"ÉTHIQUE" AND "VISAGE" IN LÉVINAS

Transcription

This paper "Éthique and Visage in Lévinas' Philosophy" was presented at Workshop on Ethics in Jewish
Philosophy and published by
Mekorot Foundation, (2003)
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Workshop on Ethics in Jewish Philosophy
"ÉTHIQUE" AND "VISAGE" IN LÉVINAS' PHILOSOPHY
By Dr. Fernando Szlajen, Ph.D. (©2008)
INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………..2
PHILOSOPHY…………………………………………………………….2
ÉTHIQUE………………………………………………………………….4
VISAGE…………………………………………………………………….5
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………….13
NOTES……………………………………………………………………...14
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………….15
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this work is to analyze the concepts of ethique and visage in Emmanuel
Lévinas' "Totalité et Infini" and "Éthique et infini"1 as well as clarify their meanings
within his philosophy. The said concepts appear widely throughout the mentioned books.
It is precisely for this reason that I have selected what I consider to be the relevant
fragments of these books to explain those concepts. As an introduction, I believe it is
necessary to point out the origins of Lévinas' philosophy, with a view to outlining the
way in which his thought establishes "being in relation" as an essentially human
characteristic.
PHILOSOPHY
Lévinas' philosophy "arises" in opposition to the philosophies of totality. This latter
concept indicates an attempt which has accompanied Western philosophy throughout its
development and can be characterized – in Lévinas' own words – "…une réduction de
l'Autre au Même..."2. This reduction alludes to a category of violence, in which the
Otherness of the Other is not respected. This type of philosophy places the value of
human life in the sphere of cognitive successes, submitting the individual to and
alienating him from the despotic force of the Whole and, thus, reducing the Other into a
mere object of knowledge or an obstacle to the freedom of the I. Both Hegel's philosophy
of history and Heiddeger's ontology – the former affirming a Logos or Universal Destiny
and the latter the entity as an expression of Being – constitute excellent examples of the
philosophies of the Totality. They claim to understand the world, while succeeding in
only reducing everything in their path to an object of knowledge. In terms of Western
philosophy, only that which is susceptible to discovery – and therefore, susceptible to
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analysis and proof – is philosophically significant. Ontology is, thus, the truth of Being,
immanence, and whatever eludes any demonstrable evidence is a mere utopia or personal
belief. This Totality philosophy is an attempt at universal synthesis through knowledge
which stubbornly adheres to Western ontology, leading it to highlight the impersonal
Being to the detriment of the concrete Entity. It also places synthesis above plurality,
synchrony over the diachronic and immanence over the transcendent. Ethically, this was
translated into forgetting the other in favor of the Self, which is, ultimately, a reduction of
all meaning, according to Lévinas. For this reason, ontology is incapable of giving value
to and expressing the significance of what is human. Therefore, a critical reevaluation of
the Western philosophical tradition is required – especially of its following three major
aspects:
•
The primacy of knowledge over the ethical relationship (between the Self and the
Other).
•
The primacy of the knowledge of the Self with regard to the Other.
•
The primacy of the evident (immanence) to the detriment of the transcendent.
According to Lévinas, the point is to produce an inversion. This inversion is based on a
defense of subjectivity (namely, responsibility towards the Other) in the face of various
totalities (State, Knowledge, Power, etc.) to which it is reduced. That is to say, placing
the Other, rather than the Self, in the center of philosophical reflection, and, finally,
establishing that which is essentially human is being in relation to something else.
For Lévinas, a thought which respects the sense of what is human cannot base itself
exclusively on knowledge and, thus, cannot emanate from the being of the Entity but
rather from the Other – i.e., from a concrete face that turns to me and can never be
understood through knowledge. Indeed, the human sense resides in disturbing of the
Selfness, in agitates him ethically, and the I can only leave itself by being called by the
Other, a call that is the outcome of a vis-à-vis or ethical relationship. Beyond the I and
oneself lies the sense, which precedes any ontological consideration3. Thus, ethics is
considered by Lévinas to be a primary philosophy, "…celle á partir de laquelle les autres
branches de la métaphysique prennent sens. 4". To understand the meaning of what is
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human we must divest ourselves of ontology and look towards ethics, which also implies
going from focusing on the Self to reflecting on and taking action with regard to the
Other. In summary, Lévinas seeks to replace ontology with the ethical relationship as a
primary philosophy, a relationship with the Other, manifested in a face that seeks my
responsibility. This is the vis-à-vis or ethical relationship.
