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HEC Montréal
Affiliée à l'Université de Montréal
Les postulats temporels et le management stratégique du temps :
L'exemple de biopharmaceutiques québécoises
par
Line Bonneau
Département de management
Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures
en vue de l'obtention du grade de Ph.D. en administration
option management
février, 2009
© Line Bonneau 2009
HEC Montréal
Affiliée à l'Université de Montréal
Cette thèse intitulée :
Les postulats temporels et le management stratégique du temps :
L'exemple de biopharmaceutiques québécoises
Présentée par :
Line Bonneau
A été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes :
M. Taïeb Hafsi
Président-rapporteur
Mme Ann Langley
Directrice de recherche
Mme Linda Rouleau
Membre du jury
M. Benoît Demil
Examinateur externe
M. Guy Paré
Représentant du directeur de l'Ecole
RÉSUMÉ FRANÇAIS
L'objectif premier de cette thèse est de comprendre comment le temps est pris en compte
dans la formation de la stratégie. Elle répond à trois questions qui s'insèrent dans cette
problématique et qui jettent les bases des trois articles la constituant. Le premier article
consiste en une étude de contenu manifeste et latent de onze articles classiques du Harvard
Business Review afin de mettre à jour l'orientation temporelle de la stratégie dans les écrits.
Les deux autres articles sont tirés d'une étude de terrain qui a adopté un design longitudinal
de cas enchâssés, permettant la comparaison entre les firmes étudiées. L'objectif de l'étude
de terrain est d'une part, de s'intéresser à l'évolution d'une temporalité dominante
institutionnalisée dans le champ organisationnel des biopharmaceutiques québécoises et de
ses interactions avec les processus de travail d'une diversité d'acteurs et d'autre part, de
rendre compte de la marge de manoeuvre dont disposent les gestionnaires de firmes
biopharmaceutiques pour gérer le temps stratégiquement dans le contexte d'une variation
du temps inter-organisationnel.
La collecte de données pour l'étude de terrain a procédé en trois phases échelonnées sur six
années. Un total de trente-quatre entrevues semi-dirigées ont été conduites auprès d'une
variété de membres du champ organisationnel incluant des gestionnaires de quatre firmes.
Les transcriptions d'entrevue ont été analysées avec l'aide du logiciel Atlas.ti. Des données
secondaires sur le secteur et les firmes étudiées ont été recueillies tout au long de la période
de collecte de données et ont servi entre autres, de matériel de validation.
Les principales contributions de cette thèse résident dans 1. L'identification d'une diversité
insoupçonnée de postulats implicites sur l'orientation temporelle, incluant des perspectives
subjectives, dans les écrits en management stratégique et ce, contrairement aux attentes des
écrits préalables s'étant penchés sur ce sujet; 2.L'identification d'une institution temporelle
au niveau du champ des biopharmaceutiques québécoises, le temps inter-organisationnel,
de sa caractérisation sur la base des rythmes de travail et du mécanisme d'entraînement
(McGrath et Kelly, 1986; Ancona et Chong, 1996) ainsi que de l'identification et la
description de sa transition sous l'impulsion de l'éclatement de la bulle technologique et 3.
Le développement et l'application d'un modèle de portefeuille d'horizons temporels
bidimensionnels, une lentille qui permet de mieux saisir les stratégies temporelles de quatre
firmes confrontées à la transition du temps inter-organisationnel, incluant des stratégies
dynamiques d'interaction d'horizons par allocation concurrente ou synergique de
ressources ainsi que des stratégies de saut temporel.
Les contributions de cette thèse permettent d'avancer que l'expression management
stratégique du temps n'a pas à être appréhendée comme un oxymore. Tant les pressions
temporelles institutionnelles que les actions temporelles stratégiques sont actions humaines.
Révéler le pluritemporalisme dans le champ du management stratégique, c'est en vérité
offrir au stratège un élargissement de son spectre d'actions vers une conformité ou une
différenciation par rapport aux demandes du champ organisationnel et des concurrents.
Mots-clés : analyse de contenu; biopharmaceutiques; cas enchâssés; entraînement; étude
longitudinale; horizon temporel; innovation; institution temporelle; management
stratégique; orientation temporelle; pluritemporalisme; postulats temporels.
iv
1ÉSU1VIÉ ANGLAIS
Temporal assumptions and strategic management of time :
The example of Quebec biopharmaceuticals
The main objective of this thesis is to understand how time participates to strategy
formation. The three essays of the dissertation answer three distinct questions posed to shed
light on the matter from different perspectives. The first essay is the result of a manifest and
latent content analysis conducted on eleven classic articles published in the Harvard
Business Review with the aim of revealing the temporal orientation of strategy in texts. The
second and third essays are based on a longitudinal field study of a single case, the Quebec
biopharmaceutical field, with embedded cases of four ventures, allowing for a comparative
analysis. The aim of the field study is twofold: first, to study the evolution of a dominant
temporal institution in the Quebec biopharmaceutical organizational field and its
interactions with work processes of a plurality of actors and second, to account for the
discretion available to managers from biopharmaceutical ventures in order to strategically
manage time in the context of a shift in the inter-organizational time.
Data collection for the empirical study proceeded in three phases over a six-year period. A
total of thirty-four semi-structured interviews were conducted with a diversity of members
from the organizational field including managers from four ventures. Transcriptions of
interviews were analyzed with Atlas.ti software. Secondary data on the sector as well as the
firms studied were collected throughout the course of the study and were used to validate
interview data.
The major contributions of the thesis are: 1. Identification of an unsuspected diversity in
implicit assumptions about temporal orientation amongst strategy texts, including
subjective perspectives about the future, contrary to expectations from previous research; 2.
Identification of a temporal institution in the Quebec biopharmaceutical field, the interorganizational time, its characterization on the basis of work processes and entrainment
mechanisms (McGrath et Kelly, 1986; Ancona et Chong, 1996) as well as the identification
and description of its transition upon the stimulus of the technology bubble burst and 3.
Development and application of a portfolio model of two-dimensional temporal horizons, a
lens that sheds light on temporal strategies of four ventures faced with a shifting interorganizational time. Temporal strategies include dynamically interacting horizons through
concurrent or synergistic resource allocation as well as temporal leap strategies.
This thesis' contributions suggest that the expression strategic management of time does
not need to be understood as an oxymoron. Both institutional temporal pressures and
strategic temporal actions are human actions. Revealing pluritemporalism in the field of
strategic management is an endeavour to help strategists widen their discretion towards
either a conformity or differentiation from the demands of the organizational field and
competitors.
Keywords : biopharmaceuticals; content analysis; embedded cases; entrainment;
innovation; longitudinal study; pluritemporalism; strategic management; temporal
assumptions; temporal horizon; temporal institution; temporal orientation.
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
Liste des tableaux vii
Liste des figures ix
Remerciements xi
I. Introduction
1
II. L'étude du temps en management et en stratégie 8
2.1 L'évolution des conceptions du temps en théorie des 8
organisations
2.2 Entretemps dans le champ du management stratégique... 12
III. Principes méthodologiques pour l'étude du temps en management et en 17
stratégie
3.1 Trois principes pour l'étude du temps en management et stratégie 17
3.1.1 Introduire du temps et étudier le temps 18
3.1.2 Temps de l'horloge et pluritemporalisme
19
3.1.3 L'invisibilité du temps 24
3.2 Les principes qui ont guidé l'ensemble de cette thèse 25
3.3 Une typologie pour l'étude du temps en management stratégique 28
IV. Article 1
36
V. Article 2
79
VI. Article 3
115
VII. Conclusion
211
7.1 Contributions de la thèse 211
7.1.1 Liens entre les articles 1 et 2 : Un jardin temporel pour le 214
champ organisationnel
vi
7.1.2 Liens entre les articles 1 et 3 : Un répertoire d'orientations 216
temporelles pour les firmes de biopharmaceutiques
7.1.3 Liens entre les articles 2 et 3 : Réponses stratégiques aux 220
pressions institutionnelles
7.1.4 Temps et formation de la stratégie 226
7.2 Considérations pour les praticiens 227
7.3 Pistes de recherche future 229
VIII. Bibliographie 233
vii
LISTE DES TABLEAUX
Tableau I
Synchronisation et chrono-concurrence en stratégie
Tableau II
Recension d'études sur le repérage temporel
Tableau III
Méthode et réponse aux principes
Tableau IV
Typologie des approches pour les recherches empiriques sur le 29
temps en management stratégique
Tableau V
Typologie des approches pour les recherches empiriques sur le 31
temps en management stratégique : l'exemple de l'orientation
temporelle des dirigeants
Tableau VI
Typologie de Lee et Liebenau
Tableau VII
Typologie de Van de Ven et Poole
Tableau VIII
Article selection method
Tableau IX
Selected articles for content analysis
Tableau X
Present-Past-Future orientation of eleven classic strategy
articles
Tableau XI
Classification of eleven articles on the basis of their temporal51
orientation
Tableau XII
Selected articles : Relationship with the future
Tableau XIII
Dominant time zones of eleven classic strategy articles
Tableau XIV
Coding of semi-structured interviews
Tableau XV
Rhythm of work processes
Tableau XVI
Shifting inter-organizational time
Tableau XVII
Bases for interaction between work processes
23
27
33
34
46
47
50
52
65
89
92
Tableau XVIII Phases of study and data collection
Tableau XIX
14
95
100
136
The dynamic management of strategic time horizons 146
Tableau XXSituation of biotech ventures at start of transition
169
viii
Tableau XXI
Transitioning by four ventures : management of an STH 175
portfolio
Tableau XXII
Questions de recherche Tableau XXIII
Contributions de la thèse par appariement d'articles 215
Tableau XXIV
Comparaison de l'orientation temporelle des quatre firmes à 218
l'étude
Tableau XXV
Comparaison des réponses stratégiques des quatre firmes à 223
l'étude
212
ix
LISTE DES FIGURES
Figure 1Effet de l'explicitation des postulats temporels 3
Figure 2Application of McGrath and Kelly's (1986) social entrainment mode! 86
to the organizational field
Figure 3Generic portfolio of strategic time horizons
128
Figure 4The academic research start-up portfolio 131
Figure 5The product company portfolio 131
Figure 6Research design 133
Figure 7Four ventures transitioning : STH portfolios at start of transition 145
Figure 8Venture A's interpretation of a FIPCO
148
Figure 9Venture A's service company portfolio 151
Figure 10Venture B's single product company portfolio 156
Figure 11 Venture C's temporal leap towards product cie portfolio 160
Figure 12 Venture D's post-merger product company portfolio 167
Figure 13 Start of transition: Composition of four portfolios 171
Figure 14Pursuing the transition : Composition of four portfolios 171
Figure 15 Transitioning ventures : A look at dynamic STH management and 173
platform development
Figure 16Questions de recherche et contributions de la thèse 213
Figure 17Orientation temporelle PPA du champ organisationnel 216
Figure 18Pistes de recherche future
229
X
« J'avais pensé jusqu'ici que l'avenir était une constante acquisition.
Je n'avais pas encore très bien vu que,
pour avancer d'un pas dans la voie de l'accomplissement ou de la simple réussite,
on s'arrache chaque fois à quelque bien
peut-être encore plus précieux »
Gabrielle Roy
À la douce mémoire de mon père
xi
REMERCIEMENTS
Le moment est venu de remercier les personnes qui m'ont accompagnée au cours de cette
thèse. J'ai fait de nombreuses rencontres utiles et gratifiantes tout au long de mon parcours
et l'on voudra bien me pardonner de ne pas toutes les consigner ici.
D'abord, je suis redevable à tous les praticiens qui ont accepté de participer à cette étude
car elle n'aurait pu voir le jour sans eux. Je salue leur générosité et l'intérêt qu'ils ont
démontré à partager leur expérience.
Je tiens à souligner la chance qui fut mienne de côtoyer les membres de mon comité, trois
chercheurs et personnes de qualité. Ann Langley m'a accueillie, outillée et mise au défi.
C'est à son contact que ma pensée s'est considérablement raffmée. Très tôt, elle m'a
encouragée à partager mes recherches dans des forums internationaux et, malgré mon
inconfort et mes craintes de l'époque, je lui en suis reconnaissante, car ce fut là un
formidable apprentissage du métier de chercheur. Linda Rouleau a contribué à me rassurer
sur mes intuitions et m'a donné l'occasion d'entrer dans le monde de la pédagogie, tandis
que Serghei Floricel a maintes fois cru en ma recherche plus que je ne pouvais le faire. Il
me semblait souvent un pas en avant, là-bas, dans ce qui m'apparaissait être une brume
épaisse.
Une thèse étant un voyage au bout de soi-même, je suis reconnaissante d'avoir rencontré
des collègues généreuses dont certaines sont même devenues des amies chères. Je pense
tout spécialement au soutien affectif et à la stimulation intellectuelle que m'ont apportés ces
femmes formidables que sont : Jacqueline Dahan, Lilly Lemay, Joanne Roch, et Pamela
Sloan. J'ai eu le bonheur de rencontrer Viviane Sergi, une collègue avec qui j'ai partagé des
conversations hautement provocantes et les rigolades les plus folles ainsi que Valérie
Lehmann, dont le contact m'a dynamisée. Maintes fois, ces femmes m'ont éclairée et
soutenue. J'ai aussi une pensée affectueuse pour Julie Gervais et Yann Hébert, deux
personnes vraies, ainsi que pour ma soeur Manon dont le soutien indéfectible me fut
inestimable.
xii
Je remercie Taïeb Hafsi qui m'a introduite au monde de la recherche et qui m'a
généreusement permis de présenter des résultats de recherche par l'entremise de la Chaire
de management international Walter-L-Somers. Finalement, je suis redevable au
programme MINE pour son appui financier et pour m'avoir procuré de stimulantes
opportunités de contact avec la communauté des chercheurs en innovation.
I. INTRODUCTION
« There is no such a thing as a simple understanding of lime »
Ida Sabelis (2009: 168)
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, des appels répétés ont été lancés auprès de la
communauté de chercheurs en management pour qu'une attention accrue soit portée à
l'étude du temps (Schriber et Gutek, 1987; Bluedorn et Denhardt, 1988; Whipp, 1994;
Goodman et al., 2001). L'importance même du temps dans les affaires humaines ne fait pas
l'objet d'un débat. Cependant, le temps prend du temps, si l'on peut dire, à s'établir comme
objet de recherche légitime dans les études sur les organisations et plus particulièrement, en
management stratégique. Ce champ de connaissances demeure encore aujourd'hui
immature et nombre de difficultés n'ont toujours pas été résolues.
Le but de la présente thèse est d'ouvrir la boîte noire du temps en management stratégique
en posant une question fondamentale : « Comment le temps est-il pris en compte dans la
formation de la stratégie ? ». Pour réaliser ce travail, nous remettrons en question des
façons traditionnelles de concevoir le temps en stratégie, en nous ouvrant à la connaissance
du temps en provenance de domaines connexes comme la sociologie et l'anthropologie.
En particulier, nous attirerons l'attention sur le caractère socialement construit du temps et
sur la façon avec laquelle une multiplicité de postulats temporels se manifestent
concrètement dans les écrits normatifs en stratégie. Nous montrerons également, à l'aide
d'une étude du secteur biopharmaceutique du Québec, comment une multitude de
conceptions du temps et de rythmes temporels interagissent dans un champ organisationnel
donné, et comment ces rythmes s'agencent et se synchronisent pour faire émerger une
temporalité partagée et institutionnalisée. Finalement, nous montrerons comment, en
présence d'une institution temporelle, les gestionnaires des entreprises biopharmaceutiques
sont à même de gérer le temps stratégiquement.
Contrairement à la littérature dominante en stratégie qui met de l'avant une conception
objective et unique du temps, mesurée par le chronomètre et orientée autour d'un nombre
2
limité de dimensions dont la vitesse (Stalle, 1988; Stalle et Webber, 1993; Eisenhardt, 1989)
et la cadence des décisions (Brown et Eisenhardt, 1997; 1998), cette thèse reconnaît le
caractère subjectif, multiple, et multidimensionnel des phénomènes temporels. De plus, en
se libérant d'une conception étroite axée surtout sur la vitesse, la thèse ouvre la voie à une
considération élargie de sa gestion stratégique.
En fait, il est séduisant de penser que le temps puisse être géré stratégiquement. Après tout,
ne dit-on pas que le temps équivaut à de l'argent?' Et, sa perte n'est-elle pas irrécupérable? 2
Pourtant, la gestion stratégique du temps ne semble pas aller de soi. Ainsi, plusieurs
praticiens rencontrés pour cette étude ont signifié leur étonnement face au thème de cette
thèse comme si « gestion stratégique », évoquant la capacité d'agir et la discrétion
managériale, juxtaposée au mot « temps », largement perçu comme une contrainte
inéluctable, générait un oxymore.
C'est justement là un défi et un objectif de taille pour les études sur le temps en
management stratégique : identifier la part de discrétion disponible aux praticiens. En effet,
l'accent mis par la littérature en stratégie sur le thème de la vitesse, désarticulée du devenir
stratégique, pourrait mener les entreprises tout droit à un piège, puisque « condamnées à
aller de plus en plus vite tout en stagnant du point de vue concurrentiel » (Stalk et Webber,
1993 : 94) comme si les praticiens ne pouvaient exercer leur choix.
Pourtant, deux consultants de Mercer pressentent que gérer stratégiquement le temps ne se
résume pas à la vitesse, que d'autres aspects demandent à être explicités en tenant compte
du contexte et que les gestionnaires peuvent avoir prise sur le temps :
« Mais la vitesse n'est qu'une dimension. D'autres aspects du temps sont
plus importants selon les circonstances des clients: aller plus lentement,
trouver la bonne séquence, prévoir dix ans d'avance f...] Le temps en
affaires peut être aussi complexe qu'en physique. Les meilleurs joueurs en
affaires peuvent nous aider à comprendre comment le temps fonctionne
vraiment et comment on peut l'utiliser, le façonner et le retourner à notre
avantage » (Slywotzky et Morrisson, 1999 :358).
I
2
« Remember that time is money » (Franklin, 1748).
Ford : my life and work, (Ford, 1922).
3
Si concevoir le temps comme une ressource de durée débouche de manière prédominante
sur une stratégie de vitesse, les chercheurs Eisenhardt et Brown ont pour leur part contribué
au développement d'une approche alternative avec le concept de « time pacing » fondé sur
des rythmes et appelant une stratégie de synchronisation (Brown et Eisenhardt, 1997;
Brown et Eisenhardt, 1998; Eisenhardt et Brown, 1998). Ces études suggèrent l'intérêt et la
possibilité de considérer de multiples dimensions du temps dans la prise en compte du
temps de la stratégie. De multiples perspectives sur le temps risquent de révéler de
nouveaux aspects temporels à gérer et, par conséquent, une source renouvelée d'avantages
concurrentiels fondés sur le temps (voir la figure 1).
Figure 1. Effet de l'explicitation des postulats temporels
1 a. Point de vue traditionnel
Phénomènes d'intérêt
en
management
stratégique
Temps comme
Durée/Ressource
Stratégie
de
Vitesse
1 b. Ouvrir la boîte noire du temps
Phénomènes d'intérêt
Révélation Nouvelles bases
en
de
la
multiplicité
temporelles
pour
management
des conceptions sur la
stratégique
le temps
gestion stratégique
Cette thèse sur le Management stratégique du temps s'appuie donc sur les deux postulats
suivants :
1. Le temps se manifeste sous une multiplicité de formes construites par les acteurs
comme suggéré par nombre d'études en anthropologie et sociologie des organisations;
2. Le management stratégique du temps va au-delà des approches dominantes du temps en
stratégie qui mettent l'accent sur la vitesse et sur la cadence des décisions.
La question générale : « Comment le temps est-il pris en compte dans la formation de la
stratégie? » sera abordée à travers trois articles répondant chacun à une ou des sous-
4
questions qui s'insèrent dans la problématique plus large. Nous débuterons la thèse avec
une recension des écrits sur le temps en management et en stratégie qui permettra au lecteur
de se familiariser avec cet objet de recherche, le temps, et de situer plus précisément les
trois articles qui suivront. Cette exploration sera accompagnée d'une réflexion
épistémologique et méthodologique sur les approches propices à l'étude de ce phénomène.
Les trois articles au coeur de la thèse seront ensuite présentés tour à tour.
Le premier article tente de répondre à la question : « Quels sont les postulats temporels qui
se cachent dans les classiques du management stratégique? ». Tel qu'expliqué dans le
prochain chapitre, il s'inspire d'une réflexion de Mosakowski et Earley (2000) selon
laquelle le manque de diversité dans le traitement du temps dans les écrits en management
stratégique dynamique est tributaire d'un manque d'attention aux postulats temporels.
L'examen d'un éventail d'articles classiques dont le propos porte sur la question : « Qu estce que la stratégie? », révèle la prédominance de postulats par rapport à l'orientation
temporelle passé-présent-avenir et se veut une contribution à la reconnaissance de la
multiplicité des temporalités dans la façon avec laquelle on écrit la stratégie. Les postulats
de ces approches bien connues des praticiens sont identifiés, discutés et représentés
graphiquement dans l'article : « Strategy is about the future.. .or is it? ».
Le premier article de cette thèse est l'aboutissement d'un travail de réécriture et de
recentrage suite à la présentation de versions préalables dans trois forums internationaux.
Ainsi, les données préliminaires ont été présentées à la Strategic Management Society MiniConference qui avait pour thème Plurality, Perspectives and Paradoxes in Strategy et qui
s'est tenue à Rotterdam en 2002. Ensuite, une version préliminaire de l'article intitulée
Revealing Temporal Assumptions In Strategy: A Review Of Eleven Classic Articles From
The Harvard Business Review a été publiée dans les actes de la conférence Management
Futures de la British Academy of Management tenue à St. Andrews en 2004. Finalement,
les commentaires reçus lors de la présentation de Strategy is about the future... or is it? à la
conférence de l'Academy of Management tenue à Philadelphie en 2007 ont permis la mise
au point cette dernière version. Les deux autres articles sont issus de données secondaires et
de données d'entrevues semi-dirigées avec des membres du champ organisationnel des
5
biotechnologies en santé humaine : gestionnaires de firmes biopharmaceutiques, capitalrisqueurs, sociétés de valorisation, agents de brevet et chercheurs.
Parce que cette thèse prétend à la possibilité de gérer le temps stratégiquement, elle ne peut
ignorer l'aspect institutionnalisé du temps et c'est ce que le deuxième article explore. En
effet, de nombreux auteurs se sont penchés sur des formes stabilisées du temps par
l'entremise desquelles les groupes se coordonnent, font l'expérience du temps et donnent
un sens à cette expérience (Schriber et Gutek, 1987; Clark, 1990; Zerubavel, 1979;
Pluchart, 2000; Detnil et al., 2001; Lawrence, 2001; Orlikowski et Yates, 2002).
Cependant, ces écrits ne discutent pas de mécanismes d'interaction entre les temporalités
qui pourraient mener à la stabilisation et à la domination d'une temporalité particulière.
Le deuxième article de cette thèse, « Inter-organisational time: the example of Quebec
biotechnology », publié en mars 2007 dans la revue International Journal of Innovation
Management, fait état du temps inter-organisationnel, une institution temporelle au niveau
du champ organisationnel des biopharmaceutiques québécoises, et de ses variations
opérées à la faveur de l'éclatement de la bulle technologique. Il répond aux deux questions
suivantes :
1. « Quel est l'«ordre temporel dominant » dans le champ des biopharmaceutiques au
Québec? »;
2. « Comment peut-on expliquer son avènement? ».
Le temps n'est pas que durée ou vitesse et est révélé dans cet article sous d'autres formes
que sont la séquence des événements, la synchronisation, la localisation temporelle, les
fenêtres d'opportunité et les délais. L'article se penche en particulier sur les processus de
découverte et de développement des médicaments, la carrière des chercheurs, la
valorisation de la recherche, le fmancement des firmes essaimées et la protection de la
propriété intellectuelle. Le concept d'entraînement expliqué plus loin dans cette thèse
(McGrath et Kelly, 1986; Ancona et Chong, 1996) est mobilisé afm de montrer comment
l'interaction entre une diversité d'acteurs, qui entretiennent des postulats temporels variés
6
par rapport à ces processus, donne naissance à une temporalité dominante dans un champ
organisationnel qui les guide, les contraint et les habilite.
Finalement, le troisième et dernier article de la thèse, « Transitioning after the bubble
burst: A portfolio of strategic time horizons for biopharmaceutical ventures », veut rendre
compte de la marge de manœuvre dont disposent les gestionnaires pour gérer le temps
stratégiquement dans le contexte d'une variation du temps inter-organisationnel identifiée
dans le deuxième article. Bien que dans leur évocation du phénomène d'entraînement,
Ancona et Chong (1996) accommode l'action stratégique (Child, 1997), l'interrelation entre
l'acteur et une institution temporelle dominante demande à être développée. Ce dernier
article répond aux deux questions de recherche suivantes :
1. « Comment les gestionnaires de firmes biopharmaceutiques ont-ils exercé leur marge
de manoeuvre dans la gestion stratégique des horizons de temps en contexte de
changement de temps inter-organisationnel? »;
2. « Quelles sont les dimensions du concept d'horizon temporel qui reflètent les stratégies
temporelles utilisées par les gestionnaires des firmes biopharmaceutiques? ».
L'étude de terrain nous a donné l'occasion de remettre en question le postulat
unidimensionnel de longueur d'un horizon de temps et de développer un construit
bidimensionnel tenant compte du futur envisagé, fondement d'un modèle de portefeuille
des horizons temporels stratégiques. Appliqué aux actions stratégiques des firmes à l'étude,
le modèle de portefeuille focalise l'attention sur la dynamique intra-organisationnelle de
réponse à un changement d'institution temporelle, le temps inter-organisationnel, et
identifie des stratégies comme, d'une part, l'allocation de ressources sur des horizons de
temps soit de manière concurrente, soit de manière synergique et d'autre part, une
manoeuvre que nous identifions comme un « saut temporel ». L'article débouche fmalement
sur la suggestion que, plus que le contenu même du portefeuille d'horizons temporels, c'est
sa gestion dynamique qui peut être reliée à la capacité des firmes à obtenir les ressources
nécessaires à la poursuite de leur développement.
7
Des versions préliminaires du troisième article ont été présentées d'abord au Forum
industriel MINE: Joutes d'innovation (École Polytechnique, Montréal) en avril 2007 sous
le titre : Strategically managing time in biotechnology after the bubble burst et au
Dissertation consortium de l'Academy of Management en août 2007 sous le titre
Dynamically recomposing time horizons: a portfolio model for biotechnology.
Suivant la présentation des trois articles, nous présentons un chapitre de conclusion offrant
une synthèse des trois articles avec une exposition des contributions de la thèse, des
considérations pour les praticiens ainsi que des pistes pour les recherches à venir.
II. L'ÉTUDE DU TEMPS EN MANAGEMENT ET EN STRATÉGIE
2.1 L'évolution des conceptions du temps en théorie des organisations
Il y a vingt ans, paraît une recension des écrits sur le temps dans les études sur les
organisations (Bluedorn et Denhardt, 1988), une recension englobant les théories de
l'organisation et le design organisationnel ainsi que les domaines de la planification et du
comportement organisationnel, dans laquelle les auteurs espèrent mettre un terme à
« l'ignorance du temps dans les études sur les organisations » (316). D'entrée de jeu et
s'appuyant sur la notion de réalité sociale construite (Berger et Luckman, 1967), Bluedorn
et Denhardt (1988: 300) posent que « le temps lui-même est une variable, pas une
constante [...et que] le temps est foncièrement une construction sociale ».
Cette prise de position est lourde de conséquences pour un chercheur puisqu'elle exige une
prise de conscience personnelle et une remise en question des a priori, les siens et ceux des
autres qu'ils soient chercheurs ou praticiens. C'est aussi une prise de position qui amène à
l'ouverture envers la multiplicité, porteuse à la fois de richesse et de complexité.
La recension de Bluedorn et Denhardt (1988) permet de soutenir que, contrairement à ce
qui peut être constaté dans le corpus d'études sur le temps ailleurs en sciences sociales, le
concept du temps dans les études en management est rarement remis en question. Plutôt, les
théoriciens en organisation acceptent sans discussion le concept de temps dominant en
Occident, c'est-à-dire l'idée « d'un concept de temps objectif, unitaire (sujet à une seule
interprétation), linéaire (progressant de manière régulière du passé vers le présent et
l'avenir), et mécanique (composé de moments individuels sujets à une mesure précise)»,
sans se rendre compte que cette perspective est, elle aussi, une construction sociale et
qu'elle « va même jusqu' à rendre les autres points de vue difficiles à discerner » (Bluedorn
et Denhardt, 1988 :302). Et, c'est la remise en question de la perspective dominante, donc
la problématisation du temps, qui tend à révéler la complexité des phénomènes temporels à
de multiples niveaux d'analyse, individuel, de groupe, organisationnel et au-delà, ainsi que
les interactions entre eux.
9
Mêmes si leurs idées n'ont pas pénétré la conception dominante en management, certains
chercheurs contribuent déjà à étoffer cette idée de multiplicité des temporalités. Par
exemple, remettant en cause la linéarité du temps, les études de Jaques (1956, 1964, 1979)
suggèrent que les organisations abritent des tâches de nature cyclique dont la durée varie
selon le niveau hiérarchique, suggérant ainsi que des activités stratégiques peuvent avoir un
horizon mesuré en décennies contrairement à d'autres tâches dont la maîtrise nécessite des
durées moindres.
En révélant les subtiles différences dans l'interprétation que des gestionnaires de marketing
font du comportement des consommateurs selon leurs années d'expérience, Clark (1978)
suggère que le processus de planification de la production est influencé de manière
fructueuse par la prise en compte d'une temporalité subjective. En mettant en lumière les
aspects saisonniers de la production de légumes en conserve, Clark (1985) révèle
l'interaction de multiples temporalités et leurs conséquences sur la gestion de l'espace
physique, de l'organisation du travail et de la logistique.
D'autres travaux remettent en cause l'objectivité du temps et suggèrent plutôt que les
organisations abritent une multiplicité de temporalités dans leurs différents services internes
qui s'accordent avec les attentes temporelles des partenaires externes de l'entreprise
(Lorsch, 1965; Lawrence et Lorsch, 1967; Lorsch et Morse, 1974) représentant un défi
d'intégration. Das (1986) met aussi de l'avant la subjectivité des planificateurs dont
l'orientation future personnelle influence la préférence pour l'étendue de l'horizon de
planification. De même, le modèle d'équilibre ponctué auquel est arrivée Gersick (1988)
dans son étude du comportement des groupes de projet suggère encore une fois que chaque
moment n'est pas égal puisque les membres de ces groupes réagissent différemment à la
durée selon les phases du projet dans lequel ils sont engagés.
Et puis, sur la base d'une vaste étude empirique, Schriber et Gutek (1987) suggèrent même
qu'au-delà des dimensions temporelles explicites, que les gestionnaires reconnaissent dans
les normes du travail (allocation du temps, horaires et échéances, séquence des tâches,
cadence du travail, coordination et synchronisation), d'autres dimensions implicites
échappent à leur gestion (autonomie par rapport à l'utilisation du temps, frontières
10
temporelles entre le travail et le non-travail, frontières temporelles intraorganisationnelles,
routine versus variété dans les tâches) tandis que d'autres encore relèveraient de la culture
(orientation temporelle, arbitrage entre qualité et vitesse, conscience de l'utilisation du
temps). On en retient que le temps se manifesterait donc dans les organisations sous
d'autres formes moins concrètes que celles communément appréhendées par les praticiens.
En plus de la multiplicité révélée par une perspective subjective du temps, la recension de
Bluedom et Denhardt (1988) fait état de travaux suggérant que des groupes, des
organisations ou des sociétés puissent partager une même temporalité, distincte de celle
d'autres entités similaires (Barley, 1985; Zerubavel, 1981) et avancent que la notion
«d'entraînement social » (McGrath et Kelly, 1986) pourrait être mobilisée dans
l'intégration de la multiplicité des temporalités révélée par une perspective qui dépasse le
temps objectif. Le concept d'entraînement sera décrit de manière plus approfondie dans
l'article 2 dont il constitue le socle théorique. Cependant, l'on évoquera ici que Bluedom et
Denhardt (1988: 313-314) présentent l'entraînement comme un mécanisme de
synchronisation de rythmes cycliques capable de relier des niveaux d'analyse. Toutefois, au
moment de leur recension des écrits, l'utilisation de ce concept ne déborde pas des travaux
de McGrath et Kelly en psychologie sociale (Kelly et McGrath, 1985; McGrath et Kelly,
1986) sauf pour des évocations implicites dans Lawrence et Lorsch (1967) et Schriber
(1986).
En rétrospective, la lecture de la recension de Bluedom et Denhardt (1988) nous amène à
suggérer que les chercheurs en management désireux de prendre le temps comme objet de
recherche à cette époque se devaient de relever les deux défis suivants:
1. S'ouvrir à la multiplicité des temps soit en :
a) Prenant le tournant de la construction sociale ou à tout le moins en incluant plus de
subjectivité dans leur approche;
b) S'ouvrant à la connaissance sur le temps provenant de domaines connexes comme
la sociologie et l'anthropologie, donc la considération de multiples systèmes de
repérage temporel;
11
c) Dépassant l'appréhension du temps uniquement comme une ressource de durée,
construction de la société industrielle.
2. Relier des niveaux d'analyse (individu-firme; individu-environnement externe; firmeenvironnement externe).
Il est ainsi plus aisé d'apprécier que l'absence du temps dans les études sur les
organisations n'est pas simplement la conséquence d'un oubli. Plutôt, son inclusion
exigeait que les chercheurs développent une façon nouvelle d'appréhender le phénomène et
s'ouvrent à la multiplicité alors que la diversité s'insère mal dans la tradition managériale
d'unicité et de contrôle puisque « sans conteste, l'objectif du management a été de
contrôler le temps et non de le problématiser » (Adam et al., 2004 : 3).
Puis, dans la foulée du congrès de l'Academy of Management en 2000 sur le thème du
temps, «A new time », quatre chercheurs suggèrent précisément de considérer le temps
comme une nouvelle lentille au même titre que « le design stratégique, le politique et le
culturel, dans la compréhension du fonctionnement des organisations »
(Ancona,
Goodman, Lawrence et Tushman 2001 : 645). Cette approche permettrait, selon eux, de
véritablement révéler le temps à la fois dans les processus et les pratiques. En fait, les
chercheurs promettent que le temps « s'insinuera dans les méthodes de recherche »
(Ancona et al. 2001 : 646).
L'étude du temps dans les organisations exigerait donc à nouveau une remise en question
non seulement des théories mais également des méthodes de recherche. Ancona et al.
(2001: 647) reconnaissent l'ampleur du changement en soulignant la nécessité de repenser
comment les terrains sont négociés avec les firmes d'accueil, d'encourager la recherche sur
le temps dans les thèses et celles publiées dans les revues et d'expérimenter avec de
nouveaux types de collecte de données et d'analyse. Cet appel à une nouvelle
diversification des approches théoriques et des méthodes pour appréhender le management
et les organisations peut être vu comme à contrecourant de la perspective postulant un lien
causal entre l'accumulation des connaissances et le consensus dans les paradigmes (Pfeffer,
1993).
12
2.2 Entretemps, dans le champ du management stratégique...
Pendant ce temps, du côté des études en management stratégique, Stalle (1988) élève le
temps au rang d'enjeu stratégique incontournable en prédisant qu'il sera la «prochaine
source d'avantage concurrentiel », prédiction fondée sur la façon avec laquelle les Japonais
« gèrent le temps comme la plupart des compagnies gèrent les coûts, la qualité ou
l'inventaire ». Il élabore sa stratégie de chrono-concurrence3 misant sur la compression du
temps et la vitesse au moment où s'effrite la domination des entreprises manufacturières
américaines face à la concurrence japonaise.
Concurremment, la vision traditionnelle de la stratégie, associée à un long horizon de temps
et définie comme la gestion à long terme des destinées de l'entreprise, est mise à mal par la
perception d'un environnement qu'on dit être devenu plus difficile à lire à cause de
discontinuités technologiques (Tushman et Andersen, 1986), de l'hyperconcurrence
(D'Aveni, 1994) et de la haute vélocité (Bourgeois et Eisenhardt, 1988).
En outre, l'avantage concurrentiel, concept au coeur de « la question fondamentale dans le
champ du management stratégique » (Teece, Pisano et Shuen, 1997: 509), n'est désormais
plus discuté seulement en termes de durabilité mais aussi comme étant transitoire
(Chakravarthy, 1997; Collis, 1994; D'Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989), renouvelable
(Williams, 1998) ou imprévisible (Eisenhardt et Sull, 2001), une situation pouvant mener à
un jeu concurrentiel dans lequel l'anticipation n'est plus possible (Lengnick-Hall et Wolff,
1999). Cette situation amène les chercheurs à souhaiter une nouvelle approche en
management stratégique qui tiendrait compte d'un niveau de risque et d'incertitude plus
élevé, d'une diminution dans la capacité à prédire et de l'ambiguité dans laquelle se trouve
la notion de secteurs industriels (Bettis et Hitt, 1995). Plusieurs, dont Porter (1991),
appellent au développement d'une théorie dynamique de la stratégie qui mettrait donc le
temps au coeur de la stratégie.
En fait, les chercheurs commencent à proposer une gamme de notions temporelles pour la
stratégie: l'idée de signaux et de fenêtres d'opportunité qui ne peuvent être ratées que sous
3
Traduction de l'expression anglaise plus connue de « time-based competition ».
13
peine de voir une firme malencontreusement éjectée du marché (Bourgeois et Eisenhardt,
1988; Taylor, 2000), les cycles rapides (Bower et Hout, 1988), l'intention stratégique
(Hamel et Prahalad, 1989), les horloges doubles (Mitchell, 1991), la régulation temporelle
(Gersick, 1994; Eisenhardt et Brown, 1998), les événements jalons (Eisenhardt et Tabrizi,
1995), l'idée d'un horizon à long terme qui n'excède pas trois ans, les rythmes basés sur
des rituels, l'improvisation, sonder l'avenir, les transitions et les liens temporels (Brown et
Eisenhardt, 1997), la concurrence en temps réel et la vitesse associées à Internet (Teece,
Pisano et Shuen, 1997) et fmalement, la synchronisation de l'action (Ferrier, Smith et
Grimm, 1999).
Comme le montre le tableau I, outre l'approche de Hamel et Prahalad (1989) qui n'y est pas
consignée et dont le propos, comme nous le verrons dans l'analyse proposée par l'article 1,
porte principalement sur la nécessité de développer une perspective à très long terme, les
autres notions temporelles peuvent être assimilées soit à une approche de « time pacing »,
ou gestion de la synchronisation (Brown et Eisenhardt, 1998; Eisenhardt et Brown, 1998)
ou encore une approche de chrono-concurrence (Stalk, 1988). Alors que cette dernière est
une stratégie de compression de la durée dans les processus de travail ayant comme objectif
d'accélérer les processus menant à l'introduction de nouveaux produits, le « time pacing »
est défini comme une situation dans laquelle « le changement est initié par le passage du
temps » (Brown et Eisenhardt, 1998: 13) plutôt que par l'occurrence d'événements tels les
actions des concurrents ou les nouvelles demandes de la clientèle. Ainsi, décréter qu'un
changement devra être opéré à une date donnée ou après un laps de temps fixe contribuerait
à contrebalancer la « tendance naturelle à changer trop peu et trop tard » ou même « trop
souvent ». La gestion de la synchronisation porterait aussi les gestionnaires à être à l'afffit
de rythmes existants. Finalement, cela créerait un « sens acharné de l'urgence » qui, parce
qu'associée à des intervalles de temps prévisibles, apporterait aux gestionnaires focalisation
des efforts, confiance et performance supérieure (Brown et Eisenhardt, 1998: 168).
14
Tableau I. Synchronisation et chrono-concurrence en stratégie
Synchronisation
Signaux et fenêtres d'opportunités
Cycles rapides
Horloges doubles
Régulation temporelle
Evénements jalons
Horizon de moins de trois ans
Rytlunes basés sur des rituels;
Improvisation;
Sonder l'avenir:
Transitions;
Liens temporels
Concurrence temps réel et vitesse hiternet
Synchronisation de l'action
Clnono-concurrence
Bourgeois et Eisenhardt, 1988
Taylor, 2000
Bower et Hout, 1988
Mitchell, 1991
Gersick, 1994:
Eisenharcit et Brown, 1998
Eisenhardt et Tabrizi, 1995
Brown et Eisenharclt, 1997
Brown et Eisenhardt, 1997
Teece. Pisano et Shuen. 1997
Fenier, Smith et Grimm, 1999
Cependant, ces deux approches ont leurs limites. D'une part, elles laissent peu de place à la
discrétion managériale. Ainsi, bien que la stratégie de « créer et même de dicter le rythme
du changement que les autres sont forcés de suivre », illustrée par le cas d'Intel, est
présentée comme une stratégie puissante, «fondamentale et souvent négligée » (Brown et
Eisenhardt, 1998: 24, 163), elle demeure une stratégie de domination qui n'est pas à la
portée de tous. De plus, le « côté sombre » de la chrono-concurrence (Stalk et Webber,
1993) souligne l'impuissance de certaines entreprises à se dégager d'un rythme qui ne leur
appartient pas.
D'autre part, en passant sous silence que le temps vu comme ressource est une construction
des sociétés industrielles, les recherches en management stratégique se confment dans
l'utilisation de « conceptions étroites du temps » insuffisantes à la compréhension
temporelle des phénomènes (Whipp, 1994 :100), comme si, « les avancées faites par les
sociologues industriels, les historiens et les étudiants des organisations par rapport à la
pluralité de l'ordonnancement du temps n'avaient jamais été faites » (Whipp, 1994 : 103).
On peut dire qu'à l'aube du vingt-et-unième siècle, les deux défis énoncés plus haut en
théorie des organisations, soit l'ouverture à la multiplicité des temps et les liens entre les
niveaux d'analyse, demeurent très actuels en management stratégique. Mais voilà que
l'étude de Mosakowski et Earley (2000) avance que l'explicitation des postulats temporels
s'avère une voie fructueuse dans la révélation d'une multiplicité temporelle dans les écrits
en management stratégique dynamique. En effet, en adoptant la lunette des postulats
temporels, ces auteurs révèlent une multiplicité de perspectives temporelles prenant à
contre-pied « l'affirmation selon laquelle la pensée managériale occidentale représente un
15
point de vue étriqué sur le temps [...] le manque d'attention explicite aux postulats
temporels a, dans une certaine mesure, masqué la diversité des points de vue représentés
dans la recherche en management stratégique » (Mosakowski et Earley, 2000 :804).
