concept ou d'un thème. La substance de ce concept se
trouve dans la célébration en 1992 de deux événements historiques (la découverte de
l'Amérique, en 1492, et la fondation de Montréal, en 1642) par la mise en scène d'un
spectacle de musique et de cinéma des pays américains dans une atmosphère olympienne.
Or, le spectacle «Au rythme des Amériques» ne s'est jamais approché de la substance de
l'événement envisagé par les demanderesses. Il n'a pas eu lieu au Stade olympique et
aucune mention n'y a été faite de la découverte de l'Amérique. En outre, la portée, le thème
et le cadre de présentation différaient grandement. Le spectacle «Au rythme des
Amériques», dont le budget représentait le tiers de celui proposé par les demanderesses, ne
constituait pas une partie importante de l'oeuvre littéraire de ces dernières. Le seul élément
similaire existant entre ces deux spectacles concernait les participants de la partie musicale,
notamment le groupe musical autochtone Kashtin. Il ne s'agit pas d'un élément nouveau ni
original. Les gens qui ont payé pour assister au spectacle du mois d'août 1992 n'ont jamais vu
celui que les demanderesses avaient exposé dans leur synopsis.
119
Théberge c Galerie d’art du Petit Champlain
(1999), JE 99-1991 REJB 99-14552, [1999] JQ 4472 (QueSupCt); revd (2000),
JE 2000-531, REJB 2000-16584, [2000] JQ 412, [2000] CarswellQue 133, 9 CPR
(4th) 259, [2000-02-22] http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200002fr.html (Que
CA); motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada granted
[2000] CSCR 198 (CSC)
Résumé
Appel d'un jugement de la Cour supérieure ayant annulé une saisie avant jugement.
Accueilli.
L'appelant est un artiste peintre de renommée internationale. Depuis l'été 1998, il constate
qu'une quantité considérable de reproductions non autorisées de ses tableaux se trouvent
dans les galeries d'art des intimés. En effet, certaines de ces reproductions ont été faites sur
des toiles plutôt que sur papier et, compte tenu de la technique de l'auteur, elles donnent
l'impression d'une oeuvre originale plutôt que d'une reproduction. La technique utilisée
consiste à transférer sur toile les encres d'une affiche imprimée. Lors de l'«entoilage», il arrive
même que la signature de l'auteur disparaisse, de sorte que certaines de ces reproductions
n'indiquent plus ni le nom de l'auteur ni celui de l'éditeur autorisé. L'appelant a fait saisir avant
jugement ce qu'il considère comme des reproductions non autorisées de ses oeuvres, dont
les entoilages. Le premier juge a annulé la saisie au motif de fausseté des allégations de
l'appelant. Invoquant les articles 34 (1) et 38 (1) de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur, ce dernier
soutient que l'entoilage constitue une violation de ses droits d'auteur.
Décision
M. le juge Michaud: L'appelant a consenti à ce que des reproductions sur papier fin de
certains de ses tableaux soient édités, mais il n'a pas autorisé la reproduction sur toile de ces
mêmes tableaux. Une reproduction d'un tableau sur papier fin ne cesse pas d'être une
reproduction sur papier fin du fait qu'elle est collée sur un support quelconque ou qu'elle est
encadrée ou «laminée». Toutefois, la reproduction sur toile d'un tableau constitue une
reproduction du tableau même si la technique pour y arriver est l'entoilage d'une
reproduction sur papier. L'entoilage ne viole peut-être pas le droit de celui qui est autorisé à
reproduire le tableau sur papier, mais il viole l'un des droits de l'auteur du tableau. La valeur
d'une reproduction sur papier n'est pas différente, qu'elle soit encadrée ou «laminée». Dans
un tel cas, l'acquéreur paie la valeur de la reproduction et le coût de l'encadrement ou du
«laminage». En revanche, l'entoilage permet au vendeur d'obtenir un prix supérieur à la
valeur de la reproduction sur papier et au coût d'entoilage.
M. le juge Delisle: Le titulaire du droit d'auteur peut saisir avant jugement les exemplaires
contrefaits de ses oeuvres si la loi de la province où sont engagées les procédures le permet
(art. 38 de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur). L'article 734 du Code de procédure civile permet à
l'appelant de faire saisir avant jugement le bien meuble qu'il est en droit de revendiquer. Il y
a contrefaçon d'une oeuvre à l'égard de laquelle existe un droit d'auteur lorsque la
reproduction, y compris l'imitation déguisée, est faite contrairement à la loi ou lorsqu'elle fait
l'objet d'un acte contraire à la loi (art. 2 de la loi). Le droit d'auteur comporte le droit exclusif
de reproduction (art. 3 de la loi). Constitue une violation du droit d'auteur l'accomplissement,
sans le consentement du titulaire de ce droit, d'un acte que seul ce titulaire a la faculté
d'accomplir en vertu de la loi (art. 27 de la loi). Ainsi, lorsqu'ils ont reproduit des oeuvres de
l'appelant sans son consentement, sous une forme matérielle différente de celle des
reproductions autorisées, les intimés ont commis une contrefaçon, du moins pour ce qui
justifie la saisie avant jugement.
