conference internationale pour l`emergence de l`afrique

Transcription

Oxford International Consultants Mauritius Ltd
CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE POUR
L’EMERGENCE DE L’AFRIQUE
L’EXPERIENCE DE MAURICE EN MATIèRE TRANSFORMATION ECONOMIQUE
par Nikhil Treebhoohun,
Président
Oxford International Consultants Mauritius Ltd.
5 mars 2015
Duclos Street, Port Louis, Republic of Mauritius
[email protected]
www.oxfordmu.com
Page 1 of 17
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
Acronymes ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 3
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.0 La trajectoire économique ...................................................................................................................................................... 4
2.0 Les catalyseurs ............................................................................................................................................................................. 7
3.0 Méthodes de mise en œuvre complémentaires (MMO) ............................................................................................ 12
4.0 MMO nationales ......................................................................................................................................................................... 13
5.0 Le début d'un nouveau cycle? .............................................................................................................................................. 14
6.0 Références.................................................................................................................................................................................... 16
Page 2 of 17
ACRONYMES
APEI/PAIE
CMPHS/ECMOM
BPO/STPC
GATS
CSO
EPZ
PIB
PNB
GFMD
GM
OIT
COI
OIM
ATI ou RES
PRI
ONG
MLIRE
OCDE
BPM
PIO
ONU
PNUD
Programme accéléré pour l’intégration économique
Enquête continue sur les ménages aux objectifs multiples
Sous-traitance des processus commerciaux
Accord général sur le commerce des services
Statistiques Maurice
Zone industrielle d’exploitation
Produit intérieur brut
Produit national brut
Forum mondial sur la migration et le développement
Gouvernement de Maurice
Organisation internationale du travail
Commission de l’océan Indien
Organisation internationale pour les migrations
Aménagement touristique intégré ou Projet immobilier
Pays à revenu intermédiaire
Organisation non gouvernementale
Ministère du Travail, des Relations internationales et de l’Emploi
Organisation de coopération et de développement économique
Bureau du Premier ministre
Bureau des passeports et de l’Immigration
Organisation des Nations Unies
Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement
Page 3 of 17
INTRODUCTION
“Imaginez que quelqu’un ait à décrire un petit pays qui offre une éducation gratuite
jusqu’à la fin de l’université pour tous ses citoyens, des moyens de transport pour
les écoliers, et des soins médicaux gratuits – y compris la chirurgie cardiaque – pour
tous. Vous pourriez penser qu’un tel pays est soit extrêmement riche soit destiné à
être rapide frappé par une une crise fiscale. Mais Maurice, un petit pays insulaire au
large de la cote orientale africaine, n’est ni particulièrement riche, ni proche d’une
débâcle budgétaire. Cependant, durant les dernières décennies, il a réussi à
construire une économie diversifiée, un système politique démocratique et un
dispositif de protection social robuste. De nombreux pays, dont les Etats-Unis,
pourraient tirer des leçons de cette expérience. ”Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Mauritius
Miracle” (Le miracle mauricien), March 2011
Le terme « miracle mauricien » a été utilisé par plusieurs universitaires et institutions internationales
pour décrire la trajectoire économique de cette petite ile (2 400 kilomètres carrés) peuplée de 1,3
millions d’habitants – ‘miracle’ implique qu’une sorte de « deus ex machina » est intervenu, alors que le
succès économique est le résultat d’une réflexion et d’une planification stratégiques, de l’élaboration de
politiques efficaces, et du renforcement des capacités humaines et institutionnels pour mettre en œuvre
ces politiques, et d’une structure gouvernementale qui stimule tous les secteurs de la population à
œuvrer ensemble en vue d’un objectif partagé.
Avant son indépendance en 1968 qui a suivi près de 150 années de domination britannique (et un peu
moins de 100 ans de domination française avant 1880), James Mead (lauréat du prix Nobel) avait prédit
un futur excessivement sombre pour Maurice qui avait toutes les caractéristiques d’une économie
(coloniale) typique africaine : monoculture, croissance démographique rapide, des termes défavorables
d’échange, et une tendance aux tensions ethniques.
Cependant, d’après ce que Stiglitz explique, « Comme s’ils voulaient contredire Meade, les mauriciens ont
augmenté le revenu par habitant qui est passé de moins de 400 USD au moment de l’indépendance à plus
de 6 700 USD à l’heure actuelle. Le pays est passé d’un modèle agricole de monoculture axé sur le sucre il
y a cinquante ans, à une économie diversifiée qui comprend le tourisme, la finance, les textiles, et si les
plans actuels aboutissent, une technologie de pointe. Le PNB de Maurice a enregistré une hausse
supérieure à 5% annuellement pendant plus de 30 ans. Il y a surement un truc derrière ces résultats.
