Trans ROMS 25 03 2009.indd - Centre d`étude de la vie politique

TRANSITIONS
* Les volumes I à XXXIII ont été publiés sous le nom «Revue des Pays de l’Est»
Nouvelles identités rom
en Europe centrale & orientale
édité par
Andrea Boscoboinik & François Ruegg
Vol. XLVIII•2
Note
Nous avons adopté en français l’orthographe de Rom/Roms pour le nom propre et rom
invariable pour l’adjectif.
Le contenu des articles rassemblés dans ce volume n'engage que leurs auteurs.
© IS/IEUG mars 2009
avenue Jeanne, 44, – 1050 BRUXELLES
Tel. 32.2/650.34.42 – Fax 32.2/650.35.21
e.mail : [email protected] – http://www.ulb.ac.be/is/revtrans.html
ISSN n° 0779-3812
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
Tsiganes en Europe centrale-orientale : la fin du voyage ?
François RUEGG
5
Le jeu des identités rom : dynamisme et rigidité
Andrea BOSCOBOINIK
19
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia : Employment and Education
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
31
Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of Moldova
Ion NEGURA & Veronica PEEV
55
Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
Le cas de la Roumanie
Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA &
Daniela TARNOVSCHI
71
Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism : How do Religious Conversions of
Roma Fit into the Wider Landscape ?
From Global to Local Perspectives
Sorin GOG
93
Conversion Narratives, Sincere Hearts, and Other Tangible Signs :
Communicating Religious Change among the Transylvanian Roma
László FOSZTÓ
109
Evangelical Conversion among the Roma in Bulgaria :
Between Capsulation and Globalization
Milena BENOVSKA-SABKOVA, Velislav ALTANOV
133
La chimère de l’ethnogenèse ou le mirage d’une solution ethnique aux
problèmes socio-économiques des populations rom
Christian GIORDANO
157
TSIGANES EN EUROPE CENTRALE-ORIENTALE
La fin du voyage ?
François RUEGG
Tandis que la filmographie sur les Tsiganes tend à prolonger le mythe des gens du
voyage, avec tout ce que cela comporte de folklorisme et d’exotisme facile, la sociologie
et l’anthropologie auraient tendance au contraire à faire de cette ethnie, à grand renfort
de statistiques, la plus grande et la plus pauvre minoritéé européenne. Simultanément
les clichés négatifs se répandent à la suite des incidents survenus ces dernières années
en Europe occidentale, surtout en Italie. Or ces scandales ne sont guère nouveaux et la
réputation de voleurs (d’enfants
(d’enfants)
d’enfants) faite aux Tsiganes ne date pas d’aujourd’hui.
Ce numéro de Transitions voudrait, en faisant appel à des recherches de terrain
récentes et à travers une vision critique et plus large de la question, identifier les stratégies
que les Roms inventent ou réinventent pour se faire une place dans les sociétés d’Europe
centrale et orientale. Les recherches, coordonnées en grande partie par le Séminaire
d’anthropologie sociale de l’Université de Fribourg, ont porté sur la Roumanie, la
Bulgarie, la Serbie, la Macédoine et la République de Moldova.
Alors donc que l’opinion publique entretient habituellement une image plutôt
négative des Tsiganes, image associée à leur statut de marginaux et de mendiants
quand ce n’est pas de criminels, et leur en impute la faute, le Conseil de l’Europe et les
ONGs de toutes sortes, accompagnés souvent par les sciences sociales, ont tendance au
contraire à faire des Tsiganes sous leur nouveau nom de Roms, une ethnie discriminée,
victime de son histoire. Leur nouveau nom de Rom, censé chasser les traits péjoratifs
attachés à leur ancien nom de Tsigane, n’a pas réussi jusqu’à présent à faire l’unanimité
parmi les Tsiganes eux-mêmes. Cette invention, qui n’est pas sans rappeler les avatars
des dénominations politiquement correctes américaines, devrait servir aussi à créer
un sentiment d’appartenance parmi les divers groupes qui s’y rattachent. Rom veut
dire homme en romani et reproduit donc, une fois de plus, le processus ethnocentrique
•5
François RUEGG
d’identification consistant à s’approprier la qualité d’homme pour se définir par rapport
aux autres groupes sociaux que l’on rejette dans une commune altérité. Le phénomène
est bien connu des anthropologues qui le rappellent depuis un bon siècle, chacun des
nouveaux exemples venant confirmer cette tendance commune de s’identifier par
opposition aux autres.
LES ROMS D’EUROPE CENTRALE ET ORIENTALE :
UNE MANIFESTATION NOUVELLE ET OBSESSIONNELLE EN EUROPE DE L’OUEST
A part quelques éclats au sujet des aires accessibles aux gens du voyage, les
Gitans, Manouches ou Sintis ne faisaient plus guère la Une des journaux en Occident.
L’intégration de la Hongrie et de la Slovaquie en 2004 dans l’Union européenne,
suivie de l’entrée de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie en 2007, ont non seulement facilité
l’accès des Roms aux pays de l’Europe occidentale mais ont décidément fait pencher
la balance ethnique et précipité la formation d’une nouvelle minorité rom dont on
dit dorénavant qu’elle est la plus nombreuse en Europe. On se rappellera toutefois
que la migration de communautés rom de l’Est en Europe de l’Ouest n’a pas attendu
l’intégration politique des anciens « pays de l’Est » dans l’Union. Leur présence n’a
cessé de faire couler de l’encre dès la fin des régimes communistes, faisant ressurgir
également d’anciens fantômes. On ne parle en effet des Roms dans les médias qu’en
tant qu’ils nous perturbent : il s’agit du retour de figures et de caractères que l’on croyait
disparus à jamais, ceux du vagabond et du mendiant, ou encore celle de la diseuse de
bonne aventure, sorcière à l’occasion.
Alors que nos Romanichels s’étaient fondus plus ou moins dans les franges de la
société et ne se faisaient plus voir que dans les processions de caravanes luxueuses
lors de leurs déplacements, les Roms eux s’affichent sur les places et dans les lieux
publics des villes et remettent en question nos habitudes, notamment quant à l’exercice
de l’aumône. Il y a longtemps en effet que la charité publique ne s’exerce plus que
par intermédiaires et que nous ne sommes plus confrontés par conséquent directement
à la mendicité et à la misère, sauf peut-être en vacances, ces contre-migrations. Par
ailleurs on ne saurait confondre non plus les Roms avec d’autres migrants, car ils
sont désormais pour la plupart citoyens européens, davantage que les Bosniaques ou
les Kosovars. Aussi sont-ils l’objet de négociations et l’occasion de marchandages
politico-économiques à l’intérieur de l’Union européenne. Les récentes politiques
de rapatriement françaises en disent assez long sur le malaise que créent ces migrants
de l’intérieur qui ne correspondent pas exactement au modèle prévu de libre circulation
pour les ressortissants des pays appartenant à l’Union. La mobilité ne serait-elle donc
pas souhaitable pour tous également ?
LES ROMS : UN PROBLÈME À RÉSOUDRE ?
L’intérêt qu’on leur porte en Europe de l’Ouest est donc clairement lié à ce malaise,
voire à ce qui est considéré comme une plaie et à la question de savoir comment
s’en débarrasser. Les moyens imaginés pour y parvenir, et ce n’est pas nouveau, sont
principalement de deux sortes. Dans le premier et le meilleur des cas, on tente de nier
la différence en élaborant des politiques sociales favorisant l’assimilation. Toutefois
cette solution n’est plus très prisée de nos jours, il est vrai, en raison de la prévalence
6•
Tsiganes en Europe centrale-orientale
de politiques de type communautaristes visant plutôt la défense de la diversité ethnique
et culturelle des minorités
éés discriminées, en général, et dans le cas particulier des Roms
en raison des expériences passées, considérées comme de véritables génocides, qu’il
s’agisse des pogroms perpétrés contre eux durant la deuxième guerre mondiale ou
de mesures plus anciennes et plus récentes d’intimidation, de bannissement, voire
de déportations ou de politiques d’assimilation forcées enfin, comme ce fut le cas
par exemple au 18e siècle dans l’Empire autrichien1. Celles-ci forçaient les Tsiganes
à changer de nom et à se marier à l’extérieur de leur groupe. D’autres séparaient les
enfants de leurs parents pour les civiliser et effacer l’hérédité néfaste
é
éfaste
. Faut-il rappeler
ici les tentatives opérées en Suisse sur les Jenischs en plein 20e siècle faisant écho à
celles-là, plus anciennes. Le plus fréquemment désormais, la différence s’affirme par des
revendications politiques de communautarisation et par conséquent de reconnaissance
d’une différence ethnique essentielle assortie de mesures de discrimination positive.
On observe ainsi en ce qui concerne les Roms un processus d’ethnicisation, ou pour
reprendre la distinction faite en conclusion de ce volume par Giordano, d’ethnogenèse,
concept qui signale bien et vise à réhabiliter, dans le cadre plus large des mesures de
discrimination positive prise à l’encontre des Roms, le projet de construction d’une
nouvelle nation, au sens ancien de ce terme, par de véritables ingénieurs ou entrepreneurs
identitaires. Cette entreprise, ainsi que l’observent Benovska & Altanov en Bulgarie,
peut prendre des formes non seulement politiques mais également religieuses, témoins
en sont les communautés pentecôtistes mixtes, devenues elles aussi monoethniques ou
homogènes, c’est-à-dire rom.
Cependant la difficulté supplémentaire que représente le cas des Roms dans le cadre
de l’Union européenne vient du fait que cette minorité est désormais transnationale et que
les Etats membres ne peuvent guère être forcés à garder leurs populations à l’intérieur de
leurs frontières, en principe abolies et encore moins leurs minorités
é indé
és
indésirables
ésirables ! Aux
faits s’ajoutent les représentations sociales et les stéréotypes qui n’ont guère changé, en
ce qui concerne les stéréotypes aux couleurs négatives, renforcés par quelques affaires
notoires comme le cas de Rome évoqué plus haut dont les répercussions n’ont pas fini
de rebondir, au point que désormais tous les Roms d’Italie seraient fichés au moyen
de leurs empreintes digitales. En revanche des stéréotypes nouveaux apparaissent,
traduisant à la fois la mauvaise conscience des Européens et l’assimilation des Roms
aux immigrés ou demandeurs d’asile, malgré leur citoyenneté, la plupart du temps
européenne. En effet, les nombreuses études consacrées récemment aux communautés
rom d’Europe de l’Est suivent régulièrement cette même orientation : adoptant le registre
humanitaire, elles se penchent sur le sort malheureux des Roms, considérés comme un
problème et comme une population globalement pauvre et discriminée, qu’il s’agisse
d’études économiques, politiques ou sociologiques.
Pour ceux qui mettent évidence la différence (ethnique) en revanche, l’intérêt positif
à leur encontre, se porte sur leur culture, leur langue et leurs traditions communautaires.
Les historiens, bien qu’ils mobilisent des sources moins connues, tendent à suivre
le même chemin : montrer la longue histoire de leur marginalisation sociale ou
rechercher les origines de leur culture à la fois originelle et originale. Ce faisant, ces
études reproduisent sans le savoir les schémas de plus anciens travaux publiés par de
savants ethnographes des 18e et 19e siècles, qui mettaient déjà l’accent soit sur le sort
•7
François RUEGG
inéluctablement défavorable aux Tsiganes, soit sur leur marginalité volontaire, mais
tout aussi fatale.
Dans les deux cas cependant, on nous donne l’impression que ces communautés
assistent passivement à leur histoire et reproduisent celle d’autres minorités opprimées,
assimilées ou ethnocidé
ethnocid es, qu’il s’agisse des Noirs de l’Amérique du Nord ou des
Indiens d’Amérique, voire des Juifs condamnés
é à errer sans fin. Des allusions explicites
és
à ces autres minorités nourrissent d’ailleurs les projets d’action en faveur des Roms
et sont utilisées par les activistes rom et non rom dans leurs campagnes politiques et
financières.
STRATÉGIES IDENTITAIRES DES ROMS
Face à ces représentations simplificatrices des Roms qui en font aujourd’hui à
nouveau des marginaux impuissants ou nuisibles, représentations issues de la seule
perception des Roms mendiants émigrés à l’Ouest, qui négligent ainsi ceux qui
demeurent en Europe centrale et orientale et leur situation là
l -bas, nous nous proposons
dans ce volume de replacer la question rom dans son contexte géopolitique local
contemporain. C’est pourquoi nous avons souhaité apporter un autre éclairage à cette
question. Il s’agissait d’étudier les stratégies que les Roms mettent eux-mêmes en
œuvre en Europe de l’Est pour se positionner dans une société nouvelle : des stratégies
identitaires recourant notamment à la mobilité sociale, géographique et religieuse. Au
cours d’une recherche de trois ans, menée en Roumanie du Nord et en République de
Moldova, financée par le FNS2, nous avons pu recueillir de la bouche des intéressés
leurs conceptions de l’identité rom/tsigane et les stratégies qu’ils ont imaginées, le cas
échéant, pour sortir du carcan des stéréotypes qui les affligent depuis des siècles, quel
que soit le régime politique en vigueur. A ces recherches viennent s’ajouter celles de
collègues ayant travaillé indépendamment sur des thèmes analogues ou dans des zones
géographiques différentes.
Nous avons ainsi été amenés à considérer la situation générale des Roms en Europe
orientale et du Sud-est, non pas tellement du point de vue économique ou politique,
ce qui est largement étudié, mais bien du point de vue des nouvelles identités qu’ils
se donnent, soit en ayant formé de nouvelles élites au sein de la société majoritaire,
soit en ayant changé d’identité à travers l’adoption d’une nouvelle religion, c’està-dire principalement leur conversion au néo-protestantisme et le plus souvent au
pentecôtisme. Notre perspective qui se veut largement émique, à la fois par la place
qu’y occupent les chercheurs de la région et les données empiriques mises à profit,
recueillies auprès des Roms, devrait également permettre de nuancer une vision par
trop simpliste ou angélique de la question, faisant souvent des Roms les victimes
des bourreaux nationalistes est-européens. Cela est particulièrement vrai lorsque les
arguments économiques sont avancés et qu’il est question de la pauvreté ou de la misère
généralisée des Roms, sur un modèle emprunté à des discours visant davantage à attirer
la pitié qu’à donner une perspective nuancée, celui qui parle par exemple de la pauvreté
africaine. Or s’il est évident que le manque de ressources est une cause majeure de la
migration, on devrait se rappeler que les Roms ne sont pas les seuls affectés et que la
majorité de la population roumaine, pour prendre cet exemple, vit dans la précarité, si
l’on s’en tient aux critères et au normes internationales élaborées en la matière. Il en
8•
Tsiganes en Europe centrale-orientale
résulte une compétition d’autant plus grande entre Roms roumains et Roumains, aussi
bien dans le pays qu’à l’étranger.
Ainsi, ce numéro de Transitions a l’ambition de présenter un autre point de vue
sur les Roms, qu’il s’agisse de démonter la mécanique et de reconstituer l’histoire de
l’ethnogenèse (Giordano) qui a lieu sous nos yeux étonnés, ou de se faire l’écho du
point de vue des intéressés
éés eux-mêmes à travers les résultats de recherches menées
par le Séminaire d’Anthropologie de l’Université de Fribourg depuis plusieurs années
(Boscoboinik) en collaboration avec le CISS de Rome3, au moyen d’enquêtes sur le
terrain, menées par des chercheurs des pays concernés avec la plupart du temps la
collaboration de chercheurs rom dans nos équipes. Ces recherches, en grande partie
qualitatives, sont également interdisciplinaires dans la mesure où elles ont été menées par
des chercheurs venant de la sociologie, de la psychologie sociale et de l’anthropologie
sociale et religieuse. Toutefois il ne s’agissait pas simplement de donner la parole aux
Roms ou de se mettre à leur place, mais bien de placer la caméra sous un angle différent.
Plutôt que de reprendre les indicateurs socio-économiques et politiques classiques,
nous avons tenu à privilégier deux perspectives habituellement négligées, la mobilité
sociale et religieuse.
• Premièrement il s’agissait de considérer la formation des élites rom (Neculau
& alii) et leur rôle dans la constitution des nouvelles identités rom individuelles et
communautaires ainsi que les changements induits par celles-ci dans la société roumaine
en particulier.
•
Deuxièmement de porter notre attention sur les identités
éés religieuses ou plutôt
sur la manière dont ces identités sont mobilisées dans la construction plus globale
des identités alternatives, c’est-à-dire en d’autres termes, comment la religion permet
aux Roms de construire des identités nouvelles, autres que celles que leur imposent
habituellement les stéréotypes (Fosztó, Gog et Benovska & Altanov).
Enfin il nous a semblé utile d’élargir la perspective géographique de notre enquête.
C’est pourquoi nous avons demandé à nos collègues de Serbie (Jakžić) et de la République
de Moldova (Negura & Peev) de contribuer à la composition de cette fresque.
È
Dans son article consacré aux identités à géométrie variable des Roms en Europe
du Sud-est, Andrea Boscoboinik présente un aperçu des recherches menées par notre
Séminaire d’Anthropologie sociale4 au sujet des définitions identitaires, celles qui sont
données par les autres aussi bien que celles que l’on s’attribue soi-même. Elle montre
notamment comment, au-delà de la distinction classique opérée par les Tsiganes euxmêmes face aux Gadje ou non Tsiganes, à l’intérieur même des communautés que nous
avons tendance à considérer comme homogènes parce qu’appartenant théoriquement
à une seule ethnie affublée de stéréotypes négatifs, des distinctions s’opèrent (ce que
confirme l’article de Neculau & alii) en fonction de critères d’authenticité prétendue,
reprenant ces mêmes stéréotypes négatifs. Ainsi malgré ou peut-être sous l’effet de la
nouvelle construction ethnique rom, réalisée avec le concours de politiciens européens
par les activistes et leaders rom, des groupes rom refusent-ils l’appellation même de
•9
François RUEGG
rom pour garder le nom traditionnel de tsigane. Elle aborde également la question des
représentations sociales interethniques à l’intérieur des nations de l’Europe centrale
orientale et du Sud-est, question fondamentale si l’on veut comprendre dans toute sa
complexité, la question des identités rom. Les Roms non seulement ne constituent pas
une ethnie homogène, ce que nous montre également leur statut social, économique et
religieux, mais les représentations de soi et des autres, les stratégies identitaires qu’ils
mobilisent, instituent des clivages et des segmentations qui marquent les communautés
rom aussi bien aux yeux des autres qu’à leurs propres yeux.
La contribution de Božidar Jakžić nous permet de mieux connaître la situation
des Roms en Serbie, pour laquelle nous avions jusqu’à présent peu de données. Loin
d’adopter la perspective des faiseurs de Roms ethniques, Jakžić se tourne résolument
vers les considérations socio-économiques pour dresser un tableau des circonstances
conjoncturelles et historiques qui font des Roms de Serbie, comme de ceux de toute la
région d’ailleurs, des marginaux, tant dans leur espace de vie, leur quartier (mahala)
(
, que
du point de vue social. Toutefois, contrairement aux nombreuses études misérabilistes
consacrées à la pauvreté quasi fatale des Roms, le texte de Jakžić souligne que la
pauvreté qui accable les Roms frappe également l’ensemble de la population, ainsi
que l’ont aussi remarqué les chercheurs roumains. Aussi consacre-t-il une bonne partie
de sa contribution à analyser deux questions plus précisément : celle du chômage et
celle de l’éducation. Les raisons pour lesquelles les Roms ne trouvent pas d’emploi
sont bien connues par ailleurs et liées à la fois à leur manque de formation et à une
discrimination de la part des groupes majoritaires, thème repris sous son aspect positif
par Neculau & alii, insistant sur le rôle des études supérieures pour avoir accès à un
nouveau statut social supérieur. Toutefois Jakžić nous montre l’incidence de ces déficits
de reconnaissance dans le niveau de vie des Roms et met ainsi en évidence une fois de
plus le cercle vicieux que constituent la pauvreté, le chômage et le manque de formation.
Ainsi est-il amené tout naturellement à traiter par la suite la question de l’éducation,
mais dans une perspective critique. La vieille question de la ségrégation et de l’apartheid
scolaire, justifié par les mauvais traitements dont les enfants rom sont victimes dans
les écoles publiques, ressurgit ici. L’approche éducative assimilationniste pèche pour
sa part par paternalisme, proposant un modèle unique de citoyenneté civilisée, tandis
que la ségrégation pèche par idéalisme, tentant à la fois de protéger les enfants rom de
la discrimination en les isolant, et leur culture en leur enseignant leur prétendue langue
ethnique commune, le romani. Les mêmes problèmes se posent ainsi aux Roms serbes
qu’à ceux de toute la région du Sud-est européen. Face à la redistribution des cartes
politiques et des systèmes d’organisation sociale, les Roms font souvent les frais de
la paupérisation généralisée. Ils sont en outre aisément tenus pour responsables de la
mauvaise situation économique et de la mauvaise réputation que les pays est-européens
(et encore davantage ceux qui n’ont pas pu entrer encore dans l’Union européenne
comme la Serbie ou la République de Moldova) ont acquise auprès des pays membres
de l’Union Européenne qui, de leur côté, tentent vainement de les convaincre de garder
leurs Roms chez eux. Ainsi les Roms deviennent-ils facilement les boucs émissaires
d’une crise généralisée.
Les Roms de la République de Moldova sont moins connus que ceux de la
Roumanie pour des raisons assez simples. Ils sont sédentarisés depuis longtemps et
10 •
Tsiganes en Europe centrale-orientale
orientent traditionnellement leurs activités vers l’Est (URSS/Ukraine/Russie) plutôt
que vers l’Ouest. L’article de Negura & Peev, nous restitue les résultats d’une enquête
effectuée dans le cadre du projet commun mentionné plus haut. Il les décrit en suivant
pas à pas le questionnaire qui a servi aux entretiens. Les caractéristiques générales les
concernant, décrites dans la partie introductive ne nous surprendront pas, tant elles
correspondent à celles des pays voisins, qu’il s’agisse de la difficulté d’établir un
recensement fiable, du taux de chômage, de la (mauvaise) situation de la femme ou de
la (faible) scolarisation ou encore des préjugés à leur encontre et de leur marginalisation.
Les questions posées au sujet de l’identité, telle qu’elle est perçue et construite par les
Roms, font apparaître la même souplesse et mobilité en fonction des circonstances,
mais simultanément un fort attachement aux valeurs traditionnelles qui constituent
cette identité. Celles-ci prennent racine dans l’héritage culturel, tel qu’il est transmis et
imaginé : appartenance au groupe restreint (famille ou clan) des anciennes catégories
professionnelles, désigné selon les occupations et/ou objets fabriqués, démarcation
vestimentaire, lieu de résidence, pratiques sociales dont font partie ce que l’on appelait
les coutumes. En définitive, il semblerait que chez les Roms de la Moldova, du moins
ceux qui ont répondu à l’enquête, l’attachement au passé et aux traditions, ajouté à des
pratiques d’exclusion réciproques qui marquent fortement les différences ethniques au
sein de la Nation, demeure le facteur d’identification majeur, la construction identitaire
se faisant à partir des origines, de la famille et du groupe élargi. La langue serait, elle
aussi, un facteur supplémentaire d’identification ethnique.
Trop souvent encore relégués dans la catégorie de mendiants-voleurs ou d’assistés,
profiteurs de l’aide sociale, les Roms ne sont que rarement considérés comme capables
de concevoir des stratégies économiques propres. Tout au plus leur reconnaît-on une
certaine habileté dans une économie parallèle. Or sans un sens aiguisé des affaires, on
voit mal comment certaines de ces familles et communautés auraient pu non seulement
survivre mais prospérer, ainsi que le montre avec éclat la classe des nouveaux riches
(cf. Neculau & alii). C’est cette économie, certes non conforme nécessairement aux
critères habituels du rendement ou de la légalité qu’il conviendrait d’analyser plus avant.
Une telle étude viendrait heureusement compléter les données concernant la pauvreté
des Roms et leur marginalité. En effet il ne nous semble pas suffisant de dénoncer les
maux qui affligent les Roms pour les comprendre.
LES NOUVELLES ÉLITES ROM
Nous avons dit qu’un des mouvements les plus dignes d’attention, parmi les
changements survenus depuis la chute du régime antérieur, était celui de la création des
élites rom. En effet, leur seule existence prouve la capacité des Roms non seulement de
réussir financièrement et socialement, mais encore de revendiquer légitimement leur
origine ou leur culture, sans vouloir nécessairement y attacher l’idée de la constitution
d’une nation ou d’un peuple rom distinct dans les Etats dans lesquels ils vivent. Adrian
Neculau et ses collègues restituent ici les résultats de leur enquête auprès de représentants
de ces élites. Comme on sait, la notion même d’élite est ambiguë, puisqu’elle englobe
toutes les formes du pouvoir, politique, intellectuelle et économique.
Partant de la formation des élites en général dans les pays post socialistes et en
Roumanie en particulier, et de leurs stratégies, il nous montre comment les membres rom
• 11
François RUEGG
de ces anciennes élites socialistes redécouvrent peu à peu leurs racines et deviennent
à leur tour des promoteurs d’une romanitéé distincte de la roumanitéé tout en demeurant
dans l’élite. Les membres rom des élites sont parfaitement assimilés et reproduisent les
mêmes comportements que les autres membres de l’élite, la nomenklatura, à tel point
que certains sont appelés les Roms invisibles. Une deuxième élite rom, très visible celleci et très présente dans les médias, est constituée par les ressortissants des chefferies
traditionnelles, suivant les différentes familles dont les noms se réfèrent comme on
a dit à leurs anciens métiers : travailleurs du bois, du métal, montreurs d’ours etc.
C’est également parmi eux que se trouvent les nouveaux riches rom, sur les stratégies
sociales desquels l’article reviendra, prenant à témoin des informateurs rom de l’élite
intellectuelle qui ne les tiennent pas en très haute estime.
L’étude se concentre cependant surtout sur une autre élite encore, celle que
constituent non pas les nouveaux riches mais les Roms entrés dans le monde académique
et politique ou administratif et qui servent de trait d’union entre les Roumains et les
Roms. Même si certains membres de cette élite appartenaient à la nomenklatura,
l’ensemble de cette classe se distingue par sa formation académique et son activisme
politique, au sens large. Ce sont certes des « parvenus » issus des classes pauvres ou
basses de la société. Toute proportion gardée, cette élite joue le rôle qu’ont joué les
intellectuels dans la formation des Etats-Nations au 19e siècle et qui ont été les pères
de la Nation, non seulement du point de vue ethnique mais également du point de vue
de la constitution d’une minorité active, capable de se faire entendre et de s’imposer au
sein de la communauté académique. Si l’on peut parler d’intégration, c’est bien à propos
des Roms qualifiés qui sont sortis de la problématique ethnique et qui ont compris que
leur qualification les valorise aux yeux de la communauté tout entière. Nous avons été
témoin d’une expérience semblable lors d’un séminaire consacré aux Roms mendiants à
Genève, auquel participait une activiste (rom) des droits de l’Homme qui, à la question
de savoir si elle militait pour la cause de la femme rom a répliqué qu’elle luttait pour
les droits de la femme et non pour les droits de la femme rom. Cette réponse illustre
bien, à mon sens, ce que l’on pourrait nommer la sortie de l’ethnie, et par conséquent
l’assimilation non seulement au niveau national mais bien international, dans la mesure
où l’on sait très bien que les élites sont en principe cosmopolites.
Toutefois les élites les plus visibles demeurent les élites économiques rom qui, en
attirant l’attention des médias et du public international, roumain et rom, renforcent les
préjugés et stéréotypes négatifs au sujet des Roms qui seraient certes riches, nouveaux
riches sans culture et ne faisant preuve d’aucune solidarité envers les Roms pauvres.
Cette nouvelle vitrine rom dessert en définitive la cause rom et suscite jalousies chez
les uns et soumission chez les autres. Un informateur les appelle d’ailleurs les élites
en carton. En conclusion, pour Neculau & alii, la voie royale pour que les Roms
fassent désormais partie des élites nationales, à savoir des élites utiles à la Nation qui
faciliteraient à long terme l’intégration sociale de l’ensemble des Roms, c’est l’accès
aux études supérieures.
RELIGION, ETHNICITÉ, CONVERSIONS ET MISSIONS
Sur un autre registre, peu étudié encore et souvent méconnu ou peu prisé, celui
de la conversion religieuse, trois contributions donnent un éclairage nouveau à la
12 •
Tsiganes en Europe centrale-orientale
question des stratégies identitaires rom en Europe de l’Est et du Sud-est. En Bulgarie
comme en Roumanie et ailleurs dans la région, le phénomène des conversions rom au
pentecôtisme a pris des proportions telles qu’on commence à l’étudier avec plus d’intérêt.
Fosztó consacre ainsi une partie de son introduction à faire le point sur les manières
d’interpréter les conversions dans les sciences sociales, et plus particulièrement les
conversions au pentecôtisme, mouvement qui se distingue par sa tonalité particulièrement
charismatique. L’article de Benovska & Altanov présente également un bon survol de
la littérature existante dans le domaine de l’étude de la conversion, lequel se développe
parallèlement aux conversions elles-mêmes, il faut le souligner, ce qui permet certes de
recourir à l’observation participante, mais d’autre part rend le regard éloignéé parfois
plus difficile.
Les communautés sur lesquelles Benovska & Altanov ont fait leur enquête en
Bulgarie sont urbaines, alors que celles étudiées par Gog sont situées dans la campagne
transylvaine. Benovska & Altanov adoptent une perspective historique et transnationale
tandis que Gog analyse la situation dans le contexte national et local. Benovska &
Altanov ont pratiqué en outre l’observation participante, non sans provoquer quelques
perturbations dans la communauté, tant il est vrai qu’il est difficilement possible de
rester inaperçu dans une communauté néo-protestante. Fosztó a également basé son
analyse de la conversion sur une enquête de terrain en Transylvanie roumaine mais il
s’attache plus particulièrement aux récits de conversion à travers lesquels il tente de
restituer la dynamique psycho-sociale qui y a présidé. Nous bénéficions ainsi d’une
image contrastée, à la fois large et très circonstanciée (récits et témoignages individuels
de pasteurs et de convertis) du phénomène des conversions dans la région. Nous avons
eu nous-même l’occasion de mener des entretiens avec des convertis et un pasteur
pentecôtiste, lors de récentes missions en Moldova et en Roumanie. Leurs témoignages
viennent confirmer la complexité du phénomène dont il est parfois difficile de démêler
les aspects, tant les motivations religieuses peuvent se doubler de motivations sociales
et identitaires.
La première communauté étudiée par Benovska & Altanov, l’Eglise de Dieu bulgare,
a été fondée contrairement à d’autres Eglises plus récentes au début du 20e siècle.
Elle connut une époque ultra-rigoriste et conservatrice dans ses pratiques, notamment
concernant le renoncement à toute propriété et récolte d’argent, lié au refus de toute
innovation, un peu à la manière de mouvements semblables bien connus, comme les
Mennonites. De même que durant le régime communiste dans la plus grande partie
des pays de l’ancienne Union soviétique, les prêtres, pasteurs (ainsi d’ailleurs que
les imams5) de ces communautés religieuses locales souterraines occupaient d’autres
emplois, participaient aux travaux collectifs et furent persécutés. Cette pratique de
pasteur polyvalent se vérifie encore parfois aujourd’hui ainsi que nous l’avons constaté
dans un quartier de Timişoara en Roumanie, où le pasteur était en même temps forgeron.
Cependant cette Eglise de Dieu bulgare a noué peu à peu des contacts internationaux
et changé radicalement de philosophie, dès la chute du communisme, ce qui n’a
pas manqué de provoquer un afflux de fidèles : elle a même été jusqu’à envoyer ses
propres missionnaires rom en Turquie. L’organisation et la hiérarchie de ces Eglises
néo-protestantes sont dictées par le modèle spirituel apostolique qui établit entre ses
membres une égalité de type confraternelle. Le clergé ne constitue guère une classe,
• 13
François RUEGG
dans la mesure où chaque Eglise garde une forte indépendance. Toutefois ce sont les
dons ou charismes reconnus chez des membres individuels de ces communautés qui les
distinguent et leur confèrent un statut particulier. Globalement, ces Eglises ne diffèrent
guère de leurs consoeurs situées dans d’autres pays, à l’Est comme à l’Ouest.
Ce qui est nouveau en revanche dans le contexte post-communiste, c’est le type
de sociabilitéé qu’instaurent ces Eglises. Si elles sont toutes fondées certes sur le même
modèle apostolique, il ne faut pas oublier qu’elles ont été également modelées par les
traditions démocratiques et puritaines anglo-saxonnes du 19e siècle, centrées à la fois
sur l’individu et la communauté des croyants. L’attrait et l’exotisme de ces nouvelles
formes de religiosité sont d’autant plus marqués, pour les chercheurs bulgares et roumains
aussi bien que pour les convertis, qu’il s’agit là en principe d’une expression de la
même religion, le christianisme, mais qui prend des formes radicalement différentes
de l’orthodoxie traditionnelle, marquée elle par une présence cléricale forte et des
expressions religieuses strictement canalisées par le rite, par définition invariable. Dans
le pentecôtisme au contraire, comme l’illustre Fosztó dans les exemples présentés, les
révélations personnelles, les guérisons miraculeuses, la diffusion des dons et autres
manifestations d’une communication directe avec Dieu, c’est l’individu qui est au
centre de la manifestation divine. Cette révolution anthropocentrique et individualiste
de la religiosité correspond évidemment doublement aux aspirations de populations
marquées à la fois par un césaro-papisme
é
ésaro-papisme
civil et religieux.
D’une part, d’un point de vue politique, l’Eglise orthodoxe, malgré ses martyrs, n’a
pas cessé d’être, officiellement au moins, liée d’une manière ou d’une autre au pouvoir
durant le régime communiste, ne serait-ce que parce qu’elle était la seule reconnue ou
tolérée. Si de nombreux fidèles ont rejoint l’Eglise orthodoxe en Europe de l’Est après la
chute du régime communiste, précisément à cause de la tradition des Eglises nationales
qui veut que pour être un bon citoyen, il faut également être un bon orthodoxe, il n’en
reste pas moins qu’aux yeux de certains, celle-ci avait perdu sa crédibilité. Par ailleurs,
la sociabilité communautaire introduite par le régime socialiste n’est pas complètement
étrangère à la sociabilité traditionnelle de l’orthodoxie qui considère les laïcs comme le
peuple de Dieu. La hiérarchie sociale contestée par le communisme est remplacée par
une hiérarchie d’appartenance idéologique de type exclusif, au sein du parti. Ainsi les
Roms, selon les recherches menées en Roumanie du moins (Gog), sont-ils ségrégés,
dans l’Eglise nationale orthodoxe, à l’église et au cimetière, comme ils le sont à l’école
et dans les villages.
D’autre part, du point de vue religieux, l’Eglise orthodoxe, dans la tradition byzantine,
se situe dans un contexte clairement clérical et hiérarchique traditionnel, un système
pyramidal où chaque catégorie occupe sa place, répondant au principe de complémentarité
ou de subsidiarité, mais certainement pas d’égalité ou de permutabilité. Le service du
culte est exercé par des clercs et les notions de participation ou de démocratisation, voire
d’égalité des sexes lui sont complètement étrangères. La modernité avec ses idéaux de
démocratie et de participation n’y trouve donc pas son compte.
Dans ces conditions, et en se référant à la littérature classique concernant l’émergence
simultanée du protestantisme et de la modernité, on comprendra l’attrait que représente
le protestantisme pour les personnes avides de modernisation de la religion et du
14 •
Tsiganes en Europe centrale-orientale
pentecôtisme, en particulier pour celles qui souhaitent être reconnues en tant qu’objet
personnel de la manifestation divine.
Il est un autre trait à souligner du point de vue des stratégies d’émancipation
sociales, et c’est l’irruption de la mission et par conséquent de la mobilité des pasteurs
indigènes, bulgares et rom dans le contexte de la mobilité internationale ou de la
mondialisation comme l’indiquent Benovska & Altanov. Ce qui nous a semblé recouper
d’autres stratégies de mobilité ou d’élévation sociale par la mission, celles-ci ayant été
pratiquées depuis le 16e siècle au moins dans les « pays du nord » colonisateurs, et
plus récemment dans les pays d’émigration, Suisse, Irlande, Italie mais aussi France
par exemple, avant la deuxième guerre mondiale, comme en témoignent de nombreux
récits, romans et films6.
Gog commence, pour sa part, par retracer les changements intervenus dans les
affiliations religieuses de la société post communiste en Roumanie. Il nous rappelle la
situation spécifique de ce pays demeuré rural et où par conséquent, malgré les campagnes
d’athéisation, la population est demeurée largement affiliée aux Eglises chrétiennes
traditionnelles, majoritairement orthodoxes. Parmi les changements survenus après la
chute du régime communiste, il relève une plus forte mobilitéé chez les Roms et chez
les Roms de la campagne qui se sont convertis pour la plupart au pentecôtisme, ayant
abandonné soit l’Eglise orthodoxe, soit l’Eglise protestante. Phénomène nouveau,
le pentecôtisme a créé des Eglises rom qui n’existaient pas comme telles sous le
communisme et qui regroupent un dixième de la population rom aujourd’hui. Nous
sommes loin, avec le cas de ces conversions des Roms ruraux au pentecôtisme, des
conversions forcées faisant partie de l’arsenal de l’assimilation, notamment du temps
des Empires. Au contraire, Gog nous fait voir comment ces communautés, fondées
à la fois sur une commune appartenance identitaire (ethnique) et éthique (puritaine),
permettent aux Roms de se créer un espace identitaire propre et une nouvelle image de
soi. Tandis qu’ils étaient et sont encore discriminés ou rejetés par la population majoritaire
ethniquement roumaine ou hongroise et religieusement orthodoxe ou réformée de manière
perceptible dans l’espace villageois, leur quartier étant clairement séparé et situé à la
périphérie, et même dans les cimetières où ils sont enterrés dans des carrés distincts,
la création de ces espaces nouveaux, ethniquement homogènes certes mais fondés
sur l’idée d’une nouvelle identité, celle que leur donne leur appartenance pentecôtiste
de né à nouveau ((born
born again
again)) semble leur permettre d’échapper à la ségrégation des
autres. La question de l’appartenance confessionnelle, on le voit, n’est pas, tant s’en
faut, seulement religieuse mais bien sociale. Ce que les Roms demandent aussi à la
religion, c’est un espace de sociabilité qui leur est refusé par les institutions existantes.
Toutefois ils peuvent très bien recourir tout de même aux Eglises traditionnelles lorsque
leurs coutumes religieuses l’exigent, une religiosité fondée sur la sacralité coutumière,
notamment la sacralité des serments (Gog). Il conviendrait à ce sujet de poursuivre des
recherches sur les syncrétismes opérés par les Roms, soit dans un contexte chrétien,
soit dans un contexte musulman dans les provinces roumaines et bulgares qui comptent
encore des minorités
é turques.
és
A côté de cet aspect sociologique de la conversion et de la progressive
communautarisation des Eglises pentecôtistes rom, il faut voir ce que la nouvelle religion
induit du point de vue certes, religieux, mais également et surtout du point de vue de
• 15
François RUEGG
l’éthique personnelle, point qui sera développé davantage par Fosztó. Cela est bien
connu dans d’autres contextes historiques et culturels, à savoir d’abord ceux qui ont vu
naître la Réforme. Ce que le protestantisme lui-même induit, c’est la personnalisation
et la modernisation de la religion. Ce que la naissance des mouvements néo-protestants
signale, avec le même décalage en Roumanie que dans d’autres périphéries européennes,
c’est la modernisation de la conception de la religion, une religion à la fois individuelle
par la lecture de la Bible, et collective par la création d’une communauté de foi quasi
démocratique qui peut ignorer en son sein les différences ethniques et sociales. La lecture
de la Bible et la solidarité confessionnelle ont depuis longtemps permis aux classes
les plus défavorisées d’avoir accès à l’éducation c’est-à-dire aux études et ensuite à
des positions sociales élitaires. Cela n’est nullement le privilège du protestantisme :
c’est une des voies classiques de l’ascension sociale, témoins en sont les nombreux
personnages illustres qui l’ont reconnu. On pense ici entre autre à Stoliaroff7 qui, ayant
appris à lire avec le pope de son village, pourra étudier l’agronomie en ville et occuper
une position importante dans l’administration. Sorin Gog nous fournit ici une preuve
encore des effets secondaires de l’éthique protestante.
Or il se trouve que même au sein des Eglises pentecôtistes roumaines, les Roms
se trouvent ségrégés : ce serait une des raisons principales pour lesquelles les Roms
ont fondé d’emblée leurs propres Eglises pentecôtistes. La situation, on s’en souvient,
n’est pas la même en Bulgarie, mais tendrait à le devenir, selon Benovska & Altanov,
sous la pression du communautarisme dont il resterait à voir de plus près s’il est lié
aux projets de constituer une minorité rom transnationale, induit par des activistes et
des politiques au niveau international ou s’il reflète une simple volonté d’autonomie.
Il est donc extrêmement intéressant de constater la progression de l’homogénéisation
ethnique au sein des communautés religieuses pentecôtistes, immédiate dans le cas des
Roms Roumains et tardive dans le cas des Eglises rom bulgares. Dans le cas des Eglises
bulgares mixtes, telles qu’elles l’étaient jusque dans les années 2000, l’ethnicisation
a également fait son apparition, c’est-à-dire que les Roms ont peu à peu créé leurs
propres Eglises pentecôtistes rom.
Les stratégies identitaires civiles et religieuses semblent suivre ainsi un mouvement
contradictoire, si l’on tient compte des élites qui tendent, au moins dans un premier
temps, à abandonner leur identité ethnique pour se fondre dans l’identité de classe
(élite), quitte à revendiquer plus tard, comme c’est le cas des minorités en général,
leur origine dans un deuxième temps ou à quelques générations de distance, une fois
leur assise sociale reconnue.
Pour pouvoir replacer la question Rom dans un contexte plus large et théorique, nous
avons demandé à C. Giordano d’analyser le processus de construction d’une nouvelle
minorité rom telle que nous la voyons s’opérer par les ingénieurs sociaux rom et non
rom au niveau national et international.
Après avoir rétabli l’histoire des termes d’ethnos et d’ethnogenèse dans leur contexte
germanique et soviétique respectivement, Giordano établit une distinction claire entre
la théorie dynamique de l’ethnogenèse émise par son fondateur, Širokogorov, et celle,
statique et essentialiste, de ses émules et successeurs, empêtrés dans des problèmes
politiques insolubles. Il relève ensuite comment les concepts d’ethnicisation et
ethnogenèse sont différemment connotés, le premier négativement dans la mesure où
16 •
Tsiganes en Europe centrale-orientale
la manipulation ethnique y est perceptible, le second positivement, dans la mesure où
l’on peut considérer comme plus noble de créer un écrin pour le joyau national que
d’utiliser la notion d’ethnie à des fins politiques pas toujours avouables.
Si nous pouvons revendiquer quelque mérite dans la publication de ce volume,
ce sera seulement d’avoir essayé de montrer la complexité de la question rom, qui
ne saurait se résumer à des théories réductrices de type socio-économique (pauvreté,
exclusion), politique (discrimination/minorité) ou culturel (ethnique) ou encore religieux
(mondialisation des mouvements néo-protestants). Qui plus est, il n’existe pas à notre
sens de question rom, mais bien d’un côté des discours globalisants et réducteurs qui se
positionnent pour ou contre les Roms, comme si ceux-ci constituaient une communauté
homogène et statique, un peuple nomade aux pieds nus auquel il faudrait faire un sort,
et de l’autre, des attitudes et des stratégies variées parmi lesquelles figurent comme on
va le lire, la volonté de rejoindre les élites et la modernité, et celle surtout de sortir des
catégories et des représentations sclérosées forgées de part et d’autre.
NOTES
1
Voir les travaux publiés par la Gesellschaft ffür Antitziganismusforschung.
2
Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique.
3
Voir les volumes d’Ethnobarometer,
Ethnobarometer, www.ethnobarometer.org
Ethnobarometer
4
Voir la note précédente.
5
Pour l’Asie centrale voir Roy, 1997. La nouvelle Asie centrale ou la fabrication des
nations. Paris : Seuil.
6
Ces mêmes stratégies continuent d’être pratiquées, au sein de l’Eglise catholique
romaine avec toutefois un renversement de la situation missionnaire, les anciens pays
de mission et de colonisation envoyant aujourd’hui leurs recrues en Europe de l’Ouest
pour compenser le « manque de vocations ».
7
Voir : Stoliaroff Ivan, 1996. Un village russe : récit d’un paysan de la région
éégion de Voronej
1880-1906. Paris : Pocket.
• 17
LE JEU DES IDENTITÉS ROM
Dynamisme et rigidité
Andrea BOSCOBOINIK
Qui sont les Roms ? Depuis quelques années, cette question se fait de plus en plus
insistante et différents acteurs, du côté rom comme du côté non-rom, se sont appliqués
à essayer de donner des réponses. En Europe centrale et orientale, ceux que l’on
appelle traditionnellement Tsiganes ont été considérés pendant longtemps comme un
groupe différent et étrange, duquel il fallait se méfier. Au mieux, il fallait les assimiler
à la population majoritaire ; au pire, les expulser. Ces trente dernières années, lorsque
l’appellation rom
r a commencé à s’imposer au niveau international, les Roms/Tsiganes
sont devenus un enjeu clé pour l’intégration de ces pays dans l’Union Européenne. La
situation des minorités dans les pays aspirants à l’UE devait être réglée pour pouvoir
en devenir membre. Dès lors, des acteurs politiques, tant locaux qu’internationaux,
commencent de plus en plus à s’occuper de la « question » ou du « problème » rom.
A l’heure de l’uniformisation où l’Europe cherche à effacer ses frontières et à se
donner une identité commune, nous voyons surgir un groupe qui réclame son droit à
une identité spécifique, source d’une appartenance ethnique et au nom de laquelle ils
revendiquent certains droits et certaines prérogatives (des politiques ciblées, des fonds
spécifiques, une reconnaissance de nation sans territoire, etc.). Ainsi, nous sommes
témoins du développement d’une élite, constituée des Roms qui ont saisi l’enjeu
conjoncturel que constitue le fait d’être la minorité la plus importante en Europe
aujourd’hui et qui cherchent à donner aux Roms une identité clairement définie, dans
laquelle tous les groupes rom pourraient se reconnaître.
Les leaders visent à ce que l’identité rom soit une entité concrète dont on pourrait
relever les caractéristiques qui lui sont propres. Il s’agit donc d’une réification de l’identité.
Or, lorsqu’on essaye de trouver ces caractéristiques communes, on comprend qu’elles
sont pour le moins diffuses. En effet, qu’est-ce qui compose « l’identité rom » ?
• 19
Andrea BOSCOBOINIK
Il n’y a pas une identité, mais des possibilités d’identité, donc des identités possibles.
Il existe une telle diversité de Roms qu’il est difficile de donner une définition certaine
de ce qu’un « Rom » est. Autrement dit, il n’est pas évident de réunir les composantes
parfois contradictoires d’une identité rom. Il y a des groupes nomades et des groupes
sédentaires, il y a ceux qui parlent un dialecte de langue romani et ceux qui n’en parlent
aucun, il y a ceux qui suivent les traditions rom et ceux qui ne la suivent pas. Ils ne
partagent ni une même religion ni un même pays de résidence. Il existe des éléments
qui pour certains sont spécifiquement rom et pour d’autres sont complètement gadjo
(non-rom). Chaque groupe et chaque famille garde une hiérarchie de valeurs différentes.
Pour certains, il vaut mieux être intégré dans le pays où ils habitent ; pour d’autres, il
est plus important de garder les traditions.
Cet article se focalisera sur les mouvements et réponses identitaires chez les Roms/
Tsiganes dans certains pays d’Europe centrale et orientale.
NOTRE RECHERCHE
Le présent article se base sur les résultats d’une recherche socio-anthropologique
organisée par Ethnobarometer, un réseau international de chercheurs indépendants et
d’experts, menée en Bulgarie en 2002, dans la République de Macédoine en 20031,
et en Roumanie et en République de Moldavie en 2006, dans ces deux derniers pays
conjointement avec un projet financé par le Fonds national suisse pour la recherche
scientifique2.
La méthodologie qualitative de notre recherche constitue une nouvelle approche de
la « question rom ». Notre objectif n’était pas de recueillir des chiffres, ce qui est déjà
fait par plusieurs études consacrées aux Roms3, mais plutôt les idées et les opinions
des Roms à travers le dialogue. Nous nous sommes intéressés à leur perception d’euxmêmes, à leurs expériences et leur présentation identitaire. Pour cette raison, nous ne
cherchions pas la Vérité, mais leur vérité, ou bien ce qu’ils voulaient transmettre dans
le jeu des identités toujours compliqué. Afin de connaître leurs histoires de vie et leur
présentation de soi, un nombre d’entretiens ont été menés dans chaque pays par des
chercheurs locaux (anthropologues, sociologues, et psychologues sociaux) avec des
personnes ayant une origine rom, qu’ils l’avouent par auto-définition, ou qu’elle leur
soit accordée par hétéro-définition.
Nous n’avons pas voulu nous confiner au Rom stéréotypé, pauvre, vivant dans
les marges de la société et sans ressources, mais nous avons souhaité au contraire
disposer d’une ample gamme de portraits. Nos entretiens couvrent donc un vaste
éventail d’informateurs, tant hommes que femmes, vivant en campagne et dans les
villes, de différents âges et niveaux sociaux, de différente affiliation religieuse, du Rom
sans éducation au Rom ayant fait des études universitaires, du Rom sans engagement
jusqu’au Rom politiquement engagé.
Cette diversité nous a permis de disposer d’un matériau riche et varié pour chaque
pays, ainsi que la possibilité de comparer et analyser les situations entre les pays. Cette
diversité révèle également les nombreuses catégories sociales et les identités multiples
observables dans les différentes communautés rom.