120
121
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. et al. v. Jane Doe
(2000), 8 CPR (4th ) 194, [2000] CarswellNat 1719, 188 FTR 68, [2000] FTR
TBEd AU141, [2000] FCJ 1267 (FCTD) Pelletier J.
The plaintiffs had secured a rolling Anton Piller order in an action for trade-mark and
copyright infringement. The plaintiffs had executed the order by serving it upon one of the
defendants and seizing from the defendant certain articles of clothing. The plaintiffs then
brought a motion to review the execution of the Anton Piller order and for an interlocutory
injunction pending trial. In support of the motion, the plaintiffs furnished an affidavit of the
solicitor who supervised the execution of the Anton Piller order. In the affidavit the solicitor set
out his experience and training in the identification of counterfeit merchandise bearing
reproductions of the plaintiffs' intellectual property and stating that the clothing seized was
counterfeit because the plaintiffs did not manufacture the particular products, the products
did not have valid labels, hang tags and packaging and the products were of inferior quality.
The affidavit did not refer to the specific intellectual properties nor to specific goods seized
from the defendant.
On the hearing of the motion, the plaintiffs advanced their solicitor's affidavit as an expert
affidavit and sought to rely upon the opinion of the solicitor that the seized clothing was
counterfeit.
Held, the motion for an interlocutory injunction should be refused and the seized clothing
returned to the defendant.
The standard of proof on the merits to obtain an interlocutory injunction is a serious issue to be
tried unless the decision would effectively put an end to the case. With respect to rolling
Anton Piller orders, most defendants do not attend on the motion to review the execution of
the order and the chances of a defendant defending the claim to trial is remote. It is
therefore incumbent on the court to go further than a limited review of the merits.
The admissibility of expert opinion evidence is dependent upon the subject matter before the
court. To be admissible, the evidence must be outside the experience or knowledge of the
judge. To the extent that the issue is the reproduction of a plaintiffs' intellectual property or
the plaintiffs' business practices, expert evidence is not required. The affidavit of the plaintiffs'
solicitor was therefore not receivable as opinion evidence.
It was not possible for the court to determine from the affidavit of the plaintiffs' solicitor which
intellectual properties were alleged to be infringed and which of the [page196] defendant's
clothing bore reproductions of the intellectual properties. The evidence was insufficient to
establish that there was a serious issue to be tried. The motion for an interlocutory injunction
was refused and the seized goods were returned to the defendant.
122
Toronto.com v Sinclair
(2000), 6 CPR (4th) 487, [2000] FCJ 795, [2000] CarsellNat 1105, [2000] FTR
TBEd
AU146,
en
(FCTD-Interlocutory Injunction) Heneghan J.
Since March 1998, the plaintiff had operated a Web site under the domain name
toronto.com. Commencing in April 1999, the defendant also operated a Web site under the
domain name toronto2.com. The defendants had framed several Web pages or portions of
Web pages published on the plaintiff's Web site. The plaintiff commenced an action for
passing off and for copyright infringement. The plaintiff also brought a motion for an
interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from using the domain name and trademark TORONTO2.COM and copying, publishing, framing or linking content of the plaintiff's
Web site. At the time the motion was brought, the defendants' Web site no longer framed
content of the plaintiff's Web site.
A tripartite test is to be applied to determine whether an interlocutory injunction should be
granted. The test consists of whether there is a serious issue to be tried, whether the applicant
will suffer irreparable harm if the relief is not granted and finally, the balance of convenience
is examined in assessing whether to grant an interlocutory injunction.
The plaintiff must show clear evidence that it will in fact suffer irreparable harm. The evidence
cannot be speculative. Irreparable harm is harm which cannot be quantified in monetary
terms and hence, refers to the nature of the harm and not its magnitude. In situations where
the validity of the trade-mark is in issue, infringement of the very proprietary rights at issue will
not constitute irreparable harm. Further, the court cannot infer the existence of a loss of
goodwill from a finding of confusion. The plaintiff must produce concrete evidence of
irreparable harm.
In the present motion it was unnecessary to address the question of whether the plaintiff had
demonstrated a serious issue to be tried and the question of the balance [page488] of
convenience, as the plaintiff had failed to show that it would suffer irreparable harm. The court
was unable to locate in the plaintiff's materials any clear evidence which was not speculative in
nature. The evidence did not prove that the plaintiff had lost or would lose reputation, brand
name awareness, consumer loyalty, or the ability to attract advertisers. Likewise, there was no
proof that its goodwill had been diminished. Although the defendants' inability to pay damages
could constitute irreparable harm, it was impossible for the court to conclude that the plaintiff
would suffer irreparable harm on the basis that the defendants might be impecunious.
123
Viacom Ha! Holding Co. v. Jane Doe
(2000), 6 CPR (4th) 36, 187 FTR 305, [2000] CarswellNat 689,
Tremblay-Lamer J.; notice of appeal was filed by Mr. Tejani on April 20, 2000
(Court File No. A-254-00); (2000), [2000] FCJ 2095, [2000] CarswellNat 3081,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27974.o.en.html (FCTDDefault) Pelletier J.
