Institutional Entrepreneurs in the Public Sector

Transcription

Institutional Entrepreneurs in the Public
Sector: Towards a Contingency Theory
By:
Taïeb Hafsi, HEC Montreal
Luc Bernier, ENAP Quebec et
Mehdi Farashahi, JMSB Concordia
Cahier de recherche N° 07-30-01
January 2007
ISSN: 1711-6309
______________________________________________________________________________
Copyright © 2006. La Chaire de management stratégique international Walter-J.–Somers, HEC Montréal.
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alteration in any form whatsoever is prohibited. This document is intended to be used as the framework for an educational discussion
and does not imply any judgment about the administrative situation presented.
Institutional Entrepreneurs in the Public Sector: Towards a Contingency Theory
ABSTRACT
As the state has evolved so did the nature of public sector
institutional entrepreneurship. In this paper, using findings reported by
the literature and our own previous research, we describe the patterns of
co-evolution of state and public sector institutional entrepreneurship. The
state creates the conditions that promote innovative behaviour which fits
with the period's needs. When the need is satisfied, the bureaucracy takes
over again. Since the Second World War, three patterns are identified with (1) great
entrepreneurs to develop new activities or new organizations; (2) Systemic
entrepreneurs, focused on improving the management of the bureaucracy; and
(3) Legislative entrepreneurs, redesigning the system. These patterns are
the bases of a proposed contingency theory of institutional entrepreneurship
in the public sector. Some implications are suggested in conclusion.
Key Words:
Institutional entrepreneurship; Public sector transformation; Contingency theory;
Evolution of entrepreneurship; Systemic entrepreneurship; Legislative entrepreneurship
RÉSUMÉ
L’évolution de la nature de l’entrepreneuriat institutionnel dans le secteur public a suivi
celle de l’État. Dans cet article, en utilisant nos propres recherches et les résultats de
recherche décrits dans la littérature scientifique, nous décrivons les patterns de coévolution de l’État et de l’entrepreneuriat institutionnel du secteur public. L’État crée les
conditions qui génèrent le comportement innovateur le plus adapté à la situation. Quand
le besoin est satisfait, la bureaucratie reprend la main. Depuis la deuxième guerre
mondiale, trois patterns sont identifiés avec (1) de grands entrepreneurs qui développent
des activités ou des organisations nouvelles, (2) des entrepreneurs systémiques,
concentrés sur l’amélioration du management de l’administration et (3) des entrepreneurs
législatifs, qui repensent les systèmes. Ces patterns sont utilisés pour proposer une
nouvelle théorie de la contingence de l’entrepreneuriat institutionnel dans le secteur
public. Quelques conséquences sont suggérées en conclusion.
Mots clés :
Entrepreneuriat institutionnel; transformation du secteur public; théorie de la
contingence; évolution de l’entrepreneuriat; entrepreneuriat systémique; entrepreneuriat
législatif.
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Copyright © HEC Montréal
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .....................................................................................................................................1
RÉSUMÉ..........................................................................................................................................1
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................2
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: TOWARDS A
CONTINGENCY THEORY ............................................................................................................3
1.
PUBLIC SECTOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP EVOLUTION
4
2.
PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CONTEXT
6
3.
GRAND ENTREPRENEURS CONCEIVING THE STATE SECTOR
8
4.
SYSTEMIC ENTREPRENEURS BUILDING PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
9
5.
SPECIALIZING ENTREPRENEURS: LEGISLATORS OR CREATIVE MANAGERS 10
6.
TOWARDS AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
13
ENTREPRENEURS AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A CONTINGENCY THEORY
14
7.
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................18
Table 1: Characteristics of a public sector entrepreneurship cycle ....................................................19
Table 2: State organization-Entrepreneurship contingency evolution.................................................20
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................................................21
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2
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: TOWARDS A CONTINGENCY THEORY
The public sector of most countries in the world has gone through dramatic
transformations since the early 1980s. The welfare states that had been completed after
1945 in many countries faced growing challenges in the 1970s. It became even more
obvious as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan came to power. In particular, stateowned firms have either been privatized or their management has been deeply modified.
New management practices known to professionals as the new public management
(NPM) have also been used. These practices were based on the idea that in using
practices that had worked well in the private sector, efficiency gains could be achieved in
the public sector (Charih & Daniels, 1997; Duncan et al., 1991). However, such gains
have not always been as great as expected. For example, new autonomous agencies closer
to the SOEs than to departments or ministries have not been very successful. Some have
argued that the focus should then be put on issues of governance (Ingraham et al., 2004).
But governance issues are more complicated than they appeared because NPM has
changed the rules of public administration by giving managers more room to manoeuvre
or to become entrepreneurs (Levin & Sanger, 1994). This change process, which makes it
possible for entrepreneurial activities to thrive, is described in this paper.
In the 1950s and 60s, the after-war economic development in Europe and elsewhere
generated a huge growth of the state sector and the creation of a large number of state
owned enterprises (SOEs). At the beginning, these were mostly appendices of
government apparatus, subject to tight controls, similar to those imposed upon
government offices. Twenty years later, although the state sector was still significant, the
relationship between SOEs and governments had changed dramatically. The highly
dependent SOEs had often become autonomous entities, competing in the marketplace, or
subjected to entirely new and very different sets of rules and regulations (Hafsi,
Kiggundu and Jorgensen, 1987).
