The AKP imprint on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East

N. Raptopoulos
Les Cahiers du RMES
n°1 Juillet 2004
Rediscovering its Arab neighbours?
The AKP imprint on Turkish Foreign Policy in the
Middle East ∗
Nikolaos Raptopoulos ∗∗
The international community has recently witnessed a new energy in
Turkish foreign policy. This change is particularly evident in her policy
towards her Middle-Eastern neighbours. The catalysts for this change
come from the combination of various internal and external factors: the
desire to assert the AKP presence in the internal politics, the political
uncertainty in Iraq, the possibility of a Kurdish state, U.S. pressures on
Syria and the stalemate in the Middle-East peace process. The unexpected
rapprochement with Syria in early 2004 through the visit of President alAsad to Ankara is an example of the new and genuine warmth in Turkish
foreign policy towards its Arab neighbours. The reason for the AKP’s
policy can be explained by the convergence of the Turkish national
interests with the party interests in the Middle East. This political and
economic rapprochement with Arab neighbours will most probably have a
serious impact on the Turkish-Israeli strategic relationship which would
now run contrary to a more pro-Arab policy.
Introduction
Since December 2003, Turkish diplomacy has displayed a period of intense
activity. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has demonstrated a
willingness to actively participate in regional and international affairs. During this
period the Turkish government faced a great number of issues related directly to
the national interest of the nation. The relations with the West, that is EU and
USA, and the East, the Muslim and Arab World, in particular the situation in Iraq,
score high among Turkeys’ national priorities.
Underlying Turkey’s day-to-day policy is its great effort to meet the requirements
of the EU Copenhagen political and economic criteria (1993). Efforts to
harmonise the Turkish socio-political, legislative and economic spheres with those
of the EU shell contribute to securing a date for accession negotiations1. Related
to the EU adhesion is the Cypriote question, which remains unresolved after the
∗
The author would like to express his gratitude to Mr M. Hussain, Mr D. Özgüden and Prof. Cl.
Roosens, for their precious remarks on earlier versions of this text.
∗∗
Ph. D. Candidate in Political Sciences in the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL), Belgium.
1
The EU Commission is expected to take a decision on this issue in its Regular Report on Turkey
in the forthcoming Autumn (October 2004).
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failure of the UN sponsored referendum (April 2004) for the reunification of the
Island. As far as the Turkish-American relations are concerned, Ankara has
managed to improve greatly2 her relations with Washington.
Alongside these key issues, Ankara remains attentive and sensitive to the uneasy
situation in the Middle East. In particular, the stabilisation of Iraq and the
revitalisation of the Middle East peace process figure high on the Turkish agenda.
The reason of such attention in essence can be explained by the fact that Turkey is
a neighbouring country to Iraq with a significant Kurdish minority. More
specifically, Ankara is seriously concerned that any break-up of Iraqi territory and
change in the status of the Iraqi Kurds could have negative repercussions on the
Turkish Kurds. An unstable Iraq is not only a border problem for Turkey, but
could pose a problem for Turkey’s security. Of relative importance is the
Palestinian question, too, which binds the AKP government morally and makes it
vulnerable to its political constituency.
The aim of this article is to explore, in the first place, the deeper reasons of the
current highly active AKP foreign policy in Middle East. Secondly, we will argue
the influence of the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement on the relations, especially of
economic character, of Ankara with the rest of its Arab neighbours. Relations with
Lebanon and Egypt merit particular attention. Finally, we aim to explore the state
of relations of Ankara with Tel-Aviv and Washington. The eventual consequences
of the Turkish-Arab rapprochement may have knock-on importance for the
Turkish-Israeli axis.
The AKP into Power : a distinct foreign policy vision ?
Nowadays, one may observe that the AKP seeks to play an active role in
international politics. This highly energised stance on the international stage has
allowed new, revised and more enhanced communication channels to be
developed. This development has become apparent throughout the numerous
official visits has been taken place . The foreign governments and institutions and
the Turkish communities abroad have received primary attention. The visits have
covered a geographic area from Washington to Tokyo and from Berlin to Jeddah
and have been undertaken by prominent AKP officials, such as members of the
government or the National Assembly.