Anton Piller
The plaintiffs in four actions for infringement of intellectual property rights moved to review the
execution of Anton Piller orders and to add defendants. The proposed defendants moved to
set aside the Anton Piller orders. [page37]
The plaintiffs were respectively the owners of the intellectual property rights of the characters
in the South Park television series, the Pokémon computer programs, the Disney animated
characters and motion pictures and the Looney Tunes characters. By reason of extensive
sales, licensing and advertising, the plaintiffs had acquired valuable reputation and goodwill
in wares bearing their intellectual properties.
The plaintiffs executed the Anton Piller orders on the proposed defendants who operated as
a retailer. The evidence obtained on the execution of the Anton Piller order showed that the
proposed defendants were offering for sale counterfeit merchandise. The proposed
defendants admitted that they intended to send the counterfeit merchandise back to their
suppliers in China for credit.
In their motion to set aside the Anton Piller orders, the proposed defendants alleged that the
orders were contrary to s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that the
plaintiffs failed to properly execute the Anton Piller orders.
Held, the plaintiffs' motion to review the execution of the Anton Piller order and to add
defendants should be granted; the proposed defendants' motion to set aside the order
should be dismissed.
The evidence established that the plaintiffs were the owners of the intellectual property rights
at issue and that the plaintiffs had a strong prima facie case of infringement. The review of an
Anton Piller order is a review de novo. The court was entitled to consider the evidence of
infringement by the defendants obtained through the execution of the orders.
The plaintiffs had established that purchasers of counterfeit wares bearing the plaintiffs'
intellectual property would be less likely to purchase the plaintiffs' wares, and that the sale of
the inferior quality and inexpensive counterfeit wares would damage the plaintiffs' reputation
for high quality wares and diminish the value of the goodwill associated with their intellectual
property. The plaintiffs had therefore established that damages caused by the defendants'
activities would be serious.
With respect to likelihood that an alleged infringer would destroy infringing wares, inferences
can be drawn from the infringer's dishonest character to conclude that the infringer would
dispose of the evidence. No distinction can be drawn from the fact that an alleged infringer
operates as a retailer as opposed to a flea market vendor. Without an Anton Piller order, the
defendants would likely continue to operate selling more counterfeit wares. Evidence would
124
therefore vanish. This was reinforced by the fact that the defendants intended to return
the counterfeit wares to their suppliers.
Section 8 of the Charter contains the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. By
s. 32 the Charter applies to government. It does not apply to private litigation. The granting of
a court injunction is not a government action to which the Charter applies. The execution of
an Anton Piller order is in the context of a private dispute between private parties. The
defendants could not therefore invoke the Charter to set aside the order. [page38]
There were inconsistencies in the defendants' evidence which had a negative impact on
their credibility. The evidence showed that the Anton Piller orders were properly executed.
Default Judgment
[8] The legislative scheme which protects the plaintiffs' intellectual properties contemplates
joint and several liability [His Lordship refers to section 38.1 of the Copyright Act.]
[para11] In the circumstances of cases such as these where a number of persons are found
to be engaged in a business which is selling counterfeit goods, and where it is not possible to
distinguish the individual contribution to the harm caused, and in the absence of any
exculpatory plea on the part of any of them, it does not seem unfair to assess liability on a
joint and several basis. In any event, it seems fairer than finding each defendant individually
liable for the full amount of the conventional award for nominal damages, when it appears
that there is only one undertaking or business which is causing the damage.
125
Wall v Van Brunell
(1996), [1996] FCJ 1149 (FCTD Prothonotary - Practice); (1997), 75 CPR (3d)
429, [1997] FTR Uned 237, [1997] FCJ 608, 71 ACWS (3d) 552 (FCTD-Summary
Judgment); affd (2000), 7 CPR (4th) 321, [2000] FCJ 841, [2000] CarswellNat
1184,
[2000]
NR
Uned
118,
en
(FCA) Malone J.
In an action for copyright infringement, the defendants had brought a motion for summary
judgment for dismissal of the action. The plaintiff filed no evidence on the motion. The
motions judge held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that there was a genuine issue for
trial and granted the motion. The plaintiff appealed the decision of the motions judge.
The motion judge was correct in holding that a plaintiff on a motion for summary judgment
may not rest on its pleadings but must provide evidence that [page322] there is a genuine
issue for trial. As the plaintiff failed to file an affidavit in response to the motion for summary
judgment, the court was entitled to infer that she was unable to attest to facts required to
make out her claim.
126
Wic Premium Television Ltd v Levin
(1999), [1999] FCJ 652, [1999] ACF 652, [1999] FTR Uned 295, 1 CPR (4th) 467
(FCTD);
(2000),
[2000]
FTR
Uned
131,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca26060.o.en.html (FCTD Time Table) Pelletier J.; (2000), [2000] FCJ 1259, [2000] FTR TBEd AU141, 99
ACWS
(3d)
145,
http://www.cmf.gc.ca/en/cf/2000/orig/html/2000fca27134.o.en.html (FCTDInterlocutory Injunction) O’Keefe J.
Interlocutory Injunction
[1This is a motion by the applicant in the above-entitled action, WIC Premium Television Ltd.