As a result, in the 1980s the public sector’s behaviour was determined by new
regulations, new norms, and even a new culture (Metcalfe, 1993). But more important
changes were to come in the 1990s when governments would have to solve huge deficit
problems. These particular changes were taking place even though little broad
institutional change had occurred yet in the world. The transformations that have rocked
Europe, Asia, and America, such as the end of the cold war, and the globalization of trade
and business activities, were still to come. It has also taken place at a time where the
philosophies inspiring state management in Europe and in America were generally stable
(Moe, 1994). Later, the changes led to further transformations, which in our perspective
have brought new patterns and an ability to look at the state as a broad organisation,
whose coordinating mechanisms are key stakes and issues (Dunleavy et al., 2006). Such a
history with a long institutional stability, followed by dramatic changes creates an
opportunity to study the process by which major institutional changes take place. It also
helps to appreciate the nature and roles of entrepreneurs in the change process (Osborne
& Gabler, 1992).
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3
In this paper we undertake to study the transformation of the state sector since the end of
the Second World War until 2005. In this study, we give a special attention to
institutional entrepreneurs, and to the strategic and organizational behaviour of important
organizations in the state sector. We finally contrast such an evolution to the concomitant
changes that have taken place in the state sector during the period in search of relations
and patterns. With support from the literature and examples from our own study of
Canadian state organizations, we will show that public secteur challenges evolve to
respond to societal needs, and that institutional entrepreneurship in the public sector
follows recognizable patterns that are consistent with such needs.
In the early phase strong-willed institutional entrepreneurs, and powerful state institutions
have shaped the organizations’ behaviour. In the second stage, a myriad of anonymous
innovators have transformed state organizations through stimulating change among the
relevant state institutions. Finally, in the third stage, co-evolution has led to institutional
fusion in which entrepreneurs, whether in government or its related organizations,
achieve legislative transformations which lead to the separation between state
organizations, including SOEs, and government. This process is consistent with an
increasing specialization of tasks and roles, and we believe it to be universal.
In the first section of the paper we discuss of the idea of state sector entrepreneurship
evolution, which will serve as a backdrop for a description, in the second section, of three
patterns of institutional entrepreneurship in the public sector that have been documented
in the extant literature, and supported by our own studies. Section 3 is devoted to the
development of a contingency theory of institutional entrepreneurship in the public
sector. A few concluding comments will be used to discuss the value of such findings for
both research and practice of public sector management.
1.
PUBLIC SECTOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP EVOLUTION
Entrepreneurship is generally “a process by which individuals – either on their own or
inside organizations – pursue opportunities without regard to the resources that they
currently control.” (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). In their synthesis, Shane &
Venkataraman (2000:220) proposed that “To have entrepreneurship, you must first have
entrepreneurial opportunities… situations in which new goods, services, raw materials,
and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost of
production.” Recognizing opportunities requires that entrepreneurs see or believe that
there is value where others don’t. When the opportunity becomes obvious, imitators come
into the fray and whether they are successful or not may be related to the existence of
isolating factors, whether strategic or institutional (Oliver, 1997) that protect the original
entrepreneurs.
An opportunity may exist but “only a subset of the population will discover it” (Shane
and Venkataraman, 2000: 221). It is both a matter of access to information and cognition.
“Even if a person possesses the prior information necessary to discover an opportunity,
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he or she may fail to do so because of an inability to see new means-ends relationships.”
(p.222). Examples of such situations abound (Rosenberg, 1994). It has been shown that
some people may see opportunities where others see mostly risks (Sarasvathy, Somon
and Lave, 1998). In general, entrepreneurs are likely to spend less time in conjectures and
analyses and more in acting upon their intuitions (Baron, 2000, cited by S & V, 2000).
Depending on the nature of the opportunity and the characteristics of the entrepreneur, a
decision to exploit the opportunity may then take place. Even if entrepreneurs tend as a
group to exploit opportunities with a higher expected value, they are not equal in doing
so. For example, whether or not entrepreneurs have a greater financial capital (Evans and
Leighton, 1989), stronger social ties to resource providers (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986), a
greater willingness to bear risk (Venkataraman, 1997; Khilstrom & Laffont, 1979) or an
optimistic outlook (Cooper, Woo & Dunkelberg, 1988) tend to increase or decrease the
chances of pursuing an opportunity.
Entrepreneurship takes many forms. It may go from building artefacts, such as a new
product or service as did M. Dell in PCs, building an organization as did Ruckelhaus with
EPA or Hoover with the FBI in the USA (Lewis, 1980), or transforming existing markets
and organizations as was done by many entrepreneurs in the public sector (Authors, in
Press1). Entrepreneurship becomes institutional when entrepreneurs are “actors who have
an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create
new institutions or to transform existing ones” (Maguire et al, 2004: 657),
Entrepreneurship, especially institutional, is often associated with strong individuals,
heroes and adventurers who discover things and exploit them single-handedly
(Ramamurti, 1982; Salazar, 1992). But the important literature on intrapreneurship has
also revealed patterns that suggest more collective entrepreneurial activities. It may be
that the form that entrepreneurship takes is affected by the nature of the opportunity and
the circumstances in which it presents itself. It has for example been documented that
individual entrepreneurs are mostly associated with the creation of an artefact or an
organization, while some kind of collective entrepreneurship arises when the
entrepreneurs have to work on an existing organization (Authors, in Press). Thus,
Institutional Entrepreneurship can be individual or collective/systemic depending on the
nature of the opportunities considered and on the context within which it takes place.
The form that institutional entrepreneurship takes could even be predicted, at least in
large complex organizational setting. Taking the public sector as an example, it has been
observed that there is a cycle in the relationship between the organization, as an agent,
and the core power of the state (Hafsi and Koenig, 1988). When the organization is
created, the relationship is close and warm. It has been labelled cooperative. This is the
situation when the core technology of the firm is not yet crystallized. When the
organization grows and its core technology develops, the relationship becomes more
adversarial, with numerous conflicts, the organization managers trying to protect the core
technology from interference of higher officials. With time, as conflict increases and
1 Our work will be referenced precisely after the review process.
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becomes more costly to all parties, higher officials tend to shy away from it, in fact
giving more autonomy to the organization.