The deeper motivation for this stance has yet to be explained. What are the
reasons that urge such a mobility? Is it the increase in the number of issues on the
2
The Turkish-American relations experienced an important crisis the period March-June 2003
because of the Turkish refusal to let the American troops through her territories. Such a permission
would allowed to Americans a Northern front, shorter and probably more secure, in the war
against the Saddam regime.
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agenda? The level of importance of these issues or their nature? In the following
we will try to draw the current political context and explore the deep-rooted
political aspects of the AKP attention to international affairs.
The AKP consist of the “modernist” fraction of the ephemeral Virtue Party
(Fazilet Partisi - FP), an Islamic party that succeeded the Welfare Party (Refah
Partisi - RP) of Necmettin Erbakan in the long list of the banned pro-islamic
parties. It came to power in the aftermath of the November 2002 elections under
exceptionally odd circumstances. The president of the AKP, Recep Tayyip
Erdo an, who faced a fierce opposition from the Kemalist circles, was banned
from participating in the first elections that his party was running. However, he
benefited from the circumstances of the war in Iraq and the demanding
requirements for harmonisation with the EU in order to revise the Turkish
legislation. These circumstances allowed him to participate in the following
elections3.
The arrival of the AKP to the power, by gaining 34,4% of the vote and 365 seats,
left the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP) in an uneasy
situation. Presided by Deniz Baykal, the CHP, was alone in the opposition with
177 seats (19,4%). This signalled the beginning of a new era in the Turkish
politics. For the first time in the contemporary Turkish politics a (pro-)Islamic
party would govern alone with an old-fashioned kemalist party in opposition4.
The new political scenery in Turkey raised some suspicion within some Kemalist
and foreign circles alike. The military, one of the most important Kemalist
bastions in Turkey, is traditionally against political power in (pro-)Islamic hands
for fear of radical changes that may compromise the secular character of the State.
As far as foreign circles are concerned, it is the European powers that have been
most troubled by seeing Turkey, a candidate State to the EU, governed by a (pro)Islamic party.
In that sense the motivation of AKP members to adopt an active stance in the
international politics can be more easily made out. Firstly, given the difficult
situation in the domestic scene, AKP is making an effort to assure the foreign
authorities and international actors abroad of the political will for stability and
continuity of the principal (pro-Western) orientation of Turkey. The possibility to
“communicate” with foreign actors offers to AKP a unique chance. On the one
hand AKP has the opportunity to convince the world of its intentions and projects
3
R. T. Erdo an run in the by-elections of the province of iirt (SE Anatolia) on March 2003,
which send him to the Parliament and subsequently pawed the way to the head of the government.
4
The popularity of the AKP ratified later on in the local elections of 28 March 2004, where the
(pro-)Islamic vote altogether (four parties) reached to 46,28% (AKP alone got 41,8%). Info-Turk
Bulletin, ‘The definitive results of the local elections in Turkey’, No 307, March 2004, (
www.info-turk.be ).
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and on the other hand to “replace” the previous Kemalist image of the Turkish
authorities with one more representative of the Turkish reality. The image of
Turkey that had been cultivated abroad by the Kemalist governments was
naturally the one that bears the imprints of an occidental, secular, republican state.
The AKP in that sense has the opportunity to alter it slightly by promoting the so
far neglected aspect, the Oriental (Anatolian) face together with the Occidental
one.