("WIC") for an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the defendants from directly or indirectly
manufacturing, importing, distributing, leasing, selling, installing, or operating equipment or
devices used to decode encrypted subscription programming signals that are not
transmitted or broadcast by a lawful distributor; and an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the
defendants from encouraging, assisting, aiding or abetting others in doing the same.
15] In ExpressVu v. NII Norsat International Inc. [1998] 1 F.C. 245, Justice Gibson held that to be
a lawful distributor, in addition to holding copyright or a licence from the copyright owner in
respect of the programming, one had to be the holder of a CRTC licence. If there was no
CRTC licence in respect of the programming decoded, there was no lawful distributor of
thatsignal, and paragraph 9(1)(c) was violated by decoding such signals. The Court of
Appeal affirmed this interpretation of paragraph 9(1)(c) in ExpressVu, supra , unreported,
November 20, 1997, Docket A-541-97. ExpressVu concerned a CRTC licenced satellite service
provider complaining of acts similar to those that the defendants in the case at bar, are
alleged to be engaged in.
[17] Given the interpretation of the meaning of "lawful distributor" that was adopted by
Justice Gibson and approved of by the Court of Appeal, the plaintiff has demonstrated a
strong case with respect to the activities of the defendants being unlawful under paragraph
9(1)(c), such that the civil cause of action under section 18 of the Act is open to WIC.
However, the second consideration, proof of damage or loss, is much less strong. It must be
borne in mind that the defendants are not alleged to be decoding WIC's own signals. It is
possible, however, that the plaintiff could lead evidence that it was given the sole right to
transmit a particular movie in Canada, and if such a movie is also being transmitted by HBO
or SHOWTIME, WIC could conceivably show damage or loss.
[20] In the case at bar, I am not satisfied that the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm if
the interlocutory injunction is refused. Any damages suffered as a result of purported violation
of paragraph 9(1)( c) of the Act are easily quantifiable in monetary terms. Damages as a
result of loss of market share or loss of customers, actual or potential, are also quantifiable in
monetary terms.
[21] Although it is not necessary in light of my finding I will discuss the remaining tests for
granting an injunction in this case. The second aspect of the irreparable harm test will now be
considered - irreparable harm to the defendants. With respect to the defendants, I believe
that the plaintiff's undertaking as to damages would not adequately compensate the
defendants for any loss. The loss of sales and profits as a result of the injunction are
quantifiable but the defendants would effectively be out of business. The impact on the
defendants is great and I do not believe justified.
127
[18] Given this, and recognizing that the merits of the case ought not be examined too
closely at this preliminary stage, I believe that the plaintiff has shown a serious issue to be
tried.
128
WIC Premium Television v. General Instrument Corporation
(1999), [1999] AJ 639, [1999] CarswellAlta 452, 1 CPR (4th) 467, 243 AR 329,
73 AltaLR (3d) 365, [2000] 2 WWR 417 (Alta QB - Ex juris service]; (1999), [1999]
AJ 696 (Alta QB - Ex juris service Supplemental); affd. (2000), 8 CPR (4th) 1, 266
AR 98, [2000] AJ 977, [2000] CarswellAlta 878, 2000 ABCA 233 (AltaCA) sub
nomine United States Satellite Broadcasting co. v. WIC Premium Television
Ltd.; (1999), [1999] AJ 1251 (Alta QB - Motion to Strike); (1999), [1999] AJ 1254
(Alta QB - Summary Judgment); (2000), 8 CPR (4th) 308, [2000] AJ 1063, 272 AR
201, [2000] CarswellAlta 969, 2000 AQBD 628 (Alta QB - Interlocutory
Injunction)
Appeal - Jurisdiction
Pursuant to a licence issued by the Canadian Radio Television Commission and agreements
and licences granted by copyright holders, the plaintiff had the exclusive right to distribute
and exhibit certain television programming in Western Canada. The programs were
encrypted, beamed up to a satellite and then beamed back to receivers which customers
purchased for the purpose of watching the programs. Certain of the defendants, including
the Echostar defendants and the United States Satellite Broadcasting Co. ("USSB") defendant,
provided similar services in the United States whereby their encrypted signals were
transmitted via satellite to a broad area which included the United States and a certain
portion of southern Canada. These defendants provided decoders to Canadians and
activated the decoders in return for payment.
The plaintiffs had commenced an action against some of the defendants in California. The
court in California concluded that all the alleged injuries and impacts of the defendants'
alleged wrongdoings were felt in Canada and that Canadian law should apply. Accordingly,
it was more appropriate for the claims to be brought in a Canadian court. The plaintiff's
action in California was dismissed on the condition that the defendants in the California
action would submit to the jurisdiction of the Canadian court.
The plaintiff commenced its action in Canada based on conspiracy, unjust enrichment,
unlawful interference with economic interest, and claims under the Broadcasting Act, S.C.
1991, c. 11, the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, and the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-34, and obtained an ex parte order for service ex juris. The Echostar defendants, the USSB
defendant and the Warren defendants, who had not been parties to the California action
but who resided in the United States, moved to have the order for service ex juris set aside
and those defendants struck from the proceedings. The motion was dismissed except in
respect of individual Warren defendants.