Cependant, on constate que le concept d'entraînement, promettant de relier les niveaux
d'analyse, a surtout été repris dans les études sur le comportement organisationnel et
l'étude de groupes mais qu'il a connu peu d'écho dans les revues les plus en vue en
management et encore moins en management stratégique. On peut cependant citer quelques
études plus récentes qui évoquent ou mettent à profit le concept d'entraînement sur des
sujets d'intérêt pour les chercheurs en management stratégique : celle de Perlow, Okhuysen
et Repenning (2002) sur la prise de décision et le contexte temporel, celle de Standifer et
Bluedorn (2006) sur la gestion des alliances, l'étude de Perks (2005) sur un processus interfirmes de développement de produits et celle de Halbesleben (2003) sur la temporalité
complexe des leaders ainsi que celle de Huy (2001) sur le rôle de la capacité temporelle
dans les processus de changement planifiés.
Finalement aujourd'hui, comment le chercheur en management stratégique peut-il faire
avancer la recherche sur le temps dans son champ d'études? D'abord nous abondons dans
le sens de Gerardo Okhuysen, lui-même chercheur ayant publié dans le domaine du temps,
(voir entre autres Perlow et al. (2002) et Ancona, Okhuysen et Perlow (2001)), qui a
déclaré lors de la conférence 2007 de l' Academy of Management que le temps était venu de
cesser de vendre l'importance des études sur le temps et d'y aller de manière plus concrète :
« Mettons-nous y!». Il est d'avis que le temps est désormais venu de développer des outils
théoriques afin de les appliquer aux questions de l'heure et ainsi démontrer l'apport concret
des réponses temporelles.
Par ailleurs, la piste des postulats temporels indiquée par Mosakowski et Earley (2000)
semble prometteuse car donnant accès à une pluralité temporelle sous-jacente et
inexploitée. C'est ainsi que les trois articles qui forment le coeur de cette thèse prennent tout
leur sens. Tandis que le premier article répond directement à l'appel de Mosakowski et
Earley (2000) de porter une attention aux postulats temporels implicites des écrits en
stratégie, le deuxième article mobilise le concept d'entraînement développé en psychologie
16
sociale (McGrath et Kelly, 1986) pour mieux comprendre comment les processus temporels
de niveaux différents dans un secteur donné interagissent et se synchronisent pour donner
lieu à une temporalité dominante. Finalement, le troisième article contribue à ré-ouvrir la
question de la discrétion stratégique en examinant comment les entreprises du même
secteur peuvent « gérer le temps » stratégiquement au-delà de la vitesse et du « timepacing » (ou de la gestion de la cadence temporelle).
Toutefois, tel que mentionné précédemment, la prise en compte du temps en management
et en stratégie exige non seulement de nouveaux concepts, mais également des
méthodologies spécifiques. La prochaine section aborde en termes généraux les
implications épistémologiques et méthodologiques de l'étude du temps. Nous expliquerons
la méthodologie propre à chacune des études au sein des articles eux-mêmes.
III. PRINCIPES ÉPISTÉMOLOGIQUES ET MÉTHODOLOGIQUES
POUR L'ÉTUDE DU TEMPS EN MANAGEMENT ET EN
STRATÉGIE
"Ii is possible to philosophize endlessly on the "nature" of time.
While such an exercise can be engaging and even of times enlightening,
I have found it more productive to use a different approach".
Edward T. Hall (1983: 14)
Nous débutons ce chapitre en articulant le défi d'ouverture à la multiplicité des temps
présenté à la page dix de la thèse avec trois principes ayant une incidence sur les méthodes
dans les recherches intéressées par le temps en management. Dans un premier temps, nous
discutons de ces principes qui font référence à des situations auxquelles seront confrontés
les chercheurs qui répondent à l'incitation d'Okhuysen de s'atteler à la tâche 4 tout en les
illustrant avec des exemples tirés des trois articles de la thèse. Dans un deuxième temps,
nous présentons comment la méthodologie mobilisée pour la thèse — tant dans l'étude du
corpus d'articles que dans l'étude de terrain — respecte ces principes.
Ensuite, avec comme objectif d'aider les chercheurs à situer leurs intérêts de recherche
concernant le temps, nous développons une typologie des approches pour les recherches
empiriques sur le temps en management stratégique qui tient compte d'une part, de la
distinction entre l'introduction du temps et l'étude du temps et d'autre part, de la
considération d'un système de repérage temporel (SRT) unique ou multiple. De plus, nous
examinons deux autres typologies, celles de Lee et Liebenau (1999) et de Van de Ven et
Poole (2005), dont nous identifions les limites.
3.1 Trois principes pour l'étude du temps en management et stratégie
Avant même d'entreprendre une étude sur le temps, la chercheure en management ou
management stratégique est confrontée à des aspects épistémologiques et ontologique
intimement liés aux méthodes de recherche que nous présentons sous la forme de trois
4
« Mettons nous y! », voir page 15 de la thèse.
-
18
principes incitant la chercheure à la réflexion. Le premier principe porte sur la façon
d'introduire le temps comme objet d'étude (e.g. par une appréciation de l'évolution
temporelle des phénomènes et/ou par une analyse de la présence de concepts temporels
dans un matériel discursif plutôt synchronique). Le deuxième principe concerne la
conception du temps comme unique ou comme plurivoque. Le troisième principe concerne
le caractère invisible du temps.
3.1.1 Introduire du temps et étudier le temps
Plusieurs auteurs ont apporté une distinction entre des études en stratégie qui produisent des
modèles de « variance » et celles qui produisent des modèles de «processus » (Van de Ven
et Poole, 1005; Langley, 1999, 2007). Les modèles de variance présentent des explications
de phénomènes en termes de relations entre variables, tandis que les études processuelles
sont intéressées à la question « qui a fait quoi quand, c'est-à-dire, les événements, les
activités et les choix ordonnancés au fil du temps » (Langley, 1999: 692). Par conséquent,
comme signalé par Langley (1999 :693), la chercheure « est souvent dans l'obligation de
conjuguer des données historiques recueillies lors de l'analyse de documents et des
entrevues rétrospectives avec des données courantes recueillies en temps réel ». Dans les
études de processus, bien que la chercheure n'étudie pas le temps en tant que tel puisque
celui-ci n'est pas le phénomène central étudié, on peut dire que, par rapport aux études de
variance, les études processuelles introduisent du temps dans la recherche en ce qu'elles
« tiennent compte des liens temporels entre les événements, différentes échelles de temps
dans le même processus et de la nature dynamique des processus » (Van de Ven et Poole,
2005 : 1383).
Les considérations d'évolution temporelle ont été importantes dans le contexte de cette
thèse, notamment pour les articles 2 et 3. Par exemple, pendant la collecte de données de la
première phase de l'étude empirique effectuée pour les articles 2 et 3, (Voir le Tableau
XVIII (article 3), Phase I), il est devenu évident que pour rendre compte du phénomène de
management stratégique du temps il fallait témoigner de son contexte historique : la période
de la bulle technologique dans l'industrie biopharmaceutique, son éclatement et la période
post-bulle. Il y a donc eu collecte de données historiques ainsi que des entrevues à la fois
19
rétrospectives et faisant état de la situation courante (Voir le Tableau XVIII (article 3),
Phase II). Une deuxième série d'entrevues a aussi été conduite lors de la phase de suivi
(Voir le Tableau XVIII (article 3), Phase III). Le suivi du phénomène au fil du temps a
donc exigé un design longitudinal.
Par ailleurs, les études qui prennent le temps comme objet peuvent aussi être vues comme
engagées dans la construction d'une « lentille temporelle dont la poursuite s'insinue dans
nos méthodes de recherche ». Ainsi, l'accent sur le temps est plus ciblé, celui-ci se
déclinant sous la forme de multiples entités comme « la synchronisation, la cadence, les
cycles, les rythmes, le flot, l'orientation temporelle, et les interprétations culturelles du
temps » (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence et Tushman, 2001 : 646). Dans ce cas, un matériel
discursif synchronique peut révéler des éléments de cette lentille temporelle.
Par exemple, le premier article de cette thèse traite de l'orientation temporelle passéprésent-avenir dans des écrits en management stratégique, une dimension qui a émergé de
l'examen des textes. Chaque texte mobilise ou interprète, si l'on peut dire, l'orientation
temporelle offrant une richesse et une complexité jusque là non reconnue et pouvant même
donner lieu à une reclassification des écrits en stratégie (Voir les Tableaux X et XI du
premier article).
3.1.2 Temps de l'horloge et pluritemporalisme 5
La chercheure en management et management stratégique n'échappe pas au fait qu'ellemême puisse tenir le temps pour acquis. Elle se doit donc de prendre position par rapport au
débat entourant l'idée d'un temps dominant dans les sociétés occidentales, communément
appelé le temps de l'horloge.
La chercheure peut adhérer à la perspective temporelle dominante en Occident, soit « un
concept de temps objectif unitaire (sujet à une seule interprétation), linéaire (progressant
de manière régulière du passé vers le présent et l'avenir), et mécanique (composé de
moments individuels sujets à une mesure précise) » (Bluedom et Denhart, 1988: 302), un
5
Traduction de "pluritemporalism" (Nowotny, 1992 : 424), offerte par Grossin (2000: 6).
20
temps dit de l'horloge aussi identifié comme le temps ou le t de Newton et communément
représenté sur l'axe des x d'un plan cartésien. Cette adhésion sans remise en question
risque de rendre la chercheure immunisée contre l'idée de la pluralité des temps. Les études
de quelque phénomène que ce soit par une approche de variance avec ou non une portion
longitudinale constitueraient un choix de prédilection pour cette chercheure.
Cependant, lorsque la chercheure adhère au pluritemporalisme, choix qui requiert une dose
de réflexivité, nous suggérons qu'elle n'a pas à rejeter le temps de l'horloge contrairement
à l'affirmation de Chiks et al. (2007: 482) selon laquelle « la perspective d'un temps
objectif et homogène [...] devrait être abandonné [même si] cette perspective temporelle
est difficile à interdire ».
Plutôt, elle peut le considérer d'abord, comme une construction sociale au même titre que
tout autre système de repérage temporel et ensuite, comme la plus standard des
constructions sociales du temps car « étant donné notre enchâssement dans une société qui
accentue le temps standard, ce n'est pas surprenant que le temps standard ou de l'horloge
soit devenu l'orientation dominante envers le temps dans les écrits sur les organisations »
(George et Jones 2000: 659). De plus, on peut remarquer que pour certains, le vocable
standard laisse plus de place à l'idée de pluralité - il y aurait des constructions sociales
moins standard - que le vocable dominant qui peut laisser croire au triomphe d'une
construction sociale laissant autour d'elle un désert. Ainsi, à l'instar de (Clark, 1985 : 41),
« on pourrait penser que le temps de l'horloge a totalement remplacé l'utilisation de
trajectoires d'événements [construction sociale moins dominante] dans les sociétés
capitalistes [...] mais ceci est inexact ».
Au demeurant, la perspective de la chercheure est enrichie d'une ouverture à d'autres
systèmes de repérage temporel moins largement diffusés, plus situés, pouvant révéler des
interactions et des efforts soit de coordination entre individus et groupes soit de
compréhension de l'environnement externe plus subtils que ceux permis par un système
dominant, standard et largement diffusé. Notamment pour Clark (1990: 141), les systèmes
de repérage temporel « les plus stratégiques se fondent sur des événements dont
21
l'occurrence est plus proche des formations irrégulières de nuages que du mécanisme
régulier de l'horloge ».
En effet, toute culture, toute société, tout groupe construit son propre système de repérage
temporel, donc son « temps ». Ces systèmes de repérage temporel sont fondés sur une
séquence d'événements, socialement construite et connue intersubjectivement, choisis pour
une certaine régularité ou récurrence et durée, et infusés de sens. Cette séquence est plus ou
moins institutionnalisée et largement diffusée (Clark 1985 : 41).
Ces systèmes et instruments varient aussi selon les époques comme relatés par Attali
(1982), Landes (2000) et Savoie (2004). Voilà pourquoi nous considérons que le temps de
l'horloge est aussi construit que les autres temps, couramment appelés, «temps des
événements » (Clark, 1985) puisque le temps de l'horloge est lui-même fondé sur des
événements. En l'occurrence depuis 1967, le décompte du temps dit de l'horloge n'est plus
fondé sur des événements célestes mais plutôt sur des événements atomiques, nommément
«la fréquence du rayonnement émis lors de la transition atomique entre deux niveaux
d'énergie particuliers de l'atome de Césium 133 » 6 .
Dans les organisations, les systèmes de repérage temporel peuvent être vus comme des
formes stabilisées et partagées du temps que les acteurs tendent à tenir comme acquises et à
percevoir comme objectives. Ils «fournissent des cadres d'interprétation permettant
d'anticiper les changements futurs » (Demil, Leca et Naccache, 2001 : 86). Une partie du
travail du chercheur intéressé par le temps comme phénomène peut donc consister à les
identifier et à révéler leur construction, leur sens et leur utilisation. C'est aussi un choix qui
met l'accent sur une préférence pour des concepts de temps ancrés dans l'empirique et les
approches inductives.
Le pluritemporalisme sous-entend non seulement une diversité de façon de compter ou de
repérer le temps mais aussi une cohabitation de ces systèmes de repérage temporel
(Nowotny, 1992: 424). La diversité se voit tant dans les événements choisis pour créer les
systèmes de repérage temporel que dans le sens attribué à des aspects temporels. Ainsi,
Voir le site du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, http://www.cnrs.fecnrsimageslphysiqueaulyceelihatomiq.html (site consulté le 18 août 2008).
6
22
dans le cadre du deuxième article de cette thèse, le vocable « délai » comporte trois sens
différents selon sa situation dans trois processus distincts : le délai est vu comme une
occurrence normale dans le processus de découverte et développement des médicaments,
comme partie du modus operandi du processus de protection de la propriété intellectuelle et
comme un échec dans celui du fmancement des firmes essaimées. (Voir le Tableau XV,
article 2). Tant les chercheurs que les gestionnaires et les fmanciers connaissent ces
processus et se rendent compte de la diversité de sens.
Comme le montre le tableau II, outre les approches historiques de Attali (1982), Landes
(2000) et Savoie (2004), les études sur la pluralité des systèmes de repérage temporel
s'inscrivent dans une tradition ethnographique et s'intéressent d'abord aux peuples primitifs
(Mauss, 1904; Evans-Pritchard, 1940), puis à des milieux industriels (Roy, 1960;
Cavendish, 1982), hospitalier (Zerubavel, 1979) et technologique (Dubinskas, 1988). Clark
(1978, 1985) a produit des études de cas ancrées dans des milieux industriels mais est
demeuré discret sur sa méthode. Bien que Zerubavel ait conduit une étude de terrain de type
ethnographique, il y est volontairement entré avec un cadre conceptuel pour l'étude de « la
structure temporelle de l'organisation sociale », qu'il crédite pour l'avoir « sensibilisé à
« voir » les patterns temporels » (Zerubavel, 1979 :xiv, xvii). Quoi qu'il en soit, il demeure
que toutes ces études ont exigé une longue interaction avec le terrain.
Dans le cadre de l'étude de terrain pour cette thèse, nous avons opté pour une autre
approche soit l'utilisation d'entrevues rétrospectives, méthode indiquée pour aborder des
acteurs qui d'une part, ne se retrouvaient pas dans un même lieu physique et qui d'autre
part, oeuvraient dans plusieurs types d'organisation d'un même champ organisationnel.
Aussi, alors que l'approche par questionnaire de Schriber et Gutek (1987) pour une étude
de normes temporelles dans les organisations a révélé de multiples dimensions temporelles,
nous pensions que les entrevues semi-dirigées pouvaient permettre d'obtenir des résultats
plus riches qu'un questionnaire puisque faisant une plus large place à l'interprétation des
répondants.
23
Tableau II. Recension d'études sur le repérage temporel
Auteurs
Attali (1982)
Monde occidental
Landes (2000)
Monde occidental vs
monde chinois
Savoie (2004)
Monde occidental
Mauss (1904)
Evans-Pritchard
(1940)
Peuples primitifs
Roy (1960)
Cavendish (1982)
Travailleurs
industriels
Clark (1978)
Zerubavel (1979)
Clark (1985)
Dubinskas (1988)
7
Groupes
Gestionnaires
marketing
Deux départements
hospitaliers
Travailleurs et
gestionnaires de deux
secteurs industriels
Entreprise de génie
génétique
Système de repérage temporel
Apport
Succession deSRT s7aveccombinaison
d'instruments et d'unités de mesure, ordre social
et rapport au temps particuliers
Différentiation selon l'époque.
SRT utilisant l'horloge n'a pas intéressé les
Chinois contrairement aux Occidentaux.
Différentiation selon les cultures nationales et le
problème à résoudre
Recensionde troisgrandstypesdeSRTs :
cyclique, éponyme et linéaire
Différentiation selon l'époque
Temporalités saisonnières
Organisation sociale et matérielle caractéristique
selon les saisons
Unités du SRT : Lune, nuages, plantes
Contraste avec SRT occidental
Différentiation selon appartenance à civilisation
(occidentale vs primitive)
CoexistencedeSRTs(travailleurs et
gestionnaires)
SRTdominant desgestionnairespour
l'organisation du travail
Différentiationselonappartenance
occupationnelle (managers vs travailleurs)
Coexistence de SRTs (gestionnaires expérimentés
et plus récents)
Différentiation selon l'expérience de la tâche
Coexistence de SRTs
Différentiation selon le contexte cognitif d'usage
Temporalités saisonnières
Organisation matérielle caractéristique selon les
saisons
Différentiation selon le secteur, les exigences
quotidiennes du travail et l'appartenance
occupationnelle
Coexistence de SRTs
Difficultés dans la prise de décision sur l'avenir
de la firme à cause des différences dans les SRTs
des membres de l'organisation
Différentiation selonl'appartenance
occupationnelle etprofessionnelle
(gestionnaires et scientifiques) et des exigences
quotidiennes du travail
24
3.1.3 L'invisibilité du temps
Lorsque la chercheure choisit de prendre le temps comme phénomène et qu'elle adopte une
perspective de construction sociale, il lui reste un dernier défi, celui d'appréhender un
phénomène invisible : « Mais le temps ne se laisse ni voir, ni toucher, ni entendre, ni
goûter, ni respirer comme une odeur » (Elias, 1984: 5). Nous avançons que le temps ne
peut être perçu qu'à travers ses manifestations indirectes.
Ainsi, Schein (1985 :14) nous informe que les postulats temporels se dissimulent au niveau
le plus inconscient de la culture. Ils demeurent habituellement implicites de telle sorte
qu'ils ne sont pas formulés soit parce que nous ne les reconnaissons pas soit parce que nous
les tenons pour acquis. Ils sont si intimement enchâssés dans notre vision du monde que
nous les acceptons comme « une portion immuable de la réalité » (Bluedom et Denhardt,
1988: 300) quand en fait, ils varient d'un groupe ou d'une culture à l'autre (Bluedom et
Denhardt, 1988; Trompenaars et Hampden-Turner 1997).
En ce qui concerne les systèmes de repérage temporel, ils sont fondés sur des événements et
comme le souligne le psychologue James J. Gibson (1975: 295) « les événements peuvent
être perçus mais pas le temps ». Par conséquent, la chercheure doit être à l'affût des
manifestations du temps « au travers des événements » (Demil et al., 2001 : 86), comme
encore une fois, les événements des processus de travail ou ceux choisis par les répondants
pour témoigner de la stratégie. Une approche par comparaison, que ce soit entre des cas ou
des thèmes à l'intérieur d'un même cas, peut aussi « rendre l'invisible visible » (Pader,
2006: 166).
Comme le montre le premier article de cette thèse, les postulats temporels peuvent être
débusqués suite à un examen minutieux de textes. Et comme le montre le deuxième article
de cette thèse, les différents sens et les dimensions temporelles usitées peuvent aussi être
identifiés par un examen attentif d'événements, entre autres ceux composant des processus
de travail. L'invisibilité du temps et son aspect tenu pour acquis font aussi en sorte qu'il
puisse être fructueux de l'appréhender indirectement, par exemple, en abordant les
25
répondants avec des sujets plus concrets comme justement dans le cas de cette thèse, la
stratégie et l'innovation.
3.2 Les principes qui ont guidé l'ensemble de cette thèse
Dans cette section, nous allons d'abord brièvement décrire la méthodologie de la thèse dont
les détails se retrouvent dans les articles eux-mêmes. Puis nous présenterons comment cette
étude répond aux principes décrits dans la section précédente.
L'étude ayant produit l'article 1 est fondée sur une analyse de contenu manifeste et latent
appliquée à un corpus de onze articles du Harvard Business Review. Nous avons choisi les
articles selon des critères développés d'une part, afin de nous assurer qu'ils aient été
publiés dans une revue à la fois appréciée du monde académique et ayant une forte
diffusion auprès des gestionnaires, et d'autre part, pour qu'ils soient à la fois représentatifs
de « ce qu'est la stratégie » et reconnus pour leur contribution importante.
L'étude empirique réalisée pour les articles 2 et 3 a adopté un design longitudinal par étude
de cas enchâssés au sein d'un champ organisationnel unique. Nous avons procédé à trente
entrevues auprès des membres du champ organisationnel, incluant des scientifiques et
gestionnaires de quatre firmes. Nous avons présenté nos résultats à des capital-risqueurs et
membre d'une société de valorisation au cours de deux présentations distinctes. Nous avons
aussi procédé à quatre entrevues de suivi auprès des firmes. Toutes ces rencontres ont servi
à échanger et à valider les résultats de l'étude de terrain dont la collecte de données inclut
aussi une variété de données secondaires. Le codage, bien que laissant une large place à
l'émergence, s'est tout de même intéressé à des thèmes spécifiques. Pour l'article 2, nous
étions particulièrement intéressée aux rythmes des processus de travail et à leurs
interactions (voir le Tableau XV, Article 2) tandis que pour l'article 3, nous avons recodé
les entrevues en portant une attention particulière à la stratégie des firmes. Nous nous
sommes appuyée sur une approche de théorie enracinée (Strauss et Corbin, 1998) et avons
mobilisé une stratégie narrative (Langley, 1999).
Nous reprenons maintenant les principes exposés à la section précédente et montrons dans
le Tableau III comment cette étude y répond. Ainsi,
26
a) L'étude de terrain introduit du temps de par son design longitudinal ainsi que la
collecte de données secondaires historiques, la conduite d'entrevues rétrospectives
et synchroniques, le recours à des entrevues de suivi et un canevas d'entretien qui
couvre les processus de travail.
b) L'étude du corpus d'articles et l'étude de terrain étudient le temps en ce que
l'analyse de contenu manifeste et latent laisse une large place aux codes émergents
ce qui a donné lieu à l'émergence respectivement de l'orientation temporelle et des
horizons de temps comme dimensions temporelles prépondérantes.
c) Dans le cas spécifique de l'étude de terrain, on peut aussi mentionner que l'étude du
temps a été rendue possible grâce à l'utilisation d'entrevues semi-dirigées qui ont
permis à des notions temporelles d'émerger comme par exemple, la frontière
temporelle de l'éclatement de la bulle technologique, et le fait que ces entretiens
aient porté sur les processus de travail des répondants, qui de ce fait, guidait la
chercheure sur leur terrain donc leurs préoccupations temporelles.
d) En ce qui concerne le respect du pluritemporalisme, nous avançons que cela est dû
à une combinaison de facteurs, le premier étant la préparation de la chercheure
comme décrit sous la section 3.1.2. Cette préparation, ou sensibilisation au
pluritemporalisme, se manifeste dans l'étude de terrain par le fait que la chercheure
ne se penche pas sur la nature du temps, considération philosophique, et ne tente
pas de générer une typologie du temps (Butler, 1995; Destri et Dagnino 2004).
Plutôt, l'étude de terrain, par l'utilisation d'entrevues semi-dirigées sur les
processus de travail et par une analyse de contenu attentive laissant place à
l'émergence, apporte du matériel à la chercheure afin d'identifier les événements
avec lesquels ses répondants construisent leurs systèmes de repérage temporel,
comme les rondes, les phases, les stades etc. et leurs interactions tel que discuté
dans l'article 2.
e) La quête à l'identification des postulats temporels par une analyse de contenu
manifeste et latent et par une approche de comparaison entre les textes (soit intra et
inter textes, soit intra et inter unités ou firmes) peut être vue comme une tentative
pour surmonter l'invisibilité du temps, et donner accès à un pluritemporalisme
jusque là insoupçonné (Mosakowski et Earley, 2000). La pluralité des orientations
27
temporelles dans les articles classiques (voir article 1), l'interaction des temporalités
des processus de travail (article 2) et les horizons de temps (article 3) en
témoignent. De plus, nous soulignons que, contrairement à l'étude de Mosakowski
et Earley (2000), tant l'étude des textes que l'étude de terrain rendent explicite
l'approche de codage mise en oeuvre afin d'accéder à la richesse des conceptions du
temps.
f) Le recours à des sujets d'entrevues concrets pour les répondants, soit les processus
de travail et le management stratégique, respecte le point de vue que le temps peut
être perçu au travers de ses manifestations dans les événements et ainsi tente de
surmonter les difficultés inhérentes à l'invisibilité du temps.
Dans le but de compléter notre réflexion épistémologique, ontologique et méthodologique
sur l'étude du temps, nous présentons maintenant les typologies des recherches empiriques
de Lee et Liebenau (1999) et de Van de Ven et Poole (2005), mais avant nous définissons
une nouvelle typologie construite sur les deux premiers principes énoncés plus haut.
Tableau III. Méthode et réponse aux principes
Étude du corpus
d'articles
(article 1)
Étude empirique
(articles 2 et 3)
Méthode
Analyse de données :
•
•
Analyse de contenu manifeste et latent
Approche comparative
Répondant aux principes
Étudier le temps
Pluntemporalisme
Invisibilité du temps
Design de recherche :
•
Étude longitudinale
Introduire du temps
Collecte de données :
•
Entrevues semi-dirigées, rétrospectives et
synchroniques (incluant suivi)
• Entrevues portants sur les processus de
travail (innovation et stratégie)
• Données secondaires historiques
Analyse de données :
Introduire du temps et étudier le temps
Pluritemporalisme
Introduire du temps et étudier le temps
Invisibilité du temps
Introduire du temps
•
•
Étudier le temps
Pluritemporalisme
Invisibilité du temps
Analyse de contenu manifeste et Latent
Approche comparative
28
3.3 Une typologie pour l'étude du temps en management stratégique
À notre connaissance, les typologies des études sur le temps en management sont rares et
nous en mentionnerons deux plus loin dans ce texte. Dans le but non pas tant de classer les
études empiriques déjà réalisées mais plutôt d'éclairer les chercheurs intéressés à se
pencher sur le temps dans leurs recherches en management, nous nous appuyons sur les
deux premiers principes discutés plus haut, c'est-à-dire d'abord, l'idée d'introduire du
temps et celle d'étudier le temps et ensuite, les notions du temps de l'horloge et le
pluritemporalisme, pour construire une typologie des approches pour l'étude du temps en
management stratégique. Les deux axes de la typologie sont d'abord, les études prenant le
temps comme objet central ou périphérique et ensuite, les études utilisant soit seulement le
système de repérage temporel dominant ou de multiples systèmes de repérage temporel
(voir le tableau IV). Cette typologie se veut utile en :
•
Montrant de multiples façons avec lesquelles le temps peut être abordé dans les
recherches, incluant le type de questions, les méthodes et les types de résultats attendus;
•
Subdivisant l'idée de «pensée processuelle» en deux composantes : l'aspect
longitudinal et les événements comme données;
•
Soulignant que les études longitudinales ne sont pas du seul ressort des études
intéressées par les processus;
•
Tenant compte de deux échelles de temps: le temps ahistorique ou détaché du contexte
et le temps historique ou contextuel.
E
em
Approche III: La temporalité
Approche II: Temps comme succession
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Utilisation du temps standard pour des
études lom itudinales.
Utilisation du temps standard pour des études
longitudinales.
Événements peuvent être utilisés pour Étude des interactions entre systèmes de
construire des SRT locaux et/ou la durée mesure et/ou interprétations.
peut être mesurée selon le SRT dominant.
Phénomène est appréhendé en termes
d'événements signifiants identifiés soit par
le chercheur ou les acteurs.
Aspects temporels de séquence (succession)
et de durée sont mobilisés de manière
prépondérante. Intérêt pour le dynamisme
d'un phénomène.
Appréhension de la temporalité d 'un
phénomène i. e. les mu ltiples aspects
temporels (e. g. orientation temp orelle,
urgence, rythme d'interaction, cadence,
polychronicité etc. ), la pluralitédes
interprétations et la multip licitédes systèmes
de mesure, locaux ou standardisé.
Utilisation du temps standard pour des études
longitudinales.
Utilisation du temps standard pour des
études longitudinales.
d 'événements
Aspects temporels comme le délai avant
l 'échec, l 'ordre d'entrée dans un secteur etc.,
mesurés de manière standard, sont
expliquées par des relations avec d 'autres
variables.
Aspects temporels comme l 'âge, la durée
d'occupation d'un poste, l 'ordre d 'entrée
dans un secteur etc. sont mesurés de
manière standarddans des études
transversales (incluant les études de
variance) pour exp liquer un phénomène.
reu r pour le temps
Temp s est périp hérique ou absent
Temps est centra l
du p hénomène étudié
au phénomène étudié
Approche I: Temps tenu pour acquis ou Approche IV: Temps comme variable
le temps comme variable indépendante
dépendante
29
30
Le tableau V reprend la typologie avec l'exemple de l'orientation temporelle 8 afin
d'illustrer comment les questions de recherche posées (Q), les méthodes utilisées (M) et le
type de résultats obtenus (R) varieront suivant l'une ou l'autre des quatre approches
choisies.
Un autre exemple, celui de l'étude de Brown et Eisenhardt (1997), montre que les quatre
approches identifiées ne sont pas mutuellement exclusives. Ainsi selon notre typologie,
nous considérons cette recherche comme intéressée par les événements (Approche II) car
les chercheurs ont posé des questions du type « quand un événement en particulier s'est
produit » et se sont intéressées « généralement sur le processus de gérer de multiples
projets » Brown et Eisenhardt (1997: 5).
Les auteures affirment que le succès des portefeuilles de produits a été défini selon les
aspects identifiés par les répondants eux-mêmes incluant « le respect de l'échéancier » et
«le respect de la date de lancement » (Brown et Eisenhardt, 1997 : 6), qui ont été mesurés
de trois façons : d'abord en entrevue avec les répondants qui évaluent si chaque projet du
portefeuille est à ce moment considéré comme respectant l'échéancier et la date de
lancement; ensuite par questionnaire, les répondants évaluent le degré de respect de
l'échéancier et de la date de lancement sur une échelle de Likert en 10 points; finalement,
en tenant compte « des évaluations quantitatives provenant des entrevues ». Tout cela est
bien en lien avec les méthodes identifiées pour l'approche II.
Mais en plus, l'utilisation de données qualitatives provenant d'entrevues et l'attention des
auteures pour la manière avec laquelle les managers rapportent eux-mêmes comment ils
appréhendent le temps leur permet de s'immerger plus profondément dans la dimension
temporelle du phénomène et de définir un nouveau construit, « probing into the future »,
construit qui est subséquemment relié à la performance. On peut donc considérer cette
étude aussi comme une recherche selon l'approche III.
8 L'orientation temporelle chez l'individu est généralement définie comme la prédominance d'une zone
temporelle (passé, présent ou avenir) dans la personnalité.
Q : Quelle est l'influence de la formation
pro fessionnelle et du secteur d'activités sur
l'orientation temp orelle des dirigeants?
M: Questionnaire, analys e quantitative.
R: On retrouve plus de dirigeants avec une
orientation Mure chez les dip lômés en
sciences sociales et administration que chez
les scientifiques tout secteur d'activités
confondu.
Études longitudinales : Temp s historique
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31
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32
Notre typologie met aussi en lumière la proximité entre les recherches des approches II et
III et la possibilité de collaborations entre ces chercheurs. L'exemple de la recherche de
Brown et Eisenhardt (1997) laisse soupçonner qu'une approche exploratoire et inductive
peut jeter des ponts entre les deux approches. On peut dire aussi que la collaboration est
possible entre les chercheurs des approches III et IV sur la base de leur intérêt commun
pour un thème de recherche spécifique. Par exemple, des chercheurs se sont intéressés au
construit de profondeur d'horizon 9 (« temporal depth») et ont posé entre autres questions :
«Quelles sont les profondeurs d'horizon futur et passé des entrepreneurs ?» (Bluedom et
Martin, 2008 :4). La collecte de données s'est faite par questionnaires envoyés par la poste.
La recherche s'intéressait au rôle joué par la profondeur d'horizon et d'autres variables sur
le niveau de stress des entrepreneurs (Approche IV). On peut suggérer que cette recherche
pourrait se poursuivre en posant une question comme : « Quels sont les aspects temporels
qui entrent dans la description que les entrepreneurs font de leur niveau de stress? » qui
amènerait une collaboration avec des chercheurs habilités à faire des entrevues sur le terrain
et une analyse inductive qui pourrait déboucher sur l'identification d'autres aspects
temporels que la profondeur d'horizon ou encore une description plus riche et située du
construit de profondeur d'horizon (Approche III).
Cette thèse démontre des caractéristiques assimilables aux approches II et III de la
typologie présentée au tableau IV. Ainsi, l'objectif premier de l'étude du corpus des articles
est de révéler la temporalité sous-jacente dans les écrits en management stratégique et est
ouverte à ses multiples manifestations, notamment la plus recensée par l'étude, l'orientation
temporelle (Approche III). De plus, l'étude empirique à la base des articles 1 et 2 s'est entre
autres penchée sur cinq processus de travail tel la découverte et le développement des
médicaments, la protection de la propriété intellectuelle, la valorisation de la recherche, le
financement ainsi que l'évolution de la carrière des chercheurs. La chercheure a donc été
guidée par les répondants et par les données secondaires pour identifier les événements
signifiants des processus, principalement en termes de séquence et de durée. Cette durée est
mesurée à la fois par le temps de l'horloge et par d'autres événements (« ronde »,
9
Définie comme « les distances temporelles vers le passé et l'avenir que les individus et les collectifs
considèrent habituellement lorsqu'ils contemplent des événements qui se sont passés, peuvent s'être passés ou
peuvent arriver » (Bluedom, 2002: 114).
-
33
« événements jalons », « phases de recherche », etc.). Finalement, l'étude de terrain a
aussi suivi l'évolution des firmes sur une période de plusieurs années.
Nous mentionnons maintenant deux autres typologies d'approches dans les études sur le
temps dans les organisations. D'abord, celle de Lee et Liebenau (1999), bâtie à partir d'une
part, d'une dichotomie temps de l'horloge/temps social et d'autre part, du temps comme
variable dépendante ou indépendante. Nous avons déjà discuté plus haut de l'aspect
construit de tout système de repérage temporel, rendant la dichotomie temps de
l'horloge/temps social illusoire. De plus, s'en tenir à l'idée de variables, fissent-elles,
indépendantes et dépendantes, tend à évacuer l'idée de la pensée processuelle parce que
d'une part, réduisant le processus à une variable et d'autre part, ignorant les événements
comme donnée riche des processus (Langley 2007; Langley, 1999). Par conséquent, cette
typologie tend à confmer, par exemple, l'étude de l'orientation temporelle dans une
approche combinant le temps comme variable indépendante et l'utilisation du temps de
l'horloge (voir le tableau VI).
Tableau VI. Typologie de Lee et Liebenau
The Concept of Cook lime
'Ibo Concept of Social Thne
Decickng Tinte
lodependeat variable - lime orientelian
— lime as anoures
- lime masure and deadline
clients
- lime-baud competidon
Varying Due
- maltiplicityof lime
- strasegy babas
Working rune
Dependent variable - lime use or time budget
- s'affins hours
decisioo making and dose
horizon
Changing »ne
- evahusdon fumiez
bchnology, tinte and social
order
- Won:mica tecimology and
time fkarne
information technology and
temporal dimensions
Source : Tableau 1, « Four notions of temporality in organizational studies », dans Lee et Liebenau
(1999: 1041).
34
En deuxième lieu, nous mentionnons la typologie des approches pour l'étude sur le
changement organisationnel (Van de Ven et Poole, 2005) dans laquelle chacune des quatre
approches, ainsi que les théories qui en sont issues, adoptent une perspective temporelle
distincte (voir le Tableau VII). Les axes sur lesquels est fondée la typologie sont au centre
de deux différences de point de vue entre les chercheurs de ce domaine notamment, «par
rapport au fait que les organisations sont des choses ou des processus et par rapport à
l'utilisation des méthodes de variance ou de processus pour mener des recherches » (Van
de Ven et Poole, 2005: 1377).
Tableau VII. Typologie de Van de Ven et Poole
Ontology
An organ.ization is represented as being:
A noun, a social acton
A verb, a process of
a real entity ( -thing')
orzanizing, emergent flux
Variance methocl
Approach I
Variance studies of change
in organizational entities
by causal analysis of
independent vaiiables that
explain change in entity
(dependent variable)?
Approach 1 V
Variance studies of
organizing by dynamic
modeling of agent-based
models or chaotic complex
adaptive systems
Process narratives
Approach
Process studies of change in
organizational entities
narrating sequence of events,
stages or cycles of change in
the development of an entity
Approach III
Process studies of
organizing by narrating
emergent actions and
activities by which
collective endeavors unfold
Epistemology
(Method for
studying change)
Source : Tableau 2, « A typology of approaches for studying organizational change », dans
Van de Ven et Poole (2005 : 1387).
Cependant, cette typologie relègue la construction sociale du temps à un seul quadrant
(Approche III) ce qui propulse la construction dominante et standard du temps dans une
position objective (Approche I). Bien que les auteurs reconnaissent que « ces perspectives
temporelles ne sont pas mutuellement exclusives » (Van de Ven et Poole, 2005 : 1394), leur
typologie n'est pas construite pour tenir compte du pluritemporalisme, donc de l'utilisation
concurrente de multiples systèmes de repérage temporel.
35
En conclusion, nous suggérons que la typologie issue de cette thèse a l'avantage de
respecter l'idée que tous les systèmes de repérage temporel sont construits tout en
accommodant l'utilisation du système standard. De plus, il est possible de voir que des
chercheurs ne prenant pas le temps comme objet central de leurs recherches contribuent
tout de même à infuser plus de temps dans les recherches soit par des études longitudinales,
soit en se penchant sur des aspects temporels mesurés par le système de repérage standard.
On voit mieux qu'une pensée processuelle exige l'examen d'événements et non seulement
des variables habituelles et bénéficie d'une analyse de type interprétative. On constate aussi
que des rapprochements sont possibles entre chercheurs soit parce que leurs visions du
monde sont semblables (Approches II et III) soit parce qu'ils partagent des intérêts de
recherche (Approches III et IV).
Nous terminons cette section sur la suggestion que « l'art méthodologique consiste donc à
choisir les méthodes qui sont appropriées dans le contexte des perspectives du temps et des
objectifs de recherche [...] » (Sabelis, 2009: 170) car chez les chercheurs qui abordent le
temps comme phénomène, « il est de plus en plus accepté que les études sur le temps
requièrent une approche multiple ou kaléidoscopique » (Sabelis, 2009: 168).
Nous présentons maintenant les trois articles de cette thèse. Par la suite, nous poursuivrons
avec la conclusion de la thèse.
IV. ARTICLE 1
« Je m'intéresse à tout ce qui est invisible,
qu'on ne voit pas mais qu'on ressent,
tout ce qui chuchote
et qu'on n'a plus le temps d'entendre »
Lino (Alain Le Brun), illustrateur et peintre,
cité dans Laurin (2005)
37
Strategy is about the future...or is it?
ABSTRACT
Because we often equate strategy with setting goals and allocating resources to achieve
them, we commonly assume that strategy is about the future. This paper offers a
complementary view of the relationship that strategy entertains with the future by
discussing the construct of temporal orientation meaning the past-present-future triad. We
argue that classic articles on strategy incorporate implicit assumptions about past-presentfuture that are flot necessarily recognized by authors and practitioners. We use eleven
classic articles from the Harvard Business Review to illustrate the diversity in the treatment
not only of the future but also of the past and the present. We suggest that the temporal
diversity in how strategy is written about has yet to be recognized and taken advantage of.
Keywords: Assumptions, future, strategy, temporal orientation, time
38
INTRODUCTION
7 ...] most of us most of the time pro bably do flot devote much attention to matters
beyond shallow pasts and futures. Deeper times tend to be left to temporal
specialists like historians, archaeologists, futurists, and strategic planners"
(Bluedorn 2002:258).
Ever since Stalle (1988) introduced time into strategy through his account of how the
Japanese were "managing time the way most companies manage costs, quality or
inventory", researchers have proposed a range of temporally-based notions for strategy
such as signais and windows of opportunity (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988), fast cycles
(Bower and Hout, 1988), strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989), dual docks
(Mitchell, 1991), time pacing (Gersick, 1994; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998), milestone
events (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995), ritual-based rhythm, improvisation, future probing,
time-paced transitions and time links (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) as well as action
timing (Ferrier, Smith and Grimm, 1999).
Moreover, because of an environment viewed as more difficult to decode due to
technological discontinuities (Tushman and Andersen, 1986), hypercompetition (D'Aveni,
1994) and high-velocity (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988) and as durable competitive
advantages came to be seen as transitory (Chalcravarthy, 1997; Collis, 1994; D'Aveni, 1994;
Eisenhardt, 1989), renewable (Williams, 1998) or unpredictable (Eisenhardt and Sull,
2001), contributing to a situation that could prevent anticipation (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff,
1999), strategy researchers have been calling for a new approaches to strategic
management. Many, including Porter (1991), have advocated a d3mamic theory of strategy.
Thus, time has become a major concem in strategic management.
As the quest for more dynamic approaches to strategy goes on, how we integrate time into
strategy may be expected to continue to spark interest. And, as Das (2004: 72) forcefully
argued recently, incorporating time into strategy should start with the future. "Not the past,
certainly. Not even the present. But the incessant, inexorable, soon-to-be-here future".
Indeed, the future does appear to be a natural companion of strategy. Strategy practitioners
well know that they deal with the future when they set goals and devise strategies as well as
allocate resources to achieve them over a certain temporal horizon. In fact, many research
39
efforts have been invested in topics that discuss the future such as vision, forecasting,
foresight and scenarios as their practical applications appear obvious.