The research that led to these observations also suggests that at the cooperative stage,
there are lots of risk-taking and entrepreneurial behaviours. Entrepreneurs committed to
the state’s views and objectives take the responsibility of building new artefacts or new
organizations. That is how for example, the European public sector has grown from the
1960s to the 1980s. At the adversarial stage, there is little entrepreneurship. The
entrepreneurs and managers who have built great organizations are generally frustrated
by the controls and difficulties that they have to put up with, and tend to leave the public
sector for other avenues. Then, as government resources decline and traditional public
sector management are questioned, desperate government officials come to realize that
they have to provide space for transformation to take place (Borins, 2001). This could
correspond to a new type of entrepreneurship that has been abundantly documented and
in which teams rather than individuals are involved in the multiple initiatives that
transformed the public sector of many countries (Hafsi and Bernier, 2005). Thus, in
particular, in a state-controlled organization, institutional entrepreneurship manifestations
and its nature are expected to be related to the nature of the relationship between the state
and the organization considered.
We take this as our starting point and our guide. Focusing particularly on the state sector,
we argue in the following sections that indeed institutional entrepreneurship in the public
sector takes forms that are related to the broad context. So far, three patterns can be
documented. In the first, heroic entrepreneurs build activities and organizations. In the
second, collectives transform organizations. Finally, a flowering of entrepreneurial forms
leads to a clear separation of the state legislative and managerial functions.
2.
PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2 IN
CONTEXT
When looking at a state-controlled organization’s strategic decision-making process, the
state is seen as a critical factor. It is the key factor in the organization’s environment. It is
the source of resources, legitimacy and key controls. How the relationship between the
state and the state-controlled organization, such as SOEs, is organized and handled can be
critical for success. In their study of such a relationship, Hafsi and Koenig (1988)
suggested that there is a cycle. When the organization is nascent, it is dominated by state
logic and perspectives. It also receives most of its resources from the state. Key managers
are themselves former civil servant, sensitive to state objectives and sometimes have been
key actors in the development of these objectives. They are at home with the bureaucracy
and are respected by most civil servants with whom they interact. The two parties
understand well each other and cooperate on most issues. This is the cooperative phase,
which has been described also as the phase in which the organization’s core technology is
still in its formative years.
2 From here onward, entrepreneurship always means institutional entrepreneurship.
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6
When the organization’s core technology is in place, its managers keep state officials and
civil servants at arms’ length, to prevent them from intervening in ways that could affect
core technology norms of rationality (Thompson, 1967). This is a slow and progressive
process that leads to confrontations. These confrontations are, according to Hafsi and
Koenig (1988), numerous but of limited intensity and scope, but slowly grow more
intense and less frequent. Confrontations are all related to the efforts of managers to
protect the organization’s core technology, and keep it functioning properly.
In the third phase, intense confrontations are increasingly seen as politically and
sometimes institutionally too costly. As a result, state officials shy away from them,
leaving the organization to pursue a more market oriented logic. The organization
becomes de facto autonomous, especially when it is possible to generate the resources
required for regular operations, which some SOEs have been able to do.
Entrepreneurship put in context is also different in these different phases. Our research
(authors’ reference) shows that where the organization is in the cooperative phase, grand
entrepreneurs take over, providing both vision and supervision. Where the organisation is
in the confrontation stage, entrepreneurship of the previous type fades away, with many
entrepreneurs leaving for other ventures within or outside the public sector. The result is
typical of bureaucracies, with well-established work standards, and very little initiative or
innovation. More focused on rituals, hierarchy and formalism, state organizations have
little concern for either effectiveness or efficiency (Crozier, 1962; Crozier and Friedberg,
1977). The state is then unable to handle adjustments to major changes should these be
necessary. In the last 30 years, as it is very well documented, states all over the world
have hit a wall that required them to reduce taxes and spending, and officials found
themselves gasping for new ways of achieving their objectives (Pollitt and Bouckaert,
2004).
This created favourable conditions for the development of a different form of
entrepreneurship, more concerned with the organization and its operations. Doing more
with less has been the motto of these new entrepreneurs (Riccucci, 1995; Sanger &
Levin, 1992). The main characteristics of this type of entrepreneurship is that it is less
individual and more collective, with groups of people taking connected or coordinated
innovations and initiatives, mostly designed to make the organizational systems function
better, and achieve a greater level of effectiveness and efficiency (Osborne & Gabler,
1992). Finally, as the organization grows older this “systemic entrepreneurship”3
generates the ways and means to secure access to critical resources while better serving
various customers or segments of the population. The systemic entrepreneurship has
reached its limits as most organizational problems are dealt with and are controlled by
newly conceived routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Organizations of the public sector
then have to deal with new types of challenges, which are mostly related to new ways of
governing, thus pushing for a separation between legislative and managerial tasks
(Roberts, 1999). This means a new type of entrepreneur, more specialized, able to design
a project and make it happen. In contrast with the entrepreneurship of the first type, this
3 Systemic entrepreneurship has been defined as involving both groups of entrepreneurs, rather than single
individuals, and transforming whole systems, rather than single or a few activities.
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one is less concerned about the organization itself, and more concerned about the design
and the achievement of specific projects that could have cumulatively an impact on the
whole state system. These patterns are now illustrated in details in the next subsections.
3.
GRAND ENTREPRENEURS CONCEIVING THE STATE SECTOR
At the end of the Second WW, C.D. Howe then the Canadian Minister of Transport and a
powerful cabinet member, supported by a number of civil servants of which Gordon R.