The Echostar defendants, the USSB defendant and the Warren defendants appealed to the
Alberta Court of Appeal. The plaintiff appealed the order striking the individual Warren
defendants and sought leave to introduce fresh evidence to the effect that USSB had
merged with DirecTV, which, at the time of the appeal, was not a party to the action, and
that programming to which the plaintiff held exclusive Canadian rights could be obtained by
calling DirecTV's toll free telephone number from Canada.
Held, the appeals and the motion to adduce new evidence should be dismissed.
In determining whether the Alberta courts may assume jurisdiction over the defendants, the
plaintiff must establish that there is a real and substantial connection between the
129
defendants and the territory and that there is a good and arguable case. Having regard
to the early stage of the proceedings at which the application for an order authorizing
service ex juris must be made, there is a fairly lax standard of proof. First-hand information, a
positive factual conclusion or evidence excluding possible defences is not required.
The chambers judge had articulated and applied the appropriate test in deciding the issue
of jurisdiction and had committed no palpable error in his assessment of the facts or the
application of the law to the facts. [page3]
USSB defendants
USSB carried on the business in the United States as a provider of satellite delivered
subscription programming. The chambers judge found that the USSB satellite signals entered
into a territory in which the plaintiff had exclusive right, that USSB activated decoders allowing
Canadians access to its signals, and that it received fees from Canadian residents for
providing services in the plaintiff's territory. Accordingly, the plaintiff suffered damage in
Alberta. This was sufficient to establish both a real and substantial connection with the
jurisdiction and a good arguable case, on the lax standard applicable at this stage of the
proceeding. The fact that USSB may be able to establish that it had done everything it could
to ensure that it did not interfere with the plaintiff's right and might have a defence was a
matter for trial.
Echostar defendants
The defendant, Echostar Communications, was a holding company and did not carry on any
business. Its wholly owned subsidiaries, however, provided DBS subscription programming and
decoder equipment necessary to access the programming. Echostar signals were sent into
Canada. Echostar decoders were sold to residents in British Columbia and Manitoba who,
after the decoders were activated, received programming that originated with Echostar.
Echostar defendants, or some of them, received payment for services provided in the territory
where the plaintiff had exclusive rights. The plaintiff's head office was in Alberta and arguably
it suffered damages in Alberta, although there was no evidence to establish Echostar sales in
Alberta. The court agreed with the chambers judge that this factor constituted a sufficient
connection with the jurisdiction, at least at this stage of the proceeding.
Warren Defendants
The chambers judge found that the Warren defendants had sold systems and decoders to
Canadian dealers which had no purpose other than to permit the reception of US
programming, originating with USSB or DirecTV, in Canada, and had arranged to have the
systems and decoders sold in Canada activated by DirecTV or USSB. While there was a
conflict in the evidence as to the magnitude of the sales and the role played by Warren, and
while the submitting of orders to DirecTV on behalf of Canadian residents may have been
contrary to company policy, there was evidence on which the chambers judge could have
found that Warren had participated in a least some of the sales of systems and decoders to
dealers in Canada and obtained and transmitted orders to DirecTV and USSB on behalf of its
customers. The chambers judge was not palpably wrong in concluding that the Warren
defendants were involved in at least part of the operation which resulted in the interference
in Canada with the rights of the plaintiff.
Individual Warren defendants
The chambers judge found nothing in the pleadings that took the individual Warren
defendants outside the role of the directing minds of the corporations. Further the evidence
pointed to the fact that the role played by the two individuals related to their position as
directors of the corporations. To the extent that evidence was available to connect the
corporations to the subject matter of the action, those [page4] acts were acts of employees
130
and not the individual acts of the two directors. The chambers judge had not erred in his
assessment of the pleadings and of the evidence relating to the role played by these
individuals.
Leave to file new evidence
Although the plaintiff may have been entitled to apply to adduce fresh evidence on
appeal, the plaintiff would still have had to comply with the usual rules relating to the
admission of fresh evidence. The evidence of the completion of the DirecTV/USSB merger was
not conclusive as to USSB's involvement. Furthermore, the evidence relating to the ability to
purchase programming services from US suppliers could have been discovered with due
diligence prior to the hearing.
Trial Interlocutory Injunction
The plaintiffs were successor companies to the original plaintiffs who had been licensed by
the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to broadcast
motion pictures to subscribers in Western Canada on a pay or pay-for- view basis. Subscribers
used authorized decoders to view the plaintiffs' encrypted signals.
The defendants were involved in a chain of program supply which the plaintiffs alleged
created and exploited a grey market. Grey market reception occurred when a decoder that
was authorized to decode a signal in a programming services' legitimate market territory, for
example in the United States, was used to decode signals in Canada. The defendants
included producers and suppliers of programming, which were not authorized to broadcast
or distribute programming in Canada, and decoder manufacturers and dealers. Together,
the defendants supplied consumers with encrypted programming services not licensed for
reception in Canada, along with the decoders necessary to receive such services.
In an action for breach of the Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2, the plaintiffs
brought a motion for an interim mandatory injunction to restrain the defendants' grey market
reception activities.
A tripartite test is to be applied on an application for a mandatory injunction.