Secondly, another interesting aspect directly linked to internal politics, is the
necessity for the AKP to build-up alliances with foreign actors. In that sense,
creating a positive stance among the international public opinion would further
secure the position of the AKP government against any internal pressures or
interventions. The RP experience, that is the pressure put by the kemalist circles
in 1996-1997 on Necmettin Erbakan to implement a series of anti-Islamic
policies, which ended by forcing the Erbakan government out of office, is still
fresh in the memories of the AKP leaders. Consequently, the very essence of the
pro-EU policies of AKP, that is the effort to upgrade the judicial and political
system of Turkey in line with the EU requirements, may be linked to avoiding the
possibility of future internal strife. Favouring the “democratisation” of the
legislation would mean further rapprochement with Europe and international
backing that would diminish the possibilities of further kemalist intervention.
Thirdly, the Islamic movement in Turkey, the very essence of the cultural
“struggle” of the periphery against the powerful centre, also has an economic
aspect worth mentioning. The Islamic movement has been associated to some
degree with entrepreneurs and lower middle classes of Anatolia since the 1960’s.
The entrepreneurs of Anatolia in order to defend their interests had full heartedly
supported the Islamic parties of Erbakan that challenged the kemalist ideals from
1970’s onwards.
The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP) governments of T. Özal in
1980s was the turning point for the Islamist capital. The policies followed on this
matter had two aspects: one internal and one external. Internally we observe
passing laws that changed the status of the charitable organisations (Vakif). These
organisations were in fact permitted to maintain economic activities and purchase
land while remaining immune from taxation. This had been envisaged in the
context of a new economic policy aiming to liberalise and boost the Turkish
economy5. This legal adjustment, a possible concession to religious sectors of the
Turkish society, strengthened furthermore the religious circles. On what concerns
the external aspects, the same economic worries and political preoccupations of
ideological nature, which subscribe in the bipolar international context, led the
5
At that time the Turkish economy had been orientated towards industrial development through
exports.
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activity of economic actors. An important factor that determined the Turkish
political system is the military cup of September 1980. While any contact with the
soviet bloc may have been judged suspicious, the contacts with the Arab world,
especially with the Islamic republics of the Gulf, have been perceived with a
positive stance. Given the perspectives of important foreign investments, kemalist
circles in fact favoured further rapprochement with these oil-reach states in the
economic field. It is during this period that a prominent member of the current
Erdogan cabinet, the Foreign minister in office, Abdullah Gül, spent some eight
years in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, working as economist in the Islamic Development
Bank. Gül became member of the Turkish parliament with the Welfare Party (RP)
in 1991 and State Minister in the Erbakan government in 1996. Reportedly he was
the chief responsible for foreign affairs of the RP, the FP and AKP.
Hence, the heavy agendas often of commercial character of the AKP officials may
be explained in part by this linkage between national politics and international
economic relations. Consequently, the desire to build up a network of regional
political relations via trade that could ensure more cordial bilateral relations is
present in the conduct of foreign affairs. By seeking to increase the overall
economic relations there is a knock-on aim to increase the political dependency
or, depending on the foreign policy goals, to claim a prominent place in the
Middle Eastern region. This in turn may further strengthen the position of the
government domestically.
The AKP Foreign Policy Towards Arab Neighbours: Syria, Egypt and
Lebanon
The Middle East, precisely the Muslim and Arab world, seems to offer a very
good opportunity to AKP to forge international relations which could strengthen
her internal position. Besides, the Middle East offers to the AKP government the
opportunity to be revaluated in the eyes of Western friends and foes by
demonstrating her geo-strategic “intermediate” character between East and West.
In the 1990’s, Ankara, displayed a more active regional policy based on her
national interests and established a strategic alliance with Israel, the principal
pivot of US in the area, to this end6. Turkey, because of this rapprochement had
6
Olson R., Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, 1991-2000. The Kurdish and
Islamist Questions, Mazda Publishers, Inc., 2001, pp. 125-165; Gresh A., ‘Turkish-Israeli-Syrian
Relations and their Impact on the Middle East’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No 2, 1998, pp.
188-203.
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been much criticized by the prominent Arab and Muslim States7. Nevertheless,
Ankara saw her policies being implemented successfully8.