Les problèmes des Roms dans les pays post-communistes sont similaires sous
plusieurs aspects. Malgré les caractéristiques propres à chaque pays, les Roms
20 •
Le jeu des identités rom
présentent dans l’ensemble un grand nombre des similitudes quant à leur situation et
à leurs stratégies identitaires. Lorsqu’on parle de « situation », il ne faut pas supposer
que nous faisons référence à leur pauvreté et discrimination au sein de leur pays, mais
bien à la multitude des situations socio-économiques dans lesquelles les Roms sont
insérés. Ils ne se trouvent pas uniquement tout au bas de l’échelle sociale, mais nous les
trouvons dans presque tous les échelons, des plus pauvres jusqu’aux plus riches, sans
éducation ou avec des études universitaires. Les Roms occupent des positions sociales
très diverses, liées à leurs activités d’artisans, de commerçants, d’ouvriers, mais aussi
de fonctionnaires, de patrons d’entreprises, d’artistes ou d’intellectuels.
Néanmoins, ils sont nombreux, dans les différents pays, ceux qui partagent un
certain nombre de caractéristiques sociales : le manque d’emploi, le logement précaire,
l’accès restreint aux ressources et aux soins, etc. Ils partagent également le fait que,
historiquement, ce sont des groupes qui ont vécu dans les marges de la société depuis
le Moyen Age.
LES ROMS ET LES TSIGANES
Dans les questions touchant l’identité ethnique, beaucoup de discussions tournèrent
autour de l’auto-identification et de l’hétéro-identification. Après Fredrik Barth (1969),
plusieurs auteurs ont observé et analysé comment l’identité ethnique est influencée des
deux côtés de la frontière4. L’identité ethnique ne se développe donc pas exclusivement
au niveau de l’identification personnelle, mais elle est également assignée de l’extérieur.
Sa construction est le résultat de la négociation permanente entre les représentations
individuelles et celles de la société environnante.
Jusqu’au début des années 1990, l’appellation « rom » était très peu connue dans
la partie occidentale de l’Europe, mais on connaissait l’existence des « Tsiganes ». Or,
suite aux changements géopolitiques de 1989, le nom de « rom », considéré comme
l’auto-appellation de ceux qui sont perçus de l’extérieur comme Tsiganes, est devenu
le terme « politiquement correct » et est celui revendiqué par les promoteurs d’une
identité commune. Pourtant, tous ceux qui de l’extérieur sont appelés Tsiganes, ne se
reconnaissent pas sous l’appellation Rom.
Plusieurs groupes, amalgamés avec les groupes rom depuis l’extérieur, comme les
Sinti, les Béas, les Ashkali, les Kalé, les Travellers, défendent leur spécificité propre
et leur différence5. Il n’est pas rare que lors des réunions officielles, les membres des
différents groupes rom et groupes apparentés s’efforcent à souligner leurs différences,
se focalisent sur ce qui les sépare au lieu de ce qui les rapproche. Pour les leaders de
chacun de ces groupes, l’enjeu identitaire est lié à un enjeu politique et d’allocation
des ressources.
Les différents éléments qui composent l’identité nous permettent de marquer
une limite entre Nous et Eux. Dans leurs discours, il apparaît presque toujours cette
volonté de distinguer Nous de Eux. De prime abord, on pourrait penser que Eux sont
les Gadje, les non-Roms, mais ce n’est pas toujours le cas. Eux sont une multitude
d’Autres, le plus souvent les autres Roms. Ce sont toujours les Autres Roms qui méritent
tous les stéréotypes négatifs et les préjugés, ce sont les autres qui sont sales, qui sont
agressifs, qui sont des voleurs, qui ne veulent pas travailler, qui salissent le nom de
toute la communauté rom. On a affaire à toutes les catégories de contrastes : les Roms
• 21
Andrea BOSCOBOINIK
modernes en opposition aux Roms traditionnels, les Roms pauvres en contraste avec
les Roms riches, les Roms convertis en contraste avec les Roms orthodoxes, les Roms
qui ne sont pas engagés en contraste avec les Roms engagés dans des partis politiques
ou des ONGs.
Nous avons remarqué dans les entretiens, en particulier en Bulgarie et en Roumanie,
que lorsqu’on parle de Nous et d’Eux il y a des jugements de valeur, des stéréotypes,
du mépris. Par exemple : « Ce sont Eux, qui ne sont pas propres, Eux, qui n’étudient
pas, Eux, qui ne sont pas intelligents ».
Nous avons aussi remarqué que souvent Nous sommes Roms, mais Eux, ils sont
Tsiganes. Ou inversement, nous sommes Tsiganes et Eux ils sont Roms. Pour les Roms
pauvres et sans éducation, ils se désignent souvent comme Tsiganes, tandis que Rom
est le nom réservé à ceux qui ont une meilleure position sociale, qui sont plus riches
ou ont une éducation. Du côté des Roms éduqués et qui ont atteint un certain niveau
social, parfois ils appellent Tsiganes ceux qui sont au plus bas de l’échelle sociale et
qui n’ont pas d’éducation.
En conclusion, il apparaît clairement que les deux noms semblent avoir une
dimension symbolique différente. Les identités associées à chacun des noms semblent
être différentes. Tsigane est le nom donné de l’extérieur et qui est considéré comme
être péjoratif. Rom est par contre le nom politiquement correct et c’est le nom associé
à un projet d’une ethnie commune. Il a donc une connotation plutôt positive.
DES RÉPONSES IDENTITAIRES AU PROCESSUS D’ETHNICISATION6
Malgré l’hétérogénéité des groupes, des intérêts et d’appartenances, l’ethnicisation
promulguée par les leaders rom se base sur la fermeture d’un groupe englobant les
« Nous Roms ». Des activistes rom ambitionnent de développer une solidarité ethnique
qui puisse exprimer que tous les Roms et les groupes apparentés forment un seul et
même peuple, qui partage des éléments culturels et des problèmes communs résultant
des injustices, de la discrimination et de la violence.
A travers ce processus d’ethnicisation, les membres de l’élite rom aspirent à
l’émergence d’une identité ethnique collective partagée afin d’unifier et mobiliser les
Roms pour une lutte commune à des fins politiques. Ce que l’on poursuit à travers ce
processus d’ethnicisation est une mobilisation ethnique, laquelle peut être considérée
comme une politisation de l’identité ethnique (Barany, 2002 : 70). L’ethnicisation à
but politique est avérée quand la composante ethnique domine les discours, les charge
émotionnellement et est instrumentalisée dans les négociations sociales et politiques.
La difficulté majeure pour accomplir cette unité est l’énorme disparité des groupes qui
sont censés la constituer. L’identification basée sur le groupe d’appartenance, les clans,
les relations entre les familles est encore aujourd’hui source d’une forte fragmentation
et animosité parmi les différents groupes qui composent les communautés rom.
Précisément, il convient d’introduire ici une distinction entre des communautés
é , au
és
pluriel, comprises comme populations, groupes locaux ou minorités, et une communauté,
au singulier, en tant que modèle conceptuel, voire idéaltype. Cette idée de communauté
au singulier, unie et homogène, est celle recherchée par l’élite rom à travers le processus
d’ethnicisation.
22 •
Le jeu des identités rom
Avec le mouvement d’ethnicisation favorisé par les membres des élites, les Roms
non-engagés, qu’ils appartiennent à un groupe rom ou à un groupe apparenté, peuvent
se voir assigner à nouveau une appartenance identitaire venue de l’extérieur. La réponse
des Roms non engagés à ce mouvement d’ethnicisation est en grande partie constituée
par un rejet, exprimé par une méfiance ou une recherche identitaire personnelle, ou
bien par l’indifférence.
Face au processus d’ethnicisation, je relèverai donc quatre réponses possibles :
L’émergence de deux classes : Roms et Tsiganes
Certains individus rejettent ce qui est ressenti comme une nouvelle imposition. Ils ont
toujours été « Tsiganes » et dorénavant ils doivent être « Roms ». Or, ils ne veulent plus
se voir assigner une identité, soit stigmatisée de l’extérieur comme celle de « tsigane »
ou valorisée de l’intérieur comme celle présentée sous l’appellation « rom ».
Comme mentionné précédemment, aux yeux des « Tsiganes » pauvres (permettezmoi d’utiliser ce raccourci) et qui ont peu d’éducation, le nom « rom » est réservé pour
ceux qui possèdent un certain niveau d’éducation et a une forte connotation politique.
Ils ne veulent pas être désignés par ce nom, auquel ils ne s’identifient pas. Ils estiment
qu’ils n’appartiennent pas à la même catégorie que les autres, ceux qu’ils considèrent
engagés, éduqués, plus aisés économiquement.
Malgré le fait que « Tsigane » a été historiquement un terme péjoratif donné de
l’extérieur, certaines personnes se le sont approprié, en le valorisant. Le défendre
est encore une manière d’opposer une résistance à ce qui peut être ressenti comme
imposé de l’extérieur. « J’ai toujours été Tsigane. Pourquoi devrais-je être Rom
maintenant ? ».
L’adoption d’une identité religieuse
Le rejet peut également être exprimé par une recherche personnelle d’identité. Il
s’agit d’une recherche identitaire résultant d’un rejet d’une identité ressentie comme
assignée de l’extérieur. Certains membres répondent ainsi d’une part aux stéréotypes
négatifs de Tsiganes : « je ne suis pas celui que vous croyez que je suis » ; et d’autre
part, à la volonté de rassemblement de tous les Roms/Tsiganes : « je ne suis pas celui
que vous voulez que je sois ». Par contre, ils veulent chercher par eux-mêmes une
identité qui leur convienne.
De manière générale, comme le rappelle De Vos (2006 : 7) la conversion religieuse
peut être un moyen d’abandonner son identité ethnique par l’adoption d’une vision du
monde transcendantale, ou bien peut être utilisée pour maintenir une identité séparée.
Bien qu’elles existent depuis longtemps, ces dix dernières années, les conversions au
Pentecôtisme ont considérablement augmenté parmi les membres des communautés
rom. Nous nous sommes donc intéressés à cette dimension dans notre recherche en
Roumanie pour analyser les liens entre ces conversions et les processus identitaires7.
Contrairement à l’interprétation répandue selon laquelle la conversion religieuse serait
liée à l’obtention de bénéfices matériels ou autres avantages financiers, nous nous
sommes aperçus qu’elle a une forte influence sur la construction identitaire et sociale
des convertis. Les « avantages » (si l’on peut en parler ainsi) ne sont pas matériels
mais symboliques.
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Andrea BOSCOBOINIK
Ces conversions volontaires ne sont pas ressenties comme imposées de l’extérieur,
et suivent un mouvement de boule de neige : cela commence par un membre de la
famille qui se converti et les autres le suivent progressivement. Après plusieurs années
de conversions, il est rare qu’un membre de la famille reste en dehors.
Les personnes qui se convertissent ont la conviction d’avoir choisi cette voie, qui
généralement suit, en plus d’un effet de diffusion parmi la famille et les connaissances,
une expérience mystique. Il s’agit pour eux d’une décision personnelle qui ne se limite
pas au moment où ils entrent dans cette nouvelle Eglise et au moment du baptême,
mais qui est une décision quotidienne car ils doivent suivre jour après jour des règles
de comportement très strictes liées à une morale puritaine. La conversion implique
un dévouement total, dans tous les aspects de la vie quotidienne. Toutes les actions
font référence à la Bible qui impose des règles de conduite fort distinctes de celles
que nous donne l’image, vraie ou fausse, de la vie des Tsiganes (ne pas boire, ne pas
faire la fête, ne pas dépenser tout son argent, ne pas être violent, etc.). La nouvelle
religion induit l’acceptation de normes sociales, tant morales que légales. Grâce à
la religion, les Roms pentecôtistes ont commencé à respecter les lois et les autorités
nationales, puisque ces comportements découlent d’un ordre biblique. De la sorte, les
Tsiganes/Roms convertis offrent à la majorité une autre image, valorisante et fiable.
Ils deviennent « respectables ».
En résumé, en réponse à ce processus visant à englober les « Nous Roms », nous
pouvons trouver notamment deux formes de rejet : le rejet d’être Rom qui peut parfois
conduire à une valorisation d’être Tsigane ; ou le refus d’être Rom et Tsigane, mais
quelqu’un d’autre, choisi par l’acteur lui-même. Il se peut également qu’il n’y ait pas
de rejet d’une identité rom ou tsigane, mais que cette catégorie ethnique ne soit pas
estimée la plus pertinente pour l’identité. Pour plusieurs Roms convertis, l’identification
religieuse est plus importante que l’ethnique. La preuve en est que les mariages avec
des non-Roms sont souvent acceptés, tandis que les mariages avec des personnes d’une
autre affiliation religieuse restent interdits.
Ethnocentrisme et communautarisme tsigane
Nombreux individus rom/tsiganes manifestent une méfiance envers tout ce qui
est ressenti comme « externe », comme autorité ou pouvoir. Il existe une méfiance
publique parmi certains Roms. Ce qui appartient à la sphère publique est souvent perçu
comme suspect, incertain, douteux, voire ennemi. La confiance se développe presque
exclusivement dans le cadre restreint de la sphère privée et à l’intérieur des réseaux
de connaissances : tout d’abord dans la famille et la parenté, ensuite avec les amis et
connaissances. La plupart des Tsiganes accordent une importance tout à fait particulière
aux relations personnalisées. Dès lors, il existe une tendance marquée à faire davantage
confiance à un leader personnalisé, proche ou membre de la communauté, qu’à une
autorité institutionnelle, représentée par un activiste rom.
Cette méfiance n’est pas particulière aux Roms, car c’est une attitude partagée
par de nombreux citoyens des pays où ils habitent. Cependant, les Roms la déclarent
également à leurs leaders, censés les représenter. Barany (2002 : 204) parmi d’autres,
signale l’énorme distance culturelle qui sépare l’intelligentsia rom de la multitude des
Tsiganes souvent méfiants et désintéressés des affaires publiques.
24 •
Le jeu des identités rom
L’ironie évoquée par Claude Cahn (2003) à propos du recensement de la République
Tchèque en 2000 illustre bien cette méfiance. Le recensement avait été précédé par
une campagne des organisations rom pour « faire confiance au système » et déclarer
son appartenance ethnique. Cela, disait-on, était important pour des raisons politiques
et de collecte de fonds. A juger par les résultats (22.000 personnes de moins que dans
le recensement de 1990 ont déclaré publiquement être Roms), les Roms Tchèques
n’ont pas suivi ce conseil. Au lieu d’un vote de confiance et de soutien, le recensement
constituait une méfiance et un rejet retentissant envers les organisations rom et les
leaders politiques.
Malgré les efforts des leaders rom pour mobiliser les Tsiganes et valoriser le fait
d’appartenir à une culture riche et variée, leur faire comprendre les effets positifs de
reconnaître leur appartenance ethnique, ils n’ont pas réussi jusqu’à maintenant à obtenir
l’adhésion espérée. Beaucoup d’entre eux se méfient jusqu’au nom « rom » et critiquent
les leaders politiques rom d’être corrompus et de profiter des projets ayant pour but
l’amélioration de la situation des Tsiganes.
Indifférence à l’ethnicité
Une autre réponse au processus d’ethnicisation est l’indifférence. La majorité des
Tsiganes a d’abord d’autres problèmes beaucoup plus urgents à résoudre comme l’accès
à la nourriture, à la santé et au marché de travail. Si elle ne résout pas les problèmes
quotidiens, les manques et les absences, la question identitaire n’est pas primordiale.
Pour certains, l’identité ethnique n’est pas d’une importance particulière.
Pour d’autres, cette indifférence leur permet encore de se distancer des stéréotypes
négatifs qui sont collés à l’étiquette rom/tsigane. Ils ne s’identifient ni comme Rom ni
comme Tsigane, mais comme individu, comme homme ou femme, comme époux ou
père, par leur métier, leur citoyenneté ou leur religion. Ils mettront en avant l’une ou
l’autre identité, voire celle de rom ou tsigane, en fonction du contexte ou des enjeux.
Cela constitue un exemple montrant que l’identité est situationnelle et n’est pas toujours
associée au premier plan avec l’ethnicité. L’ethnicité est une partie de l’identité totale,
mais pas forcément l’élément central. Les catégories identitaires ne sont pas fixes, elles
peuvent se déplacer d’une dimension telle que l’ethnicité à une autre telle que la religion,
le niveau social ou l’appartenance à un groupe déterminé d’âge ou de sexe.
QUELQUES CONSÉQUENCES POSSIBLES DU PROCESSUS D’ETHNICISATION
Une conséquence contraire aux expectatives des leaders rom est que le processus
pour renforcer une conscience ethnique, au lieu de rassembler, a creusé encore plus
le « fossé de civilisation » entre les Roms avec éducation et ressources et ceux sans
éducation ni ressources.
De plus, cette ethnicisation peut même provoquer plus de problèmes qu’elle n’en
résout. Elle peut par exemple intensifier des stéréotypes négatifs et des préjugés sur les
Roms, les enfermer plus encore dans leur groupe, ce qui facilite le mécanisme de bouc
émissaire. Par conséquence, l’ethnicisation peut favoriser le processus d’exclusion.
Elle peut en outre attiser les ferveurs nationalistes, avec les conséquences que l’on
connaît.
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Andrea BOSCOBOINIK
On devrait également tenir compte des réseaux de solidarité qui se forment ou se
détruisent comme conséquence de ce processus d’ethnicisation. D’un côté, grâce aux
nouvelles ONG rom, un nouveau tissu se forme pour défendre certains droits, mais en
même temps, le développement de certaines pratiques ou organisations peut affaiblir
les réseaux d’entraide communautaire et locale.
Finalement, les problèmes sociaux et économiques ne devraient pas devenir des
problèmes ethniques. Les solutions doivent s’adresser aux Roms mais également aux
autres secteurs ou minorités défavorisées notamment, sans s’appuyer sur l’appartenance
ethnique.
LES REPRÉSENTATIONS AMBIGUËS
Les Roms, criminels et privilégiés
En plus des managers identitaires rom qui présentent une image positive et valorisante
de l’identité rom qui contraste avec les stéréotypes courants, les Tsiganes/Roms doivent
encore faire face à une représentation ambiguë de la population majoritaire dans les
pays d’Europe centrale et orientale. En effet, pour les non-Roms l’image du Rom oscille
entre deux représentations : leur image des « dangereux » apparaît à coté de celle des
« privilégiés ». D’un côté, le « Rom criminel », le « Rom désocialisé » qui fait peur
à la majorité, tant pour les affaires nationales qu’internationales. D’un autre côté,
l’image des privilégiés, car les Roms seraient ceux qui « exploitent » leur pauvreté, qui
profiteraient des aides sociales, des moyens financiers de l’étranger, etc.
A l’intérieur, on craint la supposée criminalité des Roms et également que la mobilité
des Roms ne crée des répercussions pour les co-nationaux, lesquels se verraient fermer
les frontières à cause des incivilités et des abus supposés être perpétrés par les Roms.
Par conséquent, le Rom est souvent représenté comme le visage déshonorant de son
pays d’origine.
Nous en sommes témoins encore aujourd’hui suite à l’affaire italienne d’automne
2007 qui a déstabilisé tous les Roumains pour un crime commis par un Rom roumain.
D’une part, cette affaire a déclenché une visibilité accrue des Roms dans plusieurs pays
d’Europe occidentale : huit mois après ils font encore la une des journaux en Suisse
(cf. La Libertéé du 19.6.2008) et d’autre part, des mesures restrictives d’accueil et de
mobilité pour tous les Roumains.
Les discours reprenant ce rapport de majorité nationale vertueuse vs. une minorité
ethnique criminelle et profiteuse sont par ailleurs ceux que l’on trouve chez les membres
des partis européens d’extrême droite entre la majorité nationale et les « étrangers »,
mot utilisé comme raccourci pour désigner les personnes qui sont arrivées au pays par
voie de migration, qui seraient par définition des « criminels » et des « profiteurs ».
La mobilité valorisée et le nomadisme dénigré
Nous vivons une période caractérisée par une grande mobilité des hommes et des
informations. De tout temps, la quête de meilleures ressources a incité au déplacement.
Cependant, notre époque semble reposer sur une valorisation suprême de la mobilité,
notamment géographique, censée à la fois assurer l’adaptation à un marché du travail
flexible et le développement personnel.
26 •
Le jeu des identités rom
Les représentations collectives sont néanmoins constituées par deux images
contrastées de la mobilité :
– d’une part, la mobilité est devenue une valeur européenne, englobant les qualités
de flexibilité, de multiculturalisme, de démocratie et de tolérance. Cependant, cette
image positive de la mobilité est limitée pour une élite de citoyens européens engagés
dans des activités prestigieuses, ayant un statut social élevé et exerçant une activité
économique bien rémunérée. Elle se réfère à des cadres supérieurs, des diplomates, des
fonctionnaires internationaux. Elle s’appuie sur le changement, la capacité à se mettre
en mouvement et à s’adapter à des environnements divers.
– d’autre part, la mobilité des nomades et des migrants avec moins de ressources
est toujours connotée négativement, les considérant comme profiteurs, malfaiteurs et
vagabonds. Le terme migration a une connotation plus négative que celui de mobilité
et s’associerait davantage à l’image traditionnelle et simpliste de l’immigré en situation
précaire.
Pour tous les groupes rom en déplacement, cette connotation péjorative de la
migration intensifie encore plus leur exclusion et leur marginalisation. La mobilité
des Roms est alors largement considérée comme un « problème ». La complexité de
ce sujet dépasse le cadre de cet article, notamment parce qu’aux communautés rom
traditionnellement nomades, qui se déplacent sans se fixer sur un territoire, s’ajoute
aujourd’hui le Rom migrant en quête de nouvelles opportunités.
Ce qui nous intéresse par contre est que le développement du processus d’ethnicisation
ne ferait que renforcer ce type d’images et de stéréotypes du migrant, à cause de
l’amalgame souvent fait entre un statut social ou un comportement et une appartenance
ethnique. L’image du Rom se verrait ainsi liée à celle de migrant pauvre et le plus
souvent criminel. Elle deviendrait également une menace pour l’identité nationale de
son pays d’origine et un frein pour la mobilité de ses co-nationaux.
CONCLUSION
Les identités rom se trouvent actuellement dans un processus impliquant deux
mouvements. D’un côté, au travers de l’ethnicisation, ou selon eux l’ethnogènese,
les leaders rom cherchent l’essentialisation, c’est-à-dire enfermer les membres dans
des catégories identitaires figées et rigides. De l’autre, les identités individuelles rom
s’adaptent aux mouvements actuels et aux circonstances nouvelles. C’est une identité
fluide et situationnelle. Ayant vécu historiquement dans des pays qui ne les ont pas
toujours considérés comme citoyens à part entière, les Roms se sont créés une identité
en mouvement. Cette flexibilité n’a pas empêché certains groupes de maintenir leur
culture et certaines spécificités qui les sont propres.
Au travers des siècles d’exclusion, de marginalisation, de discrimination et parfois
d’assimilation forcée, des groupes rom ont gardé une certaine forme de conscience de
soi, et surtout de différence vis-à-vis des « autres ». Certains groupes sont restés très
fermés, gardant une protection renforcée contre l’influence externe et le tabou qu’elle
représente ; d’autres se sont plus ou moins intégrés sans pour autant perdre certains
éléments de leur mode de vie, leurs valeurs, leur culture, leur langue et leurs traditions.
• 27
Andrea BOSCOBOINIK
L’héritage culturel s’est transmis oralement de génération en génération et a survécu
jusqu’à nos jours. Ce sont ces éléments que récupèrent aujourd’hui les leaders comme
base pour marquer les limites d’une identité rom précise et distincte.
Pourtant, ce que relève notre enquête est que les identités rom sont de nature
changeante et adaptative, plutôt que fixe. L’identité est davantage un facteur de
changement qu’une source de stagnation. Les réponses possibles au processus
d’ethnicisation des Roms non-engagés que nous avons mentionnées précédemment
peuvent donc être comprises comme des réponses pour maintenir des identités
négociables plutôt que constituer une identité rigide, qui serait de surcroît ressentie
comme imposée de l’extérieur. En outre, ils doivent faire face aux représentations
ambiguës de la population majoritaire.
Les leaders rom déploient de nombreuses stratégies censées réunir les différents
groupes rom et groupes apparentés afin de gommer leurs différences et leur donner
une identité ethnique claire et commune. Les éléments principaux sont cherchés dans
une origine commune et un passé partagé de discrimination encore actuel. Un effort
soutenu est destiné à l’homogénéisation de plusieurs dialectes dans une seule langue
romani. Faute d’un territoire commun, les managers identitaires rom doivent trouver
d’autres éléments pouvant faire la démarcation du groupe.
Pourtant, l’appartenance ethnique ne peut être rapportée à un catalogue de critères
objectifs. Le contenu de l’ethnicité est élusif. Finalement, ce qui réellement importe
dans la construction d’un groupe ethnique n’est pas tant les définitions identitaires qui
le composent, que la croyance de ses membres à l’existence réelle du groupe (Weber,
1995 : 130). Et c’est précisément cette croyance dans un groupe homogène qui fait
défaut aujourd’hui parmi les communautés rom et ses groupes apparentés.
28 •
Le jeu des identités rom
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
Banks, Marcus, 1996. Ethnicity : Anthropological constructions. London :
Routledge.
Barany, Zoltan, 2002. The East European Gypsies. Regime Change, Marginality and
Ethnopolitics. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
Barth, Fredrik, ed., 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries : the social organization of
culture difference. London : George Allen & Unwin.
Boscoboinik, Andrea,
2006a. Becoming Rom : Ethnic Development among Roma Communities in
Bulgaria and Macedonia, in : Ethnic Identity. Problems and Prospects for the
Twenty-First Century. Fourth Edition. Edited by Lola Romanucci-Ross, George
de Vos and Takeyuki Tsuda. Lanham, New York, Toronto, Oxford : Altamira
Press, 295-310.
2006b. Ethnicization Process among the Roma communities in Bulgaria, in :
Interculturalism and Discrimination in Romania. Policies, Practices, Identities
and Representations. Edited by François Ruegg, Rudolf Poledna and Calin Rus.
Münster : Lit Verlag, 95-103.
Cahn, Claude, 2003. The Unseen Powers : Perception, Stigma and Roma Rights, in :
www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=2870.
De Vos, George A., 2006. Ethnic Pluralism : Conflict and Accommodation, in : Ethnic
Identity. Problems and Prospects for the Twenty-First Century. Fourth Edition.
Edited by Lola Romanucci-Ross, George de Vos and Takeyuki Tsuda. Lanham,
New York, Toronto, Oxford : Altamira Press, 1-36.
Giordano, Christian and Andrea Boscoboinik, 2003. Introduction, in : Roma’s Identities in
Southeast Europe : Bulgaria. Ethnobarometer. Working Paper No. 8, 14-29.
Guibernau, Montserrat, and John Rex, eds., 1997. The ethnicity reader : Nationalism,
multiculturalism, and migration. Cambridge : Polity Press.
Hutchinson, John, and Anthony Smith, eds., 1996. Ethnicity. Oxford : Oxford University
Press.
Liégeois, Jean-Pierre, 2007. Roma in Europe. Strasbourg : Council of Europe
Publishing.
Ringold, Dena, Mitchell A. Orenstein, Erika Wilkens, 2004. Roma in an Expanding
Europe – Breaking the Poverty Cycle. World Bank Publisher.
Roma Inclusion Barometer, 2007. Bucharest : Open Society Foundation, in :
www.osf.ro
Romanucci-Ross, Lola, George de Vos & Takeyuki Tsuda, eds., 2006. Ethnic Identity.
Problems and Prospects for the Twenty-First Century. 4th Edition. Lanham,
New York, Toronto, Oxford : Altamira Press.
Weber Max, 1995 [édition originale en allemand 1956]. Economie et société/2.
L’organisation et les puissances de la société dans leur rapport avec l’économie.
Paris : Plon.
• 29
Andrea BOSCOBOINIK
NOTES
1
Les résultats de la recherche dans chaque pays peuvent être consultés sur :
www.ethnobarometer.org.
2
“Nomads and Parliamentarians. The influence of mobility and religious affiliation on
identity building and on the development of integration social policies. Roma people
in Northern, Eastern Romania, and the Republic of Moldova”. (Scopes 2005-2008)
3
Notamment les publications de l’Open Society Foundation ou de la Banque Mondiale.
A titre d’exemple : Roma Inclusion Barometer
Barometer, 2007, OSF ; Dena Ringold, Mitchell
A. Orenstein, Erika Wilkens, 2004. “Roma in an Expanding Europe – Breaking the
Poverty Cycle”, World Bank.
4
La liste bibliographique est longue. Quelques-uns parmi les plus récents : RomanucciRoss, De Vos, Tsuda 2006 ; Guibernau & Rex 1997 ; Banks 1996 ; Hutchinson & Smith
1996.
5
Ce sont les groupes que l’on nomme officiellement « groupes apparentés » ou « related
groups » par rapport aux Roms.
6
Pour la distinction entre « ethnicisation » et « ethnogenèse » voir l’article de Christian
Giordano dans ce numéro.
7
Sorin Gog et László Fosztó explorent dans ce numéro cette dimension plus en détail.
30 •
TWO MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA
Employment and Education
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
SOME BASIC OBSERVATIONS
The social position of Roma in Serbia, as it is in other countries of the region, is
extremely unfavorable. The reasons for this state of affairs are numerous and derive,
among others, from societal indifference and lack of sensitivity towards the problems
Roma have been facing. The problems caused by persistent prejudice and discrimination
against Roma are present in many spheres of their social life. It is nevertheless encouraging
that the data collected in the research carried out so far show that the degree of ethnic
distance towards Roma in Serbia is below the regional average.
The extent to which Roma life is on the margins of social life and of concern
to state bodies is illustrated by the fact that data on the size of the Roma population
are extremely unreliable. Data on the number of Roma settlements are virtually nonexistent; dependable estimates are equally unavailable. According to the official data
of the 1991 census, 137,000 people live in FR Yugoslavia, and according to the 2002
census, 109,000 people declare themselves as Roma. Since Roma are a very much
dispersed population in spatial terms, there are different estimates on their number.
According to estimates within Roma circles, it is believed that between 700,000 and
900,000 Roma live in Serbia, but these figures are obviously unrealistic. Estimates
offered by researchers and demographers, on the other hand, range between 400,000
and 450,000 Roma. Since Kosovo – now with self-proclaimed independence – is under
international protectorate, Roma have become the largest national minority in Serbia/
FRY, eventhough they only obtained the official status of national minority in 2002. It
is assumed that the recently adopted Law on the Protection of Rights and Liberties of
National Minorities has conclusively redressed an old injustice toward Roma.
• 31
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
A majority of Roma in Serbia are urban. Thus the “place of permanent residence
of Roma families” is a town or a city. In Belgrade, for example, over 150 Roma
settlements have been registered. In Niš, the number of settlements is smaller, but the
concentration of the Roma population is higher. In Serbia, there virtually is no city or
town, except for a couple of places in west Serbia, where Roma settlements have not
been registered. Living in a mahala, rural, urban, or suburban, is the traditional form of
Roma way of life, not only in Serbia. The mahala is often interpreted as the symbol of
the spatial segregation of the Roma community. Although a majority of the interviewed
Roma families already live in urban, suburban or rural mahalas, mahala can hardly be
called their priority option in terms of residence. The results of this study show that the
attachment of Roma families to mahala has loosened. “I don’t want my child to live in
a mahala, I want him to go to school and live like everybody else”, one family said.
As to the type of settlement Roma live in, the belief is very widespread that it is
better for Roma to live in their own mahalas. If they could choose between a mixed
community and a Roma mahala, it is believed a majority would opt for a mahala and see
their future in living in a mahala. This view seems self-evident to many, including some
researchers, because they hold it to be deeply rooted in the traditional Roma lifestyle. As
numerous researchers have noted, the mahala and the cserga (the traditional movable
tent of nomadic Roma) have not only been the usual places of living for Roma, but also,
in the words of Vladimir Stanković, “their authentic ethnic symbols”. He writes that
“... mahala-type housing areas are still the dominant form of residence among urban
and even rural Roma. These ethnic-urban islands have traditionally been located on
the periphery, although in recent times some of them have merged into the central city
cores, due to intense urban expansion. The mahalas, however, most often persist as
ethnic-urban backwaters, genuine material testimony to a traditionally miserable social
existence. Their ‘historical role’ in conserving ethnic compactness and a spontaneous
cultivation of the Roma cultural identity has been paid too dearly: by the near total
ethnic marginality in all areas of socio-economic and cultural life.”1 The findings of
my research, similarly to previous ones, show that a majority of Roma is still ready to
pay this high price. It is a challenge for researchers today to explore the actual power of
tradition in Roma residential style. True, if they deem it useful, they will take advantage
of elements of “ethnic mimicry” and “statistical exodus” from their ethnic community
and pretend to accept integration and even assimilation; nevertheless, in the end, they
will strive to preserve their integrity and identity – which is completely natural and
justifiable in humane terms. Any policy for helping Roma as an extremely deprived
social group should take this fact into account.
The stereotypical image of a Roma house or apartment consists of a heap of sooty
dishes, bedding on the floor, scattered clothes, an old stove burning with merry flames,
a gang of children, and an occasional mouse popping up from somewhere. Superficially
speaking, in the past decades this impression was based on some realistic assumptions,
but today it is basically flawed, although most Roma families live in poverty. Everyday
life of today’s Roma family in Serbia does not differ much from the everyday of the
majority. The question whether this has come as a consequence of the economic
advancement of a part of Roma families, especially in the period when Serbia was under
32 •
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia
international sanctions, or of an overall impoverishment of all citizens of Serbia which
brought equalization in poverty, has not been investigated and remains open.
Furthermore, Roma are a social group which is the target of various strongly
manifested stereotypes. Therefore some research includes the examination of the
prevalence of stereotypes, in order to learn more about attitudes towards and views on
this socially marginalized ethnic community. Avoidance of contact, manifest or latent
social distance is one indicator of the lack of acceptance of an ethnic group. Generally
speaking, social distance may grow into open hostility. A negative attitude towards
Roma and social distance are factors which must be taken into account with utmost
care in exploring the possibilities for Roma integration, as evidence shows that these
factors are very unfavourable.
Steady employment is perceived as a desire of the Roma family to improve its
status and is put at the forefront of one’s ambitions. Employment is seen by a majority
of the interviewed Roma families as the first and foremost precondition for integration.
Facing challenges of everyday life and caught in the daily struggle for survival, Roma
families therefore consider the problem of employment to be of great importance. Some
other Roma families, some experts and representatives of state bodies, put children
education in first place. Obviously, it is far easier to enrol a Roma child in a school
than to find a decent steady job for an adult Roma citizen.
EMPLOYMENT
The poverty of an overwhelming majority of Roma is a handicap in the formal,
institutional economic network as it is in the informal one as well. It is paradoxical, but
nevertheless true that they are unemployed because they are poor and unskilled, and they
are poor because they are unemployed or work at jobs with the lowest pay. The circle of
their poverty is complete. The fact that some families manage to get out of the whirlpool
of poverty does not deny its existence. Large dumpsites outside the cities and garbage
bins in the cities seem to be the basis of Roma economic activity. The authorities cannot
sever this “economic connection”, even if they had the political will to do so: neither
can they move Roma far from the dumpsites, nor do the Roma themselves want to go
away. Their economic activity is largely in the sphere of black economy, such as petty
trading, selling things on the black market and at open-air markets, or still working
at toilsome physical jobs for a small daily wage. Some Roma families live simply on
humanitarian aid and welfare. Poorly differentiated socio-professional structure is an
indicator of a low social position. Roma are the most numerous in those occupations
where no skills are needed. A majority of these neighbors of ours, often invisible, put
up with very difficult living conditions. An insight into their daily struggle with life
shows that they have developed this struggle for survival into a lifestyle.
According to the results of my field research from 2002 to 20042 the percentage of
unemployed Roma in Serbia is especially dramatic – 68.4%. The cumulative percentage
of occasionally employed, those on paid leave and the unemployed is 78.3%. 57% of
heads of family are permanently registered at the employment offices. To this figure we
should add 6.9% who occasionally register as unemployed at the employment bureaus.
What are the reasons for calling this data very dramatic? Simply put, unemployment
• 33
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
refers to heads of family who are, as a rule, the most vital members of the family and
the ones most responsible for the life of others.
To evaluate living conditions of Roma families, it is not enough to look at the (lack
of) infrastructure in the settlement or the (lack of) equipment in the households. The
working status of the head of family also plays a prominent role. An insight into the
basic data obtained in this study leaves a bleak picture of the daily life of the Roma
family, as a struggle for survival.3 As an example, 18.6% of the heads of families and
2% of Roma women only hold a steady job. If we also keep in mind that these steady
jobs are located at the lowest rank of the ladder of skill and income, then the basic
impression of the material poverty in which the Roma population has been living
is still stronger. On the other hand, the number of unemployed heads of family is
very significant – 68.4% are unemployed, while 8.3% work occasionally, as seasonal
labourers. The number of people on “paid leave” (a phrase engendered by Serbia’s
economic disaster over the past years) and pensioners is virtually negligible: only 1.6%
and 2.6%, respectively. This tells us that, actually, most Roma heads of family have
never had the chance of holding a steady job from which they could retire.
Though it may seem strange at first sight, the sources of income of the interviewed
Roma families are diverse. Their answers range from stating that the basic source of
income is the salary of a member who holds a steady job, to the characteristic answer,
paradoxically precise in its vagueness – “we don’t really know how we manage”. The
ways of earning an income refers to all members of family capable of economic activity,
not just to the head of family, and therefore differences arise from data gathered on
employment. Roma family members were reluctant to talk about smuggling and the
“black market” as sources of income in front of interviewers and researchers. The
interviewees also minimized the importance of humanitarian aid, probably because the
level of aid was below their expectations.4 In 50% of the cases, they did not provide
data on second occupation. The most frequent modalities however, obtained in over
1,000 answers, were, in percentages: employment 18.5, agricultural labour 1.7, trade
3.2, smuggling 9.5, begging 0.6, selling waste 9.1, seasonal work 18.2, welfare 18.3,
pensions 5.6, help from relatives 1.0, humanitarian aid 4.3. The reply “we don’t really
know ourselves” was provided by 1.9% of the interviewed Roma families, and 7.4%
said “something else”. As we can see, almost ten percent of Roma families engage
in collecting secondary raw materials, i.e. waste. The percentage of those for whom
this is the only occupation is slightly higher. No doubt, this is for Roma a promising
possibility for employment and self-employment. However, it would be good if
“collecting secondary raw materials” did not turn into a “business reserved for Roma
exclusively”, for in this way the principle of segregation of the Roma population in
Serbia would be confirmed.
As aforementioned, the percentage of pensioners is the lowest among Roma, and
the percentage of unemployment is the highest; only every sixth head of family has
a job. Still, it is very interesting to compare working status with the infrastructural
equipment of the settlement. In absolute numbers and in percentages, the unemployed
are the most numerous; they also are the most numerous in the group without access
to electricity. Conversely, among those who are connected to the sewage system or
own bathrooms and toilets in the house, steadily employed heads of family are the
34 •
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia
most numerous. Other data may be seen on the graph presenting the combined data on
working status and infrastructure of the settlement Roma live in.
Table: Sources of subsistence of the Roma family
Sources of income
%
Summary%
no answer
0.4
0.4
job
18.4
18.8
agriculture
1.7
20.5
various trades
3.2
23.7
trading/black market
9.5
33.2
begging
0.6
33.8
selling waste
9.1
42.9
seasonal work
18.2
61.1
welfare/child allowance
18.3
79.4
pension
5.6
85.0
help from relatives and
friends
1.0
86.0
humanitarian aid
4.7
90.7
we don’t really know
1.9
92.6
something else
7.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
• 35
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
Roma families: Working status and infrastructural equipment
If we keep in mind this correlation between working status and infrastructure of
their settlement, it becomes clear why Roma put the problem of employment at the
forefront, and why the problem of education is secondary. For them, “educating children”
as an important or very important problem comes only after health, employment, food,
clothes and shoes, and housing.
36 •
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia
Roma families: How important are these problems for you
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There is one more data significant for these considerations. The skill structure
of Roma changes slowly and only slightly, but employment is on the decline. Roma
displaced from Kosovo are in an especially difficult situation. In their case it can be
claimed that they are victims of discrimination in employment.5 The interviewed Roma
feel employment to be the key problem for the family life. They are consistent in that,
putting employment at the forefront in 51.6% of cases, and stressing they would accept
any kind of job in 38.3%. Steady employment of a family member is seen as the crucial
problem to be solved in almost 90% of cases.
The low level of education among Roma reflects adversely on their socio-professional
structure. Very few Roma in Serbia have an identifiable occupation. Most of them belong
into the undifferentiated group of workers “without occupation”. Among those who do
“have an occupation”, skills learned at work rather than occupations acquired through
formal education prevail. The undifferentiated socio-professional structure is an indicator
of a low social position and the vicious circle of poverty. This confirms the findings of
previous studies concerning Roma communities in ex-Yugoslavia which pointed out
that Roma are most numerous in the occupations requiring no skill, such as maintenance
workers or cleaners, porters, warehouse workers, or still construction workers.6 The
conditions of overall impoverishment are detected through high unemployment and
rising poverty in the society at large, and to quote Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir
Zajić, “the rate of economic activity is an essential indicator of the exclusion of Roma
from the main social and economic processes. Low economic activity, very young age
structure of the population, and a large share of inactive population are the key factors in
sustaining and deepening the differences or, to put it more bluntly, the socio-economic
gap between Roma and the majority people.”7
Apart from the objective data on living conditions which make Roma a highly
deprived social group (intolerably bad housing conditions, high unemployment of
the potential workforce, insufficient inclusion of children in the school system, poor
communication with the majority population, poor hygiene and health situation),
an important part of the overall depiction of their life are subjective feelings. Some
researchers argue that subjective feeling is a more significant indicator of the quality
of life than a set of objective criteria.8 Yet, on either account Roma are a specific
population displaying typically low aspirations and extremely well developed capacities
for instant adaptation. Similarly, their subjective statements are often in contradiction
• 37
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
with objective living conditions.9 Or more precisely: they complain about unbearable
living conditions less than the researchers could ever assume.
EDUCATION
Serbia is unfortunately one of the few European countries that have not yet
eliminated illiteracy: “According to the 2002 population census in Serbia (Kosovo
and Metohija excluded) 232,925 people were illiterate, which represents 3.5% of the
total population over 10 years of age”.10 Illiteracy is almost non-existent in the most
developed Serbian municipalities, but is still quite high in the most underdeveloped
ones (such as Bojnik, 15.4%). The north, especially Vojvodina, and Belgrade are more
“literate” than the south, while over 10% of all the illiterate are concentrated in the
12 municipalities in the south-west. What is particularly disturbing is that among the
illiterate 2.7% are young people aged 10-19. Let us leave aside here the question of
how many inhabitants of impoverished Serbia are functionally illiterate, never actually
reading or writing anything, and whose “literacy” amounts to being able to sign. It is
much more important to stress that illiteracy is very strongly correlated with poverty
and underdevelopment. This practically means that the Roma, as the poorest community
of all, are also the community where illiteracy is the most widespread.11 It is enough
to cite the fact that among illiterate young people aged 10-14, 50% are Roma girls and
boys, and among those under 30 years of age, Roma comprise 44%, although Roma
make up just 109,000 within the total of over 7 million inhabitants of Serbia, according
to the latest census. If one looks separately at illiteracy among minorities in Serbia,
Roma again rank first according to the illiteracy rate.12
Roma are a people of different lifestyle, cultural patterns, customs and language,
compared to the majority populations – Serbian, Albanian, Bosniac or Hungarian – in
the local communities, as well as at the global societal level. Such differences, however
much they may sometimes provoke misunderstandings and distrust, are the richness
of a democratic society. Andrzej Mirga and Nicolae Gheorge in their inspiring work
“Roma People in Historical Perspective” discuss the problem of Roma education in all
its complexity: “In the traditional Roma community there were no intellectuals: without
writing and written culture education was not considered a high priority. Moreover,
fearing assimilation, many Roma families resisted the education of their children.”13 And
if a Roma child does go to school, what his or her experience will be – nobody cares.
He or she does not necessarily have to – and, in most cases, will not – finish it at all.
School is for any child, and particularly for a Roma child who comes from a
different social and cultural milieu, a novel life experience which generates mixed
feelings of joy and fear. Hence the question of how Roma children will be received
and accepted in their school classes is especially important. Mostly poor, insecure in
the new environment, poorly dressed, and with difficulties in communication because
of insufficient language proficiency, Roma children at school are often faced with
the arrogance of the management, soulless indifference of the teacher, and refusal of
other pupils to accept them as their “mates”. They usually sit in the back rows, they
are sneered at by teachers and pupils, and during breaks they are practically isolated
from participation in children’s games. Of course, the situation is not so bad in every
38 •
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia
school, and not all teachers and pupils behave in this way, but this is valid as a general
description.
Differences in language, as the chief means of communication among people,
are particularly emphasized when Roma children have a poorer school performance
or drop out. Subtler analyses might show to what extent the (lack of) knowledge of
the local majority language can be and is an obstacle to a better school performance
of Roma children, and to what extent the “lack of language proficiency” is used as a
pretext to mask some other problems in the process of educating Roma children. An
overwhelming majority of the interviewed Roma families speak Roma language at
home – 500 families, i.e. 71.4%. Serbian (Serbo-Croat) comes second, being spoken
in 95 families (13.6%). A “mixture of languages” is in third place, with 81 families
(11.8%). In very few families Hungarian, Albanian or some other language is spoken
(2.7%). Of Roma dialects, the arlija is the most represented (292 families or 41.7%),
then gurbet (164 families or 23.4%). Other Roma dialects are spoken in 127 families
(18.1%), while in 18 families they were not able to specify which dialect they speak
(2.6%).
Since Roma communities are highly adaptable to the surrounding environments, these
data do not allow for the conclusion that language is the chief barrier to the education
of Roma children. The causes should also be sought in tradition, and particularly in
the family’s economic condition and parents’ level of education. On the other hand,
causes also lie in the lack of understanding on the part of the wider community of
specific features of the Roma life, and especially in the refusal of school authorities and
teachers to pay adequate attention to Roma children. Similarly, Aleksandra Mitrović and
Gradimir Zajić write: “Education of children is a possible channel of social promotion
for Roma which, however, is too long, uncertain and expensive, demanding a lot of
patience and work… Education of children is an effort Roma families cannot master
by themself.”14
Not all of the interviewed Roma families have school-age children. Indeed, out of
700 interviewed families, 405 have school-age children (57.9%), 275 or 39.3% do not,
and 20 families failed to answer the question (2.9%). To the general question of why
Roma children do not go to school, 26 families (3.7%) cited the language barrier (i.e.
acquaintance with the language of the majority people), 4 families said, in line with the
tradition, that children do not need school at all (0.6%), 27 families said that “kids do
not want to go to school” and the parents cannot force them (3.9%), 29 families said
that schools are “reluctant to receive Roma children” (4.1%), while the largest number,
135 or 19.3% failed to cite any specific reason for children not attending school, or
dropping out very quickly. The range of education of the Roma family stops mostly at
incomplete or complete elementary school.
Assistance to Roma pupils to overcome obstacles and barriers they encounter at
school is often minimal and at any rate insufficient. The data obtained in this study
referring to the previous school year (2001/02) show that 9.6% of Roma children i.e.
every tenth Roma child received all or some of textbooks, notebooks and other school
supplies. 4% obtained free clothes or shoes, while about 5% of Roma children received
aid for excursions or some other form of aid. Thanks to the efforts of humanitarian and
• 39
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
Roma organizations, actions of the state institutions such as the Ministry of Education
of Serbia, have improved the situation significantly to the benefit of Roma pupils.
Although more than a half of Roma children still do not attend school regularly
and drop out early, it is interesting that Roma families, no matter whether their housing
conditions are good or bad, send their children to school in equal numbers, while
abstention of school-age children from Roma families with no permanent residence is
extremely high, as seen from the following graphs:
The level of tolerance of non-Roma parents towards the presence of Roma pupils
in the class attended also by non-Roma children decreases as the share of Roma pupils
grows. So, 79.7% of neighbors agree that “several Roma children attend the same
class”, and if Roma children would comprise over a half of the class, the percentage
drops to 52.3%. Rejection of mixed classes with “several Roma children” mounts
from 4.9%, to 31.4% for classes “with over a half of Roma children”. This impression
is alleviated by the category of those who say “it is all the same” to them how many
Roma children go to the same class with non-Roma children, while 13.7% in both
cases say “the same”. We can conclude, keeping in sight all the modalities of answers
to this question, that the interviewed non-Roma population is by far more tolerant than
in many other countries.
The results of this study may sound optimistic, but at the same time one should
bear in mind that this is incomplete education. Roma families enroll their children in
school, but this does not mean that the children attend the school regularly, and even
less that they complete the grades or the school as a whole. As previously mentioned,
the education of children most often ends at the level of incomplete elementary school.
For various reasons families send their children to school, and then very soon “get
them out”. The practice of assigning Roma children – for reasons of lack of language
proficiency, poverty, housing and urban segregation, etc. – to special schools, where
they as a rule perform very well, is not really a solution for Roma children.
