Appellants McCaughey-et-al Reply

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Appellants McCaughey-et-al Reply
Court File No. 35807
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO)
BETWEEN:
GERALD MCCAUGHEY, TOM WOODS, BRIAN G. SHAW
and KEN KILGOUR
Appellants
(Respondents)
-andHOWARD GREEN and ANNE BELL
Respondents
(Appellants)
-andCANADIAN FOUNDATION FOR ADVANCEMENT OF INVESTOR RIGHTS,
SHAREHOLDER ASSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, ONTARIO
SECURITIES COMMISSION and INSURANCE BUREAU OF CANADA
Interveners
APPELLANTS' RESPONDING FACTUM
[GERALD MCCAUGHEY, TOM WOODS, BRIAN G. SHAW AND KEN KILGOUR]
(Pursuant to Rules 29(4) & 35(4) ofthe Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156)
GOODMANS LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
333 Bay Street, Suite 3400
Toronto, Ontario M5H 2S7
Benjamin Zarnett
David D. Conklin
Tel:
Fax:
LSUC#: 17247M
LSUC#: 34621M
416.979.2211
416.979.1234
Lawyers for the Individual Appellants,
Gerald McCaughey, Tom Woods,
Brian G. Shaw and Ken Kilgour
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
CANADALLP
45 O'Connor Street, Suite 1500
Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1A4
Sally A. Gomery
sally. [email protected] com
Tel:
Fax:
613.780.8604
613.230.5459
Ottawa Agent for the Individual Appellants,
Gerald McCaughey, Tom Woods,
Brian G. Shaw and Ken Kilgour
-2 -
TO:
THE REGISTRAR
AND TO:
ROCHON GENOVA LLP
Barristers
121 Richmond Street West, Suite 900
Toronto, ON M5H 2Kl
Joel P. Rochon
Peter R. Jervis
Sakie Tambakos
Remissa Hirji
Tel:
Fax:
LSUC#:
LSUC#:
LSUC#:
LSUC#:
28222Q
22774A
48626U
62207Q
416.363.1867
416.363.0263
SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP
100-340 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, ON K2P OR3
Marie-France Major
mfmaj [email protected] .ca
Tel:
Fax:
613.695.8855
613.695.8580
Lawyers for the Respondents,
Howard Green and Anne Bell
Ottawa Agent for the Respondents,
Howard Green and Anne Bell
TORYSLLP
79 Wellington Street West, Suite 3000
Box 270, TD Centre
Toronto, ON M5K 1N2
McMILLAN LLP
300-50 O'Connor Street
Ottawa, ON KIP 6L2
Sheila Block
James C. Tory
Andrew Gray
Crawford Smith
Tel:
Fax:
LSUC#: 14089N
LSUC#: 23280C
LSUC#: 46626V
LSUC# 42131S
416.865.0040
416.865.7380
Lawyers for the Appellant,
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
David Debenham
david. [email protected]
Tel:
Fax:
613.232.7171
613.231.3191
Ottawa Agent for the Appellant,
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
-3-
PALIARE ROLAND ROSENBERG
ROTHSTEIN LLP
155 Wellington Street West, 35th Floor
Toronto, ON MSV 3H1
SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP
100-340 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, ON K2P OR3
Margaret Waddell
Denise Cooney
Marie-France Major
mfmaj [email protected] ca
Tel:
Fax:
Tel:
Fax:
416.646.4329
416.646.4301
613.695.8855
613.695.8580
Lawyers for the Intervener,
Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investor
Rights (FAIR Canada)
Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,
Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investor
Rights (FAIR Canada)
GROIA & COMPANY
SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP
365 Bay Street, 11th Floor
Toronto, Ontario MSH 2V1
340 Gilmour Street, Suite 100
Ottawa, ON K2P OR3
Joseph Groia
Bonnie Roberts Jones
Eugene Meehan, Q.C.
[email protected] ca
Marie-France Major
mfmaj [email protected] ca
Tel:
Fax:
Tel:
Fax:
416.203.2115
416.203.9231
613.695.8855
613.695.8580
Lawyers for the Intervener,
Shareholder Association for Research and Education
Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,
Shareholder Association for Research and Education
ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION
20 Queen Street West
Toronto, ON MSH 3S8
MICHAEL J. SOBKIN
331 Somerset Street West
Ottawa, ON K2P OJ8
Anna Perschy
[email protected] ca
Tel:
Fax:
Tel:
Fax:
416.595.8782
416.593.8321
Lawyer for the Intervener,
Ontario Securities Commission
613.282.1712
613.288.2896
Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,
Ontario Securities Commission
-4-
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP
5300 Commerce Court West, 199 Bay Street
Toronto, ON M5L 1B9
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP
1600 - 50 O'Connor Street
Ottawa, ON KIP 6L2
Alan L. W. D'Silva
Sinzianna R. Henning
Nicholas Peter McHaffie
[email protected]
Tel:
Fax:
Tel:
Fax:
416.869.5204
416.947.0866
Lawyers for the Intervener,
Insurance Bureau of Canada
613.566.0546
613.230.8877
Ottawa Agent for the Intervener,
Insurance Bureau of Canada
PART I- OVERVIEW AND FACTS
1.
