50 Years of Operations in Africa - CDEF
Transcription
50 Years of Operations in Africa - CDEF
Cahiers du RETEX contribute to analysis of the major issues of interest to the French Army today and feed doctrine works. They are cascaded in four complementary series: « Operations » collection It gathers thematic summaries related to a theater of operations or a warfighting function, as well as collections of tactical lessons in pocket format. collection « exercices » « Research » collection It publishes historical and exploratory work aimed at illuminating a particular area of force employment. These documents most often follow an academic research methodology. Entrusted to reserve officers or students, they are not official documents. « Reports » collection It publishes studies including those conducted from accounts of commanders in operations using the technique of authorities’ interviews. Illustrations de couverture : Photo de gauche : Tchad, octobre 1983 - Deux militaires du 2e RIMa (Régiment d'Infanterie de Marine) prennent contact avec la population sur le marché d'Ati lors de l'opération MANTA (Crédits : Benoît DUFEUTRELLE) © ECPAD/EMA Photo de droite : Mali, mars 2013 - Les Actions civilo-militaires déployées dans le cadre de l'opération SERVAL (Crédits : J. LEMPLIN) © ECPAD/EMA 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964 - 2014) Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 3 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964/2014) GENERAL OVERVIEW OF ARMY LESSONS LEARNED Under the direction of the French Army Staff, the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF) is in charge of coordinating Army lessons learned (LL, RETEX). The Lessons Learned developed in this casebook were drawn straight from the LL analysis performed by the CDEF based on the after-action reports and debriefs (CRFM). The purpose of this casebook is to make LL elements available to leaders that may be of direct use to the forces, together with the doctrine for unit tactical employment currently in force. It is crucial to forward all after-action reports to the CDEF, for analysis and for the practical measures that follow, their broad dissemination in particular. This casebook is available online on the CDEF website under the DREX tab – “cahier du RETEX collection operations” This research paper was drafted by Valentin Germain, a student at Paris I – Sorbonne University and an intern at the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF) 2013-2014 in conjunction with Captain Nicolas Rey (Lessons Learned division), under the supervision of Ms Julie d’ANDURAIN, Head of Research division, and Colonel Ghislain HUYGUESDESPOINTES, Head of Lessons Learned division. CDEF/DREX/B. RECH – 1 place Joffre – 75 007 PARIS Pnia : 821 753 81 53 – Tél. : 01 44 42 81 53 – Fax : 01 44 42 42 66 -www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr Courriel : [email protected] 4 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY T he past fifty years (1964 to 2014) have seen France committed in Africa in several ways. These interventions were due to either defense agreements signed when former French colonies became independent, or in support of African heads of state facing internal destabilization, NEOs for French nationals, or more recently within a UN mandate. Despite occasional criticism that they were simply defending France’s “backyard” in Africa, the reality of these overseas operations (OPEX) was more complex. While they certainly add to France’s influence worldwide, they perfectly exemplify how France and Africa are linked, and today go well beyond the history of colonization. The increase in overseas operations conducted at the request of African states or under UN or EU mandates demonstrates France’s specific competence in overseas operations. These operations demonstrate the worldwide developments and political reconfigurations that tie the former colonizing power, mainland France, to countries in Africa. These have become so diverse in recent years that an overall assessment and classification seems necessary to better understand the political and military context of French commitments in Africa while putting these operations in chronological order. Then, if necessary, the doctrinal framework of French military missions overseas can be reconsidered. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 5 CONTENTS 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964-2014) .................................................. 1 Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................................... 5 Summary .............................................................................................................................................................................. 7 List of acronyms .............................................................................................................................................................. 9 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Chapter I: Organization of the French military deployment in Africa ............................. 19 1.1 Defending France's "backyard": 1960 -1990 ............................................................................................... 19 1.2 Africa and the way to democracy: 1990 -1994 ..................................................................................... 20 21 1.4 France's return to Africa: 2001 - 2014 ........................................................................................................ 22 1.3 A new relationship with Africa: 1995 - 2001 .............................................................................................. Chapter II: Intervention operations ............................................................................................. 25 2.1 Time-restricted missions ...................................................................................................................................... 25 Tacaud, Chad (February 1978 - May 1980) ............................................................................................... Bonite, Zaïre (19 May - 15 June 1978) ....................................................................................................... Barracuda, Central African Empire (September 1979 - June 1981) ........................................... Oside, Comoros (7 December -16 December 1989) ............................................................................ Azalée, Comoros (29 September - 11 October 1995) .......................................................................... 25 29 30 32 32 2.2 Assessment ................................................................................................................................................................... 34 Chapter III: Counterinsurgency missions ................................................................................. 37 3.1 Towards a resumption of counterinsurgency? ........................................................................................... 37 Limousin (March 1969 - September 1972) ............................................................................................ 37 Lamantin, Mauritania (December 1977 - July 1978) ........................................................................... 39 Serval, Mali (11January 2013 - 31 July 2014) ....................................................................................... 40 3.2 Assessment ................................................................................................................................................................... 44 Chapter IV: Combat support operations.................................................................................... 47 4.1 Enduring or influence operations ....................................................................................................................... Verveine, Zaïre (6 -16 April 1977) .................................................................................................................. Manta, Chad (9 August 1983 - 11 November 1984) ........................................................................... Epervier, Chad (16 February 1986 - 31 July 2014) .............................................................................. Noroît, Rwanda (4 October 1990 - 13 December 1993) ................................................................... Balata-Aramis, Cameroon (February 1994 - 31 May 2008) ........................................................... Boali, Central African Republic (October 2002 - December 2013) ................................................ 47 47 48 51 54 55 55 4.2 Assessment .................................................................................................................................................................. 57 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 7 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964/2014) Chapter V: Peacekeeping operations (interposition) ........................................................ 5.1 From combat to stability operations .............................................................................................................. 59 59 Close combat phases and self-defense ...................................................................................................... 59 60 60 62 5.3 Licorne, a special case ...................................................................................................................................... 63 5.4 Assessment ................................................................................................................................................................ 64 Chapter VI: Security operations ................................................................................................ 65 65 5.2 Various operation mandates and contexts ................................................................................................. Protection and evacuation of non-combatant nationals ...................................................................... Defensive interposition operations .................................................................................................................. 6.1 Missions under multinational mandates ...................................................................................................... Logistical and combat support to multinational operations .............................................................. 66 66 69 6.3 Artémis-Mamba, a French and multinational success .................................................................... 71 Chapter VII: Non-combatant evacuation operations ......................................................... 73 73 74 74 6.2 Peacekeeping procedure ..................................................................................................................................... Employment of forces as a component of multinational operations .............................................. 7.1 NEOs: emergency operations ............................................................................................................................. 7.2 Defensive operations in urban environment ............................................................................................... 7.3 Operations conducted within a multinational context .............................................................................. Chapter VII: Humanitarian relief operations .......................................................................... 77 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 79 Annexes ............................................................................................................................................. 81 Annex 1: Main cooperation or military technical assistance agreements ............................................ 81 Annex 2: List of region-oriented national schools .............................................................................................. 85 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... Military publications ........................................................................................................................................................ Books (in alphabetical order) ..................................................................................................................................... Research papers and reports (in alphabetical order) .................................................................................... Articles (in alphabetical order) .................................................................................................................................. 8 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 87 87 88 89 90 LIST OF ACRONYMS ACM : Actions civilo-militaires / Civil-military operations (CMO ) ALAT : Aviation légère de l’armée de terre / Army aviation AMIS : Mission de l’Union africaine au Soudan / African Union Mission in Sudan AML : Automitrailleuses légères / Light armored reconnaissance vehicles AMO : Assistance militaire opérationnelle / Security force assistance (SFA) AMT : Assistance militaire technique / Military technical assistance APEO : Actions sur les perceptions et l’environnement opérationnel / Actions on perceptions and the operational environment (influence/engagement operations) AQMI : Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique / Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) BET : Borkou, Ennedi et Tibesti / Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti BIMa : Bataillon d’infanterie de marine / Marine infantry battalion Bioforce : Unité militaire française du service de santé des armées / French military unit of the joint medical department BSS : Bande sahélo-saharienne / Sahel/ Sahara belt CEDEAO : Communauté économique des États d’Afrique de l’ouest / Economic community of the West African states (ECOWAS) CEEAC : Communauté économique des États d’Afrique centrale / Economic community of Central African states (ECCAS) CEMAC : Communauté économique et monétaire des États d’Afrique centrale / Central African economic and monetary community (CEMAC) CFT : Commandement des forces terrestres / Land forces command COTAM : Commandement du transport aérien militaire / Military air transportation command DAMI : Détachement d’assistance militaire d’instruction / Military assistance training detachment DETALAT : Détachement de l’aviation légère de l’armée de terre / Army aviation detachment DIO : Détachement d’instruction opérationnelle / Operational training detachment DRM : Direction du renseignement militaire / Military intelligence directorate ECOMOG : Brigade de surveillance du cessez-le-feu de la CEDEAO/ Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group EEI : Engins explosifs improvisés / Improvised explosive device (IED) EEML : École d’état-major de Libreville / Libreville staff college EFAO : Éléments français d’assistance opérationnelle / French operational assistance detachment EMT : État-major tactique / Tactical HQ Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 9 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964/2014) ENU : Échelon national d’urgence / Emergency national echelon ENVR : Écoles nationales à vocation régionale / Region-oriented national schools EUFOR RDC : Opération militaire de l’Union européenne au Congo / EU military operation in the Congo EUFOR Tchad/RCA : Opération militaire de l’Union européenne au Tchad et République centrafricaine/ EU military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic EURORECAMP : Concept français RECAMP, adopté en 2007 par l’UE / French RECAMP concept, taken up by the EU in 2007 FACA : Forces armées centrafricaines / Central African armed forces FANT : Forces armées nationales tchadiennes / Chadian national armed forces FAR : Force d’action rapide / Rapid reaction force FATIM : Force armée tchadienne en intervention au Mali / Chadian armed force in operations in Mali FAZSOI : Forces armées de la zone sud de l’Océan indien / Southern Indian Ocean armed forces FFCI : Forces françaises en Côte d’Ivoire / French forces in Côte d’Ivoire FFDj : Forces françaises stationnées à Djibouti / Multinational force in Central Africa FOMUC : Force multinationale en Centrafrique / Rwandan Patriotic Front FPR : Front patriotique rwandais / Rwandan Patriotic Front Frolinat : Front de libération nationale du Tchad / National Liberation Front of Chad Front Polisario : Front pour la libération de la saguia El-Hamra et du Rio de Oro / Saguia El- Hamra and Rio de Oro liberation front FRUD : Front pour la restauration de l’unité et la démocratie (Djibouti) ) / AFAR front for the restoration of unity and democracy in Djibouti G5 Sahel : Mauritanie, Mali, Niger, Tchad et Burkina-Faso / G5 Sahel : Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chand and Burkina-Faso GAD : Groupes armés djihadistes / Jihadist armed groups GAM : Groupe aéromobile / Helicopter strike group (UK)/ Army aviation battalion TF (US) GAT : Groupes armés terroristes / Terrorist armed groups GIGN : Groupe d’intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale / Gendarmerie special forces team GTIA : Groupement tactique interarmes / Combined arms battalion task force Guépard NG : Guépard nouvelle génération / New-generation GUEPARD alert system GUNT : Gouvernement d’union nationale de transition (Tchad) ) / Transitional government of national unity (Chad) MICECI : Mission de la CEDEAO en Côte d’Ivoire / ECOWAS mission in Côte d’Ivoire MINUAR : Mission des Nations unies pour l’assistance au Rwanda / United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 10 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964/2014) MINUÉE : Mission des Nations unies en Éthiopie et en Érythrée / United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea MINURCA : Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine / United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic MINURCAT : Mission des Nations unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad / United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad MINUSMA : Mission multidimensionnelle des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali / United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali MISAB : Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui / Inter-African mission for monitoring the Bangui agreements MISMA : Mission internationale de soutien au Mali sous conduite africaine / African-led International Support Mission to Mali MJP : Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (Côte d’Ivoire) ) / Movement for peace and justice (Côte d’Ivoire) MNLA : Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad / AZAWAD National liberation movement MONUC : Mission des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo / United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MPCI : Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire / Côte d’Ivoire Patriots’ movement MPIGO : Mouvement populaire ivoirien du grand-ouest / Ivorian people’s movement of the Great West MUJAO : Mouvement pour l’unicité et la justice en Afrique de l’ouest / Movement for oneness (also mentioned as unity) and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA or MUJWA) NEO : Non-combatant evacuation operation / REVESAC : Opérations d’évacuation de ressortissants ONG : Organisation non gouvernementale / Non-governmental organization (NGO) ONUCI : Opération des Nations unies en Côte d’Ivoire / United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) ONUSOM : Opération des Nations unies en Somalie / United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) OPEX : Opérations extérieures / Overseas (abroad) operations OUA : Organisation de l’unité africaine / Organization of African Unity (OAU) RA : Régiment d’artillerie / Artillery battalion RAMa : Régiment d’artillerie de marine / Marine artillery battalion RCA : République centrafricaine / Central African Republic (CAR) RDA : République démocratique allemande / German Democratic Republic RDP : Régiment de dragons parachutistes / Parachute cavalry squadron (battalion-size) REC : Régiment étranger de cavalerie / Foreign (Legion) armor battalion REG : Régiment étranger de génie / Foreign (Legion) engineer battalion Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 11 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964/2014) REI : Régiment étranger d’infanterie / Foreign (Legion) infantry battalion REP : Régiment étranger de parachutistes / Foreign (Legion) parachute (infantry) battalion RG : Régiment du génie / Engineer battalion RHC : Régiment d’hélicoptères de combat / Army aviation battalion RHP : Régiment de hussards parachutistes / Parachute cavalry squadron (battalion-size) RI : Régiment d’infanterie / Infantry battalion RIAOM : Régiment interarmes d’outre-mer / Overseas combined arms battalion RICM : Régiment d’infanterie chars de marine / Marine armor battalion RIMa : Régiment d’infanterie de marine / Marine infantry battalion RECAMP : Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix / Reinforcement of African peacekeeping capabilities ROE : Rules of engagement / règles d’engagement RPC : Régiment parachutiste de choc / Shock Parachute battalion RPCS : Régiment parachutiste de commandement et de soutien / HQ and support parachute battalion RPIMa : Régiment parachutiste d’infanterie de marine / Marine infantry parachute battalion RT : Régiment des transmissions / Signal battalion Séléka : Coalition de forces rebelles opposées au président centrafricain François Bozizé / SELEKA Coalition of rebel forces opposed to Central African President François Bozizé SIRPA : Service d’information et de relation publique des armées / Joint information and public communications service TF : Task Force / Force opérationnelle UA : Unité africaine / African unity UFDR : Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (Centrafrique) ) / Union of democratic forces for rally (Central Africa) UNITAF : United Task Force / Force d’intervention unifiée (Somalie) VAB : Véhicule de l’avant blindé / Armored (wheeled) fighting vehicle VBCI : Véhicule blindé de combat d’infanterie / Armored (wheeled) infantry fighting vehicle VBL : Véhicules blindé léger / Light armored vehicle ZHS : Zone humanitaire sûre / Humanitarian safety zone 12 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 INTRODUCTION A ll African countries became independent in the second half of the 20th century. Although some countries became independent in the 1950s (such as Morocco, Tunisia or Guinea), most of Africa was decolonized during the 1960s. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo left the Union française in 1960; Comoros and Djibouti became independent in 1975 and 1977 respectively. The split from France, the colonial custodian of these countries since the end of the 19th century, resulted in deep change, particularly in political and military relationships. Along with political sovereignty, the idea of military independence emerged. The new countries therefore built up their armed forces, and often - but not always - used the same model as their former European colonizers. These new states were all the more ready to follow the French model against the backdrop of the Cold War. Their independence coincided with the passing of defense or military cooperation agreements that enabled special relationships to be maintained. The basic purpose of these agreements was to protect these young states until they could build up a national defense tool, covering education and training of military officers and NCOs and guaranteeing the provision of logistical support should conflict occur. However, after independence, some of these states found themselves powerless against armed conflicts requiring trained, combat seasoned forces and quality equipment. Some turned to France, requesting French intervention to support local forces in internal or inter-state conflicts to ensure regional stability. Sometimes, French troops were deployed to protect and evacuate French nationals. This was the context in which France started to conduct overseas operations. From the early 1960s until the present day, the French Army has deployed troops in over fifty operations in West Africa, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. As of 1977, it became the norm to give them specific names (Verveine, Lamanti, etc.), while the term “OPEX” (“opération extérieure”) was introduced in the early 2000s to refer to overseas (abroad) operations, as specified in a French DoD order. In fact, there are a high number of overseas missions similar to “OPEXes” that are not strictly overseas opérations. From its first operation in Gabon in 1964 to more recent operations, France has always deployed troops to Africa. Over time, however, these missions have become more complex. Taking stock of these OPEXes now seems necessary for determining their exact nature and for categorizing them. Besides distinguishing between operations against an avowed and identified enemy and those that are essentially peacekeeping operations to protect human lives, we can sort OPEX by mission type: interposition, security operations, non combatant operations (NEOs), humanitarian, intervention, combat support, and counterinsurgency. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 13 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964/2014) The diverse range of operations is testament to France’s evolving presence in Africa, as well as the French Army’s capacity for adjusting to various needs. It therefore calls for an analysis by operation type (referred to as a typological analysis)1. The classification here provides an outline of all French military commitments in Africa. Furthermore, it clearly sets out the profound changes in French overseas operations that have progressively shifted from bi- lateral French-African frameworks to multinational operations under UN or EU mandates. This paper will only address French Army missions, and not anti-piracy dispositions such as Atalante in the Red Sea or the Corymbe standing force mission in the Gulf of Guinea, as these come under Navy responsibility.2 1 French Department of Defense, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological Inventory of Operations), vol. 2, Africa; Paris, French Forces Employment Doctrine Center, Lessons Learned department, (hereafter CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations), 2006. Initially a document for internal use, this “Inventory” is not strictly typological. It is rather a list of operations in chronological order. 2 Some French operations in Africa are not addressed in this paper for lack of Lessons Learned documents. 