McGregor, got the parliament to vote the Transcanada Airline (TCA) Act, to create the
company known today as Air Canada (McGregor, 1980). McGregor and C.D. Howe
shared the vision and the will to create the airline and cooperated very closely in doing
so. Despite resistance and difficulties, they were able to bring the project to fruition.
Howe created the context for entrepreneurship and McGregor built the airline. Some of
McGregor’s statements tell of how the interaction actually worked: “one could tell
endless anecdotes of what Mr. Howe’s unfailing support meant to TCA and to me, up to
his personal defeat in the 1957 election… It was a delight to read some of the exchanges
between Mr. Howe and other members in the House when the latter incautiously attacked
the airline…” (McGregor, 1980).
Similarly, in the early 1960, the French government was tired of trying to get the
Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP), in which it held a 34% interest, to build
refineries deep inside France and away from the seaside. CFP, like most oil companies of
the time considered that to be an economic heresy. The civil servants that took over the
project and achieved the creation of l’Union Générale du Pétrole (UGP) to become later
la Société Nationale Elf Aquitaine, took great risks and had to struggle against difficult
technical and commercial odds (Authors’ reference)
Great entrepreneurs have emerged in that period everywhere in Europe, America, and
almost everywhere, creating a large number of new firms and activities. Among these one
could mention Lilienthal of the TVA in the USA, E. Mattei of ENI in Italy, W. Hopper of
PetroCan in Canada, and many others (Ramamurti, 1982; Salazar, 1992]. The
entrepreneurs were generally the designers of these projects in the government
bureaucracy and later became the managers involved in achieving them. Their projects
were made possible only because they were consistent with highly desirable objectives
stated by government officials. As mentioned earlier in the TCA case, this provided
access to needed resources and to protection from opponents in the political and
economic arenas. The relationships between the entrepreneurs and the politicians were
based on mutual trust, but the entrepreneurs still had to fight their way and take the risk
where the value of the project was concerned. Most of the entrepreneurs involved had in
fact staked their career in conducting their projects (Anastassopoulos, 1980; Ferrario,
1978). But most of them were young and willing to do that. Even if the level of risk was
different in different countries, it was seen as significant in reference to the culture of the
civil service of the country.
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The entrepreneurs have in this phase built the activities and the state sector as it emerged
from the three or four decades after the war or after the great depression of 1929. In
Europe, the result was spectacular as states were obliged or wanted to take over many
basic activities in the energy sector, in steel-making, in transportation and in
manufacturing. In the USA, only a few public enterprises in national sectors such as
electricity were developed by public entrepreneurs. This was for example the case of the
TVA under Lilienthal (McCraw, 1971). Later, new regulatory activities such as the EPA
were constructed by powerful entrepreneurs such as Ruckelhaus (Dobel, 1995). Most of
the entrepreneurs’ activities were directed at major undertakings, building new industries,
new state organizations or new state activities. The individuals dominated the process and
they were highly visible, especially in the following phase as they started confronting
their state masters to protect their creations.
4.
SYSTEMIC ENTREPRENEURS BUILDING PUBLIC SECTOR
MANAGEMENT
Once Air Canada was built, the entrepreneurs of early times fought the state to keep it
from intervening into the operations of their organizations. Early champions of state
intervention for the creation of the organization or activities, became the staunchest
opponents to state intervention to avoid the destruction of the organization that they have
built (Anastassopoulos, 1980; Koenig & Thiétart, 1988). They realized soon that to keep
the organization healthy they had to protect its technical core, a proposition that was at
the heart of contingency theory (Thompson, 1967). But confrontation with government
was exhausting for most of them and they disappeared for various reasons, some taking
private sector positions, some moving to politics, some creating their own firms, and
others simply retiring (Koenig, 1997).
The organizations of the public sector that were created gradually became bureaucracies,
controlled by rigid and formalized processes and giving traditional attention to hierarchy,
standardized output, and ritual behaviour. Very few kept innovating. The public sector
moved away from concerns of efficiency or even effectiveness to emphasize bureaucratic
rules and regulations. This was acceptable as long as the resources available were
sufficient to respond to the requirements of maintaining such a static system. But the
financial and economic crises of the 1970s, led to protests and government’s management
was questioned. Calls for restructuring and decentralization, for cost reduction and
efficiency became common. But nobody knew how to do that and revamp such a
complex system (Adams, 1979; DeWitt et al., 1994).
The conditions were thus created for the emergence of new entrepreneurs, who would
specialize in redesigning and rebuilding the state organizations. But no entrepreneur
would emerge unless the conditions were right. For example, the government of Canada
issue the “Blue book” and started building the framework of the new civil service in the
early 1980s, based on the UK government NEDO report4 (1976), and the French
4 The report is better known as the Morrison report, for the name of Lord Morrison of Lambeth, the
chairman of the commission who produced the report
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government-sponsored Nora report (1967). Activities that were autonomous enough
could be separated from the government central core to allow for a more efficient
management. Myriads of entrepreneurs were encouraged to envisage new ways of doing
the traditional jobs or improving them. Such mottos as “serving the customers” and
“being cost effective”, borrowed from the private sector became the norm and
management of the state was soon seen to be no different from management of large
firms of the private sector (Duncan et al, 1991; Osborne & Gabler, 1992).
But besides very broad statements, specific objectives could not be stated. Articulating
them was seen as a part of the reform movement and a creative exercise. There was a lot
of uncertainty about the path to be followed. No clear project could be articulated. And
no one could be reasonably financed, given the resources available. Rather many small
projects could be designed and encouraged. As a result, no great entrepreneurs emerged.