ÉTHIQUE
"Une relation dont le termes ne forment pas une totalité, ne peut donc se produire dans
l'économie général de l'être que comme allant de Moi á l'Autre, comme face á face,
comme dessinant une distance en profondeur – celle du discours, de la bonté, du Désir –
irréductible á celle que l'activité synthétique de l'entendement établit entre les termes
divers-…5"
This is the first statement that we find in the selected fragments and, consequently, the
first characterization of such a relationship. It deals with a relationship in which both
constituent parts do not form a unity, but rather each preserves its own transcendence.
Hence, the Other may be outside the Self, thus preventing their being totally joined. This
non-totality of the speakers makes the vis-à-vis relationship a non-violent one, since the
Otherness of the Other is respected6. This leads Lévinas to affirm that "Le nonsynthétisable par excellence, c'est certainement la relation entre hommes.7". Thus,
interpersonal relationships are not based on individuals thinking together, but rather
facing each other. Consequently, a true "union" does not consist of forming a synthesized
group, but rather one based on a vis-à-vis encounter. The latter as an ethical encounter is
fundamentally a social relationship. Nevertheless, the sociability of this ethical
relationship is not, as I have mentioned above, the sociability of the sum total of
individualities (synthesis), but rather the sociability of relating oneself to the Other while
preserving a separation. Such a separation is possible because, in the vis-à-vis
relationship, the Other becomes manifest through an infinite from the face, an
overflowing presence, an irreducible Otherness "comme dessinant une distance en
profondeur". Thus, the relationship between the Self and the Other is not reducible to
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"the synthetic activity of knowledge". Such an activity would imply an accommodation
between thought and the thing that is thought, imposing the Self on the Other. Therefore,
ethics based on vis-à-vis relationship is not one arising from knowledge, since the union
of the Self and the Other in a totality conceived in synthesis would, as I mentioned
earlier, do violence to the radical transcendence of the members with whom they interact.
The vis-à-vis relationship is one in which separate beings maintain their transcendence. In
this way, "Le rapport avec Autrui n'annule pas la séparation"8. The vis-à-vis concept
also expresses an immediate relationship of interpellation and ethical imperative. The
members present themselves directly – i.e., without intermediaries, without artifice, vis-àvis and openly. In such a relationship, the Other calls upon me to exercise my
responsibility. And the Other's rectitude and immediacy transmit an ethical imperative, an
obligation.
VISAGE
The vis-à-vis relationship is, then, one where the members face one another, as separate
but not indifferent beings, on opposite sides but not enemies. "...le rapport entre Moi et
l'Autre commence dans l'inégalité de termes… 9". What does Lévinas understand by such
inequality? That the relationship between the Self and the Other originates in an
inequality that comes to mean the impossibility that a third member exist in the said
relationship, encompassing the Self and the Other, thus formally determining the Other's
Otherness. Inequality means, precisely, the absence of a third party capable of embracing
the I and the Other. Therefore, the vis-à-vis relationship manifests itself as a plurality.
"…Autrui en tant qu'autrui se situe dans une dimension de la hauteur et de
l'abaissement…10"
and
"La présence du visage –l'infini de l'Autre- est dénuement, présence du tiers(…) et
commandement qui commande de commander.11"
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The significance of the Other is linked to the face – in my opinion, in a relationship that
comes from within and goes beyond oneself. In coming from within, the face's
significance lies in its expression and what it expresses is the face's absolute vulnerability
in its nakedness. However, at the same time, the face's total compassion and vulnerability
signify the high level of an entity that, in being unique in its nakedness, is completely
Other in its Otherness. The face also signifies a humanity that is equal in its compassion
and vulnerability. The nakedness of the Other's face reflects the nakedness and
vulnerability of infinite faces: symbolically manifested in those of the orphan, widow and
stranger. However, because it comes from within and "shows" us indigence, this
significance becomes externalized and transformed into a prescription, obligation or
mandate.