At present, the substantial developments that have occurred in the internal and
international scenes have created a new “order”. First of all, we observe an
important change in the top of the Turkish leadership, the arrival of (pro)Islamists to power. Secondly, to what concerns the international scene we
observe an alarming commitment of the USA in the Middle East, precisely in
Iraq. These developments have affected the Turkish stance towards Middle East in
general and her Arab neighbours in particular.
The Middle East is of some importance to Turkey because of their common past
and cultural ties. Important sections of the Arab world, due to their common
Muslim faith, represent a logical outlet of solidarity to Turkey. This group of
states qualify as a natural ally to the AKP, a political party strongly identified as
(pro-)Islamic9.
The Arab, in majority Muslim populated, neighbours hold a prominent place in
the international arena (United Nations, Organisation of Islamic Conference, Arab
League, Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) that the AKP could,
if necessary, fall back on in order to implement its policies. The RP experience as
instructor of the political behaviour and strategy planning applies in this case as
well. The “Islamic” foreign policy that RP followed back in 1996-1997
supposedly plays the role of “red lines” for the AKP. The notorious RP opening to
Arab and Muslim World was, at least in theory10, against the very essence of the
traditional Kemalist foreign policy: the Western orientation of Turkey. Moreover,
Erbakan sought to initialise contacts with the Muslim civil-society abroad, an
action that deeply disturbed even fellow Muslim leaders11. Erbakan did put in
action, however, the project of the “Developing-8” (D-8), an arrangement of
economic character between eight developing Muslim countries. The RP
government didn’t last much and judging from the results it can be said that the
RP foreign policies, since they proved to be of certain degree supportive of the
7
It is interesting to recall for example the harsh reaction of the Arab and Muslim States that
caused the hurried departure of the Turkish President S. Demirel from the OIC summit of Teheran
in December 1997.
8
In 1998 Ankara having threatened Damascus with war managed to give an end to Syrian support
to PKK. Later on the Kurdish leader A. Öcalan was captured in Kenya (1999). Aykan M. B., ‘The
Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View’, Middle East Policy, Vol. VI, No 4, June
1999, pp. 174- 191.
9
AKP officials never admitted this vocation.
10
The RP before holding office had opposed to the EU adhesion of Turkey and the cooperation
with Israel.
11
One of the first contacts of Erbakan was a prominent leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers.
The Egyptian President Mubarak was extremely disturbed with the support that Erbakan extended
to them.
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thesis that Turkey has an intermediate role to play between “East” and “West”,
gave value to Turkey’s traditional (western) policies. In that way the systemic
(Kemalist) political parties that followed the RP in the government inherited all of
any benefits of the rapprochement with the Muslim and Arab worlds.
Furthermore, the incoherence of RP between its rhetoric and practice in foreign
affairs had discredited enormously the Islamists’ image before the public opinion.
Precisely, Erbakan was not courageous enough to abolish Turkey’s EU accession
plans and the cooperation with Israel as he had promised. Such a political attitude
had deeply damaged the standing of Islamist foreign policy. Thus, the effort of
AKP officials to display a more cautious and coherent foreign policy in agreement
with their domestic politics.
Nowadays, we assist to a new rapprochement between Turkey and some
prominent members of the Arab and Muslim world. Since January 2004, Turkey,
welcomed the initiative of Syria, an eminent member of the Arab world and a
traditional rival, of further rapprochement. The visit of Bashar al-Asad, the Syrian
President, to Turkey early in January 2004 was the first official visit paid in
Presidential level12. Thus it was immediately conceived as the political will to
take more concrete steps towards the improvement of the bilateral relations13.
Damascus, since the American attack on Iraq, has tried to accelerate the
rapprochement with Ankara, a capital then equally against the armed intervention
and thus also under some American pressure. The AKP government responded
favourably, in accordance with her interests, supporting the Syrian position on the
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Important official visits took place
between the two states14. The cautious but positive diplomatic steps contributed to
a well calculated rapprochement between the two countries, which paved the way
to a successful official visit of the Syrian President to Turkey.