Instead, a large number of connected entrepreneurs started nibbling at the old state and
transforming it into a modern machinery, capable of adjusting, responding to the
customers’ needs and providing both the effectiveness and efficiency required (Riccucci,
1995). In France, the process was conceptualized by a call to build “L’État stratège”,
which meant that the state as whole should behave strategically, thus allowing strategy to
be conceived at many different levels close to reality (Trosa, 1996).
Examples of initiatives that were successful are numerous. In Canada, Qi Jing Ye (2006)
documented several projects in her dissertation. They all brought welcome improvements
to how traditional activities were conducted and in the process changed, sometimes
radically, the way government activities function (Borins, 1998; 2000).
5.
SPECIALIZING ENTREPRENEURS: LEGISLATORS OR CREATIVE
MANAGERS
The new public system is now a more dynamic system that has resolved many basic
managerial issues. Work is generally managed by objectives. Managers, especially those
at the higher levels, are evaluated and stimulated with both recognition and tangible
rewards such as promotion and higher pays. In general the public sector has become a
more effective and efficient machinery, able to recognize its customers and committed to
provide a better service to them.
But the conflict of resources is still there. The decentralization and empowerment
generates new types of inefficiencies. Multiple agencies deal with similar problems and
may enter in conflict with each other. A broader view is required to come up with better
integration. In Canada, two examples, among many which have gained recognition
through the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) annual innovation
award, will help us describe the new challenges. The first was called the “Alberta Youth
justice committees project,” and the second was the “Canadian Radio and
Telecommunication Commission (CRTC) regulatory process transformation.”
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10
Youth justice committees were a revolution in Alberta. Young offenders were a recurring
community concern throughout Canada. Developing a system that corrects rather than
simply represses wrongs of young offenders has always been a national aspiration. In
Alberta, in the 1970s and 1980s, consideration was given to community involvement, but
that led mostly to “individuals volunteering to work one-on-one with offenders.” In 1990,
in Fort Chipewyan, an aboriginal community located 750 km North of Edmonton, citizen
involvement was expanded significantly with the creation of the first formal youth justice
committee. What were perceived to be positive results led to the creation of five others in
the early 1990s. The initiative was based on the idea that crime, in particular youth crime
is a multi-faceted problem best addressed by individuals, families, communities and
government collaborating to build strong communities.
In 1994, a large number of complaints led to the creation of a task force on the Young
Offenders Act. The public consultations led to the recommendation that Youth justice
committees be promoted throughout Alberta. Their role was formally defined as
including: (1) Sentence advisory, and (2) Alternative measures program, which “ensure
that the young offender understands the full consequences of his behaviour on the victim
as well as on the community, and … successful completion of alternative measures
program results in no criminal record for the youth.” Since 1994, the Alberta Solicitor
General encouraged, assisted and supported communities develop more than 90 youth
justice committees (YJC). In addition, to ensure success, judges spend evenings and week
ends to meet with groups of citizens to educate them about the court process, while
probation officers provide YJC with ongoing case management liaison, training, and
sharing of experiences. Furthermore, a recognition program has been established for
volunteers, with Solicitor General’s certificates of appreciation recognizing length of
service, and lapel pins provided as a distinguishing feature.
Although the office of the Solicitor General was the final decision maker, the program
has been pushed by the executive director of the young offender branch, who provided
the organizational framework, the justifications and the day-to-day management. In 200001, 1,600 youths appeared before YJCs, a 60% increase over 1997-98, and “data indicates
that youths who are referred to the committees have a 90% success rate in the completion
of alternative measures agreements.” All this has been achieved with very limited
additional resources.
The Canadian Radio and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), provides guidance
and regulation in the radio telecommunication and media industries. It is also seen as a
protection mechanism for industries that have direct effects on the cultural and social life
in Canada. In 1996, the CRTC had completed the long distance phone deregulation and
started the deregulation process of the local telephony. Decision 94-195 was to suppress
barriers to entry into the local services market, allowing at the same time free access, degrouping and co-location. In the implementation process, Contrary to existing practice,
the Commission decided to introduce a new set of procedures and practices, unheard of in
any regulatory body.
5 http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/frn/Notices/1995/PT95-36.htm
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11
In the traditional method, a regulation is prepared and transmitted to the parties
concerned. Then each of the parties is invited to make representations for or against the
proposed regulatory decisions. The process had been criticized by the parties as being
cumbersome and sometimes unfair. Companies often complained that this affected their
ability to compete, while users saw the CRTC interventions as lacking the flexibility to
take into account their concerns. In search of more effectiveness and efficiency, the
CRTC has decided to get the parties involved in a collaborative process in all the steps of
the decision making process. A high level interconnection steering committee (CISC),
including a high official of the CTRC, the VP telecom, and a representative from each of
the key stakeholders, was allowed to look at all the steps and propose the most practical
ways of implementing them. Paul Godin in charge of the CISC explained that: “the
collaborative approach has been adopted because the CRTC members recognized that
representatives of stakeholders have a better knowledge of what needs to be done to
ensure a smooth implementation of a specific regulation.”
Deregulation of a well-established and heavily regulated industry involves a complex
process. Many factors and idiosyncratic circumstances have to be taken into account.
Questions such as: (1) how to connect networks belonging to competing companies, (2)
how to organize transactions among them, (3) how to facilitate the transfer of a customer
from one supplier to another, (4) how to assign a phone number, etc., questions that were
generally seen as very sensitive by telecommunication companies.
In this particular case, the various task forces set up by the CISC, involved up to 200
professionals. CISC bridges competing companies, government policy makers and public
advocacy groups. These parties, frequently at odds with one another, have forged the
guidelines and technical tools for allowing competition in local telephone services.6”
Each task group was headed by a company president, chosen by the group or by the CISC
if the group was unable to decide. Twenty groups tackled no less than 165 issues. “… By
establishing a series of dynamic working groups, knit together under a steering
committee,” many solutions were found.
