L`Argentine accuse d`Iran d`être responsable de l`attaque terroriste

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14 novembre 2006
Centre d'Information sur les Renseignements
et le Terrorisme
au Centre d'Etudes Spéciales (CES)
L'Argentine accuse d'Iran d'être responsable de
l'attaque terroriste commise par le Hezbollah
contre le Centre communautaire juif de Buenos
Aires (AMIA) en 1994. Suite à la décision du
Ministère public, un juge argentin a lancé des
mandats d'arrêt contre sept personnalités
iraniennes et un membre du Hezbollah
Le lieu de l'attaque terroriste
Sept personnalités iraniennes et un membre
du Hezbollah recherchés.
Photo: site du bureau du Procureur général,
Argentine
Les ruines du bâtiment du Centre
communautaire. Le retrait des corps des
victimes a pris deux semaines.
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Aperçu général
1. Le 25 octobre 2006, le Dr. Alberto Nisman, Procureur général d'Argentine, et le
Procureur Marcelo Martínez Burgos ont présenté les conclusions d'une équipe
spéciale chargée d'enquêter sur l'attaque terroriste du Centre communautaire juif
(AMIA) de Buenos Aires. L'explosion, perpétrée par un terroriste suicide du
Hezbollah le 18 juillet 1994, avait fait 85 morts et 151 blessés.
2. Le rapport détaillé, présenté par le Procureur général et son assistant lors d'une
conférence de presse, prouve que la décision de commettre une attaque contre le
bâtiment a été prise par les “plus hautes instances du gouvernement iranien,” et
que les Iraniens ont demandé au Hezbollah de perpétrer l'attaque. Le Procureur
général d'Argentine a donc demandé au juge responsable de l'affaire, le Dr. Rodolfo
Canicoba Corral, de lancer des mandats d'arrêt internationaux contre sept
personnalités iraniennes, dont l'ancien Président Rafsanjani, et contre Imad
Moughnieh du Hezbollah. Aucun mandat n'a été lancé contre le dirigeant iranien
Ali Khamenei, bien que le rapport affirme qu'il était impliqué dans la décision de
commettre l'attaque.
3. Le 9 novembre 2006, le juge Corral a appliqué les recommandations du Procureur
général et a lancé des mandats d'arrêt internationaux contre les sept Iraniens et
contre l'activiste du Hezbollah. Les mandats visent les plus hauts échelons de
l'ancien gouvernement iranien, y compris l'ancien Président, des diplomates iraniens
alors en poste à Buenos Aires et le conseiller militaire de Hassan Nasrallah. Voici
les noms et les rangs occupés par ces individus en 1994, selon le rapport du
Procureur général argentin :
i. Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, Président iranien.1
ii. Ali Fallahijan, Ministre des Renseignements et de la Sécurité.
iii. Ali Akbar Velayati, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.
iv. Mohsen Rezai, commandant des Gardes de la Révolution iranienne.
v. Ahmad Vahidi, commandant de la Force Qods.2
vi. Mohsen Rabbani, attaché culturel iranien à Buenos Aires.
vii. Ahmad Reza Asghari, (aussi connu sous le nom de Mohsen Randjbaran),
troisième secrétaire de l'ambassade iranienne à Buenos Aires.
vii. Imad Moughnieh, responsable des Renseignements extérieurs du Hezbollah
en 1994, fonction qu'il occupe jusqu'aujourd'hui, et conseiller militaire de
Hassan Nasrallah.3
1
Il est évident qu'une telle décision n'aurait jamais pu être prise sans l'accord d'Ali Khamenei. Un rapport sur l'enquête
menée par le CIDE (les Renseignements argentins) publié en Mars 2003, montre également qu'Ali Khamenei était
responsable. Suite au dernier rapport en date, le système juridique argentin n'a pas lancé de mandat d'arrêt international en
dépit du fait que le nom de Khamenei figure aux côtés des noms des personnalités iraniennes qui ont décidé d'attaquer le
bâtiment du Centre communautaire.
2
La Force Qods, commandée aujourd'hui par Qassem Suleimani, est responsable des opérations du Hezbollah et d'autres
organisations terroristes au Liban et ailleurs dans le monde.
3
Imad Moughnieh, célèbre terroriste international, a fomenté plusieurs attaques contre des cibles occidentales,
israéliennes et juives au Liban et à l'étranger. Il figure sur la liste américaine des terroristes les plus recherchés.
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4. L'Iran et le Hezbollah ont rejeté les conclusions de l'enquête, sans répondre
toutefois aux accusations :
i. Sayid Muhammad Ali Husseini, porte-parole du Ministère iranien des Affaires
étrangères, a déclaré que les accusations argentines étaient infondées et qu'elles
résultaient des “pressions politiques sionistes” exercées afin de détourner
l'attention des opinions publiques des “attaques sionistes” contre les peuples
palestinien et libanais. Il a ajouté que “l'Iran lui-même a été la victime de
plusieurs actions terroristes et a payé un prix élevé en vies humaines et en
dégâts matériels” (Agence de Presse IRNA, 26 octobre). Suite au lancement des
mandats d'arrêt, il a réitéré sa théorie de “conspiration sioniste-américaine”
(Reuters, 11 novembre).
ii. La station de radio du Hezbollah a affirmé que les Etats-Unis avaient lancé
une campagne internationale contre le Hezbollah afin de torpiller ses tentatives
d'établir un gouvernement d'union nationale au Liban. L'organisation a
également déclaré que les accusations du Procureur général d'Argentine
s'inscrivent dans le cadre de cette campagne, puisqu'elles sont "infondées"
(Radio Nur, 25 octobre).
La déflagration provoquée par l'attaque
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Le cratère formé par l'explosion devant le bâtiment. Quelque 400 kg
d'explosifs auraient été utilisés.
Le juge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral (Photo: site Internet AMIA)
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Principaux points du rapport
1. Le rapport du Procureur général argentin fait plus de 800 pages. Il détaille et
analyse la colossale quantité d'informations récoltées par le Procureur et tire les
conclusions appropriées. Le résumé de l'enquête (toujours en cours) a été rendu
public par le bureau du Procureur général et traduit en anglais par le Ministère
israélien des Affaires étrangères (Voir Annexe 2).
2. Voici les principaux points du rapport :
i. Le rapport affirme que “la décision de commettre l'attaque n'a pas été prise par
un petit groupe séparatiste à tendance islamique radicale, mais a été largement
débattue avant d'être prise selon un consensus par les plus hauts
représentants du gouvernement iranien d'alors.”
ii. L'enquête a soulevé le problème de savoir comment désigner le Hezbollah. Le
groupe doit-il être qualifié “d'organisation terroriste” ou de mouvement luttant
contre “l'occupation” israélienne du Liban ? Le rapport précise qu'“il est
évident que le terme de ‘mouvement terroriste’ est … le plus juste,” en
raison du nombre élevé de preuves à l'appui.
iii. Les conclusions de l'enquête prouvent que les plus hautes personnalités du
régime iranien ont demandé au Hezbollah de commettre l'attaque contre
l'AMIA. Le régime iranien a exploité l'infrastructure terroriste du Hezbollah,
“instrument utilisé pour la réalisation des objectifs de la politique
iranienne.”
iv. Les raisons de l'attaque : Le rapport n'ignore pas le fait que l'attaque a été
commise pour des raisons liées au conflit du Proche-Orient (y compris
l'enlèvement de Mustafa Dirani et l'attaque aérienne israélienne contre le camp
d'entraînement du Hezbollah dans la plaine de la Beqa’a). Toutefois, en se
basant sur les preuves rassemblées, le rapport conclut que la raison principale de
l'attentat fut “la décision unilatérale du gouvernement argentin de rompre
l'accord sur la fourniture de matériels et de technologies nucléaires signés
quelques années plus tôt entre l'Argentine et l'Iran.”
v. Le rapport décrit en détail la façon dont la direction iranienne a pris la décision
de commettre l'attaque. Celle-ci a été prise par un groupe baptisé Commission
des Affaires Spéciales (Omure Vijeh), dont les membres à l'époque étaient Ali
Khamenei,4 Ali Rafsanjani, Ali Fallahijan et Ali Velayat. La Commission s'est
réunie le 14 août 1993, dans la ville iranienne de Mashad et a donné son
accord à l'attaque.
vi. Le rapport fournit également des détails sur le vaste réseau de
renseignements mis en place par le régime iranien à Buenos Aires, sans
l'aide duquel l'attaque contre l'AMIA n'aurait pas été possible. Selon le rapport,
au milieu des années 1980, les Iraniens “ont commencé à établir un vaste réseau
d'espions qui est devenu un ‘service de renseignements’ complet, et qui
4
Malgré sa participation, un mandat d'arrêt n'a pas été lancé contre lui.