Thus, from out of its nakedness, the face of the Other commands me: "Thou shalt not
kill". This commandment must be taken to mean not reducing the naked Otherness and,
therefore, vulnerable to Selfness. The point is not to reduce the Other's uniqueness and
difference to a conscientiousness of the Self. In this sense (of being a mandate), the Other
"appears" in a higher position. Thus, the vis-à-vis relationship is asymmetrical. I wish to
point out that Buber's I-Thou relationship, unlike that of Lévinas, places the Other in a
reciprocal relationship of intimacy or complicity. Lévinas' perspective, on the other hand,
stems from the idea of the Infinite, from the Other as being absolute and transcendent.
The vis-à-vis relationship is not based, according to Lévinas, on reciprocity, but rather on
asymmetry.
"Buber a distingué la relation avec l'Objet qui serait guidée par la pratique – de la
relation dialogale qui atteint l'Autre comme Tu, comme partenaire et ami"12.
"On peut se demander toutefois si le tutoiement ne place pas l'Autre dans une relation
réciproque et si cette réciprocité est originelle"13.
Up to now, we have seen that the presence of the face or, what is the same, the
infiniteness of the Other, is indigence and mandate. The Other, then, becomes manifest in
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his face. Lévinas refers to this face using the biblical symbols of the widow, the orphan
and the stranger. All three allude not only to nakedness and loneliness but also to an
interlocutor who is incapable of lying about his misery: about the nakedness of his human
vulnerability. Thus, "…La présence d'Autrui équivaut à cette mise en question de ma
joyeuse possession du monde14". Understanding ethnocentrism and egoism as a passion
for what is mine is not accidental; it is characteristic of the I. When Lévinas states that the
I is identical to itself even in its modifications, he wishes to have us understand that this
identity stems from its ability to identify with everything in its surroundings – i.e., to
possess it, to take it for its own, and make it identical to oneself. However, the encounter
with the Other will clash with the Self, and lead us to question the manner in which the
Self sees itself, and interprets and acts within the world. Indeed, the Other provokes one
to question the I and, thereby, leads to the fall of the sovereign I as an absolute being. It
also signifies displacing the latter from its position of security. Nevertheless, this does not
imply a fall into nothingness; it is, rather, to affirm that the I is humble, as though in debt
to the Other, and having the Other as its raison d'être. Criticism of oneself cannot arise
from the spontaneous egoism of the I; it is the Other that provokes me to question the
justice of my actions and the purpose of my existence. Conversely, although ontology
described the Being as conatus (perseverance and the will to be, growth in essence,
substance and power), Lévinas places the greatness of humanness in its capacity to forget
itself vis-à-vis the Other. Questioning oneself is a movement, which rather than denying
the I, makes one be himself through responsibility. That is the reason that the structure of
subjectivity is responsibility. Listening to the misery of the Other "ne consiste pas á se
représenter une image, mais á se poser comme responsable, á la fois comme plus et
comme moins que l'être qui se présente dans le visage15", placing on oneself the burden
of responsibility. However, listening to the Other is necessary for the I to be open. By
means of the concepts of vulnerability and misery, Lévinas attempts to uncover the
individual in terms of passivity. This passivity is the sensitivity that allows not only an
openness but also a receptivity towards the Other. In his passive state, the individual
becomes displaced, abandons his subjective sovereignty and his tendency to possess and
control reality. Because of a passivity that has neither power nor intention, the individual
is able to give of himself totally and without reservation. In the vis-à-vis relationship, the
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individual perceives the need of the Other as a requirement for assistance. This is what
constitutes the call of the Other. The face of the Other is imposed on the I without the
latter being able to turn a deaf ear or forget the aforesaid call – i.e., without failing to be
responsible for his misery. When confronted with the Other, and having no time to think
about himself, the individual recognizes the urgency to respond, or to be responsible. The
responsibility the Other calls upon me to exercise does not consist merely of my having
to justify my actions, but rather, according to Lévinas, my responsibility vis-à-vis the
Other. Thus, I am responsible for the Other without my expecting reciprocity. The
interpersonal relationship, therefore, is asymmetrical. Just as the relationship between the
I and the Other is non-reciprocal, I become an individual. To be called upon to exercise
responsibility, in Lévinas' terms, is not an intentional movement from me to the Other,
but rather an immediate and irrevocable imperative emanating from the face of the
Other16. "Devant la faim des hommes la responsabilité ne se mesure qu' (objectivement).