The whole process was very precisely specified. For example, when the task groups made
a proposal, the CISC had 10 days to approve or reject it. When a conflict emerged, the
CRTC representative was in charge of reconciling viewpoints and finding consensual
positions. To do so, the dissenting party is asked to write a brief, which is then examined
by the CISC. When there is no possible arrangement, the CRTC makes the last resort
decision. David Colville, CRTC’s VP Telecom describes an example where the CRTC
decision was required: “The biggest single issue was number portability… It is extremely
difficult to attract customers to switch telephone service providers unless they can keep
their phone numbers. But how can a phone number follow a customer from supplier A to
supplier B? Who assigns the numbers?”
The process succeeded in reducing considerably conflicts and complaints, by creating the
conditions for mutual acquaintance and understanding. Small and inexperienced
companies entering the industry saw the whole exercise as an important learning process.
6 Gold prize IAPC 2000
___________________
12
The key to success has been presented as being the real devolvement of power to the
CISC and the stakeholders. Such an open attitude was unheard of in the history of the
CTRC or any other regulatory agency in Canada. This was made possible by the general
openness of government to initiative and entrepreneurship.
According to Leo Mevel, Director Technologies, the process first “puts Canada in the
international forefront in implementing local telephone competition… We were able to
get rules and procedures in place very rapidly and much faster than in other countries,
including the United States.” Second, it led to a significant cost reduction: “CRTC costs
of implementing CISC have been minimal compared to the huge expense of undertaking
dozens of lengthy proceedings, which would have involved many industry parties. A
conservative estimate suggests that through CISC, the commission saved $750,000 and
more than two years of work on the local competition alone.7” Finally, the whole
exercise changed the actors and the CRTC itself: “CISC also had a dramatic effect on the
CRTC. Team members included financial analysts, economists, legal staff and engineers.
Those who participated contributed significantly towards implementing competition.
They learned a great deal about the telecom industry and about people in general. Positive
feedback from the industry players gave CRTC staff increased satisfaction and
confidence.8” Everybody seemed to find a good word for the process, including the
telecommunication companies, which were not caught off-guard in dealing with the
deregulation.
The entrepreneurs who presented their innovation to IPAC’s award competition argued
that: “As far as we know, no other telecommunication regulatory body has done this…
The World Trade Organization agreement on trade in services calls for more than 90
countries to open up telecommunications markets to competition, but most still have a
monopoly environment… When they find out about CISC process, many of them are
extremely intrigued and want to learn more so they can adopt this model to help them
deal with these issues.”
6.
TOWARDS AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Going back to this section early statement, we see that entrepreneurship changes to
respond to environmental challenges, as expressed by state organizations’ needs. It
evolves through a series of cycles, instead of only one cycle. It starts with a first cycle in
which great entrepreneurs take the floor, when there is a need to build new activities or
new organizations. It then moves to a new management-based entrepreneurship cycle in
which collectives share in a variety of activities designed to transform or reinvent the
management of their organizations. As a result, public sector organizations gain more
autonomy, effectiveness and efficiency. But also the process leads to an increased
specialization that creates new coordination problems that put in question the very nature
of the state. It forces a re-examination of the basis of the state action and lead to a new
7 Ditto above
8 Ditto
___________________
13
cycle with another type of entrepreneurship that leads to grand organizational designs and
a redrawing of the boundaries between legislative action and the management of state
activities.
The three cycles lead to different entrepreneurship outcomes, but have the same
organizational dynamics. First there is a need, which is presented as critical for
organizational effectiveness. The need is generally social-economic or environmental in
the first cycle. It is more organizational, related to organizational effectiveness, in the
second cycle, and more legislative, setting broad policies and policy implementation
mechanisms, in the third cycle. Then, there is a call for resolution of the need and the
development of incentives for potential entrepreneurs interested in dealing with such a
resolution. Finally, the need is addressed and resolved, leading to a lull in which the
entrepreneurs are evacuated by the system. Table 1 describes the characteristics of the
cycles.
As summarized in Table 1, the state sector adjusts to respond to the need and resolve the
tensions and problems facing it. Where there is a need for creation and initiative, the state
seem to generate more space to state officials so that they can take place. But as the
problems and tensions are resolved the forces for unity and control take over again. The
entrepreneurship cycle is a cycle in which control recedes for a time to allow solutions to
take place, then comes back to avoid too much turbulence and respond to the population
need for stability and integrity. But if the state transforms in a predictable way, the
outcome of the transformation is different and responds to specific circumstances and
environmental characteristics.
7.
ENTREPRENEURS AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A CONTINGENCY
THEORY
As suggested in the previous section, the state evolves to adjust to specific challenges.
The evolution is predictable. It is cyclical. In our study, we have found that in the last
four decades, the evolution of the state has generated a type of entrepreneurship that was
consistent with the nature of the challenges faced. Table 2 is a summary which may prove
useful to follow the discussion in this section.
In the first cycle described, the Canadian government for example was dealing with a
pressing need to build new activities to protect the community or create the conditions for
its social-economic development. The need emerged either as a response to an internal
threat (national unity for the railroad) or an external threat (World War 2 for the airline).
The private sector was not able or not reliable enough to take care of the need. The state
therefore created the conditions for great entrepreneurs to conceive and build the required
activities. Air Canada, PetroCanada and Canadian National were all creations of very
visible entrepreneurs.
The need was generally clearly conceptualized by state officials and for the response to
such a need specialized entrepreneurs were sought. The entrepreneurs are generally
___________________
14
outstanding individuals who share two important characteristics. They know very well
the state machinery and they have some expertise in the domain of activity concerned.