It is not surprising therefore, that other researchers have already noticed the striking
correlation between the level of (un)education and low material standing of Roma
families. Thus Milutin Prokić takes the data on Roma education to be the most dramatic
form of “manifestation of their professional and social inferiority”, one of the “darkest
sides of the reality of Roma life”. His conclusion is precise and pessimistic: “Closed into
their ethnic confines, Roma reproduce each other. Semi-literate and uneducated, they
cannot teach their children the secrets of a better school performance or professional
advancement. As poorly paid and undervalued workers, they cannot provide themselves
or their families with a decent living, nor can they serve as an example to anyone.”15
The practice of sending Roma children, because of language incompetence, poverty,
housing and urban segregation, to special schools, where they regularly achieve good
results, is ultimately not a good solution for Roma children either. “The special school
and the conditions of life in the Roma enclave ‘guarantee’ poverty and low social and
cultural status of the Roma adult-to-be”, rightly argues Sulejman Hrnjica.16
40 •
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia
Roma families: H
Housing conditions and children's choc attendance
housing conditions
Roma families: Education of head of household and children's school attendance
children attending school
• 41
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
Interestingly, at the beginning of the 2002/03 school year, virtually identical
problems with enrollment and organization of teaching for Roma children arose
simultaneously in Medjimurje, Croatia, and in the district of Subotica, Vojvodina. This
kind of problem may be treated, if not as racist resistance of the wider community to
the education of Roma children, then certainly as a demand to segregate Roma from
an early age already.
One study of stigmatization and interethnic relations, conducted in early 2002 in
Croatia, shows that in all countries of the Western Balkans the Roma population faces
similar problems.17 Educational authorities see the “peculiarities” of Roma pupils almost
exclusively in terms of their handicaps (little or no knowledge of the Croatian language,
poorly developed cultural and hygienic habits, poorly developed speaking, motor
abilities and functional capacity, lack of work discipline and sense of responsibility).
Stigmatization and segregation of Roma children, writes Marta Vidaković Mukić who
presents the results of the study, begins in the kindergarten (if Roma children attend
it at all) and becomes very pronounced from the 1st grade of elementary school on: in
97.1% of the cases, the best friend of a Roma child is also Roma, 86.9% of Roma pupils
would like to have Croat friends, but during breaks 92% of Roma children do not play
with other children – a practice that is even stimulated by the schools by designating
a special portion of the schoolyard for Roma children to play. It is no wonder then
that 89% of interviewed Roma children feel they are not well accepted in the school
environment, while 79% say that majority children insult them, make fun of them and
refuse them any social contact.18
The situation in Central and East European countries is not much better either.
Thus in the paper “Roma in the Educational Systems of Central and Eastern Europe”
written by a group of authors (Claude Cahn, David Chirico, Cristina McDonald, Viktória
Mohácsi, Tatjana Perić and Ágnes Székely) it is argued that governments have used
the school as a means to encourage assimilation. The authors write that the collapse
of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe has been accompanied by an economic
crisis and a dramatic rise in racism: Roma are abused in the regular school system and
teachers mistreat them physically, verbally and emotionally. Pupils and their parents
also harass the Roma, while school authorities, teachers and headmasters fail to prevent
and/or punish such behaviour. It is particularly worrying that in many Central and East
European countries the school system is segregated: Roma are educated in separate
classes and separate schools. Such a situation, the authors argue, has nothing to do with
minority education advocated by some Roma activists. The existing separate classes
and schools are inevitably of poorer quality than classes consisting mainly of non-Roma
pupils. This effective segregation is in some countries even officially codified in the
institution of the so-called “special school”, which in practice means school for the
mentally disabled. In such schools Roma are so strongly overrepresented that the suspicion
becomes justified that – like it happened before in Roma history – school authorities see
the Roma ethnic group as synonym of social and mental disability. Finally, the authors
reassert the well known truth that in many countries Roma do not go to school at all or,
once enrolled, quickly drop out.19 Furthermore, they also highlight that young Roma
suffer abuse at school, including physical abuse by the teachers. Non-Roma children
42 •
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia
laugh at and harass Roma children, while teachers often do not intervene effectively.
They conclude: “Abuse in the regular school system leads to segregation”.20
By the fifth grade, Roma children have usually already dropped out of elementary
school.21 Stigmatization and segregation of Roma children at school, often tolerated
and even supported by both school’s authorities and the parents from the majority
population, give rise to disappointment among Roma children, and their initial strong
desire to attend school is weakened.22
Roma children are exposed to insults and humiliation by their peers, and in conditions
of economic crisis the poor and uneducated do not have the chance to find a job and
earn their livelihood, says Marta Vidaković Mukić. “A school system that encompasses
Roma children in the same way as the children of the majority and that does not tolerate
ethnically clean classes, is certainly an important means of eliminating discrimination,
stigmatization and segregation of the Roma population. By integrating children into
the society, encouraging their self-respect and awareness that they are equally worthy
as anybody else, that they have the chance to live in the way the majority lives, with
a similar standard of living and similar problems, within a certain period of time it
will be possible to reach the point where the stigmatization of Roma does not begin
at birth already, where adults will not be discriminated against in employment, and
where never again the ambulance will refuse to come into a Roma settlement to help
a woman in post-natal period.”23
The state could make the school “descend” into the Roma settlement. Sometimes
it is enough to employ one Roma teacher and the education of Roma children will
function well. This is currently done by NGOs, but they will withdraw after finishing
their programs. It is imperative that state bodies promote the learning of the Roma
language and culture, not only for Roma and Roma children. Of course, there is the
problem of the adequately trained personnel, who could work systematically and long
term. Psychologists often send Roma children to special schools. In these schools Roma
children are successful, but they remain stigmatized. Here everyone has their own
interests, but it is Roma children who suffer from the promotion of these interests. While
other children learn the curriculum, Roma children learn the Serbian language. By the
time Roma children have learned the Serbian language, other children have advanced
so far in mastering the curriculum that Roma children again perform poorly. Special
schools are satisfied, because Roma children raise their overall performance, while
many principals and teachers of other schools are satisfied because they have “gotten
rid of the Gypsies”. The psychologists are satisfied because they have “saved Roma
children”, “taken them off the street” and “protected them from possible mistreatment
and discrimination in regular schools”24. Finally, the parents of Roma children are not
discontent either, because their children, after all, go to some sort of school.
In comparison with the results of previous research, as well as the data of the official
statistics, the number of Roma children attending school regularly has risen to 48.4%.
The percentage of children attending school occasionally is considerably lower, 6.6%,
while the number of children not at all included in the system of compulsory elementary
education is still high – 17.1%. The percentage of school-age children for whom it could
not be ascertained whether or not they attended school is also high (27.9%).
• 43
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
The view that education is more important may, apart from benevolent
(mis)understanding of the living conditions of the Roma family, also contain a trace
of racism: “They should be educated so as to become like us”. From these answers, a
certain paternalism emanates, especially when education is rated first. When Roma,
having passed through the educational system, get “civilized”, everything will be well.
Paternalism is also guided by the self-interest of the speaker, derived from egotism.
Chauvinism has a thousand faces and disguises, and can be so subtle! What do we care
if a Roma starves to death, what matters is only that he or she does not contaminate
our environment. Let them receive education on the basis of our curricula! In this
logical sequence there is no place for the question of what if these curricula are often
bad for both “us” and Roma. Roma ought to behave like “us”, they should also adopt
the chauvinist posture, which is alien to their tradition, and then they will be “well
off”, just as “we” are. We shall provide them with everything they need to become
like “us”! Although this consistently nationalist attitude, sliding into chauvinism, is
not predominant, it is often underlying the opinions of the “experts” on education as
the dominant problem of the Roma family.
If Roma are to get any serious chance of finding employment in the formal
economic structure, the prerequisite is education of Roma children. This, along with
the development of cultural activities and general prosperity of Serbian society, is a
necessary precondition for a permanent improvement of life of Roma families. Most
often they do not speak the language of their new milieu, or do not speak it well enough
to complete the school curriculum. How will Roma children overcome the language
barrier which – instead of their alleged mental retardation (a very widespread racist
prejudice) – is the chief obstacle to the integration of Roma children into the school
system, along with poverty, absence of the tradition of education, particularly for girls,
lack of interest on the part of parents and rejection by the wider milieu? Even children
who do go to school show unstable motivation and poor concentration. The price for
this will be paid by future generations as well. This is educational segregation! And
one of the most efficient and simplest avenues of successful integration is inclusion of
Roma children into the educational system.
There is no dilemma that the Roma community in Serbia should be emancipated
from poverty. These people deserve maximum possible support. Such support also
flatters Europe’s conscience. But there also are political reasons, and these are very
important. Help goes both ways: if Europe helps Roma to survive, Roma can help
developed and less developed European countries to get rid of xenophobia and racism.
There is a lot in Roma life and Roma culture that Europe can learn from, on its way to
overcoming xenophobia. Help and gifts that Europe extends to Roma will be returned,
multiplied.
(Translated by Dr. Ivana Spasic)
44 •
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia
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Sikimić, Biljana, Banyash culture in North Serbia in Roma religious culture, Niš,
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đđunarodna saradnja u dru štvenoj zaštiti romske dece
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by Nomadic Gypsies), Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja, XIII, Sarajevo, 1958.
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FRY), Beograd, 1993.
Vlahović, Petar, Etnoantropološke
šške odlike Roma u Jugoslaviji (Ethnoanthropological
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Vujović, Sreten, Romi i stanovanje ((Roma
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50 •
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia
Vukanović, Tatomir, Romi (Cigani) u Jugoslaviji ((Roma/Gypsies in Yugoslavia), Nova
Jugoslavija, Vranje, 1983.
Weyrauch, O, Gypsy Law, University of California Press, 1997.
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žžaj
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Zirojević, Olga, Romi na području
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NOTES
1
Vladimir Stanković (1992), „Romi u svetlu podataka jugoslovenske statistike“ (“Roma
in Light of Yugoslav Statistical Data”), in: Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi
i tendencije [The Development of Roma in Yugoslavia – Problems and Tendencies],
SANU, Belgrade, p. 164. Similarly, Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir Zajić (1998)
argue that “... life in a mahala, however segregated, has helped Roma in a way to preserve
their ethnic identity.” See Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir Zajić, “Društveni položaj
Roma u Srbiji”, [Social Status of Roma in Serbia] in: Romi u Srbiji [Roma in Serbia],
Centar za antiratnu akciju i Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Belgrade,
p. 56.
2
If not stated otherwise, all data in this paper are results of these field researches...
Results of this research were published in Jakšić, Božidar i Goran Bašić, Umetnost
preživljavanja, Gde i kako žive Romi u Srbiji,, ((Art of Surviving, Where and How Living
Roma in Serbia), Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd 2005. (partly in
English, p. 219-272).
3
The unit of survey research has been, then, the family which is – not only in
the Roma culture and tradition – the basic unit of social life and the basis of the
internal solidarity of the Roma community. The examination of Roma and nonRoma families was supposed to show whether and under what conditions the
integration of Roma, especially displaced Roma, is possible – if it is possible at all.
Apart from survey fieldwork on interviewing Roma and non-Roma families,
empirical evidence was collected from other sources as well: municipal and regional
administrative bodies, Red Cross organizations, Roma associations and societies,
previously published and unpublished research, etc. Members of the research team
and their assistants in the field have also used methods of description and observation.
700 Roma families and 350 families of Roma’s neighbors (Serbs, Albanians, Hungarians),
in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, Kosovo excluded, have been chosen according
to the sample obtained from the members of the Republican Statistical Institute of Serbia,
Belgrade, on the basis of the official population census conducted in 1991. In the first
step, the sample was a quota one, while in the second, it was pro-random. Also, during
survey fieldwork we have had 40 interviews with the activists of Roma societies and
institutions, public opinion makers, representatives of concerned institutions and NGOs.
Most interviewers were either sociologists experienced in researching the Roma
population, or Roma who had an excellent knowledge of the field and had been
previously acquainted with the subject and the goals of the research, and specially
• 51
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
trained for conducting the survey. In cases when the interviewers were non-Roma
professional sociologists, the contact person in the settlement was most frequently a
Rom. Members of the research team, coordinators of the fieldwork moved through the
Roma settlements, whenever possible, together with Roma activists, acquainted with
the local situation. In this way the principle «nothing about Roma without Roma» was
respected in the research procedure as well.
4
Maybe also out of fear that someone who makes decisions on the basis of the results
of this study may conclude that the aid given so far has been too large and too diverse.
For the same reason they sometimes concealed data on who in the family is engaged
in economic activities. This did not mean simple distrust of the research and the
interviewers, but an accumulated life experience that has taught one to be wary when
“the state gets interested in Roma”, for, “with the state, you never know”.
5
As the following example illustrates, Roma are discriminated against not only in
employment, but also in the manner of losing their previous steady jobs. The example
is characteristic and refers to Roma from Kosovo who held steady jobs “with the
railways”. They fled to central Serbia, for example, to Kraljevo, together with Serbs
also employed “at the railways”. And while Serbs did not lose the status of permanently
employed, Roma lost this status. Serbs employed in the judiciary, in education and health
institutions regularly received their monthly “salaries”, while Roma received decisions
on being fired. The fi rst explanation was that, after coming to Kraljevo, they did not
register for work at the appropriate office and that such was the reason for being fired.
But later on, this explanation was replaced by another one, saying that they are mostly
unskilled workers “who are not needed”.
6
See Milutin Prokić (1992), “Socijalno ekonomske karakteristike Roma u Jugoslaviji”
[“Socio-economic Characteristics of Roma in Yugoslavia”], in: Razvitak Roma u
Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, [Development of Roma in Yugoslavia – Problems
and Tendencies] SANU, Belgrade, p. 107.
7
Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir Zajić (1998), “Društveni položaj Roma u Srbiji”
[“Social Position of Roma in Serbia”], in: Romi u Srbiji [Roma in Serbia], Centar za
antiratnu akciju/Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Belgrade, p. 29.
8
See also Romsko naselje “
“Mali London” u Pančevu
ččevu (The “
“Little London” Roma Settlement
in Pančevo),
č
čevo),
(2000) Društvo za unapređivanje romskih naselja / Institut za kriminološka
i sociološka istraživanja, Belgrade, p. 26. Similarly, in the collection of papers Javno
mnjenje Srbije (Public Opinion in Serbia) (1999) (Udruženje za unapređivanje empirijskih
istraživanja, Belgrade), a contributor, Dragan Popadić, writes: “Subjective feeling is
a considerably more important indicator of the quality of life than a set of objective
criteria such as income, property, etc. Thus the questionnaire constructed by the World
Health Organization to measure quality of life, apart from the general assessment of
the respondent’s own health condition and life in general, includes a set of questions
referring to depression, anxiety and neurasthenia. These symptoms are known to be
indices of stress, i.e. typical reactions to short- or long-term stressful circumstances.
Subjective well-being is also continuously measured in “Eurobarometer” polls conducted
since 1973 in most European Union countries” (p. 91).
9
During the winter this researcher has several times visited a Roma family living in
impossibly poor housing conditions. In one encounter with the 70-year-old head of
household, exceptionally old for the average life span of the Roma population, the
researcher wondered how they would survive the cold winter at all. To the question of
how they were doing, the host replied: “Why do you ask? Excellent, of course!”
52 •
Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia
10
Source: Demografski pregled [Demographic review], Belgrade, Vol. IV, No. 16/2003,
p. 1.
11
According to Slavoljub Đorđević, program director of the Roma Information Center
in Kragujevac, 70% of Roma are illiterate or semi-literate. “With illiteracy so widely
spread, Roma find it difficult to escape from the margins of society”. Quoted in the
daily Danas, 5-6 July 2003, p. 5.
12
In the second section of the volume, titled “Strategies and Approaches”, where data on
desegregation of “Roma schools” are supplied, we may find the figures for Bulgaria in
1992: just 4.9% of the relevant Roma population had secondary education, and 0.1%
university diplomas. This practically means that only every thousandth Roma person
in Bulgaria at the time had university education. The respective percentages for the
majority Bulgarian population are: 36.5% secondary education, 4.9% university. See,
Roma Rights: Race, Justice, and Strategies for Equality,( 2002) ed. by Claude Cahn,
International Debate Education Association, New York, Amsterdam, Brussels, p. 82.
13
Andžej Mirga and Nicolae Gheorge, “Romski narod u istorijskom kontekstu”, [The
Roma in Historical Perspective] Romološke
šške
ke studije
studije⁄⁄⁄Romology
Romology Studies, Series I, Vol. I,
Aug.-Dec. 1997, p. 11. The authors explicate this basic claim in the following way: “Roma
are facing the fundamental dilemma of whether to preserve traditional differences
contributing to their differential and unequal treatment, or to accept the need for change
and modernization, which might help them achieve equality, but might also change their
identity. A majority of Roma political and cultural elite is aware that education is the
key to modernization. However, education, particularly nowadays, requires material
resources and obligations. In the case of many Roma communities both are lacking.
Since deteriorated and humiliating living and housing conditions predominate, Roma
have not been accustomed to schooling, and high percentages of the parents are illiterate,
many view the investments demanded by education with suspicion. Moreover, traditional
families and groups are convinced that education would result in the disappearance of
Roma identity. Therefore they oppose the education of their children. Thus the crux of
the matter is: how to win equality and stay different.” Ibid. p. 39-40.
14
Aleksandra Mitrović i Gradimir Zajić (1998), “Društveni položaj Roma u Srbiji” [Social
Status of Roma in Serbia]. Uporedi Romi u Srbiji [Roma in Serbia], Centar za antiratnu
akciju i Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Beograd, p. 43. The quoted
opinion ought to be taken cum grano sali. For, Serbia is a society with extremely high
unemployment of precisely the highly educated: physicians, teachers, lawyers, engineers
etc. The percentage of unemployed in Serbia ranges about 30% of the total workforce!
The low level of education is certainly a handicap in competing for better paid jobs
and in this respect the authors are right. But Serbia is a place where jobs are scarce
for anyone, including Roma. In a situation where the “black market” is flourishing,
the “black labor market” included (the so-called grey economy), Roma are even better
equipped to cope than the majority.
Milutin Prokić (1992), “Socijalno ekonomske karakteristike Roma u Jugoslaviji”
[“Socio-economic Characteristics of Roma in Yugoslavia”], in: Razvitak Roma u
Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije [Development of Roma in Yugoslavia – Problems
and Tendencies], SANU, Belgrade, p. 112.
15
16
Sulejman Hrnjica (1993), “Izrada kompenzatorskih programa obrazovanja za učenike
romske etničke grupe“ [“Compensatory Educational Programs for Pupils from Roma
Ethnic Group”], in: Društvene promene i položaj
žžaj Roma [Social Changes and Status of
Roma], SANU, Institut za socijalnu politiku, Belgrade, p. 183.
• 53
Božidar JAKŠIĆ
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
54 •
Suffice it to say that in Slovenia for instance in 1994 just 18% or Roma kids were going
to school. See Mladen Tancer (2000), “Primarna deficitarnost u odgoju i obrazovanju
dece Roma u Sloveniji” [Primary deficit in education and training of Roma children in
Slovenia], in: Cigani⁄
Cigani ⁄⁄Romi
Romi u prošlosti i danas [Gypsies/Roma in the Past and Today],
SANU, Belgrade, p. 153.
Marta Vidaković Mukić, “Stigmatizacija i međuetnički odnosi – primjer Roma u
Međumurju” [Stigmatization and interethnic relations – the example of Roma in
Međumurje], paper prepared for the symposium “Stigmatizacija i identitet marginalnih
grupa u procesu globalizacije kulture” [Stigmatization and identity of marginal groups
in the process of cultural globalization], based on the study conducted by Ombudsman’s
Bureau and the Croatian Helsinki Committee during 2001 and the first three months
of 2002. The cited data are found in the Appendix, p. 4. In light of these results the
following statement by Neven Horvatić sounds almost cynical: “Elementary school is
for Roma pupils an immanently educational and integrational institution”. See Neven
Horvatić, “Odgoj i izobrazba Roma u Hrvatskoj” [Education and training of Roma in
Croatia], Društvena istraživanja, (Quarterly) Zagreb, Vol. 9 (2000), No. 2-3 (46-47)
p. 80.
Claude Cahn, David Chirico, Cristina McDonald, Viktória Mohácsi, Tatjana Perić
and Ágnes Székely (2002), “Roma in the Educational Systems of Central and Eastern
Europe”, in: Roma Rights: Race, Justice, and Strategies for Equality, ed. by Claude
Cahn, International Debate Education Association, New York, Amsterdam, Brussels,
p. 71-72.
Ibid, p. 73.
Ibid
Marija Vidović writes: “Education of Roma children as a channel of social promotion
has been blocked for the already well known economic and socio-cultural reasons:
deprived social milieu, absence of elementary economic preconditions for studying,
absence of support on the part of parents and the broader social environment, low
premium placed on education, lack of familiarity with the language of the majority,
failure to attend pre-school institutions. Dropping out of elementary school in such
circumstances becomes almost inevitable, and the more persistent ones who do finish
elementary school are often sent to schools for kids slightly developmentally retarded,
as pseudo-retarded or ‘borderline cases’”. See Marija Vidović (2000), “Romi i srednje
stručno obrazovanje” [Roma and Secondary Vocational Education”], in: Cigani⁄
Cigani ⁄Romi
⁄ Romi
u prošlosti i danas, [Gipsies/Roma in Past and Present], SANU, Belgrade, p. 177.
“Centuries of discrimination have alienated the Roma from the modern educational
system in the region, just as they have been alienated from others spheres of society.
Discrimination in education reproduces the effects of intergenerational discrimination.
Governments and other authorities do not demonstrate willingness to act in good faith
to punish abuse at school or to desegregate the schools…. so that most Roma children
in the educational system in Central and Eastern Europe are still at the zero point
(the beginning) of their struggle for equal success in the quality of education.” Ibid,
p. 80.
Marta Vidaković Mukić, Op.cit. p. 6.
See Claude Cahn, David Chirico, Cristina McDonald, Viktória Mohácsi, Tatjana Perić
and Ágnes Székely (2002), “Roma in the Educational Systems of Central and Eastern
Europe”, u Roma Rights: Race,Justice, and Strategies for Equality, ed. by Claude
Cahn, International Debate Education Association, New York, Amsterdam, Brussels,
str. 75.
IDENTITY PATTERNS IN THE ROMA MINORITY
FROM THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Ion NEGURA & Veronica PEEV
INTRODUCTION
Before launching the field study concerning identity constructions amongst the
Roma, we met the Roma’s baron in Moldova, Mr. Artur Cerari, in order to discuss the
Moldovan Roma’s situation, the problems they face and their community development
perspectives. At the end of our discussion, which lasted for quite a while, the baron
said some words that impressed us a lot: “We, Roma and Moldovans, have been living
together for centuries, but you, Moldovans, have always watched us from a distance”.
We rendered justice to the baron with a single reservation that Roma watch Moldovans
“from somewhere far away” too.
During the study we carried out with Roma, we tried to watch them not “from
somewhere far away”, as the baron reproached but rather from somewhere as close as
possible in order to understand the way they perceive the world and reflect themselves
in it. We were also interested in the way they plan and imagine their life, and the
identity problems they are confronted with. Although very present in everyday reality,
and moreover, in the collective mentality, where negative labels are often attributed to
them, Roma represent quite an inciting and challenging problem in the wider sociocultural cognition.
The data collected in this field study reflect the way Roma from Moldova perceive
and understand different aspects of identity building processes. In a second part, we
present this material analysis, but we thought it important to first offer a short descriptive
note on the Roma community from the Republic of Moldova.
MOLDOVA’S ROMA
According to the latest population census data (2004), there are 12 268 people
of Roma ethnic origin residing in the Republic of Moldova, that is 0,2 % of the total
• 55
Ion NEGURA & Veronica PEEV
population. The UNDP-Moldova 2007 report on the Roma community from the
Republic of Moldova (Cacea et al. 2007) shows a number of 15,000 Roma, according
to their own personal survey. This official data is contested by Roma NGOs and their
leaders. The Roma National Centre, for instance, states that the number of Roma in
the Republic of Moldova is of about 200,000, which represents 4% of the population
of the Republic of Moldova (http://www.roma.md). Nevertheless, this figure does not
have a corresponding statistical coverage to back it up. The confusion concerning the
number of Roma is generated by the fact that certain Roma hide their ethnic origin,
declaring for multiple and various reasons a different identity.
Roma are dispersed, according to their residential place, over the entire territory
of the Republic of Moldova. They can be found in all the country districts, but most of
them are settled in Ocniţa, Soroca and Nisporeni districts, where one can find locations
compactly inhabited by Roma communities.
Roma living conditions do not tend to reach high standards. Indeed, according to
the UNDP 2007 report, over 80% of Roma settlements do not have facilities such as:
running waters, WC, bath and canalization system (Cacea et al. 2007).
Roma life expectancy is estimated to be at around 63 years of age; that is 3 years
less compared to the whole of the Republic of Moldova’s population. Only 23% of
Roma have medical insurance policies, while the policy-holder ratio among non-Roma
is of 59%.
Roma education and literacy levels are lower compared to the country’s average.
Every fifth Roma can neither write, nor read. A Roma with a University degree is a
rare occurrence. Only 4% of Roma are University diploma holders, while University
the degree-holder ratio among non-Roma is of 38%.
The Roma situation on the labour market is quite difficult too; indeed, unemployment
among Roma is twice as high than among non-Roma. The long periods of unemployment
have profound and negative effects on the Roma community. It is also clear to see
that Roma women are decreasingly present on the labour market scene. This can be
explained by the traditional perception of a woman’s role; that is, being a mother,
bringing up children and “employed” as a housewife in order to keep the house clean
and tidy. Low levels of schooling for the women are also considered another reason for
their absence on the labour market. Low levels of education mean poor qualifications
and allow for employment in low-paid jobs only. It also increases poverty incidence
risk within the Roma community. Given that Moldova is considered to be the poorest
European country, the Roma minority is qualified as the most vulnerable ethnic group
from economic and social points of view (Cacea et al. 2007).
Research methodology
This study is a qualitative research based on the qualitative analysis of data gathered
by means of a thorough semi-structured interview. The purpose of the investigation was
to obtain information concerning identity building strategies in people who accepted
(more or less) their Roma belonging. We guided the interviewees towards the issues
of our interest allowing them to speak freely about their lives.
The target that our fieldwork aimed at was the individual identity strategies used by
Roma for gaining recognition and integration in the wider civic and political society.
56 •
Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of Moldova
We were interested in the diversity of Roma representations and group references, and
this is why we selected a sample of 15 informants matching the following criteria:
1. Age: the oldest – 67 years old; the youngest – 21 years old; average: 39
years old.
2. Gender: male – 10 informants; female – 5 informants.
3. Place of residence: rural- 5 informants; city – 10 informants.
4. Religion affiliation: orthodox – 13 informants; neo-protestant – 2
informants.
5.
Education level: 1-8 years of schooling – 4 informants; vocational college – 6
informants; university education – 5 informants.
6. Social activity: involved in NGO – 9 informants; not involved – 6
informants.
Empirical Data and Research Results
Our research resulted in 15 transcription texts which were subjected to content
analysis. Each transcript consists of 15 to 30 pages.
The results of the interview analysis have been organized, for convenience, in
categories corresponding to different themes of discussion or questions and answers
(which are taken from the interviewed informants’ statements).
1. Who has the right to assume Roma identity?
We received a single and very categorical answer: “a Roma is Roma by birth”
(I.D., 34 years), but this fact has to be proven daily by:
1) respecting the ancestors’ traditions taken from the Gypsy camp;
2) knowing and using the Roma language;
3) wearing the Roma clothes;
4) obtaining recognition within the Roma community;
5) living among Roma;
6) doing different good, useful and honorable things for the Roma community’s
welfare.
From the content analysis, we can identify different and frequently opposing ideas
regarding the Roma identity and the way the informants themselves perceive it. Some
informants consider that identity uncertainty does not exist among Roma: they either
are Roma or are not (M.S., female, 40 years old; R.N. male, 30 years old). Nevertheless,
cases where Roma identity is neglected but at a later stage sought after and valued to
re-integrate the Roma community are not rare.
The Roma community holds control over the processes of acceptance and refusal of
a Roma who intends to reintegrate into his/her native ethnicity. It is worth mentioning
that before one takes the final decision of giving up their Roma identity, the community
gives them time to reflect on the situation. Meanwhile, Roma discuss the issue with the
concerned individual in order to convince him/her to change his/her mind. By doing
so, they give that person another chance to think over the decision. They care about
their ethnic image as well as that of every member of the community. They do not give
up easily on a member.
• 57
Ion NEGURA & Veronica PEEV
Among the reasons for refusing one’s ethnic identity that emerged from the
interviews we carried out, we can mention the following:
1) the person was forced, by attitudes persisting in the wider society, in the
form of prejudices and stereotypes towards Roma people;
2) the person lives among other ethnicities (far from Roma communities);
3) the person was brought up in a mixed family.
In the case where the individual rethinks his/her decision and regrets it, he/she can
regain the trust and recognition of the Roma community only if the individual proves
his/her change of mind by actions and deeds. This usually takes time.
“To regain his Roma identity he has to try and fight. He has to do important things
for the Roma community, to share the same values and feelings.” (R.N. male, 30 years
old).
Roma attitudes towards the person who once refused his Roma identity and wants
to regain it are ambivalent; it usually depends upon the gender of the person. A woman,
compared to a man, is discriminated by the community. It can also happen that the
Roma who denied his ethnic identity once, is never accepted by the community even
if he desires to assume it again.
Those who refuse to fully assume and yet keep their Roma identity are severely
punished by the community; they are usually driven out and neglected. In this case “blood
relations” lose their value. “They lose the community respect. Because of them the entire
family suffers” (D.M., female, 43 years old); “They are perceived as a nobody” (I.D.,
male, 34 years); “It’s a big shame not to be proud of your ethnicity. We don’t respect
that person because he/she is refusing us” (M.S., female, 40 years old).
2. How do the Roma become conscious of their ethnicity?
Resulting from the statement content analysis, we identified the following sources
as to how Roma become ‘ethnically conscious’:
1) from the education they received in the family where they assimilate the
laws and the Roma lifestyle; “The child must learn all Gypsy laws from
his parents as he/she grows up”.
2) from their ethnic belonging as taught by their parents; “My parents told
me simply that I am a pure seed from Gypsy and that I have to be proud of
It”.
3) from understanding the attitude (which is more often negative) displayed
by other ethnicities towards Roma people; “When I was a child the children
from my village were calling me “Gypsy, Gypsy”. So I understood that I
am different, I am a Gypsy”.
4) by their own understanding, judging from circumstances, from the context.
“It came through discussions, we spoke Gypsy language, and you understood
that a different language was spoken; the circumstances made me understand
that I am different.”
3. The ethnic identity and other forms of identities
From interviewing our informants, we observed that the concerned individuals
assumed more than one identity. We noticed that this, in turn, formed a unique hierarchical
58 •
Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of Moldova
structure in which different identities were put forth depending on the context and
circumstances. Synthesizing the statements we identified the following structures:
1) One’s ethnic identity comes fi rst: “I am a Gypsy, Roma by ancestors; I
am a true Gypsy, without any mixture, I am an orthodox Christian; I am a
citizen of the Republic of Moldova” (D.M. female, 43 years old). “According
to my origin I am Gypsy; I am a citizen of Moldova; I respect the native
people’s religion; I am obliged to respect the law of this country” (I.F.,
male). “So I come from ancestors, I belong to ironsmith’s clan. I am an
ironsmith Roma” (I.S., male, 21 years old).
2) One’s personal identity comes fi rst, followed by one’s ethnic identity: ““II
am A.D., a Gypsy woman, wife and mother” (A.D., female, 30 years old).
“I am S. M., but according to my identity card I am Ecaterina … I am a
woman … a housewife, a wife what else I can say …” (M.S., female, 40 years
old). “I am I.D., I have graduated from the Political Sciences and History
Department at State University of Moldova. I took my doctor degree at
Academy of sciences in political domain at the Institute of Sociology and
Law. I identify myself as Roma, but among the Roma I am not recognized
as one of them” (I.D., male, 34 years old).
3) The religious identity comes fi rst: ““First of all I am Christian. Secondly,
I feel Roma in my soul, mind, and body. And thirdly, I am a citizen” (P.F.,
male, 30 years old). “The most important for me is to be a Christian, I am
Roma” (F.F., male, 44 years old). “I choose just God, I am not Orthodox
I am not Baptist, I am just the child of God” (V.S., male, 57 years old).
4) The family identity comes fi rst: ““My name is A.C., the son of M.C., God
forgives him, and the well known baron of the ex-Soviet Union. I was his
right hand: no matter where he went I was near” (A.C., male).
4. Roma self-perception
We can divide the interviewed people into two categories: those who form the elite
of the Roma community and the common Roma. These categories are characterised by
the differences we identified within the Roma community. The common Roma tend to
present their ethnicity in a favourable light, but the elite spotlight the weak points of
their ethnicity as a group.
The common Roma perceive their ethnicity as:
1) an old civilization,
2) a talented nation,
3) an ethnicity where respect and mutual help are the distinctive notes,
4) a nation with industrious people.
In the elite’s perception, the Roma nation consists of people:
1) scattered on the territory of the Republic of Moldova,
2) who lack a person with authority who would favour the implementation of
new elements in the Roma lifestyle,
3) with a lack of union between Roma from different clans,
4) with a strong conservative character kept over the centuries,
5) who are unemployed in the social work field (this is the situation specific
to the majority of them),
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Ion NEGURA & Veronica PEEV
6) who do not advertise their ethnicity.
We noticed that Roma coexistence with other nations contributed towards the
production of changes in Roma ways of living. This process of change is slow,
but it nonetheless certifies the possibility of rethinking the Roma life style.
5. Roma distinctive peculiarities
Roma are distinguished between other ethnicities due to the following
characteristics:
1) physical characteristics: thick-lipped, with big noses and eyes, dark-skinned,
men are pot-bellied;
2) clothes: longer skirts, coloured clothes adorned with different specific
ornaments for women;
3) verbal and physical behaviour: loud voices, have a specific accent, a lot of
gesticulation;
4) worn symbols: different symbols, flowers, jewellery, gold;
5) intuition: their sixth sense;
6) traditions
6). Roma tradition
Roma traditions are almost the same to those of the majority, but there are some
distinctive peculiarities that witness to their ancestors’ way of living. The most important
traditions are described by our informants as follows.
Engagement: The parents decide which family they will be related to through the
marriage of their children. This decision may take place at the child’s birth or during
his/her childhood up until adolescence.
Wedding: This represents an indispensable event which marks the beginning of
the newly formed family among the Roma community. Through the years, they have
kept to their ancestors’ way of celebrating this event in spite of individual families’
financial situation. The crucial elements of their party are:
1) presents: gold, different household objects, big amounts of money;
2) Roma music;
3) bride’s virginity check and the symbols related to it: the bottle of red wine
decorated with a red ribbon, basil and a red flower (a rose);
4) food: dishes prepared from fresh meat are predominant;
5) guests being placed at the table: women and men sit separately, that is, at
different sides of the table.
We also highlighted some benefits that are, for Roma, equated with the wedding
and getting married:
1) a way of earning for the bride’s parents;
2) a way of self affi rmation for the groom’s parents;
3) a way of obtaining a social status (“The richer the wedding, the higher the
groom’s parents’ authority” (I.D., N.R.));
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Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of Moldova
4) a way of self affi rmation for each Roma (“You feel like a sultan at the
wedding” (R.N.)… “The wedding is the place where Roma can get together
and present dances and songs…” (P.F., I.F.);
5) family pride (D.M.)
Remarriage: It is possible but seldom occurs, and only in the situation when the
spouse is deceased. Only the man has the right to remarry: “… the widow remains
under her brother’s care; if the woman remains alone and without children, she finds
her mission” (A.D).
Birth: A child’s birth represents a great joy for parents. The reasons are presented
here:
1) “ for Roma, the child means wealth” (D.M., P.F.);
2) “[a child is] a source of making money: if the girl is honest, you get money
for her; begging; the presents brought for the new born are money, gold
and other things related to the child’s gender” (I.D.);
3) the family’s continuation ((all the informants mentioned this aspect)
The birth is celebrated like the wedding, the gold presents are indispensable and in
this case acts as a sign of child purity and is for his/her protection from evil.
Death: Roma are religious people (according to their testimonies), but at the same
time they do not respect the religious laws entirely, they adjust them to their way of
thinking and living: “We keep the dead person for 9 days… because of our way of
living – they travel and work in Russia, Ukraine, Romania – it takes time for them to
come back and take farewell, it’s impossible to do everything in one day” (P.F.).
Gypsy Law: It represents a code of laws conveyed orally from generation to
generation which reflect different life situations and their possible solutions. These
laws are related to Roma culture, language and traditions. Roma are acquainted with
the consequence of law breaking from their youngest years.
These laws determine the type of relations to entertain within the ethnicity, community
and family and, at the same time, they suppose obedience to the oldest person’s word.
There is a hierarchy of obedience among the family’s men relations: “the grandfather
can interfere only in case of a quarrel between husband and wife, but he has no right
to interfere in the grandson’s education” (R.N.).
The man, in Roma culture, takes all the decisions in the family; he is the master of
the family and has to be listened to even if it does not seem right. If there is a conflict,
the woman must submit; the husband is the one to take the deciding steps. The woman
can address the eldest man only through his wife. Problems connected with women are
resolved through the abbot’s wife.
The CRIS represents Roma trials where the judges are the oldest men from the
community and those with authority (baron), who expect the obedience of Roma laws
by the Roma community.
Purity rituals: These remain to be a distinctive element for Roma. Some of them
are: the woman and man’s clothes are kept and washed separately; the husband takes
place first at the table and just after this his wife and children. This tradition is based
on the belief that a Roma woman is less pure than a man due to the physiological
differences (i.e. menstruation) (I.D., I.S., A.C.).
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Ion NEGURA & Veronica PEEV
7. Roma symbols
Another distinctive sign for Roma culture is represented by the symbols present
in their houses, on their clothes and for their holidays.
Gold is considered to be the defining element for Roma, without gold Roma would
not exist. We identified some of the meanings of gold in the Roma worldview:
1) a symbol of material welfare;
2) a means of exchange “Our ancestors had gold which was taken from them
by the authorities; they used it as an exchange currency” (N.R.);
3) as a sign of tidiness, of Roma soul purity (all informants mentioned this);
4) a way of improving one’s self image “ for Roma, gold is for being seen in
a better light” (V.S., P.F.).
The red rose and red wine are the symbol for the bride’s purity.
The sweet basil signifies “the girl’s obedience and belief in her husband” (A.D.,
M.S.).
Houses have different meanings, such as: a way of gaining authority within Roma
community; a source of pride; a reflection of their ancestors’ needs and a sign of their
wealth; the financial possibilities of the master who built it; proof of the owner’s
originality and uniqueness. Roma houses are decorated with different elements which
become strictly necessary to a Roma house. Thus they reflect the house master’s essence
as well as the spirit of the entire nation. “…they make different flowers from iron plates,
and decorate the house showing that a certain person is the householder” (M.S.).
8. Roma relations within the community
Another element of self-perception within the Roma community is related to the
essence of their relations within the community: “The relations among Roma are
characterized by mutual help, understanding, respect, and solidarity” (R.N., I.D.,
M.S., I.C.). To be Roma supposes to help other Roma unconditionally, when he/she is
in need. In this case the most important linking element is the language. Their ethnic
affiliation links the Roma together. Furthermore, the maintenance of this kind of relations
is ensured by Roma laws.
The Roma community, from the welfare point of view, is homogeneous. We
identified rich as well as poor Roma, nevertheless there cannot be found one single
way of perceiving poor and rich Roma. A poor Roma is most frequently declared to
be lazy and is not helped by the community, with the exception of some circumstances
which are particularly difficult. The richer Roma are considered to be people with other
possibilities of earning money, and with higher intellectual abilities. This difference
could serve as a rationale for the poorer Roma’s envy. Yet in order to avoid such a
problem, the elderly people deal with this subject by offering all the needed explanations
to the younger generations. Judging from those explanations, reported by some of our
Roma informants, the “poor Roma” phenomenon does not exist, as Roma help each
other out.
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Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of Moldova
9. Roma family
The family represents another defining element in terms of ethnicity. Indeed,
within the Roma community, family is sacred. It represents the supreme value for
them. Life habits, traditions, specific gender roles, types of behaviour in the future
family, etc. – all of these are learned within the family. Roma family is like a fortress:
“What has happened in my family remains there. Only the Roma could know but not
the neighbors” (M.S.).
The traditional Roma family consists of grandparents, parents and grandchildren.
They consider each other as relatives up to the third generation. In the worldview of
some Roma, the godparents, who have to be and thus usually are Roma, are considered
to be relatives too. It is interesting to note that relatives from other ethnicities are not
accepted or considered as part of the family.
The fundamental bond in the family are the parents, if they are dead, the older
brother or sister take over and become the family’s main reference.
Existing relations within the family are established in advance by means of the
law code which settles Roma life:
•
“the man and the woman respect each other”;
•
“the man rules the family”;
•
“the woman listens to and obeys the man, if he makes a mistake she has to
forgive him”;
•
“the woman has to listen to her parents-in law”;
•
“the ‘familial garbage’ is not taken outside of the family: that is, the quarrels,
the misunderstandings”;
•
“the wife has to serve her husband”;
•
“if there are guests in the house, the woman is not allowed to pass in front
of the husband, she can only pass behind him”;
•
“if the husband dies his place is offered to a man from the family, if there
are just girls the entire Roma community takes care of them. [The wife] does
not stay alone, there is always somebody nearby who guides and protects
her. Our law does not let the woman rule the family because she does not
know how to perform this task by herself” (I.S., R.N. and others).
These rules contribute to the maintenance of family purity; they prevent betrayal,
the husband’s or wife’s corruption and, at the same time, this set of rules ensures
the avoidance of potential problems between the members of the family. The person
responsible for family welfare is the man, he takes all the decisions. If the wife betrays
her husband, she is driven out of the family; the husband’s infidelity is not a topic of
discussion.
The election of the future partner takes place at a very early age (between one’s
birth until the age of 13-14, by means of an agreement between parents) and is based on
the criteria of ethnic affiliation, which requires the same social status on both parts.
In the case of assimilated Roma, this principle is not rigorously observed, although
the most successful marriage is considered to be strictly between Roma: “…they say it
is better to marry a Roma woman, she wouldn’t discriminate her husband”(I.D.).
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Ion NEGURA & Veronica PEEV
In the last decades the existence of Roma mixed families has became a more regular
occurrence, which is considered to be a way of facilitating Roma integration into the
wider society. The presence of a Gadjo within the family no longer means Roma laws
have been violated. A Roma mixed family is the result of a Roma and non-Roma’s
unity; but only when the Roma is a man. Indeed, the Roma woman’s marriage to a
non-Roma man is not accepted by the tradition. The non – Roma woman is accepted
and recognized by the Roma husband’s clan as a member of the family as long as she
accepts to learn the Roma language, identifies herself as Roma, respects Roma traditions
and considers her children to be Roma.
The permission for such a marriage is given by the “council of the oldest”, where
the younger members of the community are asked to think properly over their decision
before forming the family. The man’s parents also take care to ensure the young family
with a house.
10. Roma and non-Roma relationships
The way Roma build their relationships with other ethnicities represents a facilitative
strategy of their integration into society by means of the conciliating attitude towards
others. This attitude is formed due to the education received in the family and ensures
their peaceful coexistence with other ethnicities. They were taught, from their youngest
years, to be prudent with others and to build their relationships on the same principles
of respect and help which govern the relationships between Roma.
Some Roma tend to keep people of other ethnicities at a distance from their family,
yard, and territory. The explanation of such behaviour is: “What has happened in my
family remains there. Only the Roma should know but not the neighbors. Why should
they know if we live well?” (M.S., I.C.)... “Why should Moldavians live among the
Roma?” (A.C.). “The Moldavian has to look for another place, as it is Gypsy territory”
(I.S.).
In the Roma perception, the attitudes of others towards them are impregnated with
discriminative elements. “People discriminate Gypsies; they don’t respect any human
rights. The Gypsies are the most humiliated nation in the world” (I.F.).
Nevertheless, as a result of the interview content analysis we identified a large
variety of attitudes towards Roma: positive, negative and neutral.
Positive: “Roma are accepted and have equal rights if compared to other ethnicities”,
“They can attend public houses, buy a place where and when they want” (A.M.).
Negative: “Moldavians discriminate Roma when they automatically attribute to
them the responsibility for all the offences which happened in the village” (R.N.) or
when they are treated as follows: “In the Moldavians’ point of view, Roma are on a
lower level, they can’t see Roma as smart, civilized, intellectual people” (I.D.).
Neutral: “The attitudes towards Roma are formed as a result of their work, due
to their way of behaving towards others. Many people respect Gypsies because they
are talented, but if they deceive others, they receive the corresponding attitude” (I.D.,
I.F.).
Common as well as elite Roma agree that the police represent the authority which
most frequently causes problems to Roma; the policemen’s discriminative attitudes are
said to be experienced the most intensely.
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Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of Moldova
11. The Roma’s linguistic identity
The Romani language represents a means of identification for Roma among other
ethnicities: “Roma that don’t speak their native language or are ashamed when they
do this, aren’t considered to be Roma” (A.M., F.F.).
Romani language is learned at home in the discussions held with the parents
or with other Roma people. Roma are polyglots; they learn the languages of the
ethnicities they live with. They easily switch from one language to another, depending
on the situations and the people that are involved: “… if we are with Moldavians we
speak Romanian language, with Russians – Russian language, with gypsies – Romani
language” (D.M., R.N.) Although, they speak other languages they still think in their
native language. Romani language has more dialects due to the wide word borrowing
from the ethnicities they live with.
The respondents’ opinions regarding learning Romani language at school are
divided into two categories:
1) for the learning of Romani language at school;
2) against the learning of Romani language at school.
In other words some people are in favour of and others are against Romani language
learning.
Those who see the future perspectives of the Roma ethnicity’s development through
the acquisition of Romani language at school think that it would be beneficial to their
ethnicity. They believe that many problems which they face today could be solved.
The language learning process would be seen to:
•
help Roma children avoid the difficulties they face in learning different
subjects; at present Roma children’s situation is a detrimental one: they are
forced to learn and think in a language unknown to them, or which they
have just begun to learn (I.D., I.S.);
•
create a new image of Roma, and recreate the values which have been
lost;
•
change the existing image, the stereotypes regarding the Gypsies and who
they are (R.N.);
•
bring forth the existence of textbooks in Romani language (I.F.);
•
engender Roma general culture levels to rise and encourage Roma teachers
within the community (P.F.).
Romani language, according to some informants, V.S. and D.M., could be an
optional subject in the school curriculum that would be studied by those who want to
do so. Besides this, the idea of learning the languages spoken in and out of the country
has also been emphasized (R.C.).
The reasons why some of the informants adopted the negative attitude towards
Romani language learning at school are:
•
Romani language does not have wide usage, it is not a written language, it
is more of a spoken one and is needed only for Roma;
•
learning in Romani will have opposite effects on the Roma’s integration
tendency into the wider society, but studying other languages will facilitate
this process. “Romani language is the language learned at home, I know
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Ion NEGURA & Veronica PEEV
it perfectly well. There is no need to learn it at school. First of all we don’t
have Gypsy teachers, then it’s more convenient to know more languages,
Moldavian is richer than Roma” (D.M.). “I don’t think it is possible to
study Roma at school because it isn’t used by the entire population. It is
not correct; it is not good if we want them to be integrated in the society.
We will block them if we interdict them to learn other languages” (R.C.).
12. Religious identity
Roma from the Republic of Moldova are affiliated to the majority population’s
religion, namely the Christian Orthodox faith. The affiliation to the majority’s religion
represents an efficient strategy of social integration for Roma; this has been practiced
over centuries: “The Gypsies have affiliated to the religion of the zone they live in. The
Gypsies don’t have one single religion” (R.N.).
Although, they consider themselves as being religious people, they do not get
involved in church activities. “Roma do not get involved in church activities because
they don’t have such an experience” (P.F.). An exception would be the case of those
Roma who sing in the church choir: “there are Roma who sing in the church choir”
(I.C., A.D.).
Roma have spoken about themselves as being religious people, who fear God’s
power. They cannot imagine their life without God: “For me religion is … you know
when I pray I have a kind of relief, we have difficulties but when I say God help me, I
feel that I purify my soul, all rage comes out of me, and all Roma are alike. The Gypsies
live with faith and music” (D.M.).
Their religiosity is spotlighted by:
•
frequent use of God’s words, in their oral speech, and God's name frequently
risen during conversation. For instance, “God’s will” (A.C.);
•
church attendance during holidays and other occasions;
•
calling on God's power in case of conflicts with other ethnicities.
For Roma, the church carries the status of a court of law, with a judge, and where
justice is made. “When a conflict happens, only the church helps us. We go there and
declare the situation and that is all. And if you affirmed untruthfully, then one day God
may punish you” (A.C.).
Religious conversion is defined as a personal choice and is permitted by the “council
of the old Roma”. As a result, new laws are worked out to settle the social-family life
of the converted person:
1) if the husband changes his religion at any time, the wife keeps the clan’s
religion no matter what her husband’s choice is;
2) if the woman changes her religion according to her own will, she will be
isolated from the clan;
3) all conflicts of a religious nature are solved within the clan;
4) the converted person has to listen to and obey the clan’s chief’s word;
5) the converted Roma continue to respect Roma traditions.
The adoption of these laws represents a requirement addressed to the Roma community
to be tolerant and accepting of the confessional choice of their brothers. The endeavors
66 •
Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of Moldova
of Roma leaders to keep the community united are very much understandable.
The explanations for religious conversion are:
1) precarious financial state;
2) the offered humanitarian help;
3) the existence of a leader which keeps them together;
4) lack of discrimination between the members of the religious community
(they are all equal, they consider themselves as brothers in spite of their
ethnicity);
5) the possibility given to a person to express him/herself (by means of songs,
or reading prayers);
6) the sincerity and the positive psycho-social climate;
7) curiosity;
8) the high levels of suggestiveness of the converted person.
Interestingly, one’s affiliation to another religion does not contribute towards
communication or relational problems between Roma; although some minor religious
misunderstandings may occur. People who have affiliated to the neo-protestant confession
assert that they found the real God; that their way of living is taken from the bible; and
thus the quality of their spiritual life has been improved.