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comprenait l'ambassade iranienne et le bureau de l'attaché culturel à Buenos
Aires.” Il recourrait également aux services d'“éléments extrémistes” de la
communauté musulmane de Buenos Aires et d'autres villes argentines.
vii. Le responsable des activités de renseignement du Hezbollah était cheikh
Mohsen Rabbani, qui a commencé à œuvrer dès son arrivée dans le pays en
1983, et qui a par la suite été nommé attaché culturel de l'ambassade iranienne à
Buenos Aires ; il avait également participé à la réunion de Mashad. A son retour
de cette réunion, des fonds (détaillés dans le rapport) ont été transférés pour le
financement de l'attaque. Les Argentins possèdent plusieurs documents (et
écoutes téléphoniques) prouvant l'implication de Rabbani dans la préparation de
la logistique en vue de l'attaque. Le rapport précise également que des preuves
“indiquent que le Ministre de l'information iranien d'alors, Ali Fallahijan, était
chargé de coordonner l'opération depuis l'Iran.”
viii. Les auteurs de l'attentat : L'attaque a été commise par des terroristes du
Hezbollah arrivés en Argentine le 1er juillet 1994. Imad Moughnieh,
responsable des Renseignements extérieurs du Hezbollah, chargé de la cellule
opérationnelle, est entré en Argentine en 1994. Les Argentins possèdent
plusieurs enregistrements téléphoniques impliquant Moughnieh, des membres
du Hezbollah au Liban et l'infrastructure du Hezbollah au Brésil dans la région
de la “triple frontière.”5 Le 18 juillet, jour de l'attaque, “un dernier appel a été
reçu sur le téléphone portable du coordinateur de la cellule…”
ix. Le terroriste suicide auteur de l'attaque : Le 18 juillet à 9h53, Ibrahim
Hussein Berro s'est fait explosé dans un van Renault transportant 300-400 kg
d'explosifs. L'attaque a fait 85 morts et 151 blessés. Les explosifs ont été activés
devant le bâtiment de l'AMIA, provoquant l'effondrement de la devanture de
l'immeuble et causant des dégâts aux bâtiments voisins. Le rapport précise que
“le modus operandi de l'attaque était identique à la méthode employée deux
ans plus tôt dans l'attaque contre l'ambassade israélienne de Buenos Aires
(selon la Cour Suprême argentine, cette attaque a été commise par le Jihad
Islamique, la branche armée du Hezbollah).”
3. Selon le rapport, la version complète soumise au juge comprend une annexe où sont
analysées d'autres attaques terroristes dans lesquelles est impliquée la
République islamique d'Iran. Le point commun à toutes les décisions de justice
rendues sur les attaques est qu'elles “considèrent le gouvernement iranien et ses
fonctionnaires comme étant responsables de ces actes, en tant qu'organisateurs et
sponsors. Ceci prouve que le régime iranien avait systématiquement recourt à la
violence dans ses tentatives d'exporter la révolution iranienne.” Le rapport fait
notamment référence à trois cas dans lequel le régime iranien a assassiné ses
opposants, en Allemagne, en Suisse et en France :
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A la frontière entre le Brésil, l'Argentine et le Paraguay. De nombreux chiites vivent dans cette région, qui abrite
également une large concentration de groupes islamiques radicaux, dont le Hezbollah.
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i. Le 17 septembre 1992, le secrétaire général du Parti Démocratique du Kurdistan
iranien et trois de ses collègues ont été tués dans le restaurant Mykonos à Berlin.
La justice berlinoise a conclu qu'il s'agissait d'un acte du régime iranien.
ii. Le 24 avril 1990, Kazem Radjavi a été assassiné en Suisse. Ancien diplomate
iranien, il avait occupé le poste d'ambassadeur iranien à l'ONU et était le frère
de Massoud Radjavi, responsable du Conseil iranien de Résistance Nationale,
organisation anti-iranienne d'extrême gauche. Les enquêteurs suisses ont
découvert que les services de renseignements iraniens étaient responsables du
meurtre. Un juge suisse a lancé un mandat d'arrêt international contre l'ancien
Ministre iranien des Renseignements, Ali Fallahijan.
iii. Le 8 août 1991, Chapour Bakhtiar [alors Premier ministre du gouvernement en
exil], secrétaire général du Mouvement de la Résistance Nationale et son
secrétaire personnel ont été retrouvés morts, étranglés. Les meurtres ont été
commis près de Paris. Dans ce cas également, le régime iranien a été impliqué
dans la fomentation et l'exécution des assassinats.6
6
Pour plus d'informations, voir l'article d'Avril 2003 (en anglais), intitulé “Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating
Terror,” à l'adresse http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/html/final/eng/iran.htm et http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/malam_multimedia//ENGLISH/IRAN/PDF/APR_03.PDF
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Résumé de la requête du Procureur général argentin de lancer un mandat d'arrêt
contre les auteurs de l'attaque du Centre communautaire juif (AMIA) de Buenos
Aires en 1994 (en anglais)
We, the prosecutors in charge of investigation of the attack on the AMIA Jewish
Community Center in Buenos Aires (hereinafter: “AMIA”), Alberto Nisman and
Marcelo Martínez, hereby petition the judge in the case Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, to issue
an international warrant for the arrest of seven Iranian nationals and one Lebanese national
that are suspected of having played a role to one degree or another in the terrorist attack on
AMIA in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994. In the more than 800 pages of our report (which
represents only a minute amount of the information gathering and analysis that has been
realized by our unit since February 2005, at which time we took over the investigation at
the judge’s behest), we also express our conviction, which is supported by a numerous
pieces of evidence, that the heinous attack on AMIA, which caused 85 deaths, 151 injuries
and extensive property damage, was the brainchild of, and was organized by, the highest
instances of the Iranian government, which then asked Hezbollah to carry out the attack
(Hezbollah has traditionally been under the thumb of the Iranian government from an
economic and political standpoint).
We are seeking the arrest of the following persons: Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who was the
president of Iran in 1994; the former head of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security Ali
Akbar Velayati; the former commander of the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) Mohsen
Rezai; Ahmad Vahidi, who was commander of the Al Quds special operations unit;
Mohsen Rabbani, the former cultural attache of the Iranian embassy in Argentina; Ahmad
Reza Asghari (also known as Mohsen Randjbaran), third secretary (tercer secretario) of
the Iranian embassy in Argentina; and Imad Fayez Moughnieh, head of Hezbollah’s
External Security Service on the day of the attack.
The report submitted today does not take a position with respect to the Spiritual Leader of
Iran, in light of the currently unanimous view in both case law and the philosophy of law
regarding government leaders’ immunity from prosecution.
In view of the extreme gravity and public importance of the event that has been under
investigation, which is reflected in the unusual length of our report (which is also written in
a suitably forensic style), we have decided to issue the present document, which uses
language that is more accessible to the general public, whereby we have attempted to
summarize, if not all the relevant elements, at least the key facts and considerations on
which our case rests and which we took into consideration in formulating our accusations
of the suspects. In addition to the reasons already mentioned, we also feel that the general
public (which is the very essence of a democratic system of government) has the right to
know the most relevant conclusions that our investigation has reached, particularly in view
of the profound effect this attack has had on the general public.
We also felt that for various reasons, it was imperative to issue a report of the type we are
submitting to the judge today. It should be borne in mind that Judge Galeano (who was
impeached and removed from office on charges of serious irregularities in handling the
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investigation) had ordered the arrest of 12 Iranian nationals and one Lebanese citizen that
are suspected of having played a role in the attack.