The Syrian goals of reproaching Turkey were twofold: a) a strategic opening, and
b) an economic collaboration that would forge furthermore the bilateral
cooperation.
12
Previously the Turkish President Turgut Özal paid an official visit to Hafez al-Asad, then Syrian
President. Syria had not respond to this official visit at that time.
13
Previously, Damascus, having yield to the Turkish threats for military action (1998), based on
information on sheltering and supporting the PKK leader and militants, revised her policies
towards Ankara for fear of further deterioration of her situation vis-à-vis Israel, a strategic partner
of Turkey. This step back in fact weakened the assets of Syria, once a prominent Arab power, in
terms of strategy and diplomacy.
14
Such as the visit of the Syrian Prime Minister Muhammed Mustafa Miro in Turkey in July 2003
and the visit of Abdullah Gül in Syria in November 2003. Furthermore, in mid-December 2003
Syrian authorities cooperated with those of Turkey in the fight against fundamentalists by means
of signing the Memorandum of Understanding to help each other in the combat against terrorism.
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In strategic terms Damascus aimed to provide herself with regional connections
that would strengthen her position in the regional sub-system and free her from
the American pressure15. The visit of the President al-Asad came in a moment
when Syria, following the fall of the Sadam regime, faced important pressure
from the USA. Washington had passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanon
Sovereignty Act (SAA)16 by means of which was threatening Damascus with
economic and diplomatic sanctions. Moreover, Syria, encircled by hostile
countries, felt threatened with isolation in the area.
The two states, although having serious disputes on territorial and water related
matters, have a serious concern in common. This is the eventual establishment of
an independent Kurdish state in the region. This is an eventuality, that there is no
doubt, given the important Kurdish minorities within their own countries, would
jeopardise the unity of their states17.
The immediate result of the Syrian visit to Turkey was a joint statement on the
need to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq and the restoration of the stability in
the country. Precisely, the Syrian President stated that they were “not only against
a Kurdish state in the region, but [also] any State that could break the integrity of
Iraq”18.
The fact that a (pro-)Islamic party, with a sensibility to cultural matters, was in
power in Turkey was perceived by Syria, a fellow Muslim country, as a factor that
might facilitate the bilateral relations. The Syrian and Turkish statesmen
occasionally acknowledged the common faith, as a powerful tie between two
people among other factors19.
15
The Daily Star, ‘Syria-Turkey should spur wider rapprochements’, 8 January 2004.
According to this Act the Syrian government is accused of possession of WMDs, of extending
support of terrorist organisations, etc. Fahim A., ‘Syria’s Vulnerability, and Options’, Middle East
International, 17 December 2003, http://meionline.com/features/174.shtml
17
Turkish officials met in several occasions with the representatives of Syria and Iran another state
of the region with an important Kurdish minority, for this purpose. They met either during ad hoc
multilateral meetings between the neighbouring States of Iraq or in bilateral meetings. For
example, according to reports, the “real agenda” of the official visit of the Turkish Foreign
Minister A. Gül to Iran in January 2004 was to seek cooperation against the Kurdish nationalist’s
aspirations in Northern Iraq. Jenkins G., “Smiles all round”, Al-Ahram Weekly, No 673, 15-21
January 2004.
18
The Daily Star, 7 January 2004.
19
For instance, the Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Utri stressed the “common values”
between the two countries in March 2004. Anadolu Ajansı, 3 March 2004; The Syrian Assembly
Speaker Mahmoud al-Abrash with the occasion of the first visit of the Turkish Parliament Speaker,
Bülent Arınç, to Syria referred to this aspect in mid April 2004. Anadolu Ajansı, 11 April 2004.
The same goes for the Turkish Foreign Trade Undersecretary Tuncer Kayalar, during the first
round of official talks on signing of a free trade agreement between Turkey and Syria. Anadolu
Ajansı, 26 April 2004.