Maurice doit surement posséder beaucoup de diamants, de pétrole ou un autre bien précieux.
1.0 LA TRAJECTOIRE ECONOMIQUE


La Figure 1 résume la transformation structurelle de Maurice qui est passée d’une économie
basée sur la monoculture à une plateforme commerciale intégrée où les exportations de biens et
services deviennent de plus en plus importants. Les différentes phases ont été les suivantes :
Briser la dépendance au sucre (1970-79)
Page 4 of 17



Développer une industrialisation axée sur les exportations, plus spécifiquement dans le secteur
du textile et du vêtement (1980-92)
Créer les bases pour la croissance de l’économie de services (1990-2012)
S’ouvrir vers la mer (2013)
Figure 1: La Trajectoire économique de Maurice
Source: Makoond, R. 2011
Traduction du Tableau ci-dessus : Trajectoire économique
Canne à sucre
Textiles et mode
Accueil
Fruits de mer
Services financiers
TIC/Sous-traitance
Immobilier et PD
Industrie du savoir
Services médicaux
Energie renouvelable
Sucre
Textile
Tourisme
Services financiers
TIC/Sous-traitance
IRS
Fruits de mer
Textiles
Sucre
Page 5 of 17
Tourisme
Services financiers
Port franc
Textiles
Sucre
Tourisme
Industries manufacturières (locales)
Sucre
Industries manufacturières (locales)
Economie basée sur la monoculture
Industrie manufacturière et tourisme
Industrie manufacturière et économie de services
Plateformes commerciales
Plateformes commerciale intégrée
La croissance annuelle moyenne atteignait 5 % durant les années 80 à la suite du Programme
d’Ajustement structurel (PAS) de la fin des années soixante-dix, pour retomber ensuite à 4 % durant les
années 90. A partir de 2 000, le taux de croissance moyen se situait autour de 3,5%.
Per Cent
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Figure 2: Taux de croissance du PNB 1970–2013
Year
Source: Statistiques de Maurice (Statistics Mauritius), plusieurs numéros
Breaking the dependence on sugar (1970–1979): The first phase started after independence
and was aimed at diversifying the economy to reduce the vulnerability caused by the over-dependence
on sugar for jobs and export earnings. As can be seen in Table 1 the contribution of agriculture to GDP
fell from 26.1% in 1970 to 15.7% in 1982. By 1998 its share was less than 10% while manufacturing had
risen to 20.5%. While the agricultural sector, which was highly labour intensive and regulated by strict
labour laws, maintained its level of employment at above 50,000 (declining by some 3,000 between 1970
and 1982), the number of employees in the manufacturing sector almost trebled during that period. By
the end of the second phase, the manufacturing sector had become the largest employer, with the EPZ
creating the lion’s share of jobs.
Table 1: Structural transformation of Mauritius 1970–1998 (US$ bn, %)
Amounts (US$ bn)
Economic Parameters
Growth rates (%)
1970
1982
1998
70-82
83-98
70-98
Nominal GDP and GDP growth 0.42
pa ($bn)
0.95
4.45
1.52
19.1
17.2
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Real GDP (1970$) ($bn)
0.42
0.78
2.25
GDP
growth
3.2
5.9
5.1
GNP
growth
-4.8
6.4
2.1
2.2
1.1
1.4
-6.3
5.4
2.0
Population (mn)
0.73
0.92
1.10
GNP/capita (nominal)($000)
0.57
1.03
4.05
Real growth
Share (%)
Agriculture as % of GDP
26.1
15.7
8.8
Real
growth
-1.3
-0.6
-0.7
Manufacturing as % of GDP
12.0
20.1
25.2
Real
growth
4.5
7.4
6.0
Other industry as % of GDP
8.1
9.0
9.9
Real
growth
1.1
1.2
1.5
Services as % of GDP
53.8
55.2
57.9
4.5
6.6
5.8
Sources: Bank of Mauritius annual reports; World Bank Country Economic Reports; World Bank Global Development Finance
Reports, 1998, 1999; and World Development Indicators 1998, 1999
Table 2: EPZ Contribution to GDP, employment, and investment (selected years)
1976
1980
1990
2000
2010
2012
Contribution in GDP (%)
2.59
4.34
11.87
11.43
6.47
Employment (number)
644
21,344
89,906
90,682
55,828
54,597
630
1,702
913
1,066
Investment (Rs million)
38
6.2%
Source: Statistics Mauritius, various issues
2.0 THE ENABLERS
What is an ‘enabler’? It may refer to the quality of institutions, infrastructure, factors of production
(labour, technology), connectivity and integration. All of these were present in the economic and social
transformation of Mauritius. In fact transformation took place because of the effective interaction
between the different enablers. The quality of institutions (the civil service, the Central Bank, the
banking sector) ensured that funds were channelled to infrastructure development, that the labour force
was adequately educated, and that the appropriate policies were adopted to improve connectivity.