However, with the exception of the order to arrest Imad Mughnieh (for whom U.S. judicial
authorities as well as the Argentinean Supreme Court are also considering issuing
international arrest warrants, but not in regard to the present case), the status of all of Judge
Galeano’s instructions has been downgraded by Interpol, which is the agency with ultimate
responsibility for arresting the AMIA suspects. These changes in status began with
temporary suspension and ultimately culminated in definitive discontinuation of efforts to
apprehend the suspects, this latter decision having been adopted by the Interpol General
Assembly last September in Berlin on the basis of a unanimous recommendation by the
organization’s Executive Committee. Of the 115 representatives attending the General
Assembly session, 91 voted in favor of the Executive Committee’s recommendation, 9
voted against it, and there were 15 abstentions. The main justification given by Interpol for
both the temporary suspension and the definitive discontinuation of efforts to apprehend
the suspects related to irregularities committed by ex-Judge Galeano in handling the case.
In the case of the suspension – which transitioned to a virtual discontinuation as
from October 29, 2004 – the Office of Legal Affairs’ notification regarding the
decision of October 3, 2004 referred to the sentence handed down by a Buenos Aires
criminal court (Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal Federal no. 3, file no. 437/00 in the court
register, Telleldín, Carlos Alberto y otros s/homicidio calificado...(atentado a la AMIA)
[Telleldin, Alberto Carlos and other persons suspected of manslaughter (...) attack on
AMIA]), which found these persons guilty of having comprised the so called “local
connection” for the attack. The notification not only emphasizes the innocence of the 22
suspects that have been subject to a criminal investigation, but also quotes verbatim a
passage from the press release issued by the aforementioned criminal court regarding the
ruling on the case on September 2 of last year, particularly in stating that (a) “the evidence
presented in court constituted a serious violation of the rules of due process and legal
defense, as was demonstrated by the judge’s lack of impartiality;” and (b) “a number of
irregularities committed by the judge show that his actions were aimed at “constructing” an
incriminatory hypothesis in an attempt to meet the expectations of public opinion and at the
same time cater to the sinister interests of unscrupulous political leaders.” Hence, there can
be little doubt that what was uppermost in the minds of Interpol officials in making their
decision were not legal considerations, but rather the distrust aroused by Judge Galeano’s
dubious performance in the case, which ended up affecting all aspects of the trial itself.
In other words, Interpol’s reasoning was more or less along the lines of the following:
Having taken cognizance of the fact that Judge Galeano committed irregularities in
handling the case, Interpol reached the conclusion that all of the legal decisions the judge
must be equally aberrant. Moreover, the Executive Committee’s recommendation to the
General Assembly that the red alert be cancelled for the AMIA suspects clearly states the
organization’s position as follows: “The Executive Committee has in particular taken note
of that fact that the arrest warrants were signed by a judge whose actions in the case were
declared irregular by the competent Argentinean authorities.” Hence, the real and concrete
result of Interpol’s decision to terminate the search for the suspects (a measure for which
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the jargon term is “cancellation of red alerts”) is practically tantamount to declaring the
suspects’ arrest non-enforceable.
Tacitly taking on board this virtual stalemate, the Interpol Directorate has now ventured to
suggest, via their head of legal affairs, that “only new arrest warrants signed by a different
judge and based on a reexamination of the evidence underlying the accusations would
justify reestablishment of the red alerts.”
Until such time as this occurs, the
“discontinuation of search” for the 12 Iranian suspects promulgated by the Interpol
secretary general remains in force.
The matters described above are definitely enough to shed light on what led us to reach the
conclusions presented in our report. Our basic goal was to explain in minute detail the
conclusions that were reached by the investigation team in the prosecutor’s office, on the
basis of a more than 18 month-long investigation, but not as a mere slight variation on
petitions that have proven unsuccessful in the past, but rather with a view to leveraging
the opportunity presented by the Interpol decision to completely reexamine the facts of
the case with respect to the attack’s so called “international connection.”
However, this complete reexamination doesn’t mean that the two petitions have nothing in
common, since one cannot seriously expect them to be totally different, given the large
amount of information accumulated in the case through so many years of investigations.
However, and particularly in view of the work that has been done since Judge Galeano was
recused from case, there are many other aspects of the investigation for the conclusions of
the previous and current assessment differ substantially. This difference is reflected in the
individualization in our report of some of the suspects whose arrest we feel should be
requested, although Judge Galeano did not order the arrest of these individuals. And the
reverse holds true as well. In other words, we feel that some of the arrest warrants issued by
Judge Galeano were not justified by the evidence. These discrepancies are also apparent in
the accusations,both against the highest authorities in the Iranian government at the time,
as well as against Hezbollah. Indeed, whereas Judge Galeano confined himself to declaring
that the attack was the work of “radicalized elements of the Iranian regime,” in our view it
has been proven that the decision to carry out the attack was made not by a small splinter
group of extremely radical Islamic functionaries, but was instead a decision that was
extensively discussed and was ultimately adopted by a consensus of the highest
representatives of the Iranian government at the time within the context of a foreign policy
that was quite willing to resort to violence in order to achieve the goals are inherent to the
Islamic republic that was established by the revolution of February 1979.
By the same token, the contrast between the view of Hezbollah that are expressed in our
report versus the view expressed by Judge Galeano is noteworthy. Beyond the fact that in
Judge Galeano’s ruling the nature and scope of the relationship between Hezbollah
and Iran remains obscure (we are absolutely certain that Hezbollah marches to the
beat of the Iranian political and strategic drum) one thing is clear: whereas Judge
Galeano made a point of stating that there was no need to determine whether
Hezbollah is a “terrorist movement on one hand, or a movement that is resisting
Israel’s illegal occupation of Lebanon,” it is obvious to us that the “terrorist
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movement” characterization is the correct one. And thus our report tries to shed
light on this matter for the simple reason that it is precisely Hezbollah’s terrorist
dimension that throws abundant light on many of the immediate causes of the AMIA
attack.
Also relevant in this regard is that unlike us, Judge Galeano also laid responsibility for the
attack right at Hezbollah’s doorstep, despite the fact that some passages in his decision
clearly show that he had doubts about the validity of this view. For example, in referring to
the group “Ansar Allah” that claimed responsibility for the attack, Judge Galeano states
that “it was a small group of fanatics that served as a shield for an Islamic fundamentalist
group that presumably had ties to Hezbollah.” These doubts also surface a bit further on. In
discussing the strong public statements made by Hezbollah leaders shortly before the
AMIA attack, Judge Galeano says that “if these statements were a manifestation of political
rhetoric that was indicative of a political agenda that did not necessarily define a specific
action (...) in no way did these declarations imply that Hezbollah regarded itself as a
political party that was implicated in initiatives that entailed the group’s responsibility.”
Judge Galeano concludes by saying this: “No evidence has come to light as yet indicating
that Hezbollah could have known of the plans, and subsequent to that, could have been
implicated in the consequences.”
Another key factor here is this: No one should conclude from our report that the
conclusions stated therein mean that all avenues of investigation have been exhausted in
this case, since a great deal of substantiating evidence has been placed in the various files
(to take just one example, it should be mentioned that extensive cross-checking of phone
data is still ongoing in collaboration with the Secretaría de Inteligencia [intelligence
department], including an assessment of national and international calls since 1991).
This in turn precludes our reaching any conclusion regarding these aspects of the
investigation, since doing so would entail the risk of unduly fragmenting our analysis,
which could lead to erroneous conclusions.
We would like to add one last comment, which is perhaps unnecessary. As mentioned
above, in the report we state that in our view and in light of the abundant evidence that
supports this view, the AMIA attack was conceived and organized by Iran’s highest
officials, which then asked the terrorist organization Hezbollah to carry out this criminal
act.
On the other hand, we want to make one thing very clear: in investigating the attack in
Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994, it is important to take into consideration the geopolitical
situation that prevailed in the Middle East at the time of the attack, and at the same time
realize a more detailed historical analysis of the conflict has traditionally afflicted, and
continues to afflict Arab-Israeli relations.
In fact – and in keeping with the testimony of experts in this field – we believe that the
most salient characteristics of the event place it squarely in the category of religious
terrorism or terrorism that is rooted in religion (as opposed to secular terrorism), that the
event has clear transnational implications, and that any assessment of the attack that omits
these factors will run the risk of sinning through omission, or at best will be incomplete.
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Hence, we felt that it was necessary to touch upon issues, albeit indirectly, that relate to
religion, specifically Islam, or to put it more clearly, a radicalized assessment of Islam.