They benefit in their new task of some protection from the state, but such a protection is
shaky. They succeed only by going much beyond what state officials have in mind. They
grow in stature as they develop unexpected and successful answers to the stated needs
and enough support for such answers to be adopted by political officials. Therefore, the
successful entrepreneurs develop their own legitimacy and political support. They cannot
rely on state officials for support of the bold ideas that they have to come up with. In
return, succeeding in responding to the need may mean important personal benefits. The
benefits may be sufficient to envisage a comfortable life after the state career. Only a
handful of individuals have these characteristics. Entrepreneurship also becomes
institutional when the individuals involved are able to gain legitimacy for the innovation
they have developed.
The first cycle declines as the great achievements become mature and the entrepreneurs
who were instrumental in promoting them feel tired of dealing with the bureaucracy and
move away. The transition is a lull, with limited initiative and the return of the ruledominated bureaucratic behaviour. Some entrepreneurs may even be harassed as the
bureaucracy is tempted to apply rules retroactively. This kills initiative and encourages
office-holding and ceremonial behaviour at the expense of effectiveness and efficiency.
This is acceptable as the state reaps the benefits of the great construction period, both in
terms of employment and tax volume. Efficiency and even effectiveness decline and with
time the legitimacy of the state is again questioned (Doig & Hargrove, 1990). Tax levels
are generally incompatible with the quality of services and active groups of society start
questioning the ability of the state to provide services that are compatible with tax levels.
This starts the second cycle.
Resources available to state officials are increasingly tightened and they are compelled to
look for new ways to achieve additional political goals. The call for a better management
of the state sector is compatible with the discourse that dominates the contest movement.
Better management requires an adjustment to bureaucratic rules (Morris & Jones, 1999).
Control has to be relaxed to allow for the rise of a new type of initiative which will
improve services and cut costs. In contrast to the first cycle, here the entrepreneurs need
to know the bureaucracy in its intimate details. As the bureaucracy is usually specialized,
and functionally organized (Chandler, 1962; Crozier, 1962), no individual alone can
assume all the responsibilities of the required changes, which leads to systemic
entrepreneurship (Hafsi and Bernier, 2005). Groups of entrepreneurs scrutinize the state
system and come up with new ways to achieve things.
Generally, these new ways are inspired of private sector practices which has led to the
New Public Management drive and beyond (Duncan et al, 1991; Dunleavy et al., 2006).
Strategy making, new definition of goals, new human resource management practices that
reduce job security and increase job related rewards, contractual leadership, and an
emphasis on service quality and financial management, lead to dramatic improvements.
Indeed, managers seem to be able “to achieve more with less resources.” In the process,
bureaucratic rules are dramatically transformed and the boundaries between private and
___________________
15
public practices shift significantly. As a result, bureaucracies sell their services to
businesses and to the population, civil servants’ employment contracts are similar to
those of the private sector, and managers’ discourse is often dominated by the need to
achieve efficiency (Kernaghan et al, 2000). As they are free to act, public sector
managers try any available management practices and in some extreme situations their
initiative may even get out of hands, as was the case with the use of security agencies for
the American war in Iraq. The quality of traditional services, such as passport delivery,
and administrative authorization paperwork improves dramatically, but where services
have a market characteristic, as in the delivery of telecommunication or electric power
services, the mix between monopoly power and state unwillingness to reverse its new
philosophy and exert control, lead to inevitable abuses. Levels of satisfaction are
measured with new averages which though appropriate for competitive situations are
inappropriate for public services. As a result, where services cannot be economically
achieved, they are dropped or delayed beyond acceptable limits. For example, Air Canada
as a state-owned firm simply dropped remote or too costly destinations. In France, in late
2006, France Telecom offered access to cable services only in large cities.
These criticisms lead to some concern about the lack of control and the diluting of ethical
behaviour. The spending of cash in Iraq follows very few rules of US administration9.
Many criminal investigations have generated a concern about state behaviour and the
need to ensure stability and integrity. Entrepreneurship focused on improvement of
specific services is integrated into the normal activities of state organizations and part of
its routines. The cranking of routine improvements leads to new problems. In particular,
state agencies appear to be working at cross purpose and are unable to resolve their
disputes. Furthermore, the changes introduced push for more interactions among state
agencies, but also of the latter with private sector firms. This creates a new situation
which put in question the whole state system and forces the reconsideration of its
fundamental premises.
New initiatives are then called for. There is a need to bring together different activities in
search for a broader effectiveness and a broad strategic outlook of the state intervention.
Such activities are often at the interface of legislative initiative, judicial process, and
bureaucratic integration. They require a clear understanding of the legislative and judicial
processes and a broad understanding of the state action in various fields of activity. They
require an alliance of officials who can provide legislative or judicial approval and
traditional organizational effectiveness (Qi Jing Ye, 2006). This cannot be achieved by
the civil service managers of the previous cycle. Broad personalities, statesmen in
Selznick’s sense (1957), with credibility and prestige are needed to oversee the process,
but they have to come up with an alliance with managers who have the internal
connections needed to make things happen. The new change process is politically very
sensitive as it transforms fundamentally the original practices of the bureaucracy, and
modifies deeply the intent of the legislators (King, 1988). The examples of the CRTC and
its ability to generate broad cooperation instead of the adversarial control intended by the
regulation laws, and of the Alberta Youth Justice, which reinvented the judicial process
for Youth crimes, are typical. The transformation requires a skilful management of the
9 Références to several TV programs and professional magazines are to be provided.
___________________
16
change effort, so that legislators, judges, and managers agree on its new effects. The new
cycle works on deep transformations, which have both highly technical characteristics
and highly political implications. These transformations bring to the table representatives
from most of society’s segments, leading to the resolution of tricky policy debates
(Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; Hartle, 1985; Kobrak, 1996). The institutional
entrepreneurs involved in such a transformation are low key entrepreneurs, those that
Collins called Type 5 leaders (2001) who derive most of their effectiveness from their
credibility and experience in the policy process, and from their ability to value others’
contributions. Even this will be insufficient to derive broad changes. Instead, it requires a
slow and incremental process, to which many actors, from the legislative, the judicial and
the administrative segments, are called to contribute.