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Institutions that were set up specifically to mobilise financial resources and facilitate the flow of funds
include the Development Bank of Mauritius (DBM), the State Bank of Mauritius (SBM), the State
Insurance Corporation of Mauritius (SICOM), the State Investment Corporation (SIC), the Mauritius
Leasing Corporation and the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM).
In the initial phase, investment in social infrastructure (health, education) as well as in economic
infrastructure (industrial estates, the port, the bulk sugar terminal, and the airport) served to foster the
diversification of the economic base into tourism and manufacturing. To kick-start the industrialisation
process the DBM set up industrial estates, which were rented out at preferential rates. The necessary
funds were obtained by the government mainly from the Caisse Française de Développement and from
the IFC.
Figure 3: FDI and GDI in Mauritius, 1980–2001
Source: Bank of Mauritius, 2001
The driving force of Mauritius’ development has been its export sector, namely the sugar industry,
tourism and the EPZ. The relatively dynamic financial sector also played a crucial role in the
development process. These sectors have all benefited from both domestic and foreign investment
throughout their development.
It is only from the mid-1980s that FDI started entering Mauritius in significant amounts, directed mostly
to the EPZ and tourism. Many Mauritian specialists suggest that another key factor of the country’s
development success was the large proportion of domestic investment in these leading economic
sectors, in particular private domestic investment. FDI played a significant role more because of the
technological know-how it brought than because of the capital inflows as such. Indeed, the contribution
of FDI to gross domestic investment (GDI) remained quite low throughout the 1980s, representing 6% in
its peak year (Figure 3).
However, FDI in tourism and the EPZ brought in the necessary technologies and know-how to transform
them into leading sectors of the economy. It also enabled local investors to acquire and assimilate these
technologies and know-how and develop domestic firms in the two sectors.
Table.3: Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (GDFCF) (Rs million)
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2012
GDFCF
145
2,240
12,030
27,595
74,395
79,185
Private
94
1,375
7,560
19,866
59,667
60,175
Private (% of GDFCF)
65%
61%
63%
72%
Public
51
865
4,470
7,729
80%
17,898
76%
19,010
Public (% of GDFCF)
35%
39%
37%
28%
24%
24%
Page 8 of 17
Source: Statistics Mauritius
It must be pointed out that the government did not use the tax revenue to develop infrastructure but
used it for social expenditure (financing teachers and medical professionals; subsidies on food staples
like rice and flour). This helped to keep cost of living relatively low so that wages could be held at a
competitive rate to enable the export sector to flourish. Loans and grants from local and international
sources were used to build schools, hospitals, the Bulk Sugar Terminal and to revamp the airport.
The key elements that facilitated the transformation can be summed up as follows:
Factors of production: In addition to adequate infrastructure as outlined above, Mauritius always
placed major emphasis on the development of its human resources. Secondary education was provided
free of charge to the entire age cohort from 1975. This helped to increase girls’ enrolment in secondary
school and eventually provided a sufficient number of literate and semi-literate workers for the EPZ. The
education system, modelled on the British system, also catered to the needs of the civil service and
produced competent cadres to implement the policies. Furthermore, there was a class of local
entrepreneurs who were ready to respond to the government’s incentives to move into tourism or
manufacturing.