These are without a doubt highly complex and sensitive matters which we actually would
have preferred to steer clear of completely. But for the reasons stated above, we felt that
addressing these issues was not only necessary but in fact unavoidable.
This viewpoint is more readily understandable when viewed in light of the specific features
that characterized theocracies such as Iran in 1994 when the attack occurred, whereby
politics and religion were inextricably bound up with each other, to the point where the
former was regarded as a function of the latter.
In the case under consideration here, and notwithstanding the fact that specific individuals
were in charge of and responsible for the actions that led to the decision to carry out the
attack, plan it and execute it, we should bear in mind that many of these persons were high
officials in a government whose legitimacy rests on principles of a religious nature, and
that this wholly objective real-world fact, which is eminently amenable to verification (it
suffices to simply read Iran’s formal name, or look at certain principles laid down in its
constitution), perhaps embodies better than anything else the confluence of politics and
religion in Iran that we are trying to shed light on in the present report.
On the other hand, one must also avoid the pitfall of oversimplification, i.e. the assumption
that any theocracy, just by virtue of being one, will support the use of terrorism in pursuit
of its political aims, or that practicing a specific religion invariably means that its adherents
will automatically believe violence is a legitimate way to propagate their religion. It is
most decidedly not our intention to put forward any generalization of this nature, which
would also be extremely unfair to the millions of Muslims in the world today that practice
their religion in a peaceful and well intentioned manner.
Needless to say, we fully support the principle of freedom of religion laid down in Articles
14, 19 and 20 of the Argentinean constitution, as well as the international treaties that were
incorporated via clause 22 of the constitution’s article 75. We also want to make it clear
that addressing the subject of religion itself in the sense of a manifestation of the spiritual
dimension of the individual is, as we have stated, an extremely complex and delicate
subject, and not at all the purpose of the present report. We also wish to state our
unequivocal belief that the Islamic religion promotes peace and harmony between all
human beings, and does not seek to provoke hatred and barbarism – far from it.
Unfortunately, this has not prevented – since time immemorial – fanatic and unscrupulous
individuals from using religion as a pretext for carrying out their alleged religious “duty” to
incite others to murder their fellow human beings. In such cases, religion becomes a mere
facade, a pretext and a mere excuse that serve to mask facts that when looked at squarely in
the face, can only be described as heinous crimes.
It has been established that the highest authorities of the Iranian government at the time of
the attack, namely Mssrs. Rafsanjani, Fallahijan, Velayati, Rezai and Vahidi, were the
parties that planned and decided to carry out the AMIA attack, executed diagrams showing
how the attack should be carried out, entrusted execution of the attack to the Lebanese
terrorists organization Hezbollah (which acted in this case as a mere appendage of the
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wishes of the Iranian government) and took charge of the final phase of the operation which
consisted of blowing AMIA on July 18, 1994.
As our report shows, for Iran’s leaders, there was nothing unusual or exceptional about the
realization of an attack of this nature. To the contrary: an analysis of the information that
has been gathered in this case shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that the realization of acts
of terrorism abroad was not the outgrowth of an unusual foreign policy instrument, but was
instead based on principles of the Iranian revolution of February 1979, the ultimate goal of
these principles being to propagate Iran’s fundamentalist view of Islam throughout the
world.
With this goal in mind, and as actually occurred in the case of the AMIA attack, the
following emerges: the Tehran regime was in the habit of availing itself on frequent
occasions of the operational structure of Hezbollah – a militia that itself had developed
under the protection of the ideology of the Homeni revolution. And as the years went by,
Hezbollah had evolved into a fundamental instrument for the realization of the Iranian
foreign policy objectives alluded to above. In view of this particular aspect of the matter at
hand, the present report attempts to describe the close relationship of subordination that
existed between Hezbollah’s leadership and its Iranian opposite number, whereby the
emergence and consolidation of this relationship cannot be fully explained without taking
into account the expediency of this attack for Iranian interests in the region.
We show in our report that this was reflected not only on the theocratic plane, through
identification of a common enemy, but also and more patently, through the regular and not
in the least bit concealed military and financial support the Iranian government gave to
Hezbollah.
Based on the evidence in the case, we have been able to establish that the terrorist attack on
AMIA occurred against the backdrop of the conflict that has been raging in the Middle East
for decades, and particularly the avatars of the peace process that had begun with the
signing of the Madrid and Oslo accords in 1991 and 1993 respectively.
Against this backdrop, and without prejudice to the obvious fact that the attack was directly
aimed at the Jewish community, insofar as the specific reasons that made Argentina a
suitable place to which to extend the Middle East conflict, we felt it that it sufficed to
prove, on the basis of the evidence in the case, that the attack was carried out in Argentina
in particular owing to the government’s unilateral decision to terminate the nuclear
materials and technology supply agreements that had been concluded some years
previously between Argentina and Iran.
We also show in our report that this decision on the part of the Argentinean government
represented a radical change in the foreign policy of then president Carlos Menem, which
resulted in Argentina relinquishing its neutral status as a member of the group of nonaligned nations, and instead becoming a country that was aligned with the arch enemies of
the Iranian government, namely Israel and the U.S.
In our view, this was the straw that broke the camel’s back, and that led directly to the
AMIA attack. The decision to go ahead with the attack was made by the Special Affairs
Committee (Omure Vijeh in Farsi) on August 14, 1993 in the city of Mashad, at which
14
time the decision was approved by Ali Khamenei, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Velayati
and Ali Fallahijan.
Moreover, two prominent representatives of the Iranian regime that were serving in Buenos
Aires at the time were specifically invited to attend the meeting in Mashad (hereinafter
referred to as the “Mashad meeting”). These parties were
the Shiite cleric Mohsen
Rabbani, sheik of the At-Tauhid mosque (and later named cultural attache of the Iranian
embassy in Argentina), and Ahmad Reza Asghari (also known as Mohsen Randjbaran),
who had served in Iran’s renowned Revolutionary Guard, and at the time was third
secretary at the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires.
We were able to establish that this meeting actually took place on the basis of statements
by reliable witnesses who had ties in one way or another, directly or indirectly, with the
Iranian regime.
Irrespective of whether the statements supporting our contention that the meeting took place
were made by parties that attended meeting (as is the case of former president (during the
Khomeini period) Abolghassam Bani Sadr); and irrespective of whether these parties
held relevant positions in the Iranian government’s intelligence service (which is the
case of the witness who is identified solely by the letter “c”, and whose credibility was
assessed by the German court that ruled on the “Mykonos" case and by the Tribunal
Oral of the Criminal Federal no. 3 in Buenos Aires); or irrespective of whether the
parties that made these statements were members of relevant opposition organizations
headquartered abroad that had their own information services, one thing is clear: all of
these statements, – which were made at various periods and (it should be noted) by
parties across the political spectrum – for all intents and purpose say the same thing about
the meeting in question, which is a strong indication that the statements are true. This – in
conjunction with other evidence – has led us to the conclusion that the Mashad meeting
did in fact take place.
As for the proposal that was discussed and approved at the Mashad meeting, it should be
pointed out that the evidence in the case (as we present it in our report) shows that the
preliminary plan to carry out an attack in Argentina originated with the Iranian Office of
Intelligence, which was directly controlled by the president of Iran and was headed by
Rafsanjani himself. We also determined that it was integrated into the power structure via
the involvement of the aforementioned Ali Fallahijan and Ali Velayati, as well as the
commander of the Al Quds special operations forces, Ahmad Vahidi and the commander
of the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran), Mohsen Rezai.
The present report also takes into account the intelligence infrastructure that the Iranian
government maintained in Buenos Aires at the time of the attack, and without which an
operation of the magnitude of the AMIA bombing could not have been realized
successfully. In this regard, we found that when it came to Iran achieving its foreign policy
goals during the period in question here, the implementation and maintenance of the type of
infrastructure described above in so called “infiltrated” countries arose from practical
considerations, and to some extent was a necessity.