Strong prima facie case
Section 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act provides that no person shall decode an
encrypted subscription programming signal without the authorization of the lawful distributor
of the signal. Accordingly, there is an absolute prohibition against the decoding of encrypted
subscription program signals unless the signals emanate from a lawful distributor in Canada
who authorizes their decoding. While the term "decoding" is not defined in the
Radiocommunication Act, there is a strong case for a broad definition that would encompass
the provision of consumer information to the programmer or program distributor, the
compilation of that information [page310] and its integration with the programming signal,
the provision of equipment to permit reception and unencrypted viewing, and the
transmission of the programming signal to persons in the plaintiffs' territory. All the defendants
played an integral part in allowing customers in plaintiffs' territory to receive programming not
intended for viewing by those customers. The plaintiffs have made out a strong prima facie
case.
The plaintiffs' strong prima facie case was not weakened by the contention that the
interpretation given to s. 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act would unduly limit freedom
131
of expression as guaranteed under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. No party asserted any prohibition on the ability of Canadian consumers to
receive unencrypted US programming where the programmer possessed the necessary
commercial and copyright rights. The Charter argument was used primarily to protect
commercial interests.
Irreparable harm
The plaintiffs were required to provide evidence of irreparable harm that was clear and not
speculative. Irreparable harm is harm which either cannot be quantified in monetary terms or
cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect damages from the other. There
was no suggestion that the plaintiffs would not be able to recover damages eventually
awarded at trial from the defendants.
There appeared to be a means of identifying the number of persons in the plaintiffs' territory
receiving unencrypted programming and the subscription fees they would be paying. The
recent sale of one of the plaintiffs without any reference to its value being affected by the
grey market lent further credence to a conclusion that harm was reparable by a damage
award. Accordingly, the plaintiffs had failed to show irreparable harm.
Balance of convenience
The third branch of the tripartite test requires the court to determine which of the parties will
suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of an interlocutory injunction. Where the
factors appear to be evenly balanced, it is prudent to preserve the status quo. The balance
of convenience favoured the granting of the injunction. The defendants should not be
allowed to assert a position obtained as a result of their infringing behaviour.
132
Wilson & Lafleur Ltée v La société québécoise d’information juridique
(1998), REJB 98-8110, [1998] AQ 2762 (Que Sup Ct); revd (2000), JE 2000856, REJB 2000-17728, [2000] 12-10 Le monde juridique 13, [2000] RJQ 1086,
[2000] JQ 1215, [2000-04-20] http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ca/200004fr.html
(Que CA)
Appel d'un jugement de la Cour supérieure ayant rejeté une requête pour jugement
déclaratoire. Accueilli en partie.
L'appelante, Wilson & Lafleur, est éditeur de publications juridiques. Afin de poursuivre ses
activités, elle veut avoir accès à l'ensemble des décisions motivées provenant des tribunaux
québécois. Les coûts prohibitifs qu'entraîne l'obtention de la jurisprudence et certaines
difficultés relevant du fonctionnement du greffe sont des obstacles de taille pour l'appelante.
Selon le Tarif des frais judiciaires en matière civile et des droits de greffe et le Tarif judiciaire en
matière pénale, les droits de 2 $ la page sont exigibles pour quiconque souhaite obtenir
copie d'un jugement au greffe. De plus, la directive A-1, émanant de la Direction générale
des services judiciaires du ministère de la Justice du Québec, fait double emploi avec les
tarifs et prescrit le même montant. L'appelante reçoit en vrac l'ensemble des décisions de la
Cour d'appel du Québec, au tarif de 1 750 $ l'an, et reçoit de l'intimée SOQUIJ, au coût de
0,34 $ la page, les jugements touchant le Code civil du Québec. L'appelante s'est adressée
au ministère de la Justice pour obtenir gratuitement les autres jugements de la Cour
supérieure et de la Cour du Québec. Le ministre a refusé et a dirigé Wilson & Lafleur vers
SOQUIJ, qui refuse également. L'appelante demande de déclarer illégales et
inconstitutionnelles les mesures législatives et réglementaires qui font obstacle à l'obtention
de l'ensemble des décisions des tribunaux judiciaires. Il s'agit de la directive A-1, de l'article
224 de la Loi sur les tribunaux judiciaires, des articles 367 paragraphe 2 et 367 paragraphe 4
du Code de procédure pénale, de l'article 23 du Tarif sur les frais judiciaires en matière civile
et des droits de greffe, de l'article 3 paragraphe 1 du Tarif judiciaire en matière pénale, de
l'article 21 alinéa 2 de la Loi sur la Société québécoise d'information juridique et des articles 1
à 3 du Règlement sur la cueillette et la sélection des décisions judiciaires. Elle demande aussi
que soient déclarées inconstitutionnelles, en raison de leur effet, les décisions prises par le
ministre de la Justice et SOQUIJ. Elle soutient que le juge de première instance a fait erreur en
concluant à la légalité de la directive A-1 et qu'il a erré en décidant que les mesures
attaquées ne limitent pas sa liberté d'expression. De plus, elle allègue que SOQUIJ est une
mandataire de la Couronne créée essentiellement pour remplir un devoir gouvernemental
d'intérêt public, celui de diffuser les décisions des tribunaux judiciaires. SOQUIJ constituerait le
«guichet» par lequel elle devrait avoir accès à l'ensemble de la jurisprudence.