Furthermore, misevaluating the future is costly to both firms and individuals. With the
comfort of hindsight, declarations by great business people have even been ridiculed with
Thomas Watson's statement about the market for computers as a classic case in point 10 .
Beyond the first reaction of amusement, these statements remind strategists of the
unavoidable difficulties surrounding the assessment of the future.
This article acknowledges the centrality of the notion of the future to how strategic
management is understood and practiced. However, we want to expand the understanding
of the connection between strategy and time by discussing a complementary view, that of
"temporal orientation." This is defmed both in terms of the dominance of a single time zone
(past, present or future) in people's thinking as well as relatedness between the three time
zones (Cottle, 1967; Holman and Silver, 1998). Our aim is to show first, that temporal
orientation underlies conceptions of strategy, though in an implicit manner, and second,
that approaches to strategic management exhibit heterogeneity in their implicit treatment of
the past-present-future orientation and fmally, that both strategy scholars and practitioners
can benefit from this yet unacknowledged and untapped diversity.
The paper is organized as follows: First, we will engage the reader in a theoretical
discussion of the temporal orientation concept and suggest that it may be worth
investigating further as a means to introduce a subjective side of time into strategic
management approaches including dynamic theories of strategy. We will also argue that
revealing implicit temporal assumptions may be useful for both strategy researchers and
practitioners. Second, we will present the methods and findings of our study of the
temporal orientation assumptions of eleven classic articles in Harvard Business Review.
Finally, we will discuss the research opportunities and practical applications of exposing
past-present-future assumptions in strategic management approaches.
10 We will quote only two such declarations: "I think there is a world market for about five computers"
(Thomas Watson, Sr., 1943); "There is no reason why anyone would want a computer in their home"
(Kenneth Olsen, 1977). More quotes are available at
www.iitm.comiWeeklv update/Weekly 78 Aug14 2002.htm#Feature%20Article
40
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Temporal orientation
The past-present-future time zones have sparked interest in human affairs at least since the
fourth century A.D. when Saint Augustine denied the very existence of the future and of the
past outside of the mind and consecrated existence only to the present 11 .
Since then however, temporal orientation has been acknowledged as an individual and
organizational predisposition worthy of being researched in management studies (Van de
Ven and Poole, 2005). Temporal orientation is reported as varying widely across cultures
(Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961; Gonzalez and Zimbardo, 1985; Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner, 1997) and individuals (deVolder, 1979; Gonzalez and Zimbardo, 1985;
Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999) although context bas been found to impinge on a stable
temporal orientation (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). Individual temporal orientations have
been reported as predictors of behaviours in risk taking (Boyd and Zimbardo, 2005) as well
as goal setting and success (Boniwell and Zimbardo, 2004) while Schein (1992: 106)
distinguished firm behaviours and priorities on the basis of their dominant temporal
orientation.
So far, management and strategy researchers have given more attention to the future
orientation than to the past-present-future orientation. For example, Das (1986) found that
variation in the future orientation of executives, from near to distant future, impacts their
preference for the length of the planning horizon they choose to work with. However, the
"suent politics of time" (Das, 1991) that presides over the negotiation for a shared planning
horizon among members of a top management team with varied future orientations remains
to be elucidated. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) suggested a reverse relationship, from
external environment to future orientation inasmuch as characteristics of the externat
environment are said to influence and account for the variability in the future orientation of
members from several departments of firms in three distinct industrial sectors. Das and
II
Confession 20 in Wamer (2001).
41
Teng (2001) developed a contingency model of strategic risk behaviour that includes
individual strategists' future orientation. Hay and Usunier (1993: 319) proposed a
framework of six levels of strategic planning characteristics present in Western
management styles each with its own time orientation. However, the future remained the
predominant time zone in four out of six levels of strategy while the present and the past
were accounted only in strategies pertaining to career planning and annual budgets.
However, scholars do recognize the possibility that past experiences and present moods
may influence perceptions of the future and that interaction between the time zones may be
fruitful (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997: 122). Attempts have been made to
integrate temporal orientation into studies of the top management team and of strategic
decisions. For example, Hurst, Rush and White (1989) link organizational renewal and
innovativeness with the capacity of the top management team to think beyond frameworks
of logic and rationality that "depend upon normative structures based in the past" and tend
to perpetuate past situations. Rather they suggest that organizational renewal requires a
more creative framework that allows interaction of logic and rationality with individuals'
intuition, insight and feelings, a combination that is hypothesized as allowing a fertile
interaction between their past and future orientations.
El Sa (1983) revealed another practical application of a past-future link by showing that
the further in the past an executive thinks the further in the future he can plan. Bluedorn
(2002: 114) pursued this idea further and developed the concept of temporal depth as the
"temporal distances into the past and future that individuals and collectivities typically
consider when contemplating events that have happened, may have happened, or may
happen".
Although their model of the psychological context of strategic decisions integrates past
events, present conditions and future outlook, Bateman and Zeithaml (1989) fall short of
including the temporal orientation. They do however recognize its role when they state that
"the same objective future prospects, viewed from different orientations or "mind sets",
will lead to different, biased decisions".
42
Recently, Cunha (2004: 134) argued that strategic foresight requires "an effort for
articulation between past experiences, today's reafities and possible trajectories" and
suggested a "time-travel perspective" (147) that introduces the present and the past to a
practice traditionally focused on the future.
Another interest of the past-present-future orientation to strategy rests on its participation to
the constitution of a group's worldview. As Schein (1992), pointed out members of a group
share basic assumptions about time including a basic time orientation. Because time
orientation "is thought to exert a powerful influence on thought, feeling, and behavior"
(Zimbardo, 1994 cited in Holman & Silver, 1998), it could account for behaviors such as
the interpretation of the externat environrnent as well as decision-making, both conducted
by strategists.
We argue here that developing the construct of past-present-future orientation in strategy
would introduce a rich subjective view of time into the realm of strategic management and
research that is missing from most conceptions of the field. For example, Mosakowski and
Earley (2000), drawing from work in anthropology, psychology, sociology and
management note that "strategy researchers [...] generally ignore a subjective view of time
and the temporal perceptions of actors in their models" and that "at worst, time is
incorporated into theories and empirical models of firm dynamics with virtually no
attention to assumptions about time". Moreover, Bosch (2001) suggests that it is the
combination of both the "objective dimension" of time, or the dock and calendar aspect,
and the "subjective dimension" of time, or psychological aspect of time, that makes time
strategic 12 .
Given that time orientation usually remains in the domain of implicit assumptions, we
suggest that many well-known approaches to strategic management may involve implicit
temporal assumptions about past-present-future that are flot necessarily recognized by
theorists and practitioners. We now turn to the importance of exposing these assumptions
for both research and practice.
12
Our emphasis.
43
Why are assumptions important?
If "the lack of critical assessments of strategy research is a conspicuous barrier to more
rigorous and useful research" (Srivastava, 1987), then we suggest that exposing
assumptions can be seen as a means to improve such rigor and usefulness. Revealing and
discussing assumptions provide an opportunity for theorists and practitioners alike to assess
how the assumptions of a conceptual tool match those of the situation at hand. For example,
Hurst et al.'s (1989) creative management model is an attempt at matching their model's
temporal assumptions with those of a context in which managers are confronted with
novelty and ambiguity, which the authors daim, are better served with a time orientation
other than the past orientation.
Attempts to reveal underlying assumptions have been used in previous management
research to highlight the strengths and limitations of different theories (Meyer, Tsui and
Hinings, 1993) as well as to provide an opportunity for building more robust theories
(Oliver, 1991) and to contrast approaches to strategy (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Just
as Roxburgh (2003) showed, in an enlightening piece written for a readership of strategists,
being aware of and prepared for one's own braùi's flaws can help managers avoid bad
strategies. Hence, we suggest that changing implicit assumptions into explicit topics of
discussion may contribute to sounder approaches to strategic management.
Mason (1969) may have best formulated the transparency, relevancy and improved decision
making benefits brought about by examining assumptions when he wrote that "a good
planning technique [... ] should expose the assumptions underlying a proposed plan so that
management can reconsider them [and] it should suggest new and more relevant
assumptions upon which the planning process can proceed".
In regards to temporal assumptions per se, Schein (1985) informs us that they lie at the
most unconscious level of culture and that "each culture holds assumptions about the nature
of time and exhibits a fundamental orientation toward past, present and future". Temporal
assumptions usually remain implicit and as such are not formulated either because we do
flot know about them or because we take them for granted. Our temporal assumptions are
so intimately embedded in our worldview that we accept them as an "immutable part of
44
reality" (Bluedom and Denhart, 1988: 300) when in fact, they vary across groups and
cultures (Bluedorn and Denhart, 1988; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1997).
Challenging temporal assumptions opens up new possibilities for research and practice.
Thus, Bluedom's (2002) challenge of the assumption that time horizons appropriate for
strategic management run solely from the present to the future has led to the concept of
temporal depth, defined as the total horizon from the present towards both the past and the
future on which strategic decisions are based. Applying this new concept to the
understanding of firm performance, Bluedorn and Ferris (2004) show that the commonly
held belief that managing for the long term is best (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005) may
flot hold for firms of ail ages.
By focusing on implicit temporal assumptions in dynamic theories of strategy, Mosakowski
and Earley (2000) challenged an assertion about the narrow view of time in strategy
(Bluedom and Denhart, 1988) and unmasked a yet unacknowledged diversity that opens up
opportunities for scholars interested in dynamic theories of strategy to (1) Incorporate a
subjective view of time in their theories and (2) Explicitly discuss their temporal
assumptions when studying dynamics. In addition, practical applications such as matching
time views with firm choices and industry conditions as well as using current time views
either to change them or to anticipate competitors' strategic choices are suggested.
RESEARCH QUESTION
So far, we have shown that (1) Relevance and rigor in research may benefit from revealing
assumptions in general; (2) Scholars may not recognize the implicit temporal assumptions
they infuse into their theories; (3) The subjective side of time is flot incorporated in
strategic management approaches; (4) Past-present-future orientation's contribution to
worldviews may help in understanding strategic practices such as environment
interpretation and decision-making.
Given our interest in both research and practice, we have chosen to examine prescriptive
approaches in strategic management as they represent a nexus between scholars and
practitioners and we pose the following question: What are the implicit and explicit
45
assumptions about past-present-future in the prescriptive strategic management
literature? Given that our own research rests on the assumption that diversity is fruitful, we
also ask the following question: If heterogeneity were to be found, how could diversity in
past-present-future orientations benefit research and practice in strategic management?
METHODS
In order to identify the temporal assumptions in the strategic management prescriptive
literature, we chose to on the one hand, select appropriate texts that could be considered
classic articles and on the other hand, conduct a content analysis on those texts. We detail
here the article selection method and rationale as well as our coding method.
Article selection method
We conducted our review of the articles in 2002 and established a cut-off publication date
of 2001. A summary of our article selection method appears under Table VIII. Because our
review examines prescriptions made to practitioners about what is strategy and how it
should be conducted, we focused on so-called practitioner-oriented publications in
management and strategic management. Our criteria for choosing such publications were:
(1) Highly regarded journal by the academic world and (2) Journal with high diffusion
among managers.
To meet our first criteria, we consulted seven studies evaluating the quality and influence of
journals in the management field (Tahai and Meyer, 1999; Johnson and Podsakoff, 1994;
Extejt and Smith, 1990; Franke et al., 1990; MacMillan and Stern, 1987; Sharplin and
Mabry, 1985; Coe and Weinstock, 1984). Only California Management Review and
Harvard Business Review were listed by all of them.
Our second criteria eliminated California Management Review, as its average yearly
distribution totaled less than 6500 copies over the 1992-2001 period, falling steadily since
it last peaked at 7200 copies in 1996. By comparison, Harvard Business Review's paid
circulation averaged over 243 000 copies during the first six months of 2002 13 .
13
Source : Audit Bureau of Circulations
46
Table VIII. Article selection method
PHASES STEPS
1
2
3
I
4
5
1
Il
III
2
1
ACTION
Identifying a relevant publication.
Identifying a pool of "excellent" articles.
Identifying subject names as basis for selection of strategy articles.
Retrieving articles exhibiting at least one designated subject name.
Retaining articles that offer an original approach/definition of
strategy.
Retrieving HBR other articles (1993-2002) offering original
approach/definition of strategy not accounted for by phase I articles.
Retaining only HBR Best setiers.
Merging articles retained in phases I and II.
Whereas citation rates measure the visibility and impact of a publication and circulation
rates may be seen as an indication of diffusion of research among practitioners, neither
method evaluates the quality and rigor of individual articles.
Our eleven classic articles (see Table IX) were selected from a pool of excellent articles we
constituted on the basis of nearly one hundred articles, winners of the McKinsey award
between 1959 and 2001. Yearly since 1959, the McKinsey Foundation for Management
Research has recognized the best articles published in the Harvard Business Review.
Outstanding quality and impact on practice have constantly been criteria through the years.
Additionally, these articles are expected to become classics and offer managers "a chance
to retum to relatively solid ground from the heights of management fads that seem to
change yearly" (Gupta, 1996).
We had to create a list of subject names to retrieve strategic management articles among the
McKinsey winners. This is so because the Proquest 1972-2001 data base only shares two
subject names with HBR's yearly indexes (1959-1971). In particular, the following subject
names, generally associated with strategy, did not appear in the yearly indexes:
"Competitive advantage", "Competition", (except for 1962 under "Competition and big
business"), "Long-range planning" (except for 1968 and 1969), "Strategic", "Strategic
management", "Strategic business units", "Strategy" (except for "Corporate strategy"
between 1965 and 1969).
47
Table IX. Selected articles for content analysis
Year
1965
1985
1987
1989
1993
Authors
Mace
Wack
Mintzberg
Hamel &
Prahalad
Moore
1996 Porter
1998 Luehrman
1995
Brandenburger
& Nalebuff
1995 Collis &
Montgomery
1999 Yoffie &
Cusumano
2001 Eisenhardt &
Suit
Title
McKinsey
Award
"The President And Corporate Planning"
"Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead"
"Crafting Strategy"
"Strategic Intent"
X
X
X
X
"Predators And Prey: A New Ecology Of
Competition"
"What Is Strategy?"
"Strategy As A Portfolio Of Real
Options"
"The Right Game: Use Game Theory To
Shape Strategy"
"Competing On Resources: Strategy In
The 1990's"
"Judo Strategy: The Competitive
Dynamics Of Internet Time"
"Strategy As Simple Rules"
X
X
X
HBR
Best
Sellers
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Each period (1972-2001 and 1959-1971) had its list of subject names based on the general
current understanding of strategy for the former. For the latter, first, we identified subject
names that could reflect the activity of strategy-making during that period and second, we
retrieved appropriate subject names from HBR's classification at the time. The application
of these criteria narrowed the choice to thirty-five articles among which seven were
retained (see Table IX, under McKinsey Award).
Four more articles were added to our selection (See Table IX, articles labeled only HBR
best setiers). They are "HBR best setiers" appearing under the subject "Strategy" in the
1993-2002 yearly indexes and offer a perspective flot accounted for by the seven previously
chosen articles.
Coding method
We used Atlas/ti software for content analysis and interpretation. Examination of these
texts that contribute to defming strategy showed that their content could be grouped under
three emerging themes: (1) Critique of managerial actions; (2) Condemned prescriptions
48
and (3) Proposed actions. Hence, in order to compare the eleven texts, each one was
divided into three sections under which ail paragraphs pertaining to a theme were grouped.
This grouping has helped in focusing on a debate about what it is that managers should be
doing and what prescriptions they should be following in managing strategy. Not ail
articles revealed temporal aspects in every section.
A first attempt at coding for temporal words and meanings was initially conducted on three
texts with a "microanalysis" perspective that is the "detailed line-by-line analysis necessary
at the beginning of a study to generate initial categories [...] and to suggest relationships
among categories" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:57).
And indeed, this first step generated a multitude of emergent codes that were subsequently
grouped under families of similar meaning to make analysis more manageable and less
redundant. Furthermore, re-examining families within each text achieved a more contextual
meaning. For example, in one text "continuity" may mean "continuity between past and
present", whereas in another, it may mean "continuity towards the future". The most
common families were those of past, present and future.
Coding was extended to ail texts using pre-established categories as well as new emergent
codes. Re-examination of ail texts followed the emergence of a new code. Appendix A
offers a sample of coding examples.
In the following section, we will introduce our selection of articles and then, we will
temporally analyze each of them and graphically represent the past-present-future
orientations.
FINDINGS
Our analysis of ail eleven articles revealed a heterogeneous treatment of the temporal
orientation on two future dimensions and a third one pertaining to the past. Table X offers a
summary of our findings. More precisely, we were able to assess ah l articles on the basis of
49
an objective or subjective future and a single or a multiple future as well as either a
positive or a negative past.
Hence, we used these emergent dimensions from our analysis to construct a classification
of the eleven articles under study and found that six out of the eight possible combinations
were represented by our sample (See Table XI). Before using the articles to illustrate the
different temporal orientations, we will explain the dimensions that make up this
classification.
The future is revealed in our sample of articles along the dimensions of objective/subjective
and single/multiple. Our coding revealed that a number of articles operationalize strategy
with either multiple futures or, on the contrary, a single future. However, the treatment of
the future remains more complex and can be further understood with the dimension of
objective versus subjective future. Indeed, by adopting Orlikowski and Yates' (2002: 685)
perspective on the objective/subjective reality of time and applying it to the future, we can
identify an objective future as one that appears "independent of man" (Clark 1990:142,
cited in Orlikowski and Yates (2002:685)) while a subjective future would be viewed as "a
product of the norms, beliefs, and customs of individuals and groups" or again "defmed by
organizational members" (Clark, 1985:36, cited in Orlikowski and Yates, 2002: 685) and
"assumed to be neither fixed nor invariant" (Orlikowski and Yates, 2002: 685).
Article
Q
Q
M
.-
c..)
0
>3
Q
41.,
23
-:
Anachronistic;
burdensome
p
Implicit &
burdens orne past
Failure of eternal
resent
Moore
%
Anachronistic;
Inhibiting renewal
of present
o
Brandenburger
& Nalebuff
Anachronistic
+: Fused with the
present
+: Useful past
Anachronistic Anachronistic
Co-evolving
present
Eternal and ail
encompassing
present
Future-oriented
present
Extended and
uncertain present
Renewed
present
Predeterminedby
the past
Transient present
+: Source of Active andfutureknowledge
oriented present
›
°l
c.. )
Porter
Future
Multiple concurrent futures
Single reasonable future
Unknowable future
Incremental future
Multip le and concurrent futures
determined by the game
Rules can be changed to arrive at
alternate future, concealedfrom
competitors
Concurrent cyclical futures of the
ecosystems
Implicit future
Maintenance of timeless present
Envisioned future
Long and short term future
Single desiredfuture
Uncertain and risky futures
Deferred and acted upon futures;
some pre-determinedfuture
Single dynamic future
+: Source of Current frame for Uncertain futures; impossible
information
reality spanning futures; pre-determined future
past to predetermined future
+: Source of Synthesis of past, Multiple dormant futures
identity
present, future
Single dominant future
Luehrman
Mintzberg
Present
+: Source of Future-oriented
judgment
present
Past
Past-present continuity; past-future
continuity
Present-future competition
Past-present-pre-determined future
continuity
Past-present-uncertain futures
discontinuity
Past-future continuity; past-presentfuture continuity and synthes is at ail
present moments
Multiple, strongly linked, concurrent
and interacting present-future dyads
Past-pre-determinedfuture continuity
Past-pre-determined present must
stay in synch with dynamic future
Past-present discontinuity/continuity
Present-future continuity
Past-present discontinuity; FuturePresent-future continuity;
Past-present discontinuity
Present-future discontinuity
Past-present discontinuity
Pre-determined present-future
continuity
Present-future with multiple rhythms
Future-present continuity
Present-future possibly discontinuous
Past-present discontinuity
Timeless present
Timeless
present
continuity/discontinuity
FPPF links
50
51
Table XI. Classification of eleven articles on the basis of their temporal orientation
Future dimension
Single future
Multiple futures
Negative
Objective
future
Subjective
future
Porter
H&P
E&S
Past
dimension
Objective
future
Subjective
future
Moore
B&N
Y&C
Positive
C&M
Mace
Wack
Mintzberg
Luehrman
And indeed, while four articles in our sample treat the future as though it proceeds from
forces external to actors, what we suggest can be viewed as an objective future, more than
half of our articles can be seen as including a subjective view of the future. Indeed, these
latter articles suggest that managers entertain a close relationship with the future as they
have power over, influence or create it.
In addition, six articles amongst the overall sample acknowledge multiple futures although
Mace's, Wack's and Mintzberg's operationalize strategy with a single future (See Tables
XI and XII). This latter stand is in line with findings that even though time horizons
(Lorsch, 1965) and defmitive time-span of feedback (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Lorsch &
Morse, 1974) vary according to company departments and administrative levels, a "silent
politics of time" would be at play to arrive at a single planning horizon (Das, 1991).
In regards to the past, our sample of texts reveals that this time zone is treated either
positively, meaning seen as useful, or negatively, as something to be rejected or ignored.
We also note that out of the eight articles stressing that their contribution is tirnely with a
new era (identified with an asterisk in Table XII), four adopt a negative past orientation,
three a positive one while the eighth article (Yoffie & Cusumano's) entertains both options.
52
Table XII. Sekcted articles: Relationship with the future
Articles
Future
Authors' state d rationale for approach
Obt/Subj.
Single/Multiple
*Porter 1996
Objective
Single
*Collis &
Montgomery
1995
Objective
Single
*H amel &
Prahalad 1989
Subjective
Single
*Eis enharlit &
Sull 2001
Subjective
Single
*Yoffie &
Cusumano 1999
Subjective
Single
*Mace 1965
Subjective
Single
(mAttp/e)
*Wack 1985
Subjective
Single
(mu/)
Minte erg 1987
*Moore 1993
Brandenburger
& Nalebuff
1995
Luehrman 1998
Subjective
Single
(Multiple)
Objective
Multiple
Objective
Multiple
Subjective
(Objective)
Multiple
After"almost two decules [of] learning to playby a new set of rules"to
face global competition, the author argues the need for"reconnecting with
strategy".
Following the ratvious clecade's turbulence and challenges to the strategic
planning approach, authors algue that their"framework [ ..] lias the
poterÉial to out through much of this confusion" and is needed to face
competition in the 1990's.
Planning held responsiale for lack of competitiveness. 'Fo revitalize
corporate performance, we need a whole new model of strategy" in the
face of new global competition, a context put into place during the
seventies and the eighties.
`The new economy's most profoundstrategic implication is that
comparues must capture unanticipated, fleeting oprortunities in orderto
succeed".
Autinrs offerjudo strateg as a nevr arproachto "avoid head-to-head
conflict" no longer appropriate in the conterd of the "dynamics of Internet
te".
Autlor offers a resronse to what ha secs as preoccupations on the part of
US top executives during the early 60s for more formalized corporate
planning. "The only constant in business is change, and the leadership in
adapting corporate operations to the changing business world must corne
from the top".
Devising a better approach thon forecasting in an era where uncertainty has
become "not just an occasional, ternporary deviation from a reasonable
predictability"
Autior argues that "the crafiing image [rather than the "planning image]
better captures the processby which effective strdegies corne to be".
In ancra when "the only truly sustainable advantage comes from outinnovating the competition", the author argues that managers need to
"freine the problem" of competition differently with the idea of a "business
ecos3futem".
Author states that "business is a high-stakes game" and argues that
"successful business strategy is about activelyshapng the gaine you play,
not just playing the game you find".
Thinking about strategy as a portfolio of real options allows the
reconciliation of needs for franung long tenu decisions as well as "learning
from ongoirg developments" and "discretion to act based on what is
learned".
53
We now turn to the description of each text's temporal orientation and accompanying
graphical representation. The reader will notice that our representations make use of the
time's arrow (running from the past to the present and the future) as a background. We
have done this because, at least in the Western world, it is a common and taken-for-granted
way of representing the flow of time and as such can be seen as a shared basis on which to
start a conversation on temporal orientation 14.
Single and objective future orientation
We start off with Porter's (1996) "What is strategy?", an article that represents the single
and objective future orientation combined with a negative view of the past. The practice of
strategic management in the 1980's and 1990's was dominated by Michael Porter's
positioning approach. Nevertheless, as for planning, positioning has been criticized for
shortcomings amidst dynamic and turbulent markets and Porter wrote this article in
response to positioning's detractors. The author contends that, after a decade of focusing on
operational effectiveness with its considerable gains in productivity, quality and speed, it is
time for managers to come back to the sustainability of strategy.
Although the word "future" is actually absent from Porter's (1996) article, it is implicitly
evoked in what can be seen as the maintenance of a timeless present. In this article, several
elements contribute to the perception that the flow of time is made up of a succession of
present states that are expected to last. For example, although the author insists on the
benefits of continuity through a sustainable strategy, contributing to a sense of flow, other
aspects tend to create a sense of timelessness or at least stress the central importance of a
long term present, "of a decade or more". Indeed on the one hand, the future time zone is
implicit. On the other hand, the past is almost ignored and discussed only under two sets of
circumstances: the first one in which the past emerges when the failed timeless present
warrants "looking backward" to see if "one can re-examine the original strategy to see if it
is still valid" and the second that stresses the reduced ability to perceive novelty and the
necessity to make trade-offs in firms that have "a long history in the industry".
14
As an example of cultural diversity in representations of the temporal orientation, Roeckelein (2000:13)
points out that although the past-present-future division of the flow of time is also acknowledged in Hebrew
and other semitic languages, the past is represented as lying ahead because it is known and the unknown
future lies behind. This spatial arrangement of time is also found in the Aymara tribe of the Andes (Nunez and
Sweetser, 2006).
54
Porter (19961
Tinutessprenait
:A: succession of timeless presents in a flow of Orne where bath past
and future are implicit and revealed only upon J'allure of the present to retain its t
tnnelessness. •
In addition, because "strategic competition can be
thought of as the process of perceivirig new
ipositions" and because the author suggests that new
iI
1
Ipositions proceed either from a continuous or
•
I
I
I
iI1discontinuous present, the flow of time appears as a
•
1aI,,,,I.-succession of timeless presents. Interaction between
1iI „....--
i1.--1--'--the future and positioning is explicitly mentioned
It--
i
Note The Idea of a verhcal arrow
bolrowed from Mamemells (2001)
Present
only within the brief discussion about emerging
industries and businesses undergoing technological
revolutions. Because these industries are in a
temporary state during which the fundamental frontier of productivity is being established
or re-established, their future is highly uncertain and "developing a strategy [...] is a
daunting proposition". This article is actually only one in two from our sample, with
Eisenhardt and Sull's, that can be viewed as present-dominated.
Our second article, Collis and
Montgomery's "Competing On
Resources: Strategy In The
Collis & Montgomery (1995)
Expected obsolescence: Fast and Present in a dvnainicfiuv toward
a fleure mat is expected to resemble a mit between a projected
present and soute relineptisheripast
1990's", integrates two
perspectives on strategy: the
more recent one of focusing Obsolescence
Past-Present
Projected Future
Present
attention inward to identify core
competence and capabilities and Obsolescence
the more classic stand of choosing the right industries to compete in. This article 's temporal
orientation is distinguished from Porter's only on the basis of the past that it views
positively, as a source of resources. This is an article with strong past-present continuity:
the accumulation of resources in the past determines the present. Although the past is very
much present through the "guardianship [...] and the nurturing [of] critical resources", the
past-present couple is in a dynamic flux "Because ail resources depreciate". So, the present
is also made of actions such as "contùmally invest in and upgrade their resources, however
55
good those resources are today" that will make sense in a singular future, a mix of the
projection of the present and of an expected obsolescence.
We now turn to a series of articles that share the same single future view as Porter's and
Collis & Montgomery's but adopt a subjective rather than objective view of the future.
Single and subjective future orientation
The temporal orientation characterized by a single and subjective future is represented by
more than half our sample of articles, or six, two of which are oriented towards a negative
past, another three towards a positive past and the last one adopts a dual stance. Within this
body of articles, the future time zone is portrayed as a "desired" future (Hamel and
Prahalad, 1989), a future that corresponds to the output of opportunities pursued by
managers (Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001), an "envisioned" future (Yoffie and Cusumano,
1999) or again a future that can be a "reasonable" one, chosen to avoid confusion (Mace,
1965), one that proceeds from managers' mental models (Wack, 1985) or a future that
managers "allowed to pervade the system" (Mintzberg, 1987).
Both Hamel & Prahalad's (1989) "Strategic Intent" and Eisenhardt & Sull's (2001)
"Strategy as simple rules" share a negative view of the past. Indeed, the first article conveys
the idea that planning approaches have become anachronistic and that they are responsible
for Western firms' lack of competitiveness amidst the novel global competitive context of
the seventies and eighties and it is suggested that a whole new model of strategy is required
in order to revitalize corporate performance. Eisenhardt & Sull render the idea that the past
lias become irrelevant.
Hamel & Prahalad's (1989) "Strategic intent" prescribes a break with the past of strategic
thought and the adoption of a "whole new model of strategy", which the authors call
"strategic ùitent". This novel approach requires first, a break from a past loaded with
obsolete views and tools to start anew with "a clean sheet of paper" and second, the ability
to envision a "desired" future rather than "project the present forward incrementally". The
future of strategic intent is "fold[ed...] back into the present" hence guiding present-time
decisions towards the desired future "leadership position". This future adopts a very long
56
term horizon of a decade or
two, as prescribed also by
Porter (1996), and although it
Hemel & Prahala d (19891
Breakaway marathon: Strategy breaks away from the past white a long-term desired _fleure is
brought bock into the prescrit and reached through successive legs ofcorporate challenges.
is a known future, the authors
insist that the path towards it
is undetermined, "leaving
room for individual and team
•
contributions". The route
between the present and Pest
Present
Desired Future
future remains "flexible", leaving "room for improvisation". It is made up of successive
legs defined by "a series of corporate challenges [that] corne from analyzing competitors as
well as from the foreseeable pattern of industry evolution". However, continuity between
present and the desired future is stressed as it brings consistency to resource allocation and
extends the attention span of the organization, "one of the most critical tasks [...] in battles
for global leadership". Because of the break with the past, the very long term horizon and
the metaphor of the "legs", we have called this representation: "breakaway marathon".
Eisenhardt & Sun' s (2001)
Eisenhardt & Sull (2001)
"Strategy as simple rules"
stresses the present time zone
Zero-based present Irrelevant part and unknowable future make for a tinte horizon contined to
an extended present made up of market windows. Timing and exit rules corne loto play when
movement between windows is sought.
of a new and highly
unpredictable era where first,
the old rules of the past no
longer apply: "While
conventional wisdom dictates
that managers avo id
Past
Extended Prisent
uncertainty, the logic of opportunity dictates that they seek it out" and, second, where the future is unknowable
because of "fast-moving markets where unpredictability reigns", consequently, "an
executive must manage [...] as if it could all end tomorrow".
57
The irrelevance of the past combined to the unpredictability of the future leaves
managers in a sort of "zero-based" and extended present, uncertain at best. Managers must
work with a temporal horizon made up of "market windows" as well as timing and exit
rules, in order to "capture unanticipated, fleeting opportunities in order to succeed" and to
"pull out fi-om yesterday's opportunities". Managers are urged to fmd some continuity
within an extended present in order to develop competitive advantages. The future is built
incrementally by managers who shift flexibly among opportunities as circumstances dictate
until the industry matures and the mies become more obvious. Only then can the future
become more of a creation or vision.
Yoffie and Cusumano's "Judo Strategy: the Competitive Dynamics of Internet Time" also
exhibits a single and
subjectivefuture
orientation. However,
this contribution can
Envisioued Future
Yoffie & Cusumano (1999)
Protected transitions: Emphasis on reaching an envi4oned
long-term future that guides actions within a transient
present, protected foin dominant players
be seen as considering
the past as both
positive and negative,
a stand that bridges
the previoustwoPast
Future
articles with Mace's,
Wack's and Mintzberg's, three articles that treat the past as a positive orientation.
In the midst of Internet competition, Yoffie and Cusumano discuss how companies can
avoid direct conffict with larger and stronger opponents, move to uncontested grounds and
turn dominant players' strengths against them. They suggest that a long-term vision of the
future is helpful in mitigating the uncertainty sparked by the "bewildering pace of the
Internet". The past can be seen as either cumbersome or useful. If the past embodied in
"some traditional forms of business practice" have "become much less useful", "some of
the strategic precepts of the pre-Intemet world continue to ring true" and "the bewildering
pace of the Internet may even put a premium on these old-fashioned virtues", such as the
core elements of competitive advantage. So, there does not seem to be a necessary fracture
58
between the past and the present although some level of discontinuity is possible. The
focus of this approach is mainly on a present filled with rapid moves "to new markets and
uncontested ground" protected from dominant players. An envisioned future reduces
uncertainty and guides action within a transient present.
We now turn to a series of three articles within the single and subjective future orientation
that exhibit a positive rather than negative past orientation. As mentioned earlier, these
articles acknowledge multiple futures but their discussion of strategic management rests
with a single one. Indeed, for Mace, top management's role is to provide direction towards
a single future because the absence of such direction results in multiple concurrent futures,
a "hodgepodge", that distracts attention and dissipates resources. Although Wack's scenario
planning approach is by defmition anchored in the generation of multiple futures, one must
eventually be agreed upon because "strategies are the product of a worldview" and
"managers need to share some common view" (Wack, 1985: 89). Finally, Mintzberg
acknowledges the presence of multiple dormant futures within the firm that usually come to
the forefront only "when the company's prevalent strategies have broken down and its
leaders are groping for something new" at which time they may be "allowed to pervade the
system, to become organizational".
Mace's (1965) "The President and Corporate Planning" is a classic example of the
traditional planning approach that would later became so pervasive. The author describes
how corporate planning should be considered a critical job of top executives and a process
by which they can lead their filin through the changing business world. Recognizing that
the "action-minded, decision-oriented executive" prefers to delegate planning and take care
of "day-to-day crises [...] that need decisions right now", Mace nevertheless wrote bis
article to entice top executives in thinking about an "always uncertain" future. The pressure
of the present with its emphasis on current operations comes into competition with the need
to plan today for the future, hence we labeled this representation "Future required". Past,
present and future are in continuity. The experience of the past is valued and used to assess
the present and the future. The present is future-oriented as it also appears in the
contributions from Hamel and Prahalad (1989) and Luehrman (1998). Forecasts are used to
59
plan for the future. Past experience and judgment serve in evaluating forecasts and
predicting a "reasonable future" which reduces uncertainty.
Mace (1965)
Future orientation required: A single reasonable
future is chosen based on predictions from the past
and the present and drgrected tu reduce uncertainty.
Past. present and future are in continuity.
•
Fast
Present
Reasonable
Future
The other two articles among this group of three offer their own view of strategy and by the
same token a critique of traditional planning Thus, Wack's (1985) "Scenarios: Uncharted
Waters Ahead", reveals the limits of planning when managers are confronted with an
uncertain future. Mintzberg's (1987) "Crafting Strategy", highlights the limits of analytical
thinking used in planning and discusses strategy as crafting thought and action, control and
learning, stability and change.
1F1
Wack (1985)
Opening up the future: Multiple futures assessed front a. pre-detennined future in continuity with present. Impossible
futures will be discarded while one lest uneertain future will
hechosen.
Pan
Present
UF1
ttF2
PreD
1F2
UF3
The scenario method developed at Shell is geared at having managers think flot only about
the future, but more so about an "uncertain future" (Wack, 1985). It has been proposed as
an improvement over forecasting techniques because the latter "are usually constructed on
the assumption that tomorrow's world will be much like today's". Here, the future is no
60
longer seen as a single projection from the past, "it has become a moving target", and we
say corresponds to "opening the future". Predicting the future requires two elements: first,
knowing ail of the predetermined elements, that is "those events that have already occurred
(or that almost certainly will occur) but whose consequences have flot yet unfolded" and
second, knowledge of "how the world works". A predicted future in continuity with the
past must be predetermined and assumed to respond to the same "forces" because forecasts
work with predetermined elements and a world that is "familiar, predictable [...] "more of
the same" ". Mental models based on past experience will yield a correct interpretation of
the present and the future only if they match "the fundamentals of the real world". Scenario
planning highlights impossible futures (IF) that can be discarded. The impact of scenarios
on "assumptions about how the world works" may help managers "reorganize their mental
model of reality" and lead them to apprehend the real uncertainties of the future (UF) on
which to exercise their judgment.
Mintzberg's (1987) "Crafting Strategy" article, the third contribution among the single,
subjective future and positive past orientation, exhibits an eloquent tension between the
past and the future as expressed in the following quote: "Strategies are both plans for the
future and patterns from the past". Strategic identity has its roots in the past, embodied in
retrospective (present to past) patterns. This outlook on the past reveals continuity between
past, present and future, and is needed to project the firm into the future. This article
provides a rich view of interactions between the three time zones as at ail times, there is an
original triad of past, present and future. In fact, strategy requires a creative act, "a
natural synthesis of the future, present, and past".
Mintzberg 1987
Synthetic tria& Reversibility of time between Present and Past
provides access to identity and improves projection toward a single
dominant future albeit presence of multiple donnant futures.
Synthesis of PPF at ail times.
PPF PPF PPF
Past
Present
Dominant Future
61
Our analysis of Mintzberg's article concludes that of the body of classic articles that
adopt a single future, objective or subjective, as part of their temporal orientation. We now
turn to the remaining three articles of our sample that consider multiple futures. As
mentioned earlier, not ail combinations of temporal orientation are represented in our
sample (See Table XI). The multiple and objective future orientation is represented by two
articles that also consider the past negatively but none that view it positively. The multiple
and subjective future orientation is represented by a single article that entertains a positive
past.
Multiple and objective future orientation
The objective future of Moore's (1993) "Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of
Competition" is determined by an ecosystem's lifecycle while that of Brandenburger and
Nalebuff's (1995) "The Right Game: Use Game Theory To Shape Strategy" is determined
by the logic of the game.
Moore's (1993) article suggests that companies be viewed as part of a business ecosystem
that spans a variety of industries. Companies co-evolve around a new innovation and
alternately over time, compete and cooperate. Each of the ecosystems a firm is involved in
can be seen as a space-time continuum with its own context. It also exhibits its own
lifecycle with stages of "birth, expansion, leadership, and self-renewal - or, if not selfrenewal, death", to which the firm must coevolve, hence the label "living futures".
Moore (1993)
Living fianres: Eacli ecosvstem
exhibits own future and specitic
lifecycle. Optional continuity
between Present and Future.
Ecosystent 3 Ecosystew 2
,
Ecosystem 1
Pat
Preseut
Futures
62
Consequently there are as many concurrent futures as there are ecosystems, hence our
representation of two distinct present-future arrows. The future is flot necessarily in
continuity with the present, as ecosystems may die and as "managers can't afford to ignore
the birth of new ecosystems". The past tends to be seen negatively as it feeds mental
models that may become a hindrance for sensing a new reality with the detrimental effect
of having "managers still frame the problem in the old way".
In their 1995 article, "The Right Game: Use Game Theory To Shape Strategy",
Brandenburger and Nalebuff argue that game theory focuses managers' attention on the
interdependencies with competitors.
Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1995)
Cental ballftaures-: Each game exhibits °wu future. Antes of gaine eau be changed to au ive at alternate future concealed
front competitors. Entine projecled into present and reached Urane different iiwco cooperation and competition.
Gams 2
Sait
Preunt
Futures
Adopting this view can empower managers to change the game their companies are
involved in. The past can be seen as embodied in the "traditional business vocabulary", a
language that reflects the "mindset" with which managers approach the "game of business".
This mindset "inhibits a full understanding of the interdependencies that exist in business".
It is also part of rules as they may "arise from [...] custom". In using existing
managers replicate the past into the present. But they can "revise them or corne up with
new ones", thus renewing the present. There are as many futures as there are games and the
future is determined by the rules of the game and is knowable through " look[ing] forward
far into the game and then reason[ing] backward to figure out which of today's actions will
lead you to where you want to end up". So, within a game, there is a predetermined
continuity between present and future, hence the "crystal bail futures" label. On the route
to the future, there are different times: a time for cooperation and a time for competition.
63
Strategy may be seen as understanding the rules of the game, changing them to arrive at
an alternate future while keeping this future uncertain for competitors because "the way
players perceive the uncertainty [...] mold[s] their behavior".
We now turn to the final article from our sample, the only one that adopts a temporal
orientation that combines multiple and subjective futures with a positive past.
Multiple and subjective future orientation
This last article is Luehrman's (1998) "Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options". It discusses
the use of option pricing in valuing strategy as compared to a more static approach,
discounted cash flow. The author demonstrates how this approach enables managers to
adapt their strategy as cù-cumstances change over time. Using the metaphor of a tomato
garden, this article offers multiple trajectories (or projects) towards multiple futures, hence
our labelling of "temporal garden".
The "uncertain, or risky" nature of the futures is acknowledged and each present is allowed
to corne doser to its future resulting flot only in a future-oriented present but also in an
active one, "we don't wait passively". Moreover the outcome of a trajectory can impact
another, "a spillover [effect that] reduces the length of time a subsequent decision can be
deferred". This approach makes obvious the possibility that a trajectory be terminated
"because time bas run out". The past is embodied in experience and provides managers
with some knowledge about a certain predetermination of the future such as how a situation
"changes over time". Although Luehrman (1998) acknowledges this secondary view of a
pre-determined future in stable environments where it is possible to understand and predict
how changes occur over time, bis discussion stresses an active future, molded by some
managerial actions "taken immediately, while others are deliberately deferred" and by
"learning from ongoing developments" and making decisions "based on what is learned".
64
Luehrman (1998)
Pr
Temporal garda:: Multiple, strongly linked,
concurrent and interacting present-fithne
dyads. Active and future-oriented present.
Positive past enabodied in experience. PPF
continuity.
Revealing the temporal orientation casts quite a different light on the classic works we have
chosen. For example, seven out of eight texts that justify their contribution on the need for a
novel approach to strategy share a single future orientation. Unexpectedly, our analysis
groups together Mace's, Wack's and Mintzberg's approaches to strategy. Both Wack's and
Mintzberg's contributions were made in an attempt to overcome the limitations of classic
planning approaches with the former adapting planning to a more dynamic environment
and the latter attempting to infuse more flexibility and craft into strategy. From our
perspective, these approaches share the same temporal orientation. It may also be surprising
for some to realize that Eisenhardt and Sull's and Hamel and Prahalad's texts share the
same single, subjective future and negative past orientation. However, their choice of time
horizons are quite contrasted, an extended present for the former and a very long term
horizon for the latter.