15
Numerous pieces of evidence show that Argentina was infiltrated by Iran’s intelligence
service, which in the mid 1980s began establishing a vast spy network that then became a
complete “intelligence service” that basically comprised the Iranian embassy and its cultural
attache in Buenos Aires; extremist elements that were associated with the Shiite mosques
At-Tauhíd in Floresta, Al Iman in Cañuelas and El Mártir in San Miguel de Tucumán;
the businesses that we refer to as “fronts” – G.T.C. and Imanco; as well as other
radicalized members of the Islamic community, who were in Argentina for the sole purpose
of gathering the information and making the arrangements that paved the way for realization
of the attack on AMIA on the morning of July 18, 1994.
Our report shows that the driving force behind these efforts was Sheik Mohsen Rabbani,
who later became the cultural attache of the Iranian embassy in Argentina. From the time
of his arrival in the country in 1983, Mr. Rabbani began laying the groundwork that
allowed for later implementation and further development of the spy network referred to
above. All of the elements that went to make up this infrastructure were interlocked, and
involved the implementation of an intelligence service in Argentina that had sufficient
capacity to successfully organize the activities that culminated in the attack. As can be
seen when one reads the presentation that was made to the judge in the case, the bomb
explosion at AMIA constituted this culmination.
In our view, the record shows that once the decision had been made to carry out the attack,
the information flow between Iran and its Argentinean embassy substantially increased,
basically via functionaries and diplomatic mail. At the same time, substantial amounts of
money were transferred from Iran to one of the bank accounts held by the aforementioned
Mr. Rabbani – who was indisputably the leader of the “mullah” regime in Argentina and
perhaps its most representative member from an ideological standpoint – and involved
considerably larger sums than in comparable periods that were assessed.
In this regard, we have proven that soon after Mr. Rabbani’s return to Iran, where, as
previously mentioned, he had been summoned to participate in a meeting during which the
decision was made to carry out an attack against Argentina, and only four months prior to
the crime itself, funds were sent to Mr. Rabbani from Iran amounting to no less than
USD150,812, of which USD94,000 was withdrawn prior to the date of the attack (July 18,
1994), and USD45,588 of which was withdrawn over the course of the two months
following the attack.
Mr. Rabbani’s involvement in preparations for the attack is demonstrated even more
clearly by the incontrovertible documents indicating that during this same period Mr.
Rabbani visited several car rental agencies in Buenos Aires in search of a utility vehicle
similar to the one that was parked outside Calle Pasteur 633 [no. 633 Pasteur Street] a few
months later. The various explanations the cleric provided (which were obtained from
various statements, including ones Mr. Rabbani made during a TV program) were so
confused and contradictory that, as can be seen from our the present report, they do little
more than confirm that the real reason for his search for a vehicle bore little relationship to
the various explanations Mr. Rabbani provided.
16
The evidence we analyzed indicates that Mr. Rabbani was in charge of the local logistics
for the attack, while other evidence indicates that the then Iranian minister of information
Ali Fallahijan was in charge of overall coordination of the operation from Iran.
Furthermore, we found that the identical type of work, albeit strictly limited to the
operational aspect of the attack, was realized by the then head of Hezbollah’s foreign
affairs department, Imad Moughnieh. In this regard, reports that were entered in the court
record suggest that Mr. Mougnieh was in charge of establishing the operational group
whose task it was to carry out the attack. The members of this group in all likelihood
entered Argentina in early July 1994, as is shown by the international phone records that
were analyzed by our investigation unit.
These facts have led us to the conclusion that the members of the operational group, or at
least some of them, entered Argentina on July 1, 1994 via Ezeiza International Airport and
that they left the country via Jorge Newberry Metropolitan Airport on the day of the attack,
as can be seen from the various phone calls that were made via phone lines that were
installed at the aforementioned airport, as well as calls made from various phone booths
located near AMIA. All of these calls were placed to one cell phone subscriber located in
the city of Foz de Igazu, Brazil, in the region known as the triple border, where groups
affiliated with Hezbollah were headquartered at the period during which the attack
occurred.
The evidence submitted in the case enabled us to determine that the aforementioned cell
phone was operated by the party that was in charge of coordinating the activities of the
members of the cell that was in operation in Buenos Aires. This hypothesis is supported by
the fact that the flow of calls from Argentina to this subscriber abruptly and definitively
stopped on the day of the attack.
On July 1, 1994 at 10:53 a.m., the first cell phone call was placed from a subscriber at
Ezeiza International Airport to the cell phone used by the coordinator of the operational
group. A second call was placed at 12:18 p.m. from the same airport, but using a different
phone line.
A third call was placed at 5:21 p.m. on the same day to the aforementioned cell phone, but
this time from a phone booth located at Av. Corrientes 707 in Buenos Aires. Only six
minutes later, and from this same location but using yet another phone line, a call was
placed to a member of the group headquartered in Foz de Iguazú, which according to
Argentina’s intelligence service, has ties to Hezbollah. Nine minutes later, another
call was placed using the same outbound line to a subscriber that was identified as the head
office of Hezbollah in Beirut.
A week later, i.e. on July 8, 1994 and again from the phone booth on Av. Corrientes 707,
a call was placed to the cell phone of the coordinator of the operational group.
From
9:28 a.m., when this call was placed, until 9:47 a.m., more than 20 calls were made to
subscribers in Lebanon who, according to the Argentinean Secretary of Intelligence were
members of Hezbollah. These calls involved an extensive exchange of information that
coincides precisely with the day upon which Ahmad Asghari, the third secretary of the
Iranian embassy in Argentina, abruptly left Argentina for good. Mr. Asghari was one of the
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highest placed persons in charge of the attack, and was also responsible for activating the
clandestine networks of Iranians in Argentina.
On July 10, Carlos Alberto Telleldín published a classified ad in a national Argentinean
newspaper offering for sale a Renault Trafic van whose characteristics were identical to
those of the vehicle3 that was used for the suicide bombing and whose engine serial
number 2831467. The piece of the engine with this exact serial number on it was found in
the wreckage of the AMIA building several days after the attack.
At approximately 6 p.m. on July 15 (i.e. five days before Mr. Telleldin’s ad appeared in the
newspaper, and only three days before the attack) the car that was later used in the
bombing was driven into a parking lot called Jet Parking, which was located
approximately 400 meters from the target. The identity of the party that parked the
car in the parking lot is unknown.
Less than 20 minutes after the car was parked, a phone call was made from Mohsen
Rabbani’s cell phone (which had been purchased shortly before this time) to the At-Tauhid
mosque. The relevance of this call is demonstrated by the fact that, according to
information from the cell phone provider, the call was placed from an area near the Jet
Parking parking lot (according to the cell that was activated upon placement of the call).
This call lasted only 26 seconds, just the amount of time that would have been necessary to
confirm the success of a key phase of the operation.
The string of confirmations continued, except that approximately 60 minutes later at 7:19
p.m. a new call was detected, this time to the phone of the operation coordinator in Foz de
Iguazu. The call was placed from a phone booth located at Avenida Nazca 1744 in Buenos
Aires, which is only a few city blocks away from the aforementioned At-Tauhíd mosque.
This means that the information had been conveyed to the party who, in our view, was the
coordinator of the operational group.
This cursory description of the triangulation that it was necessary to realize, for reasons of
security, in order to convey the information that the van containing the bomb had been
successfully parked clearly shows that (a) the Trafic van that was parked in the Jet Parking
parking lot was the same vehicle that was later used for the AMIA attack; and (b) the
parking operation was carefully monitored by the members of the terrorist group, one of
whom was Mohsen Rabbani.
Finally, on the day of the attack (July 18) the final call received by the operation
coordinator’s cell phone was verified. This was the call realized from Jorge Newberry
Metropolitan Airport at 7:41 a.m. There can be little doubt that the assigned task of this
segment of the operational group (i.e. the suicide bombing) was carried out successfully.
The operation had entered its final phase.
Anticipating the consequences that committing this attack could conceivably bring, the
Tehran regime adopted a series of measures aimed at protecting itself and its functionaries
from any accusations that might be leveled at them in the wake of the attack.
Thus in March 1994, just four months prior to the attack, despite the fact that Mr. Rabbani
had been posted to Argentina since 1983, he was suggestively granted diplomatic status –
18
and hence diplomatic immunity – by virtue of being designated cultural attache. In doing
this, the Iranian government demonstrated that they had learned from past experience. In
October 1992, Kazem Darabi a local regime functionary whose functions were analogous
to those of the cultural attache Mohsen Rabbani in Argentina, was arrested in Berlin,
Germany for having participated one month previously in an attack on a Berlin restaurant
called Mykonos. Unlike Rabbani, Darabi did not have diplomatic immunity, and thus
nothing could have prevented his being captured and ultimately sentenced for his crime.