Elle est irrécusable.17". Responsibility is the surprising coming out from the I toward the
Other, generated by the Other. Responsibility towards the Other is limitless and infinite.
Finally, as I have stated earlier, such responsibility expects no reciprocity. This is why the
vis-à-vis relationship is asymmetrical.
Reciprocity will transform the Other into another I and destroy transcendence.
We have seen that the face becomes uncovered like nakedness, vulnerability and, thus, its
very presence is an order addressed to me. By the same token, I reveal myself to the
Other both as master and servant at one and the same time. I am more and less than he,
because the Other's face reminds me of my obligations and judges me – i.e., questions the
way I act in the world - and reminds me of my debts. I am more because, vis-à-vis the
Other, I am conscious or aware that I have at my disposal a variety of resources and am,
therefore, able to answer him.
Naturally, the Other manifests himself firstly by means of his plastic form and only later
is he imbued with the cultural context to which he belongs. Nevertheless, the Other
derives his significance from that which is beyond his form and his cultural context. This
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significance manifests itself, according to Lévinas, as coming to us, breaking the forms,
starting with the face and its infinity. The epiphany of the Other's face is revealed as
transcending its image. Beyond the form, the face is fundamentally a testimony. For that
reason, the face is a current message, which is prior to any communicable context. It is
absolute sincerity that is incapable of dissimulation. In summary, on the one hand, the
face expresses itself without reference to any system. On the other hand, the face
expresses itself even before that which is expressed by it. We can signify the Other not by
means of representative language or discourse, but rather through presentative language,
the face. By presentative language, I mean that which refers to the presence of the Other
without violating said presence with representational schemes (letters, language, thought,
etc.) Lévinas's recourse, it seems, consists of systematically avoiding the construction of
the reference to the Other in semantic-denotative terms in favor of a so-called
"metaphoric" reference. The latter stresses the criterion of justice, the being of the Other
before his truth. The point is not to make reference to the Other with logical (scientific)
language, but rather to listen to what is being expressed. The latter is what cannot be
represented without violence or injustice. To deal with this matter, Lévinas distinguishes
between the act of speech itself and that which is expressed by language. The latter is
what is communicated and the former is the act of addressing the Other. What is essential
in language, according to Lévinas, is the act of speech itself18, without the content being
expressed – theme, intention – nor the social or practical benefits of communication. It is
only the fact that language forms me and allows me to go outside myself and respond to
the Other19.
" La relation du Même et de l'Autre – ou métaphysique – se joue originellement comme
discours, ou le Même, ramassé dans son ipséité de "je" - d'étant particulier unique et
autochtone – sort de soi"20.
Therefore, this kind of (metaphysical) relationship functions primarily as discourse,
where the Self goes out of itself. To go out of itself is to be able to become responsible
towards the Other and renounce the sovereignty of the I. The act of speech is also a way
of signifying prior to any experience and content. This is the condition of all
communication: it is the non-indifference towards the Other and the exposition of
oneself. In effect, the significance of the speech act resides in conveying meaning to
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another person and, in so doing, to recognize his dignity of existence. This implies,
therefore, having felt the Other's pain, I affirm my responsibility.
The aforesaid is a theme that is placed between the Self and the Other and can either tell
the truth or lie. However, the act of speech cannot ever deny the fact of my responsibility
towards the Other. The act of speech is, then, the sincerity and immediacy of revealing
oneself, of making oneself vulnerable and accessible to the Other. Indeed, to express in a
philosophical manner the ethical significance of the speech forms part of our
responsibility towards others. "Nous tacherons de montrer que le rapport du Même et de
l'Autre –auquel nous semblons imposer des conditions si extraordinaires- est le
langage.21". Thus, an authentic relationship is carried out through it. According to
Lévinas' philosophy, there is a profound and narrow relationship between language and
ethics. This relationship began with the first word addressed to me; and addressing a
word can be considered as though waiting for a reply that, for Lévinas, is an appropriate
responsibility. Language is a relationship that goes beyond the pure communication of
contents. Language is a relationship of responsibility towards the Other, an ethical
relationship22. Therefore, the face, like a word or speech, has ethical meaning. The
relationship between the Self and the Other, realized through language, is ethical in two
ways: firstly, language is a relationship among terms that preserve their transcendence; it
is not a means to know the Other, but rather is the place where one encounters the Other.