16
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In economic terms Syria, aimed to give some grounds and motivation to the
Turkish side, which seeks to increase the economic activity in the Southeastern
Turkey. In fact, the prospect of a close economic cooperation with Syria brings to
mind recollections of the era before the 2nd Gulf War (1991). During that period,
although some serious regional instability, the trade volume with Middle Eastern
States was at its height.
Moreover, the two states on that occasion signed accords mainly of economic
character20. Consequently, the two sides acknowledged the importance of signing
a Free Trade Zone that could boost the bilateral trade21. Four months later, in late
April the first round of the official talks was already a reality22. Furthermore, the
two States considered opening trade centres close to the borders. The businessmen
of both sides had several meetings since March 2004 exploring ways for further
economic cooperation and stressed the atmosphere of mutual confidence23. At the
meantime, Damascus, as a proof of full commitment to the development of
economic ties accelerated the efforts for the opening of a Consulate in the
Southern province (Gaziantep) of Turkey in the beginning of May24.
The Turkish-Syrian rapprochement had an immediate impact in the relations of
Turkey with the rest of the Arab states in the region. The Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak, accompanied by an important delegation made up of three
Ministers and the chief of the Egyptian intelligence, paid an official visit to
Ankara on February 2004. The two leaders stated, in a way similar to the one
preceded with the Syrian President, that they stand together against any effort that
aimed to harm the integrity of Iraq. The Egyptian President also made crystal
clear that Cairo and Ankara were both in favour of an immediate resumption of
the peace talks negotiations on the basis of the roadmap and that they were ready
to play an active role25. Mubarak during this visit proposed, as a follow-up of the
memorandum of understanding of 2000 on the cooperation on energy, the
extension of the natural gas pipeline that currently ends in Jordan - to Turkey and
Europe26 through Syria and Lebanon27.
20
These agreements were aiming to prevent double taxation in bilateral trade, encouraging mutual
investments, cooperation in the sector of tourism and clearing of mine fields. The Daily Star, 7
January 2004; Jenkins G., “Smiles all round”, op. cit.
21
Turkish Daily News, 9 January 2004.
22
Anadolu Ajansı, 26 April 2004.
23
For example the official visit of the Turkish State Minister Kür ad Tüzmen to Damascus on
March and the official visit of Syrian Minister of Transportation Makram Ubayd to Istanbul on
May.
24
Anadolu Ajansı, 10 May 2004.
25
Turkish Daily News, 12 February 2004.
26
It concerns mostly Greece that signed last year an agreement with Turkey to link the pipeline
networks of the two countries. Turkey is looking at it favourably since the natural gas is abundant
in the Turkish market due to gas from Iran and Russia.
27
Hürriyet, 13 February 2004.
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The impact of the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement is more apparent in the relations
with Lebanon. The Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Jean Obeid and the Prime
Minister Rafik al-Hariri paid an official visit each to Turkey in the beginning of
April and May 2004, respectively. The Middle-East peace process and the
developments in Iraq dominated the agenda in both case. While the Lebanese
statesmen seem to seek the Turkish support against Israel, Turkey from her part
asked backing for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus28. The two neighbours signed a series of bilateral agreements
upon the Lebanese Prime Minister’s visit29. Ironically, Rafik al-Hariri spoke of
the “common points” between the two countries too, and reiterated his proposal of
setting up an “Islamic Market”30. He also insisted on the natural gas project that
aims to carry Egyptian gas to Europe31.
Given the regional circumstances, the strategic opening of Syria to Turkey offered
AKP the opportunity for a distinct foreign policy towards Middle East,
particularly towards Egypt and Lebanon. This policy consists of an intensification
of political and economic relations alike that could jeopardise the existing good
relations of Turkey with Israel.
The AKP Foreign Policy towards Tel-Aviv and Washington:
friends or foes?
The Syrian President’s visit to Turkey had inevitably an impact on Turkey’s most
important ally in the region since the mid-1990s, Israel, too. Reportedly Ankara
had been asked to play the role of the intermediary between Tel-Aviv and
Damascus on a number of issues32. While Israel requested the immediate halt on
the Syrian WMD programme, Syria from her part requested the immediate return
to the table of the Sharon government with peace negotiations33. Turkish officials
assumed this role also with the occasion of the Turkish Prime Minister’s visit to
Washington in late February 2004 but without any concrete results.