13. Roma mobility
Social and geographical mobility represent ways in which ethnic identity is
constructed.
Roma geographical mobility is explained by their ancestors’ way of living; i.e. the
nomadic lifestyle. They gained their existence by marketing different goods acquired
from abroad. Although they have houses in Moldova, they work abroad for better
earnings in order to ensure their survival. Moreover, Roma men do not take their wives
abroad with them often and their destination tends to be Russia or Ukraine. There they
work in agriculture, get into the building or commercial business or are involved in
other kinds of businesses.
From a lifestyle perspective, geographical mobility does not exist for Roma;
indeed they are now established in houses. On the other hand, to earn a wage, we
see that Roma seek the most favourable environment for this to take place, already
since their ancestors’ time. Some decades ago, they were moving to those favourable
environments with the entire camp, today they tend to limit themselves to what they
have earned at home.
Those who come back are not the same as when they left; they present some
signs of change from the foreign conditions they incurred: “I think they change their
points of view. The youngest leave and on their return home they tell the oldest what
and how to do things, because they know more, so they rule. And they are accepted by
the others” (R.N.).
Roma social mobility is extremely reduced. Seldom people from this ethnicity
succeed in achieving a career, or in being promoted on a social level. If and when this
occurs, it usually concerns men as they have more chances to succeed than women.
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Indeed, women are to dedicate their life to family as Roma law ‘enforces’; even after their
school, college, or university graduation they must ask for the husband’s or community’s
permission to get involved in social life. “I have graduated from Medical College. At
the moment I am a housewife and I practise medical service in the Roma community.
The Gypsy woman stays home and takes care of the family, children, and husband. I
have tried to work at the hospital, but there we are treated differently” (A.D.).
FINAL CONCLUSIONS
The Roma identity is not given; it is formed during one’s life experience. Furthermore,
one’s identity can be confirmed or invalidated. This is done on the basis of the next
three elements: the nation/clan the person proceeds from; the level of Roma language
knowledge; and lastly, the person’s lifestyle. These criteria apply to almost all Roma.
The most important elements of Roma identity are the clothes, the language, the family
he/she comes from and the trade of their family. If a Roma assumes the Roma identity
but some elements are missing, he is then isolated from the community.
The clan represents the most important identity criterion – and more importantly,
represents the family’s source of prestige. Roma pay great attention to family prestige,
as it can be handed down from one generation to the next, from one member to another.
The other’s attitudes towards a member of the family affects the other members of the
family.
The clothes and the language constitute the exterior signs of the person who holds
and respects the traditions. The Roma language is the main means of communication
used by Roma in different life situations, especially in those where ethnic identity is
discussed. Besides Roma language, they speak and use, depending on the context,
Russian and Romanian languages.
One’s trade has to bring benefits and be practised far from home. Roma’s mobility
is highly appreciated by the Roma community. This mobility ensures the person can
foster wide social relationships. Their business activities allow them to have a high rate
of mobility within the country or abroad, which in turn gives a particular specificity to
the traditional as well as assimilated Roma lifestyles.
Their activity implies a high risk rate (the revenues are not constant), but they also
bring in high benefits. When it comes to obtaining new benefits, it is very important for
them to be independent and use their resources according to their will.
Through our research, we have noticed that Roma solve their problems within
the confines of their own community, and do not relate to or call upon the authorities.
They thus have an informal economy and their dependence on social institutions is
minimal.
Finally, we can say that the community’s symbolical expression is related to a
presumptive past or to tradition, which actually represents a selective construction
of the past. Roma have clear representations regarding the past of their family, where
the “nation” represents the first element of their identity, followed by the clothes and
language which also play a significant role. We can also add to these elements which
seem to form the Roma identity the value they place on economic benefits and social
relationships.
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Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of Moldova
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Stewart M., The Time of the Gypsies. Colorado & Oxford: Vestview Press, 1997.
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• 69
ELITES ROM DANS LES ANCIENS PAYS COMMUNISTES
Le cas de la Roumanie
Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
LA SÉLECTION DES ÉLITES DANS LES SOCIÉTÉS OCCIDENTALES
Le terme d’élite est attaché à quelques caractéristiques qui déterminent la sphère
d’action de ceux qui en font partie – classe dirigeante, oligarchie, pouvoir, notoriété,
classe politique – ou bien qui désignent la spécialisation de ceux qui occupent des
positions dans une hiérarchie des compétences : managers, hauts fonctionnaires,
gouvernementaux, « techniciens », bureaucrates (Coenen-Huther, 2004). Ceux-ci
sont formés dans de hautes écoles pour devenir les professionnels du pouvoir. Puis ils
montent par le truchement du « pôle formel » qu’ils représentent – dans la politique,
dans la vie sociale, dans l’économie, occupent des places dans les structures du pouvoir,
et se placent convenablement dans une hiérarchie (Collovald, 1985). Ces personnes
expriment la « politique de l’Etat », le pouvoir institutionnel. La France témoigne d’un
phénomène intéressant : lorsque le parti socialiste est arrivé au pouvoir, la logique
partisane (exprimée à travers l’idéologie socialiste) a commencé à diminuer peu à
peu et à se soumettre à la « logique d’Etat » ; ou, comme Pierre Birnbaum (1985) le
dit, « au profit du pouvoir d’Etat ». Le phénomène n’est pas spécifique à la France
mais au contraire s’est institutionnalisé. Il semble aujourd’hui que la constitution des
groupes dirigeants soit plus ou moins contrôlée par les Etats-nations (Broady, Chmayko,
Saint-Martin, 1997). Le destin des élites est de devenir un groupe dirigeant, une classe
dirigeante. Au moyen de leur compétence professionnelle, de leur haute spécialisation
ou vocation sociale, les représentants des élites occupent des positions d’où ils peuvent
organiser, influencer, décider. Les représentants des élites gravitent autour des positions
de pouvoir, des cercles gouvernementaux, des décideurs.
Toutes les sociétés ou les collectivités sont gouvernées par des élites ; c’est une
tautologie à travers laquelle s’exprime la position d’autorité d’un groupe. Toute élite
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Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
détient ses propres moyens de s’imposer, toujours différents des moyens des autres, le
principal étant la compétence. L’institution de l’élite, pour fonctionner, a besoin d’être
acceptée, sous la forme de reconnaissance de la compétence, alors que les positions-clés
dans la société doivent être attestées (Suleiman, 1979). La réputation semble être la
condition majeure de la reconnaissance d’une élite, tandis que la mauvaise réputation
mène à des discriminations, elle disqualifie, stigmatise (Croizet, Leyens, 2004). S’affirmer
contre le courant social discriminateur, acquérir la réputation dans les conditions où
l’on appartient à un groupe social négativement étiqueté – n’est qu’un des problèmes
auquel est confrontée la nouvelle élite rom dans la Roumanie contemporaine.
Le terme élitisme semble être un déterminant qui disqualifie, rejette dans le dérisoire
une position acquise par compétence et effort, de même qu’un corps social qui s’affirme
par son talent. Mais ce terme peut également être compris comme une réponse idéologique
issue du discours républicain uniformisant, de l’appel au partage du pouvoir, répondant
en fait à la tentation de considérer l’institution de l’élite comme un phénomène normal
et sous-entendu. En voici une tentative de réhabilitation : « Par élitisme, j’entends la
création et le maintien d’un certain nombre d’institutions où l’accès est extrêmement
difficile, qui accordent une participation à vie, et qui ont la responsabilité de définir
l’excellence et d’en attester la réalité » (Suleiman, 1979 : 12).
L’APPARITION DES NOUVELLES ÉLITES DANS LA ROUMANIE POSTCOMMUNISTE
Les changements sociaux et politiques qui ont eu lieu en Roumanie, la démocratisation
progressive de la société, ont influencé le mode de sélection et d’affirmation des
nouvelles élites. Certains groupes, devenus rapidement des groupes dirigeants, ont
réussi à s’emparer de positions, et à s’y maintenir, grâce à l’occupation de positionsclés dans les espaces politiques et institutionnels. Cette élite a appris à coexister avec
la démocratie. Les hauts fonctionnaires, à en croire la littérature, puisent leur pouvoir
dans les fonctions qu’ils détiennent, et également dans leur appartenance à un groupe
professionnel ou à une classe sociale (la haute bourgeoisie dans les sociétés occidentales,
la nomenklatura politique et administrative dans les anciens pays communistes).
Dans les pays de l’Est, la grande majorité des dirigeants politiques et des hauts
fonctionnaires apparus à la suite des événements et des changements politiques et sociaux
de 1989, ont des liens avec l’ancienne nomenklatura communiste, ou proviennent de
familles appartenant à cette catégorie. Ils ont parcouru un processus de reconversion, à
la suite duquel ils sont devenus des spécialistes des politiques publiques, pouvant aussi
virer vers le secteur privé. C’est ce qui s’est passé en Russie, où ceux qui ont formé la
nouvelle élite politique proviennent de l’ancienne nomenklatura idéologique, formée
dans les écoles du parti (Tcherednidtchenko, 1997) et qui ont choisi « la voie de la
démocratie » (Zdravomyslov, 1997). On a affaire à une situation pareille en Roumanie,
où une bonne partie des hommes politiques, les décideurs d’après 1989, sont issus
des dirigeants du parti, ou sont de ceux qui ont gravité autour des sphères du pouvoir.
Ils ont été formés aux écoles du parti et ont détenu des fonctions de pouvoir avant le
changement (Ioan, 1997). Ceux-ci ont conservé et utilisé les compétences acquises dans
les postes publics durant leurs positions antérieures, en se servant des réseaux et des liens
personnels pour aboutir à la promotion de leurs groupes. Une analyse récente portant
72 •
Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
sur la reconversion des anciennes élites communistes en Roumanie souligne le fait que
le succès enregistré par certains membres de ce corps social est dû à leurs compétences
psychosociales exceptionnelles : ils ont su utiliser le capital symbolique acquis pendant
la dernière période du régime Ceausescu, lorsqu’ils ont été marginalisés ; ils se sont
associés avec les élites sociales qui n’avaient pas été impliquées auparavant dans la vie
politique. Ils ont structuré leur discours en fonction du public choisi, en le rassurant
quant à la transition qui aurait dû être douce et lente, sans produire des changements
brutaux. Ils ont géré la crise d’après le changement politique en utilisant des schémas
socio-cognitifs que la population pouvait comprendre et agréer (Grosescu, 2008).
« Nous sommes une nomenklatura tzigane »
Il n’était pas possible que le phénomène de l’affirmation de la nouvelle élite, dans la
Roumanie post-communiste, ne touche pas la population rom qui vit en symbiose avec
la population majoritaire et qui en emprunte souvent les modèles sociaux, les stratégies
d’affirmation et la gestuelle publique. La communauté rom a appris à développer des
stratégies de cohabitation avec la population majoritaire, en empruntant les politiques
de celle-ci. Ce n’est pas seulement le conformisme communautaire qu’elle a appris et
les techniques de retranchement et de survie, mais surtout les stratégies d’innovation
sociale et d’orientation vers les valeurs qui mènent directement au succès. On comprend
bien que la spécificité du contexte communautaire et la culture que cette population y
avait acquise ont représenté un atout important dans le processus de personnalisation
des stratégies de succès. Il était prévisible que les histoires de vie qui décrivent le
succès, celles que nous connaissons, ou celles décrites par d’autres (voir Voicu, Tufis,
2008), présentent des trajets de formation académique et professionnelle comme une
voie de redécouverte de l’ethnie et des possibilités de promotion au succès. En voici
un premier exemple : M. E., qui se perçoit comme étudiante d’ethnie rom, mais qui
en même temps reconnaît être plus habituée aux traditions roumaines qu’à celles de
son ethnie. Etudiante en 4ème année à l’époque où elle a été interviewée, en 2006, à
présent licenciée en psychologie, elle partage son expérience et nous fait connaître ses
opinions, après avoir vécu la majeure partie du temps parmi les majoritaires c’est-àdire les Roumains. Notre interlocutrice se sent « presque assimilée par la population
majoritaire ». Mais, il y a environ un an, elle a commencé à redécouvrir la culture rom
à l’occasion de sa participation à une rencontre organisée dans le but d’identifier le
nombre d’étudiants rom faisant partie de l’université de Iasi. Depuis lors, elle prend part
aux séminaires, aux rencontres, elle s’implique de plus en plus dans la redécouverte de
la culture non-assimilée afin de connaître les traditions et la manière de vivre des Roms.
Elle raconte : « Je me suis redécouverte et j’ai ainsi cessé d’avoir honte d’appartenir
à cette ethnie rom. Jusqu’ici je me sentais plutôt appartenir à l’ethnie roumaine qu’à
l’ethnie rom, mais les choses ont changé depuis environ un an ; ça ne veut pourtant
pas dire que je rejette la citoyenneté roumaine ». Ce processus de redécouverte des
origines, nous l’avons souvent rencontré parmi nos interlocuteurs.
Les représentants de la communauté rom qui projettent d’accéder à des positions
sociales élevées doivent constamment s’adapter aux changements produits autour d’eux,
aux paramètres de l’évolution sociale post-communiste. Si la société roumaine change,
la population rom est censée suivre ce processus de changement ; si la société s’oriente
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Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
vers une formation académique plus élevée, vers l’innovation, le développement culturel,
vers de nouvelles normes politiques, la minorité rom suit de près cette tendance. On
est en présence d’une vieille culture qui change rapidement, assimilant de nouvelles
valeurs. « Personnellement – nous confie un important responsable de la communauté
rom de Roumanie, V. N., Secrétaire Général ERGO ((European Roma Grassroot
Organisation – je considère que les différences entre les élites roumaines et les élites
Organisation)
rom sont non seulement dépourvues de signification par rapport aux ressemblances,
mais pour la plupart elles sont inventées, elles n’existent pas réellement ». Monsieur
V.N. considère qu’il existe des différences plus importantes entre différentes catégories
de Roms qu’entre celles-ci et la population majoritaire : « Les Rudari (artisans du bois),
les forgerons, les Roms musulmans, les joailliers, les orpailleurs, les Roms hongrois
(Gabors), les vǎtrasii (sédentaires), les montreurs d’ours (ursari
(ursari)
ursari), les Roms de Ferentari,
les Roms de Berceni, les Roms assimilés qui vivent tous à Bucarest sont plus différents
les uns par rapport aux autres que par rapport à leurs voisins roumains ».
L’idée de la similarité existante entre les élites de la population majoritaire et celles
de la population rom se retrouve aussi chez un autre interlocuteur, G. D., directeur de
l’agence « Ensemble » ((Agency for Community Development)
lopment : « Il existe certainement
lopment)
une élite rom, qu’on parle d’une élite intellectuelle, financière et/ou d’une élite culturelle »,
soutient notre interlocuteur. « Je ne trouve pas que la représentation des élites soit
différente chez les Roms par rapport à la population majoritaire. Certainement qu’il
existe en Moldavie des professeurs universitaires, musiciens, professionnels de tous les
domaines, des gens qui amassent des biens, comme il en existe partout. Je ne crois pas
qu’il y ait une distinction nette entre élite rom et élite majoritaire, avec la seule réserve
qu’un groupe de l’élite rom fait partie de la catégorie des « Roms invisibles ». Notre
répondant ne tarde pas à préciser son statut : « Malheureusement ou heureusement,
je ne pense appartenir ni à l’une ni à l’autre de ces deux catégories. Je peux dire que
j’appartiens à la trop mince classe moyenne, ou à ce que j’appelle les Roms invisibles
(cette catégorie de Roms qui ne serait pas perçue en tant que rom si elle n’assumait pas
son identité, pour la seule raison que ses représentants ne répondent pas à la perception
stéréotypée que les majoritaires ont au sujet de la population rom ».
Qui plus est, certains ont emprunté de mauvaises habitudes à un segment de
l’élite majoritaire. Un professeur de sociologie, V. B., est particulièrement critique à
ce sujet : « Tout comme chez les majoritaires, on retrouve chez les Roms les mêmes
caractéristiques, la même motivation. Les gens d’affaires et les dignitaires, les
parlementaires tout spécialement [se font remarquer] par une infatuation effrontée et
le mépris envers la loi et envers leurs semblables, ceux qui les ont aidés ou servis ».
Quant à l’élite intellectuelle, « elle n’est pas reconnue ; elle est ignorée et délibérément
passée sous silence. La valeur suprême de la communauté est le plus souvent l’argent,
qui, d’habitude, est associé au pouvoir physique. Les deux créent des élites ».
Avec une particularité tout de même, que nous pouvons maintenant souligner
sans hésitation. Dans le cas de la nouvelle élite rom, ses représentants ne proviennent
pas d’une ancienne nomenklatura communiste, mais ils appartiennent à la couche
moyenne ou même pauvre de la population rom. Les success-stories racontées par Delia
Bobîrsc dans le livre de Madalin Voicu et Claudiu Tufis évoquent la situation matérielle
précaire qui caractérise le milieu de provenance des interlocuteurs, la pauvreté de leurs
74 •
Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
familles d’origine. Ils forment un groupe nouveau, sans traditions et sans liens. Ceux
qui proviennent de familles soi-disant « nobiliaires » (on se réfère ici à une catégorie
spéciale, folklorique qui se signale par les vêtements et les coutumes) n’ont pas eu
besoin d’études ou de hautes qualifications pour s’affirmer et être reconnus, parce
qu’ils détiennent de toute façon une autorité locale, transmise par voie héréditaire,
par tradition. « Ceux-ci, étant des esprits traditionalistes et fermés, se font facilement
voir, ils sont différents… Chez eux, c’est l’argent qui prime » (M. D., licenciée en
psychologie). Raison pour laquelle ils n’ont pas été motivés et encouragés à poursuivre
des études. Ils constituent « une élite autoproclamée, comme on peut voir dans le groupe
des forgerons, mais forment en fait une fausse élite. Ils sont vraiment pittoresques, les
médias les préfèrent, mais ils ne constituent pas les véritables élites » (c’est l’opinion
de D. I., 32 ans, informaticien et étudiant en assistance sociale, spécialiste en marketing,
directeur de ventes dans une entreprise de publicité).
La nouvelle élite rom représente un groupe qui s’est affirmé par ses propres forces.
Ce groupe se distingue du trajet de l’élite gouvernementale des majoritaires, la plupart
sont des figures neuves, inconnues avant le changement politique de 1989. Ce sont des
gens relativement jeunes. Ils ont gagné leur réputation et la reconnaissance de leurs
mérites suite à leurs efforts personnels, à leur engagement dans une course pour le
développement de la communauté et l’occupation de positions dans l’espace public.
« Ce groupe – affirme D. I. – n’est pas une « élite de télévision » (notre interlocuteur
se réfère à une certaine catégorie de leaders folkloriques – chefs de communauté
(
(boulibasha),
rois, empereurs – qui occupent souvent les écrans de la télévision,
étant promus pour ce qu’ils ont de spectaculaire). Ce sont des intellectuels capables
d’entreprendre une analyse critique, d’émettre des théories, d’élaborer des stratégies.
Il existe en Roumanie une telle élite rom qui affirme son identité, dont les membres
sont très impliqués, qui n’oublient pas leurs dettes morales et qui ont la conscience
d’appartenir à une communauté ». C’est le processus d’affirmation de cette élite qui
constitue notre principal objectif dans cette étude.
Notre débat porte essentiellement sur les Roms de l’Est, plus exactement du nord-est
de la Roumanie, qui se trouvent dans la période post-communiste dans des situations
similaires à celles de la population majoritaire ; ceux-ci ont bien supporté toutes les
rigueurs des régimes totalitaires et ils ont été obligés de s’adapter pendant environ un
demi-siècle aux contraintes des régimes communistes. A présent ils supportent à nouveau
des bouleversements, comme le dit Auzias (1993), cette fois-ci « les bouleversements
du post-communisme, à un tournant-clé de leur histoire ».
Comment est apparu et comment a évolué le groupe socioprofessionnel dont on
parle ? La pensée stéréotypée, comme nous l’avons déjà dit, accorde le statut d’élite rom
aux membres de cette communauté qui se font remarquer par le coté spectaculaire, aux
personnes ayant une visibilité à part, connues par des signes extérieurs, médiatisées. Leur
réputation résulte souvent de l’association avec le phénomène « châteaux tsiganes »,
limousines, riches parures en or, vêtements pittoresques parfois et comportements
ostentatoires. Ces membres de la communauté ont acquis la notoriété par l’intermédiaire
du capital économique et symbolique, par des actes personnels, individuels, et aussi
par des gestes de façade à l’intérieur de la communauté ; mais ce statut ne dépasse pas
les limites d’une communauté restreinte.
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Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
Depuis environ dix ans est apparu en Roumanie un groupe social assez nombreux
qui illustre parfaitement le sens donné au terme élite dans la sociologie occidentale ;
la catégorie des personnes éduquées, des formateurs d’opinion, des personnes-clés des
institutions qui assurent l’interface entre les majoritaires et la population rom. Leur
réputation provient du capital social acquis à la suite de la fréquentation de hautes
écoles – jadis inaccessibles à ce segment social –, ou par l’occupation de positions
privilégiées dans les structures institutionnelles de l’Etat : dans l’enseignement, dans
la police, dans l’assistance sociale, dans les services d’assistance communautaire, mais
aussi dans des entreprises à succès du secteur privé.
En 1993, lors d’une table ronde ayant comme sujet la situation des familles rom en
Europe de l’Est en pleine période post-communiste, quelques années seulement après
la chute du communisme dans tous les pays de cette région européenne, un sociologue
roumain, Nicolae Gheorghe, affirmait la nécessité de l’apparition et de la constitution
d’une élite intellectuelle rom.
Chercheur dans un institut de recherches de l’Académie Roumaine, représentant
de la communauté rom de Roumanie, N. G. précise sans aucune retenue le fait que
ce groupe existait déjà, sous une forme plus frêle : « Nous sommes une nomenklatura
tzigane » – cette nomenklatura ne devrait que se développer, occuper des positions
sociales, s’institutionnaliser et se faire reconnaître. Les prémisses en existent, affirme
N. Gheorghe, les Tsiganes de l’Est ont été sédentarisés, et intégrés aux économies de
leurs pays, ils offrent la main-d’œuvre qualifiée dans plusieurs domaines, peuvent
dynamiser l’économie de marché par leur talent d’entrepreneurs et par leur force
d’innovation, ils peuvent sans doute devenir un moteur du développement social :
« Il y a aussi une couche tsigane éduquée dans les services, une petite bourgeoisie qui
se reflète aujourd’hui dans la vie politique » (Gheorghe : 10-13). Il a pourtant fallu
quelques années pour que cette minorité active se décide à s’orienter vers des études
supérieures, vers la carrière, pour que certains des représentants de cette communauté
comprennent que l’éducation et l’enrichissement spirituel peuvent devenir une manière
de sortir du ghetto et de la pauvreté.
Comme on l’a déjà énoncé, la nouvelle élite rom est une classe ou un groupe
relativement récent, parue suite à une tentative de la société roumaine – en pleine
transition – de remédier à la discrimination à laquelle la minorité rom avait été soumise et
d’offrir une chance d’affirmation à ses représentants. Nous allons citer, à titre d’exemple
emblématique, le discours d’une représentante de cette élite rom qui occupe une position
importante dans l’administration de la Ville de Iasi. M. H. est conseillère du préfet de
Iasi, assurant à la fois le rôle de plaque tournante des informations et des décisions qui
concernent la formation de la nouvelle élite rom. Elle reconnaît son appartenance à ce
groupe socioprofessionnel (« j’appartiens à la nouvelle élite rom, au nouveau groupe
instruit et formé dans de hautes écoles ») et revendique une ascendance qui passe
par une série de personnalités du monde de la littérature et de l’art, qui ont enrichi le
patrimoine culturel roumain. Cultivée, ayant poursuivi des études dans le domaine
des sciences sociales, notre interlocutrice n’oublie pas d’évoquer ses prédécesseurs,
des écrivains comme Anton Pan, des musiciens, des chanteurs appartenant à l’élite
rom qui s’est affirmée dans l’entre-deux-guerres. « Il y a eu même une publication
de la communauté rom à Craiova, Le Temps, il y a eu des organisations, sorte de
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Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
précurseurs des ONG d’aujourd’hui. Mais après la guerre, l’avènement du communisme
a déterminé, entre autres, la disparition de cette vie spirituelle. La communauté n’était
plus reconnue. Personne n’osait plus à l’époque affirmer son origine ». On menait
alors une politique d’assimilation, d’intégration à la majorité et de ralliement aux
valeurs imposées par le pouvoir (voir aussi Voicu et Tufis, 2008). Après la révolution
de 1989 on assista à un changement des mentalités. « Il y en a eu qui ont décliné leur
origine ; d’autres – qui ne l’ont pas fait, ils n’en ont pas eu et ils n’en ont pas même
aujourd’hui le courage. L’explosion s’est produite après 1990 lorsque les membres de
cette communauté ont eu accès aux écoles, aux universités. De 1990 jusqu’à aujourd’hui
une élite rom s’est formée. A Iasi il existe à présent (l’interview date de mai 2008)
plus de 80 étudiants, comme l’année passée. Certains parmi eux occupent les places
réservées aux étudiants rom, mais d’autres ont postulé pour des places avec les étudiants
majoritaires. Ces derniers sont encore plus nombreux que ceux qui occupent les places
spécialement conçues pour les Roms. Ces jeunes sont les futurs professionnels et ils
s’impliquent effectivement dans ce qu’ils font, étant à la fois activistes, militants pour
le développement de leur communauté. Ce qui est à remarquer pour leur communauté
de Moldavie, c’est qu’ils appartiennent aux Roms Ursari. Ceux-ci sont toujours restés
plus près des majoritaires, ont vécu avec eux, se sont plus facilement adaptés, et ont
assimilé les stratégies de promotion sociale. La plupart sont maintenant des musiciens
et des commerçants, ils représentent des catégories sociales actives et innovatrices ».
Les opinions de l’interlocutrice sont renforcées par d’autres sujets interviewés, qui
insistent sur les deux dimensions : formation et spécialisation professionnelle, mais
aussi l’implication dans les problèmes de la communauté. M. D., inspecteur dans une
Direction d’Assistance Communautaire, qui travaille parmi les majoritaires, souligne :
« les élites sont les personnes qui ont poursuivi des études, mais qui aident aussi la
communauté, qui militent pour les droits, pour l’amélioration du niveau de vie des
Roms ». En outre, ces gens doivent faire preuve d’aptitudes particulières, y compris
les aptitudes sociales. A plus dix ans de la révolution de 1989, l’accès à l’université se
fait encore à travers un concours d’admission très difficile. On peut avoir dix candidats
pour une place (voir les facultés de Droit, de Sciences économiques, la psychologie,
l’assistance sociale). Les chances de réussite dans l’enseignement supérieur étaient
liées à la réputation du lycée terminé et aux possibilités de la famille d’assurer les
moyens financiers pour bien préparer le concours d’admission. Les candidats de la
communauté rom provenaient d’habitude de lycées industriels, où la formation théorique
était précaire, et leurs familles n’étaient pas intéressées, ou n’avaient pas la possibilité
d’assurer une préparation suivie en vue de l’examen d’admission. Dans ces conditions,
tout comme dans la période communiste, les jeunes Roms réussissaient rarement à
accéder à l’enseignement de haute qualité.
En 1998, lorsque le ministère de l’Education était conduit par Andrei Marga,
on a assigné des places spéciales pour les Roms, et l’on a organisé un concours
d’admission spécial pour les membres de cette communauté. On a ainsi facilité l’accès
à l’enseignement supérieur aux jeunes gens provenant des rangs de cette communauté.
C’est dans ces conditions qu’on a vu apparaître les premiers groupes d’étudiants rom
dans des facultés comme celles que l’on vient d’énumérer. A l’université de Iasi, par
exemple, en psychologie, on a formé un groupe de 15 étudiants rom, ceux-ci étant
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Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
redistribués, à partir de la deuxième année, dans d’autres groupes. Dans ce premier
groupe compact d’étudiants rom on a admis également des personnes moins jeunes, à
condition qu’elles passent le concours d’admission, même si ce concours promouvait
la discrimination positive.
En Roumanie, il n’a jamais existé et il n’existe pas non plus aujourd’hui le phénomène
des « hautes écoles » comme par exemple en France, offrant des filières qui assurent
la formation de l’élite. Un diplôme universitaire permettait et assure encore l’accès
vers les hautes positions dans les institutions d’Etat, dans des positions de prestige.
Dans notre cas, le rôle de haute école est détenu par l’université, de façon générale
par les études supérieures, jadis un rêve impossible à réaliser pour les membres de
la communauté rom. Un diplôme universitaire donne accès à des carrières d’Etat, de
la fonction publique. En même temps, ces diplômes singularisent, ils confèrent une
distinction. Les diplômés universitaires sont ceux qui constituent le corps de ce que
l’on pourrait nommer « les élites de l’Etat », ce sont les spécialistes qui se mettent au
service de l’Etat. Ils sont des conseillers de divers notables (maires, préfets, présidents
de Conseils régionaux) responsables des services de relations publiques dans différentes
institutions, professeurs, inspecteurs de personnel, officiers de police, assistants sociaux,
mais aussi avocats, ingénieurs et informaticiens. C’est de ces statuts qu’ils tirent leur
remarquable influence. Ils n’ont pas seulement un pouvoir limité à une communauté
restreinte, comme dans le cas des élites rom traditionnelles, mais détiennent le pouvoir
que leur confère un poste-clé reconnu par le sceau de l’institution de l’Etat.
Ils se détachent des élites « en carton », comme on nomme les politiciens récemment
enrichis, ironisant ainsi au sujet de leur inconsistance et de leur superficialité. La distinction
en est une des caractéristiques. Les membres des élites traditionnelles, de même que les
enrichis des élites « en carton » peuvent exercer une certaine influence locale et peuvent
devenir des leaders, même des modèles de réussite dans les communautés restreintes
« en se servant de leurs biens, en affichant une opulence qui fascine ». Ceux-ci ne
s’approchent jamais de leurs co-nationaux, ne les aident pas, et ne constituent donc pas
une véritable élite. L’élite est formée – tous nos interlocuteurs sont d’accord sur cette
définition – par des personnes éduquées, des spécialistes qui peuvent accorder assistance
et conseils, qui peuvent orienter la population de la communauté dans le labyrinthe de
la bureaucratie. Ce sont des personnes motivées, provenant de la classe moyenne ou
des basses classes pauvres, qui ont compris que c’est seulement l’éducation qui peut les
sauver. La condition pour que ces individus soient reconnus c’est qu’ils s’impliquent
socialement, qu’ils deviennent les promoteurs de la réussite sociale, qu’ils offrent des
modèles de réussite par l’éducation. E. M., inspectrice à l’Inspectorat Scolaire de Iasi,
nous communique que dans le village de Zece Prăjini, lieu d’origine d’une fanfare
célèbre, reconnue aujourd’hui dans le monde entier, le modèle culturel c’est d’avoir
suivi des études de plus de dix classes. Ce village pauvre a donné des professeurs, des
magistrats, modèles de réussite par l’éducation. La conseillère du préfet, M. H., nous
raconte que dans sa famille plusieurs filles ont suivi des études supérieures, ont franchi
la barrière sociale, ayant comme modèle l’ascension de leur cousine.
Pour synthétiser : la formation de l’élite rom authentique est liée à l’accès aux
« hautes écoles », aux universités ; ces institutions confèrent des compétences et des
positions, de la légitimité, améliorent l’image de soi, distinguent et sélectionnent,
78 •
Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
confèrent de la supériorité et de la sécurité ; elles consacrent, elles confèrent « un certain
charisme », elles sacralisent, pouvant même parfois créer une aura mythologique.
Certains individus se spécialisent dans les relations humaines, d’autres deviennent
des musiciens ou des informaticiens, spécialistes de haute tenue qui pénètrent dans
les réseaux des professionnels de marque. Cela leur confère le pouvoir que détiennent
les spécialistes de notoriété. Leur capital professionnel et culturel peut se convertir en
capital politique et/ou économique.
LES ÉLITES ROM COMME MINORITÉ ACTIVE
Pour Charles Wright Mills (1969) les élites sont formées par des gens qui occupent
des « postes-clés » dans des organisations essentielles de la société. Leurs représentants
accèdent à ces positions et s’y maintiennent en établissant des contacts sociaux avec les
catégories sociales du même niveau de formation, en entretenant des liens, apprenant
les normes et les codes de ceux qui ont formé les réseaux ; leurs interactions sont des
relations de complicité. Dans le cas des nouvelles élites rom, la difficulté consiste à se
faire accepter par les élites majoritaires comme spécialistes, professionnels, experts à
statut égal. Ces individus doivent donc apprendre les codes et les signes de reconnaissance
pratiqués par les majoritaires, doivent développer des stratégies d’interaction utilisées
par les autres et les utiliser fréquemment dans leur travail, afin de se faire reconnaître.
Voici l’opinion d’une inspectrice dans une Direction d’Assistance Communautaire :
« Pour pénétrer dans le monde des majoritaires, les Roms ont besoin d’une meilleure
information que ces derniers. Ils font partie de deux mondes différents, le monde de
leur communauté et le monde des majoritaires, de façon qu’ils doivent toujours prouver
leur compétence. Ils doivent avoir une meilleure formation que les majoritaires, qui
sont reçus les bras ouverts ».
Les premiers groupes d’étudiants rom reçus à l’université à la suite du décret Marga
se sont confrontés à deux types de contraintes : les hautes exigences académiques qui
sollicitent des efforts particuliers pour rattraper les handicaps dans leur formation initiale,
et la réticence de les accepter, manifestée par certains collègues majoritaires (parfois
même par les professeurs), très réservés par rapport à la manière dont ils ont pénétré
dans ce corps d’élite. C’était une première : pour la première fois des groupes compacts
d’étudiants rom étaient admis à l’université. Leur simple présence, leurs prestations,
leur participation à la vie de la communauté académique, l’affirmation de leurs talents
artistiques pendant les réunions de socialisation imposaient déjà une reconsidération de
la représentation sociale quant à leur possibilité de s’affirmer comme intellectuels.
Les recherches sur les « minorités actives », concept proposé et développé par Serge
Moscovici (1979), ont prouvé que les minorités n’exercent pas une influence manifeste
(directe ou publique), mais une influence latente (indirecte, différente, ponctuelle,
privée). Dans notre cas, la seule présence en faculté d’un groupe minoritaire a provoqué
une certaine ambiguïté, une interrogation. Elle a remis en question la pression que la
majorité exerçait pour maintenir une certaine uniformité et unanimité. Elle a permis de
découvrir qu’il existait une alternative à la façon de concevoir la condition d’étudiant.
Les minoritaires proposent en effet un modèle de pensée différent, non conforme à
celui de la majorité. Ils innovent et exercent eux aussi une pression qui témoigne d’une
influence active, visible, en vue de changer les mentalités, de modifier les idées reçues,
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Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
les conceptions traditionnelles, l’ancien mode d’envisager le domaine académique. Si
le concept de minorité se trouve à l’origine du processus d’innovation (Moscovici,
Doms, 1984), alors ce qui s’est passé dans les facultés a permis de modifier les opinions
concernant la condition d’étudiant, de repenser les valeurs et de restructurer les
jugements concernant la vie quotidienne dans les universités. Il est important de noter
qu’un conflit cognitif s’est déclenché, provoquant un débat public (parfois explicite,
souvent implicite). Il est devenu évident que les facultés devraient accepter dorénavant
un groupe minoritaire qui n’avait pas eu jusqu’ici accès à ce corps d’élite. A travers
un problème pratique, on obtint des renseignements sur une minorité sociale jadis
invisible dans ce milieu social. Symboliquement, des significations se dégageaient, on
découvrait de nouvelles modalités d’interaction entre les acteurs sociaux majoritaires
et minoritaires, et l’on imposa de nouveaux styles de comportement. Les étudiants
rom furent une source d’influence. Ce sont eux qui ont déterminé la reconnaissance et
la validation d’un groupe minoritaire dans un milieu social exclusiviste, déclenchant
un mouvement d’innovation dans la pensée sociale dominante. Leur présence et leur
prestation sont devenues source de changement et la communauté universitaire ne
pouvait plus fonctionner comme avant.
Eux-mêmes ont changé. Lors d’un focus-group organisé en 2000 avec les étudiants
rom de la faculté de Psychologie, une étudiante nous dévoila ses hésitations et ses
craintes quant à l’évolution ultérieure des relations avec les autres collègues : « Les
attentes envers nous sont plus grandes, nous avons maintenant accès au statut de vrais
étudiants… et, à voir nos collègues, leur façon de s’habiller, leur vocabulaire, leur
prestation aux cours et aux examens…, je considère vraiment qu’ils sont supérieurs… je
répète, personnellement je voudrais me considérer leur égale et tout aussi capable, mais
… ce qui me manque c’est la volonté… je n’ai pas de volonté… et pour cela je respecte
mes collègues… c’est ici que je situe le problème d’intégration tel que je le vois. Mes
collègues de faculté… j’ai eu l’impression qu’ils ressentaient une injustice, au moins
c’est ce que je crois… ils se sont sentis défavorisés, c’est pour cela qu’ils ont été un
peu distants, parce que nous, nous avons été admis à l’université tout simplement, sans
concours… je crois qu’ils ont été défavorisés, c’est ce que j’ai senti. Plus tard ils ont
réalisé qu’en fait chacun gardait sa place et puis tout a changé… ». Un autre collègue
ajoute : « Nos collègues croyaient que les Roms sont récalcitrants… mais lorsqu’ils
ont vu que nous étions sociables, ils ont changé d’opinion ».
Notre discussion a laissé voir que les étudiants rom ont compris assez vite qu’ils
avaient beaucoup à rattraper et qu’ils ne seraient pas traités comme un groupe privilégié :
« nous ne voulons pas un régime spécial aux examens, nous voulons passer les examens
dans les mêmes conditions, et c’est ici la subtilité ; il y en a parmi nous qui en sont
mécontents, mais il y en a aussi qui trouvent ça normal… nous sommes arrivés ici avec
l’idée préconçue d’être traités différemment, cela s’est passé pendant un semestre, puis
nous devions rattraper…, nous avons aimé les évaluations pendant le semestre et je dis
que nous devons être traités comme des égaux ». Ces étudiants ont assimilé les normes
et se sont adaptés aux exigences du statut.
Les étudiants rom ont parcouru rapidement un programme intensif d’apprentissage
social et d’articulation au nouveau contexte. Ils ont été impliqués dans différents
programmes de formation, ils ont connu d’autres collègues d’autres centres universitaires,
80 •
Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
ils ont commencé à prendre des initiatives : « … nous avons souvent été invités à une
conférence à Bucarest… à un séminaire, à une séance, à une table ronde. On discute…
ça m’a plu. J’ai participé à une conférence à Cluj, puis on nous a invités à Oradea pour
voir comment ça se passe, comment ça fonctionne… Maintenant nous voulons faire
la même chose à Iasi ».
Les étudiants rom réalisent qu’ils sont appelés à changer quelque chose dans leur
communauté, ils assument des responsabilités. Une étudiante partage son expérience :
« J’ai été à Ciurea pour y ouvrir une école maternelle… et là-bas j’ai été très surprise
de voir combien ils étaient nombreux ceux qui voulaient apprendre… ils avaient
20 ans, 22 ans, 25 ans qui disaient ‘nous voulons apprendre’. Ils ne savent rien,
même pas lire… Ce sont des gens oubliés, nous voulons mettre en place cette école
maternelle, ça fait plus de cinq mois que nous ne trouvons pas un mur séparateur, le
programme coûte… très cher, nous n’avons pas d’argent, le programme n’as pas prévu
les aménagements… c’est-à-dire que nous voulons avoir deux salles de classe… une
pour la première classe et l’autre pour la maternelle. Ce mur est un vrai problème,
croyez-moi, ça fait longtemps que nous ne trouvons pas de solution… pas d’argent,
lorsqu’il s’agit de Roms tout le monde dit ‘ils ont de l’argent’. Il y en a qui ont, mais ils
n’en donnent pas, parce que… comment vous dire… ils n’ont pas confiance. Ils n’ont
pas confiance parce qu’ils ont déjà donné de l’argent au maire de Bucium, à d’autres
personnes qui n’ont rien fait pour eux. Et boulibacha Goliat (le chef des Tsiganes de
cette communauté), il dit ‘à quoi ça leur sert d’avoir des livres’, et qu’il ne serait pas
content qu’on le fasse (le projet)… ».
Notre expérience a confirmé l’idée de Moscovici selon laquelle la présence et
l’action d’une minorité visible et cohérente peut changer la conception de la majorité
et son mode de fonctionnement. La présence de la minorité rom dans les universités
a déclenché un processus d’innovation sociale mais qui n’a pas été déterminé par le
nombre des étudiants rom, ni par leurs compétences spéciales, mais par leur présence
même et par leur discours alternatif. Ils ont d’abord exercé une influence privée en tant
qu’individus, avant d’occuper des fonctions publiques et d’acquérir de l’expertise et
du pouvoir d’influence.
LE POUVOIR DE LA MINORITÉ ACTIVE
Qui a l’autorité et qui exerce le pouvoir dans les communautés rom ? Notre guide
d’interview contenait une question formulée de la manière suivante : « Lorsque vous
pensez à la communauté rom, vous pensez d’abord aux riches ou à ceux qui occupent
des positions grâce à leur formation professionnelle ? Expliquez votre choix ». Nos
interlocuteurs, appartenant à la seconde catégorie, nous ont expliqué que si ces derniers
devaient occuper les positions de pouvoir, les choses seraient complètement différentes.
V.B. nous répond sèchement : « Je pense à ceux qui ont une formation professionnelle,
mais la communauté pense aux riches ». Et de nous expliquer : « L’élite apparaît dans le
mental collectif comme groupe, malheureusement indistinct, massifié, comme imaginaire
et non pas comme existant réellement, comme un groupe de spécialistes qui réfléchit ;
lorsqu’il s’agit de l’identifier… les gens se tournent vers l’autre catégorie. Cela leur
semble plus facile ». Après avoir invoqué « les coutumes et les particularités culturelles
spécifiques à une minorité », un autre interlocuteur, G. D., plaide pour la valorisation
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Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
des professionnels impliqués socialement, ceux qui s’occupent de l’intégration sociale
des Roms : « personnellement, je pense que la majorité des Roms a de gros problèmes
d’inclusion sociale. C’est peut-être à cause de mon expérience de travail (ça fait 9 ans
que je travaille dans des programmes de développement locaux communautaires dans des
communautés de Roms), mais aussi de la littérature parcourue, doublée par ma trajectoire
académique (diplôme en sociologie et assistance sociale). Les catégories auxquelles vous
faites référence me passent par la tête lorsque je réfléchis aux modalités d’utilisation
des ressources intracommunautaires afin d’initier et de mettre en oeuvre un processus
de développement durable ». M. V. plaide aussi pour l’implication et le militantisme
social par le moyen de l’exemple personnel et offre son modèle d’activisme à l’usage
de la communauté comme dette morale de quelqu’un qui a réussi socialement : « Je
suis membre de deux fondations, la Fondation Internationale Ion Voicu, qui a comme
but la promotion des jeunes talents, et membre de la fondation Tot arc qui organise des
spectacles, des séminaires, cours, bourses pour les enfants doués dans tous les domaines
et de toutes les couleurs ; nous n’avons donc pas un système focalisé sur l’ethnie rom.
Je fais un travail qui ne m’apporte aucun bénéfice, dans lequel j’investis beaucoup,
même de l’argent, mais qui excite mon dynamisme et qui m’ennoblit ».
Un autre exemple de militantisme pour le développement social de la communauté
nous a été offert par un pasteur protestant d’un village pauvre du département de Iasi.
Interrogé sur la manière dont il est devenu pasteur, il répond qu’il a été important pour
lui non pas d’être un leader, mais de changer, d’avoir le pouvoir de changer la situation
qui existait dans cette localité. Depuis son enfance, il a détesté ce qui se passait dans
cette communauté (agressivité, violence, prises de bec) et il a rêvé de faire quelque
chose qui puisse améliorer la vie des Roms, et sa propre vie. Il ne savait pas quoi
exactement, mais il y avait en lui ce désir, et de plus, la conviction que Dieu peut
rendre les gens meilleurs, plus charitables. A la fin de ses dix années d’étude, notre
interlocuteur n’était pas content de l’éducation reçue, c’était insuffisant pour lui ; c’est
pourquoi il a décidé de lire plusieurs livres pour amasser des connaissances, et pour
enrichir son vocabulaire. Il aurait pu être payé par les autorités pour travailler dans la
communauté rom. Mais il a choisi une autre voie. C’est un leader communautaire, mais
non pas officiel, donc il n’est pas payé, mais il est respecté pour sa prestation, pour son
style et sa conduite. L’important pour lui c’est d’avoir changé le mental collectif et le
comportement de ses concitoyens.
Les spécialistes, les professionnels, les intellectuels rom ne sont pas suffisamment
valorisés dans la société. On a rencontré cette opinion chez plusieurs de nos interlocuteurs.
Souvent, ces personnes sont obligées de taire leur appartenance ethnique devant les
majoritaires. De façon paradoxale, il leur arrive de ne pas être appréciés par leur
communauté non plus. « Ce sont des universitaires, des médecins, des magistrats,
des officiers, etc. Ils n’ont aucun prestige dans la communauté, ils s’en sont détachés,
la communauté les ignore (V.B.) ». Notre interlocuteur nous conseille d’observer
quels sont les modèles culturels valorisés : le monde de la périphérie, de ceux qui se
débrouillent, qui construisent des stratégies de succès tout en ignorant le travail, la culture,
l’instruction, l’éducation. « Ecoutez les paroles des manele (chansons d’inspiration
orientale adaptées à des réalités locales, de qualité douteuse) », nous invite celui-ci,
en nous suggérant que dans ces chansons nous ne trouverons jamais une exhortation
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Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
à la valorisation de l’élite intellectuelle. N’étant pas reconnus, ces intellectuels n’ont
aucun pouvoir d’influencer l’opinion.
Avoir le pouvoir, se soumettre au pouvoir, déléguer le pouvoir, prendre le
pouvoir – voici des préoccupations constantes des individus qui représentent les
élites. Les psychologues ont identifié plusieurs types de « sources » du pouvoir, les
unes extrêmement visibles et faciles à démonter, les autres qui dénotent l’élaboration
et la compétence à diriger. Parmi ces sources, la possession des moyens de sanction
(récompense et punition), les compétences interactionnelles spéciales, les compétences
techniques (le degré d’expertise), la possession des moyens de contrôle, la légitimité,
la capacité de susciter « l’amour » de la communauté (Enriquez, 2007) : par exemple la
possibilité de contrôler l’organisation de la vie, l’existence des autres. Avoir les moyens
de contrôle signifie détenir la base matérielle du pouvoir. Dans le cas des communautés
traditionnelles de Roms, le processus d’acquisition et de maintien du pouvoir est
simple, mais efficace. C’est D. E. qui nous le dévoile, un interlocuteur particulièrement
important. En ce qui concerne l’organisation des Roms, notre interviewé soutient qu’il
existe des différences d’un groupe ethnique rom à l’autre : chez les forgerons, chez
ceux qui gardent les traditions, les vêtements… l’organisation est du type caste, le
boulibacha en tête, et avec des règles très strictes. D’habitude ils choisissent pour chef
(
(boulibacha)
le plus intelligent parmi eux, mais il se constitue également des centres de
pouvoir dans la communauté, en fonction du pouvoir financier. A Ciurea (communauté
rom aux environs de Iasi) deux familles riches se sont disputé le pouvoir ; leurs
membres ont constaté que ça n’allait pas, on risquait de désintégrer la communauté,
et dans ces conditions ils ont décidé de choisir comme boulibacha un ancien, pauvre,
mais le plus respecté par tous dans la communauté. De façon générale, le pouvoir se
transmet par héritage, étant basé sur le respect avant toute chose. Autrement, on risque
la désintégration de la communauté. Dans ces communautés de Roms organisées sous
forme de caste, où le chef a encore le pouvoir, les membres ont moins de liberté de
quitter la communauté pour choisir d’autres métiers ou pour faire des études. Les
leaders contrôlent le mouvement des individus. « Le chef a un pouvoir incroyable ;
les membres de la communauté font ensemble le même métier et participent tous à un
projet économique. Par exemple, à Ciurea, ils ont mis sur pied, ensemble, une fabrique
de briques. Ça leur convient. Ils vont tous bien du point de vue économique. Vous
avez vu les châteaux qu’on y a bâtis ! ». En ce qui concerne les différences sociales
et économiques existantes entre les Roms, notre interlocuteur trouve que dans les
communautés, il existe une sorte d’acceptation tacite de ces différences, et elles sont
maintenues à cause du niveau très bas de l’éducation. Les Roms pauvres acceptent ce
statut parce que, s’ils ne le respectaient pas, ils devraient partir de la communauté. Il
y aurait la possibilité de changer le système s’il ne convient pas. Or, ils acceptent tout,
parce que les riches de la communauté donnent aux pauvres la possibilité de gagner
leur pain, ils leur donnent du travail. Il semble que c’est le manque d’éducation qui les
maintient dans le système. Dans les communautés rom bien organisées, les différences
économiques sont acceptées telles quelles et la hiérarchie est respectée.
Comme nous venons de l’exemplifier, le détenteur de moyens de contrôle peut devenir
ainsi un objet de vénération, il peut susciter l’admiration, voire même l’amour ; en tout
cas, il suscite le respect pour la force que dégage les symboles extérieurs du pouvoir.
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Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
Ce mécanisme nous a été expliqué par un observateur et théoricien très compétent :
« Les valeurs actuelles de la société roumaine sont basées sur la mise en évidence de
pareils éléments. Très éloquent à ce sujet est le fait que la majeure partie des Roms, s’ils
gagnaient au Loto par exemple, gaspilleraient l’argent pour s’acheter une limousine et
une maison. La situation est la même pour les Roumains qui travaillent à l’étranger. Les
gens d’affaires font la même chose… Je ne vois pas pourquoi les Roms riches devraient
agir différemment par rapport aux majoritaires… » (G. D.). De la transformation du
détenteur du pouvoir symbolique en un objet d’admiration sacrée il n’y a pas loin.