In the same vein, on June 30, 1994, only 18 days before the AMIA attack, Iran’s
ambassador to Argentina Hadi Soleimanpour left Argentina from Ezeiza International
Airport. Eight days later, on July 8, Ambassador Soleimanpour named Ahmad Reza
Asghari his deputy chief of mission and right hand man. The day before the attack, the
Iranian ambassadors to Chile and Uruguay did likewise i.e. they left on the same flight to
Frankfurt.
They were all preparing for execution of the operation.
On July 18, 1994 at 9:53 a.m. Ibrahim Hussein Berro – a Lebanese national and active
member of Hezbollah who was at the wheel of a Renault Trafic van that was carrying
between 300 and 400 kilograms of explosives – stopped the vehicle in front of the
AMIA building at 633 Calle Pasteur and detonated the explosives, which resulted in the
collapse of the front of the building and varying degrees of damage to neighboring
buildings. The attack also killed 85 persons and inflicted injuries of varying degrees of
severity on an additional 151 persons at a minimum.
In view of the modus operandi employed in this operation – which various experts on and
analysts of international terrorism indicated in the court record is characteristic of
Hezbollah – and the fact that the method used in the AMIA attack was identical to the
method employed two years previously in the attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos
Aires (an attack that the Argentinean Supreme Court found was the work of Islamic Jihad
in its capacity as the military wing of Hezbollah), suspicion was immediately cast on
Hezbollah.
Less than one week after the attack, the hypothesis began to take form. On July 23 [TN:
hereinafter all dates are in 1994 unless otherwise indicated] the Lebanese newspaper
An-Nahar published a communique from an organization calling itself Ansar Allah
taking responsibility for the AMIA bombing as well as the bombing over Panama of an Alas
Chiricanas passenger airliner.
As demonstrated in detail in the present report, the name Ansar Allah turned out to be one
of the many fictitious names that Hezbollah has used to claim responsibility for its attacks.
Moreover, experience has shown that Hezbollah has habitually adopted this method for the
clear purpose of avoiding blame for the various actions it has carried out, except for those
realized in Lebanon where the conflict has taken the form of a conventional war.
From this point on, as mentioned previously, the judicial investigation of the AMIA
bombing went through a long series of ups and downs, mainly regarding the investigation
of the bombing’s “local connection.” Nonetheless, already in the early stages of the
19
investigation, there were indications that the then government of Iran and Hezbollah bore
ultimate responsibility for the attack.
As for the issue of responsibility on the part of the then government of Iran, we have shown
in the present report that during the first half of the 1990s at a minimum (a period during
which the two Buenos Aires bombings were also carried out) the perpetration of terrorist
acts in other countries was business as usual for Iran’s leadership. Toward this end, we
have also demonstrated satisfactorily that during the aforementioned period the Iranian
regime was in the habit of employing a specific operational methodology that was
implemented by the government’s own functionaries, a practice that was no doubt
instrumental in ensuring that the attacks were carried out efficiently. This matter is
discussed in further detail below.
Needless to say, the concept of a government bureaucracy being the handmaiden of terror
as was done by the Iranian government during the period under consideration here, may be
difficult for a reader that is not a expert on these matters to take on board. Nonetheless,
this modus operandi is perfectly intelligible when viewed in the context of the logic that
informed a phenomenon that has come to be called “exporting revolution.”
This concept (which we describe in greater detail in our report) alludes to one of the
fundamental principles that served as an inspiration for the Iranian revolution led by
Ayatollah Khomeini (who came to power in February 1979) and has to do with the avowed
goal of propagating the revolution’s ideas throughout the rest of the world. This goal of
universalizing Shiite Islamic doctrine, which is clearly enunciated in the Iranian
constitution, not only promotes the formation of and provides support for specific Islamic
groups (including Hezbollah) in other Middle Eastern countries, but also fosters more or
less covertly the realization of terrorist attacks on targets that are associated with enemies
of the Tehran regime, namely Western countries in general and the U.S. and Israel in
particular. As is well known, radical fundamentalist Muslims regarded both of these
countries as the embodiment of everything that the most radical Shiite doctrine found vile
and despicable.
According to the preamble of the Iranian constitution, the revolution is exported for the
following reason: “[so that the government can] establish a basis for perpetuating the
revolution both domestically and internationally. With regard to relationships with foreign
countries, the constitution is concerned with paving the way, in collaboration with other
popular and Islamic movements, for the creation of a single world community (...) and
ensuring the perpetuation of the struggle for the liberation of all the world’s dispossessed
and oppressed peoples.”
All available economic and infrastructural resources, including official institutions abroad,
are devoted to the achievement of this objective. The secretary general of the Iranian
opposition group Flag of freedom stated as follows in his testimony during the court
proceeding: “What matters is the fact that the Islamic revolution has never stopped
supporting the realization of terrorist activities abroad; that this has never been a secret; and
that the regime has expressly stated that its attacks target Israel and the U.S.”
20
The late Ayatollah Khomeini put it this way: “The Islamic Shiite movement seeks to
export revolution throughout the world and will never renounce this goal because Islam not
only refuses to recognize any differences between the world’s Islamic countries, but also
because we believe that Islam has become the leader of the world’s oppressed peoples.
This is something that we need to demonstrate to the powers that be and to the world’s
superpowers. Our attitude toward the world is governed by our religious convictions.”
Thus, in the interest of achieving its objective of exporting revolution, which as previously
mentioned is one of the pillars of the Iranian constitution, one of the key instruments of the
Iranian theocracy’s foreign policy is the use of terrorism. From its inception, the Iranian
regime has been using terrorism to coerce or simply intimidate or silence its opponents,
wherever they happen to be.
However, one must be careful not to fall into the trap of oversimplifying to the point of
believing that the doctrine of exporting revolution is the immediate and exclusive factor
that leads to the realization of terrorist attacks. As a rule – or at any rate, this is what
emerges from the specific cases we have analyzed for the purposes of the present report –
each of these acts fulfilled a need to achieve specific political objectives such as
destabilizing groups that oppose the regime, active resistance to the presence of Western
nations in the Middle East, or simply responding through the use of violence to actions that
the Iranian regime regards as being detrimental to or an attack on its interests. However,
while the doctrine of exporting revolution does not in and of itself justify the recourse to
indiscriminate violence, it does provide a theoretical and ideological justification that
allows for the use of violence in specific cases in which violence is necessary in order to
further the regime’s strategic objectives.
The report that we are submitting to Judge Corral today contains a dedicated section that
analyzes the specific acts of terrorism that have been attributed to the Islamic Republic of
Iran. One common element emerges from the legal decisions that have been handed down
as a result of these acts: to one degree or another, they all hold the government of Iran and
its functionaries accountable for these acts, in their capacity as their organizers and
sponsors. This evidence constitutes the most compelling proof that the Iranian regime has
systematically resorted to violence in its efforts to export the Iranian revolution. In other
words, the verbal excesses and veiled threats that Iran’s leadership directs every so often
toward its opponents and the government of Israel are more than just verbiage: they
translate into concrete criminal acts.
Three events should be mentioned in this regard, namely the cases (and terrorist attacks)
known as Mykonos, Radjavi and Bahktiar.
The first of these events occurred on September 17, 1992, when Dr. Sadegh
Sharafkandi, secretary general of the Iranian Democratic party of Kurdistan and three of
his colleagues – Fattah Abdoli, Homayoun Ardalan and Nouri Dekhord – were
machine-gunned to death at Mykonos restaurant in Berlin, where they had gone after
attending a congress of the International Socialist movement. The verdict handed down by
the Superior District Court of Berlin describes in detail the process the then government of
Iran used to carry out these murders, from activation of the dormant cells to collecting the
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required information, making the decision to carry out the attack, and then the actual
realization.