As may be expected for contributions to strategic management, the majority of articles,
actually six, stress the present-future time zones. Two articles are present dominated,
Porter's and Eisenhardt and Sull's, while only three appear to treat ail time zones in a
significant manner, those of Mace, Mintzberg and Colis and Montgomery (See Table
XIII).
65
Table XIII. Dominant time zones of eleven classic strategy articles
Dominant time zones
Present-Future
Articles
Wack, 1985; Hamel & Prahalad, 1989*; Moore, 1993;
Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1995*; Luerhman, 1998*; Yoffie &
Cusumano, 1999
Present
Porter, 1996; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001
Past-Present-Future Mace, 1965; Mintzberg, 1987*; Collis & Montgomery, 1995
* Identifies approaches that include reversibility of lime
Examination of the eleven representations show that four contributions exhibit a reversible
time flow which questions Bosch's (2001: 74) daim that "a first key strategic characteristic
of time should be its irreversibility". Indeed, Hamel and Prahalad's, Brandenburger and
Nalebuff s as well as Luehrman's articles ail exhibit reversible time from the future to the
present as shown by arrows that travel from right to lefl on the graphical representations
while Mintzberg's article is the only one exhibiting reversible time from the present to the
past.
We now discuss further the relationship of strategy with the past-present-future orientation
as well as applications of our findings to both scholarly and practical domains.
DISCUSSION
We actively draw upon our perception of time to make sense of reality. Our fmdings
suggest that we can now argue that temporal orientation may play a larger role in strategic
management than usually acknowledged.
To sum up, our analysis reveals that temporal orientation is flot explicitly acknowledged in
classic strategy articles. Rather, our findings unveil an implicit, yet heterogeneous,
treatment of temporal orientation with, unsurprisingly for strategy, a dominant emphasis on
the present-future link. Our fmdings also suggest that the past is of concern in strategy and
it, too, is treated in a variety of ways although no approach actually discusses the
redefmition of the past in light of present events. However, we suggest that Mintzberg's
approach with its reversible flow of time from present to past and acknowledgement of the
past as a source of identity opens the door to such a possibility as it may approach the socalled Makimono time perception in which the past "has flot exited into eternity with the
fmality of a slammed door; it still exists in the present" (Hayashi, 1988:9). Contrary to
66
Mosakowski and Earley's (2000) findings, our study acknowledges the inclusion of
subjective futures in classic approaches to strategy. The consideration of multiple versus
single futures, negative versus positive past and objective versus subjective future provides
a basis for a novel classification of strategy literature that may become a starting point for
future inquiry into the treatment of time in strategy.
From a theoretical perspective, our analysis adds to the current conversation on time in
strategic management by a diversity of past-present-future treatments in classic approaches
that has yet to be taken advantage of. Our findings suggest that we may have more to leam
from extant literature than currently thought in our search for more dynamic theories of
strategy and for infusing more subjectivity into strategy. Indeed, the temporal diversity
revealed and the new classification that it provides can help researchers focus on what can
be learned from the manner in which time has been integrated so far into strategy. In
particular, because "members [of an organization] will notice and respond to some aspects
of the organizational world more than other aspects" (Hatch, 1993: 663), revealing
assumptions about temporal perspective in strategy gives credence to the consideration of
strategy as the expression of worldviews.
However, because the objects we studied were articles, our contribution at this point is
mainly a theoretical one. Nonetheless, it raises further questions that warrant additional
research for generating practical benefits to practitioners, some of which we discuss
hereafter.
This article suggests how temporal orientation is written into strategy. Hence, one avenue
for empirical research resides with extending our approach of revealing assumptions to
actual strategies with the goal of identifying the temporal orientation of a firm's strategic
management and that of the industry as a whole. Building a repertoire of representations of
temporal orientations on the basis of actual strategies would help researchers assess their
respective advantages and risks as well as identify the extent of the diversity of temporal
perspectives in strategic management. In particular, attention should be brought to nonAmerican perspectives that are bound to offer additional variety, as temporal orientation is
part of the basic assumptions of any culture. Possible benefits to practitioners include the
67
development of a contingency approach to strategic management, what Mosakowski and
Earley (2000: 807) identified as the benefit of matching time views to industry conditions
whereby understanding the temporal assumptions of the industry as well as that of the firm
may clarify if the approach to strategy is appropriate. Also, because assumptions
predetermine action, prediction becomes possible. So, developing a new way to decode
strategic action may provide practitioners with the benefit of anticipating their competitors'
moves.
Another promising area deals with the rote of the top management team in infusing their
subjective temporal orientation into the firm' s. Is the firm's temporal orientation negotiated
among the members of the TMT and if so, in what manner given that it usually remains
implicit? Do members of the TMT use temporal orientation when faced with the need for a
strategic change? How does temporal orientation of TMT members and a firm's strategy
translate into performance? Additionally, longitudinal research on individual firms and
their TMT could also be pursued to assess dominant temporal orientations over different
periods in the life of the organization which might help identify how the history of the firm
and the composition of the TMT impact strategies.
Researchers interested in linking individual and firm-level characteristics may also pursue
research into the extension of the purported benefit of a balanced temporal orientation at the
individual level, described by psychologists as a way "to flexibly switch temporal frames
between past, future, and present depending on situational demands, resource assessments,
or personal and social appraisals" (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2003), to the organizational level.
Finally, we suggest that practical applications will require the active participation of
practitioners. As an example, Wack's scenario approach was developed in cooperation with
managers who were willing to identify their own implicit assumptions, discuss them and
change their view of reality, a case of double-loop learning (Argyris & Schôn, 1978). If
managers are willing to practice forms of "temporal reflexivity" (Cunha, 2004: 140) such as
identifying their temporal orientation and use thereof, it may be possible to explore the
benefits of "time traveling" a form of foresight based in part on the articulation of past,
present and future.
68
In conclusion, our study suggests that strategy is certainly about some future, be it
multiple or single, objective or subjective as well as about the past and the present and the
dynamic combination of the three time zones. The challenge ahead remains one of
acknowledging this complex diversity in the practice of strategy because, after ail, we
cannot manage what we do flot acknowledge.
69
APPENDIX A. Coding examples
We present here several excerpts from the corpus of three of the eleven HBR articles used
in this study. We focus on excerpts that highlight the links between the three time zones
and that are taken from the "proposed action" section of ail articles. As a reminder, the
temporal orientation characteristics discussed here can be found in Table X above.
We start with Mace's and Hamel & Prahalad's present which in both cases is future
oriented. However our analysis also indicates that the links between the present and future
time zones are dissimilar. As well, the author's outlook on the past is quite different: a
source of judgment for Mace and a hindrance and vulnerability for Hamel & Prahalad.
Thus Excerpt 1 shows that forecasts project the present into the future while the actual
definition of the strategic intent involves a movement from the future to the present to the
future again.
Excerpt 1. Mace's present to future continuity
"Forecasts for each of the next three to five years, based on current
operations and existing plans for improving operations, are an
important element of a sound planning program. If the company
continues to do what it is doing and planning to do today, what will
be Us future sales, profit, market position, and so on?".
Codes
Future
Horizon
Present
Continuity
Present-to-future
Excerpt 2. Hamel & Prahalad's future-present-future continuity
"The goal of strategic intent is to fold the future back into the
present. The important question is not "How will next year be
diffèrent from this year?" but "What must we do differently next year
to get doser to our strategic intent?" Only with a carefully
articulated and adhered to strategic intent will a succession of yearon-year plans sum up to global leadership".
Codes
Future to present
Present to future
Known future
Horizon
In regards to the past, while for Mace, it is a source of judgment to be mobilized in the
present in order to plan for the future, Hamel & Prahalad's article tends to emphasize a
break with the past in order to achieve a strategic intent, hence revitalize strategy.
70
Thus, excerpt 3 discusses the positive consequences of experience (past) in uncovering
novel opportunities for the future.
Excerpt 3. Mace's past as source of judgment Codes
"Critical evaluation by top executives of division or functional Horizon
managers' longer-range goals and plans has another important Novelty
advantage. A discussion by able, experienced, and interested Past
executives about the operations of a division inevitably results in the Future
disclosure of some new opportunity not thought of previously. The
interplay of active minds dedicated to greater growth and success
stimulates new avenues of thought which can be enormously helpful
to the division and to the company".
In contrast, Hamel & Prahalad's excerpt 4 describes the past, embodied in recipes, as a
hindrance and vulnerability. Additionally, excerpt 5 highlights the necessity to break away
from past practice.
Excerpt 4. Hamel & Prahalad's hindrance of the past Codes
"Competitive innovation works on the premise that a successful Novelty
competitor is likely to be wedded to a "recipe" for success. That's Past
why the most effective weapon new competitors possess is probably Continuity
a clean sheet of paper. And why an incumbent's greatest Renewal
vulnerability is its belief in accepted practice".
Excerpt 5. Hamel & Prahalad's discontinuity vvith the past Codes
"To achieve a strategic intent, a company must usually take on Continuity
larger, better financed competitors. That means carefully managing Discontinuity
competitive engagements so that scarce resources are conserved. Future
Managers cannot do that simply by playing the same game better - Novelty
making marginal improvements to competitors' technology and Renewal
business practices. Instead, they must fundamentally change the Present
game in ways that disadvantage incumbents - -devising novel
approaches to market entry, advantage building, and competitive
walfare. For smart competitors, the goal is flot competitive imitation
but competitive innovation, the art of containing competitive risks
within manageable proportions".
We present a final excerpt taken from Mintzberg's article that conveys flot only the
movement between the three time zones but also their meshing and the fertility of both
continuity and discontinuity ail at once.
71
Excerpt 6. Mintzberg's past-present-future interactions Codes
"At work, the potter sits before a lump of clay on the wheeL Her Future
mind is on the clay, but she is also aware of sitting between her past Discontinuity
experiences and her future prospects. She knows exactly what hasContinuity
and has flot worked for her in the past. She has an intimateNoyelty
knowledge of her work, her capabilities, and her markets. As a Past
craftsman, she senses rather than analyzes these things; her Present
knowledge is "tacit."Ail these things are working in her mind as her
hands are working the clay. The product that emerges on the wheel
is likely to be in the tradition of her past work, but she may break
away and embark on a new direction. Even so, the past is no less
present, projecting itself into the future".
72
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Time. New York: Free Press.
Zimbardo, Philip G. 1994. Whose time il is, I think I know — Research on time
perspectives, Presentation at the annual convention of the American Psycho logical
Association, Los Angeles.
Zimbardo, Philip G. and Boyd, John N. 1999. Putting time in perspective: a valid, reliable
individual-differences metric. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 776:
1271-1288.
Zimbardo, Philip G. and Boyd, John N. 2003. Time orientation, In Rocio FernandezBallesteros (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Psychological Assessment, voL 2: 1031-1035.
Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications.
V. ARTICLE 2
« If you can't entrain with yourself,
it is impossible to entrain with others,
and if you can't entrain,
you can't relate »
Edward T. Hall (1983: 183)
80
Inter-organizational time: The Quebec biotechnology example
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the notion of inter-organizational time, a dominant temporal
institution at the organizational field level, and an environmental dimension absent from the
extant literature. I argue that concepts such as temporal institutions and entrainment can
help explain persistent dynamics in an organizational field that pace innovative activities. I
use Quebec's biopharmaceutical field to illustrate a shift in inter-organizational time since
the technology bubble burst. I suggest that including inter-organizational time in future
analyses of organizational fields may improve understanding of the strategic context of
innovation.
Keywords: Biotechnology, entrainment, innovation, strategy, time
81
INTRODUCTION
Time moves differently in diffèrent industries. Even within the same industry, it
moves al different rates within different circles. (Slywotzky and Morrisson,
1999:358)
This paper introduces the notion of inter-organizational time, a term that I have coined to
name a temporal institution that cornes to dominate a whole organizational field. In this
paper, I attempt to uncover the intricate workings of time within an organizational field and
temporally characterize the strategic context of innovation.
Time-based competition (Stalk, 1988) and time pacing (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998;
Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998) are two main approaches to tirne in strategy, and they both
can be said to raise the question of inter-organizational time. On the one hand, time-based
competition has been understood primarily as a firm-level time-compression strategy
focused on speeding up work processes that lead to product introduction. The focus on
speed alone, however, has revealed a "dark side of time" in which a firm-level temporal
strategy may result in the entanglement of other firms in a rhythm flot of their choosing.
Hence, firms are in a "strategic treadtnill [...] condemned to mn faster and faster but
always staying in the same place competitively" (Stalk and Webber, 1993: 94). The
proposition that synchronizing with customers while desynchronizing from competitors is
the key to reaping ail the benefits of time-based competition (Stalk and Webber, 1993)
again evokes the idea of an inter-organizational time that firms conform to or distinguish
thernselves from.
On the other hand, there are two reasons that time pacing, defmed as a situation in which
firm-level "change is triggered by passage of time" (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998:13),
rather than by the occurrence of events such as moves by the competition or new customer
demands, also raises the question of an inter-organizational time. First, the very choice of a
rhythm rests on adequate synchronization with the marketplace: not so fast that it creates
execution difficulties and propels the company ahead of the market, and flot so slow that
firms become laggards in their field (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). Hence, firms need to be
aware of extemal rhythms, a notion that I liken to inter-organizational time. Second, the nec
plus ultra of tùne pacing resides in dominating the organizational field with a chosen
82
rhythm that diffuses beyond the boundaries of the firm. Thus, "creating and even
dictating the pace of change that others are forced to follow", as Intel did with Moore's
Law in the microprocessor industry, is a powerful strategy that is "fundamental and yet
often overlooked" (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998: 24,163).
Both approaches suggest that managers involved in product development and introduction
should develop awareness about time as it is manifested beyond the boundaries of their
firm. Indeed, Miller and Floricel (2004) hint that time should be taken into account in the
"inter-organizational patterns of value creation" that they call "games of innovation", as
their data suggest that the pace of scientific knowledge development and market dynamism
may vary across slow and fast games. However, the extant literature does flot offer a
sophisticated view of time as an element of the environment, precluding it from being
incorporated into an analysis of the strategic context of innovation.
I suggest that Demil et al. (2001:84)'s institutionalization approach to explaining the effect
of Moore's Law on the innovation rhythm within the microprocessor industry may
contribute to a better understanding of how time works at the inter-organizational level. An
institution is defined as a "social coordinating mechanism anchored in history that
constrains actors in their perception of reality and the meaning of their actions." I5
Institutions also tend to homogenize the behaviour of firms, providing stability and
predictability within an organizational field just as the "metronome" of time pacing creates
"a predictable rhythm for change in a company" (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998:60).
Demil et al. (2001) argue that even though Moore's Law can be traced back to a 1965
empirical observation by Gordon Moore, one of Intel's founders, over the following quarter
of a century it became a "temporal institution" that entrained flot only customers and
complementors to the same rhythm of innovation but also competitors through licensing
agreements. They show that once a temporal institution has been created, it no longer is
under the sole control of the initiating firm. The authors illustrate tins case through the
account of AMD's success in launching its own microprocessor, Athlon, before Intel's
Pentium III 700MHz.
15
My translation.
83
The dark side of time-based competition, the notion that time-pacing domination may
become a double-edged sword whereby competitors take control of the imposed rhythm
and the variability of time across games of innovation, suggests that inter-organizational
time should be further examined from the standpoint of institutionalization. In this paper, I
accept the idea of temporal institutions as argued by Demil et al. (2001) and call upon the
notion of entrainment, a mechanism that scholars studying tirne and organizations have
suggested may explain the domination of a rhythm at the inter-organizational level (Ancona
and Chong, 1996; McGrath and Kelly, 1986).
To illustrate the concept of inter-organizational time, I have chosen Quebec's human-health
biotechnology field, which encompasses research and product development activities for
both therapeutic (including pharmaceutical) and diagnostic products. It is flot unusual for
Quebec firms to conduct research on a platform that promises to spawn products in both
areas. However, for my discussion here, I will focus on the drug discovery and
development process and will refer to these firms as biopharmaceutical companies.
Although the long development process associated with converting irmovative academic
research into successful biopharmaceutical products does flot qualify human health
biotechnology as a high-velocity industry, other characteristics put time at the core of this
field's concerns. First, biopharmaceutical companies can be viewed as participating in a
race to the patent and regulatory offices (Miller and Floricel, 2004), with rewards
amounting to billions of dollars in the form of annual sales generated under patent
protection, making time a central issue. Second, the emerging state of the organizational
field provides a context with its share of uncertainty about the institutionalization of time,
facilitating its study. Finally, the technology bubble burst that affected biotechnology after
it hit telecommunications, as of autumn 2001, provides a delimitation of two periods,
facilitating the comparison of inter-organizational time over time.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Below, I will discuss the entrainment concept, in particular McGrath and Kelly' s (1986)
social entrainment mode! (SEM), which is a multi-level temporal interaction mode! based
84
on the synchronization of multiple rhythms and leading to a dominant temporal
institution that, at the organizational field level, I liken to my object of inquiry, interorganizational time. Because of the dynamic equilibrium assumptions of SEM, I expect this
conceptual framework to respond to concems about the process leading to the generation,
maintenance, and renewal of a dominant temporal institution.
But first, I will show that temporal institutions, defined as stable forms of time that act as
social coordinating mechanisms, can be seen both as embedded in work processes and
exhibiting rule-like qualities that constrain action and as being actively created by actors in
an effort to diminish uncertainty. Hence, because rhythm proceeds from temporal
institutions, this notion may shed light on which rhythms corne to dominate.
Temporal institutions
Researchers in organization studies report on a plurality of institutionalized forms of time
under several designations: temporal reference frameworks (Zerubavel, 1979), norms of
time in organizations (Schriber and Gutek, 1987), chronological codes (Clark, 1990),
temporal rites (Pluchart, 2000), temporal institutions (Demil et al., 2001), timing norms
(Lawrence, 2001), and temporal structures (Orlikowski and Yates, 2002). They consist of
events, norms, cognitive forms, or patterns of activity that constrain action and its
interpretation. Actors are predominantly seen as enacting temporal institutions as if they
were extemal rules for action and coordination within groups and organizations. However,
the view that actors, motivated by concems of foreseeing events and controlling
uncertainty, actively participate in the creation of temporal institutions is discussed
specifically only by Clark (1990) and Demil et al. (2001).
An institutionalization approach reconciles the view that actors both create and enact
temporal institutions. Indeed, the product of human activity may appear objective as it goes
through the different moments of institutionalization: extemalization, objectivation, and
internalization (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). However, theory falls short of explaining
how actors strategically use temporal institutions.
85
Temporal institutions in management have been studied primarily within groups and
organizations, and I am aware of only one study of temporal institutions at the interorganizational level, that of Demil et al. (2001). These authors trace the process of
institutionalization of Moore's Law over a 20-year period, with its extemalization taking
place during the 1970s, its objectivation during the 1980s, and its intemalization by ail
actors as of the 1990s. The alleged mechanisms of institutionalization are presented as
resting on the constraining power of the Wintel association l6 and its dominant market
position with respect to other members of the organizational field.
Entrainment and the domination of a temporal order
Entrainment is a non-linear interaction concept rooted in the observations of Christiaan
Huygens, a seventeenth-century Dutch physicist and inventor of the pendulum dock. Since
the 1960s, entrainment has been applied in biology, in particular to explain gregarious
animal behaviours such as crickets chirping in unison and fireflies flashing in synchrony
(Strogatz and Stewart, 1993). The entrainment concept has also been pursued within
macroeconomics (Sterman and Mosekilde, 1993) and within human interaction and
communication (Chapple, 1970; Dabbs, 1983; Jaffe and Feldstein, 1970; Kelly, 1984; Kelly
and McGrath, 1983, 1985; McGrath et al., 1984; Warner, 1979, 1986).
Based on his study of time in a hospital, Zerubavel (1979) alluded to the possibility that
interacting temporal institutions within an organization might lead to a "dominant temporal
order" (DTO), or shared concept of time within an entire organization. Ancona and Chong
(1996) pursued the idea of DTO and proposed the concept of entrainment as a possible
mechanism through which a DTO may emerge throughout an organization or even an
organizational field, which corresponds to my object of interest, inter-organizational time.
Unfortunately, their approach is unable to accommodate a change in DTO over time, and
their explanation of the genesis of a DTO does not expand beyond suggesting the
involvement of either "rational economic action" or "repetitive momentum". Consequently,
the synchronization mechanisms and the strategic use of temporal institutions can only be
hinted at and not explained.
16
Microsoft's Windows operating system and Intel's microprocessors.
86
McGrath and Kelly's (1986) SEM provides a more refmed explanation of entrainment in
social settings, although the exact mechanisms of entrainment remain to be elucidated.
SEM puts actors back into the process leading to a DTO. First, it posits that interacting
members of a social group must work out a "negotiated temporal order" for
synchronization or entrainment to occur. Second, the renewal of the dynamic equilibrium
state is said to occur through negotiation and renegotiation of the bases of interaction.
Although SEM explains synchronization behaviours within groups and organizations and is
said to be applicable to "behavior systems at various levels" (McGrath and Kelly, 1986:91),
to my knowledge, it has flot been used beyond the bounds of an organization to show
interactions that lead to an inter-organizational time.
I present here McGrath and Kelly's (1986) definition of the four components of the SEM
and my own transposition of these concepts to the inter-organizational level (see Figure 2):
Figure 2. Application of McGrath and Kelly's (1986) social entrainment model to the
oreanizational field
WORKBASIS OFINTERPROCESSES INTERACTION ORGANIZATIONAL
TIME
e-Multiple
eedogenous
temporal/
rhylhmic
processes
Mutuel
entrainment
RHYTHM
MESH
Of
synChr0ntsation
External pacer avents
or
entralning cycles
PACE
Temporal
patterns
of
behayiour
TEMPO
87
1. Rhythm,
or endogenous temporal/rhythmic processes. This corresponds to
Zerubavel's (1979) temporal reference frameworks that emerge from the work
processes of various actors such as, in the case of the biopharmaceutical field, venture
capitalists, researchers, valorization officers, and patent agents.
2. Mesh, or mutual entrainment or synchronization, also referred to as a "negotiated
temporal order" worked out during a period of social interaction. I associate mesh with
the bases of interaction between work processes that lead to synchrony or a'synchrony
(entrainment or non-entrainment).
3. Tempo, or temporal patterns of behaviour resulting from the synchronization of
endogenous rhythmic processes ("rhythm"). This is the inter-organizational time that
emerges from the interaction of multiple temporal reference frameworks.
4. Pace, or externat pacer events or entraining cycles are those events, externat to the
processes identified under "rhythm", that elicit or disrupt the current temporal patterns.
I associate them with events from the larger context.
Before presenting my methods, I return to my concerns about understanding the workings
of time within an organizational field and propose the following research questions in light
of the SEM:
1. Which recurrent work processes in biopharmaceuticals can be said to synchronize
temporally, and what rhythm do they exhibit?
2. What are the bases of synchronization and their evolution over tirne?
3. How does a rhythm corne to dominate the biopharmaceuticals organizational field?
METHODS
This exploratory study of time provided me with two methodological challenges: first, the
choice of unit and levet of analysis; second, exposing time in an operational way. I built on
recommendations formulated by Lawrence (2001) and Ancona and Chong (1996) for the
study of institutionalized forms of time and entrainment relations. First, according to
Lawrence (2001:649), "Timing norms do not occur at the individual, group, and
organizational levels of analysis although they might be experienced this way". Hence, this
author recommends the adoption of an "event timeline levet of analysis". Because
88
entrainment relations are expected to cross several traditional levels of analysis, Ancona
and Chong (1996) suggest using a unit of analysis that demonstrates a recurrent or cyclic
character. Hence, I postulated that work processes closely linked to actors' practice would
show a recurrent quality and cross traditional levels of analysis, thus revealing entrainment
relations.
I began the research by collecting documentary data on the dynamics of biopharmaceuticals
(both locally and abroad) from books, newspapers, case studies, and Web sites of firms and
other organizations involved in biotechnology. These secondary data enabled me to identify
recurring work processes in biotechnology before my field study. I also used it to
triangulate data from interviews. I list the most important sources in Appendix 1.
I then conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with venture capitalists, members of
incubators, valorization officers, external patent agents, and members of firms in
management and research positions. I adapted the MINE project's interview guide designed
for collecting data on the management of innovation. This guide was developed for semistructured interviews with firm members and stakeholders and discusses actual practices in
the domain of innovation management with a focus on value creation and capture. I added a
series of questions explicitly related to temporal assumptions.
My second challenge of exposing time operationally was met by remaining alert to
responses discussing three basic elements of time — duration, sequence of events, and
relative temporal location — and revealing implicit aspects of time through coding and data
interpretation. For example, a general question such as "Please describe the business you
are in. What are your main products, services? What is your firm's position in the value
chain?" elicited comments about the fact that "drugs move along the pipeline", an image
that conveys regularity and stages, two aspects that fit with my concern for event sequence.
This approach did flot preclude my interviewees fi-om contributing additional aspects of
time. For example, when asked about inherent risks, challenges, and difficulties in projects,
one laboratory manager discussed time as a limited resource and shared his timemanagement practices, including the arbitration between quality and duration. Another
89
interviewee, an academic researcher, used expressions such as "temporal window" and
"fmancing window" when asked about value creation and a particular fmancing context.
I used a grounded theory approach for coding and interpreting the data in order to derive
insights into the mechanisms leading to the domination of a temporal institution (Creswell,
1998). Interviews were coded with Atlas.ti on the basis of temporal words for duration and
sequence. Temporal codes were linked to work processes in order to trace meanings given
by different types of actor. Synchrony and asynchrony were emerging codes that led me to
explore further the theory of entrainment. Texts were again coded with these emerging
codes as an attempt to reveal relative location of events and potential relations of
synchronization or entrainment. Table XIV shows examples of the main thrusts of the
coding step. Coded excerpts appear in Appendix 2.
Table XIV. Coding of semi-structured interviews
Duration of events
Sequence of events
•
•
•
•
•
•
Relative location of events
•
•
Measurement and reference system
Time horizon
Delays
Linear, circular, single or multiple
trajectories, toward or from, etc.
Position of events in a sequence
Gaps, continuity vs. discontinuity, window,
etc.
Synchrony
Asynchrony
Meaning emerged as texts were coded and compared. I used the software's functionalities
to write impressions about paragraphs and entire texts as I was coding. Questions that
emerged during writing fed into more comparisons and coding. Eventually, I reached a
more complete understanding of work processes and their interaction through further
writing, which served as the basis for this article.
90
FINDINGS
As indicated above, the study focused on a very young organizational field in Quebec,
biopharmaceuticals, which is part of the Quebec human health biotechnology industry. My
secondary data show that most of the 109 human-health biotech companies existing in 1999
were established during the 1990s, and over 40 percent are thought to have been university
spin-offs (Byrd, 2002). The very first one, BioChem Pharma, was created in 1986 and
delivered 3TC, an anti-HIV/AIDS drug, to the market a decade later.
Venture capital is also a recent institution in Quebec, as the first funds were set up in the
wake of the financial success generated by BioChem Pharma, and only in recent years have
private funds appeared alongside government and labour-supported funds. Between 1984
and 2002, the number of venture capital firms in Quebec grew from 8 to 74, with funds
invested in ah l sectors growing from CA$23 million to CA$11.2 billion over the same
period. As of 2002, 50 percent of all venture-capital investments in Canada were made in
Quebec (Rapport Secor, 2003). In 2000 alone, CA$1.2 billion of venture capital was
invested in the Canadian biotechnology sector, out of which CA$352 million was invested
in Quebec (Institut pour le progrès socio-économique, 2002).
In 2001, the Quebec government published its policy on science and innovation 17 on the
basis of which four valorization offices, 18 each formed of a critical mass of academic,
medical, and research institutions, were created between April 2000 and December 2001
and awarded a total of CA$50 million by the government. These bodies hold a right of first
refusal to pursue the development of research results. Immature but commercially valid
technology can be supported either by the valorization offices or through incubators (hinoCentre, QBIC, and CEIM) that provide support through expert advice and sometimes
access to equipment and facilities.
Quebec's performance in the valorization of research, measured as the percentage of
revenues against R&D expenditures and as declarations of inventions per CA$2 million
17 Ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie (2001), Politique québécoise de la science et
de l'innovation. Savoir changer le monde.
18 In Quebec, valorization of research is taken as a set of activities that generate economic value of research
results and encompass their commercialization and wide dissemination. It is conducted by independent bodies
that are akin to technology transfer offices elsewhere in Canada and the USA.
91
invested, was assessed as lagging behind performance in the United States for the former
and behind Canada for the latter. As one venture capitalist who I interviewed pointed out,
"Everybody is learning their trade" and very few individuals, be they in venture capital,
biotech management, research, or valorization, can boast of having commercialized a
pharmaceutical product.
Examination of data collected from books, newspapers, case studies, and Web sites of firms
and other organizations in the field, as well as subsequent interviews, led to the
identification of five key work processes contributing to innovation in human-health
biotechnology: drug discovery and development, researchers' careers, intellectual property
protection, valorization of research, and financing. As hypothesized earlier, events
constituting these work processes can be seen as having a recurrent quality and as spanning
multiple levels of analysis from the individual to the organization to the organizational field
and for drug discovery and development process, the scientific arena.
The drug discovery and development process (DDD) refers to the work of researchers in
universities and firms whose careers (C) are also of interest in this study. Research results
deemed worthy of valorization (VR) are handled by a dedicated team of valorization
officers who also get involved in intellectual property protection (IPP). This last process is
also conducted within firms by either external or in-bouse patent agents. Finally, venture
capitalists get involved in the fmancing of university spin-offs (F) in collaboration with
valorization officers during the actual spin-off phase and later on with the firms' managers.
There are typically multiple financial partners within a single round of financing.
The interviews allowed me to characterize the five interacting processes in terms of their
endogenous rhythms. Below, I shall describe how actors perceive aspects of duration and
sequence in what are reported as stable work processes (sec also Table XV).
Even though drug discovery and development is described in terms of a sequence of events
from which a pharmaceutical product emerges, respondents actually discuss two rhythms:
the discovery rhythm can be seen as iterative, pregnant with promise, and conducted
through multiple trajectories. Although research steps are known, their dock duration
92
cannot be predicted with accuracy. In contrast, product development evokes an orderly
sequence of known events whose dock duration is experience-derived and exhibits a
closed-ended rhythm toward a goal.
Table XV. Rhythm of work processes
Interacting
work
processes
DDD
C
IPP
VR
F
Duration
Discovery:
Predictable event milestones
Unpredictable dock milestones
(delays as normal occurrence)
Product develop ment:
Predictable event and clock milestones
Careers within companies:
Full-time, part-time, temporary or
periodical
Academic career:
Academic sessions, conference
seasons
Research projects:
Less duration allowed to company
scientists to get results than for
academic ones
Publications:
More duration allowed to company
scientists in between publications than
for academic ones
Long term horizon
Delays as modus operandi
Short to medium term horizon
Delays as maturation
Predominant use of dock milestones
Ancillary use of event milestones
Predictable exit horizon
Delays as failure
Sequence
Discovery:
Iterative; open-ended; multiple
trajectories
Product development:
Linear sequence of events; closedended
Careers within companies:
New career, transition
Academie career:
Cyclical recurrence; windows of
opportunity for grant submissions;
cycles for tenure approval
Research projects:
Open-endedness in academia and
upstream research oriented
companies; Recurrence in other
companies
Windows of opportunity
Iterative dialogue
Transition
Linear sequence of events
Relay race
Stages
Cyclicafity of rounds of financing
Respondents also mentioned that research careers have two rhythms. Academic careers are
punctuated by the recurrent and seasonal rhythm of academic life, the open-endedness of
research, and the importance of timely publications for promotion and advancement, while
industrial careers espouse the linear and closed-endedness of product development and
pressure to achieve results within a shorter time frame.
93
Research yielding inventions worthy of protection introduces both valorization offices and
firms to the rhythm of intellectual property protection either through interactions with
external patent agents or, less frequently, with their own patent agent. Duration of
intellectual property protection is measured in years: patent protection lasts 20 years and
obtaining a patent requires years of work. Arguing a patent with the authorities follows the
rhythm of windows of opportunity during which the argumentation is prepared and delays
during which the Patent Office prepares its response. An "iterative dialogue" of windows
and delays takes place over a number of years.
Valorization is an activity that stands at the frontier of research and commercialization, two
processes that have antagonistic sequence mies. The former lives by the "publish or perish"
rule, while the latter requires that the "protect before publish" rule be honoured because
public disclosure prior to filing a patent request may severely limit the possibility of
obtaining a worldwide patent on a pharmaceutical product, which is often a sine qua non
requirement for recruiting fmancial partners. Hence, sequence is the predominant concern
in the rhythm of valorization. The transitional nature of valorization is compounded by the
fmancial burden created by an application for an international patent, a burden that must
eventually be passed along to a commercial partner. Valorization of an invention is meant
to span what valorization practitioners evaluate as a short- to medium-term period with or
without a preliminary phase of maturation, a step that can be viewed as a productive delay.
Start-ups and young fin-ms count on venture capital. Venture capitalists' discourse on
financing in human-health biotechnology reflects a rhythm resembling that of a relay race
in which notions of duration and sequence intertwine. They view themselves as members of
a sequential relay team in which upstream players include government funding agencies
supporting university research, academic researchers, and valorization offices, while
pharmaceutical or larger biotechnology firms and the stock market take on the role of
downstream players or "exit opportunities". Duration is crucial to financial returns and is
evaluated through the "exit horizon" — or investment window — dock and event milestones
used to assess value creation and delays, defined as a duration extending beyond dock
94
milestones, whose occurrence signais difficulties that can threaten return either because
value is flot created or the investment window needs to be extended.
My interviewees described endogenous rhythms as stable. However, in their discussion of
innovative activities, the respondents spontaneously referred to a "now" situation and a
"before" situation separated by the temporal frontier of the technology bubble burst. I have
sorted these activities into three sets that I have labelled financing preferences, new venture
creations, and managerial models (see Table XVI). I suggest that they reveal a shifting
biotechnology inter-organizational time over the said periods.
Shifting inter-organizational time
Inter-organizational time shifted from a focus on very early and open-ended research
projects, durations evaluated mainly with event milestones, long-term horizons, an
emphasis on novelty in projects and commercial vehicles to a focus on more mature closedended projects, dock milestones, short time-to-market horizons, and a continuity of current
firms and projects.
I identified the main changes in inter-organizational time as:
1. The overall discourse of actors in biopharmaceuticals (finance, valorization and
management) shows closed-ended rather than open-ended sequences, such as in the
creation of value with a product in mind rather than heralding the potentialities of
research.
2. Increased difficulty in finding investors for projects with durations evaluated mainly
with event rnilestones and exhibiting an open-ended sequence, such as discovery
projects or technological platforms.
3. Financed projects respond predominantly to a closed-ended sequence, such as those
designed with a commercial product in mind, a shorter time-to-market duration that can
be managed with dock milestones such as projects in downstream phases of
development.
95
Table XVI. Shifting inter-organizational time
Bubble era
Fmmicing
preferences
Post-bubble era
Sequence
Sequence
• Llpstream stages of financing and
product development
• Downstrearn stages of financing and
product developrnent
• Open-ended sequence of research
• Closed-endad sequence of
commercial products
Duration
• Investment in research evaluated
with only event milestones
Duration
• Investment in projects evaluated with
both dock and event milestanes
• Returns expected over sharter time
horizon
• Shift ta faster amas: delivery
systems, medical devices„
New venture
creations
Sequence
Sequence
• Open-ended sequence of research
• Closed-ended sequenœ of a
commercial product
• Llpstream stages of prorluct
development (platforms)
• Emphasis on nove! (spin-off) over
continued sequence (licensing)
• Upstream signais ta create fimi
(patent request)
Duration
• Maturation of research within a firm
• Downstream stages of product
develapment (close-to-market
product)
• More erapha.sis on continued
sequence (licensing. supponing
current finis M&A) over nove!
sequence (spin-off)
• Downstream signais to crante firm
(commercial product)
Duration
• Returns expected over sho
horizon
• Use of both dock and event
milestones
Managerial
model
Sequence
Sequence
• C,ontinued sequence of researcher's
career into business
• Discontinuous sequence of
academic's career path
• Synchronisation of competences
with firms' lifecycle
96
4. Projects that do fmd new or renewed fmancing exhibit a downstream move in
sequences such as fmancing stages, maturity of projects, and firm lifecycles, and
preferably exhibit shorter durations.
5. Continuity takes precedence over novelty, as is evident in the preference for supporting
current firms, licensing to established firms, and mergers and acquisitions over creation
of spin-offs.
6. The managerial model is synchronized with investors' sequential and temporally
located view of competences.
Sources of change: Pacer events
From the second half of the 1990s up to 2001, or what my respondents refer to as the
bubble era, four pacer events were entraining the five work processes examined in my
study: the success of BioChem Pharma, the first Quebec biotechnology firm; the genomic
revolution and the attendant expectations; restrictions on research grants; and generous
money markets.
BioChem Pharma's success played an important role, both fmancial and symbolic: venture
capitalists who made money with BioChem Pharma had funds to allocate to new
biotechnology ventures, while the firm's commercial success served as proof in the minds
of investors and managers alike that creating a profitable biopharmaceutical firm and sector
in Quebec was within reach. Indeed, one of the most experienced venture capitalists
interviewed recalled, "Because the Fonds de Solidarité [a labour-supported investment
fund] made money with BioChem Pharma, they said, `We are going to give [venture
capital] a go.' It started in 1990 [...] and the rest is history." Another venture capitalist,
who also worked as a scientist in a biotechnology firm, said that investors were attracted to
the idea that with BioChem Pharma, "it was possible to make a hit with academic research
[...] they figured they could invest in small companies". Indeed, this pattern of investment
became a mode! "because investors were confident and wanted to invest ... and they saw a
potential. They were seeing little BioChem Pharmas in ah l those firms."
97
Other interviewees referred to BioChem Pharma as a firm against which to benchmark
success. For example, a venture capitalist discussing risks and fmancing rounds said, "But
if you win, you can make another BioChem, create firms of that calibre", and a scientistfounder commenting on where success lies in drug discovery and development remarked,
"Well, for example, if you take a look at successes: BioChem Pharma, why did they have
so much success? They had a molecule, a molecule. That's ail that's ail it takes."
My second pacer event, the genomic revolution of the 1990s, sparked high hopes for novel
biopharmaceutical applications. Both managers and venture capitalists talked about the
excitement brought about by the promises of genomics at the time: "There was a lot of hype
in those days and it was a real revolution", one manager said. One venture capitalist noted,
"A lot of companies were set up to cut down on development time. Time and costs. And
pharmacogenomics and proteomics were supposed to answer that." Another venture
capitalist confirmed that "each drug discovery platform was designed to produce more
clinical candidates, more interesting candidates."
Thus, it was thought that the sequencing of the genome would improve the understanding
of the disease process and generate new drug targets. "In 1999-2000, a lot of investors
thought that with the genome, suddenly, we would have plenty of new drugs." But as one
manager put it, "Well, in science, there are a lot of fads. [...] But if scientific gurus say that
it's the best thing, it will bring on a revolution pharmaceutical companies and biotechs
are afraid of being left behind. And if they see Glaxo, SmithKline, or Merck adopt the
technology, they need to be on board too. It's emulation, like a snowball effect, everybody
gets on the bandwagon." In the process, pharmaceutical firms became an exit (in addition to
IP0s) for venture-capital-backed genomic firms.
My third pacer event appeared in the early 1990s, when academic researchers saw their
research grants cut as part of the effort to tackle the federal government's deficit. An
incubator manager drew a cause-effect link: "When universities don't have any money,
that's when professors want to become entrepreneurs." One venture capitalist recalled that
researchers took notice of the creation and development of BioChem Pharma centred
around research on AIDS and figured that they too could start companies, and "then
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fmanciers joined in because they expected important profits". Researchers, starved for
money, and venture capitalists, envisaging healthy retums, found one another. "That's
when researchers and financiers started talking to one another." They created and headed
spin-offs that academic researchers used to pursue their research.
Again, as the 1990s progressed, venture-capitalist firms in Quebec grew in size and
number; pension funds' investments in venture capital peaked at the end of the decade,
making money a very available resource, the fourth and last pacer event of that first period.
A manager conveyed the frenzy: "They ail wanted to give you a cheque, bump the other
guy so you'd take their cheque." And the obligation to invest in health sciences drove
prices up: "It's the same as the Internet. Companies were listed on the stock exchange,
values increased, and then more people got interested", said another manager.
However, as of late 2001, biotech firms were confronted with money market contraction,
deflated valuations, and closed IPO windows — testimonies to the end of the technology
bubble. This major pacer event signalled a change in temporal patterns of behaviour, hence
a shift in inter-organizational time, and the start of my second period.
The stock market's umnet expectations for quickly bringing a product to market in the
information technology sector is said to have tainted expectations for the biotech sector.
Even though the product development cycle is much longer, "biotech was affected because
people associate [one] high technology with [another] high technology" and the inability of
biopharmaceutical firms to offer short-term performance contributed to venture capitalists'
sentiment that their behaviour had to change: "We had to close companies and take our
losses."
My respondents also conveyed the idea that both fmanciers and pharmaceutical companies
adopted a more "realistic outlook [on genomics] ... Yes, we have sequenced the genome
and maybe we hold 1% of the knowledge on the human body. We still have 200 years of
work, 100 years of work. That's reality", said one venture capitalist. Pharmaceutical and
larger and more mature biotech companies (usually foreign) are said to have devised coping
mechanisms in the face of scientific fads or revolutions that led to more cautious
99
collaborations with smaller biotechs and tempered acquisitions on their part, previously
an easily available exit for venture capitalists. One manager stated, "All things considered,
we notice today, ten years aller, that the vast majority of genomic platforms have flot
delivered and that pharmaceutical companies that have invested billions of dollars in deals
have flot reaped the benefits they had expected." Another manager confirmed that
pharmaceutical companies have become "much better at seeing through the hype", which
has led them to "actually want to see concrete results and data". In addition, because
genomics spawned so many targets, he said, challenges in drug discovery and development
have since moved downstream from where so many biotech firms were still doing research.
As predicted by the dynamic equilibrium assumption in the SEM, when externat pacer
events change white rhythmic processes remain stable, either or both the interorganizational time and the bases of interaction will shift. Having described the changes in
inter-organizational time and externat pacer events, I now turn to the bases of interaction
whose renewal, I suggest, can be seen as the mechanism mediating the impact of externat
pacer events on inter-organizational tùne.