Cela veut dire que cet individu peut induire des pulsions de vie, qu’il peut orienter
le parcours des autres et peut leur demander de se consacrer à ses propres projets. Le
dérapage de l’ensemble (la communauté, l’organisation) vers la direction des ambitions
de l’initiateur, de celui qui assume la structuration de la pensée de chaque individu et
l’organisation cognitive de la collectivité, est une des plus perfides conséquences de
l’abandon au pouvoir.
Détenir le contrôle veut dire aussi disposer des moyens de sanction ou de récompense ;
le fait extrêmement banal d’avoir à sa disposition les instruments de sanction et/ou
la possibilité d’offrir des récompenses (position sociale, petites attentions, dons en
nature – distribuer des biens et des emplois c’est rendre le bénéficiaire dépendant de la
source de pouvoir, organiser sa vie, ordonner son existence). Celui qui offre illégalement
l’argent, à titre public ou individuel, suggère aussi l’ouverture au pouvoir. Les riches
de la communauté rom, tout comme les politiciens, utilisent deux stratégies pour
obtenir la notoriété et la réputation – c’est un aspect sur lequel tombent d’accord tous
nos interlocuteurs. Ils sont tentés de faire des gestes publics spectaculaires, des dons et
des cadeaux qui étonnent. Ils offrent par exemple des dons importants aux Eglises, ce
qui a pour résultat des gains d’image. Ou bien ils gaspillent sans mesure aux noces et
fêtes privées et publiques ou, tout simplement, ils épatent, en descendant de limousines
de luxe, en faisant saillir les signes de la richesse, l’or excessif des parures. Tout cela
est censé impressionner, et crée des relations de domination-soumission. En fait, il se
forme une spirale de dépendances et de complicités.
Un moteur de l’affirmation/reconnaissance du pouvoir est aussi l’identification
avec ceux qui ont réussi, qui ont amassé beaucoup de richesses – la richesse étant le
plus sûr signe du succès. Deux étudiantes à la faculté de Psychologie, et plusieurs de
nos répondants, nous fournissent des opinions que nous avons rencontrées chez tous
les interlocuteurs. Roxana est étonnée par cette conviction très répandue parmi les
majoritaires : « les majoritaires disent que les Roms sont riches, qu’ils ont beaucoup
d’or, mais il y a aussi des Tsiganes qui n’ont rien, qui sont très pauvres. Il y en a, c’est
vrai, qui sont très riches, qui font voir leur richesse ; à Vaslui il y a de très grandes
maisons, on dirait des écoles, et, en plus, très ornées, mais pas le genre ‘châteaux’.
S’ils sont riches, ils le font voir ! » La famille de Roxane fait partie de la « couche
moyenne » ; ils ont deux appartements, une grande maison, mais n’ont pas une vraie
villa. Mais elle tient à préciser leur condition de famille éduquée : « nous ne voulons
pas faire voir ce que nous avons, nous voulons vivre décemment, c’est tout ». Ses
déclarations témoignent d’une haute maturité et d’un niveau culturel élevé : « Les
grandes maisons ont été bâties pour montrer l’opulence de leurs habitants, les biens
détenus, l’argent, les bijoux n’étant plus à la mode. Avant, on faisait du commerce illégal,
84 •
Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
on apportait de la marchandise de l’extérieur et on vendait bien, mais maintenant ça
ne va plus. La plupart de ces commerçants ont leurs propres sociétés, ils vendent des
autos de l’extérieur. C’est comme ça qu’ils ont amassé leurs biens, grâce au commerce
clandestin, ils apportent des jeans par exemple, s’ils sont très nombreux dans leur
famille ils partent à l’étranger et envoient de l’argent à ceux qui restent à la maison ».
Les maisons à tours sont un signe de la « supériorité et de suprématie ». La maison
de la famille de Roxana est grande, mais elle n’a pas de tours ni de décorations. Sa
collègue Crenguta ajoute : « Les sources d’argent des riches sont d’habitude héritées, et
maintenant, ils vont à l’étranger où ils volent pour envoyer de l’argent chez eux, à leurs
familles ». Ils y font des travaux illégaux, du trafic de chair, ils recrutent des filles plus
naïves, qui vivent à la campagne. Ceux qui se sont enrichis « ont le respect » – gagné
de force. Ce qui est intéressant, c’est que la manière dont on a acquis les richesses ne
compte pas, ce qui compte c’est que la richesse impose le respect, l’admiration et la
soumission. Cette opinion est partagée par tous nos interlocuteurs et elle porte surtout
sur les représentations sociales des pauvres, de ceux qui n’ont pas réussi. « Les pauvres
ne considèrent pas les riches avec rancune, ils s’entraident », ajoute Roxana. L’aide
est cependant occasionnelle, payée par le travail. Les pauvres sont plutôt méprisés, et
justement parce qu’ils sont pauvres, parce qu’ils ne réussissent pas à se débrouiller. « Ils
sont aidés par la Mairie, mais le problème c’est qu’ils ne travaillent pas, ils attendent
que tout leur tombe du ciel ». Tandis que les riches sont enviés, tout le monde aimerait
avoir des maisons qui confèrent du prestige. Ils ne sont pas enviés seulement par les
Roms, mais aussi par les Roumains.
Un classique de la psychologie clinique, F. Redl (1963), en analysant le rôle central
de la personne dans différents groupes, a trouvé que ces personnes peuvent devenir
objets d’identification, elles peuvent contenir l’idéal de soi de l’individu, et arriver au
statut d’objet d’amour ; l’amour qui provoque la fusion. Ou bien, il peut aussi produire
la peur, et dans ce cas-ci la solution est l’identification avec l’agresseur, avec le Grand
Frère. Mais la richesse, la chance d’avoir réussi ? Toutes les formes de possession (les
maisons, les terrains, l’argent) peuvent impressionner, même si rien des éventuelles
qualités humaines de ceux qui les possèdent n’y est contenu. La manière dont la richesse
a été obtenue n’importe pas, ce qui importe c’est que ça existe, et que c’est une garantie
du succès personnel. On a affaire à une pensée restrictive, simplificatrice, mais qui
étonne par son réalisme et son pragmatisme. Même si nous n’acceptons pas les moyens
par lesquels on obtient rapidement la richesse, nous en sommes impressionnés, nous
accordons du crédit aux personnes qui ont réussi une performance de ce type. Avec cela
nous entrons dans un jeu obscur de la mise en scène de la réputation. L’affirmation dans
la lutte de concurrence, l’effort pour la reconnaissance impressionnent la plupart des
gens, il y en a même qui en sont hypnotisés. Toutes ces observations sont applicables
aux communautés de Roms. Ceux qui font voir leurs richesses (« palais », limousines,
or) – même si tout ça a été obtenu illicitement – fascinent, ils éveillent l’envie. Ils mettent
en œuvre un système de relations sociales auquel il ne manque pas la transmission
de la compétence de produire de l’argent, les stratégies interindividuelles, les gestes
symboliques, voire même la sexualité (Foucault, 1993) et qui sont associées à un
grand nombre de caractéristiques de personnalité comme autorité reconnue, la force,
• 85
Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
le prestige, le pouvoir d’influence, la capacité de domination et celle d’obtenir la
soumission (Ruano-Borbalan, 2002).
HISTOIRES DE SUCCÈS
La littérature mentionne le fait que le pouvoir de leader s’acquiert par qualités
personnelles, par les aptitudes exceptionnelles de certains chefs, par leur capacité de
susciter le respect et l’admiration de la communauté ; par la renommée reconnue à
l’intérieur du groupe, par la qualité d’interaction avec les autres (par le pouvoir du
mot, du geste symbolique ou du style personnel efficace), la capacité de communiquer
(Neculau, 1977, 2007). Nous faisons référence à des spécialistes de haute classe, à des
professionnels, ce que nous allons exemplifier par deux études de cas, M.V. et D.E.
et, par la suite, le parcours de quelques militants impliqués dans le développement de
la communauté.
Le premier, M.V., est un personnage fort médiatisé, leader politique, musicien
reconnu, fils d’un grand violoniste. Il a été et est encore professeur de musique, chef
d’orchestre, il est devenu à un moment donné le chef d’une formation politique, Partida
Romilor, et membre dans la Chambre des Députés. Il se présente comme un produit de
talents et de motivations personnelles : « Je suis quelqu’un d’ambitieux, et lorsque je
me propose quelque chose, je fais tout pour y aboutir, je ne fuis pas la responsabilité.
Politiquement parlant, je suis membre du PSD, vice-président du PSD de Bucarest, leader
rom, et je me préoccupe de tout ce qui se passe ; j’ai quitté le Partida Romilor après avoir
considéré que ce n’était pas là la meilleure place, car cela impliquait un comportement
hypocrite du point de vue politique ; j’ai assumé et j’assume encore le rôle non pas de
leader, mais d’exemple ; tant pour les majoritaires que pour les Tsiganes, l’exemple
de ce qu’une personne publique devrait représenter, une place, un modèle, j’aide et
je fais tout ce que je peux dans toutes les directions politiques, sociales et culturelles
pour aider les gens de qualité, les doués, les talentueux, pour les promouvoir, quel que
soit leur âge, et je crois que beaucoup d’Occidentaux veulent me parler, ils demandent
mon avis, ils me font comprendre que quelque part mon comportement est surveillé, de
même que le travail que je fais dans ce sens. Mais je ne peux pas accepter (beaucoup
d’attitudes et comportements –n.n.) ; cela tient à l’éducation, chez nous à la maison, on
n’a jamais discuté de ce qui est bon et ce qui est mal au sujet des Tsiganes ».
D.E. a connu un trajet professionnel et social de succès, ce qui le recommande
comme analyste et interlocuteur très compétent : il a suivi un lycée de musique où il a
étudié le violon et puis il s’est présenté cinq fois au Conservatoire pour passer l’examen
d’admission où il pense avoir été discriminé ; chaque fois il lui manquait très peu pour
y être reçu. L’admission au Conservatoire en ce temps-là était très difficile, parce qu’il
y avait 3 ou 4 places et 20 à 30 candidats par place. A partir de 1992 il a évolué à la
Philharmonie de Iaşi, et il a enseigné au Conservatoire pendant six ans, de même qu’à
l’Ecole normale de Iasi. Puis, il a suivi des cours à la faculté de Psychologie et a fait
un master en Relations humaines et Communication. Il est impliqué dans des projets
d’intégration des Roms et de recherche du talent musical de ceux-ci. Sa famille a
valorisé l’éducation et s’est orientée vers le progrès et vers l’acquisition d’un statut
social : « Mon père a pensé qu’il était bon pour moi d’aller à l’école, d’apprendre la
musique, de faire des progrès. L’orientation de la famille a été pour le progrès, l’étude
86 •
Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
et l’éducation. Ils on fait ce pas vers un statut social. Ils n’ont pas imposé le métier
traditionnel de nos ancêtres musiciens, mais ont été ouverts à d’autres métiers. J’ai des
cousins avocats qui n’avaient pas d’affinité pour la musique ». D.E. a beaucoup voyagé,
il a entrepris des tournées à travers le monde avec l’orchestre dont il fait partie (Italie,
Angleterre, le Japon). Il a une grande ouverture d’esprit et connaît beaucoup d’éléments
de la culture des pays où il voyage. Il allie la compétence professionnelle et la notoriété
avec le militantisme et l’implication dans les problèmes de la communauté.
Dans la même catégorie font partie des personnes à compétences techniques
particulières, spécialistes reconnus qui prouvent à la fois une connaissance supérieure
des mécanismes du développement social, des lois économiques et financières. Ce
sont des magistrats, des juristes, des économistes, gens de lettres qui ont une carrière
professionnelle, mais qui sont en même temps impliqués dans le social, contribuant
ainsi au développement et au progrès de la communauté. C’est la cas de I.D., un
informaticien qui travaille dans les ventes et qui a obtenu le statut de directeur pour la
Moldavie dans une entreprise de publicité. Il suit les cours d’assistance sociale dans
une autre faculté pour pouvoir s’impliquer avec plus de compétencesdans les problèmes
de la communauté.
Il s’agit d’une catégorie à part, largement répandue et très appréciée, celle des
activistes, de ceux qui valorisent leur vocation militante. Presque tous les interlocuteurs
de cette catégorie nous ont parlé de leur trajet d’activistes conscients de leur tâche
morale, nous ont parlé de la voie par laquelle ils ont pris conscience du besoin de
s’impliquer.
Voici le cas de A.V., 34 ans, qui travaille pour l’organisation Romani CRISS (Roma
(
Center for Social Intervention and Studies), une organisation non-gouvernementale qui
promeut les droits de la population rom en Roumanie. Notre interlocuteur raconte :
« Quand j’étais étudiant, je travaillais avec un professeur, je gagnais mon argent,
j’avais un statut différent parmi mes collègues et c’était bien. J’ai entendu parler de
Romani CRISS qui organisait des cours d’ordinateur et j’ai voulu voir en considérant
que c’était pour moi l’occasion d’améliorer mes compétences en matière informatique.
J’ai eu de la chance, car j’ai rencontré une ancienne activiste qui m’a demandé où
j’étais, ce que je faisais, et elle m’a invité à leurs réunions. J’y suis passé, elle m’a fait
entrer dans diverses tâches qui ont été très stimulantes pour moi, ça m’a plu, ça m’a
donné de la confiance et beaucoup de responsabilités, le reste est allé de soi. Deux
mois plus tard je coordonnais déjà le projet Romani CRISS, ce qui était très difficile
pour une personne dépourvue d’expérience. Maintenant non plus je n’ai pas beaucoup
d’expérience, j’ai beaucoup de choses à apprendre. Petit à petit, je me suis impliqué
dans cette question… ». C’est l’histoire de la plupart de nos interlocuteurs.
L’exemple des deux personnalités que l’on vient de citer (M.V. et D.E.) nous a semblé
être vraiment représentatif des success-stories et surtout de la manière d’influencer la
vie de la communauté par l’exemple personnel, par une carrière construite sur l’effort,
le talent et le mérite personnel.
Les quatre « histoires de succès » de Delia Bobîrsc, insérées dans le volume de
Mădălin Voicu et Caludiu Tufiş racontent des expériences d’apprentissage en vue
d’une carrière professionnelle, bien qu’ils proviennent tous de familles pauvres, où
les modèles culturels et la tradition de l’orientation vers l’éducation étaient absents.
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Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
Le dénominateur commun aux quatre interlocuteurs est le fait que, grâce à leurs
qualités, ils ont parcouru des trajets de formation ascendante et ils ont construit des
scénarios de vie en investissant dans la haute éducation. Ioana parcourt le trajet d’une
étudiante attardée qui se rattrape et qui se réinvente jusqu’à ce qu’elle devienne une
spécialiste reconnue. Elle monte l’échelle sociale grâce à ses performances, devient
haut fonctionnaire public (souvent discriminée), elle doit gérer des fonds européens
importants, elle voyage, écrit, observe et évalue. Elles sont très intéressantes ses
observations concernant les attitudes des officiels européens envers les problèmes des
Roms ; ceux-là sont souvent réticents, distants, ne manifestent pas d’intérêt à ce sujet,
mais ils sont « diplomates ». Elle utilise ses compétences pour faciliter l’expression
des « sans voix », elle croit pouvoir transférer à ses semblables son énergie et son
affection, « l’activisme et le militantisme » qu’elle a appris à son tour. Claudiu est lui
aussi « fasciné » par l’école, il obtient de bons résultats ; encouragé il suit un trajet
ascendant et fait des études universitaires de littérature. Ensuite, il découvre sa vocation
d’activiste pour les droits de l’Homme : il suit la faculté d’Etudes politiques, puis le
Master, s’implique dans le développement de la communauté rom, dans l’organisation
politique des Roms, et acquiert la conscience de militant. Andrei a bénéficié de l’appui
inconditionnel de sa mère pour faire ses études ; comme étudiant (faculté d’Assistance
sociale), il travaille comme bénévole dans trois organisations non gouvernementales, il
écrit des projets, participe à des workshops et travaille avec des enfants handicapés. A la
fin de ses études post-universitaires, Andrei se spécialise dans les « politiques sociales
et institutions européennes », reçoit un prix comme activiste, et devient très compétent
dans le management de projets. Dans ce cas aussi, la conscience de militant s’avère être
motivante pour une carrière réussie. Elena provient d’une famille où l’éducation a été
considérée comme une valeur. Les parents doivent se limiter – à cause des conditions
précaires – aux études moyennes. Mais ils investissent dans les enfants. Elena connaît
le succès à l’école, elle est très appréciée par les professeurs, elle assume ouvertement
son identité, s’engage dans des actions publiques, dénonce les stéréotypes négatifs qui
visent les Roms et pratique le bénévolat. Elle pense être idéaliste parce qu’elle s’implique
dans des actions sociales, d’où il ne résulte pas un profit personnel. Elle théorise sur
le concept d’idéalisme social, étant pleine d’espoir et de projets.
Certains de nos interlocuteurs ont invoqué la propension à l’éducation issue de leur
famille, chaque génération montant plus haut sur l’échelle du succès social. I.D. évoquait
avec émotion le parcours de ses parents qui ont quitté le village, se sont établis en ville,
sont allés à l’école, se sont qualifiés dans des métiers complexes, voulant transmettre à
leurs enfants leur désir irréalisé de faire des études universitaires. Leur rêve s’est réalisé,
leurs enfants ont suivi les cours de l’université et ils sont très actifs comme militants
dans leur communauté. V.R., 58 ans, qui a fait seulement le lycée, s’exprime dans une
langue remarquable, et évoque son père, membre respecté de la communauté, qualifié
dans un métier, « qui parlait bien, était fier, s’habillait soigneusement et était renommé
pour sa sagesse ». A son tour, V.R. a la renommée d’un homme sage, qui n’oublie pas
« d’où il est parti », respecte « les coutumes et les traditions tsiganes qui transmettent
une spiritualité profonde et une modalité particulière de vivre ». Il est très fier de ses cinq
enfants, ayant tous fait des études : une fille actrice à succès, mentionne son origine à la
télévision ; une autre a fait des études de philologie, un garçon est professeur de sport
88 •
Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes
et psychologue, un autre, étudiant en assistance sociale. Il se félicite d’avoir transmis
aux enfants le désir de l’éducation, le respect pour les traditions de la communauté et
pour la culture en général.
La famille élargie contribue dans ces cas à la sauvegarde et à la transmission des
traditions ; elle constitue l’élément fondateur de l’organisation sociale et des groupes.
Dans la famille, qui est l’unité psychosociale de base, se construisent des modèles culturels,
de même que la stratégie pour la société extérieure. Dans ces familles se développent des
stratégies pour vivre « à coté » des politiques de la population majoritaire, et l’on peut
y retracer des trajectoires formatives réussies. Elles doivent s’adapter constamment aux
changements extérieurs, aux changements sociaux post-communistes (Auzias, 1993),
et par ces efforts se trouve modelé le trajet de la nouvelle élite rom.
EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION
Ce qui manque aux communautés rom, particulièrement aux communautés pauvres,
c’est l’organisation, l’unité d’action et la confiance dans les représentants locaux et
nationaux. Il existe une perception collective de frustration, le sentiment que d’autres
(qui appartiennent ou non à la communauté, des notables), manipulent les ressources
qui devraient leur revenir, y compris les aides venues de l’Union Européenne pour les
Roms.
La majorité de nos interlocuteurs sont tombés d’accord sur ce diagnostic. Il nous
est confirmé aussi par d’autres recherches (Baltasiu, Dobrica, Jderu, 2005) qui évoquent
l’instauration d’une culture de la pauvreté, ayant pour corollaire l’apathie et le fatalisme,
le rejet des responsabilités vers l’extérieur, l’appel à des solutions minimales de survie
et la crainte envers les forts. L’effet obtenu est « un manque réciproque de confiance »,
l’envie, la compétition exagérée entre les groupes et « l’incapacité d’unifier les efforts
dans des directions d’intérêt majeur, comme par exemple l’amélioration des voies
d’accès, le soutien accordé aux pauvres, l’accès à l’électricité et à l’eau courante ».
Les gouvernants adoptent envers les Roms des solutions d’assistance sociale (qui
peuvent être intéressantes pour les futurs votes de la part des Roms). Les politiques
d’auto-gestion économique manquent (requalification ou qualification professionnelle,
emplois permanents, mise en valeur des métiers traditionnels), de même que les leaders
authentiques capables de mobiliser, d’unifier et de diriger l’effort communautaire. Parfois
trop « intellectuelles » et trop « idéalistes », les élites que nous avons interrogées ne
trouvent pas encore d’audience suffisante ni les modalités pour influencer de manière
décisive les communautés. Elles n’ont pas l’esprit d’entreprise et ne peuvent pas offrir
des modèles personnels de succès. Les élites que nous avons identifiées et décrites sont
encore trop faibles et le nombre de leurs représentants est encore très réduit. Mais elles
ont la possibilité de compenser ces handicaps par leur compétence dans les positions-clés
qu’elles occupent, par mobilisation et implication, comme il arrive dans beaucoup de
cas. L’avenir des communautés rom se trouve dans les mains des élites authentiques,
conscientes de leur pouvoir et de leur responsabilité.
L’Europe étant confrontée à une dispute sans précédent dans sa tentative d’adopter
une politique cohérente par rapport à la population rom, l’appel aux leaders rom, à l’élite
professionnelle et culturelle, nous semble être une solution plus que nécessaire.
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Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI
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• 91
POST-SOCIALIST RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
HOW DO RELIGIOUS CONVERSIONS OF ROMA FIT
INTO THE WIDER LANDSCAPE?
From Global to Local Perspectives
Sorin GOG
The present paper explores the issue of Roma religious conversion to Pentecostalism
and the impact it has on their ethnic and social identity. I endeavour to analyse how
religious conversions restructure the practices and narratives of self and how postsocialist established communities of Pentecostals create a new sense of identity among
this marginalised community.
By looking at the official data provided by the national censuses from 1992 and
2002, I analyse how the religious structure of post-socialist Romania has changed.
These data allow us to see how the different religious denominations evolved in this
period and where exactly they were most successful.
Drawing on sociological and ethnographic1 data we will try to explore how the
social marginalisation of Roma leads to religious exclusion as well as the impact of
religious conversion by taking these facts into consideration. I do not try to explain
by this why the religious conversions among Roma take place, but rather what the
social and cultural implications of this are. A new social narrative has appeared within
Roma Pentecostal communities and this paper tries to explore the conditions for and
consequences of these conversions.
The post-socialist period meant the abolition of secularism logic and atheist
regulation of religious practice. The Communist ideologists and bureaucratic party
networks managed to expulse religion from the public sphere and push forward a
process of societal secularisation. Because this was not accompanied by a genuine social
modernisation (Romania remained one of the most rural countries of Eastern Europe),
the “atheisation process” was one of the Communist regime’s big failure (Gog 2007).
As a result, the religiosity that was still alive at the private level eventually invaded
the public sphere.
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The neo-protestant religious movements were part of this religious revival as well.
Suppressed by the Communist regimes, the neo-protestant churches actively made use of
the post-socialist democratic pluralism and invested a great deal of energy in “spreading
the Gospel” (Coleman 2000) and becoming much more visible on the religious market.
Resulting from this, a lot of new neo-protestant churches were established in the past
two decades, especially among the Roma community. Before analysing the impact
of these religious conversions we will start by analysing the general post-socialist
religious context.
As we can see from Table 1, the religious structure of Romania underwent only
minor transformations in the post-socialist period. All major religious denominations
kept the same proportion of religious adherents during the turbulent post-Communist
period: besides the neo-protestant denominations (Baptists, Pentecostals, Adventists and
the Brethren Assemblies) that managed to increase the number of their believers (from
2.01% to 2.72% of the total population, in absolute numbers 131.452 new believers) all
other denominations lost only a small and insignificant number of their followers.
Religious belonging does not reflect religiosity or a distinct religious perspective
on life. We thus have to look at these numbers as indicators regarding religious
affiliation, not necessarily mirroring the dramatic religious changes that happened in
post-socialist Romania. For a great segment of the Romanian population the religion to
which one belongs does not have any public and/or private religious currency. As I have
shown elsewhere (Gog 2006) the increasing post-socialist pluralisation of life-worlds
(
(Lebenswelt
) led to an erosion of the traditional religious world-view and amplified a
distinct logic of secularisation. This, in turn, manifested itself as a de-Christianisation of
the religious worldview, a de-institutionalisation of religious practice and de-moralisation
of the practical sphere of life. This distinct secularisation process affected mostly the
younger generations that were socialised in the new post-socialist world and that were
living in an urban area.
The religious affiliation is generally assigned at birth and signals the belonging
to a distinct cultural tradition (Orthodox-Romanian; Reformed-Hungarian; LutheranGerman, etc.) that is sometimes employed as an ethnic marker. Although it does not
reflect the religious transformations that happened in this period, when we look at the
religious affiliation at a national level we can see that the religious structure of the
different ethnic minorities of Romania underwent specific pathways of change.
From Table 2 we can see that the neo-protestant movement gained an increase
of 5.72% within the Roma population compared to only 0.6% within the Romanian
population and 0.35% among the Hungarian population. At the same time, according
to the official data from the two censuses, the Orthodox Church lost more members
within the Roma population (3.42% from the total Roma community) than from the
Romanian population (0.6%).
It is worth mentioning that the Orthodox Church does not have any distinct Roma
clerical hierarchy or Roma Churches. Roma and Romanians are part of the same
Orthodox ecclesial setting just like Hungarians and Roma are part of the same Reformed
local church. In spite of this, there were more Roma that left the Orthodox Church than
Romanians, and we will take a look at this issue later on.
94 •
86.79 %
2002 - Census
RomanCatholic
4.73 %
5.09 %
0.88 %
0.98 %
GreekCatholic
3.23 %
3.52 %
Reformed
0.17 %
0.26 %
Lutheran
Evangelical
0.31 %
0.34 %
Unitarian
2.72 %
2.01 %
NeoProtestant
41.00 %
4.81 %
3.80 %
1.71 %
1.98 %
85.30 %
81.88 %
Hungarian-1992
Hungarian-2002
Roma-1992
Roma-2002
Source: National Census 1992 and 2002
41.20 %
1.78 %
94.08%
Romanian-2002
1.77 %
94.68 %
RomanCatholic
Romanian-1992
Orthodox
1.15 %
0.89 %
1.37 %
1.44 %
0.83 %
0.94 %
GreekCatholic
3.06 %
4.39 %
46.47 %
47.10 %
0.09 %
0.08 %
Reformed
0.06 %
0.07 %
1.15 %
1.23 %
0.02 %
0.03 %
Lutheran
Evangelical
0.13 %
0.23 %
4.54 %
4.56 %
0.01 %
0.01 %
Unitarian
8.57 %
2.85 %
2.07 %
1.72 %
2.59 %
1.99 %
NeoProtestant
Table 2: The denominational structure of the major ethnic groups existing in the Romanian society
according to the 1992 and 2002 National Census
Source: National Census 1992 and 2002
86.81 %
1992 - Census
Orthodox
Table 1: The evolution of the religious denomination structure in the Romanian Society: from 1992 to 2002
0.35 %
0.86 %
0.23 %
0.24 %
0.07 %
0.12 %
Without
religion
/ Atheist
0.01 %
0.36 %
Without
religion
/ Atheist
Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism
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Another important aspect of the post-socialist conversion of Roma to neo-protestant
religious movements is that it gained impetus within rural areas but not within urban
parts of Romania. More often than not, the rural population has a strong traditional
attitude towards religious pluralism, regarding it not only as heresy but as a betrayal
of the intimate texture and values of the community of the villagers as well. Because
of this it is surprising to see (Table 2b) that among Roma communities living in rural
areas the neo-protestant movement gained an increase of 6.83% compared to an increase
of 3.92% among the Roma living in the urban areas (Table 2c).
At the same time, if we take into account the rural/urban variable we can again see
that there is a stronger decline of the Orthodox Church among the Roma within the rural
sector (4.57%) than the urban sector (1.56%). These numbers do not necessarily reflect
religious mobility from one religious denomination to another but it is also dubious to
consider the changes within Roma religious structure as the result of different fertility
patterns among the Roma from the two denominations. Indeed, taking into account that
most of these religious conversions occurred in the past decade, it is very unlikely that a
different religious belonging produced, in such a short time, a different demographical
pattern. As our fieldwork highlighted, the presence of a neo-protestant community in
the Roma section of a village has usually appeared after the fall of Communism and its
members have been recruited from the dominant religious denomination: Orthodox in
the case of Romanian villages and Reformed in the case of Hungarian villages.
By analysing the data from the two censuses we can conclude that the biggest
changes in the religious structure of post-socialist times are related to the expansion
of the neo-protestant religious movements. Furthermore, we can also note that this
expansion has had a greater impact on the Roma community living in Romania, and
more precisely on the Roma living in the rural areas of this country.
Another important conclusion we can draw by analysing the data regarding the
religious structure of the different ethnic groups inhabiting Romania is related to the
nature of these religious conversions. Within the Roma community, most of these
religious conversions are effectuated into Pentecostalism: 75.14% of the total Roma
neo-protestants belong to a Pentecostal Church while only 55.06% of the Romanian
neo-protestants belong to this religious community. Among the Hungarian, the dominant
neo-protestant community is that of the Baptists that constitute 42.84% of the neoprotestant believers while the Pentecostals have only 16.51% Hungarian neo-protestant
believers. Within the Hungarian community we can nevertheless also observe a weak
growing trend of the Pentecostal movement: in 1992 they constituted 13.56% of the
Hungarian neo-protestant population while in 2002 they represented 16.51%.
Because the denominational demography shows that Pentecostalism is by far the
major option for the Roma who convert to another religion, we focus, in our analysis,
in what follows from the impact Pentecostalism has on community building and
conceptualisation of the social self among this ethnic group.
At the level of the entire social system the religious structure (analysed in terms
of the declared religious belonging) has not been altered dramatically. We cannot talk
about a major religious mobility that took place in post-socialist Romania. But if we
take a look at this issue by analysing each distinct ethnic group we can see that today
around 10% of the Gypsy population belongs to one of the neo-protestant churches
96 •
Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism
and that the majority of these believers have been recruited in the decade after the fall
of Communism.
There is another important hallmark to the religious conversions into neo-protestant
churches that take place in this period: according to the Roma pastors we interviewed,
around 90% of the Roma Churches have been founded in the past decade. During the
Communist period most of the Roma neo-protestant believers attended the same church
as their Romanian or Hungarian spiritual brothers.
The post-socialist period meant not only the expansion of neo-protestant movements
among the Roma but the institutionalisation of distinct religious services as well. There
has been a growing religious autonomy of the Roma Pentecostal community through
the creation of distinct religious Pentecostal associations or through the creation of a
distinct ecclesial structure where the religious hierarchy is solely composed of Roma
people.
This process of religious ethnicisation triggers, as we will see, a distinct perspective
on Roma identity in which the institutional mechanisms of the local Pentecostal church
plays a very important role. The local church is organised mainly by local Roma religious
elite, but all members of the church are actively involved in the life of the community
as well. Through the creation of specific social spaces within and outside the church,
through a religious language that enables this disempowered community to articulate a
unitary identity and a new image of the self and through the communitarian ethic that
rigorously guides the life of the born-again believers, the Roma find in the Pentecostal
established ecclesial structures the institutional means to elaborate a social, cultural
and ethnical narrative of their own.
One way of exploring the religious conversion among Roma that takes place in
rural areas essentially is by looking at the social exclusion to which this community is
subjected. By drawing on quantitative and qualitative data we will show that there is
a much stronger exclusion and discrimination of Roma going on within the rural part
of Romania and although this cannot be linked directly to the religious conversion to
Pentecostalism it accounts for the lack of religious socialisation of this ethnic minority.
The social exclusion is prolonged within the religious community as well and this
has a certain impact on Roma religiosity. It would be wrong to assume that this is the
reason of their conversion to Pentecostalism, but I argue that it nevertheless plays an
important role. In comparison to how the local Orthodox Church integrates the Roma
believers (the same applies to the Reformed Church), the Pentecostal Church acts
among other things as an institutional platform that enables them to be the agents of
their own ethnic identity.
In a recent nationwide and statistical representative survey2 that explored the
ethnic relationships and the issue of Roma inclusion, people were asked to name those
groups that they would not want to have as neighbours. As we can see from Table 3 the
groups that rank highest are the homosexuals and Roma. 32.5% of the urban Romanian
population (regardless of their ethnicity) and 38% of the rural population declared that
they did not want to live next to Roma.
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Table 3: The percentage of the Romanians that would not like to have
the following groups as their neighbours
Urban
Rural
Muslims
23.8 %
29.8 %
Immigrants
21.0 %
25.6 %
Homosexuals
42.9 %
49.2 %
Jews
19.9 %
25.4 %
Roma
32.5 %
38.0 %
Hungarians
19.9 %
25.9 %
Source: The Barometer of Inclusion of Roma, The Soros Foundation, 2006
It can easily be noticed that the discrimination against these groups is stronger in
the rural areas than in urban ones. In all cases, people living in villages expressed the
desire not to have such neighbours. As we will see, within the rural areas of Romania
the exclusion and discrimination of Roma is stronger and very intensely felt by the
Roma living within the confined borders of the village.
Most of the villages explored in our research reveal how the social distribution of
space depicts this discrimination against Roma. The Roma are usually located at the
end of the village in a quarter where only Roma people live. They are not allowed to
build a house next to the Romanians and are separated from them by a strong social
border that signals the existence of a distinct territory. Sometimes even the public spaces
become problematic and Roma are excluded from these as well:
“After the 1989 revolution, there was a new bar where Romanians from different
villages gathered; I had a conflict with them as they called me ‘hey, Tzigane’. I
had to leave even if I had all the rights, as it was my village. There were streets
where I could not walk on as a child because of the Romanians.” (A. D. male;
36 years old, graduated from a locksmith industrial school, married).
This spatial segregation overflows even into the organisation of cemeteries. Although
the Roma in each village share the religious belonging of the majority of the population
(Reformed in the case of Hungarians, Orthodox in the case of Romanians) they have to
be buried separately: the cemetery reproduces the same ethnic border that exists in the
real life; just as Roma and Romanians are not allowed to live next to each other they
are not allowed to die together either. The cemetery acts in this way as a mirror of the
social space that reflects the religious transformations going on in the Roma quarter.
The neo-protestants Roma have to be separated from the Orthodox Roma and so a new
border is created in the cemetery just as the neo-protestant community is surrounded
by a new exclusion rule within the wider community.
Most of our interviews highlighted that the Roma are aware of the different problems
existing in their community (lack of education, disempowerment, unemployment,
etc) but none bother them so much as the discrimination and demeaning to which
98 •
Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism
they are subjected. This is intensely felt by all Roma and in the different strategies of
self-presentation that they employ they try to show themselves as honest people just
as all the others:
“they say Gypsies steal. But did they ever catch me? Why are they suspecting
me? You have to blame it all on me as I am Gypsy? Many times Romanians steal
and Gypsies pay for it. (A. D. female 28 years old, single, no permanent job).
In addition to the social and spatial exclusion to which Roma are subjected to, the
ethnic majority tries to make the most of their poverty and destitution at an economical
level. The unemployment rate is very high among the Roma community and the
economical situation of the Roma community is deplorable. A lot of the Gypsies we
interviewed stated that the Communist period was much better for them, because they
had a stable job that allowed them to care for their large families. Nowadays they
barley survive.
In some parts of Romania their situation is dramatic and resembles very much
the times when the Roma were enslaved. After the fall of Communism, the Roma
did not receive any land from the government as they did not own land before the
collectivisation, and the ones who did had a difficult time claiming it back. Because of
this, the Roma from the rural areas of Romania were left with nothing and in order to
survive they worked the lands of the Romanians. During the winter time, when there
is no land to work, my interlocutors told me, they have nothing left to do but beg for
food from door to door in the village. They do not have money to pay for food so they
promise to work during the following summer for so many days in exchange of the
food they receive. The villagers know that this is a good time to contract very cheap
labour force, so they overcharge them and require a lot of days of work from them.
In the summer time some of the Gypsies have to work for the food they have already
used the previous winter.
Local Roma leaders are aware of this and see that the ethnic majority finds this
very convenient:
“Everybody wants to exploit the Gypsies. Because – of course, it is
understandable – a patron thinks about efficient labour force, by spending less
money, and getting a huge quantity of work done. Yes. Everybody thinks like
that.” (F.B. male, Gherla, single, 29 years old, works at city hall)
The results of our research are consistent with the quantitative data provided by
the national survey. Here we can see how strongly Romanians (regardless of their
ethnicity) react to living together with Roma or getting married to Roma. 51.1 % of
the people living in the rural areas disagree with inter-ethnic marriages with Roma
people and 40.9 % of them disagree with sharing the same social space with them.
All the other values regarding Roma and Romanians, such as playing, studying and
working together stand very high and show that different practices of discrimination
that we encountered in our research are consistent with the perceptions and attitudes
of the ethnic majority.
Again we can notice that the discrimination against Roma is much higher in the rural
areas than in the urban parts of the country. This is explainable both by traditionalism
and the lack of social modernisation of people living in the countryside, and also by
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Sorin GOG
the fact that within the closed community of a village, social relationships with ethnic
minorities are unavoidable and this leads to a lot of conflicts.
Table 4: The percentage of Romanians who disagree with …
Urban
Rural
… Roma and Romanians
living together
31.1 %
40.9 %
… Roma and Romanians
studying in the same
classroom
19.3 %
27.7 %
… Roma and Romanians
working in the same office/
workshop
17.2 %
25.6 %
… Roma and Romanians
getting married
35 %
51.1 %
… Roma and Romanian
children playing together
20 %
31.5 %
Source: The Barometer of Inclusion of Roma, The Soros Foundation, 2006
Our research revealed that the exclusion that operates within the villages is
sometimes extended within the Church as well. Not in the sense that the priest of the
local Church has a negative attitude towards them (some of the priests we interviewed
actively take part in helping and supporting Roma) but in the sense that Roma have
difficulty in integrating themselves into the religious community.
The interviewed Romanian Orthodox priests confirm the low religious participation
of Roma and their lack of religious socialisation. The priests would like to have them
within the Church but Roma strongly refuse to come.
“I don’t understand why. This is how they were accustomed. I tried to bring them
[to Church]. But they don’t like it. They say that the Romanians do not look nice
to them.” (Father L. Romanian Orthodox Priest, 30 years old, rural area).
Most of them refuse to get married in the Church as well, according to our
informants.
Most of the time, the Church is seen by the Roma community as an institution of
the ethnic majority. The ecclesial life that surrounds the religious service is perceived
as a social space from which they are excluded. As a result of this, we find within the
church the same enclaves as we do in the rest of the existing social spaces within the
villages:
100 •
Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism
“The Romanians separate themselves from them, but I can say that sometimes
they separate themselves as well from the Romanians.” (Father L. Romanian
Orthodox Priest, 30 years old, rural area).
The lack of religious socialisation and their separation from the institution of the
Church was mentioned by many of our informants. They stated that they were treated
badly by the Romanians and that their presence was not welcomed at religious meetings.
The Roma Pentecostal Pastors were very critical about this issue and claimed that Roma
never actually belonged to the Orthodox Church because the Church was never really
interested in Christianising them:
“Even today the Orthodox Church reproaches me that I left the faith. But I
cannot understand which faith I left, because the Roma did not have any faith.
Practically their only contact with the Orthodox Church was at Easter, for
baptisms and funerals. Besides this they did not have any connection with
the Orthodox Church”. (C.F. Roma pastor and political leader, 55 years old,
converted to Pentecostalism in the early 90s).
The same issue is raised by Roma that live in villages where Reformed Hungarians
are the majority. Here as well the social and spatial exclusion functions just like in
Romanian Orthodox villages. All the Roma, no matter what their religion is, get buried
in the same cemetery, separated from the Hungarians. “There is not a single Roma
buried in the Hungarian cemetery.” (Mr. K. 50 years old, member of the Roma Party).
This, according to my informants, is an old custom from the time of the Hungarian
landlords.
In the opinion of the people we interviewed, the problem is that the Hungarian and
the Romanian communities are closed ones. For example, in the church “each one has
his own bench inherited from their ancestors.” Reformed Hungarians object to the fact
that Roma do not pay the necessary membership fee to the Reformed church. One of
my informants raised this issue to the Reformed priest.
“I told the priest about this problem and I said to him: if thirty of us (Roma)
start paying this fee, will you let us be part of your community? His answer
was no.” (Mr. K. 50 years old, member of the Roma Party).
Most of the people from the Church do not say that they will not receive them, but
act as such, according to my informant. The only contact the Reformed Roma have
with the Church happens at baptisms, weddings and funerals. The Reformed religious
leaders
“do not teach the (Roma) community about the Reformed faith.” (Mr. K. 50 years
old, member of the Roma Party).
The post-socialist pluralisation that led to the appearance of new religions also
created some confusion among the Roma, as they have found it hard to discern the
“true religion”. The lack of religious socialisation makes them think that all religions
can be reduced to humans trying to impose their will on others:
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“I met many religious people, but I don’t think anyone really understands
religion. It is not something to understand, the Catholic says one thing, the
Orthodox says another thing, a Pentecostal comes with a third idea…” (A.D.
(
Roma, 36 years old, married, no children).
Our research also showed that the social exclusion of Roma occurs within the
religious community as well. As a result of this, it is not surprising to see that when
it comes to religious participation, Roma have a very low rate of attending religious
services: only 25% of the Orthodox Roma regularly attend Church in comparison to
41.4% of the entire Orthodox population. The difference regarding religious participation
is a very big one, considering that the Roma population thinks of itself as being very
religious. Surely this is not the product of a secularisation process triggered by social
modernisation to which Roma are more exposed than other ethnic groups.
Table 5: Church attendance and trust in the institution of the Church at national level and
among Roma
Orthodox population
National sample
Roma sample
Trust in the institution of the
Church
79 %
67.4 %
Attend the Church at least
three times a month
41.4 %
25.6 %
Source: The Barometer of Inclusion of Roma, The Soros Foundation, 2006
What is even stranger is the fact that religious participation is lower among Orthodox
Roma from the rural area than the ones from the urban area. This is very strange as
other studies have shown that church attendance, religious beliefs and religious practices
are lower in those strata exposed to a process of industrialisation, urbanisation and
modernisation. This is why we usually find lower religious values in the urban sector:
among the Orthodox Romanians living in cities 40.4% of them regularly attend Church,
while the percentage of those living in the rural area is slightly higher: 42.6%. Among
the Roma the opposite is true: there are 29% Orthodox Roma that attend church in the
urban sector compared to only 23.4% in the rural parts of Romania.
This low participation rate among Roma in the rural area has to be explained as
a result of the treatment to which this ethnic minority is exposed within the confined
borders of the village and not as the occurrence of a secularisation process. This has
also an impact on the trust capital that the Roma have in the institution of the Church
(Table 5) which is significantly lower to that of the Romanians.
If we analyse the religious beliefs of Roma, and not the institutional expression of
these beliefs, we find that they are very religious, even more religious than the majority
of the population. Looking at religious beliefs such as the belief in God, Heaven, and
life after death, which are important articles of faith of all Christian denominations in
Romania, they are shared in greater proportion by the Roma than by the Romanians.
102 •
Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism
Table 6: Religious beliefs among the Roma compared to the national level
Orthodox population
National sample
Roma sample
Belief in God
91 %
93 %
Belief in Heaven
65.8 %
74.7 %
Life after death
50.9 %
57.5 %
Source: The Barometer of Inclusion of Roma, The Soros Foundation, 2006
We thus have a very paradoxical situation where an ethnic community is much more
religious than the Orthodox Romanians but does not have the structural possibility of
expressing this religiosity within the local church. Later on we will take a look at how
the Pentecostal Church is able to provide the Roma community with an environment
where this religiosity not only becomes manifest but is shaped by their cultural and
social codes as well.
We encountered, throughout our research, the same paradox when we interviewed
Romanian Orthodox priests that are just as intrigued by the religiosity of Roma and
their lack of religious participation in the Church rituals. A priest said, for example,
that when Roma from his village go abroad to work, he knows that they are decent
people – that they go there for honest work and not to beg or steal. This has to be so
because before departing
“many of them come and say: Father I am going abroad, please pray that God
helps me and that I arrive safely there.” (F.B, young Orthodox priest).
Although they are not very churchly, the priest thinks of them as God-fearing
people.
The priests also remark that Roma are very afraid of breaking oaths. When some
insolvable issues appear among them, the priest is asked by Roma people to mediate
between them. This way his sacred character and his spiritual power are recognised by
the Roma community and so he becomes a symbolic sacred mediator between them in
solving their profane issues, although most of them do not attend his church:
“I ask him to promise in front of God that they did not do this, that they did not
steal from that person or did not sleep with the other one.” (Father L. Romanian
Orthodox priest, 30 years old, rural area)
– in fact this same priest sees in them a religious-magical honesty that prevents them
to break their oaths.
In spite of this religiosity, as pointed out earlier, the Roma avoid the Church because
they say that they feel discriminated within the Church just like all the other social
spaces where they interact with the Romanians and Hungarians. The same priest, that
praised the Roma’s religiosity and “fear of God”, proudly told me about one Gypsy
individual from his eparchy that takes part in every religious service together with the
Romanian believers: by this he tries to show that Roma could become full members
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Sorin GOG
if they wanted to, and at the same time reveals the extent of the religious participation
of Roma within his community.
According to the Roma Pentecostal converts we interviewed, the same situation
of exclusion practices exists within the Romanian Pentecostal Church. The Roma feel
themselves marginalised by their Romanian brothers:
“There are brothers that, as the Word of God says, do not make any distinction
between Roma or Gypsies and Romanians … we are brothers in the Lord and
they receive us exactly as they would receive a brother. But approximately 90%
of them make a racial discrimination. […] Only 10 % of them do not make a
distinction.” (S.G., late 30s, entrepreneur in the construction sector).
According to a Roma Pentecostal leader – the president of an important Roma
Pentecostal Association that has over 150 Pentecostal Roma Churches under its
care – this was precisely the issue that determined them to create separate churches
that where led by Roma pastors. This would lead to an autonomy of Roma and allow
for local Churches where Roma had full “religious rights”. A lot of Roma Pentecostals
told him that
“the Romanians make them sit on the last benches in the Church, that they
are seldom allowed to preach the Word of God during the service and that the
Romanians don’t look nice to them.” (C.F. Roma pastor and political leader,
55 years old, converted to Pentecostalism in the early 90s).
Because the Romanians did not treat the Roma very well, he decided to start a
new religious organisation that was their own. According to my informants, in some
Romanian churches a Roma person has to wait over thirty years in order to be ordained
as a deacon.
“Why then not have our own movement, our own teachers, or own religious
ministers?” (C.F. Roma pastor and political leader, 55 years old, converted to
Pentecostalism in the early 90s).
In the past two decades the religious conversion of Roma to neo-protestant movements
was followed by the creation of distinct Roma neo-protestant churches. The churches
were located in the very quarters where the Roma were living and the religious clergy
was recruited among their own people. Although this religious movement is still a
small one, in a lot of villages where there are Roma people a new institution appeared:
that of the local Church. An important dimension of our research was then to explore
the impact of the appearance of this institution on the ethnic identity of Roma and the
specific mechanisms for the articulation of a new “heavenly citizenship” that were set
in motion by the religious conversion and the creation of a religious community.
The strong mystical experience and the religious conversion that follows lead to a
new conceptualisation of the self and the grounding of a new type of social practices.
The religious experience is not a ritualistic one, but one that invites the believer to
experience for himself the religious realities. This individualisation of the religious faith
is very different from the Orthodox communitarian way of conceptualising religiosity
and this process of individualisation leads to a strong ethical rationalisation.
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Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism
“The Orthodox allow you to do whatever you want. You go to church on
Sunday, the Priest forgives you for your sins and then on Monday you start
over again with your sinful life. Such a thing is not possible. I say that here
(in the Pentecostal Church) there is the true faith; a faith that you have to live
as well.” (C.F. Roma pastor and political leader, 55 years old, converted to
Pentecostalism in the early 90s).
If there is no outworking and application of what God says, then “it is useless to
say that you love God, if you don’t follow his commandments”. For a Pentecostal,
religiosity is not a ritual activity, something to which one can formally participate.
The true religiosity expresses itself, for a Pentecostal, in a moral life that he has to
live out.
The religious gatherings that take place a few days a week are meant to create a
religious environment where each convert can enhance his faith and find out about how
“to save himself”. Religious participation is compulsory and actively taking part in all
the religious activities is a requirement for all members of the Church.
As a result of this we can clearly see that the neo-protestants Roma have a significantly
higher church attendance rate than the Orthodox Roma. 88.1% of the neo-protestant
Roma regularly attend church compared to only 22.6% of the Orthodox Roma. For the
neo-protestant Roma the local Church is the centre of community life. The spiritual
kinship that they form within the religious community establishes a social network that
extends beyond the religious services as well.
The strong emphasis on bible studies and religious practice that exists within the
Church and the institutional requirement of personal relationship with God leads to
a strong religious socialisation: the converts we interviewed used a strong religious
framework to interpret their experiences and often quoted from the bible in order to give
to their reasoning an undisputed authority. As a result of this, we can clearly see that at
the national level, neo-protestant Roma share religious values in a higher proportion
than do the Orthodox Roma.