The verdict also mentions Hezbollah’s ties to Iran, stating that Hezbollah is a “political
appendage of Iran. Iran created it, finances it, provides it with troops and weapons, and
trains its soldiers. None of this was realized in a disinterested fashion. Iran uses Hezbollah
to spread the Islamic revolution to Lebanon, as well as to fight opponents of the Islamic
region through military force.” The German court concluded that the highest authorities in
the Iranian government were directly responsible for the killings.
Kazem Radjavi was murdered in broad daylight on April 24, 1990. While driving his car
on Tannay street in Coppet, Switzerland, Mr. Radjavi was forced off the road by two
vehicles, causing him to collide with a pillar at the entrance to a building located at number
68 of the aforementioned street. Two persons armed with machine guns with silencers then
got out of one of the cars and opened fire on the victim, killing him instantly. Mr. Radjavi
was a former Iranian diplomat who had served as Iran’s UN ambassador and head of the
Iranian diplomatic mission in Dakar, a position he relinquished in April 1981. He was the
brother of Massoud Radjavi, who was head of the Iranian National Resistance
Council and of the mujahidin, an extreme left Iranian opposition organization.
The legal proceedings resulting from this event revealed that the Iranian government had
been instrumental in bringing about these murders. The Swiss investigators put it this
way: “In light of the facts that have been uncovered in this case and that are described
above (...), we are convinced beyond the shadow of a doubt that one or more organs of the
Iranian government were involved in the assassination of Kazem Radjavi.” A similar
conclusion was reached by the report of July 3, 1990 submitted by Inspectors Junod and
Cottier of the Security Police in Geneva, regarding an investigation that was realized
under the direction of the magistrate in the case Dr. Chatelain. The report states as follows:
“...We are convinced that an Iranian governmental organization was involved in the
killings.”
For these and other reasons that we set forth in our report, the magistrate in charge of the
case Jacques Antenen ultimately issued an international arrest warrant for the Iranian
Minister of Intelligence Alli Fallahijan for his alleged participation in the crime. Judge
Antenen stated as follows: “The unit that carried out the attack probably comprised four
persons. In any case, the investigation established that 13 persons were involved in
planning and carrying out the killings. All of these persons were legitimized by virtue of
their diplomatic passports, which stated that they were carrying out a mission. Some of
these documents were issued in Tehran on the same dates. The majority of the suspects
entered Switzerland together via Iran Air flights from Tehran to Geneva, and had in their
possession flight tickets whose numbers were reciprocally sequential. (...) The minister Ali
Fallahijan was in charge of coordinating the operation; all orders and missions were
promulgated by him.”
On August 8, 1991 at approximately 11:50 a.m. Chapour Bakhtiar, secretary general of
the Iranian National Resistance Movement and his secretary Soroush Katibeh were found
dead at the residence located at 37 Rue Cluseret de Suresnes near Paris. Autopsies of the
victims revealed that the murders had been committed two days previously. Bakhtiar was
22
found to be have suffered mechanical asphyxiation, multiple fractures of the larynx, as well
as external bleeding resulting from puncture wounds inflicted by a sharp weapon. Katibeh
had suffered facial asphyxiation, as well as multiple puncture wounds inflicted by a sharp
weapon.
Bakhtiar had been named prime minister of Iran in early January 1979 under the Shah’s
government, but was forced to leave this post less than a month later when the Shah was
deposed by the Islamic revolutionaries. Bakhtiar then escaped surreptitiously to France,
where he founded the Iranian National Resistance Movement, which was opposed to the
Iranian regime. Bakhtiar channeled his political activities into this organization and used it
to fight against the Iranian government.
A detailed analysis of the findings of the French court in this case clearly reveals that
Bakthiar’s and Katibeh’s murderers were not only carried out under the aegis of, and
abetted by, the Iranian government: the perpetrators also made use of the Iranian
government’s infrastructure to faithfully carry out the murder of the leaders of Iran.
That the most senior officials in the Iranian government were directly responsible for
planning such a specific assassination, providing the weapons for it, and realizing it is
demonstrated beyond any doubt by the following: the Islamic government clearly stood to
benefit from the disappearance of one of the main members of the opposition to its rule;
extensive resources were deployed during the operation; those involved in the operation
were readily able to obtain the fake documents they needed; a sizeable number of Iranian
nationals helped the suspects escape; the relationship between the Iranian government and
some of persons involved in the operation has been documented.
As previously stated, during the period in which the AMIA bombing occurred, the
realization of terrorist operations abroad by the Iranian government entailed joint and
coordinated activity on the part of specific Iranian governmental organizations, each of
which carried out the activities, within its sphere of responsibility, that were necessary to
bring the target operation to a successful conclusion. This structure, which we refer to as a
matrix (a term that conveys the idea of a predefined model or schema) functioned in a
pyramidal mode, whereby the apex of the pyramid was the aforementioned Special Affairs
Committee, which was headed by the Spiritual Leader of the Nation, beneath which
interacted, at the same level, the Intelligence and Security Ministry, Foreign Affairs
Ministry, the Islamic Culture and Religion Ministry, and the Revolutionary Guard Ministry
(Pasdaran), within which operated the feared Quds special forces, which were in charge of
carrying out special operations abroad.
The following specific activities (among others) were methodically organized, rapidly
supplied and equipped, and scrupulously monitored by various Iranian government
agencies that were involved in the AMIA attack to one degree or another: gathering
sensitive information regarding the potential targets; elaboration, assessment and
acceptance of the plan of attack; obtaining more specific information on the target that was
ultimately selected; transmitting passports and visas; assigning diplomatic cover identities;
providing airline tickets and accommodations in the country selected; and the use of money
laundering after the crime was committed.
23
Cognate with this, in all countries where the Iranian government had diplomatic
representation, it maintained intelligence capabilities that provided the aforementioned
matrix with the support that kept it going. The organizational structure of this matrix
(which was described in detail by expert witnesses that testified in the case) included
consulates, Iranian diplomats and embassies also helped gather intelligence and monitored
the targets that Iran planned to attack); mosques, which in addition to being perfectly
legitimate places of worship, were used by fanatic and unscrupulous individuals to recruit
followers; and certain members of the local Islamic community, who used their legitimate
social roles (many were taxi drivers or college students) as covers for the realization of
intelligence gathering activities on behalf of the Iranian government.
The exhaustive investigation into the AMIA bombing proved that at the time of the attack,
a system of this nature was functioning actively and successfully in Argentina. The
concrete evidence that backs up this statement is described in detail in a lengthy chapter of
our report; this evidence cannot be reproduced here for obvious reasons.
It should be borne in mind that without the logistical and operational advantages provided
by the infrastructure described above, it would have been impossible to carry out an
operation of the scope of the AMIA bombing. This is a key point, because among the
numerous factors indicating that the then government of Iran was ultimately responsible for
the AMIA attack, the intelligence service abroad emerges as one of the most important
factors and an essential precondition for the attack, since it both embodied and provided the
window of opportunity without which the attack would have been unrealizable.
As for what we feel are the underlying causes of the AMIA bombing, our report contends –
without prejudice to Islam’s extremist ideology which has been a key driving force behind
every act of violence committed by the regime – that certain issues were in the air at the
time of the attack that were related to the then-geopolitical situation in the Middle East and
that in some ways “justified,” the AMIA attack, according to the pernicious logic of
Islamic fundamentalism,
These causal factors are related to the sudden cancellation by the Argentinean government
of nuclear technology transfer agreements between Argentina and Iran, a decision which
(as we explain in our report) was an impediment to the implementation of Iran’s nuclear
strategy.
In short, we have in the sudden cancellation of the so called “nuclear contracts” – a fact
that was adequately proven during the court proceedings – the advent of a totally plausible
reason or motive which in our view constitutes one of the main indicators that the then
government of Iran was involved in the AMIA attack.
Other events more closely related to the delicate situation that existed in the Middle East at
the time served as an ideal and certainly very opportune excuse that provided the
organization that carried out the AMIA attack – namely Hezbollah – with a justification for
it, although the decision to commit the crime was made previously.
The events we are referring to are the abduction in May 1994 of the Hezbollah commander
Moustapha Dirani (an action that was attributed to Israel) and the Israeli bombing that
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began the following month of a Hezbollah refugee camp in the Bekaa valley of Lebanon.
The bombing resulted in the deaths of an indeterminate number of people, but according to
the court record in the case, there were between 9 and 40 deaths.