Bases of interaction
My interviews show that although the shift in the inter-organizational time was felt starting
in autumn 2001, it was when attempting to raise a new round of fmancing or create a new
university spin-off that managers of biotech firms and valorization officers experienced, at
first hand, changes in the new bases of interaction, which for some of these actors meant as
late as 2004. "It's like hitting a wall", confirmed a firm manager.
My data suggest that work processes were synchronized mainly on the basis of the
endogenous rhythm of academic research during the first period and on the endogenous
rhythm of fmancing during the second period.
As Table XVII shows, during the bubble era, work processes synchronized on the basis of a
long-term duration evaluated principally on the basis of event milestones. Financing,
valorization, and drug discovery and development met at upstream stages and synchronized
on an open-ended future. Researchers found themselves in the same academic rhythm,
100
simply pursuing their research within the bounds of a spin-off and apparently flot
distracted by intellectual property protection or commercial pressures.
Table XVII. Bases for interaction between work processes
Interaction bases for synchrony
Remaining asynchronies
Interacting
Bubble period
Post-bubble period
Post-bubble period
veork
processes
Financing
versus DDD
Duration
Event milestones
Duration
Fundamental research:
long Lime horizon
Sequence
Fundamental research:
upstream and
open-ended
Financing,
IPP & VR
versus Career
Sequence
Recurrence of academic
research within spin-offs
Financing
versus VR
Durat ion
Fundamental research:
long rime horizon
Sequence
Fundamental research:
upstream
Sequence
Protecting before
publishing
Durat ion
Clock milestones
Temporal window
Sequence
Research: downstream
and closed-ended
Duration
Event milestones
Duration
Fundamental research:
long lime horizon
Sequence
Fundamental research:
upstream and
open-ended
Duration
Delays in learnhig
business
Sequenc.e
Recurrent versus Linear
Publishing as first reflex
Sequence
Protecting before
publishing
Durat ion
Fundamental research:
long time horizon
Sequence
Fundamental research:
upstream
The bubble era offered such a rosy view of the future that financiers were distracted from
the temporal rhythm of their own fmancing process and became entrained to the
endogenous rhythm of academie research. However, the open-endedness of research can
become financiers' fatal attraction, as happened in Quebec, where fmanciers' urge to set up
101
an industry increased the entraining power of research. The deflat ion of valuations, the
closing of exits and the contraction of money markets made more apparent that work
processes had so far been entrained to academic research's rhythm. Venture capitalists
realized that they were not marching to their own drummer. Their firms pursued academic
research, and very few could promise products within the foreseeable future.
Although money has become scarcer, the pressure to generate a return, or at least to cut
losses, bas driven a renegotiation of the interaction. Since the bubble burst, innovative
activity bas become increasingly synchronized with investors' need to obtain a return
within a "reasonable temporal window". Although "protecting before publishing" remained
a non-negotiable rule over both periods, a patent request is no longer sufficient to entice
fmanciers to invest in a new venture. Additional preferences cover several characteristics of
projects: their duration measurable with dock milestones, their closed-endedness, and their
position within development phases. Other fmanciers' characteristics also corne into play,
including preferences over stages of fmancing (seed, start-up, growth, mezzanine), in
interaction with the lifecycle make-up of their portfolio of firms.
This change in the bases of interaction lias brought to the forefront frictions over temporal
preferences that actors need to negotiate. For example, as shown in Table XVII, fmancing,
drug discovery and development, and valorization no longer synchronize well because of
the very long time horizon of fundamental research or new upstream projects, conducted
within universities or firms, which is less compatible with a healthy return, while their
duration can hardly be matched with dock milestones. "The market no longer tolerates the
fmancing of platforms", confirmed a venture capitalist. Venture capitalists also view this
kind of research as flot mature enough for commercialization, meaning located too far
upstream in the development process, thus not subject to dock tnilestones, too risky, and
requiring too long a duration before a commercial product is foreseeable. In short, this kind
of research is evaluated as outside the venture capitalists' leg of the relay race.
The temporal contrasts between an academic and an industrial career have become more
salient and reside in, on the one hand, the recurrent rhythm of academic life, the openendedness of research, and the importance of timely publications for promotion and
102
advancement, and, on the other hand, the linear and closed-endedness of product
development and the pressure to achieve results within a shorter time-frame. In addition,
the long duration taken by founders-scientists to learn the management trade no longer fits
within the "reasonable temporal window" of financiers. As one venture capitalist stressed,
"Our business is so competitive, it takes so much time to develop, it costs so much we
can't afford to have someone who will leam on the job. We need someone who is proactive
and who knows who can see things coming."
To sum up, the Quebec biopharmaceutical field amply illustrates that recurrent work
processes synchronize into an inter-organizational time. By studying this organizational
field over two periods of time, I have revealed a synchronization that exhibits "stabilized
for now" qualities (Schryer, 1993) consistent with a dynamic equilibrium. Pacer events
have been shown to be powerful triggers for a shift in the inter-organizational time. I have
also shown that temporal frictions result from a change in the bases of interaction, and these
frictions, in tum, elicit a renegotiation of interactions. I now describe some of the temporal
strategies that the field's actors devise in light of a renewed inter-organizational time.
Dynamic temporal strategies
Venture capitalists represent unavoidable stakeholders both in the commercialization of
academic research, because they provide access to the most cash, and in investment in
individual biotech firms, because they usually own a majority position, and therefore
changes in the temporal requirements for interacting with them are bound to elicit a
response. Achieving synchrony represents ways of bridging temporal discrepancies. It is
the desire to create or sustain a firm that motivates this action.
The maturation funds that valorization officers have recently been granting for declared
inventions by academic researchers can be seen as a strategy to overcome the sequential
asynchrony experienced with financiers in the attempt to commercialize upstream
fundamental research. Maturation is expected to improve synchrony with fmancing
partners' expectations of a short time-to-market duration. As well, valorization officers
have been creating fewer new ventures and more agreements with existing licensing
partners.
103
Academics' adoption of the "protecting before publishing" sequential rule cornes into
conflict with their "first reflex" of publishing. Moreover, protecting and commercializing
an invention tend to detract an academic from the rhythm of his own career, as "having a
patent doesn't impact his work, flot at ail. Can't put that in his résumé ... it's flot
recognized as a scientific paper". My data suggest that adaptation to the mie has been
coming gradually over both periods studied with the help of valorization officers who have
had to grapple with seasonal emergencies in patent requests. As one interviewee puts it,
"Instead of calling us up and saying, 'Vve got something coming up in about four
months... ' No! He waits. And, out of the blue, he thinks we can make miracles!"
Changes in the bases for interaction with venture capitalists appear to have reinforced the
importance of the rhythm of intellectual property protection. Both valorization offices
studied for this article put strategies in place to overcome the asynchrony between the
rhythm of academics' careers and that of intellectual property protection and instil a more
entrepreneurial culture. One office has been attempting to entrain its researchers to the
sequential iule of "protecting before publishing" through education campaigns and in situ
cooperation led by a special liaison team. The other counts on entraining researchers to the
rhythm of industrial research contracts, a type of research that requires the protection of
intellectual property and is more closely focused on product development.
I have also been made aware of the strategy of one institutional venture capitalist involved
solely with projects that are clearly positioned upstream from what is currently favoured by
most venture capitafists for the sake of keeping a "deal flow". He is applying the temporal
institution of duration milestones to pre-clinical studies in order to find additional fmancing
partners. Indeed, this novel strategy makes a project appear more downstream, with an
assessable time horizon, and "de-risks the opportunity". Another strategy used by both
valorization officers and venture capitalists in search of financial partners consists of hiring
high-level pharmaceutical executives with a proven track record in an effort to provide
credibility to a new project, again making it appear more mature or downstream and hence
facilitating fund raising.
104
My data also suggest that the asynchrony that lies between the rhythms of academics'
careers and the rhythms of fmancing, intellectual property protection, and valorization
tends to be resolved along three modes: academics willingly assume the rote of "repeat
offenders," a term referring to researchers who repeatedly corne up with inventions but
prefer to continue working at the university; hiring of professional managers who
understand the temporal requirements of a business; and hiring of serial entrepreneurs
whose competences are synchronized with the firm's lifecycle and whose tenure is
reviewed with every round of fmancing. The last two strategies are being used by both
venture capitalists and valorization officers.
CONCLUSION
I have used the concept of temporal institutions and the social entrainment model to reveal
the intricate workings of temporal dynamics in an organizational field. I have identified the
rhythms of five work processes (drug discovery and development; researchers' careers;
valorization; intellectual property protection; fmancing) that enable and constrain actors'
innovative activities. These rhythms were synchronized on different temporal bases over
two periods delimited by the technology bubble burst, giving rise to distinct interorganizational times that gave pace to imrovative activities in the Quebec
biopharmaceutical field. I have also shown that powerful external pacer events, mediated
by changes in synchronization bases, sparked the shift observed in inter-organizational
time.
Because I have adopted a model with dynamic equilibrium assumptions and focused on an
organizational field with diverse stakeholders instead of the more restricted concept of
industry, my study sheds light on the limitations of the idea of successfully and unilaterally
imposing a rhythm on other actors. I also suggest that actors may devise strategies to reap
benefits from inter-organizational time and steer it doser to their interests, which may help
overcome the "dark side of time" effect. In addition, I show that time may indeed be
viewed as an element of the structured contexts of the games of innovation (Miller and
Floricel, 2004) and that actors do retain some freedom to develop temporal strategies.
105
As a dynamic equilibrium mode!, SEM postulates synchrony as an expected state. In
addition, disruption of synchrony is expected to be transient as "left alone over time,
[rhythms] will also become once again synchronized" through "some system(s) or
process(es) — some regulating device(s)" (McGrath and Kelly, 1986:86). My field study
illustrates the contribution of strategic action to the desynchronization and
resynchronization process. However, more research remains to be done to elucidate further
the social dynamics in place that lead to the choice of rhythm to entrain to.
During the course of my field study, respondents showed their awareness of the importance
of time in the innovative activities of the biopharmaceutical field. Further research is
needed to follow the evolution of inter-organizational time in biotechnology as well as to
inventory and assess temporal strategies. Application of the SEM to other organizational
fields is expected to reveal distinctive inter-organizational times. Such findings would
argue in favour of treating time as an environmental dimension to be included in analyses
of the strategic context of innovation.
106
APPENDLX 1. LIST OF MAIN SECONDARY DATA SOURCES
Books or chapters of books
Henderson, R, L Orsenigo and GP Pisano (1999). The pharmaceutical industry and the
revolution in molecular biology: interactions among scientific, institutional, and
organizational change. In Sources of Industrial Leadership, DC Mowery and RR Nelson
(eds.), pp. 267-311. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Moses, V and RE Cape (1999). The science and the business: an introduction. In
Biotechnology: The Science and the Business, V Moses, RE Cape and DG Springham
(eds.), pp. 1-7. Harwood Academie Publishers.
Niosi, J, L Martin Cloutier and A Lejeune (eds.) (2002). Biotechnologie et industrie au
Québec. Montreal: Les Éditions Transcontinental inc.
Orsenigo, L (1989). The Emergence of Biotechnology. Institutions and Markets in
Industrial Innovation. London: Pinter Publishers.
Robbins-Roth, C (2000). From Alchemy to IPO: The Business of Biotechnology.
Cambridge: Perseus Publishing.
Articles and Reports
Beaulieu, P, A-L Saives and B Lessard (2001). "Le profil des bio-industries du Québec."
Répertoire des entreprises des bio-industries du Québec, Chaire en gestion des bioindustries, École des sciences de la gestion, Université du Québec à Montréal.
Bergeron, MY, L Kryzanowski, P Beaulieu and Y Gadhoum (2000). Financing-Related
Issues and Difficulties for Canadian Biotechnology Companies. Scientific Series.
Chaire en gestion des bio-industries, École des sciences de la gestion, Université du
Québec à Montréal.
Bordt, M and C Read (1999). Survey of Intellectual Property Commercialization in the
Higher Education Sector, 1998. Statistics Canada Cat. No. 88F0006XIB1999001.
107
Brunet, P (2003). Rapport du groupe de travail sur le rôle de l'État québécois dans le
capital de risque. Gouvernement du Québec. ISBN 2-550-41839-5.
Byrd, CA (2002). Profile of spin-off firms in the biotechnology sector: results from the
biotechnology use and development survey — 1999. Statistics Canada Cat. no.
88F0006XIE02004.
Institut pour le progrès socio-économique (2002). Les biotechnologies au Québec — Un
diagnostic fondé sur huit conditions de croissance. www.institutprogres.org
Livingstone, A (1997). Report on UBC Spin-off Company Formation and Growth.
University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
National Institute for Health Care Management Foundation (August 2000). Prescription
Drugs and Intellectual Property Protection. Washington, DC.
Web sites
BioPortal, Canadian governement's biotechnology portal
www.bioportal.gc.ca/english/BioPortalHome.asp?x=1
BioQuébec, Quebec biotechnology business association with links to member firms
www.bioquebec.com
BioteCanada, Canadian biotechnology business association
www.biotech.ca/
Canadian Venture Capital Association
www.cvca.ca
Centre québécois d'innovation en biotechnologie, incubator
www.cqib.org
Centre québécois de valorisation des biotechnologies, partner in technology transfer
www.cqvb.qc.ca
Montreal In-Vivo, local biotech portal
www.montreal-invivo.com/sciencesdelavie/site/index.jsp
PhRMA, The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
www.phrma.org/
Réseau Capital, Association of Quebec investors and venture capitalists
www.reseaucapital.com
108
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, an independent, academic, non-profit
research group affiliated with Tufts University
http://csdd.tufts.edu/
Valorisation Recherche Québec (VRQ), non-profit organization created to support
valorization of research in Québec
www.vrq.qc.ca
And the four valorization offices:
MSBI
www.msbi.ca
Sovar
www.sovar.com
Univalor
www.univalor.com
Valeo
www.gestionvaleo.com
Newspapers and on-une publications
Business sections of local newspapers: La Presse, Le Soleil, Le Devoir, Les Affaires.
Drug Discovery and Development, www.dddmag.com
Genetic Engineering News, www.genengnews.com
Nature, www.nature.com
Case studies
Boucher, T, A-A Gratton, D Luc and LJ Filion (2003). Office of Technology Transfer de
l'Université McGill: un levier dans l'essaimage technologique au Québec. Centre de
cas, HEC Montréal.
De Oliveira Lima, E and LJ Filion (2003). André de Villers et Theratechnologies: esprit
entrepreneurial et leadership d'innovation en biotechnologie. Centre de cas, HEC
Montréal.
Lefebvre, G, D Luc and LJ Filion (2002). Institut de cardiologie de Montréal (ICM),
transfert technologique et essaimage. Centre de cas, HEC Montréal.
Lefebvre, G, D Luc and LJ Filion (2002). L'Université de Sherbrooke: un milieu
d'innovation et d'essaimage. Centre de cas, HEC Montréal.
109
Savary, I, D Luc and LI Filion (2002). De Polyvalor à Univalor: une valorisation accrue
du transfert technologique. Centre de cas, HEC Montréal.
Veillette, M, D Luc and LI Filion (2002). Essaimages technologiques à l'INRS-Institut
Armand-Frappier: apprentissages laborieux. Centre de cas, HEC Montréal.
Veillette, M, D Luc and L.1 Filion (2001). Le Centre de recherche du CHUL: une émulation
contagieuse. Centre de cas, HEC Montréal.
Workshop
Spin-offs: Practical advice from the experts. Workshop organized by the McGill University
Office of Technology Transfer, May 15, 2003.
110
APPENDIX 2. EXAMPLES OF CODED EXCERPTS
Code: Delay
"For example ... I've invested in a company that was a year away from clinicals. But I'll
only know in ten years' time if I've got a drug that works! There is lots and lots of
uncertainty between the two. And that's the hardest part of our job."
Code: Duration
"Maybe people hadn't understood that it would take so much time to develop a product.
And the more time it takes, the higher the failure rate because for each ... to reach every
stage there is a specific probability of failure."
Code: Sequence
"There is a gap in financing, that's true! And our vision is that venture capital shouldn't
position itself there. It doesn't work. Returns take too long. We can't make money if we
invest there."
Code: Synchrony
"Don't forget that if an industrial partner is interested in the research he will proceed with
IP due diligence ... he will want to verify that confidentiality was maintained, if third party
rights are know, if inventors are involved. They won't buy the technology if it's a mess!"
111
Code: Time horizon
"Yes we have sequenced the genome and we may be at one percent of the knowledge we
need to have about the human body. We still have 200 years of work, 100 years of work.
That's reality."
Code: Trajectories (multiple, single)
"Someone said this morning, 'I would get rid of every project in your company except your
product'. So you're cutting off the thing that got us here, the thing that's going to ... the
platform that's going to ... that differentiates us from every single company in the world.
Somebody was willing to just kill it and just put all of the resources on developing that one
product, which is kind of silly and also incredibly risky, because dies toxic in the next test,
you're down to zero and you've killed your technology platform and your company is dead.
So, that was an extreme example but some people think that. That's sort of the reality we
have to live with."
Code: Window
"The acceptable temporal window simply means that ... it's a window that ... that allows
my firm to retain a value ... for example, a value for acquisition or merger."
112
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Perspectives. Joseph E. McGrath (ed.), pp. 63-88. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Zerubavel, Eviatar (1979). Patterns of Time in Hospital Life: A Sociological Perspective.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
VI. ARTICLE 3
"In contrast to biodiversity, "chronodiversity" is terra incognita"
Karlheinz A. Geifiler (2002. 131)
"To speak of one 's experience is to speak of time"
Ramon Ramos Torre (2007: 181)
116
Transitioning after the bubble burst:
A portfolio of strategic time horizons for biopharmaceutical
ventures19
ABSTRACT
No one doubts the importance of time in management especially in a science-based
business like biopharmaceuticals. Following the 2001 technology bubble burst, Quebec
biotech ventures were expected to hait activities in platform development in order to focus
on the discovery and development of specific drugs. Powerful stakeholders such as venture
capitalists voiced new preferences for shorter horizons rather than longer ones. This
exploratory and longitudinal study of the Quebec biopharmaceutical field suggests that the
management of time horizons in biopharmaceutical ventures is more complex than the
habituai calls for attending to different lengths of horizons. We develop a portfolio model
of two-dimensional strategic time horizons that illustrates the expected transition from a
platform company to a product company. The story of four ventures sheds light on the
intra-organizational dynamics of responding to an institutional pressure, in this case, a
temporal shift. We also suggest that a dynamic management of strategic time horizons,
including interaction between horizons and temporal leaps, may be instrumental in a
successful transition as well as venture survival.
Keywords: Biopharmaceutical ventures; intra-organizational dynamics; institutional
pressure; portfolio; strategy; science-based business; technology bubble; temporal shift;
time horizons; transition.
19 Note that this third article of the thesis is presented in a lengthier form than is usual for an article published
in a journal. This was felt to be appropriate for the thesis given the importance of the extended narratives of
the four cases in providing a strong and credible grounding for the findings. In submitting the work for
publication in journal form, it will no doubt be necessary to condense the empirical sections.
117
INTRODUCTION
Time is important in a science-based business like biopharmaceuticals. As the director of a
biology laboratory in a biotech venture stated: "In biotech, there is only one thing that is
limiting. It's lime. So resources can be found, money can be found, experts can be found.
But you don't gel three years to do something. So, that's the number one challenge".
The Quebec biopharmaceutical field we focus on in this study exhibits inherent temporal
complexities such as: (1) A long and costly drug discovery and development process with a
relatively short patent protection duration for the marketed drug; (2) Multiple temporal
windows including that of the drug discovery and development process, the regulatory
process and the patent process; (3) Decisions linked to uniyersity technology transfer
including time required for incubation, when to spin-off a firm and rounds of venture
capital; (4) Two distinct eras preceding and following the technology bubble burst and
fmally, (5) Biopharmaceutical ventures where venture capitalists, managers and scientists
meet, ail thought to adhere to different temporal values or cultures (Dubinskas, 1988).
Following the 2001 technology bubble burst, the temporal characteristics of the
biopharmaceutical field such as continuity, sequence, lifecycle and duration exhibited a
shift as compared to the pre-burst situation (Bonneau, 2007). Enforced by powerful
stakeholders such as venture capitalists, as well as university technology transfer offices,
these characteristics were undisputedly by managers of existing ventures as rules they
needed to comply with especially if they were to be successful with a subsequent fmancing
round and as such, this temporal shift was viewed as an institutional pressure. These
pressures materialized in demands to hait teclmological platform development and
transition into a product company.
How then did biopharmaceutical managers strategically manage time in light of the changes
in inter-organizational temporality? The context of this transition would tend to suggest that
venture managers had little choice but to comply with the field's new temporal demands
and hence lost discretion in the management of their venture (Oliver, 1991). However this
exploratory study of the Quebec biopharmaceutical field suggests that, contrary to
118
expectations, venture managers retained a level of discretion that they exercised in how
they managed strategic time horizons following a temporal shift in the organizational field.
We focus more specifically on four ventures: two that were successful in reaching the stock
market, one of which also successfully spun-out its original platform as a service company,
and two others that failed to renew financing.
Our study also provides a basis for the development of a portfolio model of strategic time
horizons that suggests heterogeneity in the discretion retained and exercised by firm
managers in the face of strong institutional pressures towards conformity. Building on the
traditional defmition of the one-dimensional construct of time horizon focused on length,
this model offers a second dimension, incorporating aspects of the future envisaged, thus
improving the understanding of the complexity of strategic time management.
Amidst the emphasis on speed and synchronization in the strategic management literature
pertaining to time, including Riolli-Saltzman and Luthans' (2001) call for more speed and
fiexibility on the part of "high-tech firms" since the bubble burst, this study contributes
rather to the literature on planning horizons.
In addition, it contributes to a "new variant of institutional theory [...] that remains
relatively undeveloped" (de Holan and Phillips, 2002: 70) and which attempts to reconcile
understandings of on the one hand, institutional processes towards both persistence and
change and on the other hand, purposeful action to support or modify institutional
arrangements.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. First, in the following
paragraphs, we draw on three distinct literatures to frame our research question, those
conceming (1) technology ventures, (2) institutional pressures and (3) time horizons and
the strategic management of time. The latter literature also includes the discussion of a twodimensional model of time horizons that frames our study and the presentation of two
generic portfolios of strategic time horizons that represent the starting point and the
outcome of the post-bubble transition period. Second, we discuss the methods and present
our fmdings starting with an understanding of the Quebec context of biopharmaceutical
119
ventures. This is followed by a presentation of the portfolios of strategic time horizons
of our four ventures with the story of how time horizons were strategically managed in
response to a temporal shift in the organizational field. Finally, we discuss the contributions
and limitations of our study and offer future avenues for investigation.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
This study explores how time horizons were strategically managed in four Quebec
biopharmaceutical ventures following the temporal shift of the 2001 bubble burst when
ventures were transitioning from companies conducting technological platform
development to companies focused on product development. We begin this literature
review by examining the evolution of business models in the biotechnology sector, prior to
reviewing the insights from institutional theory that appear relevant to understanding how a
sector might react to key institutional change that threatens existing business models.
Finally, we briefly recall elements of the strategic management of time literature and
examine more closely the concept of time horizon before presenting the portfolio model
used to organize our empirical data.
The evolution of business models among Quebec biopharmaceutical ventures
Quebec biopharmaceutical firms set up during the second half of the 1990's were
predominantly university spin-offs backed by venture capital (Niosi and Bas, 2003),
granting venture capitalists with much power over firms' decisions. Such ventures, and in
particular high-tech university spin-offs that are so common in biopharmaceuticals, can be
seen as entities with a transitional growth pattern. Indeed, Vohora, Wright and Lockett
(2004: 147) suggest that these firms develop towards sustainability by maneuvering
through critical junctures. They also suggest (Vohora et al., 2004: 167) that venture
managers need to be "successful in transforming their existing resources, capabilities and
social capital" in order to cross the last critical juncture, or threshold of sustainability, and
engage their venture on the path of sustained revenues rather than folding it.
Success in doing so steers the venture away from possible stagnation or even failure. These
biopharmaceutical ventures are also part of the so-called science-based business of
biotechnology, defined as "a commercial enterprise or collection of enterprises that
120
attempts to both create science and to capture value from it", representing a proposition
fraught with "confiicting objectives and requirements" (Pisano, 2006: 2, 6).
While consequences of the science-based nature of the venture on the strategic management
of time will be discussed later in this section, we can say that the presence of powerful
stakeholders and the transitional nature of their growth render biopharmaceutical ventures
more susceptible to pressures for change from the institutional field because noncompliance may prevent access to critical resources for their viability and eventual
accession to a full-firm status.
During the 1990's, the global pharmaceutical firms adopted the blockbuster business mode!
that "focuses the majority of a company's investment on creating blockbuster product
franchise s—that is, brands that achieve global sales of more than $1 billion" (Gilbert et al.
2003:3). This very profitable business model has since corne under attack because of
stagnant or declining R&D and expiring patents, as well as "threat of price pressures, short
product life cycles, and more fragmented markets" (Pisano, 2006: 174).
Although the term " business mode!" is "seldom defmed explicitly", it may be considered
as "a heuristic logic that connects technical potential with the realization of economic value
[...] whether explicitly considered or implicitly embodied in the act of innovation"
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002: 532, 529, 530). It is much in use in the press and
managers' discourse even though it "is less a new phenomena that a new articulation of
pre-existing concepts" (Lecocq, Demil and Warnier, 2006: 109).
Biotechnology ventures have attracted the attention of pharmaceutical firms in search of
increased productivity and a renewed pipeline of products. Although technology platforms
of human health biotechnology ventures can be promising for both therapeutics (including
pharmaceutical) as well as diagnostics, or nutraceuticals applications, venture capitalists in
Quebec and elsewhere, have prodded ventures to focus on pharmaceuticals.
Biopharmaceuticals have seen numerous business models over the course of the sector's
history. Preferences are said to have evolved according to decades: the contract R&D
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mode! (mid to late 1970s), the fully integrated pharmaceutical company (FIPCO) (early
1980s), the alliance-driven firm (early 1990s), the platform company (1990s), and a retum
to the product company after the bubble burst (Pisano, 2007). There are also the tool and
service providers (Van der Meer, 2001) and more recently, the "no research, development
only" or NRDO business model (GenNews, Apr 1, 2005).
The Quebec biotechnology ventures of the second half of the 1990s were focused on the
development of platforms or enabling technologies with multiple potential applications.
They were mostly founded on and basically run as academic research projects, hence with
long time horizons hoping to develop into a platform company that would generate
revenues through licensing fees or subscriptions to their technology. In contrast, following
the 2001 technology bubble burst, the pressure to adopt a profitable business model was
mounting: Existing and would-be ventures found it difficult if flot impossible to obtain the
support of the financial and technology transfer communities if their activities were flot
clearly focused on a commercial product and a short time to market. This change in
temporal rules which has been detailed elsewhere (Bonneau, 2007) can be viewed as a
temporal shift defmed as "changes in a collective's experience of time" (Staudenmayer et
al., 2002: 588).
In Quebec, pharmaceutical applications were largely favoured as it was thought that
although highly risky they provided the highest possible returns. Additionally, members of
BioChem Pharma, the first biopharmaceutical firm in Quebec to ever bring a successful
product on the market, 3TC, an anti-HIV/AIDS drug, were on the board of several small
ventures.
Institution al pressures
The change in temporal rules in the biopharmaceutical sector described above can be
viewed as a major institutional shift. Compliance to institutional pressures on the part of
organizations is usually explained in terms of expected rewards such as legitimacy,
resources and survival (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Meyer and Rowan, 1991). And,
although "institutional theory has tended to deemphasize both the ability of organizations
to dominate or defy external demands and the usefulness 10 organizations of pursuing these
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types of strategies" (Oliver, 1991: 150), Oliver (1991) argues that firms are faced with
possible trade-offs between compliance and resistance as both can bring benefits and
potentially deleterious consequences. For example, while compliance may allow the firm to
access resources and legitimacy it can also diminish its ability to adapt to unforeseen
environmental contingencies. Likewise, although resistance can threaten long-term viability
through loss of resources and social support, it can also increase the firm's flexibility,
irmovativeness and capacity to adapt to change.
Prior to the bubble burst, biotech ventures were managed according to temporal preferences
associated with research and funds were abundant. In the context of the shift in temporal
preferences, the potential negative consequences apprehended by biopharmaceutical
venture managers were that their venture would lack continued long-term innovative
capabilities if they complied with pressures and abandoned their technological platform in
order to focus on the development of a commercial product. Yet, the fmancial rewards
envisaged in the form of milestone payments and expected access to IPOs or acquisition by
a larger firm, were strong incentives to comply. Hence, there was an expectation that
managers would generally loose discretion in the conduct of their venture's affairs.
Although the serious situation of the organizational field atter the shift brought about strong
institutional pressures to comply, the suggestion that firms do not "passively succumb to
institutional coercive and normative pressures" (Fernandez-Alles and Valle-Cabrera, 2006:
503) possibly because "conformity is neither inevitable nor invariably instrumental in
securing longevity" (Oliver, 1991:175) supports the idea that biopharmaceutical managers
may have retained some discretion in how they deal with tensions between the benefits and
inconveniences of compliance and directs further attention towards the critical "role of
intra-organizational dynamics in accepting or rejecting institutionalized practices"
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996: 1032). Furthermore, Seo and Creed (2002: 223) argue that
it may be those very tensions and contradictions that "transform the embedded social actors
into the change agents of the very institutional arrangements", hence extending managerial
discretion.
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In the context of an institutional change in temporal assumptions, we argue in this paper
that one possible source of discretion may lie in the way in which time horizons are
managed. We now examine how this concept has been developed in the previous literature.
Time horizons and the strategic management of time
In his account of the history of business strategy, Ghemawat (2002:63) reviews several
approaches that attended, as of the 1980's, to "the need to retum the time dimension to
predominantly static ideas about competitive position" including value-based strategic
management, time-based competition (Stalk, 1988; Stalk and Webber, 1993), game-theory
IO models (Shapiro, 1989), the resource-based view of the firm (Wemerfelt, 1984),
dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1997), and commitment or irreversibility
(Ghemawat, 1991), approaches that ail shared the same underlying concern of the
achievement and maintenance of a sustainable competitive advantage over time.
In this article, we are interested in which aspect of time is most important for venture
managers and what they actually do to strategically manage it. Several aspects of time have
been identified by strategic management scholars in the past including notions such as
signals and windows of opportunity (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988: Taylor 2000), fast
cycles (Bower and Hout, 1988), strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989), dual cbcks
(Mitchell, 1991), time pacing (Gersick, 1994; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998), milestone
events (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995), ritual-based rhythm, improvisation, future probing,
time-paced transitions and time links (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), real-time competition
and Internet speed (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) as well as action timing (Ferrier, Smith
and Grimm, 1999).
In this empirical study of the Quebec biopharmaceutical field with an emphasis on
ventures' strategies, the concept of time horizon has been most salient. "Time horizon" is
usually considered as a one-dimensional concept, concerned only with length or duration
span, and oriented from the present to the future. In strategic management, "planning
horizon" is the term most frequently used and this can be viewed as a variant of time
horizons in management studies (Barringer and Bluedom, 1999: 425). We will use both
denominations interchangeably in this article.
124
Ebert & Piehl's (1973: 35) defmed "time horizon" as "the distance into the future to which
a decision maker looks when evaluating the consequences of a proposed action". This
definition has flot been enriched over the years with the notable exception of the addition of
the present to past perspective to the usual present to future one through the temporal depth
construct (Bluedom, 2000: 125; Bluedom, 2002: 111-145; Bluedom and Ferris 2004: 115;
Bluedom and Waller, 2006: 366).
Since Ebert and Piehl (1973) wrote that "Time horizon is flot commonly used and
understood by managers", concems with time horizons have predominantly gravitated
around an arbitrarily evaluated length. Thus on the one hand, planning horizons have
become too short for global leadership (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989) with some industries
seeing their long-term horizon shortened to three years (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). On
the other hand, it is argued that a longer than five-year planning horizon is "not tenable for
entrepreneurial firms" that need to adapt quickly to environmental change (Entrialgo et al,
2000: 429) whereas Chesbrough (2000) highlights the advantages of an indefmite time
horizon for corporate ventures, allowing managers to fund long-term projects.
However, several other studies suggest that there may be more to time horizons than their
length and that their diversity might need to be managed too. For instance, Lawrence and
Lorsch (1967) argue that time horizons differ between departments of an organization on
the basis of the length of time required to obtain feedback on departmental decisions from
the environment and that these times also differ from one industry to the other while Floyd
and Lane (2000) discuss the differences in time horizon length between subprocesses of
strategic renewal, handled by top-, middle- and operating-level managers. In addition,
Rhyne (1985) identifies five types of planning — short-term forecasting, budgeting, annual
planning, long-range planning and strategic planning — differentiated on the basis of their
time horizon and relationship with the stability or instability of the environment.
Goodman's (1973: 224) typology suggests that a firm facing the more complex or
"turbulent" environment (Emery and Trist, 1965) "requires a complete spectrum of time
perspectives from the short to the long". And, in the specific context of eight pubficly held
American biotechnology firms, an empirical study of strategic time horizons (STH),
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defined as "the period of time between the initial commitment of significant resources
for an investment with a specific strategic objective and the point at which that investment
was expected to begin to provide a return on that investment" (Judge and Spitzfaden, 1995:
180), suggested that superior financial performance, expressed in terms of "traditional
owner/manager stakeholder criterion of profitability" (Bluedom and Waller, 2006: 387) is
associated flot with the management of a single STH but rather with a diversity of them.
Despite the varied conjectures about the diversity of time horizons, guidance for managers
remain surprisingly scarce and often limited to the traditional calls for the need to balance
between on the one hand, short term horizons to remain responsive to the environment and
on the other hand, long term horizons to remain visionary (Barringer and Bluedom, 1999:
436), totally bypassing concems of "the best mix or balance of temporal depths in a given
situation" (Bluedom and Waller, 2006: 387). This is a stand that appears to have withstood
the bubble burst as managers of high-tech firms are still exhorted to "strategically integrate
short-term realities with long-term purpose and vision" (Riolli-Saltzman and Luthans,
2001: 118).
In addition to environmental factors, it has been suggested that planning horizons are also
influenced by managers' personal preferences (Ebert and Piehl, 1973: 35; Das, 1986, 1991;
Hay and Usunier, 1993), as well as power struggles or a "silent politics of time" between
company executives who "probably "use" their planning horizon preferences as a means
[...] in their strategy negotiations much as any other means, such as resources like money,
power and effort", which tends to indicate a strategic time management through the
negotiation of a single planning horizon (Das, 1991: 55).
Learning more about time or planning horizons in strategic management would contribute
to improving our understanding of "the allocation of corporate resources and energies, as
well as the coordination of short-mn and long-range planning" (Das, 1987: 204), a central
issue indeed. However, it has been acknowledged that time per se "is only now beginning
to receive the attention it deserves in organizational scholarship" (Bluedom and Standifer,
2006: 196). We now know that the quest to learn more about time horizons and time in
126
general needs to be anchored in the multiplicity of times and on the fact that "ail times
are socially constructed" (Bluedorn and Standifer, 2006: 200).
In the case of science-based businesses such as biopharmaceuticals, it may be beneficial to
develop a more complex lime horizon construct because of a four-pronged challenge fo the
traditional time horizon construct. First, it has been suggested that the assessment of what
short and long term mean is subject to cultural interpretation and that it differs between
scientists and managers (Dubinskas, 1988). Second, temporal differences in the way these
two groups plan activities would also include a preference for "open-ended" or "indistinct
future" on the part of scientists and "closed" systems or "seeking closure" on the part of
managers (Dubinskas, 1988: 192, 194, 209). Third, the iterative nature of the drug
discovery process, whereby the answers to a first round of questions may simply reveal the
"unknown unknowns" and require another round of questioning and research (Pisano,
2006: 8), differs from the usual assumption of a linear time horizon. Fourth, the habitual
perception of risk and uncertainty associated with longer term horizons (Das & Teng, 2001)
in any industry is compounded in biopharmaceuticals by the fact that risk does not
necessarily diminish with shorter term horizons because of the nature of the drug discovery
and development process.
Extant literature on the management of time horizons does flot provide adequate support to
biopharmaceutical ventures' managers because first, it relies on a one-dimensional lengthbased construct of time horizon, falling short of the complex reality of a science-based
business and second, remains suent as to how exactly time horizons should be managed
beyond striking a balance between different lengths. In addition, literature on responses to
institutional pressures neglects transitions and ignores the specific characteristics of
science-based ventures.
In light of the literature reviewed above, we now present a portfolio model of strategic time
horizons constructed on the basis of two dimensions that we argue are critical to
understanding the temporal strategies used by biopharmaceutical ventures' managers
following the temporal shift created by the bubble burst. Notwithstanding this dualdimensional time horizon, we adopt Judge and Spitzfaden's (1995: 180) terminology of
127
"strategic time horizon" and corresponding defmition of "the period of time between
the initial commitment of significant resources for an investment with a specific strategic
objective and the point at which that investment was expected to begin to provide a return
on that investment" as it coincides with our data and the portfolio mode! used. Although
partly inspired by the literature, this conceptual model only emerged clearly as we began
our exploratory interviews with investors and managers. We present it at this point in the
paper to clarify the presentation of our argument. The empirical section of the paper will
then draw on and elaborate this conceptual framework to answer our research question:
"How did managers of biopharmaceutical ventures exercise their discretion in strategically
managing time horizons in the context of a temporal shift?".
Portfolio mode! of STH
The temporal shift observed in the biopharmaceutical field involved pressures flot only to
reduce the length of time horizons, but also pressures to transition from a situation with
multiple future possibilities, which we associate with an open-ended future or as Dubinskas
(1988: 195) puts it: "a seemingly infmite regression of possible branches and paths into an
indistinct future" that can be compared to Nightingale's (2000: 321) definition of scientific
knowledge as "unknown end results", towards a future that focuses on a distinct
achievement or goal such as the development of a particular product or "seeking closure"
(Dubinskas, 1988: 209) or again as an innovation process evolving towards "known end
results" (Nightingale (2000: 321), a situation that we liken to a close-ended future.
Thus as we indicated earlier, investors involved with biopharmaceuticals were concerned
with:
1. Moving away from projects with an open-ended future towards those with a closeended future. This meant staying away from projects heralding the potentialities of
research such as the development of new platforms and rather investing in valuecreating projects with a clear product in mind.
2. Moving away from longer-term projects and favouring investments in projects that
exhibit shorter time-to-market.
128
By combining (1) the traditional metric of length of horizon and (2) the nature of the
future contemplated (Dubinskas, 1988), we therefore propose a portfolio model of strategic
time horizons20 which we use to represent the starting point of most Quebec
biopharmaceuticals during the 1990's, the platform company, and the desired outcome of
the product company (Figures 3-5), which we now detail.
Figure 3. Generic portfolio of strate ic time horizons
Future
Length
Open-ended
Close-ended
Shorter
Longer
The length of horizon. Although Barringer and Bluedom (1999: 429) contend that five
years is a heuristic that has been used in management studies as a divide between long and
short planning horizons, we choose to judge the length of the horizon in our study in a
relative manner from shorter to longer.
Indeed, drug discovery and development is known to take about fourteen years 21 . Drug
discovery per se is often defined as the activities leading to the identification and
optimization of lead compounds (potential drug candidates) as well as the pre-clinical
laboratory and animal testing to test for safety and efficacy span about half that time. The
other half is taken up by the actual drug development defined as the clinical studies that
again test for safety and efficacy, but this tùne in humans, as well as by the regulatory
approval process.22 Also, the notion of what is "long" or "short" may vary by participant in
the organizational field, with venture capitalists being guided by the length of their
For a history of portfolio models in business strategy, see Ghemawat (2002 : 46ff).
See Appendix 3a.
22 See Appendix 3b.
20
21
129
investment fund (Chesbrough, 2000: 38) while managers are likely to be more sensitive
to the nature of the product cycle itself (confirmed by our data). In this context, a relative
conception of time horizon length seems more appropriate.
The nature of the future contemplated. As mentioned above, we distinguish between the
open-ended and close-ended future dimension of the time horizon. When envisaging an
open-ended future, one considers the many possibilities of research or the many
applications of a platform or proprietary technology without focusing on a specific
pharmaceutical product. By contrast, when considering a close-ended future, one focuses
on a specific product to be developed.
Hence, the combination of both dimensions for the construct of strategic time horizons
leads to the generic representation of the portfolio model in Figure 3 where each of the four
quadrants house the following strategic time horizons:
Open-ended and shorter horizon supports initiatives where a proprietary technology is
applied to short-term projects even though the somewhat generic nature of the technology
allows for multiple application possibilities (open-ended future).
Open-ended and longer horizon supports initiatives that correspond with the development
of a new technology or in the case of biopharmaceuticals, a new platform. Possibilities are
almost endless because the platform enables further discovery and because these initiatives
closely resemble fundamental research. This is often fundamental research such as that
conducted in academic laboratories.
Close-ended and shorter horizon supports initiatives that have a clear end in mind such as
the development of a specific biopharmaceutical product in the shorter-term phases of
product development.
Close-ended and longer horizon supports initiatives that have a clear end in mind such as
the development of a specific biopharmaceutical product in the longer-term phases of
product discovery.
130
Based on this initial conceptual framework, typical biotech start-ups common in the latter
half of the 1990's in Quebec can be viewed as exhibiting a single open-ended and longer
term horizon as illustrated by Figure 4. As one of our firm respondents put it, when venture
capitalists started funding biotechs in Quebec, academic researchers ignored what they
were really getting into, "except that they had money to pursue their research on a larger
scale". So, academics were continuing the development of their platform that, in those
days, was often times based on genomics.
With the bubble burst, the field entered a time horizon transition that our model represents
as that from the portfolio of an academic research start-up to that of a product company
(Figures 4 and 5).
In the product company, the venture focuses exclusively on close-ended horizons as shown
by the two right quadrants. Favouring close-ended futures pressures managers to stop the
development of the platform (bottom left quadrant) and, if potential drug candidates (lead
compounds) were discovered through work on the platform, to put lead compounds into
drug discovery (bottom right quadrant) and eventually into drug development (top right
quadrant). Although both drug discovery and drug development are usually understood as
taking about the same duration, it has been customary in the past to conclude alliances with
large pharmaceutical companies at various stages of the drug development process: very
early on during the bubble era and doser to the end of Phase II after its burst. Hence,
reaching phases of drug development provides an exit to venture capitalists before the full
six-year horizon either through alliances or the stock market.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the gap between the STH portfolio of on the one hand, a great
many ventures at the time they were preparing for a new round of financing post-bubble
and on the other hand, that sought by financiers. It provides a vivid temporal representation
of how the field's institutional pressures manifested themselves to the ventures'
management. However, what these generic representations fail to convey is the actual
management of the transition between the two situations. The empirical study described
131
next will explore in detail how four ventures strategically managed time horizons in the
face of these institutional pressures.