Table 7: Religious values among the Orthodox and Neo-protestant Roma
Orthodox Roma
Neo-protestant Roma
Attend the Church at least
three times a month
25.6 %
88.1 %
Trust in the institution of
the Church
67.4 %
81.1 %
Belief in God
93 %
92.8 %
Belief in Heaven
74.7 %
85.6 %
Life after death
57.5 %
80.2 %
Source: The Barometer of Inclusion of Roma, The Soros Foundation, 2006
Not only is the religious participation higher among the neo-protestant Roma but
so are the religious beliefs and religious practices. The frequency of praying, according
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Sorin GOG
to what our informants stated, is much higher among the neo-protestant Roma: 84.7%
declared that they prayed daily compared to only 45.5% of the Orthodox Roma.
Table 8: Frequency of praying among the Orthodox and Neo-protestant Roma
Frequency of praying
Orthodox Roma
Neo-protestant Roma
Every Day
45.5 %
84.7 %
A few times a week
9.8 %
10.8 %
Once a week
4.3 %
0.9 %
Source: The Barometer of Inclusion of Roma, The Soros Foundation, 2006
As many other researchers have pointed out, the Roma communities are strongly
fragmented (Gay y Blasco 1999) and lack an ethnic-national narrative in order to
articulate an overarching “imagined community”(Anderson 2006). The lack of political
mobilisation and their marginalisation triggered by the ethnic majority coupled with their
economical destitution leads to a widespread disempowerment of Roma from Romania.
This is especially true of Roma in rural areas where the structures of opportunities are
limited and from which they are mostly excluded.
The Pentecostal movement does not offer social opportunities for the inclusion of
Roma among the Romanian Pentecostals, as some have argued; indeed, our research
showed that they themselves feel excluded from these religious communities as well.
This is the main reason for the creation of distinct Roma Pentecostal churches.
Through its specific religious mechanisms, the local Pentecostal Church manages to
create a sense of a new transfigured community grounded on an ethical rationalisation
of life. The religious environment creates a social space dominated by an ethic of
brotherhood that manages to overcome the strong kin fragmentation that exists among
the Roma community and to diminish the effects of discrimination and exclusion by
emphasising the strong spiritual bonds grounded in the love of God.
Through the institution of the Church the disempowered Roma can find the means
to articulate a distinct social and cultural identity. The Pentecostal Roma become the
agents and managers of their own identity and they find in the religious language the
tools to reflect and elaborate this new identity in the different contexts of life. The
institutional management of the local Church is composed of Roma people who manage
the day to day issues of the religious community and act as spiritual leaders.
The strong emphasis on bible studies, sermons and devotional literature creates a
high literacy rate among the Pentecostal converts that in turn leads to a valorisation of
education as a way of social achievement. Pentecostal Roma insist that education is
an important priority within their family and encourage their children to go to school.
The religious activities that take place within the Church lead to the creation of a local
religious elite that are able to articulate the needs and problems of their community.
The new “heavenly citizenship” and the promise of eternal salvation create strong
bonds among them and through this, a cohesion that diminishes the exclusion and
discrimination attitudes of the majority against them is born. The strong emphasis on
106 •
94.52 %
2.22 %
2.49 %
85.99 %
84.43 %
Romanian-2002
Hungarian-1992
Hungarian-2002
Roma-1992
Roma-2002
4.16 %
5.10 %
42.17 %
42.31 %
1.51 %
1.57 %
RomanCatholic
1.24 %
0.86 %
1.42 %
1.52 %
0.99 %
1.11 %
GreekCatholic
1.85 %
2.94 %
44.99 %
45.76 %
0.13 %
0.12 %
Reformed
0.03 %
0.06 %
1.38 %
1.42 %
0.03 %
0.04 %
Lutheran
Evangelical
0.13 %
0.12 %
4.21 %
4.15 %
0.01 %
0.01 %
Unitarian
6.53 %
2.61 %
1.67 %
1.42 %
2.17 %
1.70 %
NeoProtestant
0.43 %
1.31 %
0.26 %
0.30 %
0.11 %
0.19 %
Atheist
Without
religion/
1.06 %
1.40 %
84.81 %
Hungarian-1992
Hungarian-2002
Roma-1992
80.24 %
93.59 %
Romanian-2002
Roma-2002
94.34 %
Romanian-1992
Orthodox
3.56 %
4.60 %
39.68 %
39.76 %
2.09 %
2.01 %
RomanCatholic
1.09 %
0.91 %
1.31 %
1.34 %
0.64 %
0.74 %
GreekCatholic
3.84 %
5.40 %
48.13 %
48.82 %
0.05 %
0.03 %
Reformed
0.09 %
0.08 %
0.91 %
1.00 %
0.01 %
0.01 %
Lutheran
Evangelical
0.13 %
0.30 %
4.90 %
5.08 %
0.00 %
0.00 %
Unitarian
9.87 %
3.04 %
2.50 %
2.09 %
3.06 %
2.34 %
NeoProtestant
0.31 %
0.54 %
0.20 %
0.16 %
0.03 %
0.05 %
Without
religion/
Atheist
Table 2c: The religious denominational structure of the Romanian society living in the rural areas according to the 1992 and 2002 National Census
94.96 %
Romanian-1992
Orthodox
Table 2b : The religious denominational structure of the Romanian society living in the urban areas according to the 1992 and 2002 National Census
TABLES
Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism
• 107
Sorin GOG
the internalisation of moral codes and the puritan ideals allows the converted Roma to
articulate distinct practices that are totally contrary to the general perception or Roma
as vagabonds that steal, cheat and are dirty.
Our research put to light that most of the Roma regard the local NGOs as a private
way to make money and the different political projects as a way to enrich a small
number of people from their community. The local Pentecostal Church is increasingly
regarded in many parts of Romania as the single local institution that creates the
structural conditions for the formation of a unified community that has the power and
the language to articulate a specific social and cultural identity, capable of politically
mobilising a fragmented ethnic group.
REFERENCES
Anderson, B.R.O.G., Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism. London; New York:Verso, 2006.
Coleman, S., The globalisation of charismatic Christianity: Spreading the gospel of
prosperity. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Gay y Blasco, P. Gypsies in Madrid: sex, gender and the performance of identity.
Oxford: Berg, 1999.
Gog, S.,
“The construction of the religious space in post-socialist Romania.” Journal
for the Study of Religions and Ideologies(15): 37-53, 2006.
“Ateizmus után. Románia a vallási újjászületés és szekularizáció között.” Erdé
Erd lyi
T rsadalom 1: 51-64, 2007.
Tá
NOTES
1
The ethnographic data I am using in this paper is the end-product of the research “Nomads
and Parliamentarians. The influence of mobility and religious affiliation on identity
building and on the development of integration social policies Roma people in Northern,
Eastern Romania, and the Republic of Moldova. 1989-2005” (NOMAPARLIA).
2
The Barometer of Inclusion of Roma, The Soros Foundation, 2006.
108 •
CONVERSION NARRATIVES, SINCERE HEARTS, AND OTHER TANGIBLE SIGNS
Communicating Religious Change among the Transylvanian Roma1
László FOSZTÓ
INTRODUCTION
Religious conversion is often followed by personal transformation of the convert
and of his/her social relations. Analysts have pointed out the centrality of the conversion
narrative in these self-transformative attempts (Snow and Machalek 1983; Stromberg
1993). In this paper my starting point is similar to that of the analysts, but I take the
argument one step further: I start with an analysis of the ritualised narrative that
accompanies conversion but subsequently develop my analysis to other (non-verbal)
aspects of the conversion, considering social constraints on the performance of the
narrative and other self transformative attempts based on ethnographical data. Empirically
speaking, I am concerned with the maintenance and transformation of the moral self in
the context of religious conversion among a group of Roma from Romania who live
in the Cluj area, Transylvania.2
The study of religious conversion is an expanding subfield within the anthropology
of religion (see recent volumes: Buckser and Glazier 2003; Hefner 1993; Lamb and
Bryant 1999; van der Veer 1996), but the commencement of anthropological studies of
conversion can be traced to the late 1960s and early 1970s (Goody 1975; Horton 1971;
Peel 1968). At that time, the debate focused especially on the problem of tradition (in
Africa) versus modernity. Special attention was paid to differences in the modes of
thought, and particularly to the role of rationality in different societies (see Horton 1993).
More recent debates (Coleman 2000; Lehman 1998, Robbins 2004b; van der Veer 1996)
centre on the relative similarities and divergences of social processes observed across
regions where conversions are increasingly commonplace. The scope of conversion
studies has been broadened to consider transformations of other ‘world religions’.
Some analysts adopted the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ in order to explain parallel
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László FOSZTÓ
transformations observable in Christian, Islamic, and Hindu societies (Eisenstadt 2002;
Hefner 1998; van der Veer 2002), and there are many recent ethnographies from nearly
every region of the world. In addition to African societies (Comaroff and Comaroff
1991; 1997; Meyer 1999; Peel 2000), Latin American (Chesnut 1997; 2003), European
(Coleman 2000), Papua New Guinean (Robbins 2004a), and post-Soviet societies
(Pelkmans, et al. 2005; Wanner 2003; 2004) have also been studied, and likewise,
comparative analyses are available (Lehman 2001). The problem of modernity seems
to be an enduring issue within conversion studies. Nevertheless interpretations of the
concept of modernity and approaches to the process of modernisation encompass a
wide theoretical range.
At one end of this theoretical spectrum we find works adopting primarily individualoriented, cultural or psychological models that focus on changing ideas and practices
related to the construction of personhood, self, community, and commitment. The
methodology of such studies usually focuses on linguistic aspects of social behaviour such
as religious rhetoric and conversion narratives (Harding 1987; 2000; Stromberg 1993),
or, more broadly, on changes in representational practices amongst the converted (Keane
2002). At the other end of the spectrum are explanations emphasising the importance
of dynamic socio-political contexts and the political economy of conversion. These
models are often supplemented by historical discussions of the changing socio-political
context of religious expansion.3 Other approaches can be placed between these poles;
reconstructions of the ‘religious encounters’ between natives and missionaries (Peel
2000) and inquiries into the translation of ideas (Keane 1997; Meyer 1999) are often
supported by documents, procured principally from the archives of missionary societies.
Those authors who take such an approach provide conscientious reconstructions of
the historical interactions that took place in missionary encounters, while criticising
socio-political accounts of conversion for their purported economic determinism and
neglect of ‘local voices’.4
My own approach is closer to the first pole, though I advocate a perspective that
integrates the communicative practices observable in conversion into the wider context
of ritual communication emerging in the post-socialist era. Some authors contend that
conversion narratives should be viewed as a key component to the transformations of
self that are inherent to conversion, and not simply as retrospective accounts of the
phenomena itself (Snow and Machalek 1983; Stromberg 1993). I am interested in
how alterations to individual communicative practices and relationships brought about
by religious conversion lead to more general personal transformations. I proceed by
analysing both verbal and non-verbal aspects of conversion and, furthermore, describe the
social contexts, which support or subvert attempts at expressing converted personhood.
The wider social and economic changes transpiring in post-socialist Romania are
connected to practices and ideas of conversion and other religious practices. I trace
the link between different levels of social organisation through an ethnography of
communicative practices.
Conversion narratives contain features of performance (see Austin 1976); they
are not simply accounts of past events, rather their performance creates and maintains
the act of conversion. The impact of the conversion narrative on personhood is
considerable, but my analysis of conversion will not solely be confined to the verbal
110 •
Conversion Narratives, Sincere Hearts, and Other Tangible Signs
aspects (i.e. the narrative) of the act. I would like to single out a problem here; while
analysts of conversion stories recognise the importance of the narration in transforming
the converts’ personal identity, and demonstrate the impact of conversion on the self
(Stromberg 1993), they do not pay enough attention to the ways in which narration and
other verbal actions are embedded in and transform the social world of converts and
how these transformative performances can act as social constraints.
I approach conversion as a form or ritual that includes both verbal and non-verbal
elements. I define the performance of the narrative as part of a ritual sequence, and
therefore the connection between the performance and social context must be described
and analysed. If conversion narratives are seen as part of a broader domain of ritualised
communication, non-verbal ritual codes (i.e. dressing, gestures, visible changes in
consumption, etc.) must be included in the analysis. Indeed, both verbal and non-verbal
aspects are integral parts of the communicative practices which undergo changes
in the process of conversion. Moreover, the pragmatic aspects of this transformed
communication should be analysed because they reveal the interconnectedness of the
converted person to the immediate social structures that either undermine or support his
or her attempt at self-transformation. Identifying the social limits on ritual communication
reveals how, in some contexts, the willingness or unwillingness of a convert to retell
his or her conversion narrative, and, alternatively, the willingness or unwillingness of
an audience to listen are part of a dialogical construction of moral personhood.
For my analysis of conversion amongst the Roma, the most relevant connection
is with the work of Paloma Gay y Blasco.5 Through her case study of the Gitanos of
Madrid, Gay y Blasco demonstrates how the group maintains its identity via an everyday
focus on personhood. Gitanos neither subordinate the individual to the group nor link
‘Gypsiness’ to communal unity and solidarity. Their emphasis is rather on a specific
modality of moral personhood existing in each and every Gitano man and woman,
and that is distinct from that found in non-Gitanos (Payos
(Payos)
Payos). An “awareness of each
other as moral beings” underpins the Gitano community (Gay y Blasco 1999: 41).
Gay y Blasco discusses the impact of Evangelical Christian conversion on this ideal
of morality and suggests that conversion reinforces some aspects of the distinctive
Gitano morality. In this sense converts become “better Gitanos”, while a new sense
of community simultaneously emerges, which extends group solidarity further than
the narrow boundaries of kinship, which was the main organising principle for nonconverted Gitanos.
The structure of this paper is as follows: I start with a case study of a convert and
his narrative about his encounter with God. I seek to demonstrate the role of narration
in the performative transformation of personhood. I analyse the limitations of such
transformative attempts through another case study. The third section is an analysis
of a debate about a biblical passage and explores social constraints on conversion
attempts, through a consideration of the problem of social rejection of transformative
narrations (together with the denial of the feasibility of a born-again personhood). The
fourth section is concerned with the ‘tangible signs’ of actions or attitudes, which are
not primarily communicative or are communicated indirectly. The fifth section focuses
on emerging spiritual kinship-ties, practices, and ideals. My conclusions point to the
importance of the changing social orientation of the converted self.
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László FOSZTÓ
CONVERSION NARRATIVES: SYMBOLIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE PERSON
In this section I quote passages from a long autobiographical narrative by ‘Dani’,
a middle-aged male convert who is a Pentecostal6 preacher in Gánás. Dani was born
in Gánás to a very poor Roma family and spent part of his life outside the village. We
became acquainted as soon as I started to visit the Pentecostal gatherings that were
regularly held in a house in Dani’s neighbourhood. I was already familiar with some
events from his narrative because he often included personal examples and testimonies
in his preaching. I asked Dani if he would tell me the ‘whole story’, and he agreed. He is
trilingual, as are most of local Roma, but before we started to record his narrative Dani
told me that he would only speak Romanian for the interview; ‘This is the language
in which I can speak about my encounter with God’ – he added. His choice of using
a single language rather than the usual composite of quotations in various languages
indicated that this was to be a special narrative form, more ritualised than everyday
narratives. The relatively mono-vocal narration also conferred more authority upon
Dani in his account of the past, and, as I will argue, Dani’s mono-lingual performance
acted to emphasise his transformed personhood in the present. The following narrative
is a product of our interaction in a supportive environment; Dani’s own house in the
presence of his wife and a few other sympathetic listeners. Sometimes I intervened
with short questions, but the construction of the whole of the narration was clearly
under Dani’s control.
Dani:
Maybe God wanted it to be like this: because if God hadn’t put me to suffering I
might not have turned to God, and probably I would never know him. Probably
I wouldn’t be a convert (Rou: pocăit)7 as I am now.
In my life, before I converted, I would drink one or two glasses of brandy, like
every man. But I was stupid when I was drunk. If somebody insulted me, I beat
him and cut him, I did … the devil carried me (Rou: dracul m-a purtat). And
once I was in Zalău, because then I was living there at Poarta Sălajului. I was
married there. I was a son-in-law there. And there were some wicked people:
some tent-dwelling Gypsies (Rou: ţigani corturari) with big moustaches and
long hair. And those Gypsies would come there when we would be drinking with
my brother-in-law at my mother-in-law’s house. They came and they scoffed
at us… because they said we are Gypsy-like… anyway… Then on a Saturday
afternoon I started to drink there, and those Gypsies came and started to quarrel
with us. We were drunk… the other guy owed some money to my brother-in-law,
the guy who we killed, because we killed one of them… (…)
I was condemned to 16 years in prison. I had been in prison several times before,
but I never had gotten a big punishment. I was frightened, when I heard that
I was getting 16 years, I was frightened. (How old were you?) Me? I was then
35. Then I said: Lord, if you will set me free I will change (Rou: o să mă întorc),
I will convert, I will serve you for the rest of my life. But as I knelt down, the
guard saw me through a small window and took me out to the lobby. That was
a real beating I received! ‘So you are praying here? Didn’t you have time to
pray while you were outside? You are praying here in order to show the thieves
you are a believer!’ He beat me. But I continued to pray day and night to God,
I was asking him to help me get free.
112 •
Conversion Narratives, Sincere Hearts, and Other Tangible Signs
The man who had beaten me, the same policeman… because I had no education,
I wasn’t able to read or write… But at once God put the intention in his mind
and on his heart (Rou: a pus in minte si i-a pus pe inima), and he returned to
me, as he saw me continuously praying and crying. I was desperate and I was
not eating. He came and asked me: ‘Don’t you have the right to appeal?’ I said
to the sergeant: ‘Sir, I cannot read and I cannot write.’ He took me out to the
lobby and put a chair next to a table because he felt pity for me as desperate as
I was and I was crying. He said: ‘Listen, I’m going to prepare an application
for you. Request an appeal, but keep in mind what you now declare to me,
because I take it down, and after three months when you are called for the
hearing, you must say the same. If you make even a small mistake it will be
bad for you. You might forget…’ I told him everything. I dictated everything
without a devious word because if they were to catch me lying at the appeal, I
probably even could have gotten additional years. He filed the appeal, and they
took the application to Bucharest. After three months I received the decision.
The guard came: ‘Have you filed an appeal? Prepare your pack for the trip.
You will go to the hearing.’ I prayed throughout these three months: ‘Lord, you
know that I have no education. Lord, help me to speak there. Because there are
a lot of people, I might get scared. But you, my God, you can help me. You’ve
always helped me.’
My brother, when I was there at the court, there were eighteen of us. Eighteen
people were there for appeals. Who knows how it happened, because I was
the last, from the beginning, but we had gotten there who knows how, and they
took the files and I was the first. You know, how could this happen? As they
took the files those that were on top came out at the bottom and mine came
first. When we reached the courthouse, we were all in chains, and they called
my name. I stood up, there was such a crowd there… there were more than five
hundred people. He asked me a question. The judge asked me if I admitted to
all the declarations that had been recorded after my arrest. I do not want to
praise myself, let the praise be for God, I was even in prison before and I was
aware of all the laws… It is not good to be in prison, but it is good to know a
bit of hardship… I started courageously: Sir, and honoured Supreme Court, I
recognise only one of the declarations: the last one. Except this last declaration
I can recognise none. ‘Look, they are all signed.’ ‘They are signed because I
was obliged to sign. I was desperate; I was desperate because of the beating I
received. I was obliged to sign what they told me to sign!’ ‘But here in front of
you, I know that you are here to interrogate, and solve our problems, I know
that you are here and you will not beat me…’ And then I explained this, and
this… and then he took that book, and turned the pages, and the judges discussed
something. ‘Sit down!’ … They were listening to the others. ‘Wait outside in
the lobby because I will give the result immediately.’ Then we waited outside
and a sergeant came: ‘Who is S. Dani?’ ‘I am, at your command.’ He said:
‘Prisoner S. Dani you have 8 years to serve.’ (Reduced to half…) Yes. They
changed my punishment because I was classified anew (Rou: mi s-a schimbat
încadrarea) (…)
But you see, I went out to work. On a Saturday when we were outside I asked
the commander: ‘Sir, if I were to work, from my eight years, how much would
remain?’ And I explained: ‘I had sixteen years and the Supreme Court reduced
my punishment, and I was left with eight. Now I would like to go out to work
• 113
László FOSZTÓ
in order to gain some days, if I go, how much can I reduce from these eight?’
‘What is your occupation?’ ‘I am a mason.’ ‘We need masons. You are the
only one.’ And then they took me out to work as a mason, and he said: ‘From
the eight years you will remain for four. And you are free! But you must have
good conduct and no reports, because if you get a report, that will be added
when you are released and you will stay six more months, or nine months, or
even a year, depending on the report.’ My brother, I had such good conduct
that in four years I had no reports. God saved me, praise him, and that is why I
converted. I converted because I saw the love of God. After all that I had done
in the prison, how much I had sold, how I was fighting, how much bad I had
done there… and I had no reports, because God took care of me. I was fasting.
I fasted twice a week. (When?) Tuesday and Friday… And God saw me: Look
this is in suffering, and even in suffering he is fasting, praise the Lord. That
is why I converted. (…)
When I returned from prison I forgot about God. If a brother-in-law would
come, or a friend or a relative, I would start to drink and I had forgotten God.
Six months passed like this. After six months I started to drink even harder. I
was beating this poor woman… how much she got it, God forbid. The drinks
did it, not because I was a bad man. I was not bad, but when I drank the devil
worked. And listen now: because now comes the thing!
I was attending the assembly… (Who encouraged you to go?) … just me
alone. (But there, while you were inside were people coming to you to talk?
To teach…) Yes, they came. But they came to talk about God, not to teach me.
(Who were they?) Some converts came on Sundays, and they took us out, those
who wanted to come… (Were they Pentecostals?) Pentecostals… But I knew
before… I even went to congregations. And then I went to the assembly. And
when I went to the assembly I liked it, but I was not able to pray. Because if
you have no education, just: Help me God! You know my God! Help me God! I
was not able to say more. (…) When I would come home from church, I would
drink two-three decilitres of brandy and even put a bottle in my pocket. I came
home and drank. Six months passed again, I went to the assembly and I drank.
I was drinking and smoking.
But one night, after six months, because the Bible says: he who is in God’s
plan to convert, God will convert him even from his mother’s womb. Whether
you want it or not, you will be a convert! The Bible says that. Because if you
do not want it, he will put you on a bed of suffering (Rou: patul de suferinţa),
and from the bed of suffering you will cry: Lord if you help me I will convert!
Like I was in prison: Lord, if you liberate me I will convert, and since then God
has not let me down. God saw that I was drinking and fighting… I was fighting
with the Gypsies and attending the assembly!
And then, one night at two o’ clock the face of Jesus Christ appeared to me. I
have a book, I can show you… Jesus was wearing a mantle and he was coming
through the air. And I heard a voice. I heard a voice: ‘How long do you want
to continue like this?’ I got up, and woke her [the wife]. We kneeled down:
and then I got scared indeed. I said then: ‘Lord, starting from today…’ It was
dark; I had not turned the light on. I said: Lord if I do not serve you truly, put
my mouth on my nape. If I put drinks in my mouth or smoke. Whatever will
be in my life, I will convert. And thank my Heavenly Father since I made this
114 •
Conversion Narratives, Sincere Hearts, and Other Tangible Signs
covenant with him… I would say in vain to you or to Misi… You do not need
to know me… I want God to know me! Because… people are enemies. People
say bad things about you, but I do not care what the world says, because the
Bible says: If you want to be saved, do not look to the right or look to the left,
look ahead. (…)
After a week I felt very, very bad: I wanted to smoke, I wanted to drink. But if
you take an oath in front of God (Rou: jurămînt în faţa lui Dumnezeu) you must
be very ambitious… because I was a hard drinker. But thank God that I said:
Lord, I feel like drinking, and I feel like smoking, but how bad these are! I know
you do not like these, because when Jesus Christ came to save us, to clean sin,
he did not come with drinks and cigarettes in his pockets, to distribute to the
drinkers and smokers. No, he came to reject cigarettes and drinks. Because
only in this way can you turn to the Word of God.
(From whom did you learn?) I tell you that too: while we had children around,
I could not pray at home, because children are children, especially if you are
a convert, you cannot hurt a child. When I was going to the forest to collect
wood I knelt down and prayed: ‘Lord, I have no education. Lord I don’t know.
Lord, teach me! If you want me to be a convert and to serve you all my life,
teach me!’ And then, I took the Bible in my hand, and I could not recognise
the letters. I knew none of the letters. And I looked into the Bible and I was
crying. I was crying and crying and my tears were flowing on the Bible. I said
how good it would be to know what is written here… Lord it would be very
good to know what it says here. Lord, I converted in vain if you do not grant
me understanding to know what your Word says. Lord, teach me Lord! Show
me that you are God, show me now, because if you show me now that you will
teach me to read, I will believe in you even more. Isn’t it a big thing to learn to
read at fi fty years old when I didn’t attend school at all. Not even for a minute.
I wasn’t at school. It passed two months like this. I couldn’t get anything… And
once as I took the Bible in my hand, I opened to John 3. And I looked there and
at once I read: Jesus and Nicodemus… And then I asked Józsi, I asked him
first: ‘Józsi come tell me what it says here.’ But I said nothing that I had read…
He says: Jesus and Nicodemus… when I heard this my hair rose on my head.
I would learn to read! I didn’t sleep all night. I stayed up with the light on and
I read the Bible. This was on a Saturday. In the morning, the next morning, it
was Sunday, and I spoke in the assembly… I took the Bible and I knelt down,
and I prayed to God. Everyone knew that I couldn’t read. But when I started
to read from the Bible everybody was amazed. ‘You couldn’t read!’ ‘I couldn’t,
but God is good.’ And with him you can do whatever you want; if you are a
believer and you say: let this forest move, the forest will move. And God has
taught me, my brother. And I thank God, because without any school, without
any education, without any teaching … not taught by anybody… nothing at all!
(And the pastors didn’t teach you?) When I was at church he wouldn’t speak to
me personally (Yes…), he preached to everybody, but I listened in vain, because
what I would hear from him, in two-three days I would forget. (Yes…) But God
purged me… he made me pure, and when God saw that I walk his paths and I
want to be a real convert, God gave me understanding (Rou: pricepere). Do
you realise that without any education you will go among three to four hundred
people and preach the Word of God? It is a big thing, my dear Laci.
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One main motive of this narrative is the recurrent demand on Dani to speak in
public: Dani repeatedly presents situations where he is expected and compelled to
speak. This motive can be interpreted from the present identity of Dani as a preacher;
his self-construction as a person who has become a public speaker. Throughout the
narration his personal development is connected to suffering and the intervention of
God. This motive emphasises Dani’s personal development through a continuous
overcoming of obstacles. As Dani puts it: “It is good to know a bit of hardship…” He
might be considered a ‘self-made man’, but divine support is always involved. This is
particularly salient in the culminant point of his personal development, when Dani is
able to read and begins to understand the Scripture (Rou: pricepe) the changes he is
undergoing are already beyond his influence. According to his narrative, only God could
teach him to read. Dani’s account of this radical change disconnects his achievement
from his abilities and skills, and transforms the event into a miracle: achieving wisdom
without learning or education. This idea is consistent with the traditional Roma form
of constructing personhood in an individualist and authority-defying manner, but also
contains a resigned acceptance that without divine intervention, his condition could
not have changed.
Another particularity of this narrative is the symbolic rupture that separates sinful
past behaviour from the virtuous present person. This dualistic construction of conversion
narratives has been remarked on by other researchers (Snow and Machalek 1983).
Throughout his narration not only does Dani reject his pre-conversion behaviour, he
also asserts a continuity in his character. The tension between these implicit statements
is resolved by the presence of evil influences in his life: ‘Not because I was a bad man,
but [because] the devil worked’. Conversely, the point of rupture and Dani’s new,
converted personhood is supported by the continuous presence of God. Dani attributes
his initial suffering that triggered his conversion to God, who he sees working in the
lives of other characters mentioned in the story. The apex of Dani’s relationship with
God occurred when he had a vision one night. For Dani, the apparition of Jesus signals
God’s care for Dani’s own personal development: ‘He for whom it is in God’s plan to
convert, God will convert even from his mother’s womb’. This divine sign scares Dani
and he responds by submitting himself and making a ‘covenant’ with God.
In Dani’s narrative, conversion is presented as having social consequences: Dani
refuses to consider the opinions of others, instead focusing solely on his connection
with God. He seeks to ‘understand’ and enact religious ideals: ‘If you want to be saved,
don’t look to the right or to the left, look ahead’. Such radical decisions and personal
changes need not be central to a conversion narrative. This emphasis on radical change
and rupture indicates that the new personhood of the convert is still embedded in his
earlier commitments. The spiritual and social process of conversion is initiated by a
covenant with God, and repeated public performances of the conversion narrative are
necessary (though not sufficient) for the convert to gain social acceptance as a new
person.
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RELUCTANT CONVERT: CAUGHT IN FAMILY TIES
Róza:
Róza, a Roma in her sixties, was one of my neighbours in the village. For a good
part of my stay I was not aware that Róza was a Pentecostal convert. After I learned
that she had converted in the early 90s, I asked her about the circumstances surrounding
her conversion, and she recounted her and her family’s story. In addition to eliciting her
conversion narrative, I spoke with other members of her family who seemed to share
Róza’s view of many of the events surrounding her conversion.
The process was set in motion when Róza became severely ill. She was taken
to the city hospital where a doctor told her that she had leukaemia. Her family knew
that this was a deadly disease, and her three daughters cried in desperation. She was
taken home where she was confined to her bed for months on end, losing weight and
unable to move on her own. Her family resigned itself to the fact that she would die
in a matter of weeks.
Róza was divinely inspired to seek out the healing practices of Pentecostalism. She
recounts how the idea came to her during a long night of ‘discussions with the Lord’.
God told her to go to a Romanian-run Pentecostal church in the city, where, during
the powerful public prayer session, she would be healed. Róza’s family attributed her
intentions to confusion brought on by her suffering and was unwilling to bring her to
the city. One of her married daughters had strong objections to her mother’s wish to
abandon her old religion. Shortly after this, the daughter nevertheless decided, under
the influence of a dream, that Róza should be taken to a Pentecostal assembly.
Róza was taken to her sister’s home in the city in preparation to being taken to the
church. Róza’s brother-in-law worked in construction industry and had Pentecostal
colleagues. He invited them to come pray for Róza. Róza believes that “the Lord was
working” since her first contact with the Pentecostals. She was finally able to sleep well
after months of being unable to do so. After a few days she was taken to the church and
there, was healed. Her strength returned as she took part in the collective prayer. She
“received Jesus” during the same service, and after several months she was baptised.
Her journey as a convert remained unfulfilled because when the Holy Spirit came
to give her the gift of tongues and prophecy, she could not get the “baptism in the
Spirit”.8 Still staying with her sister, one evening Róza felt the presence of the Holy
Spirit coming on, but her husband stopped her from speaking in tongues so as to
avoid frightening the children. Disturbed by this, the Holy Spirit departed and Róza
received only ‘the seal’ (Hun: “le voltam pecsételve”).9 She blames her husband for
not supporting her in her attempt to be baptised by the Holy Spirit, but she says (and
her husband confirmed this) that he was scared by the changes she underwent during
the visitation of the Holy Spirit.
Other members of Róza’s family were also adherents of Pentecostalism, though
none of them had fully converted. Her husband had regularly visited an assembly for
months. He was almost baptised, but “there were no application forms that day”, and
that day Róza’s brother-in-law called him, half seriously inviting him to “have some
more drinks together and pay some more visits to the chicks”. Thus, Róza’s husband
remained unconverted. Soon after Róza’s baptism, her daughter (the same daughter who
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had the divinely inspired dream) became ill. Her ailment was due to satanic influence
and could not be diagnosed by medical doctors. She was taken to and healed at the
same church at which her mother had been healed. She received Jesus and was to be
baptised, but her husband, a musician, told her that he would divorce her if she joined the
Pentecostals. Róza took her daughter’s case to the Pentecostal assembly and explained
to the converted brothers (Hun: hív
í őtestv
ív
ő
érek)
rek) that her daughter could not be baptised
rek
because it would destroy her family (she and her husband had two young children at
that time). The assembly agreed that it would be unwise to break apart the family:
“Nevertheless, God wouldn’t leave her alone.” – they commented. The later material
success (house, car, etc.) of Róza’s daughter’s family is attributed by Róza to divine
help, but she also fears that the time for admonition (Hun: dorgálá
lás
lá
ás) will come.
In their attempts to convert, Róza and her family members walked a markedly
different path than did Dani. Physical suffering and miraculous healing play a part in
many conversion narratives, and this is not unique to the Roma. But Roma converts
share a common experience of having a direct, intimate connection with the Lord and
Jesus. When asked about their belief in God, they often mention their ‘knowledge of
God’ (Rom: me prinzhanaw le devles). Therefore, prayer as a ‘conversation’ with God
is not unusual among Roma converts. In Róza’s story, she and her daughter had already
had direct relations with God even before being converted. Divine signs and answers
are often close at hand; one must only open his or her eyes and heart. Therefore, in
Róza’s narrative the moment of conversion itself does not mark a sudden and novel
encounter with the supernatural. In Róza’s case conversion came along with her having
been healed. The difficulties of her post-conversion life had only just begun with her
acceptance of God. The process of conversion burdens the convert, who must work
through his or her new commitments. Among these commitments kinship seems to be
the most important.
Neighbours and friends form another category of social contacts with whom the
convert must deal in his or her new personhood. Converts are often faulted for being
selfish. This has partly to do with the convert’s awareness of being saved while others
might be doomed. But converts are also seen as being selfish in more worldly ways: the
convert, as part of the renegotiation of his or her life, may have to sever pre-existing
social relations and abandon social networks that stretch outside the bounds of the faith
community, or those that could potentially be seen as ‘sinful’. Róza and other similarly
isolated converts I met, however, were not thought of as selfish. The fact that I had
gone so long without realizing Róza was a convert, though partially due to the fact
that I was preoccupied with work I was conducting in a different part of the village,
was also due to the fact that Róza did not conspicuously display her piety or have the
physical appearance of a convert (i.e. adopting a dress code).
When Róza speaks about her incomplete baptism by the Holy Spirit, she is aware
of her husband’s scepticism (Hun: ne csináld
ld az eszed
eszed) and her family’s fear of her
ecstatic displays. Róza imagines an ideal scenario of spiritual support: upon the first
signs of the Holy Spirit appearing in the convert’s behaviour, the family members would
kneel down around him or her and pray for his/her baptism. She experienced the signs:
trembling and against her will, her hands rose, a power like a strong wind or fire came
down to her, and she began to speak loudly, but the family refused to support her. The
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presence of their young children is strategically referred to by Róza’s husband; small
children should not be frightened. This preoccupation with the well being of children
was also exhibited by Dani, who prayed in the forest so as to not disturb the children in
his house. Roma find great pleasure in playing with their kids, and babies and children
are sources of great joy, they also tend to believe that fright can cause serious illness,
particularly for children.
Family values and the safety of babies are called upon once more, when Róza’s
daughter is threatened with divorce by her husband. At this moment, Róza takes
responsibility for protecting her daughters’ marriage, even risking violating one of the
ethical tenets of Pentecostalism – that the faith should be spread as much as possible.
In practice, Róza was able to maintain most of her life as a convert, remaining lowprofile and doing little missionary work. She recognises the inherent tension between
her religious and family life, and she fears that her family members will suffer for not
converting. Her fear is expressed in the dualistic language of the Pentecostals: God
will not leave the family alone, but Satan will also approach them, and as they are not
converted, her family members are vulnerable to his attack.
It is worth noting that Róza’s son-in-law (Rom: zhamutro) did not oppose his wife’s
conversion because of any deference to the values of another religion, but simply for
pragmatic reasons: he would be unable to practice his job as a musician (which involves
parties and drinking) being married to a pious, converted wife. Róza’s brother-in-law
(Rom: kumnato) relied on a bias towards male superiority when he prevented Róza’s
husband from being baptised.
The first preliminary conclusion that can be drawn from these cases is that conversion
should not be viewed as a single event, and should not be attributed solely to a personal
decision. It is analytically more useful to look at conversion as a process, which, though
potentially triggered by an individual’s choice, nonetheless sets in motion a succession
of events that affect and are affected by the convert’s position in local social networks
and his or her pre-conversion values and commitments. Even in extreme cases in
which the convert is cut off from his/her everyday world, it is still worth looking at the
convert’s shifting commitments and values. Therefore, prison conversions (as is the
case of Dani) can be of special interest. A second conclusion is that studying conversion
can be useful for understanding more than just the particular religious movement in
question. Nonetheless, individual religions may be objects of study in their own right,
and studying conversion could lead to a better understanding of religious phenomena.
There is a further reaching consequence of social-anthropological approaches to
conversion: For the ethnographer, individual conversion attempts offer a window into
the social-cultural context surrounding the convert. The tensions and transformations
experienced by converts reveal much about larger social systems.
REFUSAL: JOHN 3: 4-7 IN A ROMUNGRO SETTLEMENT
Accompanied by my host Misi, I paid a visit to the preacher (Dani) with whom I
was by then familiar with. We found him outside his house with a group of several other
converts (two males Jani and Zoli and several females) who were in a heated discussion
with a non-converted Rom, Bandi, who had recently returned to the village from the city.
Some non-converted Roma joined the circle and listened on with intrigue and curiosity.
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As I later found out, Bandi was a rather educated person; his parents were from the
village, but he had grown up in an orphanage and finished vocational education in the
city. Occasionally he would visit his relatives in the village, and as they lived in the
same neighbourhood as the preacher, Bandi dropped by for a chat that developed into a
quite intellectual discussion with the converted families. The discussion attracted more
people, and when we arrived the group was discussing the idea of being ‘born again’.
I recorded the scene with their permission. I think it is fair to say that the discussion
was not considerably influenced by my presence and use of the camera.
The preacher assigned various passages from the Bible for Bandi to read, and together
they would then interpret the passage. In some cases Bandi reluctantly accepted the
scriptural interpretation offered by the converts, but often he claimed that the text was
inconsistent and because of this refused to admit that the Scriptures could provide a
basis for any normative framework. Bandi loudly declared that he had been “educated
by the Communists”, and so his knowledge was based on material existence. In some
cases he was surprisingly well informed; he referred to the Dead Sea Scrolls when
talking about the non-canonical texts of the Bible, and about DNA when the discussion
came to the topic of reproduction.
On the issue of being born-again (as accounted for in John 3: 4-7)10, Bandi proved
to be a rather tough opponent for the preacher: he refused to accept that Jesus had been
thoroughly honest in his talk with Nicodemus who asked him a simple question: ‘How
can a man be born when he is old?’. In order to show how unfair Jesus had treated his
interlocutor, Bandi recounted the following story. During the course of Bandi’s narration
Dani tried to interrupt several times, dismissing the whole story as having nothing to do
with heavenly matters, but the audience remained rather puzzled by the situation, some
of them refusing to believe that Bandi was totally wrong. Their growing sympathy for
Bandi’s challenge was based on the text’s built-in ambivalence: Jesus’ metaphorical
answer to Nicodemus: ‘Flesh gives birth to flesh, but the Spirit gives birth to spirit. You
should not be surprised at my saying, you must be born again.’ Bandi was quick to point
out that Jesus offers no direct answer to the question and that written texts often have
more than one meaning. Bandi also argued that literate people can interpret scripture
to suit their own tastes and agendas. As a result of the discussion the non-converted
audience became increasingly sympathetic to Bandi’s line of argumentation. Bandi’s
story went as follows:
BANDI: - A great fortune-teller was living before the Second World War...
what he said would come true, remember: before the war it came true! A man
came to him and asked: “Look, my son is going to the war, is he going to live
or not?” Look what he did! [Bandi takes a piece of wood and draws lines on
the ground, to imitate how the fortune-teller writes.]
BANDI: - You all know Romanian, right?... [He fails to complete his writing
because the stick breaks. He throws it away.] Dammit!...
DANI: - Look, take this! [Dani throws a sharp stone to Bandi’s feet. Bandi
takes the stone and continues to write on the soil.]
BANDI: - Look here! What does he reply? “NU
“NU; VA TRAI”. [It is a pun, which
can be interpreted as ‘He will live’ or ‘He will not live’]
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Conversion Narratives, Sincere Hearts, and Other Tangible Signs
ZOLI: - He will not... [He reads the signs.]
BANDI: - So: NU; VA TRAI. Keep it in mind! The boy goes to the war and he
is killed. “Didn’t you say to me, that he would live!?” He replies: “Me? What
have I written to you? NU; va trai.”
BANDI: - Whatever you might do he will get the upper hand!
DANI: - Fine, so what?
BANDI: - Wait, wait, wait... let me...
JANI: - Let him, let him...
BANDI: - So if he lives: “I said to you that he would live!” ...if he dies “I told
you he is going to die! He will not live!” You know why this is? Because of
this: a point and a comma [ ; ]. So look at what I am not able to understand...
DANI: - Just a moment...
JANI: - Let him, let him...
ZOLI: - Wait a moment...
DANI: - Do you know what this means?... Compared to the works of Jesus
Christ? It is like heaven to earth... Exactly nothing! That is all you’ve said!
BANDI: - OK. So look, what I am unable to understand is: “unless one is born
of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter...”
DANI: - Are you done?
JANI: - Let him, let him... He should say when he is finished!
BANDI: - So this is what Jesus says: if one is not born out of water and the
Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. This is 5... Let’s start at 4.
Nicodemus says the following... So this is what Nicodemus asks, and what I’ve
just read is how Jesus replies. The question is: “How can a man be born when
he is old? Can he enter a second time into his mother’s womb and be born?”
So that is what a countryman asked.
DANI: - Right...
JANI: - It is true! Right...
BANDI: - It is exactly like how the father asked: “Will my son survive?” And
you reply “NU; VA TRAI”. You put point and a comma. So you cheat me!
DANI: - But...
In order to interpret this scene it is important to point out that even if some of the
participants had received primary education, most were at least functionally illiterate.
Therefore most would be unable to appreciate the subtleties of Romanian orthography
such as the ambiguous use of the semicolon. They thus easily accepted that a semicolon could be turned into a tool of deception. On the other hand, this generalised
scepticism can be seen as the protective strategy of those who feel powerless in the
face of written documents. The credibility of the story is enhanced by its reference to
fortune telling which can be practiced with success by using creative invention and
manipulation of signs.11
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As soon as Bandi felt that he had gained the sympathy of his audience, he pushed
his challenge further:
BANDI: - But keep in mind, that I cannot understand this Part 5 at all. “That
which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.”
The only one who is born of Spirit is Jesus, I am sorry.
ZOLI: - Praise him!
JANI: - That is why he says...
BANDI: - So he is the one! He is the only one.
DANI: - Right...
BANDI: - So we can’t give examples that you or somebody else was born of
the Spirit. He is the one, so he should not be considered here.
DANI: - ….
BANDI: - So now... “You must be born again.” This is beyond my understanding,
again... I am born again if... I swap my faith...
DANI: - Some light is coming...
JANI: - You see that you will...
BANDI: - But wait a second, man!
DANI: - Don’t you see I am sitting here!
JANI: - Take it with more gentleness!
BANDI: - But, this is not what Nicodemus asked. He is asking if he, as an old
man in flesh and bones, can enter his mother’s womb again. This is what he
asks! And he [Jesus] does not reply!
These allegedly down-to-earth arguments and Bandi’s refusal of the more subtle or
metaphorical interpretations are backed by a moral claim on respecting the everyday
rules of discussion. While Dani made several attempts to turn the discussion to more
spiritual concerns, the debate slipped into a discussion of the problems related to being
born in a biological sense. The conversation took on an even more frivolous twist, forcing
Dani onto the defensive, so he changed the topic and opened the Bible to a different
passage and handed it back to Bandi. “He does not need to look. He knows it by heart,
because he has recited it so many times...” Dani’s wife commented supportively.
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SINCERITY, THE HEART AND OTHER TANGIBLE SIGNS
Na dikh tu, na dikh tu ke hom kalo,
numa o Del, numa o Del prinzhanel munro jilo.12
(Do not look, do not look that I am black,
God alone, God alone knows my heart.)
These two lines are taken from a Pentecostal song popular among Roma converts.
The opposition it expresses between the outer appearance of the person, which is seen
as kalo (black) by others, and his or her inner quality, which can only be recognised
through the divine relationship, is a major distinction that builds the converted self.
The statement that God knows (Rom: prinzhanel
prinzhanel) the heart of the convert is seen as
reciprocal, as the verb prinzhandel is used to express a more intimate acquaintance
between two people as opposed to the more distant relation between a person and an
object known from the ‘outside’ (Rom: zhanel
zhanel). Therefore, once God recognises the heart
of the convert, the convert also comes to know the personal God for him or herself. I
often heard the same expression when I asked people if they ‘knew’ God. People rarely
responded negatively to this, even among the non-converted Roma.
One can come to know God due to the passage of either fortuitous or inauspicious
events, through divinely inspired dreams, or still through hearing voices. All of these
paths to God are available for converts, but the main difference between converts and
non-converts is that converts claim to have a more intimate connection with God, using
their open hearts to communicate. Escaping from a difficult situation (as in the case of
Dani), or being miraculously healed (like Róza) do not necessarily lead to conversion. If
a ‘covenant’ with God had not been made by Dani, or if the Holy Spirit had not ‘sealed’
Róza, both would have continued with their pre-conversion lives. But as Róza and Dani
fostered a special connection with God (as they account for in their narratives), both
claim they started to become different people. However, this new personhood is not
always easily validated in the social contexts of the converts.
Even if a special connection between converts and God is accepted by outsiders,
a puzzle nonetheless persists: What can secret relationships with God, which are
encapsulated in the hearts of converts, reveal to and validate for the outside world? The
unconverted may either refuse to accept or not recognise these relationships as real.
An outsider, even if he or she accepts the existence of God, may doubt the veracity of
the convert’s claimed connection to God. Converts have their own way of dealing with
outsiders; they insist on the truth of their special relationship with God and express
this connection in ritual forms. A convert can distinguish between those who ‘think of
themselves as being Christians’ and ‘real believers’ based on the verifiable existence
(or lack thereof) of a strong relationship with God.
The construction of this relationship is contingent upon a definition of the inner
self engendered by an opposition between outside and inside. The oft repeated phrase
“God does not look at the face of a person, but at his heart.” (Rou: Dumnezeu nu se uita
la fata omului se uita la inima) is a clear example of this opposition. This opposition
places the heart at the centre of the inner self. It is important that the heart be ‘open’
because the only path to self-transformation is through inviting and accepting Jesus
into one’s heart. The main cause of failed conversions is a refusal on the part of the
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would-be convert to accept the word of God into his or her heart. (Rou: Nu primesti
cuvintele lui Dumnezeu la inima.)
Once the centre of the self is established and opened to the influence of God, changes
become observable in the life of the convert. Ideally, the main consequence is an innerdriven unity of the self and behaviour that can be recognised in the everyday practices
of the convert. Adopting a term utilised by Keane (2002), I refer to this unity of self and
behaviour as sincerity. There is no exact equivalent for this term in the everyday speech
of Roma converts, but I nonetheless hope to show that these two aspects are intertwined
in the behaviour of converts. The closest term Roma use is patjivalo (‘honest’), which
refers to reliability in social interactions. Patjivalo is opposed to ravasz (‘cunning’,
a loan word from Hungarian), which describes people who hide their true intentions.
The ideal of converted selfhood requires honesty and complete transparency. Keane
points out that the ideal of sincerity assumes a clear distinction between words and
thoughts; presupposes a hierarchical relation between inner self and speech; and seeks
the authority of words as accurate reflections of inner states. Moreover the ideal of
sincerity demands an effort from the speaker to match his/her words to his/her inner
states. Therefore sincerity connects ideas about language to moral questions (Keane
2002: 75). When the sincerity of words uttered by a convert is contested by non-converts,
as often happens, the morality of the convert is called into question.
While I was recording conversion narratives in the village, my host’s daughter-inlaw, who was in her early twenties and whose parents had converted to Pentecostalism
when she was a teenager, warned me against accepting these narratives as “true”.
“Converts lie a lot!” (Rom: O pokaiti but xoxavel!) – she told me. Her view was shared
by others who expressed their reservations not only behind the backs of converts, but
also directly to some of them. One middle-aged male convert who was trying to publicly
recount his conversion narrative was interrupted and ridiculed by some youngsters.
The notion of sincerity is also useful for describing and explaining why non-verbal
emotional expressions are so important for Pentecostals inside their communities. These
observations point to the variable success of self-transformation attempts, as successful
conversions are largely dependent upon the convert being socially accepted and his or
her choice being reinforced by forces that are beyond his or her control.
Verbal utterances must be accepted as valid by the audience in order to attain
their performative force (see also the earlier discussion of John 3:4-7). Therefore, the
importance of the assembly and ritual gatherings in providing a sympathetic audience
in the process of self-transformation cannot be overestimated, though there are accounts
of the process being initiated outside of a ritual setting. Such was the case with Dani.
After being beaten, Dani knelt in front of the guard who mocked Dani for what the guard
believed to be Dani’s excessively conspicuous pious display of religiosity in front of the
other prisoners. But because Dani persevered in his prayers day-in and day-out, crying
and asking God to help him escape, the same officer who had formerly mocked him
had a change of heart and helped Dani file an appeal some days later. Dani attributed
the change in the guard’s attitude to the fact that “God put an intention in his mind
and in his heart” to help him. Dani mentioned this event as one of the catalysts of his
conversion, which happened after he was released. In this story the perseverance and
sincerity of the prisoner changed his fate. The way Dani interprets the change in the
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guard’s attitude illustrates that even a cruel jailer is able to experience the beneficial
effect of God in his heart and change his attitude for the better.