14 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 List (by type) of overseas operations in chronological order (1964-2014) OPERATION COUNTRY DATES TYPE Gabon 19 February 1964 Chad March 1969 – September 1972 Verveine Zaïre 6 – 16 april 1977 Lamantin Mauritania December 1977 – July 1978 Counterinsurgency Tacaud Chad February 1978 – May 1980 Intervention Bonite Zaïre 19 May – 15 June 1978 Intervention Barracuda Central African Republic September 1979 – June 1981 Intervention Manta Chad 9 August 1983 – 11 November 1984 Combat support Epervier Chad 16 February 1986 – ongoing Combat support Togo September 1986 Intervention Comoros 7 December – 16 December 1989 Intervention Oside Intervention Counterinsurgency Combat support Requin Gabon May – July 1990 Non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) Noroît Rwanda 4 October 1990 – 13 December 1993 Combat support Bérénice Somalia January 1991 Godoria Djibouti 26 May – 29 June 1991 Baumier Zaïre September – October 1991 Verdier Togo – Bénin 28 November 1991 – 14 February 1992 Interposition Iskoutir Djibouti February 1992 – June 1999 Interposition Addax Angola Central Africa 1 – 5 November 1992 Somalie December 1992 – December 1993 Bioforce Oryx – ONUSOM I/II er 14 March – 2 April 1992 NEO Humanitarian operation NEO NEO Humanitarian Security operations Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 15 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964/2014) OPEX PAYS DATES TYPE Bajoyer Zaïre 28 January – 14 February 1993 NEO Volcan Rwanda 9 – 11 February 1993 NEO Balata – Aramis Cameroon February 1994 – 31 May 2008 Amaryllis Rwanda 9 – 14 April 1994 Turquoise Rwanda 22 June – 22 August 1994 Combat support NEO Interposition Croix du Sud I/II Chad – Niger October 1994 – December 1995 Security operations Caducée Guinéa-Bissau 22 November – 9 December 1994 Humanitarian Azalée Comoros 29 September – 11 October 1995 Intervention Malebo Congo November 1996 – February 1997 NEO Almandin I/II Central Africa 18 April 1996 – 19 June1997 Bubale Central Africa January 1997 – April 1998 Pélican I/II/III Congo March – June 1997 Almandin III Central Africa 20 June 1997 – 15 April 1998 Antilope Congo October – November 1997 MINURCA Central Africa 15 April 1998 – 28 February 1999 Iroko Guinéa-Bissau June 1998 – June 1999 Khor Angar Djibouti January 1999 – July 2000 Malachite DR Congo August – October 1998 Khaya Côte d’Ivoire 25 – 31 December 1999 MINUÉE Ethiopia – Eritrea 12 May – 12 December 2001 Licorne Côte d’Ivoire 19 September 2002 – 21 January 2015 Boali Central Africa October 2002 – December 2013 16 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Interposition Security operations NEO Security operations NEO Security operations NEO Interposition NEO Interposition Security operations Interposition Combat support 50 years of overseas operations in Africa (1964/2014) OPEX PAYS DATES TYPE Artemis – Mamba DR Congo 16 May – 6 September 2003 Providence Libéria 7 – 11 June 2003 Dorca Chad 31 July – 11 September 2004 Security operations ONUCI Côte d’Ivoire a/o October 2004 Security operations EUFOR RDC DR Congo June – December 2006 Security operations EUFOR Chad- Chad – Central Africa Central Africa 28 January 2008 – 15 March 2009 Security operations Chari-Baguirmi 1 – 8 February 2008 Chad Security operations NEO Harmattan Libya March 2011 - October 2011 Serval Mali 11 January 2013 – August 2014 NEO Intervention, population protection, Counterinsurgency Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 17 CHAPTER I ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN AFRICA F rance’s military presence in Africa has considerably changed since the 1960s. Although France has maintained a permanent presence, the number of troops has fallen continuously and regularly. The drop in numbers is part of a political choice reflecting the growing capacity and will of African nations to commit their own forces. French troops in Africa 1960 1970 1980 1990 1997 2010 2013 2014 30,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 8,405 8,5153 9,3504 6,596 Evolution of the French military presence in Africa, 1960-2014. 1.1. Defending France’s “backyard”: 1960-1990 During the Cold War, Africa applied a bipolar logic of siding with either East or West, thereby forcing newly-independent countries to adapt to the stakes of a conflict between the East and West, despite no effective armed forces being available. Hence why, immediately after the decolonization process, French authorities signed some twenty defense and cooperation agreements with its former African colonies. France considered its presence in Africa crucial for countering Soviet influence5. It also wanted to assume responsibility for the defense of its former colonies6. As the Western bloc saw France as its strong arm in Africa, the US supported France’s actions. France’s “backyard” in Africa was multidimensional: the “franc CFA” monetary zone (financial dimension), interests dating from the colonial period (economic dimension), and various agreements passed with African countries7 (military dimension). These agreements fell into two categories: cooperation or technical military assistance (AMT) agreements covering the education and training 3 With an additional 1,460 armed forces in the south of the Indian Ocean (FAZOI) in Réunion Island and Mayotte. Cf. Josselin de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (French African policies), Rapport d’information n°324, 28 February 2011, p. 24. 4 Organized as follows: among prepositioned forces, 900 troops (including 450 permanently stationed) in Libreville; 1,900 troops in Djibouti (1,400 permanently stationed); 700 troops in United Arab Emirates and 1,900 in Mayotte and Réunion Island; 350 troops in Dakar (about 260 permanently stationed). In overseas operations: 4,200 in Mali, 1,000 in Chad, 1,000 between the Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, and anti-piracy dispositions. Jean-Pierre Chevènement et Gérard Larcher, Sahel: pour une approche globale (Sahel: for a comprehensive approach), Rapport d’information n°720, 3 July 2013, pp. 166-167. 5 Jeanny Lorgeoux and Jean-Marie Bockel, La présence de la France dans une Afrique convoitée (the French presence in coveted Africa) Rapport d’information n°104 , 29 October 2013, p. 257. 6 Pierre Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ? (Which developments for French security policy in Africa), Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004, pp. 15-16. 7 General (retired) Jean-Claude Thomas, Généralités sur notre politique militaire en Afrique, enseignements des actions passées et orientations pour l’avenir (General considerations on our military policy in Africa, lessons learned from experience and guidelines for the future), l’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre – Actes de la journée d’études du 5 février 2007 (Sub-Saharan Africa from one crisis to another : proceedings of the research meeting held on 5 February 2007), Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2007, p. 6. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 19 Chapter I: Organization of the French military deployment in Africa of national forces of African countries, and defense agreements constituting a legal basis for French interventions. Between 1960 and 1991, France signed military assistance agreements with 23 countries8. 8 nations were bound to France through defense agreements until the late 1970s9; these agreements became “defense partnership agreements” in May 200910. Initially, France led military actions in its former colonies to restore their domestic situations, to oppose rebel movements or to defend them from aggressive nations11. During the Cold War, French prepositioned troops were stationed in Dakar and Brazzaville before their transfer to Libreville. From the 1970s, France’s next step was to exert its influence outside the area of its former colonies12. Contact was made with French-speaking nations such as Zaire (the former Belgian Congo) from 1977, and Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s. French operations were decidedly offensive, as seen in the long, drawn-out conflict against northern rebels in Chad and in Libya from 1978 onwards, or the airborne operation over Kolwezi in May that year. Whether through intervention, counterinsurgency or combat support missions, from the 1960s until the 1990s, France acted alone and with a combat rationale against avowed enemies. 1.2. Africa and the way to democracy (1990-1994) The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War heralded a new era for French interventions in Africa. The end of the two-bloc system in Africa meant it lost its strategic importance and became a minor challenge of influence for Western countries13. This shift in diplomatic momentum generated new developments in French doctrine, as underscored by President Mitterrand in the discours de La Baule (La Baule speech) on 20 June 1990. As a left-wing president, Mitterand’s election had an impact, as he sought to set himself apart from his predecessors. During the 16th France-Africa Summit, François Mitterrand explained the prominent role democracy was to play from then on. Africa could not avoid the consequences of the overthrow of the former Soviet system in Eastern Europe by its former peoples. From this point, France’s role was to help develop democracy in Africa14. Change was to follow in France’s intervention patterns, with a shift to more NEOs, interposition or stability operations. This change can also be explained by a shift in the African landscape, whereby more criticism could be levelled at French intervention. France instigated political and military changes to meet certain African countries’ longstanding wish for a new role for Paris within a different relationship between Africa and France. In the early 1990s, African states asserted their will to provide the means for their own security, with independent military forces15. Through sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)16, African states gradually took charge of security issues. When civil war broke out in Liberia, they went so far as to set up a non- standing military force built up with troops from national forces, ECOMOG17. 8 See Annex 1: Main bilateral cooperation or military assistance agreements until the early 1990s. 9 Cameroon (1960 then 1974), Central Africa (1960), Comoros (1973 then 1978), Côte d’Ivoire (1961), Djibouti (1977), Gabon (1960), Senegal (1960 then 1974), Togo (1963). 10 See Annex 1. 11 A. Dulait, R. Hue, Y. Pozzo Di Borgo & D. Boulaud, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne (Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa), p. 8. 12 François Gaulme, La politique française d’intervention dans les conflits limités en Afrique (the French intervention policy in Africa’s limited conflicts), Penser les ailes françaises n°13, April 2007, pp. 7-8. 13 Jean-Pierre Bat, Le syndrome Foccart (The Foccart Syndrome), Gallimard, 2012, p. 507. 14 J. de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (France’s African policy), rep. cit., p. 8. 15 P. Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ? (What changes for the French security policy in Africa?), art. cit., pp. 28-29. 16 It was founded in 1975. 17 ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group). 20 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter I: Organization of the French military deployment in Africa 1994 marked a turning-point for Africa: the CFA franc currency was devalued, the Apartheid regime in South Africa ended and genocide was perpetrated in Rwanda18. The Rwandan genocide had a considerable impact on France; people were more aware that Central Africa was embroiled in conflict and of the difficulty of military intervention on a “go it alone” basis. France’s complex domestic political situation at the time, with a “co-existence” government, helps to explain why France started to withdraw from Africa19. France started to reconsider its security policy in Africa as of 1995, coinciding with change in doctrine that led to the establishment of professionalized Armed Forces. As opposed to the years from 1960-1990, to a certain degree the following period would see France’s withdrawal from Africa. 1.3. A new relationship with Africa (1995-2001) The second half of the 1990s brought changes to the French Armed Forces, and consequently to their interventions in Africa. In 1996, President Chirac decided to professionalize the Armed Forces and suspend compulsory national service. Troop numbers fell significantly, leading to the disbanding of several units and the reorganization of the reserve forces. Cooperation, in particular military cooperation, in Africa was rethought. In 1998, new guidelines appeared based on five tenets: refusal of unilateralism, bilateral military interventions for the security of French nationals, a permanent but reduced presence, multilateral operations with African Forces, partnership between Europe and the UN to provide combat support for African Security Forces with a program to reinforce African peacekeeping capabilities (RECAMP) and the development of regionalization based on regionoriented national schools.20 As unilateral engagements gave way to solely African security building, the Ministry of Cooperation became a junior ministry (Secrétariat d’Etat) attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the general directorate of political and security affairs also managed military cooperation missions. French cooperation paved the way for the development of local forces’ education and training. Fewer students were sent to France after 1997; 17 region-oriented national schools opened that could provide training in 10 countries in Central and Western Africa. As costs were lower than in France, the schools also taught students from foreign countries: 811 out of the 1,198 posts offered in 200521. Whereas France had previously opted to “go it alone” during security operations in Africa, the 1997 launch of the RECAMP program significantly boosted African peacekeeping capabilities. Founded on the will of states and African organizations, RECAMP’s purpose was to enable Africans to manage crises on the continent. By helping reinforce defense capabilities, the program committed nations to playing the key role in the preparation and conduct of exercises and operations22. 18 François Gaulme, La politique française d’intervention dans les conflits limités en Afrique (the French intervention policy in limited conflicts in Africa) art. cit., p. 8. 19 P. Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ? (What changes for the French security policy in Africa?), art. cit., p. 29. 20 J. Lorgeoux and J-M. Bockel: La présence de la France dans une Afrique convoitée (The presence of France in coveted Africa), rep. cit., p.260. These developments were derived from the “neither interference nor indifference” tenet initiated by Lionel Jospin. 21 A. Dulait, R. Hue, Y. Pozzo and D. Boulaud: La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne (Crisis management in subSahara Africa), rep. cit., p. 12. See Annex 2: “Le réseau des écoles nationales à vocation régionale” (The network of region-oriented national schools). 22 Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix, Doctrine interarmées (Reinforcing African capacities for peacekeeping, Joint doctrine ), DIA-3.4.7 (B)_RECAMP (2011), n° 179 DEF/CICDE /NP, 22 September 2011, p.21. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 21 Chapter I: Organization of the French military deployment in Africa It included several functions: military leader development, support for the training and organization of HQs and units, and operational support to committed forces. Validated by France in 1997, RECAMP was submitted to the European Union and was approved as “EURORECAMP” in 2007. After signing a strategic partnership agreement with the African Union23 in 1998, it became “AMANI AFRICA”24 and served as a common framework for the organization of crisis management exercises for African Standby Forces (FAA/ASF). This change in political direction in Africa led to new developments in doctrine; the downsizing of military strength, and, in certain specific cases, types of disengagement25. Disengagement did not equate to “withdrawal”, although some bases were evacuated and closed for specific reasons, for example Bouar and Camp Béal in Central Africa26. 1.4. France’s return to Africa (2001 – 2014) The 9/11 attacks and the emergence of a new global terrorist threat led to a change in approach. Numerous, strong links had been forged between the Sahel area and greater Middle-East where some terrorists were trained. France was to reengage in Africa, with 2013’s Operation Serval marking the peak involvement. Southern Sahara emerged as a safe haven for Islamist terrorist combatants who capitalized on African states’ loose grip on Saharan territories by setting up bases and training facilities in the area. France’s period of relative inaction in Africa during the late 1990s ended as the country intervened again, although this time it would act solely in a multinational framework, backed by UN resolutions and its defense agreements. New outside actors appeared in Africa; China deployed for essentially economic reasons, while the European Union showed interest due to the considerable challenges of immigration, terrorism and organized trafficking in Africa. Africa’s sub-regional organizations played an important part as internal actors. The Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC/ECCAS), initially intended to promote regional economic cooperation, became an increasingly major player in managing local security crises. This was also the case for the Economic Community of Western African States (CEDEAO/ECOWAS)27. In line with its policy from the 1990s, France committed in Africa with due regard to any legitimately and democratically elected governments and authorities. France condemned taking power by force, and defended the integrity of territories and borders. French military engagement on the African territory only occurred following a request from an African country and under UN mandate28. The unilateral interventions that had prevailed from the 1960s to the 1990s thereby gave way to multilateral deployments conducted in agreement with African countries, most often within the framework of European actions. 23 The African Union superseded the African Union Organization in July 2002. 24 J. de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (French African policy), rep. cit., p. 36. 25 See Table 1: Developments in the French military presence in Africa. 26 Breaking of diplomatic relations between France and the Central African Republic after Operations Almandin. P. Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ? (What changes for the French security policy in Africa?), art. cit., p. 31. 27 General J-C Thomann, Généralités sur notre politique militaire en Afrique (General aspects of French military policy in Africa), art. cit, p. 8. 28 P. Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ? (What changes for the French security policy in Africa?), art. cit., p.34. 22 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter I: Organization of the French military deployment in Africa During the 2000s, the European Union became a full-scale actor for peace and security in Africa, developing the African component of the European security and defense policy from 200529. From 2003, France deployed troops as part of European forces in Operation Artemis in DR Congo, and would take the same line with operations in Chad, Central African Republic and Mali. Today, France’s overall military structure in Africa relies on several elements with different features30. It combines permanently prepositioned forces, French forces in Gabon31, French forces in Djibouti32, and French forces in Côte d’Ivoire, activated on 21 January 2015. French troops have also been deployed to Senegal (Dakar), where French elements constitute a region-oriented operational cooperation center33. As well as France committing troops as part of its overseas operations, its “sovereignty” forces are present on La Réunion and Mayotte islands, with the Armed Forces in the south of the Indian Ocean (1,900 troops). All in all, France has 6,500 French troops deployed on the African territory. France’s overall troop organization includes a significant presence on Africa’s Atlantic coastline (Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gabon). It also plays a significant logistical role in West and Central Africa (Mali, Chad, Central African Republic) and enables France’s presence on the Eastern coast of Africa (Djibouti, La Réunion/Mayotte). 29 J. de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (French African policy), rep. cit., p.34. 30 Jean-Pierre Chevènement et Gérard Larcher, Sahel : Pour une approche globale (Sahel: for a comprehensive approach), rep. cit., pp. 166-167. 31 900 troops in Libreville, including 450 on a permanent basis. 32 1,900 troops, including 1,400 on a permanent basis. 33 350 troops, including about 260 on a permanent basis. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 23 CHAPTER II INTERVENTION OPERATIONS 2.1. Time-restricted missions An intervention operation is a time-restricted combat operation; its main objective is the annihilation or suppression of an enemy force through direct intervention. Such intervention missions belong to a specific period of French political history: between the end of the colonial empire and the mid-1990s34. The first example of such an operation in post-colonial Africa occurred in Gabon. In February 1964, France launched an intervention to restore the Gabonese President, Léon M’Ba (1902 -1967), to power as he was under threat from opponents. Marine troops were deployed, particularly a company of 7th marine infantry battalion based in Dakar (“7° RIMa”), a HQ and two companies from Fort-Lamy (Chad), as well as the separate marine infantry parachute company based in Brazzaville35. Due to the close positioning of troops, it was possible to launch the operation very quickly, between 18 and 19 February. Although the operation led to 2 deaths in the French Forces36, it did make restoring President Léon M’Ba’s authority possible. Nonetheless, it was only in the late 1970s that France launched its most significant interventions: Operations Tacaud in Chad in 1978, Bonite (also called Leopard) in Zaire in the same year, and Barracuda in the Central African Republic in 1979. Tacaud, Chad (February 1978 – May 1980) France had already intervened in Chad in 1969 (Limousin), in the aftermath of the upheaval caused by the civil war. In 1978, the country was once again split by internal divisions that had grown in number since 1975. In April of the same year, a coup brought General Malloum to power, who initially tried to start negotiations with rebels. Until 1977, the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT37), grouping the northern rebels, had not launched large-scale operations, except in Tibesti. Instead, it capitalized on the period to enhance its combat power thanks to Libyan aid38. 34 The end of the Cold War and the French repositioning process resulted in the end of this kind of mission; the last mission of that type was Operation Azalée in 1995. 35 Jean-Louis Dufour, Les troupes de marine dans les interventions africaines des années 1960 à nos jours (Marine troops in interventions in Africa from the 1960s until today), in Maurice Vaïsse (dir), Les troupes de marine dans l’armée de Terre (Marine troops in the army), Lavauzelle, 2001, p. 263. 36 André Foures, Caractères des interventions militaires françaises outre-mer de 1960 à nos jours (Main features of French military overseas interventions from 1960 until today), Revue Historique des Armées, n° 169, pp. 92-101, chart p. 101. 37 A Chadian armed movement founded in 1966 by Ibrahim Abatcha to fight against the southern regime. 38 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad) vol.2, Service historique de l’armée de Terre, October 1989 vol. 2, p. 35. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 25 Chapter II: intervention operations However, in early 1978, rebels from the north seized the towns of Faya-Largeau, Ounianga, Fada and Koro-Toro. The Chadian Army lost 2,000 troops in the fighting, as well as a considerable amount of equipment39. The threat of the rebels quickly seizing the capital city of N’Djamena was so great that General Malloum requested France’s help under agreements signed in 197640. Plan Citronnelle was implemented on 3 February 1978, with the aim of providing immediate military technical assistance to the Chadian Forces, while a longer-term engagement was also prepared. Finally, Operation Tacaud was launched on 26 March197841 after the first round of French legislative elections. Operation Tacaud’s defining feature was that it operated on a case-by-case basis, according to the situation on the ground, explaining the gradual deployment of elements. It can be split into three main phases: a combat operation from February 1978 to March 1979 that enabled the military situation to be stabilized, a period of neutrality from March to July 1979, and assistance in reconstructing the Chadian state from July 1979 to May 1980. An average of 2,000 French troops was deployed, with a peak deployment of 2,200. A group of twenty-two advisors deployed, belonging to 11th Airborne division, and 9th Marine infantry division. Three GTIAs (combined arms battalion task forces) were also sent from Foreign Legion units (1st REC and 2nd REI) and Marine infantry (3rd RIMa) stationed at Abeche, Ati, Mongo and Moussoro. Each task force comprised one motorized infantry company, one cavalry troop (company-size) and one mortar platoon. Some light aviation elements were also deployed with four light helicopters (Alouette III) as well as eight Puma utility helicopters (seven cargo and one gunship). The opponents were no longer a gang of lightly armed rebels like in 1969, but organized military forces equipped with modern weaponry: surface-to-air missiles, 120-mm mortars, recoilless 75- and 106-mm guns, and RPG-7 grenade launchers42. In order to block the rebel offensives, French troops conducted several combat operations from April to the summer of 1978. Thus Tacaud also included fighting in Salal (15 - 25 April 1978), where a company team (built around a cavalry troop) opposed a 400-500 strong enemy battalion. Intense fighting broke out and French troops withdrew towards Moussoro; Salal remained in rebel hands. On 27 April, these events were followed by the deployment of ten JAGUARs to provide air support, stabilizing the frontline along Abeche-Ati-Moussoro. On 19 - 20 May, French Forces fought two National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) companies (200-300 combatants) in Ati and seized the city. These companies were equipped with mortars, automatic weapons and machine guns. France committed the MONGO tactical HQ, one company from 3rd RIMa and a platoon from the Chadian army. The rebels put up strong resistance; it took French troops two days, and the support of light aviation and JAGUARs to recapture the city and its outskirts. Recapturing Ati caused around 100 rebel losses, 3 prisoners were taken and 80 weapons seized. French troops counted three dead and around ten wounded. 39 CDEF/DREX (French Forces Employment Doctrine Center): Répertoire typologique des opérations (A typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p. 34. 40 P. Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ? (What changes for the French security policy in Africa), art. cit., p. 19. 41 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad) vol.2, op. cit., p. 123. 42 Jérôme de Lespinois, Emploi de la force aérienne au Tchad 1969-1987 (Employment of air force assets in Chad 1969 – 1987) , Penser les ailes françaises, June 2005, n° 6, pp. 67-74. 26 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter II: intervention operations (Operation Tacaud, map taken from Stéphane Mantoux, Les guerres du Tchad (The wars in Chad), 2014.) Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 27 Chapter II: intervention operations The French offensive then moved to Djedaa, where the JAGUAR detachment was initially deployed, followed by action from ABECHE GTIA 31 May - 1 June. Nearly 600 rebels from the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT), equipped with mortars, guns and machineguns, had withdrawn into the town. 1st company (3rd RIMa) as well as two platoons from the 3rd company (3rd RIMa) took position to the south and west of the village, together with one company (1st REC), one battery (11th RAMa), and Chadian gendarmes and soldiers. French troops delivered heavy surface and air fires and recaptured the town, killing approximately 100 rebels and taking 3 wounded prisoners. The French emerged the victors of these skirmishes, thereby stopping the rebels’ thrust towards N’Djamena43. The rebels were increasingly prone to infighting. The situation stabilized in the latter half of 1978, after negotiations between General Malloum and the rebels concluded with the formation of a national union government. Nonetheless, serious dissensions broke out again, culminating in the battle of N’Djamena, 12 - 15 February 1979. French attempts to reconcile the factions proved futile; all French troops deployed on the Chadian territory withdrew towards N’Djamena from August 1979. Despite General Malloum stepping down, and the establishment of an interposition force, fighting resumed between the various Chadian warring factions, leading to deadly fighting in March 1980. French authorities announced the withdrawal of troops in April 1980. By the time the operation ended in May, 18 French soldiers had been killed and 27 wounded. Chad, June 1978, Operation Tacaud © ECPAD, Roland Pellegrino. 