National governance: An important factor in the sustained growth of the economy has been political
stability, not in terms of the political landscape, which has experienced episodic turbulence, but in terms
of broadly shared beliefs among the political class and consensual adherence to an economic strategy of
outward orientation, market-driven development, and the rejection of nationalisation and inwardlooking policies. This has provided continuity in the pursuit of broad objectives. The state played
different roles in different phases of transformation, for instance as initiator, promoter, protector and
arbiter. But it was a developmental state, committed to development of the country in which the rule of
law prevails. The government was instrumental in securing access for Mauritian products and services
through the negotiations of treaties (Yaoundé, Lomé, AGOA, Double Taxation Agreements) and joining
regional groupings (the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA)). The government intervened positively in the early stages of development to
mobilise domestic and foreign capital for infrastructure development. As domestic savings were low and
sugar was the only export sector, it had to ensure that the flow of foreign exchange from sugar exports
remained stable so as not to handicap investment efforts. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
guaranteed a favourable price but was to expire when the United Kingdom (UK) joined the then
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. Mauritius therefore imposed an export duty on sugar
and a cess (a tax earmarked for a specific purpose) to fund research by the Mauritius Sugar Industry
Sugar Industry Research Institute and the setting up of institutions (e.g. the Sugar Planters’ Mechanical
Pool Corporation) to improve the productivity of small planters.
Policy coherence: The success of Mauritius rested on its adoption of an outward-looking strategy since
independence. The EPZA was passed in 1970, two years after independence. Unlike EPZs in other
countries, the Mauritius EPZ did not refer to a specific geographical area, but was a legal entity which
offered the holder of an export-enterprise certificate generous incentives: tax holidays, duty-free import
of raw materials and equipment, free repatriation of capital and flexible labour regulations. The
importance of an appropriate meso–micro incentive structure, consistent with macroeconomic
objectives of stability, prudence and balance, cannot be over-emphasised. In spite of the above elements,
the Mauritian economy did not really take off before the mid-1980s. The main reason was the failure to
get prices right, i.e. exchange rate, interest rates, tariffs and tax policies had to be geared towards a clear
goal – to achieve development by adopting an outward-looking strategy.
Before the SAPs, fiscal policy was characterised by high government expenditure, financed by high taxes
and external borrowing (short-term Euro-Dollar loans to finance long-term infrastructure projects). The
Page 9 of 17
fiscal and exchange rate reforms undertaken in the context of the SAPs ensured more efficient fiscal
governance (the overall budget deficit as a percentage of GDP remained at around 3% between 1985 and
1995), removed the distortions of a dual exchange rate policy and ensured that the Rupee was not
overvalued. In general, however, Mauritius has used the exchange rate to have a competitive edge. From
time to time there has been some overvaluation but corrective measures were quickly taken. These are
illustrated in the two graphs from an IMF report on the competitiveness of Mauritius and the role of the
exchange rate.
Figure 4: Nominal and effective exchange rates, 1948–2007
Sources: Reinhard and Rogoff (2004); IMF annual reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER); and IMF
Staff Reports from the late 1960s.
Figure 5: Nominal and effective exchange rates, 1980–2005
Page 10 of 17
Source: Reinhard and Rogoff (2004); IMF Notice System, monthly data
Trade promotion: FDI was actively encouraged, and there was a general consensus that FDI was in the
country’s interests. Mauritian nationality was offered to Hong Kong investors when the UK and China
were discussing the fate of the then British colony in preparation for the handover in 1997. This second
surge of investment from Hong Kong underpinned the remarkable growth of the textile and clothing
sector in the 1980s. Institutions were set up specifically for the purpose of promoting trade and
attracting investment and their boards of directors comprised more representatives from the private
than the public sector. The exchange rate policy was instrumental in maintaining economic
competitiveness, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. Furthermore, the private sector was also given incentives
to set up industrial estates to attract foreign investors. As can be seen from Table 3, private investment
has on average made up around 70% of GDFCF. The bulk of capital was in the form of loans from the
local commercial banks. Until the SAP in 1979 there was credit rationing in Mauritius whereby the
Central Bank imposed ceilings on various categories of borrowers. The trade sector was discriminated
against while productive sectors like agriculture, import-substituting enterprises holding Development
Certificates, EPZ firms and the tourism sector benefited from discounted rates. The main provider of
loans to the private sector was the Mauritius Commercial Bank (set up in 1838 with the seed capital
being the compensation the British paid to planters when slavery was abolished), which was the main
banker of the sugar sector.
Funding for social projects: The government of Mauritius is using an innovative financing mechanism
to ensure that social projects are funded by the private sector. It imposes a Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) levy of 2% of book profits towards programmes that contribute to the social and
environmental development of the country. From January 2012, companies are required to spend 50%
of their CSR Fund on the four priority areas: social housing; addressing absolute poverty and promoting
community empowerment; the welfare of children from vulnerable groups; and the prevention of noncommunicable diseases. As a result CSR becomes an innovative source of financing for some of the
priority areas of the government’s agenda.