Décision
L'appelante a droit à un accès non entravé à l'ensemble des décisions judiciaires
québécoises. Ce droit est reconnu par le législateur, qui a confié à SOQUIJ, sa mandataire, la
mission de favoriser un tel accès. Dans un État de droit, il est essentiel que les citoyens soient
en mesure d'échanger et de critiquer librement l'ensemble de ces règles. Ils doivent pouvoir
s'exprimer et critiquer librement les institutions qui les régissent. Ces échanges et critiques
doivent également viser les fruits de ces institutions, les décisions judiciaires en l'espèce.
L'accès des citoyens aux décisions des tribunaux s'impose de lui-même et doit être réel. En
adoptant la Loi sur la Société québécoise d'information juridique, l'Assemblée nationale a
reconnu son obligation fondamentale et d'intérêt public d'assurer la diffusion de la
jurisprudence d'ici. La législation crée deux voies que peuvent emprunter les justiciables afin
d'avoir accès à la jurisprudence québécoise: les greffes des cours de justice et SOQUIJ. Ces
deux guichets n'ont cependant pas la même fonction. La distribution en vrac de l'ensemble
de la jurisprudence des tribunaux québécois doit être effectuée par le biais du «guichet»
133
SOQUIJ. La difficulté est que l'accès à l'ensemble de la jurisprudence est plus théorique
que réel. D'une part, SOQUIJ n'acquiesce pas à la demande de l'appelante. D'autre
part, par le biais de la sélection qu'elle effectue, elle met à la disposition des justiciables une
fraction de l'ensemble des décisions rendues. SOQUIJ peut sélectionner et organiser
l'information pour faciliter sa diffusion, sa compréhension et, ultimement, la discussion et la
critique. Cependant, le fait qu'elle ne mette pas à la disposition des autres éditeurs la totalité
des jugements reçus restreint l'accès à la matière première. SOQUIJ doit donc donner à
Wilson & Lafleur accès à tous les jugements rendus par les tribunaux judiciaires du Québec
auxquels elle a elle-même accès, qu'ils soient sur support informatique ou papier. Quant à la
question des coûts, il n'appartient pas à la Cour de fixer la somme précise que devrait
débourser Wilson & Lafleur. Il fait partie de la mission de SOQUIJ de rendre disponibles les
décisions au coût réel de reproduction. Ce coût pourrait cependant être majoré de frais
d'entreposage ou de livraison. Finalement, en vertu de l'article 224 de la Loi sur les tribunaux
judiciaires, il appartient au gouvernement de fixer les droits de greffe relatifs à l'obtention des
jugements ou d'exempter des individus ou des organismes du paiement de ces droits. La
directive A-1 ayant été édictée par la Direction générale des services judiciaires du ministère
de la Justice, elle doit être déclarée illégale.
134
Wing v Van Velthuizen
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 2873, [2000] FCJ 1940, [2000] FTR TBEd NO120,
Nadon J
[1] This is an application brought under the summary proceedings provisions in section 34(4)
of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (the Act) and pursuant to Rule 300(b) of the Federal
Court Rules, 1998, in respect of infringement of copyright in a literary work. […]
[45] The Diary was created in the United States. Since the United States became a member of
the WTO in 1995, it is a treaty country for the purposes of the Act, according to the definition
of "treaty country" in section 2 of the Act. In addition, pursuant to subsection 5(1.01) of the
Act, the United States is deemed to have been a treaty country at the time the Diary was
created. Since Ms. Wilson was a citizen of the United States at the time of the making of the
work, I agree with the Applicants' contention that copyright in the Diary subsists in Canada.
[46] As for the term of subsistence of the copyright, section 7 of the Act deals with works
unpublished at the date of the death of the author. I agree with the Applicants' argument
that pursuant to subsection 2.2(3) of the Act, since he Diary was published by the
Respondent without the consent of the copyright owners, it remains an unpublished work for
the purposes of the Act. Therefore, in accordance with subsection 7(3) of the Act, which
applies in this case since the Diary had not been published before the coming into force of
section 7 (December 31, 1998) and since the death of Lois Wilson occurred during the period
of fifty years immediately before the coming into force of section 7, the unpublished Diary
benefits from a 50-year protection following the end of the year 1998. The Diary is therefore
protected by the Act since the term for copyright has not yet expired.
[48] In any event, whether or not it can technically be said that the Respondent is putting in
issue the existence of the copyright, the result is the same. If one considers that her
statements in her correspondence can be considered as putting in issue the existence of the
copyright, the presumption applies, and the Respondent must submit evidence to reverse the
presumption. Since nothing was filed, the Respondent has not met her burden, therefore the
copyright is presumed to subsist in the Diary. If the Respondent has not put in issue the
existence of the copyright, then the Applicants do not have to demonstrate that the
copyright subsists, since it is not disputed by the Respondent. Either way, the result is the same:
for the purposes of this case, the copyright subsists in Canada and the Diary is protected by
the Act.