43 Pierre de Tonquédec, Face à Khadafi, Opération Tacaud (Confronting Gaddafi, Operation Tacaud), Saint- Cloud, SOTECA, 2012, p. 46 28 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter II: intervention operations Bonite, Zaire (19 May – 15 June 1978) Out of all France’s operations in Africa, Bonite is still fresh in people’s minds due to its airborne operation over Kolwezi in May 197844. Under the dictatorship of President Joseph- Désiré Mobutu (1965 – 1997), Zaire had suffered attacks from the “Katanga Tigers” since the late 1970s. After being driven back by 1977’s Operation Verveine, these “Tigers” had taken refuge in Angola, with support and training from the Soviets and Cubans. On 11 May 1978, nearly 3,000 Katanga fighters moved into Kolwezi, a city covering some 40 square kilometers and comprising several distinct, separated districts with a population of over 100,000, including 3,000, mainly Belgian and French, Europeans employed in the mining industry. As the hub of the country’s mineral wealth (copper and cobalt), Kolwezi was an important objective in the Shaba province. Inside Kolwezi, some Zairian Forces broke off to join the Tigers, while the others were pushed back. When the population, the Europeans in particular, started to suffer abuse, the crisis took on an international dimension. France decided to send an airborne infantry battalion (2nd REP in full), reinforced by military assistance from Zaire, as well as three parachute teams from 13 th RDP , making a Force that was 710 strong45. Although several hundred “Katanga” fighters withdrew on 15 May, nearly 500 fighters in small units stayed to oppose the French Forces46. The concept of operations was to take control of the residential districts by airdropping paratroopers on the city center, in order to then access the airport 6 kms away. Airdropping achieved a surprise effect and prevented any reprisals against the civilian populace. Although Belgian Forces had also been deployed to Kolwezi, no prior coordination was possible, as Paris and Brussels failed to agree on a common operation47. Operation Bonite, 1978, CDEF/DREX, Inventory of operations by types, p. 21. 44 Colonel Michel Goya, la légion saute sur Kolwezi (Foreign Legion airdrop on Kolwezi), Guerre et histoire, December 2013, n° 16. 45 CDEF/DREX (Forces employment doctrine center) Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.24. 46 General Rémy Gausserès (Company commander at the time of the operation), Les enseignements de Kolwezi. Mai 1978 (Lessons learned from Kolwezi. May 1978); supplement to “les cahiers du RETEX” n° 12, 2003, pp. 27-30. 47 Adjudant-Chef (First Sergeant) Jean-Claude Saulnier, Une vie de légionnaire (The life of a légionnaire), Nimrod, 2013, p. 105. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 29 Chapter II: intervention operations In the early afternoon of May 19, three companies and the battalion HQ (about 400 troops) were airdropped from less than 250m on Kolwezi. The legionnaires came immediately under fire, suffering 1 dead and 6 wounded. The French troops started street fighting to liberate the European nationals who had been taken hostage or who had been hiding in their homes. In the evening, the paras/ legionnaires managed to seize the city center and old town. At this point, the “Katanga” fighters were in control of Manika, a town on the outskirts. The following morning, a second wave was airdropped. 200 legionnaires from the 4th company and the weapons company discovered several mass graves to the east of the new city. At the end of the day, the legionnaires took control of the Metal-Shaba mining area held by 200 rebels, as well as of Manika. From 21 - 27 May, the battalion still held the city, and deployed towards Likasi and Lubumbashi, leaving the control of Kolwezi to the Belgian Forces that had been airlifted to the airport on 20 May. On 28 and 29 May, apart from a rifle company and the mortar platoon that had stayed in Kolwezi, the whole battalion gathered in Lubumbashi. The legionnaires from the 2nd REP all returned to France by 15 June. The first large-scale airborne operation since Suez in 1956, Bonite proved a military success. Although approximately 120 Europeans and 500 Zairians were killed prior to the paras/legionnaires’ arrival48, nearly 2,000 European non-combatants were able to be evacuated. French troops suffered 5 dead and 15 wounded, while the rebels suffered 250 dead49. Barracuda, Central African Empire (September 1979 – June 1981) Operation Barracuda saw French troops deploy to the Central African Empire of Bokassa I. The USSR’s and Libya’s display of interest in Central Africa, combined with the ambiguous political attitude of Jean-Bedel Bokassa (1921 - 1996), were initial sources of concern for France. However, a series of factors - the deteriorating social climate, emerging domestic and external opposition, and above all the Emperor’s personal responsibility for the student massacre committed in Bangui in spring 1979 - propelled France to take action to oust the Head of State and offer support to the opposition50. There were in fact several aspects demanding rapid military intervention: the worsening domestic crisis in Central Africa, a critical media campaign in France highlighting the State authorities’ goodwill towards Bokassa and the request for assistance from leaders of certain neighboring countries (Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny) in order to ensure political stability and security in the area. Most important was stemming the threats to French nationals and the fact that negotiations had failed to resolve the crisis. The first phase of Operation Barracuda, from September - November 1979, had several objectives: ensuring that French nationals and the new government were protected and providing support to Central African Armed Forces (FACA) during their law and order mission, thereby avoiding any direct commitment. The Army detached a tactical HQ, three paratrooper companies, one cavalry platoon, one aviation detachment and a paratrooper team from 13th RDP . Together with a medical element and some personnel from the 1st RPIMa, the total strength came to 500 troops. 48 Michel Goya, La légion saute sur Kolwezi (Foreign Legion airdrop on Kolwezi), art. cit., p. 26. 49 R. Gausserès, Les enseignements de Kolwezi. Mai 1978 (Lessons learned from Kolwezi. May 1978), art. cit., p. 30. 50 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad), op. cit., p. 338. 30 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter II: intervention operations Central African Republic, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2004. On 20 September, marine infantry troops seized Bangui M’Poko airport51, starting immediately with the airlift of troops, equipment, and the aviation detachment from N’Djamena to Bangui. French troops also seized critical points in the city: airport, embassy, seat of government, and radio center. On the evening of 23 September, all immediate threats had been averted in the capital, with no use of weapons. Troops ensured Bangui was secure by preventing looting, neutralizing the two battalions of the imperial guard in Berengo (where the Emperor lived) and capturing a platoon of 37 armed Libyans52. Protection of 3,200 French nationals was ensured without suffering any losses. Operation Barracuda developed step by step. From May 1980, troops were split into two company teams in Bangui and Bouar, and were tasked with re-building and training the Central African Army, making it strong enough to ensure the country’s security. For the sake of stability, the French Forces’ area of action ranged across the country. Barracuda came to an end in June 1981. French Security Force Assistance elements took over, who were to stay in Central Africa until 1998. 51 Florent de St Victor, 45 ans d’opérations militaires en Centrafrique (45 years of military operations in Central Africa), Lettre du RETEX – Opérations, n°8 9 December 2013, pp. 1-8. 52 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military operations in Chad), op. cit., p. 365. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 31 Chapter II: intervention operations Oside, Comoros (7 December – 16 December 1989) The Togo operation in 1986, as well as Operations Oside and Azalée in the Comoros in 1989 and 1995, also typified intervention missions by their very short duration, and pitching French troops against those perpetrating coups. During Oside, at the request of the Comorian government, France sent 200 paratroopers under the defense agreement passed on 17 August 196053. Operation Oside was sparked by the assassination of President Ahmed Abdallah (1919 - 1989) on the night of 26 - 27 November, and the threat to the stability of the Comoro Islands. Comorian local authorities and Armed Forces (500 troops) held 600 mercenaries responsible. Led by Bob Denard54, the mercenaries’ role on the island had been unclear for several years. President Abdallah’s assassination drew condemnation from the international community and sparked fears of a major conflict between the local authorities and the presidential guard. At the request of Comorian authorities, decision was made to launch an operation. The aim was to restore the Comorian authorities’ control over the country and compel the mercenaries to leave. Operational command was taken by the higher command of armed forces of the southern zone of the Indian Ocean (FAZSOI). Attached to these units were a paratrooper company from 2° REP in standby in Djibouti, an assistance training detachment from 1st RPIMa, the aviation detachment from Djibouti, paratroopers from 11th RPC and a mobile army surgical hospital55. Army Forces comprised 710 troops, supported by 490 navy personnel and several ships (1 escort ship, 1 light transport ship, 1 replenishment ship and 2 patrol boats)56. Besides reducing the threat from the presidential guard, the French Forces had to ensure the security of the 1,200 French nationals. Last, Security Force Assistance was performed to lead the Comorian Forces and, in the long term, ensure the external protection of the Comoros. The troops sailed on 12 December 1989 and, three days later, seized Hahaya airport, as well as the Kandani barracks and Hombo camp. Negotiations immediately got underway with the mercenaries and the military facilities were demilitarized. Eventually an agreement was reached whereby Bob Denard and 22 mercenaries would depart for South Africa, while nearly all presidential guards gathered in Kandani with no bloodshed. Oside officially ended on 16 December, 1989. The Military Training Assistance detachment stayed in the area to mentor the presidential guard, which became the Comorian Security Force57. No losses were suffered; the mercenaries withdrew when confronted with the paratroopers sent by French authorities. Azalée, Comoros (29 September – 11 October 1995) Another military coup occurred in the Comoro Islands in 1995 when the elected President, Said Mohamed Djohar, of the Comorian Republic was ousted by Bob Denard. Denard’s 40- or-so-strong team was accompanied by nearly 700 coup-perpetrating troops, some of whom had already participated in a previous coup. The Prime Minister took refuge in the French Embassy and requested French intervention under the 1978 French-Comorian defense agreements58. France agreed to intervene, particularly in order to protect French nationals (278 in Grande Comore). 53 Pierre Pascallon, Politique sécuritaire de la France en Afrique (French security policy in Africa), p. 19. 54 Walter Bruyère-Ostell, Histoire des mercenaires (A history of mercenaries), Tallandier, 2013. 55 From 7th RPCS (HQ and support parachute battalion). 56 CDEF/RETEX Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.80. 57 Until 8 January 1990. 58 André Dumoulin, La France militaire et l’Afrique (Military France and Africa), Brussels, Ed. Complexe, 1997, p. 115. 32 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter II: intervention operations France deployed a tactical HQ, four infantry companies, one reconnaissance platoon, one long range observation team, a forward signal party with military intelligence (DRM) teams, paratroopers from 13th RDP, personnel from 41st RT and from the armed forces information and public relations office. They were accompanied by a TF from special operations command (infantrymen from 1st RPIMa and a gendarmerie intervention team from GIGN) deployed on board two PUMA utility helicopters. Last, an aviation element was also deployed for the mission59. The Navy deployed several ships (one frigate, two patrol boats and one transport ship) and one Breguet Atlantic aircraft, as well as troops from the Navy’s Jaubert commando. The Air force contributed eight C-160 Transall aircraft, one C-130 Hercules, and one A-310 heavy lift aircraft. The mandate for Operation Azalée was to protect French nationals and successfully counter the coup. Operation Azalée, 1995, CDEF/DREX (French forces employment doctrine center): a typological inventory of operations, p. 222. On the night of 3 - 4 October, Navy commandos were deployed while 1st RPIMa was lifted by helicopters in order to seize the Iconi and Hahaya airports. By nightfall, the town of Moroni, where the French embassy was located, was under their control. On the evening of 4 October, Bob Denard released the President, who was then transferred to La Réunion Island. Denard and his mercenaries surrendered the next day; they were evacuated to mainland France and imprisoned. Meanwhile, the Comorian rebels were handed over to the Comorian authorities. On 11 October, with the situation partly stabilized, troops started to disengage, although the Azalée detachment stayed in order to ensure the security of French nationals and to help local authorities in rebuilding their security forces. At the end of the operation, there were only two wounded journalists, whereas the rebels counted 5 dead and approximately 10 wounded60. This type of operation did not occur again for various reasons. New international developments - the end of the Cold War in particular - brought drastic changes to the geopolitical roles of several countries. New political theories emerged, such as the “soft ideologies” explained in Joseph Nye’s Soft Power61, leading all countries to rethink international relationships. The conflicts that had made Africa central to European concerns had faded, making it possible for France to change the paradigm of intervention in Africa, particularly as François Mitterrand wished to be rid of 59 CDEF/RETEX Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), p.220. 60 CDEF/RETEX Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p. 224. 61 S. Joseph Nye, Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power, New York, Basic Books, 1990. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 33 Chapter II: intervention operations recurring accusations of “Françafrique”62 in a break from De Gaulle’s legacy. On 20 June 1990, Mitterand’s speech at the 16th France-Africa summit at La Baule marked this new direction. Penned by Erik Orsenna, the speech stressed how development should go hand-in-hand with democracy, with the aim of launching new operations and forging new relationships with African countries, whose sovereignty was now sacrosanct. Intervention operations belong to the period 1960-1990, with the principle of intervention making a comeback in 2013 with Operation Serval, launched at the request for assistance from the Malian state authorities in the wake of terrorist attacks63. 2.2. Assessment Setting aside any political assessment of these intervention operations, and what put an end to them, overall they can be judged as military successes. On a strategic level, they generally achieved the goals set. Hence why, in Gabon, President M’Ba’s power was restored. In Chad (1978) Operation Tacaud was primarily a military success: the rebels coming from the North, supported by Libya, were stopped in their advance towards southern Chad. The operations sparked negotiations between the various sides of the rebellion and the local authorities. When fighting broke out in the capital city, more than one thousand European civilians were evacuated to Libreville and Yaounde, while assistance to the local populace continued. In the long term however, and particularly from a political perspective, the mission proved a failure. Hence why, when tensions broke out again in N’Djamena, France disengaged. Tacaud, therefore, albeit a military success, was not a political success. Other missions fared better: in Zaire, Barracuda enabled non-combatant evacuation and repelled the “Katangais” offensive, while maintaining a permanent deployment in the Central African Republic near the border with Chad. Military intervention in Togo in 1986 prevented the downfall of the Togolese Head of State, General Eyadema, who had been threatened by a coup. Oside prevented Bob Denard’s coup perpetrators from taking power. Last, Azalée neutralized rebels and captured the mercenaries, who were transferred to mainland France for trial. These intervention missions had a significant surprise effect. They could be conducted at speed; French institutions authorize the French president to launch an intervention without first seeking approval from Parliament. From a military perspective, the implementation of the GUEPARD alert system also upped the speed of operations. Deployed for the first time in1967 in response to unrest in Djibouti64, GUEPARD applied to professional troops - in particular those that became the Rapid Reaction Force (FAR: force de réaction rapide) in 1983 - and included a 72-hour standby status for units that lasted one month. With the total professionalization of the Armed Forces and disbanding 62 In 1990, Pierre Péan’s book on Jacques Foccart was published. Pierre Péan, L’homme de l’ombre : éléments d’enquête autour de Jacques Foccart, l’homme le plus mystérieux et le plus puissant de la Vème République (The man in the shadow: investigation on Jacques Foccart, the most mysterious and powerful man of the 5th Republic), Paris, Fayard, 1990. Since then, several university research papers have been written, including Jean-Pierre Bat’s Le syndrome Foccart; la politique française en Afrique de 1959 à nos jours (the Foccart syndrome: French African policies from 1959 till today), Folio histoire, 2012, and Maurice Vaïsse/ Philippe Oulmont (dir.), De Gaulle et la décolonisation de l’Afrique subsaharienne (De Gaulle and the decolonization of sub-Saharan Africa), Karthala, 2014. There is also the unpublished book by Benoît Beucher, La Françafrique, entre mythe et réalités (Françafrique: between myth and reality), Brussels, Université libre, 2010, which provides an excellent summary of the issue. 63 Two successive phases can be distinguished in Operation Serval: one that can be categorized as intervention, and another as counterinsurgency. This will be addressed later on. 64 M. Goya, Les opérations extérieures en perspective historique 1962-2008 (Overseas operations within a historical perspective 1962-2008), art. cit., p.65. 34 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter II: intervention operations of the FAR in 1999, the alert system was extended to all land forces65. Today, the NG GUEPARD alert system66 enables designated units to be deployed for overseas operations under immediate (12 hours) or short (48 hours to 9 days) notice. This disposition maintains a brigade in a standby posture for six months, and involves up to 5,000 troops67. The speed of intervention is also due to the logistic capabilities of the French Army, particularly transport. In order to act quickly on a theater of operations several thousand kilometers from mainland France, the choice of air transport is crucial. In the late 1970s, the Military Air Transportation Command (COTAM) counted nearly 350 available aircraft, of 11 different types, with a total number of aircraft of 1,500, of thirty types. Military air transportation comprised three squadrons of twelve TRANSALL C-160s, four squadrons of fifteen NORATLAS N 2501s and four DOUGLAS DC-8s68. Although the TRANSALL aircraft could lift 16 tons of equipment or 89 troops69, and the NORATLAS only 8 tons or 45 troops70, decision was made to field C-130s from December 1987. The latter aircraft had a better lift capacity: up to 20 tons of equipment or 120 troops71. After the war in Algeria, Tacaud was a typical example of a detachment to Africa far from permanent bases72. The onward movement of troops and equipment was ensured by two DC-8s and two C-160s, with eight and sixteen round trips respectively73. As for Bonite, an initial airborne operation had been planned but then given up. Finally, the operation was confirmed and its date was brought forward in order to guarantee surprise effects; 2nd REP was airlifted to Kinshasa on US Air force aircraft74 then airdropped in two waves on Kolwezi, from Zairian C-130s and French C-160s75. The operation was conducted in adverse weather conditions, proving the adaptability of French forces. An initial intervention to evacuate French nationals from Bangui76 was considered, but this was soon given up. The airlift was performed from N’Djamena, where the Tacaud Forces took part in the operation. Chad’s proximity obviously added to the surprise effect, and was a crucial factor in achieving speedy execution. Airlift was performed first by two turn-rounds of eight C-160s, then four PUMA helicopters77. For Oside and Azalée, troops were fielded by sea and helicopter, made easier by the proximity of the Comorian island of Mayotte (40 minute-flight) and by the presence of troops in the Indian Ocean and Djibouti78. 65 Nicole Fouilleul, Entre professionnalité traditionnelle et professionalisation en cours, la cohésion dans les troupes de Marine (Between traditional professionality and ongoing professionalization, cohesion within Marine troops), Centre d’études en sciences sociales de la Défense, October 2001, p.39. 66 New Generation GUEPARD system. Upgraded in 2012, in 2014 it was integrated into the emergency national echelon defined in the 2013 French White Paper. 67 Directive for implementation of the GUEPARD alert system, Joint Publications PIA-7.0.1.1_GUEPARD (2013), n° D13010873/DEF/EMA/EMP.2/DR of 12 Sept. 2013 (Amended 9 October 2013). 68 Lieutenant-colonel Pierre Decaillot, De l’intérêt de la France de disposer d’un nombre minimum d’avions de transport militaires à grosse capacité et long rayon d’action (Why France needs a minimum number of military transport aircraft with significant carrying capacities and extensive range), Staff College technical certificate, 1979, p.7. 69 Air Force, transportation file: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/technologies/aeronefs/transport/transport, consulted 04/08/2014. 70 Nord N 2501 NORATLAS file: http://www.avionslegendaires.net, consulted 04/08/2014. 71 French air force, transportation file, art. cit. 72 The same year there was an operation in Lebanon. 73 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad), op. cit., p. 118. 74 Lieutenant-colonelP. Decaillot, De l’interêt de la France… (Why France needs …), op. cit., p.12. 75 CDEF/ DREX, Répertoire typologique des operations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.25. 76 Operation Black pass. 77 Department of Defense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad (French military interventions in Chad), op. cit., p. 362. 78 CDEF/ DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., pp.80 and 221. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 35 Chapter II: intervention operations Prepositioning is therefore a crucial factor; it makes rapid intervention possible. Although not formalized during the decolonization process despite a significant French presence in Africa79, prepositioning proved crucial during operations intervening in the center of Africa, Chad especially. Having troops present made it possible to plan and deploy for Barracuda; airlift was also performed from N’Djamena, while for Bonite it took an eight-hour flight from Solenzara, Corsica to Kinshasa80. Implementing Manta (1983) and Epervier (1986) was later made easier by this positioning, with equipment and logistical support from Central Africa. In the same vein, after Bonite, France expanded its area of influence to Zaire, a French-speaking, former Belgian colony, thereby creating a unique axis of presence in the heart of Africa, covering Chad, Central Africa and Zaire. This prepositioning process coincided with the process of professionalizing the Services. Until 1969, the Foreign Legion had been the only professional force81. With the number of operations growing, the disposition needed reinforcement, resulting in several Marine troops units becoming professional troops82 during the course of an initial operation in Chad. On the tactical level, these typically short-duration missions quickly brought to the fore French troops’ superiority in combat. They lasted from a few days (ten days for Oside, thirteen days for Azalée, two weeks in Gabon) to a few months (two months for Bonite, three months for the first part of Barracuda, seven months for the first phase of Tacaud. The aim was always to avoid becoming bogged down, minimizing losses and effectively seizing and destroying weapons. Thus, during Barracuda, more than 1,000 weapons were seized, including two light armored reconnaissance vehicles, four recoilless guns, fifteen mortars, twenty-one rocket-launchers, ten machine-guns and thirty-eight light machine-guns83. For France, these intervention missions were the opportunity to test out its Armed Forces and their doctrine on the African theater of operations. France’s superiority was particularly owed to good coordination across various branches, and to the individual and collective quality of French soldiers, as displayed during OperationTacaud when 110 troops from the Air force and the Navy were deployed in addition to Army troops. Ten JAGUAR aircraft and a KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft provided close air support, reinforcing the ground troops’ action. Meanwhile, the Navy projected commandos and naval aviation personnel (40 men in total) with a Breguet Atlantic aircraft. During Bonite, transportation air assets took part in the airborne operation; Zairian Mirage squadrons with French pilots were also deployed, but did not prove efficient84. For Barracuda, 40 Air Force and 20 Navy personnel were deployed. Last, Oside and Azalée included a substantial Navy component, due to the maritime environment of the theater of operations; the Air force was also involved, in particular for transport. 79 In 1964, there were more than 8,000 troops distributed across six countries, essentially Marine infantry soldiers: 1,400 in Niger, 1,200 in Central Africa, 1,600 in Congo and 3,000 in Chad. J.L. Dufour, Les troupes de marine dans les interventions africaines des années 1960 à nos jours (Marine troops in interventions in Africa from the 1960s until today), art. cit., p.263. 80 General Rémy Gausserès, Les enseignements de Kolwezi. Mai 1978 (Lessons learned from Kolwezi. May 1978), art. cit. p. 27. 81 Professionalization of marine troops started in 1969 (with 3rd RIMa based in Vannes and the 8th RPIMa based in Castres), so as to meet overseas operation requirements. 82 Nicole Fouilleul, Entre professionnalité traditionnelle et professionalisation en cours (Between traditional professionality and ongoing professionalization), op. cit., p.35. 83 R. Gausserès, Les enseignements de Kolwezi. Mai 1978 (Lessons learned from Kolwezi. May 1978), art. cit., p.30. 84 J.C. Saulnier, op. cit., p.120. 