Though prayers uttered by a kneeling, crying man provoked the prison-guard to beat
a prisoner, this overtly emotional form of worship and dedication tends to be the norm
in Pentecostal assemblies. During services emotional individual prayers are encouraged
during long prayer sessions that are alternated with singing, individual testimonies,
and preaching. Church services provide an ideal setting for developing and practicing
connections with the divine in the presence of fellow converts. The uttered prayers are
improvised; the emphasis is on affective expression and immediate communication with
the Holy Father and Jesus. These occasions also provide a setting in which congregants
speak in tongues, a practice considered to signal that the speaker is being overcome by
the Holy Spirit and is in immediate communication with God. Such an atmosphere can
impress even a non-believer. Nico, an elder Roma described to me her first experience at
a Pentecostal service, which she attended with her adult daughter. During the collective
prayer the two exchanged sceptical looks and suppressed smiles. On the way home
they joked about the people who had been crying during the prayer. As they continued
attending subsequent services they too started to cry during the prayer sessions. “First
I thought they were crazy (Rom: dinjile), but then we started to cry also.”
‘Opening one’s heart’ is not necessarily an intentional act; it can spontaneously
occur during the ritual beyond the control or will of the affected individual. The further
step of ‘filling one’s heart’ with God (that is, making a commitment) requires more
conscious activity and social control. A ritual in which the convert raises his or her
hands, goes to the front of the congregation, and verbalises some variant of a prayer
marks the initiation of this process. Following this commitment the active contribution
of the assembly is of paramount importance. Most assemblies in the city have special
structures for the incorporation and education of future members. So-called ‘groups
for growth’ (Rou: grupuri de creştere) are small study groups that gather at the house
of a member for this purpose, though hardly any of the Roma converts I met had been
incorporated into their congregations through such structures. My informants usually
participated in less systematic and usually informal gatherings in village homes, or
went through a short preparatory course in a church before their baptism. Baptism may
happen as soon as the course has been completed, and people drop out of the church
rather frequently. When discussing his experience with Roma converts, a Romanian
Pentecostal pastor in the city expressed his view that Roma converts may more easily
accept Jesus, but they are not consistent enough in repenting. He gave the example of
a young Roma who cried loudly in the assembly, “Oh, how nice it is along with you,
my Lord!” (Rou: Oh, ce mi
mişto e cu tine Doamne!), 13 but the pastor found the man’s
commitment superficial.
There is one aspect of assembly life where the sincerity of church members is
continuously tested. Pentecostal churches rely heavily on contributions from members,
who are expected to regularly tithe (Rou: zeciuială
zeciuial ). Nevertheless, as most Roma live
of irregular (and often very low) incomes, the pastor and other members cannot directly
determine the amount of money that each member should be expected to contribute. If
a church member does not pay his or her tithe for some time, his or her survival can be
seen as proof of insincerity in the domain of the material world, because the member
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László FOSZTÓ
is thought to be hiding his or her income and failing to financially support the church.
Therefore, the financial obligations of church members constitute a recurring sermon
topic. The pastor of the Roma church in the city spent a considerable amount of his
sermons reminding congregants that their donations would be multiplied and returned
to them by God.
Converts find support and encouragement inside the assembly, but sometimes
also find themselves to be the target of suspicious looks in their broader community.
In the village, non-converted Roma and the Hungarian majority consider the ascetic
rules of the Pentecostals as very foreign. This is perhaps best exemplified in the case
of male converts who were once known as drinkers. In a community where drinking
is a common form of male sociability those who quit drinking rupture connections
with their peer-groups. This is compensated for by the alternative community with
which converts are connected through the process of conversion, though converts may
still be tempted to join their former drinking friends for drinks.14 Discussing alcohol
consumption with two converted Roma in the village, I was told that it would be wrong
for a converted person to drink even an alcohol-free beer. They explained that if one is
a known convert and is seen by non-converts drinking beer it would encourage the nonconverted to continue drinking and would thus damage the image of the Pentecostals
in the larger community.
In this way converts exclude themselves from many of the settings of male sociability.
On Sundays one can also see these same people dressed in elegant suits, carrying Bibles
or hymnals, and even donning eye-glasses that they do not usually wear on weekdays.
Peace greetings (Rou: Pace!) are exchanged and converts shake hands. Even when the
gathering is at a local home there is a visible attempt to celebrate the day. When there
is a bigger event such as a visit by a guest pastor, a group of converts from the city or
from neighbouring villages may gather for bigger a service in the local Baptist prayer
house on the main square of the village. Pentecostals and the few Baptists (also local
Roma) celebrate such occasions together.
Dani is married to a Roma from another village and his wife usually joins the
Pentecostals in their services. She was baptised along with a young Roma by a Baptist
pastor from the city at a missionary event in her village. The priest had brought a large
plastic container and had filled it with water. The converts were submerged in water,
much to the astonishment of the onlookers, amongst which was the local orthodox priest.
The services of a photographer were also called upon to immortalise the event for the
newly baptised members. The photograph that Dani’s wife displays in their house is
tangible evidence of her conversion. She showed me the picture, proudly proclaiming
that the entire event had been organised solely for their baptism, and this in order to
show a ‘real baptism’ to the villagers.
THE PHRALA (BROTHERS): A NEW FORM OF SPIRITUAL KINSHIP
The refrain of the aforementioned Pentecostal song is the following:
Oh che shukar, oh che shukar o Isus si amaro phral,
Oh che shukar, oh che shukar vas amenge vo muleas!
(Oh, how wonderful [it is]; oh how wonderful, Jesus is our brother,
Oh, how wonderful [it is]; oh how wonderful, He died for us!)
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Conversion Narratives, Sincere Hearts, and Other Tangible Signs
The idea of brotherhood expressed in these lines is composed of several elements.
On the one hand, fraternity with Jesus is a privilege for those who join assemblies. On
the other, the option of joining an assembly is open to the wider community. I argue,
therefore, that this ideal of spiritual kinship is simultaneously inclusive and yet elitist.
The all-encompassing element of this brotherhood can be demonstrated through its
trans-local character. ‘Brothers’ are everywhere in Romania and abroad, and this spiritual
kinship network can be further extended through the incorporation and conversion of
‘outsiders’ found in the immediate social surroundings of the congregants.
The practice of brotherhood in Gánás is neither uprooted from nor totally defined
by existing local and kinship ties. There is indeed a significant overlap between the
kinship based on pre-conversion social ties and the broader connections created through
the conversion. These broader connections also use kinship terms (brother, sister, etc.)
to denote the social ties. It is more accurate to describe the practice of brotherhood as a
public expression of belonging. Thus, the boundaries of the local assembly are salient,
and converts who do not regularly attend the assembly or who are reluctant to express
and practice the ethic of their religion are eventually excluded.
Figure 1: Distribution of aid shown on a kinship diagram
Figure 1 is based on my observation of a situation in which aid was distributed
among the converted brothers. A pastor (18), who lived in another village but who had
familial connections with Gánás (e.g. 16) sent word to Dani (1), that Dani was to be
entrusted with managing the distribution of clothing donations from abroad. The pastor
did not drive all the way into the village, so Dani waited for the aid truck by the side of
the main road. From there, Dani hired a local cart to carry the cargo to the village. There
were 17 large bags filled with clothes. Dani loaded the cargo on the cart and brought it
to the Roma neighbourhood in which he lived. The clothing was distributed according
to kinship lines as shown in figure 1. Dani kept for himself and his brother-in-law
12 bags (6 each), and distributed the remaining five to the most active converts in the
assembly, each receiving one bag. The clothing was further distributed, exchanged, or
sold by the recipients among the local Roma.
In its ideal form, the brotherhood is both a voluntary association and an elite
organisation, but these ideas must be contextualised in the broader local social structure.
When considering stratification in the village, it becomes apparent that the transformation
of the self and construction of the converted community offers an opportunity for
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László FOSZTÓ
social mobility for people from lower status positions. This desire for mobility does
not directly challenge existant ethnic and status divisions. Everyday practices and signs
of conversion create a sense of belonging for the religious elite without relying on or
opposing pre-existing local social structures. People who have otherwise been seen as
marginal by the local majority acquire access to symbolic resources, which promise
to change their position through recourse to resources external to local structures. The
practice of brotherhood relies on existing local ties and reinforces the boundaries of
the converted ‘elite community’.
CONCLUSION
Although advocacy of inner-directed conversion is hardly a novelty for missionaries,
and although ‘the heart’ is thought to be the centre of the self in other contexts as well,15
Pentecostalism diverges from most other forms of Protestantism in its emphasis on
not only the transparent and inner-governed self, but also in its acceptance of a wide
spectrum of emotional expressions as being spiritual. Unity of the self is grounded in
emotional experiences, and these experiences can be validated as divinely inspired.
I suggest that this aspect of Pentecostalism can be best understood with an enhanced
concept of sincerity that incorporates and credits these experiences as authentic. An
implication of Pentecostals’ experience-centred orientation is that their potential target
group is humanity as a whole. Converts insist that everyone is capable of opening their
heart to emotional-spiritual experiences.
The concept of sincerity offers an answer to the question of why the universally
oriented Pentecostal church has been most successful amongst socially segregated
groups. The social life of a convert depends on communal recognition of the sincerity
of the convert. Pentecostal Assemblies provide a space for expression of emotions
and verbal utterances that are repudiated by outsiders. Boundary-maintenance of these
groups is realised through a small number of ascetic elements present in Pentecostal
ethics (i.e., non-smoking and zero tolerance for alcohol) and to a certain degree in
tangible representations of religious elitism. Apparently these groups rely more on the
micro-dynamics of the local societies in which they are embedded than they do on any
form of centralised structure.
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NOTES
1
This paper is based on a chapter of my PhD dissertation defended in July 2007 at the
Institute for Ethnology, Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg. The research was
part of the ‘Religion and Civil Society’ project of the Post Socialist Eurasia Department
at Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle. I owe thanks to Chris Hann
and all the participants of the writing up seminar organised at the MPI for commenting
on an earlier draft of this text.
2
The people I am concerned with belong to the Romungro group also called “magyarcigány”
meaning ‘Hungarian Gypsies’. I carried out fieldwork in the city of Cluj and in a nearby
village I refer to as Gánás. Most of the local Roma are trilingual: in addition to their
native dialect of Romani they are proficient in Romanian and Hungarian. Throughout
this study I refer to this group simply as ‘Roma’ following the in-group usage of the
term. All personal names are pseudonyms.
3
For a discussion of conversion in the context of colonialism see Comaroff and Comaroff
(1991).
4
The exchange between John Peel (Peel 1992) and the Comaroffs (Comaroff and Comaroff
1997: 42-53) exemplifies these tensions. See also the Terrence Ranger’s (2001) review
of Peel.
5
Patrick Williams’ studies (1984; 1991) initiated anthropological interest in the conversion
of Roma to Pentecostalism. In these seminal essays Williams introduces many of the ideas
which were further developed and illustrated in ethnographical examples by others. On
one hand he connects Pentecostal conversions to the processes of urbanisation, because
many of the problems emerging through in this process are addressed and ‘treated’
by conversions. On the other hand, the community of the converted offers new social
space and facilitate new forms of identifications which overarch the divisions between
the different subgroups.
6
I cannot introduce here the history of the spread of Pentecostalism in Romania. For
an overview see my discussion in Fosztó (2006).
7
The everyday term Roma use for converted people, ‘o pocaiti’, is derived from this
Romanian word. They sometimes also use a derivative from the Hungarian term (hívő),:
‘o hivövi’. Actual members of these churches most often refer to themselves simply as
Christians (Rou: crestin). I use the following code for the different languages Rou – for
Romanian, Rom – for Romani, and Hun – for Hungarian.
8
The baptism of the Holy Spirit is considered to be the sign of the true conversion in
Pentecostalism. It is often accompanied by extraordinary experiences and receiving
the ‘gifts of the Spirit’ (e.g. glossolalia).
9
The ‘seal’ is the sign of being chosen for salvation.
10
“How can a man be born when he is old?” Nicodemus asked. “Surely he cannot enter a
second time into his mother’s womb to be born!” Jesus answered, “I tell you the truth,
no one can enter the kingdom of God unless he is born of water and the Spirit. Flesh
gives birth to flesh, but the Spirit gives birth to spirit. You should not be surprised at
my saying, ‘You must be born again.’ (New International Version)
11
Apart from one attempt by a Roma in the initial period of my fieldwork, nobody tried
to tell my fortune, nor did I see anybody practicing fortune telling with the villagers.
12
This song circulates in a wider context than the local Roma group or the assembly in
the city with which I am most familiar. The dialect found in the song is different from
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László FOSZTÓ
local Romani. Romungre call the heart ‘vodji’’ not ‘‘jilo’ – they readily point out that
the song comes from other Roma assemblies.
13
‘Mişto’ [Rom: mishto ‘good’] is a loan word from Romani in Romanian meaning ‘good’
or ‘nice’. It is used in informal contexts and often has an ironic connotation (Leschber
1995: 167).
14
Michael Kearney (2004) describes a similar problem in the case of a peasant community
in Mexico.
15
Based on archival research, John Peel (2000:250-5) describes 19th century evangelicalism
as “a religion of the heart”.
132 •
EVANGELICAL CONVERSION AMONG THE ROMA IN BULGARIA
Between Capsulation and Globalization
Milena BENOVSKA-SABKOVA, Velislav ALTANOV
The changes in the religious identity of the Bulgarian Roma have been important and
intriguing. These started decades ago acquiring mass character and social significance
in the wake of 1989. The process of conversion among the Roma and their joining the
ranks of Protestant churches was noted by Bulgarian ethnologists and sociologists,
as far back as the start of the 1990s (Marushiakova, Popov 1993: 166-167; Tomova
1998: 343). They paid particular attention to the rapidity and growth with which these
processes developed. Nevertheless, these noted events are not an isolated phenomenon;
such processes have proceeded in a similar way in neighboring countries such as
Romania (cf. Fosztó 2006: 269-292; Fosztó 2005: 1-12) and Serbia (Todorovic 2002:
175-186; Dordevic 2004: 103-112). However, the mass extent of evangelization among
the Roma should undoubtedly be discussed within the context of globalization, or, in
other words, as part of the advance of the Pentecostal movement throughout the whole
world (cf. for instance Czegledy 2007: 1-22; Coleman 2000).
Some Bulgarian authors explain the Roma conversion in relation to phenomena like
‘ghettoization’ and social marginalization. The role of conversion has also been pointed
out as being a key instrument of social reorganization for threatened communities,
as well as a mechanism of keeping its psychological balance (Marushiakova, Popov
1993: 177-167; Tomova 1998: 343)1. Essential progress was made in the familiarization
with and the study of this scholarly problem with the publication of a pioneering study
dedicated to the Evangelical Roma (Slavkova 2007). The author showed the processes
of a sweeping social and cultural change, entailing “the formation of a new Gypsy
community” ((Ibid
Ibid.. 268).
Ibid
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Milena BENOVSKA-SABKOVA & Velislav ALTANOV
The purpose of the present work is to review the change of religious identity among
Bulgarian Roma within a specific social and historical context. Our starting point of
view is the conviction that the study of conversion among Roma should be based on
thorough knowledge of the Protestant denominations in Bulgaria: “old” (“traditional”
Protestant) and “new” (the Pentecostal charismatic churches). The availability of a
monograph on “the Evangelical Roma” made it possible to take the next step and to
discuss the question of conversion among Roma in its procedural aspect. This has been
one of our basic tasks; the other has been combining, on an equal level, the interest
in Roma culture with the historical and anthropological study of a certain religious
community. The main research questions are the following: How do the Evangelical
churches function in their capacity of social communities, structured on a religious
basis? How should the religious conversion of Roma be qualified: as a fait accompli,
or as an open and controversial process? Does evangelization engender changes in the
identity, traditional culture and values of Roma, and if so, how? To what extent is this
process characterized as an original local phenomenon and how far may it be discussed
as a product of globalization?
This article has been written on the basis of field work effectuated in two churches,
located in the outskirts of Sofia, both of them belonging to the Bulgarian Church of
God (further referred to as BCOG; prior to 1990 it was known as the Church of God,
further referred to as COG). The restricted scope of the observations narrows down
the research, but also carries undisputed advantages. The endeavor was, in this way, to
show conversion not as an anonymous process but as the result of real social actions and
interactions with real social actors. The informants were selected from the denomination
embodied by the BCOG, for two specific reasons. First, the BCOG, being Pentecostal,
is of prime interest as it is the Pentecostal churches, precisely, that have had a leading
role in the attraction of believers in Eastern Europe, since 1989.2 Second, the historical
presence of the COG dates back to the inception of the Pentecostal movement, from
1921 onwards, and has been characterized by a certain Bulgarian specificity.
The field work was carried out over the course of five months in 2008 in Gornitsata
[Upstairs], a Bulgarian Church of God in the Hristo Botev residential district, and in
the BCOG in the Lyulin-5 residential district. Serving as additional sources of empirical
data have been: a) the field work, carried out independently by Velislav Altanov (further
referred to as Velislav in the text) in 2007 among charismatic Christians in different
places across Bulgaria3, and b) field work among Roma, carried out by Milena BenovskaSabkova (further referred to as Milena) in 20024.
THE METHODS OF FIELD RESEARCH
We defined the field research strategy after the “case study”’s qualitative method
model; we opted for the optimal comparison between two case studies (cf. for instance
Orum et al. 1991: 1-26; Warner 1991: 174-1995). The fieldwork techniques include:
observation, participant observation (Bernard 1988: 148-179) and autobiographical
interviews. We engaged in participant observations mostly in the Lyulin-5 church.
This became possible insofar as we started attending this church without having
established preliminary contacts and in this way we remained anonymous to most of
the believers. In the case of Gornitsata, in the Hristo Botev district, we were familiar
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Evangelical Conversion among the Roma in Bulgaria
with the priest and some of the believers beforehand, which provoked the so-called
“reactivity” (Bernard 1988: 150), i.e. it left an imprint on the proceeding of the very
church services. Our presence, for instance, prompted a prolongation of some religious
events (sometimes almost twice as much) at Gornitsata. In this sense the work carried
out there may be qualified as observation rather than participant observation. We attended
church services, women’s (“sisters’”) gatherings, sacraments (“Lord’s Supper”) etc.
During the interviews, we rarely used tape recorders, instead we mostly took notes.
We also documented telephone calls with believers. We also had to make some of the
observations singly (Milena took part in “sisters’” gatherings without Velislav; he, in
turn, documented other events independently). Finally, we individually kept field diaries
(cf. Bernard 1988: 183-185).
To provide backup data, we also held observations among the most numerous church
community (with about 1000 active members); the BCOG in the town of Samokov with
Pastor N.V. (cf. Velev 2002: 126). We likewise took part in a few non-denominational
events and interviewed some of the most active members of the two churches (priests,
heads of the women’s groups, regular parish). We also accepted and analyzed as specific
autobiographical narratives the so-called “testimonies” [of beneficial interference
from the Lord], which are rife in various kinds of religious services. Our contact and
conversations with Pastor Pavel Ignatov6, Chief Elder of the BCOG, considerably
helped the progress of our fieldwork.
We not only interviewed Roma, but Bulgarians too, because of our interest in the
interethnic relations in the churches, and because of Bulgarians’ longer experience as
Evangelical Christians. We have kept the informants’ anonymity (those whom we quote
by initials) with the exception of public persons such as Pastor Ignatov. This article’s
authors’ religious orientation influenced the perceptions and assessments of the carried
out research (cf. Woodhead, Healas). We therefore have combined the “emic” and the
“etic” points of view to the researched subject, insofar as one of us has an Eastern
Orthodox family background, while the other is a Protestant. We have therefore mutually
enriched our competences – that of the ethnologist with that of the theologian.
THE CHURCH OF GOD AS A “PRIVATE” RELIGION (1921-1990)
The COG is a Pentecostal church. The establishment of Pentecostal churches
in Bulgaria had been prepared by the earlier existence of “traditional” Protestant
communities in the country. It has not however been clarified, with any precision,
at what point Protestantism first arrived among the Bulgarians. The year 1850 has
been fairly tentatively assumed to be the start of Protestant missionaries’ activity
in Bulgaria (Ignatov 2006: 55, 60; Slavkova 2007: 51). “The Methodist Episcopal
Church started its activity mostly in North Bulgaria in 1857”, the Baptist Church – in
1863; the Congregational Church had established its first church in 1871, whereas
the Adventists – in 1895 (Ignatov 2006: 126). Researchers, both neutral and coming
from Protestant circles, have been unanimous regarding the significant contribution
made to culture and education in Bulgaria by missionary activity, particularly in the
19th century (Nestorova 1991: 51-97; Karapetrova, Kohen 1998: 311; Slavkova 2007:
52-53; Kulichev 1994: 94-121).
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Milena BENOVSKA-SABKOVA & Velislav ALTANOV
The COG traces its “pedigree” directly to the pioneers of the Pentecostal movement
in Bulgaria. These were missionaries, sent and financed by the Assemblies of God, an
influential Pentecostal denomination from the USA (Ignatov 2006: 149-150)7. Most
prominent among them were the Russians Ivan Voronaev (founder of the Pentecostal
movement in Russia) and Dionysus Zaplishni (Kulichev 1994: 348-349; Ignatov
2006: 132, 138; Slavkova 2007: 53), who set up eighty churches within a short span
of time8.
In 1928 there was a split of the unsteady Pentecostal movement in Bulgaria. The
causes were mainly due to the different ritual practices cultivated. On the one hand
there were those practiced by Voronaev and Zaplishni, and on the other, those of another
couple of missionaries from the Assemblies of God, which came somewhat later,
viz. the Bulgarian Nikolai Nikolov and the Russian Schmid (Ignatov 2006: 151-153;
Velev 2002: 33-44; Slavkova 2007: 54). A constituent assembly of the Union of the
Evangelical Pentecostal Churches was organized in March 1928 in the city of Burgas.
Pastor Stoyan Tinchev’s (1880-1965) followers, subsequently called Tinchevists after
him, refused to join. But Tinchev upheld adherence to the spiritual principles bequeathed
by Voronaev, whereas Nikolov and Schmid were carriers of the Pentecostal movement,
which had developed and become established in the meantime. The teaching inherited
from Voronaev had some specific features such as the act of washing of the feet9
during the Supper of the Lord (the Holy Communion), the ritual of “denunciation in
sin”, a specific appearance and dress code (Mollov 2006: 254-255), which were not
encouraged by Nikolov and were not practiced by other Pentecostals (Mollov 2006:
211-280; Ignatov 2006: 152, 158-159).
In this way the “Tinchevists” split into an independent Church of God, which until
1990 operated without having been officially registered and for that matter had been
treated by the state as a “sect”, both prior to and under socialism. The “Tinchevists”
adopted the strategy of capsulation not only with respect to the then formal Bulgarian
institutions, but also with respect to the kindred Pentecostal and other Protestant
denominations: “Stoyan Tinchev banned contacts with foreign missionaries; he did not
admit them to his churches; he banned the reading of translated church books and aids.
He likewise refused any financial backing and spiritual relations”. This contributed to
the peculiar Bulgarian image of the “Tinchevists” movement (Ignatov 2006: 159-160).
Besides the specific set of rituals, worth mentioning is also the emphatic charismatic
image of the CL, and its extreme ‘rigorism’ (concerning this term cf. Makrides 2007).
Knowledge and education were played down (Ignatov 2004: 117, 118-119); first-rate
importance was instead attached to “spiritual gifts” like prophesies, visions, healings,
“interpretations” (i.e. “translations” of what had been said via glossolalia – “heavenly
tongues” in everyday speech) (Ignatov 2006: 214-244; Mollov 2006: 218-246, 254255; Altanov 2007a: 257-260).
The “Tinchevists” were generally those who pertained to the lower social strata
and were also rather undereducated (Ignatov 2004: 117; Mollov 2006: 56-57). In
addition to their emphatically charismatic orientation, they were also connected with the
rejection of formal organization and administration. The written word had no essential
role in the administration of the church communities; communication was by and large
achieved orally (Ignatov 2006: 244-245). The latter aspect was also connected with
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the specificities of the primarily oral traditional rural culture present in the Balkans
where lack of education and literacy were not rare even up until the middle of the 20th
century.
The believers had difficulties legalizing their marriages and birth certificates,
particularly prior to the introduction of the civil marriage in 1944; indeed, by not
having been registered until 1990, the COG was not entitled to issue such documents.
Pavel Ignatov, having been an Elder of the COG for many years, testified to the degree
of self-isolation: “[….] There are no church archives, either. The events are conveyed
by word of mouth. The teaching is memorized. There is no attempt at chronicling the
movement. There is no written history. No photos. Stoyan Tinchev had banned taking
photos. […] Musical instruments had also been rejected.” (Ignatov 2006: 247). The
utter conservatism also found expression in giving up money in church life; there
was no real estate, there were no church buildings; religious services were performed
at home; the collection of tithe or donations were also avoided. “Money is collected
for needs, cropping up at the moment, and is spent straightaway. No one earns his
living preaching the Word of God. No one gets a salary. The presbyters have some
other employment to earn their living, while church servicing is by free will and free
of charge” (Ibid: 251; cf. also Mollov 2006: 281-285). Also present was quite a few
extreme anti-modern manifestations like refusal of medical aid, rejection of military
service and military oath, giving up the possession of a TV or radio set (Ignatov 2004:
61-62; 77; Altanov 2007a: 255-257).
By the irony of fate, the legal operation of other Protestant denominations had
turned them into an easier “prey” for total control under socialism (Kulichev 1994:
383; Altanov 2007a: 252-253). At that time, the Churches of God suffered serious
reprisals from the atheistic policy (cf. Ignatov 2004: 15-153). The closed character of
their community, however, and the decades-long practice of holding religious services
in private homes10 were obstacles to being followed by the socialist special services.
For instance, a secret document of the Committee on the Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox
Church and the Religious Cults, dated February 22, 1984, reads that “the sect” of the
COG of the “Tinchevists”, “create great obstacles for the authorities in their attempts
to control them. They are scattered in groups of 5-6 people and more, in different parts
of the country” (Kulichev 1994: 383).
An important feature of the COG is that its organizing principle is based on family
and kinship structures. Stefan Mollov, a grandson of founder Stoyan Tinchev, emphasizes
the importance of the kith and kin as a form of dissemination and keeping up of the
faith: “Should one of the adults start to believe in the Truth about Jesus Christ, the entire
family follows in his wake. Not hesitating very long, the rest of the families of the kin
join in: the brothers, sisters, cousins, in-laws… The COG is set up in numerous villages
and towns by families by flesh, which later become forever in families by spirit, too”
(Mollov 2006: 21). Some of the present-day pastors are sons and grandsons of pastors,
i.e. second or third generation of religious leaders. It would not be an exaggeration if
we qualify the principle thus described as “patriarchal”.
Therefore, the unofficial and by and large capsulated existence of the COG caused
considerable hardships and persecution for its members (cf. Petrov 2001: 35-39;
Ignatov 2004: 120-152), but likewise, it was an essential factor for the survival of these
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communities under socialism (cf. Altanov 2007a: 252-254, 265), as they functioned as
informal social networks. The self-isolation of the churches, in the period preceding
1990, into private spaces, their isomorphism with respect to family and kinship structures
lead to characterize this movement as “private” religion (cf. Casanova 1994).
However, this changed with the registration of the church under the name of the
Bulgarian Church of God on December 27, 1990 (Velev 2002: 55; Ignatov 2006: 321;
Slavkova 2007: 58).
FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CENTRE: TRANSFORMATION OF THE BULGARIAN
CHURCH OF GOD INTO A PUBLIC RELIGION (1990-2008).
The changes in the BCOG started long before its registration. The first (unsuccessful)
attempts at registration were made as early as in 1962 and 1969 (Ignatov 2004: 99).
After the demise of Stoyan Tinchev in 1965, the church remained without leadership
until 1974. At that point, it was Dimiter Pankov, Chief Presbyter, who took the lead until
his death in 1977 (Velev 2002: 44; Ignatov 2004: 99). After this, the church was headed
by Pastor Pavel Ignatov (Velev 2002: 54), who remained its leader until 2005.
The new Chief Elder was an exponent of the views of new generation church
leaders, pleading for “a more modern style and interpretation of the Gospel” (Mollov
2006: 72), and more importantly for overcoming the church’s isolation and its extreme
“rigorism”. In this way the earliest contacts were established with churches outside
Bulgaria: initially, in 197311, with the Church of God in Yugoslavia, and through it,
with the World Church of God12 (Velev 2002: 55; Ignatov 2004: 102). In 1981 the COG
was recognized as part of the World Church of God (Ibid: 124). Through its contacts,
the COG gradually got out of its anonymity. Its international relations probably also
stimulated the strategy for attracting Roma to the COG.
Quite a few books have been devoted to the reprisals against the COG under
socialism (Mollov 2006: 73-85, 88, 99-127; Velev 2002: 54-58; Ignatov 2004, among
others) and for this reason, we do not dwell on them at this time. In spite of these
reprisals, however, the COG increased its membership, particularly in the 1989s.
Shrinking to barely 600 in 1974, its membership increased to 3000 in 1985 (Ignatov
2004: 100-215).13 The COG also gradually changed its character of “private” religion:
through the street protests it organized in the centre of Sofia in 1983 (Ibid: 170-171), it
transferred its activities to the public space. Along these lines were also the numerous
attempts of the early 1980s to get registered in court. The international defence for the
COG including publications in foreign mass media and diplomatic notes helped it get
out of anonymity. The social base of the COG gradually changed, too: it developed its
own intelligentsia (Ignatov 2004: 119; Altanov 2007).
In the wake of the political changes of 1989, the activities and character of the
BCOG radically changed. The religious services held from 1988-1989 took place in
the outlying Hristo Botev poor Roma residential district but have, since 1990, been
transferred to one of the big halls of the National Palace of Culture. This action has had
an unambiguous symbolic meaning. It has testified to the social, political and economic
changes having taken place in the BCOG, but most of all to its transformation into a
public religion (cf. Casanova 1994). In fact, the history of the BCOG has followed some
of the general laws of the post-socialist development of religious life: “religion has
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become much more visible in the public sphere and much more open to transnational
influences” (Hann 2006: 2). However, the BCOG’s ambition to occupy a central place
of prestige in the “symbolic geography” of Bulgarian public space has been obvious.
The “private” religion has become “public”, having traversed the road – as much as in
the real, as in the symbolic space – from the periphery to the centre.
Almost coinciding with these events was the split of a group from the BCOG
which was registered on November 25, 1991 under the name United Churches of God
(Slavkova 2007: 58). This was the result of a split which had begun much earlier in
the Church of God. Starting from the early 1980s, this wing of the congregation took
shape, dissatisfied with the new development of the denomination (cf. Mollov 2008:
72-73). The tendency to split and the continuous formation of new branches, however,
has been a common feature not only of neo-Protestantism, but of Protestantism as a
whole. Therefore such a development was not unexpected.
The 1990s were a period characterized by an upsurge of the BCOG: its congregation
swelled (according to unconfirmed data – up to 33 000)14; it carried out massive
evangelistic events; it accepted a multitude of foreign missionaries, preachers and
guests. The BCOG engaged in sweeping social activities, the peaks coinciding with
the two periods of the most acute social and economic crises in Bulgaria: 1991-1992
and 1996-1997. The BCOG currently maintains ten social centres, five of which are
in the territory of Sofia and the others are dispersed across the country (Velev 2002:
126, 63; Slavkova 2007: 163).
PARTICIPATION AND ROLE OF ROMA IN THE STRUCTURES OF THE BULGARIAN
CHURCH OF GOD (1979-2008)
Notwithstanding the massive Roma involvement with the BCOG, there is scarce
and fragmentary written evidence of this process. Directly questioned about the start of
this process, Pastor P. Ignatov pointed out both rational and spiritual incentives for the
start of evangelistic work among the Roma. This happened in 1979 as a well developed
strategy from the leadership of the Bulgarian Church at the time. This strategy targeted
at increasing the membership of the church congregation and helping the struggle for
the registration of the Bulgarian Church under socialism:
“This was the main objective – massive involvement. I established that the
Pentecostal movement had always been successful among the poorest in the
outlying residential districts, the working class, the minorities, the groups
of immigrants, women. […] In a group of intelligent brave young people we
decided that wherever we happened to be we had to speak about the faith in a
revolutionary manner; that this society had to be given freedom. I understood
that there [among the Roma] I was to find a soil. Moreover, as these people had
nothing to lose. Our stand was that we had to tell about ourselves even if we
should die […] Of course, I prayed, I fasted – do not preclude the spiritual!…”
(P. Ignatov).
The first family which “came to believe” in 1979 and passed over from Islam to
the Church of God (COG) was that of H.Ch.: a big and influential family of popular
Roma musicians. ““After we won over that family our influence incredibly rose.” Let
us only add that during our fieldwork, we happened to meet one of the younger female
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representatives of this family – a woman dedicated to the faith. To put it in other words,
the generations following from the first Roma to believe have not changed their religious
belonging for almost thirty years after the original conversion.
Comparing what Pastor Ignatov said with the indubitable data on the wide-scale
conversion of the Roma in a number of countries in the world (cf. Slavkova 2007: 60-71),
we can assume that the COG had received an impetus for this “mission” also by way
of its contacts with the Pentecostal congregation outside the confines of the country.
The process of people of Roma origin joining the COG in the 1980s was also
testified by the documents of State Security following the activities of the COG. In
a secret report to the Sixth Department of State Security dated November 21, 1984,
concerning a check-up at the home of P. Ignatov and his father Boris Ignatov in Sofia, it
is pointed out that attending the “gathering” (religious service) had been 55 people: 28
were listed by names, personal data and addresses. What is curious is that the remaining
27 people attending had been Roma, and had been characterized in the following
manner: “The remaining persons were of the Gypsy minority of advanced age”15. The
conclusion stands out that Roma participation had been played down, notwithstanding
that it amounted to almost half of the attendance; the Roma had not been distinguished
by “the honor” of being listed by names. This document casts some light on the random
and qualitatively non-representative “sample” concerning the Roma membership of
the COG, which was gaining momentum even as early as in the 1980s.
M. Slavkova presents these trends on a broader scale. The Pentecostal religion
permeated the Roma communities in the 1970s and 1980s. The data, which the author
quotes, give grounds to conclude that in most of the cases this was due to the intervention
of the COG or of representatives of the United Church of God, which later split from it
(Slavkova 2007: 93-97). At the same time, church representatives from the “traditional”
wings of Protestantism interacted among Roma. M. Slavkova tentatively distinguishes
two stages in the process of conversion among the Roma in Bulgaria in the wake of
1989. The first one was during the first half of the 1990s – “the massive spread of
evangelism among the Gypsies in the early years following the changes”, when there
was a connection between conversion, marginalization and the hard economic problems
confronting the Roma population. The second stage was characterized by the “stabilization
of the processes during the late 1990s and the establishment of a constant number of
believers” and “the segmentation of the churches under the influence of individual
Gypsy priests, who were looking for a public outlet for their prestige” (Ibid).
In what concerns the BCOG, what has to be noted are the recent changes which have
given a new orientation to the Roma’s involvement within it. During the gathering of
presbyters belonging to the BCPG, in 2005, in the city of Plovdiv, the Roma businessman
and pastor A.T. (Slavkova 2007: 107) was elected Chief Elder of the BCOG, with
the backing of the long time leader P. Ignatov. Different versions of that event then
emerged but it nevertheless provoked discontent and eventually the withdrawal of
some members of the big church communities (those in the towns of Smolyan and
Dobrich, for instance) belonging to the BCOG. In this way the Roma involvement has
become determining for the BCOG. We are probably witnessing the next successive
split of the BCOG now. This has become possible in the BCOG precisely because of
its democratic statute. Other Protestant denominations have restrictive conditions with
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regards to the leadership, such as one’s level of education, which indeed operates as
a barrier to most Roma. “We wanted to provide a good example of ethnic tolerance”,
P. Ignatov said. “Alas, this failed to take place, however.”
The contribution of the BCOG to the Pentecostal conversion of Roma in Bulgaria has,
since the 1980s, been of considerable proportion. In spite of its impact on this process,
the BCOG is just one of “the faces” of this phenomenon. It is common knowledge that
Protestantism as a whole infiltrated the Roma communities considerably earlier – as
early as the 1920s (cf. Kulichev 1994: 342-343; Slavkova 2007: 76-84). Suffering over
a few decades under socialism, it wanted to be revived again in the 1980s. The process,
however, has been uneven with regards to the geographical spread of the churches; it
flourished in waves and pockets, but was not massive.
THE GORNITSATA [UPSTAIRS] CHURCH IN THE HRISTO BOTEV ROMA
RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT
Its name - Gornitsata - originates from the location of the church on the top floor in
Pastor I.I.’s home, but it probably also has a biblical analogy with Jerusalem’s Upstairs
from the Acts of the Apostles, 2d. Its founders Pastor I.I. and his wife L.I. converted
from Orthodox Christianity to the COG in 1985 through the evangelization of Boris and
Pavel Ignatov, who were preaching at that time in the Hristo Botev residential district.
Somewhat later I.I offered his home as a place for holding the religious services of the
COG. This was essentially due to the fact that after Pastor P. Ignatov was interned in
1987, the church community in Sofia did not have a single house of prayer. The home
centres existing up to that time had been closed down by the authorities. In 1989,
Gornitsata became the only house of prayer of the COG in Sofia; P. Ignatov held
sermons in it and at that time it was not rare that the capacity of about 200 seats was
insufficient and a great number of the believers remained outside.
Even back in 1990, the church drew the interest and involvement of a great number
of foreign pastors and missionaries. I.I. was ordained a pastor by P. Ignatov in 1992
(Velev 2002: 68-69) and continues to hold religious services in Gornitsata to this day.
He also continues to exercise his trade as a shoemaker as well. In 1996 pastor I.I. started
the construction of a new church building after an architect’s design, but because of
the shortage of funds, it has still, to this day, not been completed.
Gornitsata has been an embodiment of a stage in the history of the COG and has
been one of the unifying “places of memory” for the believers of the denomination
as a whole. This has been a source of pride and legitimization for the activity of the
pastor, as well as a specific spiritual resource for his reputation of a powerful mediator
between the believers and the Lord Jesus Christ.
At the end of the 1980s, the attendance of Gornitsata was made of Bulgarians and
Roma together. This was not only a matter of tolerance (concerning tolerance, cf. Hann
2006: 8-9; Buzalka 2006: 293-314), but also of a deliberate manifestation of solidarity
in an authentic Christian spirit. P. Ignatov testifies to the atmosphere in the Gornitsata
at the end of the 1980s in the following way:
“And then Ivan says to my father that we can go at their place and they can
adapt the upper floor [as a house of prayer]. And therein the best features of
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the Roma have come to the fore: tolerance, solidarity. I was interned and in
order that the church may be saved, it moved into the Roma residential district.
It was mixed: Bulgarians and Roma. The Roma protect the Bulgarians. […]
Because that was an honor, if Bulgarians went to the neighborhood. Then
we moved to the Gornitsata. We were then living with the idea that people of
different cultures and languages could be together.”
Today, M. Slavkova defines this church community as Romani (Slavkova 2007:
129). As a matter of fact, expecting just that, during her first visit in that house of
prayers in 2005, Milena was surprised by some Bulgarian attendance, though of not
very big proportions. In 2008 the Bulgarian believers’ presence still remained. The
Sunday religious services bring together more than 100 believers. During one of the
“sisterly” (female) gatherings for prayer, Milena took short interviews from two of the
attending Bulgarians, who had now been coming to this church without interruption for
twenty years. The trend of a Roma homogenization of the church seems to be at hand,
but this is not yet a fait accompli. The mixed Bulgarian and Roma attendance has been
a source of satisfaction for pastor’s wife. “These Bulgarian women, they come to us,
they love us. You may start to love us, too”, she said to Milena.
THE BULGARIAN CHURCH OF GOD IN THE LYULIN-5 RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT
Lyulin-5 does not differ much from the other outlying residential districts of Sofia.
Its residents are mostly Bulgarian, although there are some Roma too. The charismatic
events have given an impetus to the establishment of that religious community. Its
founder has been pastor Ch.Ch., a former Muslim. Having witnessed and taken part in
wonderful healings, he started to believe during a religious service in Gornitsata, in
June 1988. About one year later, a small household group of five or six believers took
shape around him and his wife in the Lyulin-5 district. It had also been operating as
a group of mutual assistance. Regardless of the fact that the group had increased its
composition to about 40, it had been operating in household conditions and in 1993 it
started meeting in a deserted former refectory of a special police force in Lyulin-5. Pastor
Ch.Ch. has been ordained by P. Ignatov and is a member of the national leadership of
the BCOG; he is greatly involved in the activities of the churches located in the Roma
residential districts of Sofia (Velev 2002: 63).
During our first visit in Lyulin-5 we sat in different places, according to the
requirement of the BCOG that men and women sit separately during religious service.
Milena was immediately approached by two women, who invited her to sit next to
them, and one of them said joyfully: “A new sweet soul!”. The women – a Bulgarian
and a Roma – embraced Milena and in an embrace the three of them started praying
and chanting. This warm welcome made Velislav assume that Milena had known these
people from a previous encounter, but this was not the case.
This fieldwork episode has been a testimony of the integrative moods and openness
in the church. Attendance during Sunday services ranges from 70-80 to as many as 120
people and about one-quarter of them are men. The ethnic composition is mixed; the
Bulgarian participation ranges within the frameworks of 10-15 percent.
A peculiarity of the church in Lyulin-5 is that in charge of it are two pastors. For
five years now – since July 20th 2003, Pastor Ch.Ch. and his wife have been missionaries
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of the BCOG in P., a town in Turkey with a population of about 50 000, and in his
absence Brother S.D. has been preaching. The current residence conditions for foreign
citizens in Turkey makes it necessary that the pastoral couple alternate three-months
stays in Turkey and Bulgaria. So the two preachers alternate in performing services in
intervals of three months.
Influencing the social character of this church has been the fact that it is located in a
common city district rather than in a compact Roma populated neighborhood. This also
reflects very much on the social compositions of the Roma themselves. Among them
are well-to-do families with businesses of their own, although they do not necessarily
represent the Roma in church. This church is attended, for instance, by the parents of
Azis, the scandalous Bulgarian show star. Undereducated members of the working
class predominate, but these do not solely belong to the lower strata of society. Our
observations bear out the conclusion that the time has gone when there still was a direct
interdependence between conversion and marginalization (Slavkova 2007: 96).
THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY: STRUCTURE, INTERNAL HIERARCHY AND
DYNAMICS
The believers in the two churches do not just make up communities, but may be
defined as groups as Homans means it (Homans 1950: 1). This differentiation has
been prompted by the high degree of connectivity, communion and interaction among
the believers. In this sense it may be claimed that the two churches, respectively, are
operating and have the structure of a local religious group. There are also a multitude
of acquaintances and kinship relations among the believers in the two districts, as well
as similar relations with other churches of the same denomination. For that reason
the believers of the BCOG in Sofia may be presented as a community, made up of
separate groups.
The main structural differentiation is between:
a) the core of the church group composed of its most committed members, whom
we shall call “church activists” (the leaders of the female and youth prayer groups,
cashiers, cooks, etc.);
b) regular participants in the religious services;
c) the rest of the believers, attending the house of prayer irregularly or rarely. The
latter make up “the periphery” of the group and are the most unstable part of it. This
mainly expresses itself in leaving the church or passing to another church group, quite
often of another denomination, too.
The church “activists” are connected with the leader – the pastor (cf. Slavkova
2007: 144-163) and entertain strong personal links. This is a figure of outspoken power
positions, combining the charismatic power through “spiritual gifts” and social capital
through the management of the social networks both in the group itself and between
the group and the macro society. In Gornitsata these relations are reinforced by the
fact that the church is operating in the pastor’s home. In Lyulin-5 the relations with the
leader also find expression in the visits, paid by “the activists” to the pastor in Turkey,
as well as through regular telephone calls.
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This hierarchy is based on the degree of incorporation in the life of the group
and the voluntary implementation of certain functions (accounting, cooking for “the
brotherly meals”, teaching Sunday school, etc.). Equally important for the position
in the group hierarchy are the charismatic “skills” – “the spiritual gifts”: the gift
of prophesy, speaking in more than one of “the heavenly tongues”, the skill of their
interpretation (during the Supper of the Lord). The latter is not common and is a
privilege of two or three people in the group only. Similar to these “gifts” is also the
composing of spiritual verses, which are read in public during religious services. The
internal hierarchy in the group is visible in the spatial arrangement of the believers
during the religious service. Besides the spatial division by gender, there is also an
endeavor on the part of the “activists” to occupy seats in the front part of the hall. The
male “activists” occupy the front-most part of the space, which is also occupied by the
pastor during the church service. This is proof of determination to symbolically come
close to the leader, and a means of self-presentation and reaffirmation of the positions
in the group. The female “activists” occupy the front rows in the hall. Sitting in the
back are the new members of the church.
The believers identify with the religious group to which they belong. This is a
matter of loyalty and of a positive acceptance of “one’s church”, based on its importance
for the denomination (Gornitsata) and/or on the conception of the church as a place
where God’s blessing is shown, most often through healings. In this way, in the 1990s,
the church in Lyulin-5 became known under the name of the “Hospital at the End of
the Town”.16
Churches are places of active communication. Spiritual messages are publicly
exchanged within a ritual context (most of all through “testimonies”), as well as
information of everyday nature (such as offers or searches for employment, for
instance). Outside the framework of religious ritual communication, we find elements
which may be found in any other kind of community: conversations about family
and everyday affairs, flirting among teenagers at the door of the church, etc. At the
same time, the level of social control in the church community is high. Sometimes
the private life of a certain “sister” or “brother” is discussed in public; accusations
are made in a non-Christian manner. This is no doubt a repercussion of the rituals of
“denunciation of sin”, a manifestation of the “rigorism” of the “Tinchevists” of yore.
In this way conflicting situations come to the fore and a transfer to another church is
also possible for the concerned “brother” or “sister”. We have observed such cases in
both the studied churches.
This transfer option bears witness to the dynamism within the church groups,
which are sometimes joined by new members, while others leave them, while others
still temporarily get out of the circle of the “activists”, by reducing the regularity of
their church attendance. The high dynamism of the changes within a certain religious
community is nothing unique: similar processes have been witnessed in Protestant
denominations in other countries (Warner 1991: 174-178: Fosztó 2005: 3-5). During
the time of our fieldwork, changes occurred in the membership of the churches, as well
as in their conditions for operation. The church in Lyulin-5 was threatened to lose its
building: private persons made claims on the ownership of the terrain. This was not
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only the object of worried discussion but also of attempts to take pertinent action. The
outcome still remained unclear at the time we wrapped up our fieldwork.
Most of all, the changes concerned the membership within the churches. At times,
the changes also reflected on the activities of the churches. Between Milena’s first visit
of Gornitsata in 2005 and our most recent fieldwork, the children’s gatherings had
been discontinued because of the work load their leader was under and the lack of a
trained substitute in the church. In June 2008 the youth gatherings there had also been
interrupted (probably only temporarily) as their leader gave birth to a second child.
New members joined the churches, others left. During the religious services two
young girls underwent “baptism in the Holy Spirit” (expressed in glossolalia): a group
of women, holding their hands, backed up the neophyte through an emphatically
emotional prayer. This was the first stage of the ritual acceptance of new members
in the community. Group baptisms in water were also held twice a year – which is
considered to be the next step to gain membership to the group.
On the other hand, one of the churches lost two of “their sisters”, who passed
away during the time of our fieldwork. Some “brothers” left to work abroad; one of
the “sisters” started to attend a more prestigious church in the centre of Sofia. An
unpleasant surprise for us was the fact that such a change also happened with our
key informant from Gornitsata, which hampered our work there for some time. She
also started attending church in another district of Sofia, which, moreover, was not
of the same denomination. It was an intriguing situation when she referred to us for
information as to what denomination that church belonged to. In fact, her family has
been a good example of the uneven nature of the conversion and a strong reminder of
the heterogeneous nature of the Roma communities. She, her two daughters and her
mother had been attending Gornitsata for about 10 years, but her brother had not been
converted. He is Muslim, while her sister-in-law is an Orthodox Christian. This provoked
her brother’s comment: “Sister, we shall not be together in the netherworld!”
All this comes to show that the conversion is not necessarily a completed fact
but an open process. László Fosztó’s observations among the charismatic churches in
Romania are of a similar ilk (Fosztó 2005: 10-11).
This dynamism of joining and leaving the churches makes it imperative to ask the
question what part of the Roma in Bulgaria have been converted to different Protestant
denominations? Notwithstanding the joining of new members, “the brothers” and
“the sisters” of the two studied churches are of the opinion that their numbers are now
dwindling. The pastors share the same view. It is hard to even approximately estimate the
number not only of the converted Roma, but more generally the number of Protestants
in Bulgaria. According to the National Statistics Institute, Protestantism has been the
only confession, which has, in recent years, seen an increase in its followers. In the
period between the two latest censuses, the number of Protestants has doubled in the
country – from 21 878 in 1992 to 42 308 in 200117. Different sources give unofficial data
which greatly vary: from 24 651 to 80 000 (Slavkova 2007: 43-44). According to some
estimates, about half of the Protestants in Bulgaria are Roma (Ibid). The approximate
values of these assessments are obvious. We shall take the risk of adding one more.
Indeed, not claiming to be precise, we shall mention that out of about 3500 people who
took part in the World Day of Prayers on May 1118, a little less than half were Roma.
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When shared with Bulgarian pastors, this view provoked their disagreement. The numbers
of converted Roma seem to be a disputed question, insofar as it is used as an argument
in the contest among the pastors for access to prestige, resources and power.
TRENDS IN THE IDENTITY AND IN THE CULTURE OF THE ROMA EVANGELISTS
The processes of evangelical conversion are connected with changes in Roma
identity and culture. The Roma pastors, converted in the 1980s, had been guided by the
strategy of modernization and the integration of Roma in Bulgarian society. This can
still be observed in Gornitsata and particularly in the church in Lyulin-5. The children
of these Roma pastors have a higher social status than that of their parents: they are
educated and belong to the Roma intelligentsia, while their lifestyle does not differ in
any way from that of most Bulgarians.