[49] The next issue is that of ownership of copyright. Pursuant to subsection 13(1) of the Act,
Lois Wilson was the first owner of the copyright, since, as discussed previously, she is the author
of the Diary. According to section 13(4) of the Act, the owner of the copyright in a work can
assign that right. In addition, as pointed out by the Applicants, the words "otherwise than by
will" in section 14(1) of the Act acknowledge that a copyright can be assigned by will. I agree
with the Applicants' claim that based on sections 13(4) and 14(1), Lois Wilson was entitled to
transfer the copyright in her Diary by a written and signed will.
[50] The Applicants also claim that copyright can pass under a will to residuary legatees even
if the will makes no express mention of copyright. In Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd. v. Massie
& Renwick Ltd., supra, the late Charles Edward Goad devised and bequeathed in his will all
his "property real and personal of every nature and kind whatsoever in the Dominion of
Canada" to the Toronto General Corporation. He made no specific mention of his copyrights
135
in the will. The question was whether Mr. Goad's copyrights passed to the executor as
part of the "property real and personal of every nature and kind whatsoever". […]
[51] Therefore, since I was unable to find any case law to the contrary, it appears that a
copyright which is not mentioned in the will passes under the gift of residue to the residuary
legatees. Consequently, I must agree with the Applicants that as a residuary beneficiary of
Lois Wilson's estate, the Applicant Nell Wing is a valid co-owner of the copyright.
[73] According to subsection 38.1(5), in exercising its discretion to award statutory damages,
the Court should consider all relevant factors, including the good faith or bad faith of the
defendant, the conduct of the parties before and during the proceedings, and the need to
deter other
infringements of the copyright in question.
[74] In my opinion, statutory damages should be granted. The infringement in this case was
blatant; the Respondent reproduced the Diary in its entirety. Although the Respondent was
not publishing the Diary in bad faith from the start, she was warned several times that her
conduct was infringing the Applicants' copyright. She refused repeatedly to cease infringing
the copyright, and attempted to sell "her" copyright to the Applicants for the sum of
US$125,000. In my opinion, as of the moment she received notice of her
infringement, her conduct was reprehensible. In addition, with regard to the third criteria, and
considering the Respondent's behaviour, there is a definite need to deter further
infringement of the copyright in question. Consequently, in my view, the Applicants are
entitled to a sum of $10,000 on this count.
136
Wolanski v Rhombus Media Inc
(2000), [2000] CarswellNat 2308, [2000] FCJ 1582, [2000] FTR Uned 128
(FCTD) Nadon J.
[On motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of Plaintiff's action.]
[2] The Plaintiff alleges that she is the author of an unpublished manuscript entitled "Core of
Time" and that the movie "The Red Violin" infringes her copyright in the "Core of Time".
[4] […] In Arbique c. Gabriele, [1998] A.Q. no 3794, JE 99-352, Trahan J. of the Quebec
Superior Court, at page 3, sets out the facts which a Plaintiff must prove to succeed in a
copyright infringement action:
Pour déterminer s'il y a eu violation du droit d'auteur en l'instance, le Tribunal doit
d'abord déterminer si l'oeuvre des demanderesses est une oeuvre antérieure et
originale qui bénéficie de la protection de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur. Le Tribunal
doit ensuite déterminer si les défendeurs ont eu accès à l'oeuvre protégée et, le
cas échéant, s'ils en ont copié une partie essentielle ou si l'oeuvre des défendeurs
est le résultat d'un travail indépendant.
[5] On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that there is no genuine issue of a trial. In my
view, the
Plaintiff cannot possibly succeed on her action. I agree with counsel for the Defendants that
the Plaintiff has no evidence whatsoever to offer in regard to those elements which she must
prove in order to succeed.
137
ROBIC, un groupe d'avocats et d'agents de brevets et de marques de commerce voué
depuis 1892 à la protection et à la valorisation de la propriété intellectuelle dans tous les
domaines: brevets, dessins industriels et modèles utilitaires; marques de commerce, marques
de certification et appellations d'origine; droits d'auteur, propriété littéraire et artistique, droits
voisins et de l'artiste interprète; informatique, logiciels et circuits intégrés; biotechnologies,
pharmaceutiques et obtentions végétales; secrets de commerce, know-how et concurrence;
licences, franchises et transferts de technologies; commerce électronique, distribution et droit
des affaires; marquage, publicité et étiquetage; poursuite, litige et arbitrage; vérification
diligente et audit; et ce, tant au Canada qu'ailleurs dans le monde. La maîtrise des
intangibles.
ROBIC, a group of lawyers and of patent and trademark agents dedicated since 1892 to the
protection and the valorization of all fields of intellectual property: patents, industrial designs
and utility patents; trademarks, certification marks and indications of origin; copyright and
entertainment law, artists and performers, neighbouring rights; computer, software and
integrated circuits; biotechnologies, pharmaceuticals and plant breeders; trade secrets,
know-how, competition and anti-trust; licensing, franchising and technology transfers; ecommerce, distribution and business law; marketing, publicity and labelling; prosecution
litigation and arbitration; due diligence; in Canada and throughout the world. Ideas live here.
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IDEAS LIVE HERE
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compilation préliminaire des décisions rendues

Transcription

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