36 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 CHAPTER III COUNTERINSURGENCY MISSIONS 3.1. Towards a resurgence of counterinsurgency? A counterinsurgency mission is as a combat operation against an avowed enemy which, depending on the situation, territory or time period can be called an “insurgent”, “rebel”, “guerrilla” or “terrorist”. Well-entrenched on a specific territory, this enemy conducts sporadic operations and takes hostages from among the populace to assert himself against the legitimate authorities. The purpose of counterinsurgency is to regain control of the territory by establishing secure zones, while restoring the legitimate authorities by dissociating the populace from the identified insurgent organization. Although at first glance, counterinsurgency has a lot in common with intervention operations, the duration and assets deployed are different. Having conducted few counterinsurgency operations after 1962, France’s 1969 intervention in Chad marked a resumption of French counterinsurgency operations, with Operation Limousin, continuing in 1977 in Mauritania with Operation Lamantin. Then, in more recent times, there came Operation Serval in Mali. Limousin (March 1969 – September 1972) Chad became independent in 1960, but was rocked by internal crises fuelled by dissatisfaction among the rural masses. With economic difficulties and governmental authority mainly in the hands of ethnic groups from the south, opposition and rebellious movements emerged. The creation of a national liberation front (FROLINAT) in June 1966 and the build-up of a 1,500- strong army resulted in a situation that verged on insurgency in the center and east of the country and northern Tibesti. The 1,850-strong Chadian Armed Forces failed to control the situation despite an initial French deployment of troops from August to November 1968, under the defense agreement passed in May 1961 (3rd RPIMa deployed to support Chadian forces in their recapture of AOUZOU85). Chadian troops became quickly overwhelmed and the capital city came under threat. At the request of President François Tombalbaye, on 18 March 1969, General de Gaulle decided that French forces would intervene to prevent the political situation from deteriorating86. 85 In fact, this initial deployment can be regarded as the starting point of the operation. Colonel Michel Goya, L’intervention militaire française au Tchad (French military intervention in Chad 1969-1972), Lettre du RETEX – recherche n°6, 26 November 2013. 86 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit ., p.12. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 37 Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions (Chad, 1970, Operation Limousin, © ECPAD) Nearly 1,600 French troops were deployed in three main phases. An initial emergency intervention from April to September 1969 was aimed at stabilizing the military situation across the entire Chadian territory, particularly within Chad’s northern “préfectures” (administrative districts): Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti (BET). From September 1969 to June 1971, French troops engaged on the Chadian territory reorganized the Chadian Army, which doubled in strength. French Forces gradually disengaged from June 1971 to August 1972, handing operational responsibilities over to Chadian authorities. French forces were initially organized into five battalion task forces or tactical HQs in Mongo, Am Timam, Largeau, Abéché and N’Djamena. The first offensive was launched from Mongo, in the center and east of Chad. Upon arrival, the troops stationed in Mongo had to confront 250 rebels. With a combination of CAS and ground close combat, the French Forces regained ground; providing assistance to the populace and creating village militias, thereby ensuring National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) lost public support. From 1970, operations mostly took place in the north of the country. The new Libyan regime under Colonel Gaddafi had so much support for FROLINAT that in July it launched a series of offensives in the areas of Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti (BET). France had to send reinforcement troops from Fort-Lamy and Fort-Archambault in order to free outposts that had become surrounded by rebels87. 87 Those missions were also given code names: Operation Ephémère in March 1970; Operation Moquette in July 1970. 38 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions EMT: tactical headquarters Operation Limousin, April 1969, CDEF/DREX, Typological Inventory, op.cit., p.16. An offensive phase followed the defensive phase from January to June 1971: Operation Bison. 900 French troops and 350 Chadians tracked down the rebels in Tibesti, using 150 vehicles, 18 helicopters and 8 airplanes. Although the national liberation front ( FROLINAT ) suffered very heavy losses, it was not enough to tip the balance of power in the conflict. Due to heavy French losses (50 dead in three years88), decision was made not to deploy additional troops. As part of Chad (dubbed “useful Chad”) had been pacified and the Chadian army reorganized, the French started to disengage. However, France maintained a military technical assistance element, 6th RIAOM together with some Air force elements. The operation ended in summer 1972 with President Pompidou’s visit to Chad; a political event intended to highlight the success of the French engagement. Lamantin, Mauritania (December 1977 – July 1978) Although Lamantin was mainly an air operation, it is included in this paper as it implemented deployment capabilities that affected all other French operations in Africa. Central to this operation was Spanish Sahara; Algeria, Mauritania, Spain and Morocco were all making claims on it. In May 1973, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hara and Río de Oro (Polisario Front) emerged, which soon garnered the support of Algeria, and opposition from Mauritania and Morocco, leading to a French intervention. From 1975, the Polisario Front started attacking the mining industry, thereby launching raids against Mauritanian and French interests. The safety of French nationals became jeopardized in 1977, following several attacks during which French people were killed or kidnapped. With Mauritania also under threat, France decided to intervene at Mauritania’s request, with the aim of putting a stop to the Polisario Front’s raids89. 88 A. Foures, Caractères des interventions militaires françaises outre-mer de 1960 à nos jours (Features of French overseas military interventions from 1960 until today), art. cit. 89 General Michel Forget, Mauritanie 1977 : Lamantin, une intervention extérieure à dominante air (Mauritania 1977: an air-heavy overseas operation), Revue historique des armées, March 1992, n°186, p.4. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 39 Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions The mission was mainly assigned to the Air force, with the purpose of taking the Polisario Front by surprise just as it launched a raid and suppressing it. Particular to Lamantin was the fact that every French intervention had to be validated by the Mauritanian authorities prior to the French. As they could be called on at any time, French Forces had to be in a state of constant operational readiness. Operations were launched from Dakar, 1,000/1,500 kilometers away from the theater of operations, or a 5-hour flight-time. As for Army Forces, they operated within small teams of paratroopers, responsible for guiding Jaguar aircraft. Deployed in the field, the teams played a warning role and took part in launching offensive actions. The French intervention, combined with more efficient Mauritanian offensives, made it possible to gradually repel the Polisario Front’s attacks. However, a military coup in July 1978 ousted President Moktar Ould Daddah, thereby putting a stop to Mauritania’s claims on Western Sahara, and the raids stopped. Although this marked the end of Operation Lamantin, a small number of Lamantin forces would remain in place until May 1980. Serval, Mali (11 January 2013 – 31 July 2014) Serval is a typical example of an operation whose nature shifts as it develops. Initially an intervention mission, as operations developed it turned into counterinsurgency. Since becoming independent, Mali has experienced several waves of rebellions, some originating from the Tuareg, who claim to have been marginalized by central authorities. In October 2011, the Tuareg issue gave way to the creation of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). One of its branches turned radical and created an Islamist movement, Ansar Dine90. On 14 January 2012, both movements launched an offensive from the Adrar des Ifoghas towards the south of Mali, claiming self-determination and independence for Azawad (Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao provinces). The offensive ended in April, with the Tuareg proclaiming independence for northern Mali. During the summer, several terrorist groups (Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb, AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Ansar Dine opposed the MNLA and, in autumn, took control of northern Mali. They started to prepare an offensive towards the capital city. Meanwhile, after 2012’s political and military defeat, President Amadou Toumani was ousted by a military coup in March. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) enforced economic, financial and diplomatic sanctions against the military junta in Bamako, which were lifted after negotiations concluded in an agreement conferring power to the Parliament Speaker. In early January 2013, several terrorist units moved towards Southern Mali and seized the town of Konna. Malian state authorities then requested French assistance; French Armed Forces were committed on 11 January, deploying up to 4,500 land force troops. 90 Aware of the deteriorating situation in Sahel, CDEF/DREX (French Forces Employment Doctrine Center/ Lessons learned department) published a casebook on the issue in January 2013. Major (Reserve) Mériadec Raffray, Les rébellions touarègues au Sahel (The Tuareg rebellions in the Sahel), Cahiers du Retex, Recherche, CDEF/DREX, January 2013. 40 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions Tuareg claims, 2012. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 41 Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions Operation SERVAL can be divided into four clear phases91. - From 11 January to 22 February, French troops primarily endeavored to stop the terrorists’ advance. Several helicopter teams from the 4th RHFS stationed in Burkina- Faso engaged the column of pick-up vehicles of the Jihadist armed groups (GAD) or terrorist armed groups (GAT) in the center of the country. Over the next three days, fresh French Forces from the Marine troops and Foreign Legion were deployed in Mali92, with support from a company of combat engineers (6th RG) from the GUEPARD alert system in France. These troops formed the first Battalion Task Force (GTIA 1), tasked with security operations in the capital city’s airport, before launching the first large-scale ground offensive towards Sévaré and Diabali. Then, they made the Jihadist armed groups retreat towards the north, and, from 14 to 21 January, they took control of the Diabali-Kona line. Due to the enemy resistance encountered, on 21 January, decision was made to increase the number of soldiers. Serval increased from 750 to 2,500 personnel, forming three additional GTIAs, as well as a helicopter GAM93; (GTIA SÉVARÉ, January 2013, © ECPAD.) 91The data included in this chapter was taken from CDEF/DREX, Synthèse RETEX de l’opération Serval au Mali, janvier-mai 2013 (Lessons learned summary of Operation Serval in Mali, January-May 2013), Cahier du RETEX, November 2013, p.38 (DR classification), and from General Barrera’s book Opération Serval, notes de guerre. Mali 2013 (Operation Serval, wartime notes. Mali 2013), Paris, Seuil, 2015. 92 21st RIMa of the Epervier deployment (Chad) plus a troop from 1st REC and a PROTERRE battery from 3rd RAMa. A light tactical HQ and a platoon from 3rd RPIMa, a cavalry troop from 1st RHP from Operation Licorne (Côte d’Ivoire); two rifle companies from 2nd and 3rd RIMa. 93 GTIA2 with 92nd RI, GTIA3 from 1st RIMa, GTIA4 from 2nd REP. There was also a helicopter GAM. CDEF/DREX, Lessons learned summary of Operation Serval in Mali, op. cit., p.40. 42 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions - From 23 January to 12 February, the disposition’s build-up continued with the aim of recapturing the Malian territory and liberating it entirely. On 25 January, an offense reconnaissance was launched towards Timbuktu and Gao (GTIA1 and GAM). The assigned task was to prevent the enemy from laying traps in the area by arriving there before him. This GTIA was split into two elements supported by aviation, due to the 600 kilometers that had to be covered and the 164 vehicles that had to be moved94. Timbuktu and its airport were captured on 27 January. Meanwhile, the elements from the (Special Forces) Sabre disposition moved towards Gao. They captured the city’s bridge and airport by neutralizing some fifteen terrorists. On 28 January, French Forces along with Malian troops secured Bamako, Sévaré, Gao and Timbuktu. At that point, Serval counted 2,000 troops. To consolidate the troops’ advance towards the north and east of the country, order was given to seize Kidal and Tessalit airports and the town of Ménaka. - From 12 February to 15 April, French forces continued their advance in depth while split into two geographical areas: the north and the center. In the north, some of the troops tried to destroy AQIM forces. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) tried to get closer to French Forces which, from 16 February until 1 April, were engaged in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountain range. GTIA3 and GTIA4 and the Chadian Armed Force deployed in Mali (FATIM) moved into and searched the area (the Amettetai valley and Tigharghar cirque). The terrorist groups were well organized and held defensive positions, but at the end of the operations 250 terrorists had been neutralized, and forty tons of equipment and ammunition seized95. French troops then had to prevent a terrorist safe haven from becoming re-established in the area. In the center, the mission was tracking down the MOJWA around Gao. GTIA2 fought the MOJWA groups from 21 January to 15 April. After the fall of Gao, the groups quickly became disorganized, while the local populace increasingly cooperated with the Force. Broadly speaking, this matched the objectives of locating the withdrawal bases and camps of the MOJWA, causing attrition in its ranks and depriving it of resources (financial and grassroots support through trafficking). - From 16 April to May 2013, the final phase, a gradual disengagement, was organized so that the control of operations could be transferred over to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)96, which soon became the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)97. French Forces were downsized from 5,300 to 3,200 on 1 July, then to 2,500 in October 2013. However, the troops continued their action against terrorist groups in the eastern area around Gao and towards Tessalit and Kidal. The groups’ members tried to merge into the populace and avoid contact with the Serval Force. When Operation Serval came to an end in July 2014, to a large extent its objectives had been met: the terrorist groups that had threatened the capital city had been stopped; Serval put an end to long-term and deep-rooted terrorism in the northern Mali desert. Success was the fruit of resolute commitment of French troops, nonetheless, 9 were killed in action and some 60 wounded. The operations that were performed alongside Malian armed forces, however, or in coordination with the MISMA, then MINUSMA African forces, neutralized several hundred terrorists. 94 CDEF/DREX, Synthèse RETEX de l’opération Serval au Mali, janvier-mai 2013 (Lessons learned summary of Operation Serval in Mali, January-May 2013), Cahier du RETEX, November 2013, p.42. 95 CDEF/DREX, Synthèse RETEX de l’opération Serval au Mali, janvier-mai 2013 (Lessons learned summary of Operation Serval in Mali, January-May 2013) art. cit., p.54. 96 Authorized by the UN Security Council resolution 2085, 20 December 2012. 97 Created by UN Security Council resolution 2100, 25 April 2013. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 43 Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions They also located weapons and ammunition. France demonstrated its troops’ undisputable skills, moreover, with its allies’ support98, it was able to overcome the logistical challenge of the operation (Bamako is located 2,000 kilometers away from Tessalit). Flight hours totaled 13,000 hours, the fixed wing aircraft deployed performed 7,500 sorties (fighters, flying tankers, tactical and strategic airlift), delivering nearly 300 bombs99. (Mali, Operation Serval, ECPAD ©) 3.2. Assessment Thirty-five years separate Lamantin and Serval; France did not conduct any COIN operations in Africa during that period. The re-emergence of this type of operation can be explained by the presence of a clearly identified enemy, by the threats to regional stability, and the urgency of the situation. All these factors accounted for a return to a rapid intervention approach. While it was crucial to capitalize on a strategic surprise effect, for the most part, returning to COIN was nonetheless justified by a political and military desire for short wars100. Keeping the cost of the intervention down, in personnel and equipment, and avoiding soaring costs in overseas operations are also important factors. 98 Serval could rely on support from eight countries for airlift or in-flight refueling missions: Germany, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, United Kingdom, Spain, United States and the Netherlands. French Armed Forces Staff, Sahel reference file http://www.ema.defense.gouv.fr/operations/index.php/sahel/dossier-de-reference.html, consulted 17/03/2015. 99 GBU 12, GBU 49, AASM, MK82. The various logistics battalions that operated covered 400,000 kilometers per month, or 10 trips around the earth each month. 100 Colonel Michel Goya : La guerre de trois mois: l’intervention militaire en perspectives (A three-month war: prospects for military interventions), Politique étrangère, Summer 2013, vol. 78, n°2, pp.157-168. 44 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions Strategically speaking, Serval was a success: within the space of a few months, the situation in Mali had been stabilized, rebels’ offensives had been stopped, and the terrorist groups had been expelled from the north of the country. The same goes for other COIN missions. Limousin stopped the rebellion in its advance towards the south; the populace was provided with medical support free of charge and local forces were reorganized. France detached as many as 650 officers and NCOs to the Moussoro training center and Fort-Lamy military academy. However, for Chadian army leaders, the training proved insufficient; although “useful Chad” was pacified, the rebellion persisted in the north of the country. As the conflict situation had not been totally stabilized, and fresh rebel offensives broke out again, the launch of Operation Tacaud was required. Operation Lamantin in Mauritania can be analyzed in more or less in the same way; while the short-term objectives were met, the local situation did not change dramatically101, despite French assistance in enabling Mauritanian authorities to respond more efficiently to the Polisario Front’s attacks and better defend themselves against attacks on the territory. In the longer term, it seems that the success of these operations did not always lead to total suppression of the enemy. Thus in Mali, the regional terrorist threat has not completely disappeared; instead it capitalizes on its cross-border nature and the Sahel desert area to reorganize. In terms of Lessons Learned, the situation requires a longer-term strategy, with a focus on civil-military cooperation integrated into actions on perceptions and the operational environment. This will make it possible to restore local authorities and the socio-economic fabric, as well as organizing partnership between the regional states (G5 Sahel)102, to enable a rethink of how operations are conducted across the entire Sahel-Sahara belt103. 101 The conflict shifted to Morocco afterwards. M. Forget, Mauritanie 1977: Lamantin, une intervention extérieure à dominante air (Mauritania 1977: Lamantin an air-oriented overseas intervention), art. cit., p.5. 102 Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina-Faso. 103 This is no less than a comprehensive approach whose intellectual origin can be found in the approach developed by Gallieni and Lyautey. France encountered the value of civil-military cooperation again during the war in Afghanistan. See Sarah Aubertin, Le Développement, un défi aux relations entre forces armées et organisations civiles en Afghanistan (Development, a challenge to the relationships between armed forces and civilian organizations in Afghanistan), Cahier de la recherche doctrinale, CDEF/DREX, 2010. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 45 Chapter III: counterinsurgency missions Doctrinally speaking, these successes attest to the quality of the intervention force, in particular during those operations conducted in the 1970s by newly professionalized troops. For example, when deployed as part of the 1969 operation, 6th RIAOM based in Fort-Lamy was a professional unit104, as was 3rd RIMa when called to relieve 2nd REP. Today, the issue of professionalization is no longer relevant, particularly for Serval. However, what remains a success factor is a capacity for contingency intervention based on two systems: prepositioned forces and the GUEPARD alert system. Prepositioning proved a decisive factor in 2013, making it possible to convey troops at short notice and to stop the terrorist offensives rushing towards Bamako. But prepositioning was not just a question of transportation logistic issues; French troops in Africa provided skills in various areas, such as the provision a combined arms HQ (Senegal), the presence of Special Forces (Burkina Faso) capable of committing aviation assets and one commando, or enough forces to form a GTIA (Epervier in Chad), or for conveying or transiting troops (Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire)105. Serval was also an opportunity to test the efficiency of the NG (new generation) GUEPARD alert system. Land Forces Command (CFT) was able to deploy troops on standby in mainland France: nearly 200 troops were deployed within 48 hours of the operation’s launch. For example, a company from 2nd RIMa was sent on 12 January after only 8 hours’ preparation106. In Mali, 60% of French troops came from the NG GUEPARD alert system. Tactically speaking, both in the past and today, French soldiers have proven superiority in combat. In the 1970s, Chadian rebels, armed merely with submachine guns and rifles, were unable to achieve efficiency in combat107. Moreover, they were overwhelmed by the French capacity for incorporating airlift, reconnaissance and fire support assets, in particular helicopter air assault forces. However, despite its tactical superiority, France suffered heavy losses (50 dead) so the offensive in Chad stopped after 1972. Forty years later, with Serval, tactical superiority in combat was once again a key element for success. The surprise caused by the scale of the deployment was such that the enemy chose to flee rather than confront the columns of armored vehicles and air support assets. The first objective of recapturing territory was achieved without any fighting108. Then, while keeping a rapid tempo, French forces conducted a maneuver covering a wide range of capabilities: close combat, counter-IED, field artillery fire support, air-to-surface fire support (guided bombs, rockets, cannons, missiles), aérocombat (Army Aviation) thanks to the constant presence of helicopters, logistics (significantly distances over Malian territory, desert climate) and Security Force Assistance (SFA). These operations fall within the category of standard quick response interventions, whose efficiency has been proven109. 104 Colonel Michel Goya, L’intervention militaire française au Tchad (French military intervention in Chad 1969-1972), Lettre du RETEX – recherche n°66, 26 November 2013, p.3. 105 Christophe Guilloteau and Philippe Nauche, L’opération Serval au Mali (Operation Serval in Mali), Information report 1288, 18 July 2013, p.37. 106 Christophe Guilloteau and Philippe Nauche, L’opération Serval au Mali (Operation Serval in Mali), op. cit., p.38. 107 Claude d’Abzac-Epezy and Jérôme de Lespinois, Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique, des années 70 aux années 90: l’exemple du Tchad (French military interventions in Africa, from the 1970s to 1990s: the Chadian example) in Pierre Pascallon, La politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique (French security policy in Africa), Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004, p.54. 108 Synthèse RETEX de l’opération Serval au Mali, janvier-mai 2013 (Lessons Learned summary of Operation Serval in Mali, January-May 2013), p.48. 109 Colonel Michel Goya, Mali : l’intervention militaire en perspectives (Mali: perspectives on military interventions), CESAT Casebooks n°33, September 2013, p.15. 46 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 CHAPTER IV COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS 4.1. Enduring or influence operations A combat support operation is a long-duration combat mission whose final objective is to rebuild national forces behind a defense line. France’s support missions in Africa are derived from intervention and counterinsurgency missions that were launched in the late 1970s. Although at times these can be very short duration missions, they form part of a longer-term “influence” policy distinct from the former French “backyard”. Operation Verveine in Zaire was an example110. Roughly speaking, these support operations continue in the same vein as previous operations such as Limousin, Tacaud and Barracuda. France deployed troops in the long term for Operations Epervier (Chad, 1986-2014), or Boali (Central African Republic, 2002-2013). Verveine, Zaire (6-16 April 1977) After Patrice Lumumba, one of Belgian Congo’s leading independence figures, was ousted by Joseph Kasa-Vubu, the first President of Congo-Kinshasa, in 1961, Joseph Désiré Mobutu eventually came to power with American support, as the US tried to stem the tide of communism in Africa. Mobutu was first appointed President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (1965-1971), before changing the country’s name to Zaire in 1971, as his grip on power became increasingly autocratic. However, since becoming independent, Zaire had become locked into a series of Blocks that were damaging the country’s economic interests; a situation accentuated by recurring internal crises: rebellions in 1964-1965, student demonstrations in 1969 and 1971, etc. In March 1977, another conflict –the Shaba war – further destabilized the country. Thousands of militiamen from the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo crossed the border between Angola and Zaire to invade the Shaba province (formerly Katanga). The “Katangese Tigers” seized the towns of Kisengi, Kapanga and Dilolo. As a target of the Polisario Front’s attacks, Morocco offered to help Zaire, with a view to more easily countering the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that was thought to be siding with Algeria and the Polisario Front. The considerable distance between Morocco and Zaire, however, did lead to logistical problems. Together, Joseph Désiré Mobutu and King Hassan II requested France’s help. France agreed to intervene under the 1975 military cooperation agreement between Paris and Kinshasa. This primarily airborne operation enabled France to take a position beyond its former colonization zone and extend its influence. Operation Verveine was launched on 6 April 1977. The next day, 11 TRANSALL C-160s took off towards Rabat. An air-bridge between Morocco and Zaire started on 9 April, involving the 11 TRANSALLs and 2 DC-8Fs, i.e. an overall strength of 140 crew and support personnel. Verveine ended on 16 April with the disengagement of the French detachment. In the space of one week, a total of 125 vehicles, 9 trailers and 36 tons of freight had been airlifted111. The conflict came to an end on 26 May when 110 Major Laurent Levitte, L’opération Verveine en 1977: maîtrise de la projection de force et diplomatie aérienne (Operation Verveine in 1977: full command of force projection and air diplomacy), Penser les ailes françaises, n°24, Winter 2010-2011, pp.61-70. 111 Major Laurent Levitte, L’opération Verveine en 1977 : maîtrise de la projection de force et diplomatie aérienne (Operation Verveine in 1977: full command of force projection and air diplomacy), art. cit., p.68. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 47 Chapter IV: combat support operations Zairian forces recaptured Kapanga. Operation Verveine proved a success, despite the Katangese Tigers returning the next year in the attack against Kolwezi, which necessitated another intervention, Operation Bonite. Manta, Chad (9 August 1983 – 11 November 1984) After Operation Limousin in 1969, France returned to Chad through Operation Tacaud (March 1978 – May 1980), then again in August 1983 with Operation Manta. France resumed operations in the middle of Africa after negotiations in 1980 led to the setting up of a Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) headed by President Goukouni Oueddei, a former rebel leader and rival of Hissène Habré. Despite the peace efforts, conflict broke out again with former Prime Minister Habré’s loyalists. The conflict was still raging as French troops evacuated Chad in 1980. Goukouni Oueddei Operation Manta, a map by Stéphane Mantoux, Les guerres du Tchad (The wars in Chad), Lemme publisher, 2014 © 48 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter IV: combat support operations was overthrown by Hissène Habré in June 1982. With the support of Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi, GUNT rebel forces tried to bring down the government, launching a powerful offensive in 1983 that seized Abéché and put N’Djamena under threat. In July 1983, France started developing an NEO operation (Operation Bernacle) from Cameroon, in order to intervene in case the situation deteriorated. Despite a few Chadian successes - Hissène Habré recaptured Faya-Largeau on 30 July the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) and the Libyans especially overwhelmed the regular armed forces thanks to their modern and sophisticated equipment, including aircraft to support ground forces (Faya-Largeau was bombed by Libyan SU-22 SUKHOIs112). With the US backing Hissène Habré against Colonel Gaddafi, President François Mitterrand was persuaded to launch a direct intervention on 9 August 1983. France sent equipment and instructors prior to committing troops. At the peak of the operation, 3,500 service members - including 3,200 from the army had been deployed113, making Manta the biggest overseas operation launched by France since the Algerian war. While the first phase of the deployment was being organized from 9 to 23 August, instructors were sent to the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT). The French forces were organized into two elements: one stationed in N’Djamena and the other in Abéché (Task Force Echo). Another Task Force was set up around Moussoro and Salal (Task Force Oscar) from 15 August. Reinforcements were also deployed from France and Central Africa; the latter troops came from French SFA elements, bringing the number of troops deployed to 1,000. From 2 September until 21 December 1983, as the deployment was consolidated it was confronted with several offensive attempts by the rebels and Libyans. In response, Army Aviation, artillery and armored assets were reinforced as the airstrip at N’Djamena could not accommodate BOEING 747 airplanes114. Another Task Force was positioned in Ati (Task Force Charlie) along with a company-sized unit from Gabon. To confront the Libyan air threat, Twelve PUMA SA 330 helicopters, nineteen GAZELLE helicopters, three L-19 observation airplanes, two NORD 2501 transport airplanes, four JAGUARs, four MIRAGEs, two BREGUET ATLANTICs and two KC-135 STRATOTANKERS were deployed as part of Army Aviation and the Air force. Crucially, in order to thwart the Libyan air raids, France deployed a number of SNERI light airport surveillance radars on the Chadian theater, in Moussoro, Ati and N’Djamena, as well as CROTALE air defense missile batteries in N’Djamena and a SPARTIATE radar (Army multipurpose instrument flight control and landing system for helicopters) in Biltine 115. The deployment was designed to play a deterrence role and to deny access to southern Chad. 112 P. de Tonquédec, Opération Tacaud (Operation Tacaud), op. cit., p.113. 113 They came from 9th DIMa, 31st Brigade, 11th DP, Aviation brigade, 13th RDP, 44th RT, 5th RHC and to the EM/FAR (Rapid reaction force HQ). CDEF/DREX Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.54. 114 Claude d’Abzac-Epezy and Jérôme de Lespinois, Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique, des années 70 aux années 90 : l’exemple du Tchad (French military interventions in Africa, from the 1970s to 1990s: the Chadian example), art. cit., p.62. 115 Arnaud Delalande, De Manta à Epervier : opérations aériennes au-dessus du Tchad (From Manta to Epervier: air operations over Chad), http://airpower.over-blog.com, 13 December 2013, consulted 03/21/2014. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 49 Chapter IV: combat support operations Operation Manta, 1983 © ECPAD While the French deployment had so far been defenseoriented, January 1984 saw the French launch an air offensive. Libya supported and encouraged Goukouni Oueddei in seizing Zigey, near Salal. In response, an air operation was launched in Toro Doum, north of Zigey, during which France lost a JAGUAR and its pilot116. The number of French troops increased from 2,850 to 3,500117. From then on, no large-scale rebel breakthrough occurred; the Libyans were stopped in the north and, with cracks starting to appear between the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) forces and the Libyan troops, the coalition began to fall apart118. Negotiations were organized between France, Chad and Libya, and an agreement on the “simultaneous and concomitant withdrawal” of French and Libyan troops was signed in September 1984. Manta ended on 11 November 1984 with troop disengagement119. The losses were 13 dead and 8 wounded120. 116 Claude d’Abzac-Epezy and Jérôme de Lespinois, Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique, des années 70 aux années 90 : l’exemple du Tchad (French military interventions in Africa, from the 1970s to 1990s: the Chadian example), art. cit., p.56. 117 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.55. 118 Arnaud Delalande, De Manta à Epervier : opérations aériennes au-dessus du Tchad (From Manta to Epervier: air operations over Chad), art. cit. 119 With Operation Silure (25 September – 11 November 1984). 120 CDEF/DREX Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.57. 50 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter IV: combat support operations Epervier, Chad (16 February 1986 – 31 July 2014) Having signed the September 1984 agreements, Colonel Gaddafi was expected to withdraw his troops from Chadian territory. However, not only did Libya maintain troops in the Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti areas, it increased their number and its deployment, as shown by the 3,800-meter airstrip for heavy lift aircraft built in Ouadi-Doum121. Gathering his troops in the north of Chad, with support from rebels in the south, Colonel Gaddafi hoped to topple Hissène Habré’s government in order to put the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) forces that were friendly to Tripoli in its place. Soon, he resumed his attacks towards N’Djamena and on 10 February 1986, GUNT troops attacked several communities beyond the “red line” set along the 16th parallel by Paris. France immediately responded with the launch of Operation Epervier122. The operation’s defining feature was the primacy of air operations. The troops were made up of 600 Army123 and 800 Air force personnel124. The Army elements’ task was to execute static protection operations on the N’Djamena and Moussoro sites thanks to anti-aircraft batteries, to prevent any large-scale action south of the 16th parallel, and, most importantly, to train the Chadian national armed forces, and accompany them in recapturing the north of the country125. While Operation Epervier could have relied almost solely on the Air force, this was because it was helped by successful military and technical assistance in the meantime, enabling a significant build-up of the FANTs. Against them were 5,500 Libyan troops and 1,500 Chadian coalition rebels, equipped with heavy armored vehicles and powerful artillery assets. Significant air support was available, as Libya had 489 French and Soviet combat aircraft, including sixteen TUPOLEV Tu-22 bombers, MIRAGE and MiG fighters and around twenty ANTONOV transport aircraft126. Help for Libya also came in the form of advisors from East Germany and Cuba. Over the course of several phases, Epervier became an enduring operation. The deployment was built up from February to March 1986, with reinforcement after November, as even with the deployment of around 40 aircraft, the French forces were still fewer in number than the Libyan air force. In a purely defensive posture, initially France only had support for the Chadian national armed forces and recapturing the north. From 1 June to 10 September 1987, the Chadian forces unsuccessfully tried to recapture the Aouzou strip in the far north of the Chadian territory. They also performed a raid deep into the Libyan territory that resulted in the successful destruction of the Maaten Al Sarra base. On 11 September 1987, a cease-fire was concluded between Chad and Libya, making it possible to reduce the number of French troops to 1,200. On 31 August 1989, the Algiers agreement was signed between Chad and Libya, putting an end to the conflict127. 121 Pierre de Tonquédec, Face à Khadafi, Opération Tacaud (Confronting Gaddafi, Operation Tacaud), op. cit., p. 113. 122 Claude d’Abzac-Epezy and Jérôme de Lespinois, Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique, des années 70 aux années 90 : l’exemple du Tchad (French military interventions in Africa, from the 1970s to 1990s: the Chadian example), art. cit., p.57. 123 The Army troops came from the FAR, 13th RDP, 402nd and 403rd RAs. 124 Equipped with 16 JAGUARs, 4 KC-135 STRATOTANKERs, 4 MIRAGEs, 7 C-160s and 5 SA 330 PUMA helicopters. 125 Jérôme de Lespinois, Emploi de la force aérienne au Tchad 1969-1987 (Employment of air force assets in Chad 1969 – 1987) art. cit., p.74. 126 Claude d’Abzac-Epezy and Jérôme de Lespinois, Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique, des années 70 aux années 90 : l’exemple du Tchad (French military interventions in Africa, from the 1970s to 1990s: the Chadian example), art. cit., p.57. 127 A. Delalande, De Manta à Epervier : opérations aériennes au-dessus du Tchad (From Manta to Epervier : air operations over Chad), art. cit. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 51 Chapter IV: combat support operations Operation Epervier, map by Stéphane Mantoux, Les guerres du Tchad (The wars in Chad), Lemme publisher, 2014 © 52 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter IV: combat support operations The conflict caused no human losses. It demonstrated the extent to which France was capable of supporting a country in difficulty. French assistance was preceded by an observation mission (Mission Musaraigne) that was tasked solely with informing the French authorities of the airstrip’s construction128. French assistance took the form of bombing the Ouadi-Doum airstrip (Mission Trionyx) to prevent Libyan air forces from bombing the Chadian territory: on 16 February 1986, eleven Jaguars protected by Mirage aircraft destroyed the facility. In response, a Libyan Tupolev Tu-22 dropped four bombs on N’Djamena airport the next day, damaging the airstrip. Restoring air superiority on the Chadian territory made an air-bridge possible over the Chadian capital, nonetheless, the Libyan bombing showed that aircraft based on Libyan territory could inflict damage129. On 5 September 1987, the Chadian attack on Maaten Al Sarra also instigated a Libyan air response: two Tu-22s attempted bombing French facilities in N’Djamena on 7 September. With the French MIRAGE unable to intercept them in time, 403rd RA stopped the enemy aircraft with Hawk missiles130. The second missile launch was a success, destroying the Tu-22 while its four missile hatches were open. The Tu-22’s four bombs were ejected, although they did not explode on impact as they had not been activated131. The second Tu-22 bombed Abéché without results, and managed to escape without being hit by AD artillery132. A combat support mission initially designed as an overseas operation in 1986, Operation Epervier gradually shifted into a permanent stationing deployment, becoming one of the links of French prepositioned bases in Africa. It formed part of a policy of influence and strongholds in Africa disclosed at the end of the conflict between Chad and Libya. Shifting into a permanent deployment organization was justified by it being necessary to protect French interests, in particular non-combatants living in Chad, and to provide logistical support for Chadian armed forces. French troops also provided medical support to the populace, and offered support in education and health. Last, the Force could be called upon to make its capabilities and infrastructure available to national and international contingents, as for the EUFOR/Chad/Central African republic and MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad). Just prior to August 2014, around 950 French troops were deployed for Epervier through a joint HQ, a battalion TF (320 soldiers and 80 vehicles) executing reconnaissance tasks, compounds guard duty and providing combat support to Chadian forces, an air task force (150 troops and around 12 aircraft) accomplishing fighter and reconnaissance missions, and a joint support base for operation support of units. These troops were deployed on N’Djamena air base, the detachment in Abéché camp and the detachment in Faya-Largeau133. 128 General (retired) Bernard Molard, L’air et l’espace : une continuité stratégique (Air and Space: a strategic continuity), in Penser les ailes françaises, n°20, Summer 2009, pp.116-125. 129 Claude d’Abzac-Epezy and de Jérôme Lespinois, Les interventions militaires françaises en Afrique, des années 70 aux années 90: l’exemple du Tchad (French military interventions in Africa, from the 1970s to 1990s: the Chadian example), art. cit., p.58. 130 Colonel Jean-Pierre Petit, Le succès du Hawk au Tchad, (The successes of Hawk missile employment in Chad), in Les cahiers du RETEX n°6, 2002. 131 Arnaud Delalande, De Manta à Epervier : opérations aériennes au-dessus du Tchad (From Manta to Epervier: air operations over Chad), art. cit. 132 Jérôme de Lespinois, Emploi de la force aérienne au Tchad 1969-1987 (Employment of air assets in Chad 1969 – 1987), art. cit. p.74. 133 Joint armed forces staff, Chad reference file: http://www.ema.defense.gouv.fr/operations/index.php/tchad/dossierde-reference.html, consulted 03/24/2014. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 53 Chapter IV: combat support operations Noroît, Rwanda (4 October 1990 – 13 December 1993) Until the start of the colonial period, the Tutsi ethnic community had wielded power in Rwanda, despite their being in the minority. After Rwanda’s independence in 1962 heralded the start of the democracy process, the Hutu majority took power, forcing part of the Tutsis into exile. From there, the Tutsis created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) in order to regain power, garnering the support of Uganda, in line with the expansionist views of its president. On 1 October 1990, the rebel forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front crossed the border; leading to ethnic-based domestic unrest. This violence triggered a French intervention under the 1975 agreements between France and Rwanda134. With French and foreign expatriates’ security was at risk, Operation Noroît was launched on 4 October 1990. The operation can be broken down into three phases. From 5 to 16 October 1990, French Forces organized the evacuation of nationals from Kigali and Ruhengeri (770 and 170 nationals respectively) and assisted in restoring order together with Belgian forces. From 17October to 5 December, the deployment was reduced; troops only provided security at the airport, before the mission became one of presence and assistance to the Rwandan armed forces (FAR) until December 1993. On site, force strength evolved according to the assigned tasks. Thus, in a first phase, a tactical HQ with two motorized and airborne companies with teams from 13th RDP were committed. From December 1990, a tactical HQ was sent in relief for troop rotation, just as the military training assistance detachment was deployed from April 1991, comprising paratroopers from 11th Airborne Division and positioned in Ruhengeri. Army troops numbered around 350, then 200 from December 1990135. The only operations conducted during Noroît were an intervention due to unrest in the south of the country in February 1992 and NEO Volcan in Ruhengeri in February 1993. The October coup in Burundi and the raid performed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) in November 1993 did not change the deployment organization; troops were nevertheless called upon by the government and NGOs for humanitarian logistical support. The implementation of the Arusha agreements between the Rwandan government and the FPR signed on 4 August 1993, and the expected deployment of a UN force - the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda - led to the end of Operation Noroît in December 1993. Balata – Aramis, Cameroon (February 1994 – 31 May 2008) In the mid-1990s, France deployed troops to Cameroon to assist with the dispute with Nigeria over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula, as part of Operations Balata and Aramis. In a first phase, in compliance with the defense and cooperation agreements signed in 1974, France deployed two PUMA helicopters and parachute commandos136, then, in order to survey the borders, sent fifty troops to assist with command, logistics, intelligence, operational training and evacuation. Fourteen years after its launch, the operation ended on 31 May 2008, after political agreements declared the Bakassi peninsula to be part of Cameroon. 134 Pierre Pascallon, La politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique (The French security policy in Africa), art. cit., p. 19. 135 According to the organization of relief, they originated from 2nd REP, 3rd RPIMa, 8th RPIMa, 2nd RIMa, 1st RPIMa, 21st RIMa and 1st RI. CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.90. 136 Operation Aramis: www.alat.fr / page 211.html, consulted 03/25/2014. 54 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter IV: combat support operations Boali, Central African Republic (October 2002 – December 2013) When Operation Bonite in Zaire ended in 1981, France deployed EFAO Security Force Assistance (SFA) elements. Their mission was multidimensional: assisting with the build-up of Central African armed forces, while their bases in Bangui and Bouar were used for force prepositioning in Africa and for troops’ acculturation and training137. They then participated in several operations in Africa: Manta in Chad, then Noroît, Volcan, Amaryllis and Turquoise in Rwanda, Requin in Gabon, Verdier in Togo and Bajoyer in Zaire. In October 1997, the EFAO elements left Central Africa in a six-month disengagement process (Operation Cigogne, October 1997 - April 1998). Following a decision from the French President, French Forces were to refocus on Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Chad and Djibouti. However, their presence was maintained through the cooperation program of African peacekeeping capability reinforcement (RECAMP) that was made official at the same time. Despite the RECAMP program, stability was far from being attained in Central Africa. In October 2002, President Chirac and President Bozizé, who had just taken power after a coup, signed an agreement that resulted in the launch of Operation Boali in March 2003. Against a backdrop of marked political instability, Central African Armed Forces and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) needed support. 300 troops were scheduled in October 2002, though in reality Mission Boali comprised 200-250 troops within a HQ, an infantry company and a sustainment detachment. Together with cooperating volunteers, they performed training and advisory tasks in support of units, NCOs and officers of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), as well as with some units of the Multinational Force in Africa (FOMUC)138 in order to develop technical and tactical skills. In November 2006, French troops provided intelligence and logistic combat support for the FOMUC in Birao, as well as air fire support. Reinforcements were sent to the Central African Republic from Gabon and mainland France thanks to the GUEPARD alert system. In March 2007, the airfield on the outskirts of Birao was recaptured from the rebels of the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR). Some units that were prepositioned in Chad, Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire, along with forces from mainland France, were deployed to help an SFA detachment that had become isolated in the city and under rebel threat139. In December 2012, a marine infantry company (from 8th RPIMa) was tasked with ensuring the security of French nationals and facilities in Bangui, the capital city. Reinforcements came in the form of a tactical HQ and a foreign legion company (2nd REP) from Gabon, together with a company of 2nd REI and two PUMA helicopters from Chad. More than 600 French troops were deployed. In March 2013, conflict resumed around Bangui, requiring a 300-strong reinforcement of French troops from Gabon, sent in addition to the 250 troops already present in Central Africa. 137 CDEF/DREX, Opérations en Afrique Centrale: Epervier et Boali (Operations in Central Africa: Epervier and Boali), Cahiers du RETEX, March 2008. Florent de Saint Victor, 45 ans d’opérations militaires françaises en République Centrafricaine (45 years of French military operations in the Central African Republic), Lettre de RETEX/Opérations n°8, 9 December 2013, pp.1-8. The rest of the paragraph is based on these two sources. 138 The Multinational Force in Africa (FOMUC) was created in 2002. It was replaced by the FOMAC (Multinational Force in Central Africa) on 12 July 2008. 139 CDEF/DREX, Retours d’expérience (Lessons Learned) 1 / 2007, Cahiers du RETEX, October 2007, p.75. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 55 Chapter IV: combat support operations Boali: training and advisory missions in support of units, NCOs and officers of the Central African armed forces. - © ECPAD/EMA The relationship between France and Central Africa changed in April 2010, with the amendments made after the renegotiation of various defense agreements in Africa (following the 2008 “White Paper on National Defense and Security”). The defense partnership no longer provided for French intervention, even in the case of interference from abroad. This is why ever since the SELEKA (a coalition of political parties and rebel forces opposed to Central African president François Bozizé) took power in March 2013, the Boali detachment has focused on protecting French nationals and strategic key points (diplomatic facilities, non- combatant collection points) and on logistical, administrative and technical support for the African stabilization Force in Central Africa140 and the security of M’poko airport. The reinforcements were partly disengaged in June 2013, downsizing French troops to 400 prior to the deployment of Operation Sangaris on 5 December 2013, replacing Operation Boali. 140 The former FOMUC became the Mission for the consolidation of peace (MICOPAX) in July 2008, then, in December 2013, the International support mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). 56 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter IV: combat support operations 4.2. Assessment From a strategic perspective, Operations Manta and Epervier were successful. Manta put a stop to the rebels’ southward offensives and negotiations followed. Epervier was a complete success as it put an end both to the war between Chad and Libya and to the Northern rebels’ offensives which had occurred repeatedly since 1969. Its durability allowed for the build-up of the Chadian Army; this was consolidated as a professional army capable of decisive operations such as Maaten Al Sarra on 5 September 1987. A permanent deployment system made it possible to stabilize the area. Noroît in Rwanda and the “twins” Balata/Aramis in Cameroon all came to an end as the two warring parties came to an agreement. For example, in Rwanda, the signing of agreements between the rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the government brought a return to a peaceful situation and the deployment of a UN force. The detachment’s various goals had nonetheless been achieved (NEO, protection of designated facilities and personnel, training and reorganization of local forces). Last, the French presence deterred the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) from launching offensives around Kigali. In Cameroon, the presence of French troops spurred on negotiations and the signing of agreements. As for Boali, it successfully ensured the protection of French nationals and interests in Bangui, particularly after the SELEKA took power in March 2013. Although the operation partly helped train some troops of the Central African Armed Forces, progress remains to be made, as it was the inefficiency of these forces in the war against the UFDR rebels, then against the SELEKA members, that led to the launch of Operation Sangaris. From an operational perspective, the success of these operations is explained by the French Army’s capability for intervening rapidly in Africa. This capability stems from the prepositioning of troops, the quality of transport infrastructure (air in particular) and the effectiveness of the GUEPARD alert system. French troops in Cameroon initially supported Manta in launching Operation Bernacle and in Central Africa, in Gabon and in Chad for deploying fighter aircraft for Operation Orque141. Prepositioning also proved useful when it came to deploying reinforcements, whether from France or from Central Africa, with the commitment of French SFA elements. While Epervier relied on prepositioned support, it provided logistic capabilities for the following French operations: Noroît and Turquoise in Rwanda, Requin in Gabon, Verdier in Togo, Croix du Sud I and II in Niger, Pelican II and III in Congo, Khaya in Côte d’Ivoire and Artemis Mamba in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The quality of prepositioning also depends on France providing transportation assets to convey troops and equipment on the theater of operations. During Operation Verveine, the complexity and scale of the transportation means deployed illustrated the French Army’s operational efficiency. Even if it was a small-scale operation compared to the 1948 Berlin or 1992 Sarajevo air-lifts, Verveine was nevertheless an excellent testing ground for the response and overseas intervention capabilities of military air transport142. Sometimes, as with Manta, the initial logistical difficulty was mitigated by forces prepositioning. 141 CDEF/RETEX Répertoire typologique des opérations (typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.55. 142 Victor Bréhat, L’opération Verveine, chronique (A chronicle of Operation Verveine), Revue de la defense nationale, July 1977, pp.162-165. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 57 Chapter IV: combat support operations Last, from a tactical perspective, the French Army demonstrated that it had learned from past experience across the various theaters of operations. Manta integrated the lessons learned from Tacaud, in particular as regards Army Aviation employment. The French Forces’ tactical efficiency stems from the employment of professional units from the Rapid Reaction Force. Their experience and expertise when it comes to intervening in Africa meant that theirs was a real intervention during combat support missions. Epervier also capitalized on its duration and on the lessons learned from previous operations: Limousin, Tacaud or Manta. However, as Epervier was an air-oriented mission, the courses of action were different. The deployment system was based on air and air-defense deterrence, while the land component was tasked with holding the ground with air support and with protecting AD assets, in particular the missile batteries. On the whole, however, combat support missions are often similar to assistance missions. Noroît and the Rwandan Armed Forces are an example; besides NEOs from Kigali and Ruhengeri, (legionnaires from 2nd REP rescued and evacuated non-combatant nationals in the south of the country in February 1992) there were few operational activities. (Civil-military cooperation in a Malian village, 2013 – J. Lempin © ECPAD / Joint Staff) 58 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 CHAPTER V PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (INTERPOSITION) 5.1. From combat to stability operations An interposition mission is a stability operation, without any avowed enemy. The goal is to interpose between two warring parties. These missions stem from a significant shift in the international context in the early 1990s, as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (1991) and the end of the Cold War put an end to the peripheral conflicts between the East and West in Africa. With it seemingly no longer necessary to support former allied regimes, there was a political shift in France’s challenges in Africa after the France- Africa Summit in La Baule on 20 June, 1990. In the late 1980s, the minister and former doctor and founder of the NGO “Médecins sans Frontières”, Bernard Kouchner, set the ball rolling by advocating the “humanitarian right to interfere”. This stemmed the idea that non- governmental organizations should be included among regular contributors to conflict resolution, and that “military-humanitarian” interventions were possible. Militarily, this led to a growing number of stability operations in which France was responsible for protecting French nationals and the local populace during conflict, while troops could not use their weapons except for self-defense. Paradoxically, as these operations took place in countries with longstanding and strong ties to France, such as Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Central Africa (where there was a permanent deployment of troops), or Rwanda (not a former colony, but a French-speaking country where France wanted to extend its influence), these interposition missions corroborated the notion that France intervened only within its former “backyard”. On the other hand, France was also involved in Ethiopia, Angola and Somalia; countries with weak historical links to France. These operations were conducted within a UN or EU framework in the second half of the 1990s, based on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle issued by the UN General Assembly. Thus, to some extent, French interposition operations reflect France’s past in Africa and its permanent legacy, as well as international political decisions. 5.2. Various operation mandates and contexts Interposition operations meet various mandates to fulfil peacekeeping requirements. In order to end a conflict, French Forces need to make it possible to establish a peaceful, or at least safe environment, while specifically avoiding naming either warring party an “enemy”. Military skills are therefore put to use during these operations, while warfighting is avoided. Whether for area control, organizing transport logistics or interposing between warring parties, orders cover military procedures such as installing combat posts, or performing observation or patrol tasks, but the usual warfighting dimension that previously defined them is lacking143. From Verdier in Togo and Benin in 1991 to 143 Jacques Thouvenin, Quelles ressources pour quelles missions ? Le cas français (What resources for what missions? The French case) Métamorphose des missions ? Le soldat et les armées dans les nouveaux contextes d’intervention (A complete shift in missions? Soldiers and Armed Forces in the new intervention contexts), Conference speeches 14, 15 and 16 June 1994, Centre d’études en Sciences sociales de la Défense, April 2000, p.124. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 59 Chapter V: Peacekeeping operations (interposition) Licorne in 2002, the mandates may have developed and changed but defining them was the typical common interposition concept split into three courses of action: protection and evacuation of French and foreign nationals, stabilization of the territory through defensive interposition between nationals, occasional phases of hostile contact based on application of self-defense rules by French troops. Protection and evacuation of non-combatant nationals France’s main reason for intervening in Africa is the presence of French nationals in the countries that become theaters of conflict. Interposition between warring parties is launched so that the French people living in these countries do not suffer the effects of a civil war. During Operation Verdier, for example, France deployed troops to deter the warring parties from fighting and to ensure the security of the French nationals (3,200 people, including 2,800 in Lomé). The operation was launched on 28 November 1991 after the rebellion of some Togolese service members who opposed the government of Prime Minister Joseph Kokou Koffigoh. Operations Almandin I and II occurred while Central Africa was torn apart by several internal crises, after mutinies broke out in a number of Central African armed forces units from April 1996 to June 1997. The two operations held similar objectives: ensuring the security of French nationals and interests (EFAO facilities, ambassador’s residence, nationals’ living quarters), protecting President Ange Patassé and his residence, ensuring security along main supply roads (Bangui and its surroundings) and in sensitive areas (TV network HQ, fuel storage sites, power stations). Almandin I consisted of patrolling the European quarters, which deterred the mutineers from attacking the expatriates. An NEO was nonetheless conducted on19 April 1996 using armored vehicles. Almandin II was in response to a more marked threat against foreigners; air assets were enhanced to six transportation aircraft with a 4,000- passenger airlift capacity to Libreville or N’Djamena within three days. The EFAO elements’ facilities spontaneously became a refuge for many French nationals or foreign expatriates (as occurred on 24 May 1996). After more riots broke out in November, EFAO elements deployed into the city again, to protect the embassy and expatriates, including 1,586 French. By its presence, France could also conduct defensive intervention operations. Defensive interposition operations During Operation Verdier (Togo, 1991-1992), France deployed nearly 680 troops144. Two companies and four C-160s were stationed in Cotonou (Benin), while a ten-soldier strong team was detached to the French embassy in Lomé, the capital of Togo. French Forces in Cotonou influenced events in favor of the government and successfully delayed the rebels’ offensive against the seat of government on 3 December, when armor raided the building and forced the Prime Minister to surrender. Operation Iskoutir (Djibouti, February 1992 - June 1999) followed in the same vein. Conducted by Marine infantry (5th RIAOM) to provide assistance to the civilian populace in the north, it encouraged the resumption of negotiations and enforced the ceasefire between the Djibouti Forces and the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD)145. Operation Khor Angar followed Verdier in January 1999. Its aim was to interpose and protect Djibouti from the disruption caused by the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. A defensive and temporary operation, Khor Angar ended in July 2000 after the two countries signed a ceasefire. 144 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (Typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.128. 145 Jean-Michel Boucheron, Les forces françaises de DJIBOUTI (French forces in DJIBOUTI), Rapport d’information n°2591, 21 September 2000, p.37. 60 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter V: Peacekeeping operations (interposition) Operation Turquoise was in response to similar issues, interposing between the Hutu government, its armed forces and the Tutsi rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), and protecting the civilian populace of both ethnic groups, as both were the targets for massacre from both sides. Hutu extremists (militiamen, military units and the populace) began directing violence against the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus after the attack against the Burundian and Rwandan presidents in April 1994. Meanwhile, the FPR reacted to the massacres by perpetrating violent acts against the civilian populace. From 22 June to 22 August 1994, the French army deployed more than 2,500 troops tasked with keeping a strictly neutral posture towards the warring parties. Most of these troops came from the rapid reaction force (FAR), particularly from prepositioned elements in Africa: EFAO elements from Central Africa, or French forces in Djibouti. From 24 June, French Forces were responsible for protecting the Cyangugu refugee camp, in the far south-west of the country, close to the border with Zaire. With an increase in population movement and increased armed gang activity, along with the FPR gaining ground in the north and east of the country, French troops decided to set up a humanitarian safe zone linking Lake Goma and Rwanda’s southern border, covering the south-west146. To make humanitarian activities possible, the attackers were repelled and kept at a distance. From 6 July, the humanitarian safe zone was kept under control by repelling the infiltration efforts of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, accommodating every person seeking refuge in the area and disarming the Rwandan armed forces and Hutu militiamen. From mid- July, some refugees fleeing the FPR’s offensives settled in the Goma area. French troops deployed there, occasionally engaging the enemy in Goma. In particular, the high-priority activities covered health support and food supply, with riot control when necessary. Inside the camps of the humanitarian safe zone, besides their monitoring, assistance and area denial tasks, troops also had to combat looters. From 1 to 21 August, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (MINUAR) gradually relieved French Forces in the area, with French troops totally disengaged by 22 August. Despite the criticism levelled against it, the rapid and in depth interposition between the armed forces and the FPR made it possible for French troops to extract a number of refugees, orphans and clerics who were under threat, before conveying them to safe areas. As Rwanda’s armed forces and militiamen were disarmed by French troops, the safe humanitarian area fulfilled its purpose: two million people were conveyed to safe areas. What is more, the Joint Medical Department performed more than 5,000 procedures and stamped out a cholera epidemic in Goma147. Due to the unrest in Central Africa in spring 1996, France deployed 1,150 soldiers from 18 to 29 April 1996, contributing to Operation Almandin I148. First deployed as a show of force with armored vehicles (AMLs and VABs), the troops were supported by helicopter overflight (SA 330 PUMAs), in order to deter the mutineers and give a boost to the loyal Central African forces. The French Force patrolled the European quarters, by its presence and activity it was possible for the presidential security personnel to regain control and contain the mutineers. Almandin II was launched on 18 May 1996 after another mutiny. This time, the operation lasted longer and was split into several phases and mandates. During the first half of May, the objectives were similar to those of Almandin I. The period of peace that followed was an opportunity for restructuring the Central African Armed Forces. From November, a second mutiny among the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) meant French Forces intervened again in the same conditions. Last, from January 1997, the French troops handed over their intervention mission to the MISAB (Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements), while providing occasional support. The Force strength shifted from 2,100 in May to 1,750 during the period of calm following the first mutiny, and up to 2,300 when clashes occurred again. 146 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (A typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.192. 147 ibid, p.194. 148 ibid, p.233. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 61 Chapter V: Peacekeeping operations (interposition) Before 2002’s Operation Licorne, an initial French deployment took place in Côte d’Ivoire in December 1999: Operation Khaya. Some soldiers who were members of the UN mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) had rebelled after not being paid. The revolt caused the sudden departure of President Henri Konan Bédié, who had to take refuge in the French Embassy. France decided to interpose and take action to evacuate the president, deploying 526 army troops and three COUGAR helicopters as well as twelve SAGAIE ERC- 90 light armored vehicles. The evacuation was performed by two rotations: on 26 December, the president and his family were exfiltrated to Lomé, Togo, followed by the evacuation of thirteen other members of the government the next day149. Close combat phases and self-defense Defensive interposition between warring parties can sometimes lead to phases of hostile confrontation, requiring an appropriate military response that will depend on the degree of selfdefense. As interposition missions, these operations are based on peace-making activities. The issue of engaging in combat is important, with the rules of engagement defining the degree of self-defense, the possibility to respond to fire and to kill. Verdier was based on a broad notion of selfdefense. Opening fire was authorized in order to liberate non-combatants from violent attacks150. During Turquoise, Resolution 929 of the UN Security Council authorized France to operate in Rwanda; thus the operation complied with the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: weapons may be employed to accomplish missions, in this case “temporary activities of a strictly humanitarian nature”151. On the theater of operations, this could include NEOs, such as that in the Butaré area on 3 July 1994, where the TF from special operations command took action while under pressure from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR). Opposition to Force infiltration and the disarming of armed forces or militias (e.g. the humanitarian safe area in Rwanda) were part of that process. During Almandin I and II, more close combat episodes occurred. The principle of self-defense remains, although units were encouraged to behave firmly but not aggressively. Security breaches have to be deliberate attacks if they are to be countered. The engagement was carried out with VABs, AML 90s and VLRAs with 20-mm guns, as well as PUMA helicopters. Almandin II was conducted in a more violent environment; French Forces came taken under intermittent fire from 19 May, 1996. Close combat missions were sometimes justified by the need to recapture a critical point (such as the radio broadcast HQ, occupied by mutineers on 22 May 1996), or to physically protect troops152. Close combat was also justified by reprisal operations, such as on the night of 4-5 May; an action that led to the rebels’ departure from the south-west of the capital, enabling the return of loyalist forces153. Overall, there were few human losses during these operations: one wounded by an anti-vehicle mine during Verdier, one dead due to disease and three wounded in combat during Turquoise. There were no losses during Almandin I, two dead and about fifteen wounded during Almandin II and no losses during Khaya. 149 Idem, p. 313 150 Idem, p. 128 151 Idem, p. 187 150 ibid, p.128. 151 ibid, p.187. 152 On 4 January 1997, an officer and a NCO from 6th RPIMa were assassinated by mutineers while they were trying to mediate between rebels in Bangui. Florent de St Victor, 45 ans d’opérations militaires en Centrafrique (45 years of military operations in Central Africa), art. cit., p.3. 153 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (A typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.247. 62 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter V: Peacekeeping operations (interposition) 5.3. Licorne, a special case Out of all the interposition missions, Operation Licorne remains a special case for two reasons. It marked the transition from exclusively French interventions to operations under multinational mandates (UN or UE). It is also atypical due to its duration, the adjustments to the various situations and its transition into a permanent deployment organization, making it similar to operations such as Boali or Epervier. As an exclusively French interposition within a framework of defense agreements, Licorne was France’s last traditional interposition operation in Africa. It marked a shift toward multinational engagements, reflecting the reform of French policies in Africa during 1997-1998 that advocated new courses of action: avoiding bilateralism by working with regional organizations and operating under UN legitimacy154. 19 September 2002 saw an attempted coup in Côte d’Ivoire. The Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) took control of the north of the country, splitting it in two. The rebels seized the cities of Bouaké and Korhogo. On 22 September, France launched Operation Licorne to ensure the protection of French nationals and expatriates. Marine troops were deployed with 43rd BIMa stationed in Abidjan, reinforced by elements from 11th airborne brigade. French Forces performed NEOs in Bouaké on 25 and 26 September and in Korhogo on 29 and 30 September. On 1 October, Licorne was 1,260 troops strong155. On 17 October, President Laurent Gbagbo signed an agreement for the cessation of hostilities with the MPCI. Once it was signed, French reinforcements were deployed to monitor the ceasefire. In late November, two new rebel movements, the People’s Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement forJustice and Peace (MJP), started operating in the west of Côte d’Ivoire. Fresh reinforcements were deployed, increasing the strength to 2,500. From January to 10 February 2003, the MJP and MPIGO launched attacks against the French Forces. With the help of Liberia’s armed forces, they opened a front in the south-west. The mandate of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MICECI) also began in January. With the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis agreements on 24 January, President Gbagbo remained in power and a “government for national reconciliation” was set up. In May, Resolution 1479 created the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI). In February 2004, this became the UN operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI), which allowed for the deployment of 6,240 blue helmets for a 12-month initial period from 4 April. The Licorne force was tasked with ONUCI support. Initially, Licorne was based on security and NEO operations, before interposition and encouraging negotiations between the warring parties156. Nonetheless, combat episodes did arise during the operation, against resolute and well-armed opponents. French Forces had to combine direct fire from armored vehicles, armed helicopters and mortar fires157. These combats caused significant losses among French troops. For example, on 25 August 2003, a French river patrol came under 154 General Emmanuel Beth, L’opération Licorne, une opération nationale en soutien d’une mission de l’ONU, (Operation Licorne, a national operation in support of a UN operation) (L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre (Subsaharan Africa from one crisis to the next) – Proceedings of the Research Session 5 February 2007, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, 2007, p.11. 155 CDEF/DREX, Enseignements de l’opération Licorne (Lessons Learned from Operation Licorne), Cahier du RETEX, July 2004, p.6. 156 General Emmanuel Beth, L’opération Licorne, une opération nationale en soutien d’une mission de l’ONU, (Operation Licorne, a national operation in support of a UN operation), art. cit., p.12. 157 CDEF/DREX, Enseignements de l’opération Licorne (Lessons Learned from Operation Licorne), Cahier du RETEX, July 2004, p.13. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 63 Chapter V: Peacekeeping operations (interposition) attack on the Sakassou peninsula; one died and two were wounded. The next year, on 6 November 2004, an Ivorian Su-25 SUKHOI bombed a French camp in Bouaké, killing 9 French soldiers and wounding 31. The French deployment faced a fresh challenge in December 2010 as a crisis broke out following the elections; President Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down. The deployment was reinforced to more than 1,600 French troops, responsible for, among others, performing several NEOs on 31 March and 16 April 2011. More than 5,000 French and Ivorian nationals took refuge in Port-Bouët camp and 3,000 people were then evacuated. Meanwhile, support to ONUCI continued throughout that period; troops neutralized armored vehicles and heavy weapons (4 and 10 April). In summer 2011, however, Licorne was reduced to 700 troops. With the security situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire normalized and the goals justifying the deployment achieved, France ended the operation on 21 January 2015. In compliance with a defense partnership agreement signed in January 2012158, France maintained 450 troops in the country; the French Forces in Côte d’Ivoire (FFCI). 5.4. Assessment Through the major lessons learned, prepositioned forces in Africa came to the fore once again during Licorne and the other interposition missions, as valuable assets for all emergency interventions and reinforcements. Another crucial component of Licorne was the importance of command support capabilities and tactical mobility across large distances. More specifically, Licorne demonstrated the importance of the Armed Forces keeping up their skills in reversibility and force control, particularly in urban and crowd control operations. 158 The agreement emphasized the geographic location of Côte d’Ivoire, the quality of its harbor and airport facilities, and the possibility for Abidjan to become a major strategic, operational and logistic hub. 64 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 CHAPTER VI SECURITY OPERATIONS 6.1. Missions under multinational mandates A security operation is as a stability operation performed by an international force under UN mandate, without any avowed enemy. It aims to restore a peaceful situation by securing the territory in which conflict has occurred. For France’s operations in Africa and its Army, the second half of the 1990s was a period of significant change. After the criticism levelled at 1994’s Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, France sought to change its intervention methods in Africa. This change in doctrine coincided with a political development that aimed to respect the legitimacy of elected regimes and to intervene only through a framework validated by the UN. Following this shift was a restructuring of the Army, which became entirely professionalized as of 1996. From that point, France’s operations in Africa were developed under the mandate of an international organization and within a multinational framework. In 1992, Operation Oryx in Somalia was the first attempt of this type, in support of the UN peace force present. It was nonetheless with Operation Croix du Sud II that France meaningfully engaged in multinational operations in Africa. French troops would later participate in numerous UN operations, such as MINURCA in Central Africa (19971999), MINUÉE in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2001) and ONUCI in Côte d’Ivoire (since 2004). They also contributed to European Union-organized operations, such as Artémis-Mamba in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2006), or EUFOR (Chad/Central African Republic, 2008-2009). The main difficulty in these operations is their multinational nature. Engaging several countries in different cultures, languages and sometimes operating modes leads to significant challenges in the preparation and deployment of security operations. A common outlook on the interventions is required for interoperability to stand a chance of success159. Depending on the countries involved, requirements can vary; each has its own national aims and military objectives specific to operations. These first often hinder an intervention’s efficiency, e.g. sending a small number of troops or laying down caveats160, to avoid ruffling the feathers of public opinion that is reluctant to deploy troops. The number of countries participating can make the decision-making process longer, considerably impeding the rapidity of intervention. Real military success therefore lies in one country clearly maintaining leadership. Such was the case during Operation Artémis; France supplied significant military and financial means, whereas the allies provided support and legitimacy by their very number. One country holding designated leadership is important as it makes corroborating multinational military efficiency possible, as well as avoiding the vagaries of collective decision-making. 159 M. Goya, Les opérations extérieures en perspective historique 1962-2008 (Overseas operations within a historical perspective 1962-2008), art. cit., p.66. 160 Restrictions to employment of forces within a multinational contingent based on national reasons. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 65 Chapter VI: security operations 6.2. Peacekeeping procedures The features of multinational security operations are quite similar to those of strictly French interposition operations. Here, the aim is also to interpose between two warring parties and to control areas, thereby enabling the protection, safety or evacuation of the populace161. In this type of operation, military units are also tasked with peacekeeping missions while avoiding combat. These law-and-order activities follow a show of force, to avoid having to use it: the troops must avoid confrontation and open fire only in self-defense. Putting an end to a war without using force is no easy task, and experience in Somalia and Bosnia has shown that this type of operation can lead to heavy losses among the French military162. These security operations are established according to a wide range of contexts and rules of engagement. We can nonetheless define two broad categories. France has participated in these operations either as a component of a multinational peacekeeping operation by the employment of its troops (Oryx, Croix du Sud I/II, Dorca, ONUCI, EUFOR RDC, EUFOR Chad/Central Africa), or as a supporting force to these operations by providing logistical and combat support (Bubale, Almandin III, Minurca, Minuée). Operation Artémis was a special case, due to extent of French involvement. Employment of forces as a component of multinational operations In Somalia, the fall of General Siyad Barre in 1991 led to clans openly fighting to take power. With the population suffering from a famine that caused several hundred thousand deaths and the exodus of two million people, the international community decided to send in troops. On 24 April 1992, the United Nations approved Resolution 751 authorizing humanitarian operations and organizing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Humanitarian factors were key to deciding to launch the international intervention. In spring 1992, “Médecins sans Frontières” reported on the awful living conditions and famine in Somalia163. The humanitarian situation was nonetheless not the only factor taken onboard: an intense communication campaign manned by the American media, combined with domestic policy concerns led the US to organize an airlift, before intervening and supporting the UN mission. On 3 December, with Resolution 794, the United Nations authorized the deployment of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF); its mission was to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations. With Bernard Kouchner as Minister for Health and Humanitarian Action, France initially worked alongside the US in the airlift. France launched Operation Oryx and joined the UNITAF international force under UN mandate and US command (Operation Restore Hope). The French Army deployed 2,400 troops from the rapid reaction force (FAR) and French forces stationed in Djibouti to a strategic area; its proximity to the Ethiopian border enabled the transit of rebels and government troops. The French soldiers patrolled the main avenues, before taking command of the Baydoa area and fighting against armed groups. Afterwards they remained a permanent presence in cities, patrolling their outskirts. 