"Le langage accomplit en effet un rapport de telle sorte que les termes ne sont pas
limitrophes dans ce rapport, que l'Autre, malgré le rapport avec le Même, demeure
transcendant au Même 23." Secondly, language establishes an ethical relationship because
what is fundamental in speech is not what is said but rather the saying itself – i.e.
addressing the Other, entering into a relationship with him.
"…Une relation avec le Transcendant – cependant libre de toute emprise du
Transcendant- est une relation sociale. C'est lá que le Transcendant, infiniment Autre ,
nous sollicite et en appelle á nous.24"
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Having reached this point in the text, we can observe the equivalence that Lévinas makes
among the terms: Other, Transcendence and the Infinite. Thus, we see that Lévinas also
calls the vis-à-vis relationship a social relationship moreover than an ethical one. This
latter relationship is understood by Lévinas as displacing the sovereignty of the I – i.e., a
relationship devoid of a desire to preserve one's own being. Such a social relationship
cannot be based on knowledge because it is always in correlation between the thought
and what is being thought. This knowledge contains an impossibility – that of going
outside oneself and, therefore, sociability cannot have the same structure as knowledge.
Knowledge is based on, or rather, interpreted as, in most cases, assimilation and
possession of the known object. Knowledge suppresses Otherness. By contrast,
sociability is another form of going outside oneself.
A social relationship cannot
constitute a totality among its terms because "l' Infini ne se laisse pas intégrer 25", that is
to say, it refuses possession by which the Other would come to be imprisoned by the Self.
"L'infini n'est pas "objet" d'une connaissance- ce qui le réduirait á la mesure du regard
qui contemple – mais le désirable, ce qui suscite le Désir…26" Access to the Other
cannot be effected by means of Wisdom, taking into account that knowledge is
essentially a relationship that aspires to totality. Ontological access – based on knowledge
– does not respect the Otherness of the Other; it is a violent access which must be
abandoned. In this way, Lévinas' thought can be understood as an effort to gain access to
the Other by the rightness of non-violent relationships. Acceding to the Other justly is to
respect his Otherness: the Other is absolutely Other. The Other is as incomprehensive as
Infinity and Transcendence – i.e., there is no way it can be contained within a concept.
The Other's incomprehensiveness signifies that its difference, its transcendence, must be
respected. Thus, moral necessity is added to the logical impossibility of conceptualizing
the Other. In other words, morality demands that Otherness be respected. Transcendence
results from a just relationship with the Other. Thus, it is not a matter of knowing the
Other, because access to the Other through eyesight dominates the Other, exercises a
power over him that reduces him to a mere object of knowledge. It is a matter of relating
to him morally, since sight is perception. The relationship with one's face - the infinite in
the Other - can be dominated by perception, but that which is specifically face cannot be
reduced to perception.
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The face cannot be transformed into content; it is uncontainable. By contrast, sight is a
search for correlation – it absorbs the Other. The incomprehensive Other is always more
than I can think – i.e., infinity. In Lévinas' thought, infinity is contrary to totality, the
latter being understood as a synthesis where all differences are reduced and incorporated
within one another. Thus, the face of the Other is expressed as that which cannot be
reduced or neutralized into a conceptual content; it always remains external to thought.
Infinity cannot be an object of knowledge, but rather what is "…le désirable, ce qui
suscite le Désir…27" vis-à-vis the Other. Indeed, the Desire for the Other is an infinite
one; it is a desire for the absolute, for that which can never be reached. Thus,
metaphysical desire (as Lévinas states) tends toward the absolutely Other, wishes to attain
that which is beyond any transitory satisfaction. For that reason, metaphysical desire is
different from the desires relating to worldly necessities. It does not seek satisfaction but
rather desire. It is not a necessity that must be satisfied nor does it seek any usefulness,
but rather it hopes for externality. A relationship with the Other, based on desire, does not
seek coincidence, fusion or mutual usefulness, but rather instills sociability: a relationship
between separate, different beings. "Et seule l'idée de l'infini – maintient l'extériorité de
l'Autre par rapport au Même, malgré ce rapport28." To express this impossibility of
reducing the Otherness or the externality of the Other who enters into a relationship with
me, Lévinas returns to the Cartesian concept of "the idea of Infinity".