28
Anadolu Ajansi, 13 May 2004.
More precisely, they signed a protocol on technical, scientific and economic cooperation in
agriculture field, an agreement on mutual encouragement and protection of investments, an
agreement on prevention of double taxation and tax evasion, a protocol on economic and technical
cooperation in public works and fight against natural disasters and a protocol on cooperation
between archives. Anadolu Ajansi, 13 May 2004.
30
Anadolu Ajansi, 13 May 2004.
31
R. T. Erdo an reportedly showed an interest to Hariri’s suggestions. Reuters, 12 May 2004.
32
Turkish Daily News, 10 January 2004.
33
The operation of several armed groups in the South Lebanon officially is the reason for the
bottleneck in the negotiations between Tel-Aviv and Syria.
29
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In spite of this significant political cooperation, Ankara seems to have changed
her stance towards Tel-Aviv considerably since April 2004. All of the signs show
that this was a result of the harsh Israeli policies against Palestinians. Turkish
high-level statesmen in several occasions made known their disapproval for the
policies followed by the Sharon government. The Turkish Prime Minister did not
refrain himself from accusing Israel of genocide against Palestinian civilians.
Although he confirmed that the economic relations between the two states would
not be affected, the Turkish Foreign Minister Gül urged that Turkey might be in
the unpleasant situation to diminish its diplomatic representation in Israel34.
However, the above argument sounds less convincing by its own if we don’t take
into account the recent Turkish-Arab rapprochement.
The Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East cannot be studied without taking
into account the policies of the major international actor, the USA. The TurkishAmerican relations were significantly restored following the crisis that the two
allies experienced throughout the spring 2003. The efforts of the Erdo an
government as well as the terrorist attacks in Turkey in November 2003
contributed to this end.
Turkey, following the crisis took steps forward to restore her alliance by assuming
the role of model state, the concept of the Turkish model of the democracy, in the
Arab and Muslim world. The Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül since May
2003 suggested the Arab and Muslim states reform their socio-political system35.
This, Gül claimed, was essential in order to attain modernity, ensure a good level
of democracy and human rights as it is understood within Western hemisphere
and ultimately reinforce the combat against terrorism.
Moreover, Turkey, suffered two terrorist attacks in November 2003, joined the
group of states that have been allied against Al-Qaida. The American authorities
took some time to consider the Turkish calls for reconciliation. Nevertheless,
given the geo-strategic location of the country it seems that Ankara keeps her
importance in the larger strategic plans of Washington. In any case the American
“Greater Middle East Project”, even if it lacks coherence and is under constant
revision, concerns directly Turkey, a NATO ally of USA and key actor in the
crossroads between Europe and Asia.
The AKP Foreign Policy manifests signs of unrest with the American policies in
the region on several points: a) it continues to be suspicious about the American
intentions concerning Kurds, b) it seems to disagree with Washington on the
treatment that it gives Damascus36, c) it denied recently to contribute in the
34
Anadolu Ajansı, 26 May 2004.
With the event of the official visit to Pakistan (May 2003) and later on in the OCI summit in
Teheran (June 2003).
36
For instance Turkey backed Syria against the announced USA sanctions in May 2004.
35
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American Great Middle East Project while considered as a “model state” 37, and
d) it seems to disapprove of Washington’s unconditional support to Tel-Aviv, a
strategic ally of USA, vis-à-vis the Palestinian question.
In this extremely unstable regional context the AKP government manifests her
eagerness in playing an active role in bringing closer the USA and EU
governments in a more coherent action in the Middle East. The Turkish
candidature (Ekmelledin Ihsanoglu) to the head of the General Secretariat of OIC
(Organisation of the Islamic Conference) appears to be revealing. Undoubtedly
Turkey by envisaging such a prestigious post would be able, while committing
herself to peace, stability and cooperation in the region on behalf of the Muslim
world, to mediate inter-cultural dialogue and further advance her national
interests, the image of “bridge” to both “West” and “East”.