As stated above, another factor that has led us to the conclusion that the Iranian
government was responsible for the AMIA attack is that on dates that are very sensitive
owing to their proximity to the date of the attack, the amount of mail and the numbers of
diplomatic functionaries being sent by the Iranian government to Argentina rose
dramatically and out of all proportion to previous practice (as reflected by records that were
examined during the investigation). This mail originated in various parts of the globe such
as Germany, Iran, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, the latter also being completely atypical
relative to previous periods. \
Our investigation also revealed that, according to documentation from the Argentinean
embassy, at this period there was no reason, circumstance or event that could have justified
such a flood of diplomatic mail. All of this, when analyzed in light of the other evidence in
the files, led us to infer that the operations of this nature that were detected, whether they
were meant to be a smokescreen, or whether they served to transport sensitive information
and/or materials, or perhaps both, were a direct outgrowth of the preparations that were
being made for the AMIA attack.
Equally suggestive in this regard is the sudden departure from Argentina of the influential
third secretary of the Iranian embassy (and former member of Iran’s special forces unit
Padaran) Ahmad Reza Asghari, according to the evidence related to the case, also attended
the Special Affairs Committee meeting on August 14, 1993. Indeed, in view of the
confluence of circumstances that we have just described, we feel that there is no reason
more plausible than the one we have set forth for Ashgahri’s extremely abrupt departure
from Argentina in early July 1994, when he was in fact not scheduled to leave the country
until three months later, in October of 1994.
The concurrent – and certainly very opportune – departure of the Iranian ambassadors in
the region fits into this chain of events as well, since it is clear, in light of the circumstances
we have described, that we are confronted here with yet another maneuver on the part of
the Iranian government designed to put enough distance between its functionaries – and in
so doing the government itself – and any possible direct connection with the attack.
As has been pointed out a number of times in the present document, in the interest of
carrying out the terrorist bombing of AMIA on August 14, 1993, the Iranian officials in
charge of the Special Affairs Committee used Hezbollah, a Shiite Lebanese organization
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that has historically been subordinated to the interests of the Iranian government. The key
evidence developed during the case demonstrating that Hezbollah participated in the AMIA
attack is as fellows:
The modus operandi:
Carrying out attacks using a car bomb loaded with explosives that are triggered by the
vehicle’s suicide bomber-driver is the first factor that suggests that Hezbollah was
responsible for the attack. In fact, and as one of the experts on international terrorism that
testified during the court proceedings put it, this spectacular method is a veritable
Hezbollah “trademark,” a fact demonstrated by the large number of similar operations
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(enumerated in our report) that Hezbollah realized in Lebanon in the 1980s and the early
1990s.
The attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires:
In a decision handed down on December 23, 1999, the Argentinean Supreme Court stated
that the March 17, 1992 attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires was the work of
Islamic Jihad, which the Court accused of being the “armed wing” of Hezbollah.
In short, the marked similarities between the two events (although these are more than just
similarities: it would be more accurate to speak in terms of identical events: identical
location, identical target, and identical modus operandi), in conjunction with the temporal
proximity between the two acts, as well as other elements, clearly justify our inference that
both attacks were realized by the same terrorist organization – namely Hezbollah.
Claiming responsibility:
Five days after the AMIA attack, a group called Ansar Allah published a communique in
the Lebanese daily An Nahar claiming responsibility for the AMIA attack, as well as for
the previous bombing of an Alas Chircanas airliner over Panama.
This was the same procedure that Islamic Jihad had used two years previously to claim
responsibility for the attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires (identical method,
including publication of the communique in the same newspaper). The documents and
testimony obtained from the files (including periodic declarations made by the deputy
secretary general of Hezbollah and number two man in the organization Nahim Kaseem)
demonstrate that Ansar Allah does not exist and that it is merely one of the fictitious names
used by Hezbollah to claim responsibility for this type of attack in a manner that at the
same time enables the organization to escape direct blame for its crimes.
The explosion:
It was conclusively established that on July 18, 1994 the Lebanese national and Hezbollah
member Ibrahim Hussein Berro was driving the Renault Trafic van that blew up in front
of AMIA, killing Mr. Berro. We will not describe here, one by one, the elements in the
chain of evidence that proves the aforementioned facts, since this has already been done in
a dedicated section of our report.
Moughnieh:
As has already been mentioned, testimony from various witnesses proves that Imad Fayez
Moughnieh was in charge of planning and coordination of the operational phase of the
AMIA attack. Needless to say, this fact is yet another clear indication that Hezbollah was
responsible for the bombing.
Public statements by Hezbollah leaders:
It would make no sense to refrain from analyzing public statements made by Hezbollah
leaders prior to the attack as possible indicators of the organization’s responsibility for it; in
any case, these statements do not prognosticate the operation, in any way whatsoever,
particularly its modus operandi.
In this vein, Francois Gorphe referred to two statements made by Hezbollah leaders as “a
sign of statements made prior to the crime” (Apreciación judicial de las pruebas, Bogotá
Editorial Temis, 1989, p. 239). These two statements are particularly noteworthy,
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coming as they did from the highest levels of the Hezbollah hierarchy, and in view of their
macabre nature and, in the case of the second, their forcefulness.
The first statement, which is attributed to Hezbollah’s spiritual leader Mohamed Hussein
Fadlallah, was made after the abduction of Dirani alluded to above: “The resistance –
supported by the Shiite clergy – has a lot of oxygen. The enemy has said that they have a
long reach but when Abbas Moussawi was assassinated, the Islamic fighters proved that
they can reach all the way to Argentina. The battlefront has spread throughout the world,
and the battle is unfolding as time goes on.”
Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah made the following less elliptical, but
similarly prophetic statement only one month before the attack: “A thousand suicide
commandos are preparing to confront Israel all over the world.”
In view of the scope of the tragedy that struck AMIA a mere 32 days later, and the rest of
the evidence in this case, it would be absurd to suppose that this terrible threat was pure
happenstance.
The whole body of proof and evidence, which is consistent, serious and accurate in its
entirety, confirms that Hezbollah was responsible for the AMIA bombing. This evidence,
which is substantiated by the testimony of numerous experts and analysts in the field of
international terrorism, unanimously points to Hezbollah as the perpetrator of this heinous
act, and has done so since the inception of the investigation.
Moreover, the aforementioned testimony also indicates forcefully and unanimously that
Hezbollah – an organization that was created and is supported militarily and economically
by the government of Iran – does not carry out foreign terrorist acts (or at any rate was not
doing so during the period in which the attack occurred) on its own initiative, but rather in
response to instructions that are issued by the Tehran regime directly to the Hezbollah
leadership.
And this is in fact exactly what happened in the AMIA attack, as has been proven by the
evidence in the case: Tehran and Hezbollah were the two sole actors in the bombing, actors
whose actions were coordinated like clockwork within the framework of Hezbollah’s
subordinate relationship with Tehran that was described by the experts.
Hence, the elements adduced as supporting evidence in our report answer many of the
central questions that the investigation of the bombing set out to answer.
Our report specifies who decided to carry out the attack on AMIA, when this decision was
made, the reason for the decision, the parties in charge of coordinating the operation, and
the parties in charge of carrying out the actual attack. Our report also specifies which
parties were instrumental at the local level in implementing the attack, and describes the
most salient characteristics of the operational infrastructure which, in providing intelligence
and logistical support, laid the indispensable groundwork for successful realization of the
bombing.
However, we wish to reiterate that the petition that we are submitting to the court today
should not be construed to mean that all avenues of investigation have been exhausted in
this case. Far from it. For there are numerous aspects of the investigation that we are
working on tirelessly in collaboration with other Argentinean government agencies, and
significant progress has been made in some of these areas.
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But these additional findings cannot be disclosed until certain ongoing procedures have
been completed, so as to avoid jumping to conclusions that might well be erroneous or at
best incomplete.
However, what we have said above does not mean that it would be inappropriate to
disclose other findings at this stage in the investigation, since these findings are
substantiated by the evidence. And this is exactly what we have endeavored to accomplish
in our report, and for two main reasons: the necessity of (a) demanding the arrest of the
group of individuals that are suspected of having participated in the AMIA attack; and (b)
determining the extent of the responsibility of the highest authorities in the Iranian
government and of Hezbollah in the case.