The relations among Roma and Bulgarians in the two churches need not be idealized:
they are brotherly (cf. Slavkova 2007: 176-177) in an authentic Christian spirit. We
became convinced of this throughout our fieldwork.
The language of communication in the churches is Bulgarian. In Gornitsata,
songs sung during the service alternate between Bulgarian and Romani19. Whereas in
Lyulin-5, there is a cappella singing during the church service (i.e. with no instrumental
accompaniment): Bulgarian evangelical songs are performed from the collection Sion
Songs20 and only one song is in Romani language. When this one is sung, the Bulgarian
worshippers can be recognized as they do not sing, not knowing the Romani language.
When both vocal and instrumental music is performed, the number of bilingual and
Romani songs increase, the musical style being specifically Romani in the latter instance.
This is a general characteristic of the Roma churches (cf. Slavkova 2007: 115-120). In
the second case “the brothers” and “the sisters”, Roma and Bulgarian alike, are more
passive and behave instead as an audience.
With an increase in number of Roma evangelists and the multiplication of Roma
ethnic character churches21, what can be observed is a striving of the church community
to recruit its members amidst a specific Roma group (cf. Slavkova 2007: 99). In fact
this striving is also one of the reasons underlying the segmentation of the churches.
The churches – Gornitsata and Lyulin-5 – however, do not follow this principle. As
a whole, the establishment of churches on the basis of a certain Roma group is still a
trend and not yet a rule or obligation.
According to P. Ignatov, one of the architects of the conversion trend among Roma,
the process in question has been part of the problem, referred by him as “Gypsification”
of the BCOG. He denotes in this way the process of capsulation within ethnically
homogeneous churches, accompanied by a certain retreat from modern values, which
the evangelizers have been trying to cultivate alongside the conversion. In his view, a
new generation of Roma pastors has joined the BCOG, after 1995, for whom education
is no longer a value as it had been for their predecessors. One of the successes of the
evangelizers has been the struggle against alcoholism and drug abuse and the imposition
of sobriety as a standard (those who fail to comply with this requirement drop out – cf.
Benovska-Sabkova 2002: 82). This success has not by far been the only one: a number
of modernization changes have been observed in the behaviour and values, in the
everyday life and the festivities of the Roma (Slavkova 2007: 190-195). Some of the
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more influential Roma pastors have been successful in negotiations for non-acceptance
of interethnic conflicts provoked by criminal incidents involving Bulgarians and Roma.
As a whole, the evangelization has added a new and positive identity among the Roma
(Giordano, Boscoboinik 2002: 18-19; Slavkova 2007: 256). Nevertheless, this process
does not revoke the Roma identities which rest on internal divisions and differences in
the cultures of the different groups (Slavkova 2007: 256).
Certain hardships can also be encountered in the co-habitation of some specificities
of Roma culture with Puritanism, particularly strong among the BCOG. This concerns
partnership cohabitations, which are traditional and are practiced extensively among the
Roma. “The pastor must be the husband of one woman!”, P. Ignatov imperatively says
and this implies the rejection of divorce as an option: “If the pastor divorces he shall not
serve”. There are rumours in the local communities that some of the Roma pastors have
extramarital relations (cf. Slavkova 2007: 152). In this way double standards come to the
fore in the BCOG, because the older generation of Pentecostal Christians continues to
uphold the marital institution, most of all because of its religious implications. During
our fieldwork we watched a conflict between two Bulgarian “sisters”, engendered by
the fact that one of them “denounced in sin” the other one because her daughter was
cohabitating with her partner. Nevertheless, cohabitation has been practiced even by
some Roma church “activists” of the same church, but this has not become an object
of discussion.
Certain obstacles to the upkeep of common moral standards by all believers have
also been the early marriages among the Roma, which are practiced, but not encouraged
by the pastors. We had the opportunity of witnessing how the pastor was trying to adapt
modern standards to social practices among the Roma. Blessing the children before
the start of Sunday school, he called all the children under 14 to come to the fore and
added: “If there are married among you, let them come to the fore, too!” Apparently,
the mutual adaptation between religious values and Roma traditions are a process of
continuous negotiation. At the same time the striving of some of the Roma pastors to
keep Roma churches homogeneous has been prompted by the desire to protect the
Roma traditions from “modernizing encroachments”. The capsulation, on the one
hand, is supported by some foreign missionaries, while on the other, it finds a political
expression. We shall dwell on these matters in the following sections.
CONVERSION AND ROMA NATIONALISM? POLITICIZATION OF THE CHARISMATIC
CHURCHES
The trend some churches have followed since 1995, towards Roma homogenization,
has not been apparent in the BCOG, regardless of the existence of ethnically mixed
churches too. Slavkova (2007: 176-177) and Altanov (2007: 1-18) tell us of charismatic
churches with mixed ethnic composition: Turks and Bulgarians, Roma and Bulgarians.
To some extent, homogenization has also been connected with segregation in that
converted Roma now live in compact Roma neighborhoods. There are, however, other
reasons for this too: the striving for independence of a big share of the Roma pastors;
transnational contacts and influences, which some authors conceptualize as an act of
globalization (cf. Coleman 2000: 49-71); the ambitions of the secular Roma elite,
too, for nationalization of the Roma.22 In other words, the existence of homogeneous
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Roma churches has been the result of social, economic and political factors. Worth
mentioning among the economic factors of homogenization is the competition for the
access to financial and other material resources (most often coming from the activities
of foreign missions and missionaries in Bulgaria); the possibility that the religious
leadership may legalize activity in the non-governmental sector or simply in the business
sphere. By far, not all the churches receive permanent financial support by foreign
missions or organizations. But it is a safe bet that more sweeping projects (such as the
maintenance of social centres or educational structures) are being financed with foreign
assistance (cf. Slavkova 2007: 98-99; 161, 163, 247). All this has been connected with
transnational contacts and influences. It is most probably a matter of the Roma pastors’
wish to communicate directly with the foreign sponsors, without the mediation of the
denomination’s national leadership.
Homogenization may be described as the result of multilateral interactions among
various social actors: Roma pastors, central leadership of the BCOG, foreign evangelical
missions and individual missionaries, international Roma organizations, Bulgarian nongovernmental organizations, and ethnic Roma political structures. Pastor P. Ignatov’s
view, though not neutral, helps in getting our bearings in the picture. The idea of
separate Roma churches is also backed outside the frontiers of the country – by Roma
pastors in Western Europe as well as by individual Western missionaries, operating
in Bulgaria:
“[The Roma pastors in Bulgaria] have established contacts with the Roma
evangelical societies in Spain, Germany and France. The leaders there
suggested to them to go back to Bulgaria and to do what was not allowed in the
West – to Gypsify the evangelical churches. The Western Evangelical churches
do not allow Gypsification. Coming back [to Bulgaria], they [the Bulgarian
Roma pastors] begin to take pride in the negative traits. For instance, this
striving and interest to get education has disappeared. [….] They have learnt
a sermon – and they think that this is enough. If there were any social support
or some other assistance – then yes…. And so their movement for independence
was begotten.”
Tangible in Pastor P. Ignatov’s standpoint is the bitterness of the loss of control
over processes, which had been initiated thanks to his activity.
“I ask them: ‘Shall we make one society?’ – They say: ‘We shall be forced to
set up a Roma church.’ And they take no interest, generally, whether it is a
Pentecostal or what it is…[…] I am greatly concerned about the future. At the
point when the advantages are exhausted, they will withdraw.”
What has been symptomatic of the advanced homogenization of Roma churches
in the BCOG has been the foundation, in 2002, of an independent Association of the
Roma Pastors, Churches and Societies in Bulgaria. The setting up of a Roma Church
of the Lord in 2004, defined as “independent”, has had a symbolic meaning (Slavkova
2007: 107-108, 164).
This trend of deepening ethnic capsulation of the churches also has a political followup. Since 2000, Roma pastors have gradually turned out to be politically committed to
the structures of the EuroRoma ethnic Roma party (on this topic cf. Benovska-Sabkova
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2002: 80). According to P. Ignatov, during the 2005 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria,
“a political party – EuroRoma - decided that it could use the Evangelical churches
as its clubs. All [the Roma pastors] to the last one became supporters of EuroRoma.”
Some of the Roma were elected municipal councillors, and others have been nominated
by EuroRoma to be national representatives. Though not complying with the moral
standards of the charismatic BCOG, which requires a clear-cut distinction between the
church affairs and lay matters, the political instrumentalization of religion has not been
something unexpected. Indeed, “no aspect of religious identity after socialism could
be free of the political” (Hann 2006: 6).
“FOREIGN AID” - A CONTROVERSIAL DISCOURSE BETWEEN EXAGGERATION AND
REALITY?
To avoid simplified interpretations we shall first point out that the role of financial
aid from international sources (religious or other) should not be overrated. Most of the
Roma pastors earn their living exercising their lay trade or professions (cf. Slavkova
2007: 150-151). The international aid is an important factor, but on the other hand, is
not, by far, conditio sine qua non for the existence of all the evangelical churches at any
period of time. Some of the churches are financed by their own means (Slavkova 2007:
122-123), as is also the case with the churches we studied. The two churches, however,
have had periods of more intensive financial backing from international sources.
The financial aid coming from Protestant missionaries and missions have been
a strongly contested question, whose significance has long and regularly been used
in manipulative discourses. Thus back in the 19th century, the Protestant proselytism
in the Balkans was attacked by the local political forces and religious institutions as
something brought from outside and mercenary, because of the funds invested by West
European and American missions (cf. Ignatov 2006: 66-67). This attitude has essentially
not changed under the post-socialist conditions of today, either. Anthropologists have
been repeatedly reporting on sharp accusations in self-seeking motives levelled against
those who have accepted Protestantism (particularly the Pentecostal denomination) in
different post-socialist countries (Pelkmans 2006: 32-37; Hilgers 2006: 80, 82, 86).
These attacks have been coming from the traditional religious institutions (the Orthodox
Church, Islam and others), striving to enforce their hegemonic role. This discourse has
been common also among the broad strata of the population. Similar discourses are used
as an argument in the internal disputes between the different Protestant denominations,
and fairly often, also by one and the same denomination, including the rivalries between
Roma pastors. The exaggerated idea of a generous financial support from abroad
sometimes even threatens the safety of a certain pastor and his family. For instance,
the wife of Pastor I.I. from Gornitsata had been attacked and abused by Roma of the
neighborhood with the accusation that the family allegedly “had money” from foreign
aid, but had not distributed it among the rest of the residents in the neighborhood.
In fact the attitude to foreign aid has not been unambiguous in the circles of the
Evangelists themselves, moreover, not only among the Roma. It has been acknowledged
that not a single important project can be realized without foreign aid (Ignatov 2006:
145-150, 361). Dependence on the latter, however, is recently recognized as a problem
and has been the object of mixed feelings (Ibid: 361-362).
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It would be simplified and incorrect to present the process of evangelization of
the Roma as the result of an interest in foreign aid. The humanitarian aid in the form
of food and second-hand clothes were also available in the Gornitsata and Lyulin-5
churches, but this aid generated no particular interest from the believers. Instead, these
items have been distributed among socially underprivileged people, who do not attend
these churches. The attractiveness of charismatic Christianity among the Roma has been
due to more factors; here we can primarily highlight the proselytism of the Protestants,
particularly of the charismatic trend. The intensity of the emotional experience during
religious services and the faith in the possibility of healing should also be mentioned
(Slavkova 2007: 158-159), or still the belief that devotion guarantees the resolving of
everyday problems (“God finds jobs!”, A. says from the church in Lyulin-5). The sense
of belonging and community life, which the churches offer, also attract the Roma.
LOCAL SOCIAL ACTORS COME OUT ON THE GLOBAL STAGE
What seems paradoxical in the politicization of the Roma Church has been its
close relation between opposite ideologies: globalization, on the one hand, and the
capsulation of Roma “nationalist” ambitions, on the other. Of course, we are using
the term “nationalism” provisionally only (Fosztó 2003: 104). In fact the process of
Roma homogenization in the BCOG has again been the Roma elite’s project in which
some shifts have occurred with the advent of certain pastors. It is also a matter of the
Roma pastors’ struggle for an access to and control of resources, available on “the
religious market”23, and about the legalization of the claims of “exclusive rights” on
this market. In this sense, the conclusion that what is necessary is “a reinterpretation
of the opposition local – global” is justified (Fozsto 2003: 106-170). What has been
observed is the strengthening of the local social actors through their inclusion in global
movements.
There is yet another trend of globalization of charismatic Christianity, in which the
Roma take part already, not as an object of impact, but rather as an active instrument of
proselytism. This is the missionary activity of Roma pastors within and out of Bulgaria.
The Roma participation in this process cannot be separated from the overall missionary
activity among the Protestants in Bulgaria. Since 2000, the missionary movement has
been gathering force and Bulgarian missionaries are engaging in activities in India
and the Republic of South Africa, for instance. A Bulgarian network of missionaries
has been established which has, since 2002, been publishing a bulletin of its own24.
The finances for missionary activities are collected from different sources: aside
from those international sources, the financing is also secured by Bulgarian sources:
individual Protestant denominations, and sometimes even the personal finances of the
missionaries themselves.
The Roma participation here emphasizes once again the importance of globalization
as a concept, within the frameworks of which the progress made by charismatic
Christianity should be discussed. As we have mentioned, Pastor Ch.Ch. and his wife
have been carrying out missionary work in Turkey since 2003. This has happened
with the mediation of the central leadership of the BCOG, financed by the American
Church of God. The missionary work is carried out under the leadership of an American
missionary, and his communication with Pastor Ch.Ch. has been in Turkish. Pastor
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Evangelical Conversion among the Roma in Bulgaria
Ch.Ch. has two native tongues: Turkish and Roma. This makes him suitable for his
mission in Turkey. It is well known that Protestantism has no big successes in that
country. “The Turks are people of stone hearts, it is very hard to work with them”,
Pastor Ch.Ch. says. The sending of Roma missionaries relies on the familiar strategy
of evangelization among the Roma, this time in Turkey. “Because the Roma are not
either with these or with the others” (i.e. neither Christianity, nor Islam have authentic
roots among them). Obviously this strategy has been mostly based on the heterogeneity
of the Roma culture. In other words, successful work is expected of the Pastor among
other Roma people, but the potential of the Roma cultural adaptability to a different
cultural context is also appreciated. During our fieldwork, we learnt about R., another
Roma pastor from Sofia, a missionary in Romania. For her part, Slavkova (2007: 143)
says that she had witnessed evangelization, organized by Bulgarian Roma among
Roma in Spain.
The incorporation of the Roma in world missionary networks has been a comparatively
recent process, whose future is hard to foresee. What is more important, however, is
that it can be discussed as the reverse of ethnic homogenization and capsulation.
CONCLUSION
The evangelization among the Roma in Bulgaria has been a process, resulting from
the interaction of local, national and global social actors under the impact of various
historical factors. It has come into being as part of the dissemination of Protestantism
and of the Pentecostal movement, in particular, in Bulgaria in the early 1920s; it almost
completely waned under socialism but nearing the end of this period (the 1980s),
gained strength to become rapidly widespread after the political changes of 1989. We
have reviewed this process through the prism of the historical development of the
Pentecostal Bulgarian Church of God. Till the end of the 1960s this denomination had
a definitely rigorist character and capsulated life in its decentralized structures. During
that period it had the features of a “private religion”. The renovation and modernization
of this church has resulted in its centralization and has been accompanied by successful
evangelization among the Roma at the end of the 1970s. In the 1980s Bulgarians and
Roma shared their religious experience together in ethnically mixed churches.
Immediately after the political changes of 1989, the Bulgarian Church of God
turned into a “public religion” and social actor, having the ambition to play a central
role in the Protestant movement in Bulgaria. During the subsequent two decades, almost,
Roma participation became massive in the Pentecostal movement as well as in other
Protestant denominations. This has entailed quite a few changes in the culture of the
Roma and the acquiring of a new positive identity, without the latter replacing “the old”
identifications among Roma. Hardships have also been observed in the adaptation of
Roma culture to the culture of the puritan moral standards of charismatic Christianity.
Under the impact of global (foreign missionaries) and local (Roma pastors) factors,
trends of ethnic homogenization and capsulation have been observed in Evangelical
churches with Roma participation. This has enabled the politicization and political use
of the Bulgarian Church of God and its integration for the purposes of an ethnic Roma
party, since the early years of the new millennium. The universalist philosophy of the
charismatic churches is no obstacle to the development of “nationalistic” trends in
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Roma churches insofar as this conforms to the power ambitions of the Roma pastors,
joining the Roma elite.
Globalization finds its expression in the opposite direction, too, through the
infiltration of international networks of missionaries by Roma pastors.
The evangelization among the Bulgarian Roma is an incomplete and contradictory
process, accompanied by changeability in the life of the church communities as well as
by vacillations, the joining of new believers and the withdrawal of older members. A
painstaking analysis of the social practices in the two church communities has shown
an organic community life and internal cohesion, notwithstanding the existence of an
outspoken internal hierarchy and social control, based on religious criteria.
It would be incorrect to play down the evangelization process of Roma and to limit
their conversion to their interest in foreign financial aid. The attractiveness of charismatic
Christianity among the Roma has been due to many more factors: the proselytism of
the Protestants, the intensity of the emotional experience in the charismatic churches,
the faith in the possibility of healing, and the sense of belonging and community life,
which Roma acquire in their local religious communities.
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Моллов, С. 2006: Духовен споменник за Българска Божия църква. Художественодокументални повествования 1919-1990. София, Издателство Български
писател. [= Mollov, T. 2006: Spiritual Memoir About Bulgarian Church of
God. Sofia, Balgarsi pisatel. In Bulgarian].
Несторова, Т. 1991: Американски мисионери сред българите 1858-1912. София,
Университетско издателство „Св. Климент Охридски”. [= Nestorova, T.
1991: The American Missionaries amongst the Bulgarians 1858-1912. Sofia, The
University of Sofia Publishing House “St. Kliment Ochridski”. InBulgian.]
Петров, М. 2001: История на българското протестантство между двете световни
войни. Дипломна работа. Софийски университет „Св. Кл. Охридски”.
[Petrov, M. 2001: The History of Bulgarian Protestantism between Two
World Wars. Diploma Thesis. University of Sofia “St. Kliment Ochridski”. In
Bulgarian].
Славкова, М. 2007: Циганите евангелисти в България. София, Парадигма. [=
Slavkova, M. 2007: The Evangelical Gypsies in Bulgaria. Sofia, Paradigma.
In Bulgarian].
Томова, И. 1995: Циганите в преходния период. Международен център по
проблемите на малцинствата и културните взаимодействия. София, 329355 [= Tomova, I. 1995: The Gyspieds in the Transitional Period. International
Centre for the Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations. Sofia]. Quotations
by the Bulgarian Edition.
Томова, И. 1998: Роми. – В: Кръстева, А. (ред) Общности и идентичност в България.
Петекстон, София, 329-355. [= Tomova, I. 1998. Roma. – in: Krasteva, A. (ed)
Comminities and Identities in Bulgaria. In Bulgarian].
154 •
Evangelical Conversion among the Roma in Bulgaria
NOTES
1
Cf. a detailed bibliographical review of the works on conversion in Slavkova 2007:
35-41.
2
These processes have been observed by anthropologists in different post-socialist
countries. Concerning Romania cf. Fozsto 2006: 269; Fozsto 2005: 1-12; concerning
Kirghistan, cf. Pelkmans 2006: 35, 41-42; Hilger 2006: 85.
3
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the New Bulgarian University for
the research of Velislav Altanov in 2007.
4
Concerning the field work, accomplished by Milena Benovska-Sabvkova in 2002, cf.
Benovska-Sabkova 2003: 57-93.
5
The latter work has been especially devoted to the application of the method in the
study of one specific Presbyterian congregation.
6
Pastor Pavel Ignatov officiated as Chief Elder from 1980 to 2005. He is also the author
of two books we have quoted here: Ignatov 2004; Ignatov 2006.
7
Assemblies of God have been directly connected with the initial establishment of
Pentecostalism in the USA (Ignatov 2006: 154) and more specifically with “the miracle
in Azusa Street” - 1906, Los Angeles (about it cf. Coleman 2000: 21).
8
Voronaev stayed in Bulgaria for about a year until the middle of 1921, while Zaplishni
stayed on, but was forced to leave the country for political reasons in 1924 and returned
again in 1927 (Ignatov 2006: 150-151; 155-156).
9
Washing of the feet, as a ritual analogy of the biblical text, had been adopted by Voronaev
under the influence of the practices of the Adventists, cf. Ignatov 2006: 137-138.
10
In whose homes, specifically, had religious services been held since 1928, cf. for instance,
Mollov 2006: 64-65; 68-81; 88-89 et al.
11
There is a certain inconsistency in the data, quoted by Ignatov, himself (2004). On p.
102, he indicates 1972 as the year of the first international contact, and on p. 120 he
gives the year 1973.
12
The Church of God, seated in Cleveland, Tennessee, currently holds branches in 150
countries and boasts of a membership of 6 million, cf. http://www.churchofgod.org.
It is important to remember that the Pentecostal organization in Bulgaria had been
established by missionaries of the American Assemblies of God, whereas later the
Church of God opted for associating with another branch of the Pentecostal movement,
viz. the same-name Church of God. The connection with the Church of God had also
been prompted by the refusals of the Assemblies of God to cooperate with an unofficial
and unregistered denomination, as the Church of God was until 1990. Cf. Ignatov 2004:
124.
13
These figures are approximate as there are no official statistics about membership in
the BCOG.
14
According to data provided by Pastor P. Ignatov. He refers to the 2001 data of the
Council of the Elders of the BCG, when representatives of about 550 church communities
supplied data about their memberships.
15
A copy of a document published by Mollov 2006: 83-86.
16
The name is a response to the title of a popular Czech serial TV film of the 1980s.
17
www.nsi.bg/.
• 155
Milena BENOVSKA-SABKOVA & Velislav ALTANOV
18
The event took place in Hall No. 1 of the National Palace of Culture, the largest concert
hall in Bulgaria, seating 3380, cf. http://www.ndk.bg/halls.php.
19
Slavkova 2007: 118 informs us about religious chanting in other mother tongues among
Bulgarian Roma-Turkish or “Wallachian”.
20
No year of publication.
21
Concerning mono-ethnic churches, cf. Fosztó 2006.
22
A number of authors have been dwelling on the striving of the Roma elite for the ethnic
mobilization of the Roma.
23
About this term cf. Pelkmans 2006: 30-31.
24
Cf. http://bulmn.com/Specials/Bulletins/Bulgarian. About Bulgarian missionary Ivailo
Shatrovski, cf. www.hvalenie.com.
156 •
LA CHIMÈRE DE L’ETHNOGENÈSE OU LE MIRAGE D’UNE SOLUTION ETHNIQUE
AUX PROBLÈMES SOCIO-ÉCONOMIQUES DES POPULATIONS ROM
Christian GIORDANO
ETHNOS ET ETHNOGENÈSE : UNE BRÈVE ARCHÉOLOGIE TERMINOLOGIQUE
Le lien entre la notion d’ethnogenèse, telle qu’elle est utilisée aujourd’hui aussi dans
les discours concernant l’identité des Roms en Europe, et celle d’ethnos est difficilement
contestable. Aussi l’ethnogenèse peut-elle être définie comme le processus spécifique
qui aboutit à la formation d’une communauté stable et quasi immuable, fondée sur des
critères ethniques quels qu’ils soient, et que les anthropologues ont appelée ethnos.
Mais d’où vient cette notion et qui en a fait usage et l’a divulguée ? Sans remonter à la
Grèce antique d’où elle dérive certainement d’un point de vue strictement étymologique,
on peut dire en toute bonne foi que le terme ethnos se répand avant tout parmi les
ethnologues de la première partie du 20e siècle pour se distancer du concept germanique
de Volk ou russe de narod devenus désormais assez vagues et idéologiquement trop
connotés (Mühlmann, 1964 : 56 ss.). En effet aussi bien la notion de Volk, si habilement
rendue populaire à travers l’idée herdérienne d’un Volksgeist et d’une Volkseele, que
celle de narod, propagée dans les milieux slavophiles de Saint Petersbourg et de Moscou,
devinrent durant le 19e siècle des expressions favorites de la rhétorique nationaliste en
Allemagne et en Russie. Ce n’est donc pas par hasard que ce fut l’ethnologue russe
S.M. Širokogorov qui lança la théorie de l’ethnos et par conséquent de manière quasi
automatique celle de l’ethnogenèse. Selon cet auteur, l’ethnos, dans la mesure où il
est l’expression d’un processus permanent d’adaptation et de reproduction sociale,
culturelle et biologique, peut se définir comme une unité sociale en mutation constante
qui se distingue des autres par les cinq aspects fondamentaux suivants :
1. L’ethnos se reconnaît à ses formes spécifiques d’adaptation culturelle et donc,
en particulier, par l’existence d’une culture matérielle commune. Cela constitue l’aspect
typiquement ethnographique, selon Širokogorov.
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Christian GIORDANO
2. L’ethnos représente l’unité linguistique par laquelle ses membres s’expriment
dans un idiome commun. Pour notre auteur il s’agit de l’aspect psycho-mental.
3. L’ethnos se distingue par un passé commun et par des traditions partagées.
Ici l’ethnologue russe parle de continuité historique.
4. Les membres individuels de l’ethnos sont conscients d’appartenir à une unité
sociale singulière et c’est l’aspect psychologique.
5. Par le processus de transmission héréditaire garanti par des pratiques endogames,
les caractéristiques physiques des individus appartenant à l’ethnos se reproduisent.
Širokogorov parle alors d’un aspect biologique (Širokogorov, 1935 : 14)
Cette construction théorique élaborée par Širokogorov durant son exil à Pékin
sur la base de données recueillies en grande partie dans quelques sociétés tribales
d’Asie centrale, a eu peu d’écho dans la partie occidentale du vieux Continent, sauf en
Allemagne, bien que l’auteur eût l’occasion de publier sa volumineuse monographie
intitulée Psychomental Complex of the Tungus en Grande Bretagne et certains articles
sur le thème de l’ethnos en français et en allemand (Širokogorov, 1935; Širokogorov,
1936; Širokogorov, 1937; Gossiaux, 2002 : 7 ss.)
En revanche ce furent les ethnographes soviétiques et en particulier Yulian V. Bromlej
qui utilisèrent, instrumentalisèrent et abusèrent des idées théoriques par ailleurs fort
subtiles et complexes au sujet de l’ethnos qu’avait développées Širokogorov. On peut
dire sans hésitation que l’etnografija postrévolutionnaire s’appuyant plus ou moins
ouvertement sur Širokogorov a, jusqu’à la fin des années quatre-vingts, fonctionné
essentiellement sur le concept d’ethnos à des fins politiques, à savoir pour légitimer le
système soviétique (socialiste) et ses déviations par rapport aux prophéties de la théorie
marxiste-léniniste (Bromlej, 1977).
Lorsque les ethnographes soviétiques se consacrèrent à l’étude de la diversité
culturelle, sortant du contexte restreint de leur société nationale, ils durent tout de
même garantir, au prix d’acrobaties théoriques et de mystifications empiriques, la
compatibilité entre la réalité des spécificités ethniques ou nationales d’une part et l’idéal
internationaliste d’autre part, selon lequel les diversités ethniques sont des résidus, ou
encore comme l’écrivait Engels, des décombres du passé ou dans le meilleur des cas, des
monuments ethnographiques sans aucune incidence politique (Engels, 1971 : 13, 225).
L’internationalisme socialiste est un idéal qui prophétise clairement l’homogénéisation
graduelle mais inéluctable de la société en marche vers le soleil de l’avenir communiste.
Pour ces académiciens il s’agissait donc de concilier la doctrine marxiste-léniniste,
revue par Staline, avec la persistance obstinée d’une multitude d’affiliations culturelles,
linguistiques et religieuses. En effet, comment expliquer que la fin de l’impérialisme
grand russe, l’élimination des rapports de production capitalistes et donc la liquidation
de la hiérarchie de classes après la révolution d’octobre n’aient pas résolu la question
nationale dans l’espace du territoire soviétique et dans celui des pays satellites?
De fait, après la mort de Staline, l’ethnographe soviétique Yulian V. Bromlej, avec
sa théorie de l’ethnos empruntée à Širokogorov, proposa un compromis qui, à notre avis,
peut se résumer d’une manière peut-être schématique de la manière suivante (Skalnik,
1988 : 164; Skalnik, 1990 : 185). L’ethnos possède une essence naturelle propre et par
conséquent immuable dans le temps, que des événements historiques du calibre de la
158 •
La chimère de l'ethnogenèse ou le mirage d'une solution ethnique
grande révolution d’octobre et de la grande guerre patriotique ne sauraient affecter.
Selon cette perspective la naissance et l’expansion du pouvoir soviétique neutralisent
de manière irréversible le potentiel conflictuel entre les groupes ethno-nationaux.
De cette manière la question nationale est résolue... mais les différences ethniques
demeurent: c’est l’oeuf de Colomb imaginé par Bromlej sur le modèle d’un passage de
Lénine dans lequel, contredisant Engels, il écrivait sur son ton prophétique bien connu
que les différences nationales se maintiendraient encore pour un temps très long si ce
n’est même au-delà de la réalisation de la Dictature du prolétariat à l’échelle mondiale
(Bromlej, 1977 : 161, Lenin, 1978, Vol. 20 : 19).
Que la proposition théorique de Bromlej soit un faux compromis est désormais
amplement démontré par la renaissance des conflits ethniques à la périphérie de l’exempire soviétique. Cependant un communiste orthodoxe et bien rôdé à la dialectique
marxiste pourrait sûrement expliquer ces phénomènes à connotations souvent violentes
comme une conséquence de la dissolution de la division harmonieuse du travail entre
les républiques de l’Union soviétique et de la restauration perverse de la propriété
privée dans les rapports de production capitaliste.
Cependant on pourrait répliquer que Bromlej en appliquant la théorie de l’ethnos a
volontairement mis en scène et mythologisé l’harmonie interethnique, créant ainsi un
véritable rideau de fumée à même de cacher la permanence de violents contentieux et
tensions. Cette mise en scène réalisée par les spécialistes de l’ etnografija soviétique,
dominés par la figure de Bromlej, s’est avérée en dernière analyse un instrument fort
commode pour le Parti Communiste de l’Union soviétique lui permettant de cacher
à long terme la réalité et de nier ainsi l’évidence. Ainsi Peter Skalnik a parfaitement
raison lorsqu’il fait remarquer que la théorie de l’ethnos développée par Bromlej et ses
pairs ne doit pas être prise pour une déviation par rapport au marxisme-léninisme de
fabrication stalinienne. En dernière analyse elle n’est rien d’autre qu’une façon typique
du totalitarisme soviétique de créer des mythes au service de l’appareil d’Etat et du
parti (Skalnik, 1988 : 170-172; Cannarsa, 1994).
Toutefois la mystification politique opérée par Bromlej et d’autres ethnographes
soviétiques recèle un changement de nature méthodologique apparemment léger mais
cependant substantiel du concept d’ethnos tel que l’avait créé Širokogorov. Cet auteur,
comme le remarque à juste titre Jean-François Gossiaux, entend l’ethnos comme une
réponse collective aux multiples défis du milieu et non comme une communauté immuable
et préconstituée qui persiste malgré les turbulences historiques comme par exemple
une révolution ou une guerre ou encore une catastrophe naturelle (Gossiaux, 2002 : 8).
Si aujourd’hui on peut reprocher quelque chose à Širokogorov c’est probablement une
certaine vision organiciste de la société et de la culture pas très éloignée au fond de
ce que pensaient les fonctionnalistes britanniques de l’époque et en particulier Alfred
Reginald Radcliffe Brown. L’ethnos est par conséquent comparable aux organismes
étudiés par les biologistes et l’anthropologie doit être considérée comme une sorte de
biologie sociale.
Bromlej et les ethnographes soviétiques ont dénaturé la conception dynamique
de Širokogorov pour les raisons mentionnées ci-dessus et ce faisant, ont donné à la
notion d’ethnos une forte connotation essentialiste et évolutionniste. La notion d’ethnos
devient avant tout volontairement essentialiste et de ce fait redevient statique, afin de
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Christian GIORDANO
mettre en évidence la carte pluriethnique de l’Union soviétique. Celle-ci est de ce fait
représentée comme un ensemble d’ethnies en harmonie les unes avec les autres. L’idée
d’ethnos devient ainsi un instrument très utile pour la mise au point d’un système de
classification politiquement opportun.
En même temps qu’à l’essentialisation de la notion d’ethnos, on assiste à la
fabrication d’une théorie de l’ethnogenèse, ou processus d’ethno-transformation qui
se nourrit de la vision évolutionniste inhérente à la philosophie de l’histoire marxisteléniniste. Bromlej parle explicitement, dans ce contexte, de processus ethno-évolutifs
(Bromlej, 1977 : 143).
L’ethnogenèse n’est donc pas un phénomène qui se manifeste exclusivement durant
la phase première de la formation et de la consolidation de l’ethnos lui-même, mais
également un processus qui continue durant les diverses phases du développement
historique. Au contraire, ces stades semblent presque déterminer le processus de
l’ethnogenèse, à savoir les mutations de l’ethnos. Les termes d’ethnie/ tribu/ peuple/
nationalitéé et enfin de nation ne sont rien d’autre que les expressions d’une séquence
évolutive d’entités ethniques pré-nationales et donc d’ordre inférieur à la nation vue
comme la communauté ethnique d’ordre supérieur (Bromlej, 1977 : 26-27). De manière
plus concrète, on peut préciser que l’ethnie, la tribu ou le peuple (synonyme de Volk)
Volk
sont des formes d’ethnos spécifiques des phases plus primitives de l’humanité, la
nationalitéé témoignerait d’une époque intermédiaire, tandis que la nation représente
donc l’expression la plus évoluée de l’ethnos, lequel domine surtout dans la phase
historique du capitalisme.
En conclusion on peut dire que par rapport à la notion d’ethnos élaborée par
Širokogorov, laquelle malgré son caractère processuel, faisait preuve déjà de quelques
traces assez évidentes d’essentialisme, Bromlej s’évertuera à en essentialiser encore
le caractère. Cela à des fins non étrangères à la politique soviétique, préoccupée de la
persistence de la diversité ethnique à l’intérieur d’un ordre socialiste contraint de tenir
compte des différences ethniques, mais en réalité fondé sur une vision universaliste
peu sensible à la diversité. La transformation conceptuelle de la notion d’ethnos dans
l’etnografija soviétique a bien entendu influencé aussi l’essentialisation de l’idée
d’ethnogenèse qui n’est pas le produit d’une construction sociale de la réalité dans le
sens où l’entendent Peter Berger et Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 1966)
mais advient plutôt lors d’un processus d’évolution primordiale et quasi naturelle, que
l’ethnologue révèle par son intervention.
L’ETHNOGENÈSE DES ROMS: ILLUSION IDENTITAIRE OU ALTERNATIVE POUR
L’ÉMANCIPATION?
Malgré l’hétérogénéité des groupes, certains activistes et politiciens rom tentent
de développer une sorte de solidarité ethnique censée exprimer le sentiment que tous
les Roms appartiennent au même peuple particulier, qu’ils partagent des traits culturels
communs ainsi que les problèmes communs issus d’un large spectre d’injustices et de
préjugés, d’hostilité ethnique et de violence.
Au risque d’encourir les foudres de certains gestionnaires de l’identité,
é d’origine rom
é,
ou non, nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de constater, eu égard aux données récoltées
durant nos enquêtes, que l’identité rom est extrêmement diversifiée. De ce fait, il serait
160 •
La chimère de l'ethnogenèse ou le mirage d'une solution ethnique
probablement plus exact de parler d’identités plurielles et d’identités multiples, flexibles
et situationnelles. Mais cette affirmation remet en question l’adéquation des discours par
ailleurs fort en vogue parmi les membres influents de l’élite politique et culturelle rom
qui préconisent la naissance d’une ethnie-nation rom issue d’un processus d’ethnogenèse
plus ou moins encouragé par le haut, sinon carrément gérée par des institutions et des
organisations transnationales et/ou supranationales.
L’ethnogenèse en tant que processus social de mobilisation pourrait donc s’avérer
un instrument valable grâce auquel les Rom seraient en mesure d’exprimer un sens
plus fort de cohésion et d’exercer par conséquent un impact majeur dans le domaine
politique (Barany, 2002 : 70).
Dans le cadre de ces conceptions et projets, l’ethnogenèse, néologisme aujourd’hui
par ailleurs non seulement un peu vieilli mais encore héritage, comme on l’a dit
précédemment, d’une anthropologie essentialiste et issu d’une conscience collective
de nature ethnique, fondée par conséquent sur le partage d’une origine et d’une culture
communes, devrait induire les populations rom à développer nécessairement un esprit
communautaire, lequel à son tour aurait une fonction émancipatrice et se révélerait
encore utile pour réduire les préjugés et les discriminations de la part des collectivités
ethno-nationales dominantes. Par l’ethnogenèse on éliminerait ainsi un grave déficit
social des Roms par rapport aux autres communautés. Ils deviendraient de cette manière
paradoxalement moins diffé
diff rents et par conséquent plus égaux
é
par rapport aux autres,
puisqu’eux aussi atteindraient un niveau plus élevé d’organisation sociale comparable
à celui des autres.
D’un point de vue purement éthique le but du processus d’ethnogenèse, tel qu’il
est conçu par ses promoteurs, est sans doute louable. Cependant la question ne porte
pas tellement sur la valeur morale du projet que sur sa faisabilité au 21e siècle, siècle
marqué par une phase de mondialisation accélérée. En vérité, deux aspects importants
au moins ne manqueront pas d’éveiller un certain scepticisme chez celui qui s’occupe
de sciences sociales.
• Il est évident que le modèle fondé sur l’idée de l’ethnogenèse s’inspire implicitement
ou, ainsi que le fait remarquer un de ses concepteurs, le sociologue roumain
d’origine rom Nicolae Gheorghe, se réclame explicitement de la nation-building
du 19e siècle. En effet les projets de l’ethnogenèse actuelle des communautés rom
suivent plus ou moins fidèlement l’exemple de la formation des Kulturnationen
en général et en particulier celui de l’Europe centrale et orientale et du Sud-est
entre la fin du 18e et le début du 19e siècles.
Pour les leaders de l’élite, la nation, en tant que formation sociale, semble une
solution viable, d’une part pour lutter contre la stigmatisation et la marginalisation
de leur communauté et d’autre part c’est une manière de traiter les problèmes
sociaux et culturels qu’ils doivent affronter (Fosztó, 2003 : 102). Cependant il
convient de faire une distinction ici entre deux écoles de pensées. La première,
plus traditionnelle et plus simple, suit les modèles classiques du nationalisme
ethnique selon lesquels, à travers l’ethnogenèse, on se propose de redonner vie à
la culture et à l’identité rom à l’intérieur des contextes nationaux et territoriaux
particuliers. Ainsi naîtraient des communautés ethniques rom singulières sans
relations entre elles au niveau transnational. L’ethnogenèse serait alors une simple
• 161
Christian GIORDANO
réédition des processus qui ont abouti dans les siècles passés à la formation des
nations européennes actuelles.
La seconde est bien plus subtile et sophistiquée dans la mesure où elle s’appuie
sur une vision explicitement transnationale et déterritorialisée de l’identité
ethnique rom. L’ethnogenèse serait ici la voie choisie pour arriver à un sentiment
d’appartenance d’une portée bien plus vaste et de dimension européenne. Dans
un langage plus institutionnel, on pourrait parler de l’émergence d’une nation
ethnique rom qui outrepasse les frontières restreintes des Etats nationaux et
qui se construirait en tant que stateless political community. Cependant même
dans ce cas il est impossible de passer sous silence la référence évidente à l’idée
de Kulturnation, même si ce concept est habilement adapté à une réalité plus
diffuse du point de vue spatial, socialement moins articulée et culturellement
moins cohérente.
A ce moment, il est toutefois légitime de se poser deux questions, à savoir si
d’une part on ne propose pas là un modèle obsolète et si, d’autre part, on n’a pas
affaire à une vision séduisante mais irréaliste. Dans le premier cas, celui qui
reproduit fidèlement la formation des nations durant le 19e siècle, ce qui donne
une impression anachronique et d’une certaine manière anti-historique, c’est
la suggestion de faire répéter à presque cent cinquante ans de distance et dans
des conditions socio-économiques globales si différentes, le même parcours à
la population rom. En fait, c’est comme si on proposait une théorie simpliste
du dé
dééfificit socioculturel censé être comblé en reproduisant tout simplement un
modèle expérimenté avec succès par d’autres groupes dans un passé désormais
trop lointain.
Au second projet, celui de l’émergence d’une communauté rom transnationale
et déterritorialisée, même s’il s’inspire lui aussi de modèles du 19e siècle, on
ne peut reprocher son anachronisme, du fait qu’il tient justement compte des
tendances sociopolitiques actuelles liées au processus de la mondialisation.
Celui-ci semble en outre très séduisant parce qu’il adopte un langage aux accents
postmodernes par ailleurs fort en vogue auprès des organisations transnationales
et internationales, (comme par exemple l’Union européenne et certaines
ONGs). Toutefois, la grande variété des rôles, des statuts et positions sociales,
les différences culturelles notables, sans compter la dispersion territoriale des
populations rom risquent de constituer un obstacle quasi insurmontable à la
réalisation de cette vision spécifique de l’ethnogenèse en en faisant ainsi un projet
peu réaliste, voire velléitaire, ce qui revient à dire qu’il s’agit d’une alternative
d’émancipation improbable.
• Le concept d’ethnogenèse se fonde lui-même, comme d’ailleurs toute forme
d’ethnicisation, sur la création de frontières entre nous et les autres. Celles-ci ne
doivent pas nécessairement être de nature territoriale. D’un point de vue théorique,
c’est Frederik Barth qui nous a rendu attentifs au fait que les appartenances
ethniques sont le résultat d’un mécanisme ou mieux, d’une stratégie sociale et
que, à travers l’utilisation plus ou moins intentionnelle de marqueurs singuliers
ou de la combinaison de ceux-ci, fort variables entre eux, les groupes sociaux
162 •
La chimère de l'ethnogenèse ou le mirage d'une solution ethnique
signalent leurs frontières réciproques, territoriales ou culturelles (Barth, 1969).
Il est évident que dans ces situations un système d’auto- et d’hetéro-attributions
se met en place, basé sur la représentation de soi et des autres. Il est donc logique
et naturel de se poser la question de savoir si l’ethnogenèse en général et celle des
Roms en particulier, ne finit pas par renforcer en définitive les vieux stéréotypes
et préjugés des autres au sujet des populations rom et par conséquent à augmenter
les discriminations dans les pratiques sociales. Ainsi le résultat de l’ethnogenèse
pourrait bien induire une aggravation des processus d’exclusion.
Ces réflexions cependant confirment la vraie question de fond relative à tous les
projets d’ethnogenèse qui est la suivante: est-il vraiment nécessaire de donner à l’aspect
ethnique de l’identité rom une telle importance, quitte à mettre les problèmes sociaux
qui affligent depuis toujours les populations rom au second rang? Les doutes demeurent
entiers quant à la question de savoir si l’ethnogenèse est vraiment la bonne formule pour
permettre aux populations rom et particulièrement à celles de l’Europe orientale et de
la Roumanie de s’approprier leur propre destin collectif, tout en améliorant ainsi leur
situation socio-économique plus que précaire, ou de se libérer de leur longue histoire
d’exclusion et de discrimination fondées sur les préjugés et les stéréotypes de type
culturels et raciaux, ceux-ci étant en outre ici à nouveau mis en évidence.
ETHNOGENÈSE OU ETHNICISATION?
UNE DISTINCTION IMPERCEPTIBLE SEULEMENT EN APPARENCE
Au cours des vingt dernières années le terme d’ethnicisation s’est peu à peu imposé
(Giordano & Boscoboinik, 2003; Giordano & Boscoboinik, 2005; Boscoboinik, 2006 :
295 ss., Boscoboinik, 2006b : 95 ss.), tandis que celui d’ethnogenèse a pratiquement
disparu de l’usage. A première vue, les deux termes pourraient paraître identiques ou du
moins très similaires. Toutefois ils sont de nature différente, ce qui explique pourquoi
les managers des identités préfèrent le second au premier.
Le concept d’ethnicisation trouve sans doute ses racines épistémologiques dans
l’approche constructiviste de l’ethnicitéé et des appartenances ethniques. C’est pourquoi
le processus d’ethnicisation est avant tout le résultat d’une activité bien précise que
l’on peut attribuer aux élites politiques et/ou culturelles. Il s’agit donc d’une action
voulue, fondée sur l’intentionnalité et par conséquent de nature stratégique. En outre,
l’ethnicisation possède ainsi de manière évidente une connotation instrumentale, puisque
celui qui recourt à une telle stratégie poursuit un but bien précis, à savoir d’unifier les
individus et de construire ainsi une identité ethnique de groupe. Cependant à côté de ces
caractéristiques pour ainsi dire neutres, l’ethnicisation cache un revers à première vue
peu perceptible, mais qui bien souvent revêt un aspect plutôt désagréable pour ceux qui
s’engagent dans le management identitaire. En fait, la démarche peut être facilement
prise pour un acte d’instrumentalisation et donc de manipulation. Cette dimension,
négative et quasi répugnante de l’ethnicisation a été souvent remarquée dans le cadre
du paradigme théorique néo-marxiste qui y voit une astucieuse stratégie des groupes
dominants ou hégémoniques visant à créer une fausse conscience de classes subalternes.
Pour certains auteurs de tendance néo-marxiste tout ce qui est ethnique revient à une
disengagement strategy, mise en oeuvre par les élites pour distraire les couches sociales
défavorisées de leurs véritables intérêts (Aronson, 1976 : 9 ss.).
• 163
Christian GIORDANO
Dans ce genre d’analyses, l’ethnicité et/ou l’ethnicisation, ainsi que, du reste la
tradition, pour reprendre ici comme exemple la célèbre thèse de Hobsbawn et Ranger,
sont présentés comme le produit d’une invention et donc d’une mystification, c’està-dire comme le résultat d’une pure et simple escroquerie (Hobsbawn et Ranger,
1983). Il est évident que cette façon de concevoir l’ethnicisation ne se limite plus à
la décrire comme un processus top down, mais se propose également, en vertu d’une
vision normative déclarée, de lui donner une valeur négative et par conséquent de la
discréditer moralement. Enfin, l’idée d’ethnicisation en tant que construction sociale
pose aux managers identitaires le problème de l’authenticité. Les identités ethniques,
étant un produit de la société, donnent l’impression d’un artifice auquel fait défaut une
qualité fondamentale, celle de la spontanéité.
On voit bien de ce qui précède que ceux qui se consacrent à la besogne identitaire
ethnique ont de nombreuses raisons pour éviter l’emploi du concept d’ethnicisation,
empreint d’une sévère critique de leur activité. Peut-être avons nous là les raisons qui
font préférer à ceux qui se sont engagés dans la promotion d’une identité ethnique au
sein de la communauté rom, la notion d’ethnogenèse. En fait ce terme possède une
connotation implicitement positive du fait qu’il suggère l’existence d’une identité
ethnique préexistante dont il suffit d’ôter le voile qui la cache pour la modeler ensuite
au gré des besoins et intérêts réels de la communauté. Ainsi les élites occupées au
management identitaire assument-elles un rôle positif, puisque par leur louable activité,
elles parviennent à capturer et donc à revitaliser quelque chose d’authentique risquant
d’être irrémédiablement perdu. A travers l’idée de l’ethnogenèse le management
identitaire est réévalué et ennobli. Il paraît être également une aide désintéressée pour
la renaissance bottom up de l’appartenance ethnique. On tente ainsi d’oblitérer tous
les soupçons et reproches de manipulation et de mystification qui, à tort ou à raison,
semblent inhérents au concept d’ethnicisation et pourraient discréditer le management
identitaire. Le choix délibéré des rares élites intellectuelles rom en faveur de la notion
d’ethnogenèse prend une connotation vraiment positive et paraît être, en dernière
analyse, une stratégie pour mieux légitimer leur action.
164 •
La chimère de l'ethnogenèse ou le mirage d'une solution ethnique
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166 •
NOTES SUR LES AUTEURS
Velislav Altanov is a PhD student at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria.
Milena Benovska-Sabkova is professor of ethnology at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia,
and senior research fellow at the Ethnographic Institute of Bulgarian Academy of
Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria.
Andrea Boscoboinik est assistante-docteure à la Chaire d’Anthropologie sociale de l’Université
de Fribourg, Suisse.
Mihai Curelaru est maître de conférences, Laboratoire de psychologie sociale, Université
de Iasi, Roumanie.
László Fosztó is researcher of the Institute for Studying National Minorities’ Issues, Cluj-Napoca,
Romania. [email protected]
Christian Giordano est professeur titulaire de la Chaire d’Anthropologie sociale de l’Université
de Fribourg, Suisse et président d’Ethnobarometer (Consiglio Italiano per le Scienze
Sociali).
Sorin Gog is assistant-lecturer at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Babes-Bolyai
University, Cluj-Napoca , Romania.
Božidar Jakšić is sociologist. He is senior research fellow and member of the research
team of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade,
Serbia.
Adrian Neculau est professeur de psychologie sociale, Université « Al.I.Cuza » Iasi,
Roumanie.
Ion Negura, PhD in Psychology is professor and head of Psychology Department,
Pedagogical University of Chisinau, Republic of Moldova.
Veronica Peev is lecturer at Psychology Department, Pedagogical University of Chisinau,
Republic of Moldova.
François Ruegg est professeur associé à la Chaire d’Anthropologie sociale de l’Université de
Fribourg, Suisse.
Daniela Tarnovschi is a PhD student at the Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
and program coordinator at Soros Foundation Romania.
Daniela Zaharia is PhD student and assistant-lecturer at the Laboratory of Social Psychology,
at “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Iasi, Romania.