Figure 4. The academie research start-up portfolio
Future
Length
Open-ended
Close-encled
Shorter
Longer
Platform develop ment
Figure 5. The pro duct company portfolio
Future
Length
Shorter
Longer
Open-encled
Close- ended
Drug develop ment
Drug discovery
132
ME THODS
In this section, we first provide the context for our study and then discuss the research
design, data collection and the analysis of our qualitative data.
Context of the study
Applying a temporal lens to management research is difficult (Ancona, Goodman et al.
2001: 647) first, because theoretical tools are scarce, second, because scholars, managers,
students of time and laypersons tend flot to question their use of the word "time" which
encompasses without being limited to meanings such as "duration", "cycle", "windows of
opportunity", "rhythm" etc. (Adam, 2000; Lee and Liebenau, 2002) and third, being often
taken for granted (Schein, 1985; Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988: 300), "time" tends to
remain hidden and elusive and as such, difficult to study.
So in effect, although the study began with a general interest in the strategic management of
time, the actual research question - How did managers of biopharmaceutical ventures
exercise their discretion in strategically managing time horizons in the context of a
temporal shift? - emerged during the course of the field study, examination of secondary
data and coding of interviews. Even though we framed our introduction and literature
review with temporal horizons in mind, this particular temporal topic as well as the model
reported in the findings emerged in the course of data collection and analysis. This is flot at
ail unusual in exploratory case studies where "fieldwork and data collection are undertaken
prior to the final defmition of study questions and hypotheses" (Yin, 2003a: 6) and for
some, may testify to "the messy, nonlinear reality of grounded theory research" (Suddaby
2006:637).
Research design
Important choices were made in this research design in the following four areas: 1. To use
the case study method; 2. To do a single industry case; 3. To use embedded units and 4. To
conduct a longitudinal study (See also Figure 6).
133
The relative scarcity of empirical work and theoretical tools about time in organizations
and organizational fields motivated the use of case studies. Indeed, it is an approach
appropriate in exploratory social studies when researchers want to broadly frame their topic
and encompass contextual or complex conditions (Yin, 2003a: xi), an approach that is also
likely to spawn new and interesting observations about the phenomenon.
Figure 6. Research design
Context of organizational field temporal shift
Case of biopharmaceutical field in transition
Unit 1:
Venture A
t i _ t2
Unit 2:
Venture B
Unit 3:
Venture C
t i _ t2
Unit 4:
Venture D
tl- t2
tl- t2
Because this study is concemed with an interaction between two levels of analysis, the
organizational field and the ventures level, we used embedded units of analysis. Rich single
case studies can provide "a powerful means of deriving insight [...] because the different
theoretical interpretations provide the base for comparison needed" (Langley, 1999: 699),
including in the study of temporal rhythms in a single hospital (Zerubavel, 1979) and single
hotel (Bunzel 2002). In addition to the opportunities for comparison provided by the
134
temporal frontier of the technology bubble burst revealed during the pilot project phase
of this study, multiple units, such as this study's biopharmaceutical ventures, are expected
to offer researchers with additional opportunities of generating insights through cross-units
comparisons.
The use of comparisons in single or multiple case studies is an approach coherent with that
of a grounded theory approach in which "theory derived from data" (Strauss and Corbin,
1998:12) is arrived at through successive rounds of comparisons highlighting similarities
and contrasts between incidents, categories, properties etc. Also, using multiple units
enhances extemal validity i.e. "the domain to which a study's findings can be generalized"
(Yin, 2003b: 34).
Given that this study was flot designed to test theory but rather to at least describe and
maybe provide an explanation of a temporal phenomenon in the context of a scarcity of
theoretical tools, the primary objective of using multiple units was to access a "natural
variation" (Yin, 2004: 86), if at ail present, in first, the temporal aspects managed by
venture managers and second, in their reactions to a temporal shift at the organizational
field level.
This study also adopted a longitudinal design as ail ventures were followed between the
initial interviews in 2002 and the Summer of 2008 at which point a performance outcome,
success or failure, could be identified. Diachronie case studies, by definition interested in
how things evolve, can be seen as instrumental in disentangling dynamics and outcomes
(Barley, 1990: 225).
Data collection
The inherent temporal complexities of the biopharmaceutical field that guided us in
choosing it for this field study were enumerated earlier in the introduction of this paper.
Data collection was done in three phases (See Table XVIII) and started off with a pilot
project which helped in "defming the questions and hypotheses" for the rest of the study
(Yin, 2003a: 5).
135
We conducted ten semi-structured open-ended interviews with managers and scientists
from two ventures, a manager and specialist in a technology transfer organization as well as
a venture capitalist. The venture capitalist and the technology transfer organization were
well known and active in the field.
In the post-bubble burst context of biopharmaceuticals merging or closing down and with a
grim outlook for the survival of the whole sector 23 , we wanted to increase our chances that
ventures recruited for this study would survive and possibly thrive. Hence, we attempted to
fmd ventures recognized for the innovativeness of their research and their capacity to
attract financing. The two ventures had both been laureates of a local innovation prize and
attracted significant venture capital. Both were university spin-offs and Venture A was
linked to the technology transfer organization taking part in the pilot project phase and
recruited by phone for this study. Venture D was recruited through the help of a contact.
From the data collected during the pilot project phase, emerged the notion that a temporal
frontier, the burst of the technology bubble, was quite significant and this helped refme
research questions and guided further data collection for both the organizational field level
case and the embedded units.
To pursue the organizational field case study, we extended data collection with additional
members from the organizational field until saturation. We met with the major paragovernmental and labour-backed Quebec venture capitalists based in Montreal. Also, we
interviewed members of a second technology transfer office (TTO), hence covering the two
most active TTOs in human health biotechnology in Quebec. We added internai and
external patent agents as well as representatives of two local incubators.
A closing rate of 50% within the following year was discussed at the workshop "Spin-offs: Practical advice
from the experts" May 2003.
23
Cil
Ventures ' web sites
Biotech association web site
Business press
On-fine science publications
(Nature, Genetic engineering)
=
Books
Articles and reports
Case studies
Web sites
Newspapers and on-une
publications
Technolo transfer worksho
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Venture C:
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Venture D:
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Sr Mngr Clinical Dvt
Dir. PreclinicalPharma
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President and Founder
V-p Business Admin.
Operations Manager
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Business press
Ventures ' web sites
Biotech association web site
Bio 2007 (Chicago)
Interview cancelled
Venture C:
Two on-site presentations :
Two Venture Capitalists
One Tech Transfer Manager
April2008
April2006 - Surnmer 2008
rn
et
Venture capitalists: 5
Tech office members : 4
Patent agents: 3
Incubator managers: 2
Dec 2004-Aug 2005
April -December 2003
•
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B iopharmaceutical Venture capitalist: 1
Tech office members: 3
field
Dec 2004 —April2006
Fall2002 - Dec 2004
•
c7à
Interviews
Phase II: Extended p hase
Phase I: Plot p roject phase
136
137
We also needed to increase the number of ventures while remaining within the bounds
of our resources and so recruited two others. Both ventures were recruited upon the
recommendation of members of the organizational field taking part in our study. Venture C
was recommended on the basis of its considerable intellectual property. After verification
in the press and on its website, we could confirm that the venture had also attracted a good
amount of venture capital. Finally, Venture B was mentioned as a venture with a new and
original business mode!, potentially better adapted to the changing organizational field
conditions. As well, it had been recognized as highly innovative and won a local prize.
In short, we had good reasons to suspect that the four ventures were appropriate for the
study. They ail showed some success in innovation and fmancing as ail had received
significant previous financial backing and three had won a local innovation award. Venture
A had a revolutionary platform and had prestigious members on its board. Venture B used a
novel business mode!. Venture C had leading-edge research and had been successful in
securing fmancing for a building and separate laboratory without even a proof of concept.
Finally, Venture D was able to secure major fmancing from outside Quebec and had struck
alliances with an American biopharmaceutical firm. Ail were about the same size and were
still fmanced by venture capital.
The one-hour long interviews showed that by engaging respondents to talk about what they
actually did, about innovation and strategy in biopharmaceuticals as well as the risks,
challenges and difficulties involved with biopharmaceutical ventures, they were revealing
for instance, how in their work processes, they measured time and how they arranged
events over time, two fundamental temporal notions.
Our semi-structured interviews were guided by the questionnaires from the MINE research
program for which we developed a temporal correspondence that helped us be prepared for
temporal contributions (See Appendix 1). Because the interviews were semi-structured, we
were able to remain alert to respondents' contribution to temporal matters including but flot
restricted to elements of duration, sequence of events and relative temporal location, in
order to elicit more responses when such topics were brought up.
138
Prior to the first interviews and throughout the length of the study, we set out to get
acquainted with the context and reported stakes in the Quebec biopharmaceutical field as
well as abroad. Hence, we collected and reviewed secondary data, such as books, business
newspapers and academic articles, press releases, case studies and documents published on
web sites from firms and other organizations involved in biopharmaceuticals. Topics
focused on included product development, technology transfer, venture capital and current
scientific approaches such as genomics, proteomics and others. Data collected on the
venture covered as much as possible its life span and went on until Summer 2008.
Secondary data collected on the four ventures during the follow-up study were used to test
our portfolio model.
As a second round of validation, we conducted four follow-up interviews in April 2008
with members of three of the ventures, bringing the total of interviews to thirty four. A fifth
follow-up interview with Venture B's original Vice-president Finance and Business
administration and now Chief Executive Officer was scheduled but cancelled at the last
minute. In June 2008, the press reported on rumours that the venture ran out of money and
was about to fold.
"A final analytic challenge is to bring a case study to conclusion". In effect Summer of
2008 can be seen as the calendrical location of "the end of a logical cycle in the sequence of
events" (Yin, 2004: 251): Two of the ventures have secured new financing and become
publicly traded while the other two have had to close down.
Data analysis
Data analysis pro ceeded in several iterative steps that included (1) Coding interviews for
temporal words and meanings; (2) Within unit analysis including taking into account the
two eras straddling the bubble burst; (3) Cross-unit analysis; (4) Writing four within unit
narratives leading to a data grounded model and finally, (5) Two rounds of model
validation with secondary data and new interview data.
We used a grounded theory approach for coding and interpreting interview data in order to
derive insights into the management of innovation and the strategic management of time
139
(Creswell 1998; Locke 2001). As interviews were proceeding, we started coding them
with the help of the software Atlas.ti, a coding done paragraph by paragraph on the basis of
temporal words such as duration and sequence of events, leaving room for emergent codes,
for instance, synchrony and asynchrony. The coding software functionalities were used to
write up impressions on paragraphs and whole texts as well as between texts comparison.
The temporal frontier of the 2001 technology bubble burst guided part of the within and
between units comparison of work processes and innovation practices. New questions
emerged through analysis which fed more coding and revision of previous coding on ail
texts.
In addition to respondents' understanding of work processes and of the field level temporal
shift, particular attention was given to temporal aspects of firm strategies as reported by
respondents. Because of the scarcity of theoretical tools as well as the many interpretations
possible for the word "time", as mentioned earlier, we free-coded the data set as "the goal
of open coding is to surface a variety of possible themes in the data" (Dougherty, 2002:
860). The most common codes were, by far, the future, followed by temporal rules and
venture history. In addition to the usual short and long term aspects of a horizon towards
the future, a finer-grained examination of interviews revealed clearly two other subtle
aspects of the future, its open-endedness and close-endedness described earlier, a notion
central to strategy in the context of biopharmaceutical ventures.
Coding of interviews goes beyond assigning a code to a paragraph. In coding, the
"researcher must interact deeply with the data" (Dougherty, 2002: 851). As a case in point,
here is a comment on the coding practice written down during the actual coding of
interviews: "The comings and goings in coding allow for a deeper understanding. For
instance, creating a new code in an interview and going back to the other interviews
requires reading again the same excerpts and allows the development of a greater intimacy
with data". Some detailed illustrations of the coding at this stage of the analysis are
provided in Appendix 2.
Our coding was a first step in a process of understanding how time was strategically
managed during the transition. Indeed, we adopted a narrative strategy (Langley 1999) and
140
wrote up multiple within unit narratives flot even primarily to communicate research
fmdings to colleagues but even more so as a step that would hopefully bring more insight
and perhaps generate theory (Pentland 1999). These narratives provided a thick description
of how managers perceived the transition they had to operate in the context of a temporal
shift. In particular, there were concerns about how to synchronize the venture's strategy and
work processes to temporal changes in the organizational field.
It is in the process of writing the first narrative while still being confronted with the fmegrained definition of the future that the idea of combining length of horizon and open/closeendedness of the future into a two-dimensional time horizon model first emerged. Further
along the way, we wrote up the other within unit narratives and used the portfolio model to
help in interpreting data.
The portfolio model was subjected to two rounds of validation in order to test and refme it.
First, secondary data about the four ventures' reported strategic decisions since the initial
interviews were used to test the model's ability to integrate this data. Second, our
respondents' comments fi-om follow-up interviews validated the model, in particular the
metrics used to build it (open and close-ended future; shorter and longer horizon).
In particular, when presented with the STH portfolio model, Venture A's current Chief
Technology Officer mentioned that it was useful in identifying what the venture's strategy
could have been in order to generate shorter term revenues. Also, in our follow-up
interview with Venture D's original Executive vice-president and Chief Operating Officer,
lie grabbed a sheet of paper and started scribbling on the representation of the portfolio
model to show where his current venture was at, actually transferring the portfolio model
developed with the original biopharmaceutical venture to his new diagnostics venture.
In brief, the length of the period covered by data collection, the triangulated data sources,
the thick descriptions, the feedback from organizational field members and the two
validation rounds through secondary data and venture member checks all contribute to
ensure the trustworthiness of data collection and analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
141
FINDINGS
We report our findings in two sections:
1. First, the specificities of the context of Quebec biopharmaceutical ventures.
2. Second, we recount how managers of four ventures strategically managed time horizons
during the transition between the academic research start-up and the product company
models.
Specificities of the context of Quebec biopharmaceutical ventures
The temporal shift within the Quebec biopharmaceutical field triggered a change in the
relationships between actors such as biotech managers and venture capitalists and brought
repercussions on decisions about firm activities and resource allocation practices, a change
that became most apparent when the venture prepared for a new round of financing, a
timing that sprawled over several years depending on the particular venture's situation.
For instance, venture capitalists preferred continuity over novelty and acted to merge and
support existing ventures rather than fund new university spin-offs. Investors' preferences
also went to projects with a close-ended sequence, such as development projects with a
commercial product in mind, rather than those with a promising but vague open-ended
sequence such as discovery projects or technological platforms. As well, projects that did
fmd new or renewed financing exhibited a downstream move in sequences such as
fmancing stages, maturity of projects, and firm lifecycles, and preferably exhibited shorter
durations.
In Quebec, numerous biotechnology ventures, mostly platform companies conducting
fundamental research, primarily in genomics, were started up or spun-off from universities
during the last portion of the 1990's. However, as the investment climate radically changed,
platform companies were in jeopardy and there were even expectations in 2003 that most
firms would flot survive the following eighteen months. Transfer technology offices were
holding off creating new spin-offs as well. The initial public offering (IPO) window was
said to be closed at least until 2005. It was well known at the time that venture capitalists
142
favoured the transformation of current platform companies into product companies to
meet their urgent need for securing an exit towards the stock market.
Because platform ventures were involved with very long term projects that could flot
promise short term returns, the time horizon of their research activities could flot match that
desired by venture capitalists. So, atone or syndicated, venture capitalists worked to merge
companies in their portfolio whenever they could or simply folded them. The research's
quality or innovativeness was never in question. But venture capitalists, the financial
lifeline of biotech ventures, needed to limit their tosses and maybe, generate a return.
Not surprisingly, when preparing to raise a new round of fmancing after 2001, biotech
managers faced an unwelcoming fmancial community, quite a different scene from what
they had experienced just a few years earlier. Consequently, a researcher studying biotech
ventures in the aftermath of the bubble burst could have logically expected to witness the
compliance of biotech managers with the new temporal rules, on the basis of both an
economic as well as a symbolic rationality, a compliance that could have been expected to
result in a high level of isomorphism amongst firms' strategies and activities.
However, as we will describe further, a finer-grained examination of four
biopharmaceutical firms reveals a diversity of responses that we capture with the twodimensional model of time horizons.
In the following section, we use the two-dimensional STH portfolio to illustrate how
managers exercised their discretion in managing time horizons during the transition fi-om
the academic research start-up to the product company models.
Managerial discretion in strategic responses to a temporal shift: Diversity, consistency
and dynamism of STH portfolios
When we first met with members of the four ventures, ail our respondents clearly reported
they felt the change in temporal rules occurring in the organizational field. The shift was
materializing most strongly while searching for renewed fmancing. Three of the ventures
were preparing a new round of fmancing and a fourth one was pondering a decision of
143
when and how to transition towards an in-house drug discovery and development
program hence searching for fmancial support towards that goal.
There are three main fmdings fi-om the study of these four cases:
1. The four ventures' management had their own way of transitioning hence Figures 7a to
7d illustrate a diversity of STH portfolios;
2. The initial mariner chosen by managers for the transition was consistently pursued over
a number of years and,
3. As the ventures' accounts and cross-unit comparison will render explicit, two out of
four ventures, Ventures C and D, operated a dynamic transition and reached the stock
market while the other two, Ventures A and B, showed no dynamism and failed in their
bid to renew fmancing. Since then, they have folded. As summarized in Table XIX, we
define a dynamic management of time horizons:
a) First and foremost on the basis of interacting horizons brought about by a
purposeful strategy of concurrently allocating resources between two or more
horizons as described by members of the firm themselves (See arrows in figures 7c
and 7d for example). The insistence on purpose is in line with Helfat et al. 's (2007:
5) contention that "dynamic capabilities reflect some degree of intent even if flot
fully explicit". We have found two different patterns of this dynamic management
of strategic time horizons: the competing allocation and the synergistic allocation.
b) We have identified a second strategy that we interpret as a manifestation of a
dynamic management of STHs, which we label a "temporal leap" and defme as
quickly re-arranging the STH portfolio in such a way as to appear doser to the
product company model with later-staged compounds. The motivation for a
temporal leap can be to attract additional venture capital, bring the venture doser to
an IPO and in the case of Venture C, show results that are more in synch with the
age of the venture. A temporal leap can be accomplished, for instance, through the
acquisition of downstream clinical trials programs or that of a later-staged company.
144
But before pursuing with a cross-unit analysis we will recount each venture's transition
to the product company portfolio. We present these brief accounts from the simplest
deployment (Commitment portfolio, Venture A) to the most complex arrangement of
strategic time horizons (Juggling portfolio, Venture D) with intermediate forms
concentrating on close-ended horizons (Isomorphic portfolio for Venture B and
Opportunistic portfolio for Venture C).
Each venture's account begins with the situation at the time we first met with its
management ("Start of transition") and carnes on in a subsequent section with the
continued transition aller our first series of interviews ("Pursuing the transition"). In each
section we attempt to provide an understanding of 1. The underlying rationale for the STH
portfolio or an answer to the question: Why those horizons?, and 2. What guided the
allocation of resources between horizons.
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Fu ture
Figure 7. Four ventu res transitioning: STH portfolios at start of transition
145
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Table XIX. The dynamic management of strategic time horizons
What?
Interacting horizons
"Temporal leap": STH portfolio's rearrangement
How?
•
•
•
•
Competing allocation
Synergistic allocation
Acquisition of downstream clinical trials prop-am
Acquisition of a later-staged company
In addition, under the "Start of transition" section, we try to convey the tensions present
that were expressed in the management of horizons. Under the "Pursuing the transition"
section, we also describe the ultimate outcome for the venture, success in reaching the stock
market or folding the venture.
Finally, we used quotations from interviews that we see as representing each venture
management' s idiosyncratic attitude towards time as an inspiration for the labelling of the
four portfolios. None of the four portfolios in Figure 7 are intended to represent an ideal
case. Rather they are meant to show the diversity in how managers exercised their
discretion during the transition towards the product company model.
Venture A's Commitment portfolio: "The ultimate goal is to have access to a new
chemodiversity [...] that was developed by Nature over millions of years of evolution [...]"
(Venture's founder and president).
Start of transition: Underlying rationale of STH portfolio and allocation rules
When first interviewed during the summer of 2003, the president and founder of Venture A
started narrating the founding of his company in the mid 1980's even though the company
was actually set up in 2000. Twenty years of his professional life including his Ph.D., his
MBA and his academic career were dedicated to developing a plant-cell culture approach,
hence the label "commitment portfolio". He and his closest collaborators, mostly engineers,
were hoping to solve the lack of innovation in the pharmaceutical field by renewing
chemodiversity, meaning they aimed at replenishing the library of compounds scientists
draw from when developing new drugs. They were aware of the fact that their research was
excentric in the sense that their techniques steered away from high-throughput screening, a
dominant paradigm in the field.
147
In regards to the STH portfolio, there were no allocation iules of resources per se as only
one quadrant was being deployed. Indeed, the venture's activities were overwhelmingly in
the open-ended and longer horizon as the technology platform was the raison d'être of the
venture. However, as a first step in the transition to a product company model, management
identified molecules to be transferred into the discovery process and also planned to hire a
drug discovery and development specialist (close-ended and longer horizon in Figure 7a) to
conform to the board's wishes.
At that time, Venture A's management was preparing for a second round of fmancing and
mentioned that they and their board members did flot agree on the venture's future. Our
data suggest that the open-ended and longer horizon, platform development, became
contentious and fed heated disagreements and tension between the board and management.
In particular, there were discussions about the timing of when to stop allocating funds to it,
discussions that highlight differences in perspectives about on the one hand, the very nature
of the technology and on the other hand, the nature of the venture itself.
In regards to the first difference, that about the nature of the technology, both the founder
and his then Operations manager confirmed in separate recent interviews that board
members never really grasped the fact that a plant cell culture platform is actually alive.
Indeed, the board favoured "killing the platform" 24, (open-ended and longer horizon) to
concentrate an resources on the development of lead compounds (close-ended and longer
horizon). So, abandoning the platform really meant "killing it" while rebuilding the
platform would have required at least two years of work.
So, while the board was seduced by the platform inasmuch as it could promise a
blockbuster drug, Venture A's management was concerned with the platform itself as a
ticket to the perennity of the firm: "There are forces that conspire against innovation once
you have an interesting product to move forward [...] Somebody was willing to just kill it
[platform] and just put ail of the resources on developing that one product, which is kind of
24
An expression heard many times in interviews with members of several ventures.
148
silly and also incredibly risky, because if it's toxic in the next test, you're down to zero and
you've killed your technology platform and your company is dead. So, that was an extreme
example but some people think that. That's sort of the reality we have to live with" (Vicepresident, Business development, reflecting upon that morning's board meeting).
This brings us to the second difference in perspectives between board members and venture
managers, that about the nature of the venture itself, materialized in the choice of the
business mode!. Indeed, the pursuit of the fully-integrated pharmaceutical company
(FIPCO) business model was an avowed goal at Venture A (Figure 8 illustrates the
translation of a FIPCO into the STH portfolio mode!). This meant that the venture was to
become a company involved in ail stages of proprietary self-funded drug discovery and
development in addition to production, marketing and sales. Well known examples include
Amgen, Genentech, Chiron, Biogen, Gilead and MedImmune.
Figure 8. Venture A's interiretation of a FIPCO
Future
Length
Open-ended
Close-ended
Shorter
Drug development
Longer
Continued Platform
Development
Drug Discovery
At least in the mind of Venture A's founder, resources would continue to be allocated to
platform development, an open-ended and longer horizon, in order to provide a steady flow
of lead compounds to drug discovery and drug development. It is implied that revenues
generated by product sales as well as money raised from the stock market would be
sufficient to sustain a continued stream of innovation, a scenario that in our most recent
149
interview, the founder retrospectively qualified as "naive" and "requiring way too much
money", stressing his own "ignorance" as well as that of his board at the time.
In a recent interview, the founder revealed that as soon as his venture raised its first round
of financing in 2002, "I had three or four VCs on my case to convince me to buy other
companies. They suggested about fifteen companies". Indeed, venture capitalists were
trying to salvage pre-bubble burst investments they had made in a multitude of platform
companies, by merging them.
The founder and other managers met for this study were indeed concerned with ensuring
the continuity of the venture while needing venture capital. So, the president attempted to
entrain venture capitalists to the longer rhythm of a fully-integrated pharmaceutical
company. For instance, the president declared that he had "educated our VCs on where we
wanted to go". Also, his discourse showed that, even in the post-bubble burst context, lie
was still counting on the potentialities of furthering the platform's development to obtain
fmancial support (open horizons). Indeed, lie mentioned that during the first meeting of his
newly formed scientific advisory board, the scientific experts confirmed the "enormous"
potential of the research. The description of future potentialities went even further and
alluded to the possibility of creating new strains of plants, non existent in nature but that
could grow in the laboratory, providing in essence a technical monopoly "that excites
investors because you don't need a patent if your molecule cannot be synthesized in any
other way".
Although management was insisting on keeping the platform, this is not to say that it was
unaware of the importance of developing products. As a case in point, the vice-president,
Business development mentioned that in a document lie was preparing for the next round of
fmancing, he was estimating that, over the following years, the platform's value would
decrease while products spawned from the platform, "the fruits of technology", would
provide increased value to the company.
150
Nevertheless, the founder's vision of a fully-integrated pharmaceutical company failed
abruptly during Spring 2005 when the company ran out of money, could flot mise new
funds and had to lay off its forty employees. This occurred despite efforts to materialize the
close-ended, longer horizon through the hiring of a vice-president drug discovery in April
2004 as well as a change of company name in order to acicnowledge the transition from a
company that "used to do fundamental research on molecules from the plant world" to a
"drug and discovery house". A statement signalling a transition to the product company
model as further development of the platform was officially put on hold.
Pursuing the transition: Portfolio changes and new underlying rationale
Not ail was lost though. In February 2006, the Canadian subsidiary of a small American
pharmaceutical company acquired Venture A's intellectual property and research
equipment for a fraction of the investments made in it. The founder and Operations
manager stayed on board.
Its mission was redefined as "commercializing plant-cell based bioprocesses for the
discovery, development and production of natural and novel plant-derived products for the
pharmaceutical, cosmetic and nutraceutical industries" (Company documentation). In
effect, this meant that the platform was to be used as a proprietary technology (open-ended
and shorter horizon) to offer services in applications such as product development for world
leading companies in cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and consumer health (close-ended and
longer horizon) (See Figure 9 for the STH portfolio). Agreements were sought and signed
during 2006 for joint product development with world leaders in cosmetics,
pharmaceuticals and consumer health, generating revenues of two million dollars in its first
year.
Because products in those fields do flot need to be scrutinized by regulatory agencies, they
escape the rhythm of clinical studies and their development exhibit a shorter time horizon.
In addition to bringing in revenues, the new service company portfolio was starting to bring
time horizons into interaction, hence contributing to learning: "And the platform evolved.
Just by developing applications, we discover ail sorts of things. We discovered a lot in
151
working with cosmetics companies", stated the former Operations manager and current
company's Chief Technical Officer.
Fi ure 9. Venture A's service comanv uortfolio
Future
Length
Open-ended
Close-ended
Shorter
Proprietary technology
Longer
Platform development
Pharmaceutical cosmetic
& nutraceutical
applications
It is worth noting, as our most recent interview with the founder reveals, that he was
interested in cosmetics applications from the platform from the onset in 2000 and was even
approached by a potential client company. However, even if the service company model
would have generated revenues from proprietary technology (open and close-ended shorter
horizons), his board of directors refused the opportunity in the name of "focusing" and
avoiding "distractions", and pressed on towards the product company model (Venture A's
founder). In a follow-up interview with the then Operations manager and current CTO, he
recalled that even laboratory workers at the time, engineers, chemists and technicians, were
of the opinion that the platform could and should be used to generate revenues. Instead
between 2003 and 2005, "there was only one goal: go as fast as possible [towards a
product]. Money is no question". But, "by dint of saying "focus, focus, focus...", we ended
up ...dead...because we were focusing on something that could eventually bring value but
no short-term revenues to the company".
Nevertheless in early 2008, the company suspended its activities again, for lack of funds.
Insufficient investments on the part of the acquiring company have been mentioned as
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instrumental in the demise of the venture. The founder has declared that if the intellectual
property became available for sale, he would fmd an investor and pursue its development.
In conclusion, Venture A, a true platform company, failed at its transition to a product
company while managers were experiencing tensions with board members on the basis of
their different perspectives about the nature of the technology and the nature of the venture
itself. These differences were expressed in the choice of horizons for the allocation of
resources as well as the appropriateness of generating revenues from the platform while
attempting to reach the product company portfolio. Pressured to focus the allocation of
resources on a single horizon (close-ended, longer horizon) in the hope of speeding up
transition to the product company, Venture A nevertheless failed at securing additional
financing and halted its activities. Subsequently, Venture A was allowed to adopt the
service company portfolio, which generated revenues, and started to experience interacting
horizons. However, the venture folded a second time.
Venture B's Isomorphic portfolio: "No matter who you are or in what sector, when
you're face to face with investors, absolutely everything is about timing" (Vice-president,
Finance and Business development).
Start of transition: Underlying rationale of STH portfolio and allocation rules
Venture B is the sole venture of our sample that was officially incorporated in the midst of
the technology bubble burst that hit biotechnology in Fall 2001. The two founders were a
scientist tumed venture capitalist and an investment banker. One of the founders and vicepresident, Finance and Business development, confirmed that he and his partner were well
aware of the fmancing community's shifting investment preferences. In fact, the venture
was designed ex-ante to respond to them.
Thus, as venture capitalists "don't invest in platforms anymore. They want a company
focused on a disease [...] a pure-play company", Venture B never had a multiple disease
applications platform (open-ended and longer horizon) but rather, unlike most if flot ail
biopharmaceutical ventures in Quebec at the time, in-licensed early-stage compounds,
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bypassing the academic research stage, as well as focused on a single disease (close-ended
rather than open-ended horizons), diabetes.
Further institutional field's new preferences were incorporated in the design of Venture B.
For instance, activities in the open-ended horizons were minimized flot only by the absence
of a platform but also by extemalizing ail other open-ended time horizons. Only liaison
activities were done by an in-house pre-clinical trials group that regularly kept abreast of
academic research and qualified compounds before they were brought in-house (into the
close-ended and longer horizon). The requù-ement for speed was met by having drug
discovery activities (close-ended and longer horizon) managed in-house but actually
outsourced to contract research organizations (CROs). Management's goal was to reach the
completion of clinical trials phase II, at which point collaboration with pharmaceutical
partners would be sought. Finally, concems for the management of risk were met through
the staged pipeline of the close-ended horizon with four molecules with different
mechanisms of action and at different stages of advancement. This was said to provide
"several shots on goal", hence managing risk (Vice-president, Finance and Business
development).
The reasoning behind the ex-ante design of this portfolio of time horizons along with
Venture B management's expectations that their organization "success and survival" would
benefit from it are reminiscent of Meyer and Rowan's (1977: 349) description of
"institutional isomorphism". Hence, we labelled Venture B's portfolio "isomorphic" (See
Figure 7b).
At the time of initial interviews in Summer 2005, management was highly concemed with
speed and used outsourcing, experts and cross-functional teams as well as laboratory
facilities located within an incubator in order to speed up development, get access to
forefront expertise, slow down burn rate, minimize delays and lower risks. Although four
compounds were said to be under investigation and used in the pipeline published on the
web site and on company fact sheets, when pressed with questions, we leamed that priority
was indeed given to speeding up one compound into Phase lia clinical trials (close-ended
154
shorter horizon) "flot for survival reasons, but for the visibility of the venture". Clinical
trials are seen as a stage that "differentiates men from boys" and raises the company's
profile in the eyes of fmanciers as "the switch is turned on" when clinical trials are close at
hand (Senior manager, Clinical development). Another compound was expected to enter
preclinical trials shortly (close-ended, longer horizon) as management was also preparing to
raise a new round of fmancing, hoping to get US $30 million.
Both at the start of transition and later on, Venture B was recognized with several awards
for the innovativeness of its research, attractiveness to fmancial partners and contribution to
the notoriety of Quebec's biotech sector. In the initial interview, the vice-president, Finance
and Business development, mentioned that venture capitalists he was meeting in
preparation for the second round of fmancing were impressed that the company had met its
first round's milestone objectives, contributing to the venture's credibility. The other
managers met also conveyed the idea that research in this venture was under control for
several reasons including the efficiency of outsourcing: "When we need to evaluate a
molecule, it is more profitable to work with an outside expert who already has this expertise
rather than develop it in-house. Otherwise, it takes time, you can stumble, and it's flot
profitable...in terms of time...resources, energy...", the insistence on speed and reliability
in the choice of sub-contractors as well as the focus on a single disease: "I have seen other
companies that had several projects at once, trying to lead them simultaneously. They failed
because they were just too scattered". The well-thought out operations of Venture B were
credited to the experience of the founders and other experienced managers who knew "what
not to do to fait ...and what to do to advance..." (Director, Pre-clinical pharmacology).
Control and planning was also on the mind of the Senior Manager, Clinical Development
who understood that small biopharmaceuticals are "timeline driven [...] and cannot incur
delays [...] we try to be as creative and accurate as possible. We try to really meet our
deadlines, even beat them". In order to do so, relationships with contract research
organizations (CROs) need to be managed: "My colleague and I are always ahead of the
CRO. We are the ones managing it!". And indeed, the first compound was said to advance
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rapidly through the stages: "It is simply a question of organization, internai and externat
expertise... and maybe luck...we try to do the same with ail the compounds".
No tension in the management of horizons transpires from our data. On the contrary, our
interviews with members of Venture B left us with the understanding that this
management's knowledge of the financial community's shifting investment preferences as
well as the conscious design of the venture's portfolio of time horizons protected it from
the vagaries of the transition that other ventures had to shoulder. As the Director, Preclinicat pharmacology put it: "Investors are very interested in a dynamic company
with...how could I say?...that is looking ahead and plans also for the future...I think we
have a very good organization". The Senior Manager, Clinicat Development also insisted
on the necessity to respond quickly to changes in the drug discovery and development
process and declared that this venture had the required capacities such as "team spirit,
dynamism, pro-activity....anticipation, planning...that will allow us to surely and safely
advance in the process. And try other times - instead of taking one route — try to cut down a
bit to...accelerate the process...because developing a drug costs an arm and a leg!".
Nevertheless, Venture B was unsuccessful in raising new funds in 2005 although it secured
a US $ 8 million bridge fmancing, attracted two new fmancial partners and announced it
was still hoping to raise a new round for the last quarter of 2006, something that never
materialized.
Pursuing the transition: Portfolio changes and new underlying rationale
Hence this venture originally designed to comply with the temporal shift and housing
several close-ended future time horizons could not sustain its isomorphic portfolio and
chose to concentrate ail resources on advancing a single product towards clinicat trials in
the hope of providing an exit for its powerful stakeholders (See Figure 10).
Close examination of company fact sheets and web site between June 2005 and April 2008
shows that the very detailed staged pipeline and predicted achievements (milestones)
present in the June 2005 and April 2006 fact sheets were bared down to a minimum starting
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with the Fa!! 2006 fact sheet, the last one to be published. Achievement predictions
disappeared from the subsequent pipeline representations on the firm's web site as verified
in March 2007 and April 2008. No other compound has advanced into the close-ended and
shorter horizon. In fact, other compounds became identified as "research programs", a set
back from progress advertised in 2006. We were not able to confirm if previous activities of
liaison with academic investigators as well as externalized fundamental research were still
going on
Figure 10. Venture B's single product comoanv nortfolio
Future
Length
Open-ended
Close-ended
Shorter
Longer
Compound A
Research programs
Finally in early Summer 2008, the press reported a major set back in clinical trials of the
main lead compound with other (early-stage) compounds requiring massive investments.
Mid-Summer 2008, the assets of the company were sold to another biopharmaceutical
company for a little over one million dollars.
In conclusion, Venture B's STH portfolio designed to comply with institutional pressures
by insisting on close-ended horizons provided expectations that it would adequately focus
its resource allocation to become a product company, given that it did not have the baggage
of previous ventures set up during the bubble era with a platform company's portfolio
(open-ended, longer horizon). However, effectively relying on a single time horizon (closeended, shorter horizon) rendered Venture B more vulnerable to the threat identified by
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managers of the other three ventures: a set-back in clinicat trials with no resources
(technology or income) from other time horizons to support further venture activities.
Venture C's Opportunistic portfolio: "You need good scientists and good managers who
can raise money at the right time and in the right amount. And once in a white, planets need
to be aligned so that when an opportunity cornes, you're able to seize it and bring it fo its
full potential. And that's luck." (Founding scientist).
Start of transition: Underlying rationale of STH portfolio and allocation rules
Venture C was the epitome of the technology bubble biotech firm. Although it was flot
unusual in Quebec during the latter part of the 1990's, to create a firm to develop a
technological platforrn, doing so without any lab results had not been seen before Venture
C. This venture was set up to pursue very early discovery research with promises of a range
of products whose time to market elude estimation.
We found no prior design of the venture's portfolio or cornmitment to a particular research
at Venture C except for the long-term goal of trying to fmd a licensing partner after clinicat
trials II. Retrospectively, we can say that opportunistic behaviour was present from the
onset, hence the label "opportunistic portfolio". Actually, the venture's birth was recounted
by the vice-president of Finance as a serendipitous affair: "By a nice Friday aftemoon,
three university professors were having a beer...". And, they indeed came up with a very
attractive idea: what if by combining their knowledge in molecular biology, virology and
drug resistance, they could use genomics to overcome the problem of bacterial resistance to
antibiotic drugs?
Although stopping the platform's development in 2003 to pursue drug discovery (closeended and longer horizon) was no accident, as it was a decision taken in compliance with
venture capitalist's preferences, the addition of a close-ended and shorter horizon was flot
planned. Indeed, toxicity problems encountered in drug discovery put management face to
face with the riskiness of "focusing" solely on drug discovery and its threat on the venture's
perennity.
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In a controversial decision within its ranks, Venture C's management chose to retain its
chemists instead of temporarily letting them go, and reassigned them to an alternate
research project which eventually opened up four avenues of pro-drugs development in the
close-ended and shorter horizon albeit additional costs were incurred.
Although unforeseen, this horizon was promising in many ways: (1) Pro-drugs being a
complex of a known drug and a molecule targeting a specific delivery site, their
development offers a shortened, hence speedier, clinical trials process; (2) Pro-drugs can in
effect be assimilated to later-stage compounds (close-ended and shorter horizon); (3) Prodrugs are protected by industrial secret rather than patent, providing an extended temporal
window of exclusive sales as compared to regular patented drugs and (4) Because prodrugs were being developed with four distinct drugs, it provided management with
increased bargaining power towards the drugs' varied owners.
At the time of initial interviews in January 2005 and again in a recent one, management
confirmed that it had been dynamically allocating resources between the two close-ended
quadrants and among the four pro-drugs projects on the basis of the speediest progress
towards clinical trials (See Figure 7c) considering also the costs involved and the expected
future value.
Dynamically allocating resources to competing quadrants and projects certainly brought its
tensions. Indeed, the founding scientist viewed switching resources from one project to
another as a sort of "guerrilla research". Nevertheless, it was also necessary because of the
"lack of resources to compete with larger companies". And Venture C had this capacity to
adapt : "this is a company with a plastic structure in the sense that if you have a good vein,
ail resources need to be reorganized around it so that we can advance rapidly even if it
means abandoning certain things that, a few days or weeks ago, looked really good". The
academic researchers were credited as a source of plasticity, used to switching from one
area to another "very different from the pharmaceutical industry that have a structure that is
much, much more rigid and where this kind of thing is much more difficult to operate".
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Another aspect of the capacity to adapt was the acceptance that the role of founders can
change. Thus, when first met, the founding scientist was acting as a scientific advisor to the
venture. He had had previous experience in university spin-offs having been a board
member for a spin-off from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the
founder of two others in Montreal. He said he was "totally comfortable" with the changing
role of a founder, more important at the beginning and phasing out over time, "When the
company starts to develop and there's serious financing....often investors require that a
management structure be in place [...] that's when the role of the founder...becomes more
scientific [...] until the scientific needs surpass the founders' capacities, because after ail, I
am flot a chemist".
Even the scientific mission of the venture was adaptable. Indeed, funding was expected to
run out at the end of 2005. Although management was not prepared to reveal which
strategic option it was more likely to embrace in order to close the next fmancing round, the
founding scientist stated that "ail options must remain open", including the acquisition of a
more mature product and merging with a company with an endowment that could be spent
on common projects. The prospect that one or the other current project be set aside in order
to successfully raise new funds did not appear unsettling to him because "the intellectual
property could eventually be presented to other partners or other companies with an interest
in it".
Pursuing the transition: Portfolio changes and new underlying rationale
Venture C is one of two ventures from our sample that was actually successful in raising
new funds to ensure its continuity. It did so through a temporal leap late in the year 2005,
filling up the open-ended shorter horizon with the acquisition of a Phase III clinical trials
program for an antibiotic whose development had been suspended (See Figure 11 for the
new STH portfolio).
Although far less innovative than the platform's lead compounds that promised to
revolutionize antibiotherapy, this new drug candidate allowed Venture C to transform itself
160
into a product company with a staged pipeline. The vice-president Finance recalls that
management felt obligated to abandon the then current projects in order to save the venture:
"You have no money left, you're searching for financing and you're presenting your
company. The questions they ask you are "How much time?", "How much does it cost?"
and "What' s the risk?". We knew no one would take the bait. If we had persisted, we were
dead...we were dead [...] We worked on these during...five years... spending...at least
fifteen or seventeen million dollars...". But being philosophical, he added that usually, the
research a biotech starts with is not what finally ensures its success.
Figure 11. Venture C's temporal leap towards product cie portfolio
Future
Open-ended
Close-ended
Length
Shorter
In-licensed compound:
indication no 1.
In-licensed compound:
indication no 2.