Turkish-Arab rapprochement : Any foreseeable impacts ?
Ankara has undertaken one of the most important openings towards the Middle
East since perhaps the very establishment of the Turkish Republic. Turkey,
attempted in the past to enhance her relations with the Arab states of the Middle
East. The circumstances and motives of all these attempts differs largely. In 1950s
it was Turkeys’ worry to serve, as a newly admitted member of the western
alliance. From the 1960s onwards, Turkey, having felt isolated made a “strategic”
opening to Middle East in order to gain support for her national causes. In 1980s
the demands of the bipolar international system, coupled with those of the military
coup of September 1980 and the economic transformation that followed, entailed
an “economic” opening of Turkey to the Middle East. It is only in the second half
of the 1990s that Turkey with an Islamist party in government tried – albeit in an
inconsistent manner - to implement better relations with the Muslim World.
The AKP currently follows a distinct foreign policy faithful to the national
interests. It demonstrates a good adaptation of the party interests to the national
interests in the Middle East. The Turkish-Syrian political rapprochement of
January 2004 led to the Turkish-Arab rapprochement at the regional level. The
successful high-level discussions held with the occasion of the official visit of
Syrian President to Turkey followed up by several meetings treating “low-level”
politics. These discussions had a positive impact on the Turkish-Lebanese and the
traditionally warm Turkish-Egyptian relations. The perspectives on this overall
political rapprochement have been broadened since it was accompanied by an
important cooperation at economic level to the satisfaction of the AKP foreign
affairs strategists. The leadership of the neighbouring Arab states have pointed out
in several occasions to their Turkish counterparts that they are able to ensure
37
Hürriyet, 1 June 2004.
12
N. Raptopoulos
Les Cahiers du RMES
n°1 Juillet 2004
Ankara a safe and profitable access to the Arab, African and Asian markets.
Reportedly, some steps have been taken to this effect.
The Turkish government clearly committed itself to close political and economic
relations with the neighbouring Arab States. This is of course only a narrow
picture of the reality. To complete the puzzle the growing bilateral relations with
prominent Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, have to be
taken in to account too.
The often dubious and counter-productive American policy in the region,
precisely in Iraq, coupled with the cultural sensitivities of Turks contributes to this
end. The Kurdish question in Iraq, an issue of national importance for Turkey,
was another key factor in the rapprochement between Turkey and her Arab
neighbours.
The Erdogan government seems to be inclined to treat preferentially her Arab
neighbours displaying in such a way a more or less coherent stance, which is of
importance to its constituency. This highly energetic policy which brings Turkey
politically and economically closer to Syria seems by its nature against Turkey’s
security interests. The possibility of even closer Turkish-Arab relations may put at
stake the very existence of the military sponsored multi-level cooperation with
Israel. For instance, the need for coherence between domestic and foreign politics
has pushed the Turkish Prime Minister, whether by conviction or not, to criticise
Israeli operations against Palestinians.
In this point we can’t help pondering whether the Turkish leadership, under the
heavy “friendship” attack from the neighbouring Arab States, wouldn’t tend to use
her well-established contacts with Tel-Aviv as a leverage in favour of the cause of
the fellow Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese people. In any case a foreign policy
that is led, up to a point, by economic motivations in such a complex regional
environment like the Middle East sounds risky and may have serious
repercussions in the internal and external politics of the country.
Ironically, the kemalist circles in turkey, who would otherwise express bitterness
about the internal policies of the government38, are keeping silent concerning the
handling and operations of AKP in the Turkish Middle East Foreign Policy,
something that could be interpreted as a consent. We have but to wait and see how
long this apparent win-win situation in Turkish foreign affairs may last.
*****
38
The reaction of the Kemalist circles to the Law on the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) is a
good example.
13