We have seen that Western philosophy has sought, promised or recommended absolute
knowledge understood as a thought wherein everything can be comprehended. By
contrast, the idea of infinity implies a thought of inequality, where the ideatum of this
idea is infinitely greater than the act of thinking it. Therefore, this act is disproportionate
to that which this same act allows one to reach. According to Descartes, such a
disproportion contains one of the proofs for the existence of God; inasmuch as thought
cannot produce anything that surpasses it, it was necessary that the idea of infinity be
placed within ourselves. For Lévinas, however, the idea of infinity, regardless of whether
it constitutes a proof of the existence of God or not, is significant because, first of all, it
represents the possibility of there being a relationship between the finite and the infinite,
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establishing this relationship in ethical terms: a relationship that does not reduce the
Other into the Self.
The idea of infinity in me is already a moral relationship: it is a matter of responding to
the look of the Other both directly and as a matter of responsibility.
Lévinas emphasizes the ideas of transcendence, the Absolute and the possibility of
establishing a relationship with this Absolute. His intention is not epistemological –
related to knowledge – as in Descartes, but rather metaphysical and ethical29. Therefore,
from the Cartesian notion of infinity, Lévinas basically retains the idea of the
transcendence of infinity. Thus, the separation among the terms expresses and makes
transcendence possible.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the idea of infinity is revealed or makes its presence felt in us by means of
the Other's face. Indeed, the face manifests the Otherness of the Other in a unique way.
The knowledge that I can have of transcendence through the face is not objective, but
exceptional: it constitutes experience par excellence because the idea of infinity in me
through the face of the Other reveals an immeasurability to me: it breaks the immanent
order, an order I can comprehend, think or possess. Starting with the infinity of the Other,
as expressed in his face, one is able to perceive the infinity of divinity. Finally, in the
look of the Other, Lévinas recognizes God's appeal not to abandon anyone who needs me.
Responding to the Other is tantamount to responding to God. For that reason, Lévinas
would call "religion" the relationship with the Other. "Nous proposons d'appeler religion
le lien qui s'établit entre le Même et l'Autre, sans constituer une totalité.30"
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NOTES
1
Lévinas Emmanuel, Totalité et Infini, Kluwer Academic, Paris. 1987
Lévinas Emmanuel, Éthique et Infini, Fayard, Paris. 1982
2
Lévinas Emmanuel, Totalité et Infini, Pag. 33
3
The significance of a sense according to Lévinas' thought (previous to the knowledge and
critical respect to it) was also affirmed in the contemporary philosophy by the represents of the
dialogical thought like, Buber, Rosenzweig, Marcel, etc.
4
Lévinas Emmanuel, Éthique et Infini Pag. 7
5
Lévinas Emmanuel, Totalité et Infini. Pag. 29
6
Form this relation without violence Lévinas begins to criticizes the Hegelian system of totality
where the latter makes an identify between Reason, State and History.
7
Lévinas Emmanuel, Éthique et Infini. Pag. 71
8
9
Ibidem
10
11
12
13
Ibidem
14
15
16
Here is where is evident the heteronomy of the Lévinas' ethics
17
18
Here we can see the influence of the Torah in the Lévinas' thought. To think addressed to all
men. This addressing to the Other is the fundamental function of the act of speech.
19
"En effet, pour moi, le dit ne compte pas autant que le dire lui- même. Celui-ci m'importe
moins par son contenu en informations que par le fait qu'il s'adresse a un interlocuteur." Lévinas
Emmanuel, Éthique et Infini. Pag. 33
20
21
22
23
Starting from this responsibility is where Lévinas defines Human Being as a responsible Being
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24
Lévinas Emmanuel, Totalité et Infini. Pag.76
25
26
27
28
29
"Chez Descartes l'idée de l'Infini reste une idée théorétique, une contemplation, un savoir."
Lévinas Emmanuel, Éthique et Infini. Pag. 86
30
BIBLIOGRAPHY
•
Lévinas Emmanuel, Éthique et infini, Fayard, Paris. 1982
•
Lévinas Emmanuel, Totalité et Infini, Kluwer Academic, Paris. 1987
2004,‫ אוניברסיטה עברית ירושלים‬,‫ שיח‬-‫ פילוסופים קיומיים יהודים ברב‬,‫מאיר אפריים‬
•
15

"ÉTHIQUE" AND "VISAGE" IN LÉVINAS

Transcription

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