In-licensed compound:
other indications
•
Pro-drugs•
Longer
Platform's compounds
Again, management was opportunistic. The vice-president, Finance remembers how it
went: "One morning, the three of us [Chief executive officer, chef scientific officer and
vice-president, Finance] sat down and figured out we needed at least a Phase II compound,
Phase III would be better. We needed something and we had eight to nine months of cash
[...] They got on the phone. They called people and that's what they found [...] les a
coincidence we stayed in the antibiotics. We looked at ail sorts of things. But obviously,
these guys know the antibiotic business best", and that is where their contacts were.
So they found a molecule and "there weren't very many lying around and it's very close to
the market, two, three years at the most to sales", confirmed the vice-president Finance.
Moreover, they could use the venture's history in solving antibiotic resistance, as well as
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pro-drugs (developed with antibiotics) to build an argument based on continuity, fuelling
credibility in the eyes of stock market analysts.
Staging multiple indications for the compound shortens the subsequent indications' horizon
as their investigation can commence at Phase II clinical trials. Thus, toxicity studies done in
Phase I clinical trials for the first indication benefit other indications. In addition, by
keeping the close-ended and longer horizon of pro-drugs, to which less than 5% of
resources are allocated, Venture C retains the resources of a chemistry laboratory that are
used three ways: 1. To continue the development of pro-drugs on the basis of other
companies' antibiotics, hence building a pipeline of products; 2. To develop an additional
pro-drug with their in-licensed antibiotic, a more profitable option should the drug be
optimal as they own the intellectual property and 3. To chemically alter the in-licensed
antibiotic while conserving its activity in order to reset the patent dock to zero, offering an
additional twenty-year protection. This last use can be seen as a synergistic allocation of
resources between the two close-ended quadrants.
Compounds spawned from the platform still appear on the venture's web site as an integral
part of the pipeline, providing an additional project in the close-ended, longer horizon
quadrant. However, we were told that no resources are being allocated to them because of
the high cost and risk as well as the very long horizon evaluated to be of at least another ten
to fifteen years. Nevertheless, this additional stage in the pipeline and horizons was said to
be use ful in raising the last round of funds, a symbolic use of the horizon, but that it is not
wise to allocate resources to it until the venture becomes more independent financially.
As confirmed by the vice-president Finance, Venture C's temporal leap was instrumental in
raising in excess of US $100 million in a 2007 round and 2008 IPO. In effect, it
transformed a biotech venture with an uncertain future and no product close to market into
a rare opportunity for investors: Aller all, " "It's flot often you mn into a private company
that has had two positive Phase III trials and is ready" to seek approval from the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration", declared in the press the newly hired CE0 in the Fall of 2006,
confirming venture capitalists' "great deal of interest".
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Pursuant to the leap the venture had to quickly acquire personnel experienced in clinical
trials, regulatory affairs and marketing, which it did by assembling a team of recently
retired pharmaceutical managers. In the course of 2008, the company filed a New Drug
Application with the FDA as well as a Marketing Application with the European Medicines
Agency (EMEA). Sales are expected to start in the course of 2009.
Asked to reflect upon the transition, the vice-president, Finance, laughed, saying that it was
more a "one hundred eighty degree turn"! He continues: "What's of outmost importance is
management's capacity to adapt and bounce back".
In conclusion, Venture C reached the stock market with a molecule it did flot discover and
had to let go of its potentially revolutionary approach that was so attractive to investors
when the venture was first set up. Its management successfully manoeuvred between
compliance to shifting temporal rules from the organizational field and seizing unforeseen
opportunities. It did flot "focus" resource allocation on the close-ended, shorter horizon
until it completed its temporal leap. Even now, a minimal amount of resources is allocated
to the pro-drugs project. Of this account of Venture C's transition emanate a continued
sense of adaptation and plasticity in the projects pursued, the intellectual property
developed and the personnel on board as well as a commitment to ensure the continuity of
the firm itself.
Venture D's Juggling portfolio: "It actually makes more sense to start considering the
technological applications of the science before the science is finished. There are enough
challenges just getting the application together that... we run out of time basically"
(Director, Biology Laboratory).
Start of transition: Underlying rationale of STH portfolio and allocation rules
Venture D was born three times between 1994 and 1998 when it fmally settled on the
development of a proteomics platform. Its management had previously developed and sold
two other businesses. As illustrated in Figure 7d, Venture D's portfolio encompassed
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horizons in ail four quadrants which were managed synergistically. Hence, we chose the
label "juggling" to qualify this venture's portfolio.
When Venture D raised its first round of fmancing in 2000, management's goal was to
build the best proteornics platform in the world (open-ended and longer horizon). However,
"it was clear that, as of 2001, a technology platform in development, with no deliverables,
no revenues, no market, and no prospect of profitability was worth nothing. Even longterm. Zero" (Executive vice-president and Chief Operating Officer).
Moreover, at each board meeting "we had to justify why we had this platform and why we
had twenty-four months of cash. Why shouldn't the board take back that cash [...] We had
to justify not only the cash we had raised but aLso why they wouldn't take it back [...] You
need to create value" (Executive vice-president and Chief Operating Officer).
When we first met in Spring 2003, Venture D's management had flot started allocating
resources to the "home run" horizon (close-ended and longer horizon) but was reflecting
upon the appropriateness and the timing of either setting up an internat drug discovery and
development progam or again acquiring a later-staged company. However, in spite of
changes in the financing community's preferences, management was of the opinion that
abandoning the platform might threaten the venture's perennity. It would become
vulnerable if confronted with the common occurrence of setbacks in drug discovery and
development or even if it became a target for a take-over by a pharmaceutical company.
Indeed, by the time compounds enter clinicat trials, "what pharma's buying is the whole
company or the crown jewels and that doesn't leave the company with much left as a
pipeline to pursue their efforts and that's leading them to pretty dire financial consequences
and their investors abandoning them and companies going under" (Executive vice-president
and Chief Operating Officer).
Moreover, the platform had become validated and Venture D had even struck an alliance
with a larger American biopharmaceutical to provide it with proteomics services that would
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help leapfrog that company into proteomics, avoiding the vast investments in genomics,
while funding future platform development at Venture D.
The three horizons Venture D was pursuing at the time were:
1. Platform development which was "focused on just, in general, making proteomics
more sensitive, knowing that whatever we do there will apply to ail our projects"
(Executive vice-president and Chief Operating Officer);
2. Projects to improve the platform marginally and design future deals for potential
partners, (open-ended and shorter horizon), or as the Director, Biology laboratory put it,
"give the business guys the =munition to go out there and say: "You know what? We
can approach these disease areas too. And here's some data to show you what we can do
with it", and
3. Delivering on such contracts (close-ended and shorter horizon).
The complexity of the portfolio was compounded by the dynamic and synergistic
interaction between time horizons. For instance, delivering on current deals (close-ended
and shorter horizon) was seen as building the company's credibility and legitimacy for
future deals (open-ended and shorter horizon) (arrow 1) while improving the platform
(arrow 2). It also allowed the company to retain targets and other intellectual property for
future development of its own drugs (arrow 3) while developing future deals provided
resources to R&D to advance the platform further (arrow 4). These collaborations also
brought in funds that slowed down the burn rate. Participating in the proteomics race,
meaning attempting to become the "best proteomics technology [...where] there's absolute
standards that have yet to be met", increased efficiency in work done on developing future
and current deals as well as potentially opening up new opportunities for future deals
(arrows 5 and 6). It also provided maturation of the platform and was expected to bring the
company doser to its goal of starting an in-house drug development program (arrow 7)
either through the set-up of an internai drug discovery and development program or by
acquiring a later-staged company (Executive vice-president and Chief Operating Officer).
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Finally, allocating resources to synergistically interacting time horizons brought tensions
that were flot found in the other three ventures, the sum of which was defmed by the
Business development associate as risking to become "an intellectual overload". These
tensions were:
1. Between shorter and longer term horizons, in effect giving precedence to the more
urgent tasks and may explain why extra funds earmarked for supplies and equipment
dedicated to the Proteomics Race were flot fully used.
2. Between open-ended and close-ended horizons, with the latter having a tendency to
take precedence because "you're having to, in parallel, deliver for partnerships while
you're trying to also innovate at the same time and sometimes, that doesn't allow you to
always take a step back and refme everything and test everything you'd like to test
before you go and try it out". (Executive vice-president and Chief Operating Officer):
3. Uncertainty about the future value of investing in the three horizons in regards to
hitting the home run, "you've got to believe in this day and age, you've got to make your
board and your investors believe that that investment pays off Because you're in a race
to be the best proteomics technology" (Executive vice-president and Chief Operating
Officer), which brings us to the last tension,
4. Uncertainty about the dynamic of the multiple horizon model to open up the home
run horizon, "it's flot always possible to understand if we're working on something
that is very valuable or if the project we're testing is of interest but flot enough to build
another Genentech. So it's not always easy to understand where to allocate human
resources and money" (Business Development Associate).
Pursuing the transition: Portfolio changes and new underlying rationale
Venture D did attain its goal of transitioning into a product company through a temporal
leap, as did Venture C. This decision was arrived at after the realization that the length of
the horizon for developing a pharmaceutical product from the company's own platform was
too long (eight to twelve years) with no hope of being able to raise the necessary funds to
pursue drug discovery and development, evaluated at about 250 millions dollars.
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The first attempt at a temporal leap came by purchasing two clinicat trials programs (closeended and shorter horizon): a Phase I in 2004 and a Phase Ha in Spring 2006. The plan was
to pursue development until the programs could attract additional fmancing, either venture
capital or public market. However, an early 2007 attempt at an IPO failed, the IPO window
reportedly too narrow.
Aller the failed IPO, management came to realize that the product company model and the
platform were actually involved in a "marnage of reason". The clinicat programs were
burdened by the platform's debt, over twenty million dollars, white contracts and alliances
made on the basis of the proteomics platform were limited to those that fit the
pharmaceutical company model: "you just do things that complement you business model:
royalty deals, milestone deals, things that move you forward with your pharmaceuticals.
You don't do diagnostics..." (Executive vice-president and Chief Operating Officer).
Contacts made in the industry showed that few, if any, contenders were prepared to
purchase the whole company. Even the clinicat programs, in cancer and infectious diseases,
attracted more attention individually than in combination. Contrary to most companies,
Venture D wished to keep its platform which had become profitable through a good service
business.
So, aller much difficulty tater in 2007, management found a publicly-traded
biopharmaceutical company to merge with. As a result of the deal, Venture D's portfolio of
horizons was reconfigured into two separate companies: the original close-ended and
shorter horizons (acquired clinicat trials program) along with the close-ended and longer
horizon (pre-clinical compounds developed by Venture D in the course of its service
agreements) were merged with the clinicat trial candidate (close-ended and shorter horizon)
of the new partner to become Venture D Pharmaceuticals as shown in Figure 12. This entity
then raised additional venture capital to pursue clinicat development.
In addition, the remaining horizons: open-ended and longer (platform), open-ended and
shorter (proprietary technology) as well as close-ended and shorter (service agreements)
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remained in a venture redefmed as a service company, Venture D Proteomics. This new
entity can be seen as retaining the original STH portfolio (see Figure 7d) which also houses
a close-ended and longer horizon which is that of future diagnostics products to be
developed on the basis of proteins identified through the close-ended and shorter horizon.
Venture D Proteomics was shortly thereafter acquired by an investment fund whose goal it
is to resell it at a profit within two to three years.
Figure 12. Venture D'spost-mer er product company portfolio
Future
Length
Open-ended
Close-ended
Shorter
3 clinical candidates for
Cancer and infectious
diseases
Longer
Pre-clinical
compounds
For the ex-Execut ive vice-president and Chief Operating Officer (and new CEO of Venture
D Proteomics), there is a sense of accomplished mission: "There is something interesting in
the fact that in 2000 when we raised our first round, our goal was to build the best
proteomics platform in the world. And today, in 2008, in spite of all the market upheavals
and the financial desert crossing, it is the best proteomics platform in the world!".
In conclusion, although recognizing the seriousness of the shifting temporal rules as well as
the vulnerability of ventures that focused resource allocation solely on clinical trials
compounds, Venture D's management refused to let go of its platform. Rather, it chose to
leverage it in order to generate funds and as a motor for a synergistic management of its
STH portfolio. In contrast with Venture C's experience, its own temporal leap through the
acquisition of two clinical trials programs did not bring about a successful IPO. Rather,
Venture D reached the product company portfolio through a merger with a publicly-held
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company at which point the STH portfolio was split in two to allow the spinning off of a
proteomics company destined for diagnostics applications rather than pharmaceuticals.
Now that our study has testified to the diversity of portfolios amongst the four ventures, we
attempt to shed more light on what may have contributed to Ventures A and B's demise and
Ventures C and D's success.
CROSS-UNIT COMPARISON
We recall the three main fmdings from our study of four ventures and provide a cross-unit
comparison in order to deepen our understanding of the differences and similarities in time
horizon management and venture outcomes:
1. The diversity of STH portfolios illustrated in Figures 7a to 7d stem from the distinct
ways in which management at the four ventures chose to operate the transition;
2. There is some consistency over the years in the way the transition was managed of each
venture and,
3. The two ventures that transitioned dynamically (Ventures C and D) were successful in
reaching the stock market while the other two (Ventures A and B) that did not show
dynamism folded.
While the list of characteristics in Table XX provides a good snapshot of the ventures, it
falls short of clarifying differentials in time horizon management and venture outcome.
Indeed, Ventures A and D actually share more characteristics with each other, such as
business mode!, academic origin, development of a technological platform, breath of
potential market, than with the other two ventures even though their respective portfolios
are the most distant from one another in terms of deployment and dynamics.
I
STHPortfolio
Aiming at FIPCO
(Fully integrated
pharmaceutical company)
University spin-off
Foundedin 2000 after 20-year
gestation
Plant cell culture
Business Model
Research origin/
Established in
Technological
platform/
State of platform
dvt
Potential market
(DDD)
1
Scientist-founder with
associates (engineers)
04
Founding teams
-4.
Preparing for 2nd round of
financing in order to start
Phase lia and preclinical
trials
Managers-founders
(Scientist turned VC and
investment banker)
In licensing of early-stage
compounds up tilt
completion of phase II
clinical trials
Not a university spin-off
IPbought from university
spin-off & others
Sel t 200 1
Natural plant active
ingredient
rm
cu
o
=
Size
Financing up till
interviews
k
e.
s...
0
I;
■.?
Preparing 3rd round of
financing (C$ 25-30M)
At odds with VCs on options
e..)
....b
%à
tn
...4
FOCUSED
Infectious diseases
42 emp loyees
C$ 20M
(No platform dvt)
FOCUSED
Type 2 Diabetes
29 emp loyees
C$ 27M
(Current platform dvt)
WIDE
Chemodiversity for wide range
ofdiseases
40 employees
C$ 23M
Not a university spin-off
By-passed university tech
transfer stage
1997
Bacteriophages for target ID
and DDD;
pro-cirugs
(No platform dvt)
DDD up to phase II clinical
trials
Preparing 4ffiround of
financing (C$ 25M)
Ail options openedincluding
M&A
3 university scientists & non
founding managers
WIDE
Process improvement for
wide range ofdiseases
80 emp loyees
(Current platform dvt)
Proteomics
University spin-off
3births ( 1994- 1998)
2founding teams: Founding
scientists & Founding
managers
Aiming at FIPCO
(Fully integrated
pharmaceutical company)
When and how to transition
towards internai DDD
"You need good scientists and "It actually makes more sense
good managers who can raise to start considering the
money al the right lime and in technological applications of
the right amoun t. And once in a the science before the science is
while, planets need to be aligned finished. There are enough
so that when an opportunity challenges first getting the
cornes, you 're able to seize it and application together that ... we
bring if to ils fu i potentiaL And nrn out of lime basically ".
that 's luck. " (Founding scientist)
(Director, Biology Laboratory)
4%
Challenges/
Options for future
action
Ventu re D
tà:1
te
(Founder and president).
Venture C
Z
"No malter who you are or in
what sector, when you 're face
to face with investors,
absolutely everything is about
timing "
(V-P, Finance andBusiness
Development).
Ventu re B
Isomorp hic
04
"The ultimate goal is to have
access to a new chemodiversity
[...] that was developed by Nature
over millions of years of evolution
Ventu re A
Commitment
,..
.....,
169
›
V)
(..)
170
We now examine the following three possibilities to deepen our understanding of the
fifty percent rate of success within our sample of ventures:
1. Success or failure is linked to the composition of the STH portfolio.
2. Failure is linked to the presence of a platform while success is linked to its absence.
3. Success is linked with dynamism in STH portfolio management while failure is linked
with a lack thereof.
Success or failure linked to STH portfolio composition
Comparing the four ventures' portfolio composition first, at the start of transition and
second, while pursuing the transition shows that no one portfolio composition can be linked
to either success or failure (See Figures 13 and 14).
Indeed, Venture B (failure) shares its portfolio composition with Venture C (success) at
both moments and with post-merger Venture D (success) while pursuing the transition.
Additionally, Venture D (spun-off proteomics venture) (success) retains its original
portfolio composition while Venture A (failure) goes it alone at the start and pursuing the
transition.
Hence, the actual composition of the STH portfolio cannot discriminate between failure and
success.
171
Figure 13. Start of transition: Composition of four portfolios
Future
Length
Open-ended
Close ended
Shorter
Ventures
B mai C
Venture D
Longer
Venture A
Figure 14. Pursuing the transition: Composition of four portfolios
Future
Lettgth
Op -ended
Close-ended
Venture
Shorter
Venture D
(Prof)
Longer
1
Ventures
B, C, D
Success or failure linked to absence or presence of a platform
Management at ail four ventures were knowledgeable about the high risks of drug
discovery and development. A common risk that bas been mentioned by our respondents is
that of finding out that the compound is toxic and must be abandoned. Or that the
compound could go through clinical studies and fait to show efficacy or exhibit
172
unacceptable side effects, hence the trials would suffer major setbacks and require
redirection and further investments or the compound would be abandoned.
The presence or absence of a platform within a venture was a significant element in the
tensions between venture managers and venture capitalists and can be seen as the desire of
the latter to externalize risk diversification white venture managers would prefer to
internalize risk diversification.
Indeed, venture capitalists "use your company to balance their portfolio" (Venture A's
vice-president, Business development) which results in spreading the risks of drug
discovery and development in numerous ventures, advancing as fast as possible, recovering
resources from ventures that fait and concentrating them on the ones that are still worth
betting on, ah l in the hope of arriving at a profitable exit: a drug that will allow a successful
IPO or selling the company to a pharmaceutical firm.
But the venture's management is concerned with the perennity of its organization and "as a
company, we need a pipeline wide enough to put chance on our side because those
are...that's the law in drug discovery and development... things fait» (Venture A's vicepresident, Business development).
The presence of venture capital, though instrumental in the set-up and development of these
science business ventures, propels them in a vulnerable position. Indeed, responding to
venture capitalists' need for speed by "focusing" resource allocation on the close-ended and
shorter horizon puts the venture at risk of flot recovering from a setback in clinicat trials.
Paradoxically, even success may translate into the termination of the venture's activities.
When clinicat trials are successful and the venture sold to a pharmaceutical company, it
gets the "crown jewels", leaving the company with little if anything to pursue its activities
especially if it did "focus" its resource allocation on that one successful compound.
Hence, continuing the development of a platform can be seen as an attempt on venture
management's part to mitigate drug discovery and development's risks. Thus, Venture D's
173
service business and intent on becoming the best proteomics platform may be seen as a
deliberate attempt to also make itself less vulnerable to the presence of venture capital.
As Table XX showed, both Ventures A and D kept their platform while Venture B never
had one but in-licensed four compounds in drug discovery and Venture C abandoned its
platform to pursue the development of four pro-drug projects in addition to its lead
compounds. Again, this aspect cannot discriminate between failure and success.
Success or failure linked with dynamism or lack thereof in STH portfolio
management
Zooming in on the notions of on the one hand, pursuing or flot the development of a
platform and on the other hand, using a dynamic management of STH portfolio, Figure 15
illustrates that the absence of a technology platform is flot strictly associated with
successfully reaching the stock market, hence providing an exit for venture capitalists.
Rather, we suggest that dynamically managing time horizons with or without the
continuation of platform development better reflects circumstances of success.
Figure 15. Transitioning ventures : A look at dynamic STH
mana ement and Dlatform develoD ment
PLATFORM DEVELOPMENT
DYNAMIC
ABSENT
PURSUED
STH
MNGT
DYNAMIC
NOT
DYNAMIC
Venture C -
Venture D
Venture B
Venture A
Note: Shaded areas correspond to ventures successful in reaching stock
market
174
Indeed, Ventures C and D dynamically managed time horizons throughout the course of
this study as shown by either competing or synergistic horizons in addition to operating a
temporal leap to a later-staged company (See Table XXI). Both ventures' management
confirmed that the temporal leap was purposely done to attract further financing and ensure
the venture's survival. It became ah l the more crucial since as time went by the stock market
tended to no longer offer an exit for investors at the Phase II clinical trials but rather at a
more downstream stage, Phase III clinical trials. In addition, as mentioned in an initial
interview, Venture C needed to solve another problem. Indeed, as it was established at a
fundamental research stage, it appeared old for the results it had to show, possibly eliciting
mistrust from investors. The temporal leap was supposed to offset this age problem by
providing a better match between age of venture and achievements.
In contrast, Ventures A and B did not manage time horizons dynamically. It is correct that,
late into the transition, Venture A switched to a service company model by using its
platform as a proprietary technology. As Venture A's CTO mentioned this switch in
horizons was starting to put in place interacting horizons. However, it appears that it was
too little too late as the venture folded for a second time. In regards to Venture B, it
suffered a set-back in the clinical trials for the sole compound it had in the close-ended,
shorter horizon. Had it managed time horizons dynamically, for example through a
competing allocation between the two close-ended horizons, it might have had other close
to clinical trials compounds to fall back on. Rather, this venture's story ends with the sale
of its intellectual property to another venture.
This analysis of three potential avenues for reaching a deeper understanding of success and
failure within our sample of ventures brings us to the observation that a dynamic
management of strategic time horizons contributed to the success of Ventures C and D
while the lack thereof contributed to Ventures A and B's demise.
Outcome
New
underlying
rationale
Opportunistic
Isomorphic
Speed to clinical trials.
Priorization of projects to reach
IND status (entry into c linical
trials).
Installing a new paradigm for
pharmaceuticals in order to
renew chemodiversity.
Venture folded. IP sold out.
New venture developed
platform applications for
other industries.
Folded again.
Clinical trials set back. No IPO.
Sale of assets.
Late conversion to proprietary Resources presumably focused on
technology accomplished single clinical trials compound.
after sale of IP. (Open-ended
and shorter horizon)
Generating short term Getting at least one product close
revenues. Keep platform to market to
increase
alive.
attractiveness for investors
Ex ante design to synchronize
with VCs preferences inc luding
staged pipeline and focus on
single disease.
Very long term view of the
FIPCO model.
Generating short term revenues
with platform in order to s low
down burn rate and hope to
secure additional venture capital.
4 synergistic horizons
Juggling
Venture D
Temporalleap.
Acquis ition of clinica l trials
program (close-ended shorter
horizon)
Providing close to market
projects in order to increase
attractiveness for investors.
Matching age of venture with
accomplishments.
Successful temporalleap :
Attracted additional venture
capital plus IPO.
ie transition
Temporal leap.
Acquisition of clinical trials
programs (close-ended shorter
horizon)
Providing c lose to market projects
in order to increase attractiveness
for investors.
Providing financial return for
platform investments.
Unsuccessful temporal leap :
Failed IPOattempt.
Later merged with publiclytraded comp any, raised more
venture capitaland sp un-off
service company financial ly
backed by investment fund.
Project that is fastest, less Generate cashflow; Build
costly, creates more future intellectual property and value;
value.
Manage multiple tensions
Monitor results andreadjust.
, between horizons.
Serendipity offounding
research. Accidental alternate
research project. Opportunistic
behaviour.
2 comp eting horizons
Start of transition
Venture C
Venture B
a.)
=
0
Z
STH
Portfolio
changes
Dynamic
STH mn t
Underlying
p
rationale of
initial STH
ortfolio
Allocation
ru les
Venture A
Commitment
Table XXI. Transitioning by fou r ventu res: management of an STH p ortfolio
a.)
=
0
Z
175
176
We now highlight elements that might have favoured or precluded a dynamic STH
management in our sample of ventures by continuing with comparisons. First, comparison
of the two ventures that pursued a platform development and second, that of the two
ventures that did flot.
Both Ventures A and D had to counter an organizational field that was unfavourable flot
only to platforms but also to the service company model or even to a therapeutics product
company model. Venture capitalists were investing in ventures with the goal of selling
either drug compounds or the whole venture to a pharmaceutical firm in the context of
these firms needing to quickly renew a dried-up pipeline and protect themselves from a
wave of expiring patents. Therapeutics and service were flot an option they were willing to
consider as confirmed by Venture A's founder and Venture D's Executive vice-president
and Chief Operating Officer in recent interviews.
In the case of Venture A, the board actually refused to pursue such an opportunity in a
decision made in 2000 in the name of focusing ail resources on the pharmaceutical product
company model.
Venture D had a board of directors that was asking its executives "What's next?" during
periodic strategic reviews of platform opportunities. Even though the question was also
intended to avoid surprises, the focus would turn to "opportunities [that] might allow us to
go into different areas like basically this decision to go into biomarkers and mechanisms of
action studies" (Executive vice-president and Chief Operating Officer).
Venture A had a board committed to the development of pharmaceutical drugs with
members interested in salvaging investments made in other ventures by merging them.
Venture A had been approached with fifteen candidates for its consideration.
In light of Venture D's success in developing a sound service business that could even lead
to an entry into therapeutics, as well as Venture A's subsequent, albeit belated, success in
developing applications for industries beyond pharmaceuticals with the service model,
177
brings us to the observation that a dynamic management of time horizons may be
favoured by a board of directors and a management whose vision accommodates a diversity
of business models and opportunities while it may be precluded by a narrow one.
Let's now turn to the contrast offered by the comparison between Venture B and Venture
C.
We recall that Venture C's STH portfolio exhibited no prior design in contrast to Venture
B's horizons that were carefully designed in conformity with the new institutional
preferences. Rather, Venture C capitalized twice on serendipity: first, at inception, as the
story of the birth of the founding idea shows and second, when deciding to keep its team of
chemists which led to the pro-drugs horizon.
Both ventures mentioned concerns with speed, cost and flexibility, but responded quite
differently to these challenges. For instance, Venture B outsourced numerous activities to
contract research organizations claiming speed, control and efficiency while Venture C's
management confirmed recently that they were able to obtain more speed at a lower cost,
three to four tirnes cheaper, by not using contract research organizations: "With a
subcontractor, you have to design the protocol and draw a contract. He goes about working
by the protocol. If along the way, he fmds out that something's wrong, he still goes on with
the protocol. But, in-house, we stop spending. We don't go on with it. We adjust...With a
subcontractor, you can't adjust [...] It's a contract". In addition, since the day it decided to
keep its chemists, Venture C has become a rare organization with competences in ail three
of biology, chemistry and in-vivo studies, providing flexibility that they are now using with
the newly acquired clinical program. Again, a consequence of serendipity...
The fact that Venture B's management cancelled our appointment for a follow-up interview
limits our analysis of their management of time horizons and comparison with other
ventures. However, faced with a common challenge, their respective response was quite
different.
178
Could it be that Venture B's design did not account for luck while Venture C was
indeed able to seize it as demonstrated more than once? Did the ex-ante design preclude
Venture B from capitalizing on opportunities and adapting along the way? Or is it that by
its emphasis on leanness, it could flot build internai capacities that could have benefited it
later on, creating its own luck?...
Many questions do remain. Nevertheless, comparing ail four ventures brings us to the
paradoxical observation that when a biopharmaceutical venture strictly complied with
venture capitalists' shifting temporal rules, as with Venture B, it actually increased its risks
of demise. Faithful compliance to these temporal institutional rules without considering the
venture's need for continuity as an independent entity confirms the venture's status as yet
another project in a venture capitalist's portfolio. This situation is accompanied by the risk
of having its — usually sole project — stopped and its assets reassigned to other, more
promising projects within the venture capitalists' portfolio.
While the interests of venture capitalists and venture managers may coincide, managers are
the ones who purportedly work towards the venture's survival beyond venture capital while
venture capitalists protect their investments whatever the financial vehicle. Hence, one can
expect tensions between venture capitalists and managers about the future of the firm and
the management of strategic time horizons.
The strategic management of time on the part of venture managers resides in that discretion
they exercise to gain and retain legitimacy and access to resources by finding ways of
adhering to institutional temporal rules without hindering the venture's ability to secure a
future of its own. In this study, we have seen that Ventures C and D achieved this through a
dynamic management of time horizons.
On the one hand, Venture C complied with institutional rules by allocating resources to
speedier projects and through a temporal leap in order to first, match its accomplishments
with its age and second, to position itself as a late-stage company and thus increase its
attractiveness in the eyes of venture capitalists and the stock market. On the other hand,
179
Venture C also kept projects and resources that did flot agree with the ride of "focusing"
ail resources on a single project which reportedly brings efficiency benefits.
Venture D's synergistic portfolio allowed it to somewhat dirninish the venture's reliance on
venture capital by making room for income or "funded R&D" from alliances with other
pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical companies (Executive vice-president and C00). In an
effort to comply further to institutional preferences for a later-staged company, Venture D's
management proceeded with a temporal leap. Following the unsuccessful IPO, its
management realized that its portfolio was supporting two business models with the service
company flot being able to "spread ils wings" (Executive vice-president and Chief
Operating Officer).
To comply with institutional preferences for a later-staged company, Venture D operated a
temporal leap. However, the IPO was unsuccessful, possibly because of an untimely
window. Realizing that the proteomics service portion of the business was flot allowed to
"spread its wings" (Executive vice-president and C00) and was turning down revenuegenerating contracts for the sake of the pharmaceutical product business model, Venture
D's management reached a decision that they saw as best for both areas of the ventures: a
merger with a publicly-held biopharmaceutical company and the spin-off of the proteomics
service business, which is now allowed to prosper.
Trying flot to over speculate, one can nevertheless suggest that Venture A's fate might have
been quite different had its management found a way to convince the board to develop a
service business, meaning keep its platform (open-ended, longer horizon) and use it as a
proprietary technology (open-ended, shorter horizon) as Venture D did, while moving
molecules into drug discovery (close-ended, longer horizon).
We now continue with the discussion of the contributions and limitations of our study as
well as future avenues for research.
180
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was twofold:
1. Develop an understanding of how managers of biopharmaceutical ventures exercised
their discretion in strategically managing time horizons in the context of a temporal
shift;
2. Bring to the surface elements that can help in understanding the manner in which they
operated the transition of their venture.
This exploratory and longitudinal study of Quebec's biopharmaceutical field with its
emphasis on four ventures makes the following contributions:
1. Provides the basis for a two-dimensional construct of time horizon, extending the
current one-dimensional construct present in the literature;
2. Provides the basis for the development of a conceptual tool, a portfolio of strategic time
horizons and,
3. Sheds light on the intra-organizational dynamics of responding to a temporal shift with
the identification of a dynamic management of time horizons such as competing and
synergistic allocation of resources as well as temporal leaps.
From the perspective of time studies in management, the conceptual tools developed
through this research, that is the two-dimensional time horizon construct, the STH portfolio
model and the dynamic temporal strategies of competing and synergistic allocation of
resources and temporal leaps, increase researchers' ability to apply a temporal lens to
strategy.
Indeed, we suggest that our novel approach of combining relative length of horizon and
open or close-endedness of the future to define a two-dimensional time horizon construct
and portfolio better reflects the complexity of the management of a biopharmaceutical
venture without necessarily arguing for the preferred allocation of resources to any of the
four horizons. In line with Bluedorn and Standifer's (2006: 196) assertion in regards to the
181
usefulness of considering multiple temporal views: "Our argument is flot that the longer
term view is the better, more accurate, more desirable view—although for many traditional
purposes it would be—but that we see different aspects of the world when we look at it
from different temporal perspectives, all of which have something to offer".
Our portfolio model also suggests that the relation of time with innovation in
biopharmaceuticals may go well beyond acceleration concerns (Terziovski and Morgan
2006) and even beyond a mere concern for a diversity of horizons (Judge and Spitzfaden,
1995). Rather, our data suggests that it may have been the dynamic strategic management
of time horizons that helped two ventures secure sufficient resources to pursue their
development. This would tend to support Judge and Spitzfaden's (1995: 194) concluding
suggestion that: "[...] the management of strategic time horizons is much more complex
and important than previous literature has indicated".
By zooming in on intra-organizational dynamics of biopharmaceutical firms in transition,
this study refmes our understanding of tensions between science and business and between
venture managers and venture capitalists as well as their respective priorities. For instance,
it becomes clearer that focusing on close-ended horizons without the financial capacity to
concurrently build a pipeline of products threatens the venture's survival by making it
vulnerable should a setback in clinical trials occur, for instance, and confmes it to one of
many fmancial vehicles in a venture capitalist's diversified portfolio.
The portfolio model also sheds light on the complexity of the transition that venture
managers needed to undertake. On the one hand, as with any venture, it needed to cross the
"threshold of sustainability" (Vohora et al. 2004) hence generate its own funds, which
would certainly involve activities in the close-ended and shorter horizon. However,
developing therapeutic drugs is a long process. On the other hand, since the temporal shift,
any allusion to the open-ended horizons was badly received by the financial community.
These conditions stress the highly risky context and limited options faced by venture
managers during this transition.
182
The renewal of strategy approaches in order to include more time centers around the
challenge of sustaining a competitive advantage over time and avoiding strategic drift. In
particular, Teece (2007: 1320) defmes the "ambition of the dynamic capabilities framework
[as] nothing less than to explain the sources of enterprise-level competitive advantage over
time, and provide guidance to managers for avoiding the zero profit condition that results
when homogeneous firms compete in perfectly competitive markets." The commitment
approach to strategy shares the same goal. However, it prescribes the use of irreversible
decisions that "necessitates a deep look into the future" translated as "shift[ing] the average
horizon for strategic analysis farther out into the future" (Ghemawat, 1991: 29, 73).
In the case of science-based ventures, our study shows rather that management's challenges
lie not with developing a sustainable competitive advantage or analyzing their strategy on
the basis of an indefinite future time horizon. Rather, venture managers must obtain the
continued support of venture capitalists up until such time when the venture's activities can
generate sufficient funds for survival and growth or attract other partners such as
pharmaceutical or larger biotech companies. This situation is in line with Vohora et al's
(2004: 147) suggestion that ventures go through a transitional growth pattern and that their
management's challenge can be described as being "successful in transforrning their
existing resources, capabilities and social capital" in order to cross the last critical juncture,
or threshold of sustainability, and engage their venture on the path of sustained revenues
rather than folding it. Our field study shows that time horizons were managed to attain that
goal. In fact, we stress that both Ventures A and B that pursued decisions without flexibility
(that we liken to Ghemawat's irreversible decisions) did less well than both Ventures C and
D that periodically or continually readjusted their strategy. This brings us to the observation
that managing a portfolio of strategic time horizons may be seen as a dynamic capability.
Finally, the fmdings fi-om this study have implications for practice. Indeed, the portfolio
model and the four illustrative venture stories may help revisit venture capitalists'
contention that platforms needed to be foregone. Indeed, not pursuing platform
development did not prevent Venture B from the vagaries of the phan-naceutical product
development process. This observation may allow for the consideration of a third business
model besides the platform company and the product company, that of the service company
or proprietary technology company. The STH portfolio model makes it possible to visually
183
consider and discuss alternative business models. We recall that use of the proprietary
technology to provide services to pharmaceutical and other biotech companies made
Venture D's platform profitable. It is a model that was also starting to prove itself for
Venture A.
Developing data and context grounded theoretical tools is a double-edge sword. As
precautions to ensure trustworthiness are followed, confidence in the fmdings and theory
built increase while concerns for their transferability may be voiced.
Two such concerns can be summed up in the form of questions:
1. Should the temporal shift of the technology bubble burst be considered as such
circumscribed a moment in history that theoretical tools developed in that context are
limited in their transferability or should it be viewed rather as an unexpected
magnifying glass allowing for the development of a clearer understanding of tensions
and relations at the heart of science-based business and innovation, hence facilitating
transferability?
2. Is the focus on temporal elements such as the open and close-endedness of the future
and the relative length of time horizon to build the portfolio model too specific to the
Quebec biopharmaceutical field in which firms were created through the Anglo-Saxon
model of venture capital financing hence limiting its transferability or is this portfolio to
be considered as a distillate of complex temporal interactions representing the essence
of tensions, priorities and stakes in ventures, a depiction sufficiently generic that its
transferability is increased?
These two questions are situated at the very heart of the debate on the transferability of
findings from case studies. We agree with Lincoln and Guba (1985: 124) "that the answer
to that question must be empirical". They also suggest that transferability is a "function of
the similarity between the two contexts, what we shah l cal! "fittingness". Fittingness is
defined as the degree of congruence between sending and receiving contexts".
184
Hence, our understanding of the limitations and applicability of the STH portfolio
model would be improved through further research that extends the sampling of our study.
We can suggest three instances:
1. Ventures that fofiow a different business model such as the service model or operate in
the diagnostics rather than the pharmaceuticals.
2. Ventures backed flot only by private venture capital but also by pharmaceutical firms or
spin-off of other entities, such as state laboratories as may be the case in Europe.
3. Retrospective case studies situated at the birth of highly successful biotech ventures,
such as Genentech and Amgen, firms that operated in the genetic engineering era when
biotechnology was born.
In continuity with our observation that a dynamic management of strategic time horizons
may have contributed to Ventures C's and D's success while the lack thereof contributed to
Ventures A's and B's demise, we suggest that future research could explore the possible
links between the dynamic management of a diversity of time horizons and a more
satisfying level of resources for the contùmity of the venture's development. We suggest
two possible avenues to do so:
First, it might be useful to combine the portfolio of strategic time horizons with the critical
junctures approach. Indeed, Vohora et al. (2004: 167) suggest that venture managers need
to be "successful in transforming their existing resources, capabilities and social capital" in
order to cross the last critical juncture, or threshold of sustainability, and avoid folding the
venture. This threshold requires a re-orientation towards a path of sustained revenues and
we suggest that the strategic management of time horizons may provide a useful guide to
strategic action. The combination of both approaches may also allow for a research path
finking strategic action within venture firms and performance in reaching the public
fmancial markets.
Second, researchers interested in strategy-as-practice might apply the model at the microlevel of individual decisions. Indeed, managers at both Ventures C and D mentioned that
dynamically managing time horizons brought tensions and uncertainty about the
185
appropriateness of decisions to pursue an additional time horizons or to invest in a
combination of time horizons.
In continuity with our observation that a dynamic management of time horizons may be
favoured by a board of directors and a management whose vision accommodates a diversity
of business models and opportunities while it may be precluded by a narrow one.
We suggest that future research include the study of board members' vision and
understanding of business models in biopharmaceuticals as well in interaction with venture
managers in the context of decisions about the management of time horizons.
In continuity with our last and paradoxical observation that a strict compliance to the postbubble burst temporal rules may actually have increased a venture's risks of demise, we
suggest that future research contribute to an additional sampling in number and variety as
well as extend research design to other science-based enterprises also backed by venture
capital.
Pisano (2006: 202) raised concerns about the current business models and organizational
forms for science-based business and in particular biotechnology: "[...] science creates
novel business requirements that cannot be fulfilled with these existing approaches.
Organizational and institutional innovations are needed in order to unlock the potential of
biotechnology". We suggest that reaching a more detailed understanding of time in sciencebased business may contribute to the quest for improved management as it reveals
fundamental clashes in priorities, values and practices between science and business.
Other avenues for research can be considered such as research on stakeholders. Indeed, as
the portfolio model of strategic time horizons takes into account priorities and interests of
multiple stakeholders it may become a useful starting point for the study of the so-called
"suent politics of time" (Das, 1991: 55). The graphical representation of the portfolio may
also become a useful tool for managers in understanding and negotiating business models
with board members and venture capitalists.
186
In conclusion, no one doubts the importance of time in management. What researchers
are called to now is for the development of theoretical tools grounded in field studies in
order to strive for first, a detailed understanding of time and second, awareness and means
to recognize temporal dimensions "as a factor which is controllable by the decision-maker
and which has substantial potential impact on decision quality" (Ebert and Piehl, 1973: 40).
The requirement of theoretical development is compounded flot only by the fact that time
"is only now beginning to receive the attention it deserves in organizational scholarship"
(Bluedom and Standifer, 2006: 196) but also and perhaps mostly, because time is part of "a
non-tangible and invisible world that nevertheless has real and material consequences"
(Adam and Groves, 2007: xv).
Appendix 1. Interview guides
187
How do you allocate resources to innovation activities?
Level o finvestment
Innovation related expenditures (R&D, New product, etc.)
Partnerships with complementary players
Allocation between different directions and activities
Choice between investment in current business vs. new
businesses
How much to invest? In what areas ?
Choice between internat R&D, partnership, acquisitions, etc.
How are these investment made: smallincremental, large
bets...
Approaches to control and evaluation
What are the key organizational po licies you have deve loped
to stimulate innovation
Management structure, format and informai processes
Corporate policies
Incent ives and reward systems
Funding
What are the factors that have enabled or created obstacles for
your firm to bring innovative efforts to fruition?P lease give
examp les (e. g. relationships with stakeho lders, internat
capabilities, internat misfits, blockages, other) What are the major strategic transformations or turnarounds
that your firm has experienced or intends to undertake?
Anything to add about the dynamics ofinnovation in your
industry?
What makes for success/ failure?
How is this changing?
Add : Are you encountering difficulties, risks and obstac les related to
the externat rate of diffusion of the innovation? How are they managed?
Te ll us about collaborations, their objectives, when do you expect
results, when were the collaborations first cons idered, then put in p lace.
Watchfor : words related to continuity/discontinu ity, horizons, novelty, 1
etc.
Watch for : words related to continu ity/discontinuity, horizons, novelty,
etc.
Add : What horizon o f time do you consider in your hiring policies?
Te ll us about the incentives. What do they seem to encourage ?
Watch for : rules on outputs, temporal outlook, temporalhorizon
Add : Why these cho ice s? Why do you prefer this over that?
Watchfor: temporal outlook, temporalhorizon
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
Appendix 2. Coding of interviews
a. Coding for the portfolio mode' of STH
Several iterations were necessary to code for the strategic time horizons. We found
occurrences of what we easily coded as strategies for the short or long term future
(Excerpts 1 and 2) with competition between the two generating tension (Excerpt 3).