161 Jacques Thouvenin, Quelles ressources pour quelles missions ? Le cas français (What resources for what missions? The French case), art. cit., p.124. 162 M. Goya, Les opérations extérieures en perspective historique 1962-2008 (Overseas operations within a historical perspective 1962-2008), art.cit., p.66. 163 Antonin Tisseron, Oryx : un succès méconnu (1992-1994) (Oryx: an unnoticed success), Cahier du RETEX, November 2013, p.21. 66 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter VI: security operations Thanks to an interlinking of humanitarian and military operations, French troops managed to increase security within their zone of action, a decentralized C2 organization, and scattering of units. The operation ended in December 1993. From October 1994 to December 1995, France deployed troops in Operations Croix du Sud I and II between Niger and Chad. French soldiers were tasked with setting up a liaison team between the Tuarag rebels of the AZAWAD rebels’ committee and Niger’s government; parties who had been in conflict since 1991 but had recently come to an agreement. The team, manned by a FrenchBurkina-Faso contingent, first had to establish a secure environment by patrolling the Agadez area, before securing the meetings organized by the committee to monitor the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreements. France then participated in a multinational operation alongside Algeria, Senegal and Burkina- Faso to monitor compliance with the cease-fire, and for the recovery, stowing and storage of weapons. The Army deployed thirty-six troops and twelve light all-terrain vehicles as well as five light support and reconnaissance vehicles. These vehicles belonged to the marine and foreign legion troops164. Croix du Sud I ended after the signing of agreements between the Tuarag and the Niger government in April 1995, while Croix du Sud II ended in December. France conducted Operation Dorca in Chad from 31 July and 11 September 2004, providing humanitarian support to Sudanese refugees alongside the international organizations supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). A small-sized deployment of troops operated under several mandates: one service member was deployed in Sudan under UN mandate, two in Sudan under NATO mandate, five in Chad, Sudan and Ethiopia under EU mandate, and four in Chad under national mandate. French elements in Chad tasked with administrative and logistical support bolstered the deployment165. Dorca missions included conveying food and medical supplies to the refugee camps in the east of Chad, and securing the refugee camps in the south-east. France contributed to the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI): a deployment of around twenty service members took part in missions or worked as liaison officers among the 8,000- strong UNOCI. The operation was deployed in Côte d’Ivoire in October 2004; its troops were tasked with observing and monitoring compliance with the cease-fire and assisting the government in reintegrating the rebels. The mission also comprised supporting the peace process and organizing elections. Despite its large scale, the military component is only one of the tools the UN can use to support political action and peace-building166. This concept, that aims to put an end to conflict and maintain peace, is part of diplomatic action and from the broad category of “peace- keeping” for conflict prevention. Peace-building is aimed at reducing the risk of future confrontation by reinforcing national capabilities and laying the foundations for lasting peace. 164 1st RPIMa, DRM and 13th RDP, then 43rd BIMa. CDEF/DREX Répertoire typologique des opérations (A typological inventory of operations), op. cit. pp. 210-211. 165 CDEF/DREX, Opérations en Afrique centrale : Epervier et Boali (Operations in Central Africa: Epervier and Boali), Cahier du Retex, March 2008, p.36. 166 Colonel Patrick Chanliau, RCI : le point de vue d’un chef des opérations (Côte d’Ivoire: the point of view of the operation commander), Doctrine tactique n°28, September 2013, p.73. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 67 Chapter VI: security operations In Côte d’Ivoire, the UNOCI troops thus played a major role, together with the national contingent of the Licorne force, particularly during the crisis triggered by the 2010 presidential elections. At that point, they helped with protecting both the Ivorian populace that was subject to numerous attacks and thousands of foreign non-combatants. Doing so prevented the security situation from worsening167. (Licorne: troops tasked with providing protection for Ivorian populace © ECPAD) France intervened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from June to December 2006 as part of an operation launched under European mandate, EUFOR RDC. The mandate covered the period of legislative and presidential elections and its purpose was to support the UN mission on the territory (United Nations mission in Congo, MONUC), via Resolution 1671 of the UN Security Council168. The land-oriented operation was under operational command of a German general officer, while the 2,500-strong Force was under the authority of a French general officer169. The Force had to provide a significant supportive presence and be prepared to support the MONUC whenever its capacities proved insufficient170. 167 Major General Jean-Pierre Palasset RCI : de la complémentarité d’une force de l’ONU et d’une opération nationale en soutien de son action (Côte d’Ivoire: the complementarity of a UN force and a national operation in support of its activities), Doctrine tactique n° 28, September 2013, p.77. 168 Lieutenant-Colonel Stéphane Pau, L’union européenne en Afrique : complémentarité et limites dans la stabilisation (The EU in Africa: complementarity and limitations of stability operations), Doctrine n°12, May 2007, p.79. 169 Major Privat Ternynck, L’opération Benga, ou l’aérocombat au service de l’action européenne (Operation Benga: aviation combat in support of European operations), Doctrine n°14, January 2008, p.75. 170 General Christian Damay, L’Union Européenne et la gestion d’une crise africaine : la République démocratique du Congo (The EU and the management of an African crisis: the Democratic Republic of the Congo), L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre – Proceedings of the Research session, 5 February 2007, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2007, p.18. 68 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter VI: security operations Despite France providing the largest contingent out of the eighteen contributing nations to the operation’s deployment, France did not hold operational leadership. France had sent 1,000 troops, while Germany deployed 780, Spain 130 and Poland 130171. France also contributed a strategic reserve that was ready to intervene from mainland France. During the course of operation, the Force took significant action on 21 and 22 August 2006 in Kinshasa, where violent clashes had broken out following the results of the first round of the presidential elections172. The crisis in Darfur, on the border between Chad, Central Africa and Sudan also saw France deploy as part of a European operation: EUFOR Chad/CAR. Resolution 1778 of September 2007 authorized the deployment of a multidimensional force in Chad and the Central African Republic. The Force comprised three elements: a UN police mission, a Chadian police task force tasked with maintaining law and order in the refugee camps, and an EU military presence in support of the UN173. On 28 January, the Foreign Affairs ministers of the 27 European Union member states decided to launch a military operation, with France as the framework-nation174. The operation incorporated troops from twenty countries, with a total force of 3,200, half of which were French175. The Force was tasked with protecting civilians, refugees and displaced persons in particular. It facilitated conveying humanitarian aid by improving security within the area of operation. Last, it provided security support to UN personnel and facilities. The operation deployed in the eastern areas of Chad and was task-organized into three GTIAs: a Polish battalion in the north, an Irish battalion in the south and a French battalion in the center. A French detachment was also deployed in the north-east of Central Africa, in the border town of Birao. Besides these troops, France also provided the logistical and C2 assets, as well as the nucleus of the operation HQ in Paris and in Africa. On 15 March 2009, EUFOR Chad/CAR was relieved by the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT II). Logistical and combat support to multinational operations In June 1997, several French elements deployed to Central Africa after another mutiny from Central African forces. While previous mutinies had required French troops to deploy as part of interposition activities, this situation combined two strictly national operations in support of an inter-African force, as well as a UN mission that also involved French soldiers. Operation Bubale aimed to support the inter-African force of the inter-African mission in monitoring the implementation of the Bangui agreements (MISAB) through a 91-strong C2 and logistic unit176. 171 CDEF/DREX, Opérations en Afrique Centrale : Epervier et Boali (Operations in Central Africa: Epervier and Boali), Cahier du RETEX, March 2008, p.61. 172 General Christian Damay, L’Union Européenne et la gestion d’une crise africaine : la République démocratique du Congo (The EU and the management of an African crisis: the Democratic Republic of the Congo), art. cit., p.19. 173 Opération EUFOR Chad-RCA (janvier 2008-mars 2009) (Operation EUFOR Chad-CAR), Cahier du RETEX, July 2009, p.9. 174 A nation that has volunteered and has been given the mandate to take charge of C2. It contributes the C2 structure and the largest contingent of forces. 175 CDEF/DREX, Opération EUFOR Chad-RCA (janvier 2008-mars 2009), Cahiers du RETEX, July 2009, p.9. 176 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (A typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.243. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 69 Chapter VI: security operations Operation Almandin III’s purpose was to provide fire support for the MISAB detachments and ensure force protection through combat support by recapturing certain districts in the capital city (Bangui). The operation lasted from 20 May 1997 to 15 April 1998, involving 1,650 troops organized into two tactical HQs, seven companies, a cavalry troop, a Special Ops C2 detachment and an Army Aviation detachment. French troops took part in combat alongside the MISAB. From 20 June, uncontrolled elements of the Central African armed forces (FACA) directed mortar fire on Bangui with the intention of hitting MISAB, French operational assistance elements and the French embassy. The Inter-African Force returned fire and it became a general confrontation. French Forces intervened so MISAB did not become overwhelmed. Violent fighting continued until 27 June, when a MISAB attack supported by French troops resulted in a cease-fire. The fighting caused 7 wounded French troops. The UN peacekeeping Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) followed Operation Almandin III, deploying 1,450 soldiers from 15 April 1998. French troops within the Force were tasked with providing support, ensuring the smooth operation of the Bangui airtransit, and helping destruct the mutineers’ weapons and ammunition. The French Army deployed 160 personnel until 28 February 1999, when the French contingent was relieved by Egyptian troops. Following the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, the UN decided to launch a peacekeeping operation - UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) - to monitor the cessation of hostilities. A French detachment was responsible for ensuring the security of the HQ and maintaining good working conditions, in particular for the operation of communications and transportation assets. France thereby deployed two officers to the HQ and a 178-strong administrative and protection unit. French Forces in Djibouti also sent another 21-strong platoon. The French Army deployed 166 soldiers, mainly from 1st REG. The French contingent remained from 12 May to 12 December 2001, when it was relieved by Irish troops. France’s contribution to multinational operations thus serves several purposes. First, it enables better task assignment and expenditure organization. Politically speaking, shifting from strictly national to multinational operations lends legitimacy to French deployments without conjuring the specter of colonialism. This shift also bolsters the will to incorporate France into the European defense process and to make the EU a global player, with French State authorities assuming leadership177. Nonetheless, there are several limitations to France’s contribution, particularly when it comes to language. In French-speaking Africa, French-speaking contingents such as the Belgians or French hold the advantage, even if English remains the language of multinational HQs. As coordination is paramount to interoperability and avoiding friendly fire, the various national units were not mixed in the field due to non-compatibility of radio equipment, different types of procedures or varied interpretations of the ROEs178. Last, French unilateral engagements still take place within very active bases in Africa, using permanent positioning that served their purpose during the latest operations. 177 Tobias Koepf, Interventions françaises en Afrique : la fin de l’européanisation ? (French interventions in Africa: the end of Europeanization?), Politique Etrangère, 2012/2, pp.418-419. 178 Lieutenant-Colonel Stéphane Pau, L’union Européenne en Afrique : complémentarité et limites dans la stabilisation (The EU in Africa: complementarity and limitations of stability operations), art. cit., p.81. 70 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter VI: security operations 6.3. Artémis-Mamba, a French and multinational success Artémis was the first European mission in Africa. Based on a previous French operation, Mamba, Artémis was distinct from other multinational security operations due to the strong French leadership of Mamba. Artémis-Mamba’s success and flexibility set this operation apart from the rest. In spring 2003, fighting between rival ethnic groups devastated the city of Bunia in north-east Congo. The Uruguayan battalion of the MONUC that had deployed could not stop the mounting violence179. After decision from the Security Council, an international force was mandated to provide support. France deployed troops on 4 May through Operation Mamba that became European Operation Artémis on 16 May. Until 16 May, French soldiers deployed in Bunia. Artémis then incorporated Mamba and France became the framework nation. Commanding the operation was Major General Neveux. 1,679 troops were deployed to Bunia, including 825 from the French Army. Since Bunia’s airport capacities did not allow for the full Force deployment, 294 troops deployed to to Entebbe in Uganda; the designated (EUFOR Democratic Republic of the Congo © ECPAD) 179 Témoignage du général de division Bruno Neveux (an account by Major General Neveux), Doctrine Special issue, December 2006, p.56. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 71 Chapter VI: security operations logistical support airbase. Multinational forces were 381 strong, mainly from the United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium and Canada180. The European Force controlled the five access points to Bunia and patrolled the city districts, with air support provided. The ROE were clear and appropriate: if necessary, it was possible to gain the advantage by using weapons and a degree of initiative was permitted. Artémis disengaged and left the theater of operations on 6 September 2003181. France has asserted its leadership capabilities by investing enough military and financial resources to succeed alone in operations182. This can, to a large extent, explain the success of Artémis-Mamba. Due to the unilateral nature of its command and to self-sufficiency and decision-making capacities, Artémis-Mamba proved an innovative operation183, with France’s clear leadership meaning the usual drawbacks of multinational operations were avoided and success achieved. Moreover, Mamba, followed by Artémis illustrated France’s capacity for short notice, first-entry deployment on a theater, making possible the flexible incorporation of the international reinforcements that followed184. 180 General Jean-Paul Thonier, L’opération Artémis, les moyens de l’autonomie stratégique français (Operation Artémis: the assets of French strategic self-sufficiency), Research session organized by the Fondation pour la Recherche stratégique, 14 January 2004, p.27. 181 L’opération de l’Union européenne en République Démocratique du Congo (ARTEMIS) (The EU operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Artémis), Doctrine Special issue, December 2006, p.54. 182 M. Goya, Les opérations extérieures en perspective historique 1962-2008 (Overseas operations within a historical perspective 1962-2008), art. cit., pp.66-67. 183 General Jean-Paul Thonier, L’opération Artémis (Operation Artémis), op. cit., p.29. 184 Centre d’évaluation et de retour d’expérience CEREX (Center of assessment and lessons learned (CEREX), Enseignements de l’opération Artémis (Lessons learned from Operation Artémis), French Doctrine and Higher Military Education, January 2004, p.3. 72 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 CHAPTER VII NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS A non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) is a mission that aims to protect nationals living abroad by evacuating them from an area under threat when the state authorities of the country where they live are no longer able to ensure their safety. As evacuating French nationals from Africa is an important component of French operations on the continent, it can take place during the course of various operation types: intervention, interposition, security, etc. However, some operations are strictly NEO-focused and thus can be defined only by that purpose. The short duration of NEOs sets them apart from medium- and long-term operations. 7.1. NEOs: emergency operations A non-combatant evacuation operation is defined by its urgency; political authorities often wait as long as possible before deciding to evacuate due to the diplomatic and human challenges involved, as well as for financial reasons. Most of the time, local situations that lead to political or military crises are volatile, unstable and likely to deteriorate rapidly. As any prior deployment of French troops on foreign ground is normally subject to the approval of that foreign country’s authorities, it is not really a practical option due to the legal framework of evacuation. Thoroughly preparing for NEOs therefore relies on intelligence and anticipation capabilities; these are always emergency operations185. The time frame is also characterized by the operations’ short duration: action must be taken quickly to remove French nationals from danger. For example, Operation Requin, conducted in Gabon from May to July 1990, enabled the evacuation of nationals in the 3 days from 23 to 26 May. With Operation Volcan in Rwanda in 1993, the timeframe was even shorter (9-11 February), as was Operation Providence in Liberia in 2003 (7-11 June). Responsiveness and rapidity of intervention is one of the foremost qualities of the French Army, made possible by prepositioned forces that can intervene to meet the urgent requirements of this mission type. For example, French operational assistance elements (EFAO) in Central Africa and the air assets from the Epervier deployment in Chad intervened during Operation Bajoyer in Zaire in 1993. For Operation Iroko in Guinea-Bissau in June 1998, the French Forces in Cape Verde were deployed, and for Operation Malachite in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 1998, French troops in Gabon were deployed. 185 Les opération d’évacuation de ressortissants (RESEVAC) (Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), Doctrine Interarmées DIA-3.4.2, n°136/DEF/CICDE/NP, 2 July 2009, p.10. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 73 Chapter VII: Non-combatant evacuation operations 7.2. Defensive operations in an urban environment NEOs can be categorized as defensive operations; the employment of force depends on implementing self-defense. Due to the diversity of the theaters of operations, however, evacuation can include offensive action and phases of close combat against the enemy. For example, Operations Pelican II and III conducted in Congo from 5 to 20 June 1997 caused one dead and nine wounded (five with serious wounds) among French troops. While the French soldiers were on patrol, they ran into rebelbuilt roadblocks leading to violent clashes. As non-combatant communities usually live in main cities or industrial areas, NEOs usually take place in urban environments. Plus, urban areas are usually where the airports or sea-ports of departure for evacuation are located. Conducting NEOs within these densely populated areas makes the task more difficult; French Forces must be able to achieve crowd control without jeopardizing the initial mandate. Locating the evacuee assembly point in a city does nonetheless facilitate logistic support and make it easier to carry out the operation. These particular evacuations can be achieved based on a back-and-forth organization, reducing the operation’s logistical constraints186. For example, during Operation Providence, the evacuation phase was organized into 45 helicopter rotations in the space of 13 hours187. 7.3. Operations conducted within a multinational context Today, the French Army’s expertise in NEOs is well-known, based on awareness of the environment as well a longstanding record of this type of operation ever since Operation Bonite in 1978. Increasingly, however, these French successes have become part of multinational operations. There are several reasons for this. In some African countries, domestic conflicts can involve nationals from various countries. Rarely do these countries decide to launch an NEO together; usually an operation is launched as soon as another country has decided to take action. Sometimes, there is a concurrence of national interventions despite an increasing tendency among European countries to streamline, coordinate and pool their assets188. French NEOs make it possible for French and other nationals to be brought to a safe place. During Operation Bajoyer, for example, French Forces evacuated 438 non-combatants who came from 32 countries (including 120 French). Operation Amaryllis in Rwanda on 9 and 14 April 1994 enabled the evacuation of 1,250 people, including 445 French and non-combatants from 38 other countries. During Pélican II, French troops evacuated 5,666 non-combatants (including 1,524 French). Last, during Providence, 535 non-combatants of 37 nationalities (176 Lebanese, 90 Americans, 67 Ivorians, 45 Liberians, 42 Indians, 18 French, 14 Chinese) were evacuated. 186 Major General Thierry Ollivier, Les opérations d’évacuation des ressortissants au cœur des principaux engagements des forces terrestres (NEOs at the heart of ground forces’ main engagements), Doctrine n°16, June 2009, p.5. 187 Lieutenant General Bruno Dary, L’évacuation des ressortissants étrangers du Libéria. Opération Providence (NEOs in Liberia, Operation Providence), HÉRACLÈS n°30, November-December 2008, p.18. 188 Les opérations d’évacuation de ressortissants (Non-combatant evacuation operations), op. cit., p.89. 74 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Chapter VII: Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) France’s NEO expertise in Africa can sometimes lead to other governments failing to take action as instead, they rely on the French Army’s capacities for exfiltrating their own nationals. Thus the “lead nation” concept appeared during Operation Chari-Baguirmi in Chad from 1 to 8 February 2008, formalizing the principle of solidarity between EU member nations and extending the notion of the “fully entitled beneficiary” to all European nationals189. The lead nation must thereby coordinate protection measures for all European nationals in time of crisis. In Chad, for example, French troops evacuated 1,753 non-combatants. While a third was French, the others came from 79 countries, Germany in particular. Later the German government would praise the skills and expertise of the French Army. 189 Captain (Navy) Xavier Gérard, La conduite des opérations d’évacuation de ressortissants (the Conduct of NEOs ), Doctrine n°16, June 2009, p.15. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 75 CHAPITRE VIII HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS A humanitarian relief operation is a mission to provide emergency aid during exceptional crises, such as support to the local populace, emergency assistance for people during natural disasters, or the prevention and treatment of against epidemics. The French Army’s operations in Africa often have a humanitarian aspect. The Joint Medical Department can provide humanitarian assistance during peacemaking or peacekeeping operations. Some operations, however, are of a strictly humanitarian nature, setting them apart from other operations in which the humanitarian aspect is only one of the strategic goals of the committed Force. These operations can cover a range of action: from supporting the civilian populace, natural disaster relief to epidemic prevention190. Operation Godoria, for example, conducted in Djibouti from 26 May to 29 June 1991, was aimed at supporting the Djiboutian army in assembling, accommodating and providing food and medical care for Ethiopian refugees who had fled the civil war. A military component was also deployed for disarming soldiers and conveying weapons to a safe place191. The Army took a humanitarian support approach, setting up consultations, medical care and surgery, as well as providing medicine. With 1,800 personnel deployed, it was possible to support the Djiboutian Forces in controlling the flow of refugees on land, sea or by air transport. French Forces thereby took charge of nearly 35,000 refugees and collected 13,000 individual weapons and more than 600 heavy weapons. The Joint Medical Department can also be deployed in support of a civilian populace during disasters or epidemics, with assistance from the Rapid Reaction Military Humanitarian Assistance Force. This Force covers several functions in three specific formations. It can deploy the Rapid Reaction Military Medical Element; a versatile field medical formation that is self-sufficient and can be transported by air. It can also deploy the Disaster Military Casualties Identification Team. Last, it can deploy the “Bioforce”, a structure created in 1983 to assist nations facing epidemic crisis situations. Its purpose is to identify the nature of the problem and then perform mass inoculation of the population under threat192. 190 Jean Faure, Le service de santé des armées: Les défis de la professionnalisation (the Joint Medical Department: the challenges of professionalization), information report n°458, 1998, consulted 23/04/2014. 191 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations (A typological inventory of operations), op. cit., p.119. 192 Christian Ménard, Le service de santé des armées (The French Joint Medical Department), Information report n°335, 29 October 2002, p.16. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 77 Chapter VIII: Humanitarian relief operations Bioforce was deployed in the Central African Republic from 14 March to 2 April 1992. The country was facing a cerebro-spinal meningitis epidemic: 183 cases were recorded and 42 people died in early 1992. To stop the epidemic from progressing, Central Africa deployed a team of doctors assisted by the Bioforce unit and doctors from the World Health Organization. Logistical support and security were provided by French operational assistance elements (EFAO) and personnel from the Central African Armed Forces. Bioforce’s goal was to combat the epidemic. Then, France deployed a doctor specializing in epidemiology, another doctor specializing in medical biology, a clinician doctor, three technicians and one laboratory assistant. These experts performed mass inoculation and assessed the efficiency of the other national teams and accompanying personnel. By the end of the operation, Bioforce had provided nearly 200,000 doses of meningococcal vaccine and performed more than 113,000 inoculations. Operation Caducée in Guinea-Bissau followed suit; from 22 November to 9 December 1994, France deployed troops to prepare the commitment of the Bioforce and provide logistical support for the local authorities in combatting a cholera epidemic. At the request of the Guinea-Bissau state authorities, France deployed 42 personnel including 32 from the Army. They were responsible for reinforcing the Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces in combatting the pandemic and providing logistical and medical assistance. The detachment therefore organized several convoys to supply the country’s remote medical centers with medicine, fuel and equipment. By the operation’s end, 75 medical centers had been supplied and several water points sanitized. Awareness campaigns had also been mounted across the country. French Forces were able to cover 25,000 kilometers without a single accident or incident; the ROEs had underscored that personnel display a friendly and completely cooperative attitude. 78 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 CONCLUSION O verseas operations certainly do have ties to France’s colonial past; the phrase “overseas operations theater” (“théâtre d’opérations extérieures”) first appeared in 1921, at the same time as the special croix de guerre (war cross) for overseas operations was first awarded. By setting apart overseas and domestic operations, however, colonial troops did tap into the spirit of the time: mainland France is not the same as other areas of operations or other “overseas theaters”193. It would therefore be inopportune and unadvisable to view overseas operations as a mere continuation of France’s presence in a postcolonial Africa that has remained unchanged, as is sometimes the case in texts intended for the general public. To do so would be to ignore France’s efforts, particularly during François Mitterrand’s presidency, to move away from the image of “Françafrique” typical of De Gaulle. It would also be unjust to African countries, thereby assuming that they have been incapable of managing African crises alone. As is often the case, the reality of a situation is more complex than the often overly quick and simplistic criticism levelled at it. Today, overseas operations are an important component of France’s action worldwide. Clearly, whether they are land or maritime operations, these operations fuel France’s international influence and capacity for intervening on a continent with which France has longstanding and close ties. In reality, the acronym “OPEX” encompasses a wide range of engagement types, scopes and duration. At a time when “leadership”, particularly that of the US, is being rethought the world over and leading European powers such as Germany or the UK are showing military restraint in deployment, France has shown that it is capable of deploying expeditionary capabilities of the highest quality, thanks to its Army and operational readiness, for these difficult missions. After spending a long time committed by itself within bilateral frameworks with a host nation, France now favors multinational operations. In these, French troops have displayed their expertise in training local, and particularly African, Armed Forces, before passing on these skills to European allies. Although stabilizing countries in crisis does not always prove easy on the ground, France plays its part in creating peace in the world. With its overseas operations, France has demonstrated its capability for getting the better of the opponent, or, in other words, “winning the war”. What proves more difficult, in truth, is “winning the peace”. This fight, however, is not one for the Armed Forces; it is the task of political authorities and international organizations. Some operations did draw negative attention from the media and the public, to the extent that doubts were raised over whether force employment is an effective response to foreign crises194. Today, however, overseas operations are clearly a legitimacy factor for France, particularly as terrorism has threatened to destabilize the entire Sahel-Sahara belt. Thanks to its overseas operations, the French Army counts as one of the best in the world. On several occasions, it has shown the world and French public opinion its capability for exercising its power on land, sea and in the air. This legitimacy and expertise are particularly necessary at a time when the international context calls for maintaining an operational force that can operate, overseas as well as ensure national security. 193 General Bernard Thorette, Rapport du groupe de travail : monument aux morts en opérations extérieures, (Work group’s report: War memorials for overseas operations ), French DoD, 2011. 194 Guy-Michel Chauveau and Hervé Gaymard (députés / members of Parliament), Engagement et Diplomatie : Quelle doctrine pour les interventions françaises ? (Engagements and diplomacy: what doctrine for French military operations?), Project for an information report introduced by the Foreign affairs Committee, 21 May 2015, p.23. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 79 ANNEX 1 Main cooperation or military technical assistance agreements Country Benin Burkina Faso Date 31 March 1966 Military technical cooperation agreement 24 April 1961 Military technical cooperation agreement 14 July 1965 Convention on logistical support to armed forces Burundi 31 May 1974 18 July 1966 Central Africa Congo Accord particulier relatif au concours en personnel militaire pour l’organisation, l’instruction et l’emploi de l’escadrille burundaise Extension of the above-mentioned agreement to all Burundian armed forces Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights Defense agreement Military cooperation agreement 21 February 1974 Convention to determine the rules and particulars of logistical support to armed forces 15 August 1960 Defense agreement Convention to determine the rules and conditions for 10 September 1965 contributing logistical support to army, air and gendarmerie forces 21 May 1966 Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights 8 October 1966 Comoros Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights 27 February 1975 7 October 1969 Cameroon Type 11 November 1978 4 August 1979 1 January 1974 24 April 1961 8 August 1965 Côte d’Ivoire 3 September 1965 Agreement on military technical assistance Defense cooperation agreement Convention on military technical contribution Technical cooperation agreement on training key personnel and equipping the national people’s armed forces Defense agreements Military technical assistance agreement Convention to determine the rules and conditions for France contributing support to army, air and gendarmerie forces Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights 26 January 1978 Specific agreement on armament cooperation 19 March 1980 Specific agreement on pilots’ training Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 81 Annex 2 Country Date 27June 1977 Djibouti 28 April 1978 3 September 1979 12 February 1980 11 February 1991 Gabon Madagascar Mali Mauritius Mauritania Defense and military technical assistance agreement Exchange of letters to determine the fiscal conditions relevant to military technical assistance Convention on the activation and operation of a temporary military post office Convention on provost’s authority concerning offenses or abuses committed by military technical assistance personnel Agreement on airspace control 17 August 1960 Defense and military technical assistance agreement 25 August 1965 Convention to determine rules for logistical support to army, air and gendarmerie forces 17 November 1965 Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights 1 February 1980 Equatorial Guinea Guinea Conakry Type Specific agreement on the training of Air force personnel on Mirage aircraft 9 March 1985 Military technical cooperation agreement 7 April 1985 Military technical cooperation agreement 4 May 1966 Convention on logistical support 4 June 1973 Convention on military affairs and technical assistance 29 December 1978 Convention on the Antananarivo military hospital 6 May 1985 Military technical cooperation agreement Exchange of letters to determine the fiscal conditions 28 July 1986 relevant to technical military assistance Exchange of letters on Mauritius’ monthly contribution 14 September 1979 to personnel expenditure for military assistance 25 September 1979 Specific military cooperation agreement 16 September 1979 Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights 27 April 1986 19 February 1987 Niger 19 February1977 Rwanda 18 July 1975 Military technical cooperation agreement Exchange of letters to determine the fiscal conditions relevant to technical military assistance Military technical cooperation agreement Military technical cooperation agreement Military technical cooperation agreement Senegal 82 29 March 1974 Convention to determine the rules and conditions for logistical support to land, air and navy forces, to gendarmerie, military units, civilian services and paramilitary formations (Republican guards, firemen) Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Country Date Seychelles 5 January 1979 Annex 1 Type Specific agreement on maritime issues Military technical cooperation agreement 6 March 1979 Convention to determine the rules and conditions for logistical support to armed forces 16 June 1976 Annex to deal with the management of N’Djamena hospital April 1990 Protocol on the stationing of French troops in the Kossey camp Chad Togo 30 July 1991 Protocol on the Chadian national army assistance 30 June 1992 Protocol on the reorganization of Chadian national forces strength 10 July 1963 Defense agreement 29 April 1965 Convention to determine the rules and conditions for logistical support to land, air and gendarmerie forces 28 October 1965 Protocol on the security of military aircraft flights 23 March 1976 Accord de coopération militaire technique 22 May 1974 Zaïre 9 July 1976 Military cooperation general agreement: - Specific cooperation agreement on aeronautics - Military technical cooperation arrangements in aeronautics - Arrangements for the training of Zairian personnel in French Air Academy and schools Arrangements for the military technical cooperation in the area of land forces Sources : André Dumoulin, La France militaire et l'Afrique (France’s Military and Africe), GRIP, 1997, pp. 115-117 ; P. Pascallon, Quelle évolution pour la politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique ?, (The possible evolution of French security policy in Africa), art. cit. pp. 17-20195. 195 Since May 2009, eight African countries have signed partnership agreements with France: Cameroon (21 May 2009), Gabon (24 February 2010), Central African Republic (8 April 2010), Togo (13 March 2009), Comoros (27 September 2010), Djibouti (21 December 2011), Côte d’Ivoire (26 January 2012), Senegal (18 April 2012). Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 83 ANNEX 2 List of region-oriented national schools Name École d’état-major (EEML) Staff College École Supérieure internationale de Guerre (ESIG)196 International War College École d’application de l’Infanterie (EAI) Infantry branch school École du Service de santé des Armées (ESSAL) Joint Medical Corps school École des personnels paramédicaux des Armées (EPPAN) Joint school for paramedical military personnel École d’application du service de santé militaire (EAS) Military medical corps school École militaire d’administration (EMA) Military administration school École militaire technique (EMTO) Military technical school École de génie travaux (EGT) Engineers (infrastructure) school Location French contribution Type 5 cooperation trainers General military training 5 cooperation trainers General military training 3 cooperation trainers General military training 1 cooperation trainer Military medical training Sixty students each year, including 1/2 for Niger 2 cooperation trainers Military medical training Twenty students each year, including 1/4 for Gabon 3 cooperation trainers, including 2 doctors Military medical training 2 cooperation trainers Military medical training 2 cooperation trainers Military technical training 3 cooperation trainers Military technical training Trainees Sixty students each Libreville – Gabon year, including 1/8 for Gabon Yaoundé – Cameroon Thiès – Senegal Lomé – Togo Niamey – Niger Melen – Gabon Koulikoro – Mali Ouagadougou– Burkina Faso Brazzaville – Congo Forty students each year, including 1/5 for Cameroon Sixty students each year, including 1/3 for Senegal One hundred students each year, including 1/4 for Togo Nearly 100 students each year, including 1/4 for Mali Over 150 students each year, including 1/4 for BurkinaFaso 100 students each year, including 1/3 for the Congo 196 New name given in 2013. Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 85 Annex 2 Name Ecole navale (Centre d’instruction maritime) Naval Academy (maritime training center) Centre de perfectionnement aux techniques de maintien de l’ordre (CPTMO) Center for law and order technique expertise French contribution Type Nearly fifty students Bata – Equatorial each year, including Guinea 1/3 for Equatorial Guinea 3 cooperation trainers Military technical training 100 students each year, including 1/3 for Cameroon 2 cooperation trainers Location Awaé – Cameroon Centre de perfectionnement aux actions postconflictuelles de déminage et de dépollution (CPADD) Training center for expertise in postconflict EOD and mine-clearing Ouidah – Bénin Ecole de maintien de la paix (EMP) Peacekeeping School Bamako – Mali Cours d’application des officiers de Gendarmerie Gendarmerie officers branch school Ouakam – Senegal Centre de perfectionnement de la police judiciare (CPPJ) Criminal investigation police training center Institut Supérieur d’Etudes de Protection Civile (ISEPC) Civil defense higher training center Porto Novo – Benin Ouagadougou – Burkina Faso Trainees 60 students each year, including 1/5 for Benin Peacekeeping – security forces 3 cooperation trainers Peacekeeping – security forces 1,000 students each year, including 1/4 for Mali 1 cooperation trainer Peacekeeping – security forces 50 students each year, including 1/3 for Senegal 2 cooperation trainers Peacekeeping – security forces 80 students each year, including 1/3 for Benin 20 students each year, including 1/3 for BurkinaFaso 2 cooperation trainers iPeacekeeping – security forces iPeacekeeping – security forces Sources : André Dulait, Robert Hue, Yves Pozzo di Borgo et Didier Boulaud, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne (The management of crises in sub-Sahara Africa), information report n° 450, 3 July 2006, p. 13 ; J. de Rohan, La politique africaine de la France (French policies in Africa), rap. cit., p. 32 ; « Les Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale », http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr, consulted 12/05/2014. 86 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 BIBLIOGRAPHY Documentation militaire Ministère de la Défense, Les interventions militaires françaises au Tchad, tome 2. Service historique de l’armée de terre (SHAT), octobre 1989 PETIT Jean-Pierre, colonel (er), « Le succès du Hawk au Tchad », Supplément à Objectif Doctrine, Les Cahiers du Retex n°6, 2002, p. 1-8 GAUSSERES Rémy, (commandant d’unité lors de l’opération), « Les enseignements de Kolwezi-mai 1978 », Supplément à Objectif Doctrine 37, Les Cahiers du Retex, n° 12, 2003, p. 27-31 Centre d’évaluation et de retour d’expérience (CEREX), Enseignements de l’opération Artémis, Commandement de la Doctrine et de l’Enseignement militaire Supérieur, janvier 2004 CDEF/DREX, Enseignements de l’opération Licorne, Cahier du Retex, juillet 2004 CDEF/DREX, Répertoire typologique des opérations, Tome 2 Afrique, Paris, 2006 CDEF/DREX, Retours d’expérience 1/2007, Cahier du Retex, octobre 2007 CDEF/DREX, Opérations en Afrique centrale : Epervier et Boali, Cahier du Retex, mars 2008 CDEF/DREX, Opération EUFOR Tchad-RCA (janvier 2008 - mars 2009), Cahier du Retex, juillet 2009 « Les opérations d’évacuation de ressortissants (RESEVAC) », Doctrine interarmées DIA3.4.2, n° 136/DEF/CICDE/NP du 02 juillet 2009 Sarah Aubertin, Le Développement, un défi aux relations entre forces armées et organisations civiles en Afghanistan, Cahier de la recherche doctrinale, CDEF/DREX, 2010 « Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la Paix », Doctrine interarmées DIA3.4.7 (B)_RECAMP(2011), n° 179/DEF/CICDE/NP du 22 septembre 2011 Directive de mise sur pied du dispositif GUÉPARD, Publication interarmées PIA-7.0.1.1_ GUÉPARD (2013), n° D-13-010873/DEF/EMA/EMP.2/DR du 12 septembre 2013 (amendée le 9 octobre 2013) CDEF, Retour d’expérience sur une décennie d’opérations extérieures pour l’armée de terre, juillet 2013 CDEF/DREX, Synthèse RETEX de l’opération Serval au Mali, janvier-mai 2013, Cahier du Retex, novembre 2013 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 87 Bibliography TISSERON Antonin, Oryx : Un succès méconnu (1992-1994), Cahier du Retex, novembre 2013 GOYA Michel, colonel, « L’intervention militaire française au Tchad (1969-1972) », Lettre du RETEX –Recherche, n°6, 26 novembre 2013 SAINT-VICTOR (de) Florent, « 45 ans d’opérations militaires en Centrafrique », Lettre du RETEXOpérations n° 8, 9 décembre 2013 Ouvrages AGERON Charles-Robert, La décolonisation française, Paris, Armand Colin, 1991 BAT Jean-Pierre, Le syndrome Foccart, Gallimard, 2012 BEUCHER Benoît, La Françafrique, entre mythe et réalités, Bruxelles, Université Libre, 2010 (non publié) CHAUVEAU Guy-Michel et GAYMARD Hervé (députés), Engagement et Diplomatie : Quelle doctrine pour les interventions militaires françaises ? Projet de rapport d’information déposé par la Commission des Affaires étrangères, 21 mai 2015 DUMOULIN André, La France militaire et l’Afrique, GRIP, 1997, p. 115 MANTOUX Stéphane, Les Guerres du Tchad (1969-1987), Chamalières, Lemme edition, 2014 NYE Joseph S., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York, Basic Books, 1990 PASCALLON Pierre (dir.), La politique de sécurité de la France en Afrique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004 SAULNIER Jean-Claude, adjudant-chef, Une vie de légionnaire, Nimrod, 2013 TONQUÉDEC (de) Pierre, Face à Khadafi, Opération Tacaud, SOTECA, 2012 VAÏSSE Maurice (dir.), Les troupes de marine dans l’armée de terre, CEHD (Centre d’études d’histoire de la défense), Lavauzelle, 2001 VAÏSSE Maurice et OULMONT Philippe (dir.), De Gaulle et la décolonisation de l’Afrique subsaharienne, Karthala, 2014 88 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Bibliography Etudes et rapports (par ordre alphabétique) BETH Emmanuel, général, « L’opération Licorne, une opération nationale en soutien d’une mission de l’ONU », L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre – Actes de la journée d’études du 5 février 2007, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2007 BOUCHERON Jean-Michel, Les forces françaises de Djibouti, Rapport d’information n° 2591, 21 septembre 2000 CHEVÈNEMENT Jean-Pierre et LARCHER Gérard, Sahel : Pour une approche globale, Rapport d’information n° 720, 3 juillet 2013 DAMAY Christian, général, « L’Union européenne et la gestion d’une crise africaine : la République démocratique du Congo », L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre – Actes de la journée d’études du 5 février 2007, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2007 DULAIT André, HUE Robert, POZZO DI BORGO Yves & BOULAUD Didier, La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne, Rapport d’information n° 450, 3 juillet 2006 DECAILLOT Pierre, lieutenant-colonel, De l’intérêt de la France de disposer d’un nombre minimum d’avions de transport militaires à grosse capacité et long rayon d’action, Brevet technique d’Etatmajor, année 1979 FAURE Jean, Le Service de santé des armées : Les défis de la professionnalisation, Rapport d’information n°458, 1998 FOUILLEUL Nicole, Entre professionnalité traditionnelle et professionnalisation en cours : la cohésion dans les troupes de marine, Centre d’études en Sciences sociales de la Défense, octobre 2001 GUILLOTEAU Christophe et NAUCHE Philippe, L’opération Serval au Mali, Rapport d’information n°1288, 18 juillet 2013 MENARD Christian, Le service de santé des armées, Rapport d’information n° 335, 29 octobre 2002 LORGEOUX Jeanny et BOCKEL Jean-Marie, La présence de la France dans une Afrique convoitée, Rapport d’information n°104, 29 octobre 2013 ROHAN (de) Josselin, La politique africaine de la France, Rapport d’information n° 324, 28 février 2011. THOMANN Jean-Claude, général (2s), « Généralités sur notre politique militaire en Afrique, enseignements des actions passées et orientations pour l’avenir », L’Afrique subsaharienne d’une crise à l’autre – Actes de la journée d’études du 5 février 2007, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2007 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 89 Bibliography THONIER Jean-Paul, général, « L’opération Artémis », Les moyens de l’autonomie stratégique français – Journée d’études organisée par la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 14 janvier 2004 THOUVENIN Jacques, « Quelles ressources pour quelles missions ? Le cas français », Métamorphose des missions ? Le soldat et les armées dans les nouveaux contextes d’interventions, Actes du colloque des 14, 15 et 16 juin 1994, Centre d’études en Sciences sociales de la Défense, avril 2000 Articles « Témoignage du Général Bruno Neveux », Doctrine Numéro spécial, décembre 2006 « L’opération de l’Union européenne en République démocratique du Congo (Artémis) », Doctrine Numéro spécial, décembre 2006 BRÉHAT Victor, « L’opération Verveine, chronique », Revue de la Défense nationale, juillet 1977, p. 162-165 CHANLIAU Patrick, colonel, « RCI : Le point de vue d’un chef des opérations », Doctrine Tactique, n° 28, septembre 2013 DARY Bruno, général de corps d’armée, « L’évacuation des ressortissants étrangers du Libéria – Opération Providence », Héraclès, n° 30, novembre-décembre 2008 FORGET Michel, général, « Mauritanie 1977 : Lamantin, une intervention extérieur à dominante air », Revue historique des armées, n° 186, mars 1992 FOURES André, « Caractères des interventions militaires françaises outre-mer de 1960 à nos jours », Revue Historique des Armées, n °169, avril 1987 GAULME François, « La politique française d’intervention dans les conflits limités en Afrique », Penser les Ailes françaises, n° 13, avril 2007, p. 6-12 GOYA Michel, lieutenant-colonel, « Les opérations extérieures en perspective historique (1962-2008) », Cahiers du CESAT n° 15, mars 2009, p. 65-67 GOYA Michel, colonel, « La guerre de trois mois : l’intervention militaire en perspectives », Politique étrangère, été 2013, vol. 78, n° 2, p. 157-168 GOYA Michel, colonel, « Mali : l’intervention militaire en perspectives », Cahiers du CESAT, n° 33, septembre 2013, p. 14-18 GOYA Michel, « La Légion saute sur Kolwezi », Guerre et Histoire, n° 16, décembre 2013 90 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Bibliography KOEPF Tobias, « Interventions françaises en Afrique : la fin de l’européanisation? », Politique étrangère, 2012/2 LEVITTE Laurent, commandant, « L’opération Verveine en 1977 : maîtrise de la projection de force et diplomatie aérienne », Penser les Ailes françaises, n° 24, hiver 2010/2011, p. 61-70 LESPINOIS (de) Jérôme, « Emploi de la force aérienne Tchad 1969-1987 », Penser les Ailes françaises, n° 6, Juin 2005, p. 65-74 MOLARD Bernard, général (2s), « L’air et l’espace : une continuité stratégique » (Actes du colloque international du 2 mars 2009), Penser les Ailes françaises, n° 20, été 2009, p. 116-126 OLLIVIER Thierry, général de division, « Les opérations d’évacuation de ressortissants au cœur des principaux engagements des forces terrestres », Doctrine n° 16, juin 2009 PALASSET Jean-Pierre, général de division, « RCI : de la complémentarité d’une force de l’ONU et d’une opération nationale en soutien de son action », Doctrine Tactique n° 28, septembre 2013 PAU Stéphane, lieutenant-colonel, « L’Union européenne en Afrique : complémentarité et limites dans la stabilisation », Doctrine, n° 12, mai 2007 TERNYNCK Privat, chef d’escadron, « L’opération BENGA, ou l’aérocombat au service de l’action européenne », Doctrine, n° 14, janvier 2008 XAVIER Gérard, capitaine de vaisseau, « La conduite des opérations d’évacuation de ressortissants », Doctrine n° 16, juin 2009 Sites internet Opération « Aramis », www.alat.fr/page211.html, consulté le 25/03/2014 Dossier Nord N.2501 Noratlas, http://www.avionslegendaires.net, consulté le 08/04/2014 « Peace and security », http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml, consulté le 21/05/2014 Armée de l’Air, Dossier Transport, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/technologies/aeronefs/ transport/transport, consulté le 08/04/2014 EMA, Dossier de référence Tchad, http://www.ema.defense.gouv.fr/operations/index.php/ tchad/dossier-de-reference.html, consulté le 24/03/2014 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 91 Bibliography EMA, Dossier de référence Centrafrique, http://www.ema.defense.gouv.fr/operations/index. php/centrafrique/dossier.html, consulté le 26/03/2014 EMA, Chronologie Côte d’Ivoire, http://www.ema.defense.gouv.fr/operations/index.php/cotedivoire/chronologie.html, consulté le 03/04/2014 EMA, Dossier de référence Côte d’Ivoire, http://www.ema.defense.gouv.fr/operations/index. php/cote-divoire/dossier-de-reference.html, consulté le 03/04/2014 Bureau des Affaires étrangères du gouvernement fédéral allemand, Communiqué de presse du 4 février 2008, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/ Meldungen/2008/080204-BM-Evakuierung-Tschad.html, consulté le 26/05/2014 Section de la Cartographie des Nations unies, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/ french/htmain.htm, consulté le 21/05/2014 Arnaud Delalande, « De Manta à Epervier : opérations aériennes au-dessus du Tchad », http://airpower.over-blog.com, 13 décembre 2013, consulté le 21/03/2014 92 Cahier du RETEX – Research – April 2016 Directeur de la publication : Général de Division Antoine WINDECK CDEF - 1 place Joffre - Case 53 - 75700 PARIS SP 07 Téléphone du secrétariat : 01 44 42 51 02. Fax du secrétariat : 01 44 42 81 29 Rédacteur en chef : Colonel Lionel JEAND’HEUR PNIA : 821 753 81 53 – : 01 44 42 81 53 Editeur rédactionnel : Capitaine Soraya AOUATI Traduction : Lieutenant-colonel Aleksandar STÉFANOVIC, Emma PHILLIPS Infographie : (Montage Couverture & cartes refaites) : Nanci FAUQUET/CDEF/DAD/PUB Retouche de la carte page 29 : Nathalie THORAVAL-MÉHEUT/CDEF/DAD/PUB Maquette : Christine VILLEY/CDEF /DAD/PUB Impression - routage : EDIACA – 76, rue de la Talaudière - BP 80 508 – 42007 ST-ÉTIENNE Cedex 01 Téléphone : 04 77 95 33 21 ou 04 77 95 33 25 Tirage : 2 400 exemplaires Diffusion : CDEF /DAD/PUB Téléphone : 01 44 42 43 18 Dépôt légal : ISSN de la collection Cahier du RETEX 2427-7045 ISBN du volume - Mai 2015 Version impression 978 - 2 - 11 - 138915 - 1 Version électronique 978 - 2 - 11 -138914 - 4 La version électronique de ce document est en ligne sur les sites Intradef et Internet du CDEF à l’adresse http://www.cdef.defense.gouv.fr.