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3.0 COMPLEMENTARY MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION (MOI)
Mauritius benefited from national and global complementary MoI. The non-financial MoI were the most
important element in the transformation of Mauritius, the most significant being preferential market
access and public–private sector dialogue and partnership. This section focuses on how the two sets of
policies facilitated the mobilisation and effective use of finance.
Global linkages: Collaboration with donors was an important enabler of structural transformation,
both at the national level and in the restructuring of the sugar industry. Mauritius used bilateral and
multilateral ODA relatively well, thanks to the combination of factors mentioned above. In addition, it is
important to highlight the technical assistance provided by the UN specialised agencies, the
Commonwealth Secretariat, AFD and the EU, among others. Many of the programmes were successful
because there were consultations with local stakeholders in their conception and design. Without such
technical assistance (often provided on a grant basis) it is doubtful whether Mauritius, with its limited
human resource base, would have moved so fast. The flexible attitude of foreign institutions also helped.
Mauritius was perhaps lucky to have interlocutors who believed in local ownership of development
programmes and not in universal blueprints!
Global MoI: The success of the Mauritian economy was largely dependent on preferential treatment in
the main export markets for sugar and textiles. Figure 6 presents the key trade agreements which
facilitated the development of Mauritius during each of its transitional phases: the Commonwealth Sugar
Agreement, which provided guaranteed quotas for the UK and European markets; the Lomé Convention,
which provided duty-free and quota-free access to the EU and which later became the Cotonou
Convention; and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which in the post-MFA period gave
access to the US market. The private sector was often closely involved in the negotiations. For example,
in the case of the Sugar Protocol, the sugar industry had offices in London and Brussels to complement
the work of the Mauritian embassies in gathering intelligence and lobbying the key players. The
negotiations for the AGOA were driven by the private sector, with substantial support from the
government.
Table 4: International MOIs providing preferential treatment in the main export markets for sugar and
textiles
Period
Up to 1974
1971-75
1975
2000
International MOIs
Commonwealth
Agreement
Yaounde Convention
Sugar
Lomé Convention (later the
Cotonou Convention)
African Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGOA)
Facilities provided
Provided guaranteed quotas for the UK market
Preferential tariff to EEC goods and duty-free and
quota-free access to the EEC markets and financial
aid from the European Development Fund and the
European Investment Bank
Duty-free and quota-free access to the European
Union
Access to the US market
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Figure 6: Implementing reforms
Implementing Reforms
2010
2000
Fiscal Reforms
MAAS
Fiscal reforms
Business Facilitation
Opening up to skills
New labour laws
VRS I
Open up air access
Empowerment Prog
TEST (Textile)
Eradication of Absolute
Open up telecoms
Poverty (EAP)
Landlord & Tenant Financial crisis
Euro zone crisis
Act
ICT / BPO
Telecoms Env
1990
Offshore activities
COTONOU /
Freeport
POST MFA
WTO
EPA
Blueprint for sugar
EPZ
Hotel Certificates
1980
COTONOU
Macro economic reforms
(SAP)
LOME
1970
Development
Certificates
CSA
Monocrop
Economy
Manufacturing &
Tourism
Manufacturing &
Services Economy
Business
Platform
Integrated
Business Platform
Source: Makoond, JEC (2011)
In June 1973 Mauritius signed the Yaoundé Convention, which gave preferential tariff to EEC goods and
duty-free and quota-free access to the EEC markets. This treaty also enabled the island to benefit from
financial aid from the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank. The Lomé
Convention was to provide Mauritius with sufficient market openings for its growing textile industry. In
addition it guaranteed a market for 505,000 tonnes of sugar per year under the EEC-ACP Sugar Protocol
at a price usually higher than the world price. During the sugar boom the guaranteed price was lower
than the world price but Mauritius respected the convention although it ran counter to the profitmaximising motive.
The Sugar Protocol provided the government with the main means to mobilise finance. Indeed, all sugar
proceeds had to be repatriated, thus providing foreign currency and liquidity to the banking sector
enabling it to meet the domestic demands for funds from both the public and private sector for
infrastructure and capital investment (e.g. plant modernisation, technology imports). The exports
revenue was supplemented by external grants and concessional loans made available as part of the
various international agreements.