These three cycles are but manifestation of what we believe is an endless co-evolution of
entrepreneurship and the public sector. Entrepreneurship is the critical creative process
that leads to the finding of new ways to deal with new circumstances. The latter are
generally seen by entrepreneurs to be opportunities to make progress. They see them and
assess the timing required to exploit them. As new challenges arise, it is likely that new
entrepreneurship will be generated or will emerge as a matter of necessity. It is possible
that in the last twenty years more entrepreneurship has been experienced because it is
widely accepted that it is desirable. The institutions have shifted to make what was seen
as a suspicious, profit-oriented behaviour into a highly desirable contribution to society’s
capacity to adapt. Entrepreneurship can be seen as important as structure for the ability of
an organization to function properly and adapt to its environment.
___________________
17
CONCLUSION
Entrepreneurship in the public sector is often institutional entrepreneurship. It deals with
changes that have institutional importance, modifying basic state behaviour and in the
process the relationship of the state with citizenry. Institutional entrepreneurship, we have
shown, seem to evolve through predictable patterns that are associated with the
challenges that society and the state are faced with. The co-evolution of state and
entrepreneurship is a key finding of this paper. The patterns of entrepreneurship given the
challenges described is another. These findings together lead to our claim that a
contingency theory of institutional entrepreneurship can be proposed, and could be tested
in further research.
Questions for future research are related to time and timing. Entrepreneurial adaptation to
the environment has to be different if the context is different. Early entrepreneurship of
the post WW II era during the construction of modern states was very different of the
more recent entrepreneurship. For example, current entrepreneurs in the public sector
have to institutionalize the innovation they created in the state apparatus. They have to
find a way to make sure that the legacy they want to leave behind is not perturbed or
diminished by another wave of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs who are able to generate
collective action to foster institutional change (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006) could
make sure that their innovation will last by generating political support for the
innovation. The new combination Schumpeter defined as entrepreneurship has to include
some political skills (Doig et Hargrove, 1990) particularly in the e-governance era
(Dunleavy et al., 2006) that begins. That is how entrepreneurship has been moving from
creating activities or managing organizations to legislating.
Location where institutional entrepreneurship takes place in the state apparatus may also
be an important element. Following Thompson (1967) and Hafsi et al.’s work (1987),
SOEs are more likely to be “protected” from external influences and allow entrepreneurs
to innovate under less political pressures. SOEs might therefore be one of the most
interesting place in state-systems where to study public institutional entrepreneurship
(Luke and Verreynne, 2006).
Institutional entrepreneurship in the public sector is of critical importance to our society,
when one thinks about the many challenges, to environment, to the availability of energy
and natural resources, and to peace that societies are faced with. A creative approach to
these problems will involve inevitably the state. A better understanding of the process by
which creation takes place is a useful scholarly endeavour.
___________________
18
Table 1: Characteristics of a public sector entrepreneurship cycle
1. Organizational
Structure
2. Formalization
3. Dominant Rewards
4. Recruiting
5. Government power
and legitimacy
6. Leadership
7. Environment
___________________
Phase1: Need
formation
Phase 2:
Emergence of
entrepreneurs
Centralized
Decentralized
High
Declining
Mostly Promotion Monetary
Rule-based
Management
controlled
Low but growing High
Bureaucratic and
Analytic
Shifting and
munificent
19
Phase 3: Need
resolution and
evacuation of
entrepreneurs
Toward
Recentralization
Growing
Recognition
Contractual
High but declining
Supportive of
Concerned about
initiatives
institutional change
Stable and
Stable and tight
tightening resources
Table 2: State organization-Entrepreneurship contingency evolution
Individual
entrepreneurship
Systemic
entrepreneurship
Legislative
entrepreneurship
Young organization or
new activities
Large or small
autonomous units
Equipment,
Construction, Many
concrete achievements
Strong
Very high
Mature, activities exist
already
Large organization
Components may have
existed for long
Network of large and small
organizations
Policy oriented
readjustments of existing
activities
Low
Very high
A. Organization
1. Age
2. Size
3. Types of entrepreneurial
activities
4. Growth of activities
5. Perceived importance of
the organization and its
activities for society
6. Complexity of the
organization
7. Visibility of the
organization
8. Values stressed
9. Organization’s power visà-vis the government
10. Entrepreneurs
Administration, action
taken to change the
organization itself
Average to low
Importance not very well
known
Initially the activities not Usually Complex
very complex technically
or in terms of market
Usually high
Usually low
Complex
High visibility
General and social
Organizational
Societal
Relatively low to
moderate
Strong individuals
Moderate to high
Autonomous but high
power
Groups and organizational Strong leaders and groups
systems
of entrepreneurs
B. Government
1. Interest in organization’s
High to moderate
activities
2. Political power
High to moderate
3. Resources available for the Substantial
activity planned
Low to moderate
Moderate
Low to moderate
Limited
Moderate
Limited
Low to moderate
Low to moderate
High to moderate
High to moderate
High
High
Small
High
Low
High
High
Large
Low
High
Low to moderate
Low to moderate
Large
High
High
High
High
C. Task environment
1. Turbulence
2. Heterogeneity
D. Stakeholders
1. Number
2. Involvement
3. Diversity
4. Degree of organization
5. Capacity for action
___________________
20
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23

Institutional Entrepreneurs in the Public Sector

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