Additional tension is also found in another kind of interaction (Excerpts 4a to 4c) where
some sort of synergy was alluded to. Excerpts 5 and 6 show another kind of tension: that
between research and business, this time along the fines of open versus close ended futures.
Looking at these excerpts in a detailed way the first two provide examples of
straightforward occurrences of short and long term aspects of a future horizon for strategy.
Excerpt 1.
"When we started, we were supposed to focus on products that were already
on the market and find new production processes. But that was short term".
(Venture A's Operations Manager)
Excerpt 2.
"Eventually, we will need to associate with pharrnaceutical firms, larger
partners. Because when you talk about clinical phases two or three, it can
mean hundreds of millions of dollars".
(Venture C's Director of Intellectual Property )
But, as shown by the following excerpt, interacting short and long term horizons may
generate tensions in resource allocation for instance, between on the one hand, the need for
short term revenues and on the other hand, that for long term investments associated with
developing molecules into pharmaceutical products:
Excerpt 3.
"We don 't have any [customers] . We will do research for years and years to
corne. Hem... the way it works is that...originally ...from the onset, we have
wanted to become a biopharmaceutical company. Obviously, we know we
should have short term revenues. But that's not so simple. On the other hand,
we are convinced that our bank of molecules is worth its weight in gold".
(Venture A's President and founder )
197
However, the following excerpt hints to the fact that short and long term may
correspond to a simplistic view that does flot tell ail about tensions in resource allocation:
Excerpt 4a.
"To put it in another way is that we have to produce drugs eventually or we
have to produce some sort of sustainable sources of revenue. That could
actually corne from diagnostics that we discover along the way. When we
have sold the therapeutic rights to a pharma. So, there are many ways from a
creative point of view to suce and dice the pie to actually retain long-term
upside. However, what we've decided is that the paying customer cornes first
to establish our credibility, to at least sustain our burn rate right now
through partnerships f...] But, we'll have more targets that they can pursue
and then, we will start our own [drug program] and move ourselves down the
chain but always from what I would call a prudent business model of doing it
once you're there and once you can afford to invest the resources and raise
the money to actually do it in a conservative way, never betting the whole
business at any particular point in time".
(Venture D 's Exec V-p and COQ)
In Venture D, the route to sustainable retums (long term) is thought to corne from
intellectual property that is retained for applications in diagnostics once therapeutics rights
on outcomes of current research will have been sold to pharmaceutical companies and other
therapeutics rights have been retained on additional research. However, delivering on
current contracts (short term) that use the platform in its current state has become a priority
in resource allocation in order to diminish the burn rate and establish the company's
credibility knowing that more money will need to be raised at some point (long term) when
management will choose to start developing its own products.
In addition, the same respondent confirms that if pursuing the development of a platform is
a costly decision it also enables the venture to generate revenues on the way to achieving
longer term goals, a sort of interaction between short and long horizons:
Excerpt 4b.
"[ ...] having a plaerm requires you have a lot of capital invested in it, it
takes a lot of upfront development of a technology to prove that you can do
what you can do and then, it requires quite a lot of money to then do it across
multiple patients and a particular disease area".
(Venture D 's Exec V-p and C00)
198
Excerpt 4c.
"So, you've got to constantly invest in your bol and your plaerm and also
you've got to be able to, however, use the platform that you've got now to
generate revenues now. And you've got to use it to generate revenues later".
(Venture D's Exec V-p and C00)
Equipped with the understanding of the open-endedness of the future in drug discovery and
development as well as its close-endedness in the process of venture fmancing, we started
to explore this aspect within respondents' descriptions of their strategy.
The following excerpt stresses the difference between on the one hand, building a bank of
molecules that would be associated with open futures as each molecule may be used in
multiple applications and on the other hand, concentrating on the development of a specific
product.
Excerpt 5.
"Now, our shareholders are asking: "Well, it's very nice to have built this
bank, but you need to develop a product with il" And that's where we're
really going to gel some value".
(Venture A's Operations Manager)
Finally, this concern for matching research with its open-ended future and newness with
business requirements or more close-ended futures is also found in the following excerpt:
Excerpt 6.
"f...] the business guys will give you input on what's a reasonable disease
area to be in: if there's not too much competition, if there's an interest, if
there's an unmet need... but my role is more to ...to look for areas where we
can apply our scientific strength to corne up with new stuff. In the end,
[Venture D] right now is a discovery house. And, so we always have to be
pushing in areas that no one has been in".
(Venture D's Director of Biology Lab)
199
b. Additional coding examples
As will become manifest in the following examples, revealing respondents' time through
coding can be experienced as a simple or standalone step (Excerpts 7-10), as an exercise
requiring that the coded paragraph be linked with others within the same text or even
throughout the interview data base hence contributing to a rich understanding of a
phenomenon (Excerpts lia and 11 b) or as a step in a process of grounded theory building
(Excerpts 12a and 12b).
The first two excerpts provide examples of time as speed, in particular speed in a
competitive race.
Excerpt 7.
"But you've got to allocate the resources and you've got believe in this day
and age, you've got to make your board and your investors believe that that
investment pays off Because you're in a race to be the best proteomics
technology".
(Venture D's Executive Vice-president and C00)
Excerpt 8.
"At the same time, even if expectations are very high, you need to realize that
we are going to do this for only two or three years, and that our development
is extremely swift in relation with ail other technological developments, those
of our competitors but also technological development in general".
(Venture D 's Business development associate)
Speed also appeared in strategic decision making:
Excerpt 9.
"It may be the attribute of a small firm like ours to turn on a dime ...in a
minute [...] we have a problem, this ...or that Bang! We shift 90 degrees if
necessary ...And the cascade of events will occur very rapidly. We have no
choice. It's a question of survival. That's the way it will work".
(Venture B's Senior Manager Clinical Development)
The preceding three excerpts show that time as speed was readily codable within a single
paragraph without even having to make connections with other paragraphs in the same
interview.
200
The same is true of this other excerpt that was coded with "timing mies" as the paragraph
clearly includes notions of sequence of events and what one can and cannot do at which
time:
Excerpt 10.
« It happened in two stages. We start with the [intellectual] property ...that's
the pre-requisite before you try to get financing. You can't finance a company
if you don 't own the technology. ...And once you have ail your financing, well
then, that's really when the research activities...arrived in the laboratories".
Venture B's Vice-president, Finance and Business Development
Now let's look at a less obvious example in the following excerpt where the code "timing
mies" was also assigned:
Excerpt lia.
Researcher: "Have you been faced with what you just mentioned...something
is interesting but it is too fundamental [kind of research] ? "
Respondent: "Well, that happens every day. Probably. ...I am flot in charge of
managing researchers but when I attend the scientific meetings, it's normal
also and sometimes, researchers discover something, they see a certain
activity and say. ...there are a lot of questions that occur to them. We could do
these and these tests to verify this and this hypothesis, but at the same time,
those who manage them say...lt may flot be necessary".
Venture C's Director, Intellectual Property
Taken out of context the code "timing mies" may flot appear so manifest and its use
debated. However, other aspects were considered before the code was assigned. For
instance, there was an on-going conversation about this venture's research activities and the
respondent was discussing them in the context of limited resources and with the "ultimate
goal of having a drug on the market". As well, the paragraph just preceding the abovementioned excerpt was coded with the codes "speed" and "burn rate":
201
Excerpt 11b.
Respondent: "Because we were allotted a certain amount ...and we need to
advance as quickly as possible and as far as possible with this money".
Venture C's Director, Intellectual Property
Reference to the "hum rate" code was made possible by previous coding of interviews with
the organizational field members as well as knowledge acquired prior and throughout the
study of this term used in venture capital investments and referring to the rate of use of
capital by venture's management.
"Burn rate" is a temporally complex word as it also evokes a limited time horizon at the
end of which renewed funding is expected to be needed. As we learned throughout the
study, this funding process is viewed as a cyclic sequence of events, a "round", exhibiting
the rhythm of milestones, or moments during the round at which points cash is expended
against meeting specific objectives. The actual process of a round actually starts between
nine to fifteen months prior to the planned moment at which point the venture is expected
to mn out of money or at the end of the "window" agreed upon. We could delve even more
into this process and state that curbing the burn rate is viewed as a good strategy as it
provides managers with more power over their venture's value when negotiating a new
round.
Also, we added a comment to the paragraph coded with "timing rules" that reads: "burn
rate becomes a timing rule". Hence, this coding can be seen as an element that allowed the
links between levels: an institutionalized temporal practice at the organizational field level
(fmancing rounds) is linked with a venture level practice (prioritizing research) through a
timing mie (burn rate).
This last example also illustrates how the complexity of coding can be harnessed to build a
data grounded understanding of a phenomenon.
The following example includes first, an excerpt of a statement about how revenues to curb
the bum rate were generated and second, the researcher's comment on the paragraph at the
time of coding:
202
Excerpt 12a.
"Before you're even done identeing the targets, people are paying you to
say: '7'm willing to pay you millions of dollars to fund your research in
exchange for rights to pursue what's behind door number three". And so, and
even...and ail they have to know is that... that actually... there is something
that might be behind door number three and that your technology can
actually be discovering that And so, they'll want to know if your technology
has the answer and then, they'll fund a large research project to pursue this
technology in, you know, fifty or a hundred diffèrent patients. And, actually
the fruit...because having a platform requires you have a lot of capital
invested in ii', il has a lot of upfront development of a technology to prove that
you can do what you can do and then, it requires quite a lot of money to then
do il across multiple patients and a particular disease area. So, without
partnerships, it's hard to go ail the way and identify the targets. But, with
partnerships, it makes it ail possible".
Venture D's Executive vice-president and COQ
Excerpt 12b.
"Diminishing risk means identifying fruiffid futures with his technology.
Means identifying those trajectories that are worth pursuing. Does not mean
that pursuing that one opportunity will take less lime but that the whole
process may be sped up or that the chances of success are higher"
Researcher's comment on excerpt 12a.
Retrospectively, one can now see the germ of an understanding that there is some dynamics
going on at Venture D. Of course, this is a one-paragraph example and coding is but the
first step of a multiple step iterative process in the goal of generating a rich understanding
of a phenomenon and hopefully constructs and models.
203
Appendix 3a. Timeline for the drug discovery and development
process
DRUG DISCOVERY PRECUELICAL
cumul. TRIALS
LARGE SCALE
e: FDA REVIEW MANUFACTURIN
Appendix 3b. Detailed drug discovery and clinical trials phases.
Source: http://www.montrealinternational.com/sciences/drug/stages.html
204
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Yin, Robert K. (2003a). Applications of case study research. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage
Publications.
Yin, Robert K. (2003b). Case study research : design and methods. Thousand Oaks, Calif.:
Sage Publications.
Zerubavel, Eviatar (1979). Patterns of Time in Hospital Life: A Sociological Perspective.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
VII. CONCLUSION
« "Time" and lime research is flot an institutionalized subfield
or subspeciality of any of the social sciences.
By ils very nature,
il is recakitrantly transdisciplinary and refuses
ta be placed under the intellectual monopoly of any discipline »
Nowotny (1992 :441)
Dans le cadre de cette thèse, nous avons réalisé une étude sur le temps et la formation de la
stratégie en prenant pour terrain des biopharmaceutiques québécoises en transition entre
deux temps inter-organisationnels, avec le projet d'ouvrir une voie pour la stratégie au-delà
des approches traditionnelles de vitesse qui traitent le temps de manière prédominante
comme une ressource de durée et qui s'expriment à travers la chrono-concurrence et aussi
dans l'approche de « timepacing ».
Dans un premier temps pour cette conclusion, nous allons discuter des contributions de
cette thèse : D'abord, en rappelant brièvement les contributions de chacun des articles,
ensuite en discutant des contributions issues de l'appariement deux à deux des articles de la
thèse, puis finalement, en revenant à la question de départ à savoir la place du temps dans la
formation de la stratégie. Dans un deuxième temps, nous allons énoncer des considérations
pour les praticiens alors que dans un dernier temps, nous terminerons sur des pistes de
recherche future.
71 Contributions de la thèse
Avec le Tableau XXII, nous rappelons la question de recherche principale de cette thèse
ainsi que les questions afférentes aux trois articles :
212
Tableau XXII. Questions de recherche
Thèse
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3
Comment le temps est-il pris en compte dans la formation de la stratégie?
Quels sont les postulats temporels qui se cachent dans les écrits classiques
du management stratégique?
Quel est l' « ordre temporel dominant » dans le champ des
biopharmaceutiques au Québec et comment peut-on expliquer son
avènement?
Comment les gestionnaires de firmes biopharmaceutiques ont-ils géré le
temps stratégiquement dans le contexte d'une transition de temporalités du
champ organisationnel?
Nous représentons les contributions de cette thèse sur le temps et la formation de la
stratégie comme appartenant à six zones de la figure 16. Ainsi une première série de
contributions provient de chacun des articles pris indépendamment, contributions que nous
rappellerons ci-après. De plus, une deuxième série de contributions peut être dégagée suite
au rapprochement deux à deux de chacun des trois articles, exercice auquel nous
procéderons plus bas.
La contribution principale du premier article réside dans le dévoilement de l'orientation
temporelle passé-présent-avenir comme aspect temporel dominant de onze articles
classiques sur la stratégie et dans l'explicitation d'une grande variété de traitement des trois
zones temporelles, incluant des perspectives subjectives, à l'encontre des attentes des écrits
préalables s'étant penché sur ce sujet. Cet article montre que de se mettre en quête des
postulats temporels révèle une multiplicité temporelle inscrite par les auteurs eux-mêmes
dans leur ouvrage, une richesse jusque là ignorée.
La contribution du deuxième article réside dans l'identification et la description d'abord
d'une institution temporelle au niveau du champ organisationnel, le temps interorganisationnel, sur la base du rythme des processus de travail et du mécanisme de
l'entraînement entre les niveaux micro et macro et ensuite, de sa transition sous l'impulsion
de l'éclatement de la bulle technologique. De manière plus large, cet article montre aussi
que l'adoption d'une perspective institutionnelle permet d'ouvrir une troisième voie, celle
d'une institution temporelle au niveau du champ organisationnel, au-delà des deux faces
d'une même pièce que sont d'une part, l'approche de Brown et Eisenhardt (1998) qui tend à
213
conférer un pouvoir absolu à l'entreprise dans l'imposition d'un rythme spécifique à un
secteur et d'autre part, celle de Stalk et Webber (1993 :94) dans laquelle les firmes sont aux
prises avec une sorte de force maléfique (« dark side») sur laquelle elles n'ont pas prise,
puisque « condamnées à aller de plus en plus vite tout en stagnant du point de vue
concurrentiel ». L'application fme du modèle de l'entraînement à la compréhension des
mécanismes par lesquels une temporalité peut venir à dominer un champ organisationnel
spécifique, en l'occurrence celui des biopharmaceutiques québécoises, défmit un contexte
sur lequel notre étude peut s'appuyer afm de développer une compréhension des réponses
stratégiques des gestionnaires face à une transition de cette temporalité dominante du
champ organisationnel.
Figure 16. Questions de recherche et contributions de la thèse
-
Postulatsttemppre s
edans les:&crits en
5 stratégie
•
Passé-Présent-Avenir
4ardineiemporel Ré pértbfr.e
d'orientations.,
Temps> qt
fermatraa
dela:,
stratégie
,
Transition de temps
inter-organisationnel
Portefeuille cl horizons
Stratégies dynamiques
Entraînement Réponses
stratégiques
2•
emporallté
dominante à ,1
Stratégies temporelles
214
Finalement, la contribution du troisième article réside dans le développement et
l'application d'un modèle de portefeuille d'horizons temporels bidimensionnels, une
lentille qui permet de mieux saisir les stratégies temporelles de quatre firmes confrontées à
la transition du temps inter-organisationnel, incluant des stratégies dynamiques
d'interaction d'horizons par allocation concurrente ou synergique de ressources ainsi que
des stratégies de saut temporel.
Ces trois articles sont liés par une même approche d'analyse de contenu de textes et de
transcriptions d'entrevues afm de révéler la temporalité sous-jacente. La comparaison deux
à deux des articles permet de dégager d'une part, des questions caractéristiques propres à
chacune des intersections entre les articles et d'autre part, les contributions de la thèse tel
qu'exposé au Tableau XXIII. Nous reprenons chaque appariement d'articles dans les
paragraphes suivants.
Tableau XXIII. Contributions de la thèse par appariements d'articles
Appariement
d'articles
(1 et 2)
(1 et 3)
Questions soulevées
Contributions de la thèse
Quelleestl'orientation passé-présent-avenir
Orientation PPAsimilaireàl'approche de
associée à la temporalité dominante du champ
Luehrman (jardin temporel) avec les capital-
organisationnel en transition?
risqueurs aux commandes.
Quelleestl'orientationpassé-présent-avenir
Identification d'unrépertoired'orientations
associée à chacune des stratégies temporelles des
variées. Celles-ci incluent des représentations déjà
firmes étudiées?
identifiées par l'article 1 en plus de combinaisons
d'orientations pour une même stratégie.
(2 et 3)
Conunentqualifier lavariétéderéponses Les réponses stratégiques varient dans leur degré
stratégiques desfirmesfaceà une pression de conformité et de résistance aux pressions
institutioimellecommelatransitiondela institutionnelles del'acquiescementàla
temporalité dominante du champ organisationnel?
manipulationenpassantparlatransaction,
l'évitement et la bravade.
7.1.1 Liens entre les articles 1 et 2 : Un jardin temporel pour le champ organisationnel
Le premier article a identifié les postulats temporels sur la relation entre passé, présent et
avenir qui sous-tendent onze textes classiques en management stratégique. Cela soulève
immédiatement une question par rapport à l'article 2: Quelle est l'orientation passé-
215
présent-avenir associée à la temporalité dominante du champ organisationnel des
biopharmaceutiques en transition?
Nous rappelons qu'après l'éclatement de la bulle technologique, le temps interorganisationnel a pu être caractérisé par les nouvelles préférences des fmanciers tel des
projets de développement démontrant d'une part, une séquence d'avenir fermé (produit
commercialisable plutôt que recherche) et un positionnement en aval des financements faits
jusqu'alors et d'autre part, une durée plus courte, pouvant être évaluée tant avec des jalons
d'horloge que d'événements, et associée à des pratiques ou domaines plus rapides comme
le développement de molécules sous licence ou de systèmes de livraison de médicaments
déjà connus. Les capital-risqueurs ont aussi adopté des règles cohérentes avec leur
portefeuille de firmes tant sous l'angle des maladies visées que le stade de financement de
leurs firmes. L'approche de portefeuille permet de gérer les risques entre autres en stoppant
des investissements dans une firme et en réallouant les actifs à d'autres firmes. L'accent est
mis sur la zone Présent-Avenir dans l'atteinte d'un but continuellement recomposé au gré
des fusions, investissements et désinvestissements. Cette approche de portefeuille qui
permet les ajustements au fur et à mesure du déroulement de la recherche dans de multiples
firmes peut être assimilée à l'approche de Luehrman (1998) dans laquelle les firmes de
biopharmaceutiques peuvent être vues comme une trajectoire parmi d'autres dans le
«jardin temporel» des cap ital-risqueurs (Voir la Figure 17). On remarquera donc que,
selon cette représentation, les capital-risqueurs, parties prenantes dominantes, sont aux
commandes alors qu'ils interviennent sur les firmes de biopharmaceutiques comme sur
autant de trajectoires Présent-Avenir de leur portefeuille.
Cette perspective temporelle sur le champ organisationnel des biopharmaceutiques illustre
bien la dépendance des firmes par rapport aux capital-risqueurs en ce qui a trait à des
décisions sur le devenir de la firme comme entité indépendante. On se rappellera la
nécessité de transition au point de jonction critique de la durabilité (Vohora, Wright et
Lockett, 2004, mentionné dans le troisième article de la thèse) qu'on peut comprendre
comme une inscription en bourse, des alliances, des contrats ou autres revenus autogénérés. Par la force des choses, les firmes doivent éventuellement se désynchroniser de
216
l'orientation temporelle dominante du champ organisationnel et créer leur propre
trajectoire Présent-Avenir, au-delà du portefeuille des capital-risqueurs.
Figure 17. Orientation temporelle PPA du champ organisationnel
Luehrman (1998)
PrA
Jardin temporel: Dyades présent-avenir
multiples. concurrentes, en interaction et
fortement liées. Présent actif et orienté vers
l'avenir. Passé positif concrétisé par
l'ez..-périence. Continuité passé-présentavenir
Pr
A
Pr
Pr
Passé
A
A
Pr
7.1.2 Liens entre les articles 1 et 3 : Un répertoire d'orientations temporelles pour les firmes
de biopharmaceutiques
Poursuivant le même type d'analyse que dans la section précédente pour l'article 3, la
question suivante se pose de façon naturelle : Quelle est l'orientation passé-présent-avenir
associée à chacune des stratégies des firmes étudiées?
Les stratégies temporelles mobilisées par les gestionnaires des quatre firmes à l'étude dans
le contexte d'une transition dans la temporalité dominante du champ organisationnel ont été
présentées sous la forme d'un portefeuille d'horizons de temps bidimensionnels dans le
troisième article de cette thèse. De plus, comme nous l'avons fait pour la temporalité
dominante du champ organisationnel, nous dégageons des similarités entre d'une part,
l'orientation temporelle démontrée au travers des actions stratégiques de chacune des
quatre firmes et d'autre part, les orientations temporelles identifiées dans l'analyse des onze
articles classiques du Harvard Business Review, tel que rapportées dans le premier article
de cette thèse.
217
Le tableau XXIV répertorie les orientations temporelles des stratégies de chacune des
firmes. Les firmes A et B peuvent être rapprochées chacune d'une seule orientation soit
respectivement celle de Hamel et Prahalad et celle de Luehrman avec les capital-risqueurs
aux commandes. C'est là une indication de la conformité de la firme B par rapport à
l'orientation temporelle du champ organisationnel : la firme devient une des trajectoires
Présent-Avenir dans le portefeuille des capital-risqueurs. En ce qui concerne les firmes C et
D, on remarque que leur stratégie emprunte simultanément des caractéristiques à plus d'une
orientation temporelle identifiée dans les classiques. Cette multiplicité de devenirs
possibles semble être à l'origine de fortes tensions vécues au présent que les firmes A et B
n'ont pas semblé expérimenter puisque entretenant une vision plus claire de leur avenir,
puisque unique. Cet état de choses rappelle que, bien que reconnaissant de multiples
avenirs, les approches de Mace, Mintzberg et Wack étudiées dans l'article 1,
opérationnalisent la stratégie avec un avenir unique. Pour Mace, la direction avait comme
rôle d'indiquer la voie vers un avenir unique, afin d'éviter de distraire l'attention et de
dissiper les ressources. Cependant, dans notre échantillon de firmes, ce sont celles ayant
composé avec de multiples avenirs qui ont fmalement manœuvré vers le portefeuille de la
firme de produits pharmaceutiques. Plus généralement, on peut se demander si la capacité à
gérer dynamiquement les horizons de temps stratégiques n'est pas en lien avec une autre
capacité, celle d'entretenir une orientation temporelle PPA soit hybride soit flexible.
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218
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I
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rupture avec le paradigme dominant de avenir relativement proche dont
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l'atteinte validera l'entreprise auprès
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219
220
7.1.3 Liens entre les articles 2 et 3 : Réponses stratégiques aux pressions
institutionnelles
Les articles 2 et 3 sont évidemment intimement liés car le contexte décrit dans l'article 2
sert de point de départ pour l'article 3. En particulier, la mise en relation des deux articles
soulève la question suivante : Comment qualifier la variété des réponses stratégiques des
firmes face à la pression institutionnelle constituée par une transition de la temporalité
dominante du champ organisationnel? Dans l'article 3 lui-même, nous avons mis l'accent
sur la gestion des horizons temporels pour rendre compte des réactions à la transition.
Une autre façon d'analyser ces stratégies reposerait sur la typologie de réponses
stratégiques aux pressions institutionnelles proposées par Oliver (1991). Rappelons
qu'Oliver (1991) propose cinq réponses stratégiques aux pressions vers une conformité
institutionnelle, variant de la plus passive - l'acquiescement - à celle qui démontre le plus
de résistance active - la manipulation - en passant par les stratégies intermédiaires de
transaction, d'évitement et de bravade.
En fait, bien que tous les gestionnaires de firmes rencontrés pour l'étude de terrain aient
reconnu les changements dans la temporalité dominante du champ organisationnel et
l'impact sur leurs pratiques dans différents domaines comme le fmancement, les activités
de recherche et la protection de la propriété intellectuelle, leur réponse stratégique
respective face à cette pression institutionnelle est multiple comme le montre le Tableau
XXV qui reprend la typologie d'Oliver (1991) dans une comparaison inter-unités. On
remarquera d'abord les particularités des firmes A et B n'ayant pas réussi à renouveler leur
fmancement. Premièrement, la firme A fait partie, avec la firme D, des deux seules de notre
échantillon à avoir employé la réponse stratégique de bravade par défi, en l'occurrence en
refusant de se départir de sa plate-forme. On peut penser que la capacité à générer des
revenus à partir de la plate-forme a permis aux gestionnaires de la firme D de
contrebalancer ce type de réponse possiblement risquée dans ce contexte précis. D'ailleurs,
nos données d'entrevues montrent que cette réponse de bravade n'allait pas de soi même
pour la firme D puisque la présence de la plate-forme revenait continuellement dans les
discussions au sein du conseil d'administration (Voir le Tableau XXV sous réponse
stratégique de « transaction »). Cependant, non seulement la firme A n'a pas généré de
221
revenus à partir de sa plate-forme mais le fondateur a dû refuser de telles opportunités
dans le domaine des cosmétiques pour se conformer aux demandes institutionnelles (Voir le
Tableau XXV sous réponse stratégique d' « acquiescement »).
On doit aussi ajouter que la spécificité de la technologie de la firme A, c'est-à-dire une
technologie de fabrication à partir d'une culture de cellules, indissociable de la molécule
mise au point, ne permettait pas de se départir de la plate-forme puisque la synthèse
chimique n'était pas viable pour ces molécules complexes. Dans ce cas particulier, la
pression institutionnelle de se départir de la plate-forme peut être vue comme contestable
car non rationnelle d'un point de vue scientifique, d'où un refus de la part de la firme A et
une interprétation de bravade du point de vue des acteurs de la pression institutionnelle.
Vues sous cet angle, les réponses de transaction, d'évitement et de manipulation se révèlent
être rationnelles scientifiquement, cohérentes avec la technologie et même créatives d'un
point de vue gestion, possiblement « des démonstrations de probité ou rationalité
organisationnelle » aidant à contrebalancer la bravade (Oliver, 1991: 156). Cependant,
même les tentatives de manipulation par cooptation n'ont pas réussi à convaincre les
capital-risqueurs et autres membres du conseil d'administration de déroger au modèle de
firme de produits pharmaceutiques. De plus, la firme A devait faire face à un défi important
au niveau de la protection de la propriété intellectuelle puisqu'une telle technologie ne
répond pas aux règles habituelles du domaine pharmaceutique étant donné que le produit
devient indissociable de la méthode de fabrication et elle tend à être mieux protégée par
secret industriel.
Deuxièmement, nos données montrent que, contrairement aux autres firmes qui ont déployé
une multiplicité de réponses stratégiques incluant l'acquiescement, pour la firme B,
l'acquiescement par conformité se révèle être l'unique type de réponse stratégique
mobilisée. D'une part, cette situation peut être vue comme cohérente avec notre évaluation
précédente de l'orientation temporelle de cette firme, orientation assujettie à celle des
capital-risqueurs (Voir le Tableau XXIV). D'autre part, le cas de la firme B illustre une
relation qui peut sembler paradoxale dans le contexte d'une dépendance importante envers
le capital-risque. En effet, ici, la conformité aux pressions institutionnelles est en lien avec
la non-viabilité de la firme.
222
Ce cas d'échec par conformité aux pressions institutionnelles met en exergue la possibilité
que, dans le champ des biopharmaceutiques, il y a peut-être lieu pour les gestionnaires
d'exercer leur discrétion dans un autre type de réponse stratégique. Ainsi, Oliver (1991 :
175) mentionne, dans le cas de firmes établies, que la conformité aux pressions
institutionnelles « n 'est ni inévitable ni une contribution assurant la longévité ». Au
demeurant, « la conformité à l'environnement institutionnel peut aussi mettre en péril la
survie à long terme en imposant à l'organisation des rigidités structurelles et procédurales
qui inhibent son aptitude à s'adapter et à répondre aux risques imprévus au fur et à mesure
où ils se présentent ».
Quant aux deux autres firmes, les firmes C et D ayant réussi la transition vers une
compagnie de produits pharmaceutiques, elles ont mis en branle respectivement quatre et
cinq types de réponses stratégiques, la différence résidant dans le fait que la firme C n'a pas
bravé la pression institutionnelle voulant qu'elle se départisse de sa plate-forme. Alors que
pour la firme C, le saut temporel répond à la fois à une tactique de dissimulation (stratégie
d'évitement) et de cooptation (stratégie de manipulation), pour la firme D, ce saut temporel
a eu comme conséquence de lui permettre de fragmenter la compagnie et d'aller chercher
de nouveaux constituants influents (manipulation/cooptation) afin d'assurer l'avenir de
l'unité d'affaires de protéomique (évitement/fuite).
Dans le cas de la firme D, on notera aussi que la signature de contrats avec d'autres
compagnies de biotechnologie et de produits pharmaceutiques afin de diminuer le taux
d'épuisement du capital (« burn rate »), une réponse stratégique d'acquiescement par
conformité, a été le point de départ et a contribué à des réponses stratégiques subséquentes.
Ainsi, suite à cette première réponse, la firme a déployé des réponses stratégiques de
transaction (tactiques de pondération et de marchandage), d'évitement par protection et
finalement de manipulation par cooptation et d'évitement par fuite. Le cas de la firme D
peut donc être vu comme une illustration du dynamisme des réponses stratégiques face à
une pression institutionnelle, cas de figure non prise en compte par la typologie d'Oliver
(1991).
Réponses observées
F.
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7.1.4 Temps et formation de la stratégie
Finalement, que peut-on dire sur la contribution de cette thèse à la compréhension de la
prise en compte du temps dans la formation de la stratégie? La réponse à cette question
dépend de ce que l'on considère être le temps. En effet, l'écart entre d'une part, la richesse
de la pluralité temporelle enactée par les praticiens dans le management stratégique de
l'innovation et d'autre part, la relative étroitesse des conceptions du temps manifestes des
chercheurs en management stratégique ne prennent vraiment leur sens qu'à travers un
prisme kaléidoscopique du temps et une approche de construction sociale et
d' institutionnalisation.
Nous rappelons les propos de Slywotzky et Morrisson (1999: 358) évoqués dans
l'introduction de cette thèse 25 :
« Mais la vitesse n'est qu'une dimension. D'autres aspects du temps sont
plus importants selon les circonstances des clients: aller plus lentement,
trouver la bonne séquence, prévoir dix ans d'avance [...] Le temps en
affaires peut être aussi complexe qu'en physique. Les meilleurs joueurs en
affaires peuvent nous aider à comprendre comment le temps fonctionne
vraiment et comment on peut l'utiliser, le façonner et le retourner à notre
avantage » (Slywotzky et Morrisson, 1999 :358).
Ainsi, lorsque le temps est pris comme toile de fond des événements on se préoccupe de
l'érosion de l'avantage concurrentiel, de la quête pour un avantage concurrentiel durable et
de l'évitement de la dérive stratégique. Quand on considère le temps comme de la durée, on
s'intéresse à la vitesse et à l'accélération. Quand le temps est dans les cycles, on s'attarde
aux stratégies de synchronisation.
Bien que ces aspects du temps soient importants, cette thèse en suggère d'autres imprégnant
la pratique de la stratégie comme les visions du monde inscrites dans l'orientation
temporelle passé-présent-avenir et les horizons de temps qui ordonnent les priorités
d'allocation des ressources.
25
Voir page 2.
227
En plus de la reconnaissance de multiples dimensions du temps, voir le temps non pas
seulement comme une ressource à optimiser mais plutôt adopter l'angle de la construction
sociale et de l'institutionnalisation nous semble essentiel à l'identification d'une marge de
manoeuvre pour les praticiens, car cette liberté se définit par rapport à la contrainte, celle-ci
éperonnant celle-là.
Alors que dans l'univers évoqué par Stalk et Webber (1993), le praticien se doit de
déployer une stratégie qui sera dominante par crainte d'être soumis à des forces sur
lesquelles il n'a pas prise, dans un univers de temporalités institutionnalisées, il y a toujours
une marge de manoeuvre, que ce soit celle d'adopter et de reproduire ces temporalités ou de
les modifier dans l'action stratégique. Cette thèse a montré que même de puissantes
institutions temporelles n'étouffent pas la discrétion managériale.
7.2 Considérations pour les praticiens
Alors que le pluritemporalisme dans le domaine des biopharmaceutiques est du domaine du
connu pour les praticiens, l'idée que le temps ne soit pas que contrainte leur semblera
rafraîchissante et nous l'espérons, inspirante.
Nous soumettons maintenant des considérations que nous organisons dans l'ordre selon
trois types de praticiens : gestionnaires en transfert technologique, capital-risqueurs et
gestionnaires de firmes biopharmaceutiques.
Premièrement, les choix faits par la firme D par rapport à la maturation de sa technologie à
la faveur de contrats industriels peuvent être inspirants pour les acteurs du transfert
technologique dans les sociétés de valorisation. La valorisation de technologies
universitaires immatures requiert des fonds importants alors que leur transfert ne rapporte
pas. De plus, les biotechnologies vues comme ni de la recherche fondamentale, ni de la
recherche appliquée, mais plutôt comme une activité de recherche combinant à la fois une
quête de compréhension fondamentale et un souci pour leur utilisation (ou Quadrant de
Pasteur, voir Stokes, 1997) nous semblent des candidates appropriées pour une maturation
par l'entremise de partenariats industriels.
228
Deuxièmement si « les entreprises qui réussissent bien, c'est les entreprises qui sont
capables de comprendre les préoccupations des investisseurs. Et une de ces préoccupations
là, c'est définitivement le temps », comme l'a affirmé un capital-risqueur traduisant un
sentiment retrouvé chez d'autres, d'une part, on peut évoquer cette boutade : « Reste que le
temps ne dit rien de ce qu'est le temps » (Klein, 2002 : 6), évoquant la nécessité de définir
« son temps » et d'autre part, cette thèse a mis en lumière une relation paradoxale entre la
firme B, conforme comme aucune autre, et le capital-risque. Cette thèse soulève donc des
questionnements quant aux conséquences des pratiques et de la place prépondérante du
capital-risque dans les firmes de biopharmaceutiques alors que de nombreuses parties
prenantes investissent ces firmes de leurs propres intérêts, incluant leurs employés et cadres
sans oublier les gouvernements.
Troisièment, cette thèse apporte une mise en garde et de l'espoir aux gestionnaires de
firmes de biopharmaceutiques. Ainsi, si cette thèse a mis en exergue une transition dans le
temps inter-organisationnel au gré de l'éclatement de la bulle technologique, d'autres
événements actuels sont à surveiller puisqu'ils pourraient mener à une autre transition. On
pense à la situation des pharmaceutiques qui, dans les derniers mois de 2008, ont conclu de
nombreuses transactions d'achat de firmes de biotechnologie alors qu'elles font face à un
nombre accru d'expirations de brevets de médicaments.
Bien que la vulnérabilité des firmes de biotechnologie soit évidente tant qu'elles ne peuvent
compter sur des revenus autogénérés, cette thèse montre aussi que les gestionnaires des
firmes qui ont pu jouer le rôle de dépositaires des intérêts d'une pluralité de parties
prenantes, comme au sein des firmes C et D, ont été en mesure d'opérer la transition vers
une entreprise de produits. À cet égard, nous pensons que le portefeuille d'horizons de
temps stratégiques peut s'avérer un outil de décision et de négociation avec les parties
prenantes dans l'allocation des ressources de la firme.
Nous nous tournons maintenant vers les pistes de recherche future.
229
7.3 Pistes de recherche future
Des pistes de recherche ont été formulées dans le corps du premier et du dernier article de
la thèse. Nous les reprenons et en développons d'autres ici en adoptant le format de
présentation des contributions de la thèse introduit plus haut (voir la Figure 18).
Figure 18. Pistes de recherche future
TemporalitéS' des
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mode et habillement, meubles etc.
L'étude des postulats temporels dans les écrits en stratégie peut se poursuivre avec un
corpus d'ouvrages non américains qui apporteront une variété additionnelle d'approches
temporelles de la stratégie puisque l'orientation passé-présent-avenir varie selon les
cultures. Cette analyse doit rester ouverte à la possibilité que l'orientation temporelle ne
soit pas l'aspect temporel dominant dans ce nouveau corpus.
230
L'étude des temporalités dominantes peut se poursuivre dans le champ des
biopharmaceutiques soit en continuant à suivre les changements locaux soit en transposant
l'étude à d'autres pays, en particulier ceux où le capital risque est moins crucial dans la
mise sur pied de firmes.
De même, on peut poursuivre l'étude des stratégies temporelles dans le champ des
biopharmaceutiques principalement pour mettre à l'épreuve le modèle de portefeuille
d'horizons de temps stratégiques et son management dynamique. Nous rappelons ici de
manière synthétique les trois axes discutés plus en détails dans le corps du troisième
article :
1. Limites et possibilités d'application du portefeuille d'horizons de temps :
a) Échantillon de firmes suivant un modèle d'affaires alternatif comme le modèle de
service ou opérant dans le champ organisationnel des diagnostics médicaux;
b) Échantillon de firmes avec un fmancement alternatif soit par des compagnies
pharmaceutiques ou avec une origine d'essaimage autre qu'universitaire comme des
laboratoires d'État, plus courant en Europe;
c) Histoires de cas rétrospectifs remontant à la création de firmes de biotechnologies à
succès comme Genentech et Amgen, des firmes qui ont été créées à l'époque du
génie génétique.
2. Contribution d'un management dynamique des horizons de temps stratégiques au
succès des firmes :
a) Combinaison du portefeuille d'horizons de temps stratégique avec l'approche des
points de jonction critique de Vohora et al. (2004).
b) Application du portefeuille d'horizons de temps stratégique au niveau de décisions
stratégiques individuelles.
3. Lien entre le management dynamique des horizons de temps stratégiques et la vision
des dirigeants :
a) Étude de la vision et de la compréhension du modèle d'affaires partagées par les
membres du conseil d'administration en interaction avec les gestionnaires de
231
l'entreprise dans le contexte de prises de décisions sur la gestion des horizons de
temps stratégiques.
L'étude de la relation paradoxale entre une réponse stratégique conforme aux pressions
institutionnelles et l'échec d'une firme pourra être poursuivie en augmentant le nombre de
firmes biopharmaceutiques étudiées et en étudiant aussi d'autres firmes « science-based »,
fmancées par le capital-risque. Il reste à voir dans quel autre champ organisationnel et dans
quelles circonstances particulières cette relation pourra se reproduire.
Nous suggérons aussi que la même approche déployée dans la thèse pour l'étude de terrain
peut être reproduite dans d'autres champs organisationnels. En nous fondant sur notre
propre étude d'un champ organisationnel en transition, nous avançons que les champs en
émergence ou en changement seront particulièrement fertiles. Par exemple, on peut penser
que les terrains où des technologies émergent seraient appropriés car « les technologies
émergentes sont particulièrement imprégnées de temps et peuvent être vues comme en
devenir » (Sein, 2006 : 121). Il y a donc lieu de s'intéresser à d'autres technologies outre
les biotechnologies, fmancées ou non par le capital-risque, issues soit des universités ou
d'autres centres de recherche privés ou publics. Dans tous les cas, ces terrains risquent de
fournir de multiples rythmes en interaction.
Ainsi, on peut supposer que la crise française de la chronologie des médias qui s'étire
depuis plusieurs années et porte sur les prescriptions des durées d'exploitation d'un film
selon les différents supports (salle de cinéma, DVD, vidéos à la demande (VoD) etc.) soit
aussi une bonne candidate. En effet, cette problématique rassemble de multiples acteurs aux
intérêts divergents autour d'un enjeu temporel, le partage d'une chronologie, source de flux
fmanciers parfois importants et toujours inégaux selon les supports et les oeuvres dans un
cadre réglementaire de subventions à la création.
Cependant, d'autres milieux à faible technologie peuvent aussi démontrer un potentiel.
Ainsi, on sait que le milieu de la mode et de l'habillement est balisé par des normes
temporelles : on parle de saisons, enactées par les défilés et les arrivages périodiques de
nouveaux vêtements dans les points de vente. Il faut cependant être à l'affût de
changements. Par exemple, le manufacturier et détaillant de réputation mondiale, Zara, a
232
réussi à gommer les saisons traditionnelles avec sa maîtrise des technologies de production
et propose plutôt un flux quasiment continu de produits (Birnbaum, 2000 :102). Cependant,
cette stratégie ne fonctionne que dans les marchés où la clientèle est extrêmement friande
de nouveautés vestimentaires. Un autre exemple, cette fois d'adaptation temporelle à la
concurrence asiatique : le manufacturier et détaillant montréalais Le Château a adopté une
stratégie hybride en rapatriant à Montréal une partie de sa production pour raccourcir son
temps réponse et se synchroniser au rythme de sa clientèle locale, elle-même entraînée au
rythme rapide du web qui, presqu'en direct, leur révèle les derniers vêtements portés par
...Madonna, et que les clientes de Le Château réclament à l'entreprise.. .tout de suite
(Ouimet, 2008). La compagnie Canadel, fabricant de meubles, a elle aussi adopté une
stratégie hybride afm d'être mieux synchronisée à la demande locale dans un contexte
d'offre à bas prix en provenance de la Chine (Roy, 2006).
Alors que les temporalités dominantes dans ces autres champs organisationnels pourront
démontrer des caractéristiques différentes de celle des biopharmaceutiques, l'accès aux
stratégies temporelles passera par la compréhension des pratiques stratégiques situées.
Possiblement, si la chercheure adopte une approche de théorisation ancrée, d'autres outils
théoriques, outre le portefeuille d'horizons de temps stratégiques, seront mis au point.
En ultime conclusion, nous avançons que désormais l'expression
« management
stratégique du temps » n'a plus à être appréhendée comme un oxymore. Tant les pressions
temporelles institutionnelles que les actions temporelles stratégiques sont actions humaines.
Révéler la pluralité des temps dans le champ du management stratégique, c'est en vérité
offrir au stratège un élargissement de son spectre d'actions vers une conformité ou une
différenciation par rapport aux demandes du champ organisationnel et des concurrents.
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