4.0 NATIONAL MOI
Public–Private Dialogue: A key factor in the transformation of the economic structure in Mauritius is
the shared vision of the public and private sector. The close public–private sector collaboration forms
part of good governance as it shows willingness on the part of political leaders to dialogue and a sense of
responsibility on the part of industrial leaders to participate constructively in the policy-making process.
A precondition for such effective dialogue is the existence of a structured private sector. Conscious of
this, the private sector organised itself to speak with one voice in its dealings with the government and
Page 13 of 17
established the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) which comprised all the private-sector bodies (i.e. the
Chamber of Commerce, the Employers’ Federation, the Chamber of Agriculture, the Sugar Syndicate). It
was headed by a previous minister, who understood the workings of the public sector. Thus, the
relationship was built on trust, on the understanding that the government had social responsibilities and
that the profitability of the private sector was not its sole concern. There are inevitably tensions but the
existence of mechanisms for dialogue ensured that solutions were found. This dialogue was facilitated by
annual meetings between the JEC and the Prime Minister and his economic ministers.
It was this collaboration (at times very informal) which led to certain key initiatives, such as the EPZ
being set up, the first hotels being built, successful negotiations on the Sugar Protocol with the posting of
representatives of the sugar sector to London and Brussels to lobby the EU to secure favourable access
for Mauritian products generally, the creation of the national airline, the establishment of a stock
exchange and a freeport, investment in Mozambique, and the adoption of VAT.
Many enabling institutions, support agencies, schemes or policies emerged from discussions at the level
of the private and public sectors. In addition private sector institutions are represented in many
governmental institutions in order to obtain consensus and buy-in in projects being developed. Through
this mechanism, the private sector has the opportunity to propose, share and participate in decisions
related to the priority infrastructure required for the country’s development and to define the role it
could play in the necessary financing.
5.0 THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CYCLE?
This paper has described the successive transformations of the economic structure of Mauritius from the
1960s, when sugar was the only industry. At independence there was a deliberate policy to develop local
industrialists, and to promote export-oriented industrialisation and the tourism sector.
The political and economic situation in 1975 compelled the government to adopt a SAP, overseen by the
World Bank. This brought changes in policies and institutional development that took Mauritius onto a
higher growth path, which effectively led to the structural transformation with the manufacturing sector
overtaking sugar as the main pillar of the economy.
The Mauritian economy has started to slow down since 2010 as a result of the global recession, which
led to weak sugar and textile exports, a decline in the construction sector and lower margins in the
tourism sector. Although the ITC and financial services continued to grow, they were unable to absorb
the unemployment generated from the traditional economic sectors. As a result, unemployment has
risen to 8%, putting additional pressure on the government to finance enterprise-restructuring efforts,
and to finance for Temporary Unemployment Benefit (TUB) and a youth employment programme to
facilitate their integration into new growth sectors.
Mauritius always strived to maintain a welfare state, providing safety nets to vulnerable sectors of the
population in terms of free access to education, health services, subsidised housing, and subsidies on rice
and flour. Economic growth has translated into an improvement in the quality of life in terms of access to
basic utilities (water and electricity), better public infrastructure (schools, hospitals, roads, highways,
modernisation of the port and airport), access to concrete housing (following an increase in purchasing
power), better lifestyle through access to imported products (foods, household electronics, cars, etc.)
The Education for All policy has also led to a reduction in inequality and to gender mainstreaming. The
development imperative has been at a clear cost to the environment (costal development pressure,
claiming of land for road construction, industrial pollution and an increase in waste), leading to more
controls on industrial initiatives (e.g. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) of development projects)
Page 14 of 17
and the development of the MID in 2008 to promote renewable energy, energy efficiency and sustainable
development.
Page 15 of 17
6.0 REFERENCES
African Economic Outlook Mauritius 2012. Tunis: African Development Bank.
Bank of Mauritius (various issues) Annual Reports. Port Louis: Bank of Mauritius.
EU Delegation Mauritius website, EU assistance to sugar sector
Gulhati, R. and Nallari, R. (1990) Successful Stabilization and Recovery in Mauritius. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
International Monetary Fund (various years) Country Reports. Washington, DC: IMF.
Kalamova, M., Kaminker, C. and Johnstone, N. (2011) ‘Sources of finance, Investment policies and plant entry
in the renewable energy sector’. OECD Environment Working Papers No. 37. Paris: OECD.
Makoond, R. (2011) Mauritius Economic Trajectory. Port Louis: Joint Economic Council.
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conference internationale pour l`emergence de l`afrique

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