In paragraphs 72 to 80 of their factum, the Respondents assert that even if the Court of
Appeal was wrong to find that the limitation period ins. 138.14 of Ontario's Securities Act (the
"OSA") had been suspended because of s. 28 of Ontario's Class Proceedings Act, 1992 (the
"CPA") and thus did not expire, the result the Court of Appeal reached of permitting the
Respondents' action to proceed can still be upheld, because the inherent jurisdiction doctrines of
nunc pro tunc and special circumstances should be applied to extend the limitation period. This
ground was not relied on by the Court of Appeal; it is unavailing.
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 ("OSA"), s. 138.14
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 28
2.
A finding that the statutory limitation period under the OSA was not suspended under the
CPA and thus expired necessarily entails a fmding that the two statutes, each read as a whole in
light of their language, purpose and the intention of the legislature, bar the Respondents' action
because it was out of time.
3.
Inherent jurisdiction doctrines such as nunc pro tunc and special circumstances have a
specific and clear limit - they cannot be used to override a statute and defeat the legislature's
intention. Inherent jurisdiction does not confer "jurisdiction on the Court to override a clearly
expressed statutory limitation period ... " and cannot be used if inconsistent with limitations
legislation. The result for which the Respondents contend is therefore impermissible.
Trecothic Marsh, Re (1905) 37 S.C.R. 79 at p. 82, Appellants' Responding Book of
Authorities ("R. B.A."), Tab 15
Cheong v. Ontario (Minister ofFinance), [2004] O.J. No. 378 (C.A.) ("Cheong'') at
para. 36, Appellants' Book of Authorities ("B.A."), Tab 3
Joseph v. Paramount Canada's Wonderland, 2008 ONCA 469 ("Joseph" ) at paras.
13 and 26, R.B.A, Tab 6
Courts ofJustice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 11(2) and 146
-2-
PART II - ARGUMENT
4.
The Respondents are not correct when they say in paragraph 74 of their factum that
inherent jurisdiction applies except when a statute expressly says otherwise, thus suggesting that
there is a need for specific words in the statute that expressly say inherent jurisdiction doctrines
do not apply. Rather, as the Ontario Couti of Appeal's approach in Cheong v. Ontario (Minister
of Finance) shows, the search is not for the express ouster of inherent jurisdiction doctrines - it is
for whether, on a proper interpretation of the legislation, the limitation period has been clearly
expressed. When a limitation period has been clearly expressed the legislature has said all it
needs to say to prohibit an inherent jurisdiction doctrine from being used to override - that is,
conflict with - the limitation period. The legislature could not intend that its unambiguous
enactments be overridden or defeated by conflicting inherent jurisdiction doctrines.
As the
Superior Court noted in Tuli v. Mississauga (City): "The authorities are clear that unless the
power has been granted by statute, the courts have no inherent jurisdiction to extend a limitation
period provided by the statute".
Any other approach would reduce limitation periods from
requirements to mere suggestions, subject always to a Court's discretion not to apply them.
Cheong, supra at paras. 34-37, B.A., Tab 3
Tuli v. Mississauga (City), 2011 ONSC 3267 (Sup. Ct. J.) at para. 14, R.B.A., Tab 16
Baxter Student Housing Ltd v. College Housing Co-Operative Ltd, [1976] 2 S.C.R.
475 at p. 480, R.B.A., Tab 2
5.
The Respondents are also not correct to assert that an inherent jurisdiction doctrine could
here be used to fill a "gap" not anticipated by the legislature, and thus as a "complement" to the
legislative scheme. "Gap" filling can only occur where the legislative enactment would not be
contradicted.
Cheong, supra at paras. 34-37, B.A., Tab 3
Middleton v. Middleton, [1994] 3 All E.R. 236 (U.K. C.A.) at pp. 242-243 and 245,
R.B.A., Tab 8
-3-
Stelco Inc., Re, [2005] O.J. No. 1171 (C.A.) at para. 35, R.B.A., Tab 13
6.
The interpretive techniques that deal with whether there is a conflict between federal and
provincial legislation (to determine paramountcy) or between legislation and subordinate
legislation - in each case to determine whether the latter can operate - are instructive in
determining whether a common law inherent jurisdiction doctrine conflicts with legislation, and
thus is inapplicable. One technique to determine whether a conflict between two laws exists is to
ask whether, to the same question, the words of one say "yes" and of the other say "no". If they
do, an operational conflict exists, since the two laws conflict, are irreconcilable, and create
incoherence.
Multiple Access Ltd v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 at p. 191, R.B.A., Tab 9
Levis (City) v. Fraternite des po/iciers de Levis Inc., 2007 SCC 14 at paras. 47-49,
B.A., Tab 10
Reference ReBroadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting
Order CRTC 2010-168,2012 SCC 68 ("Broadcasting Reference") at paras. 37-44,
R.B.A., Tab 12
7.
Applying that approach here, nothing could be clearer than that a conflict exists. To the
question: "Is an action barred if commenced more than three years after the misrepresentation?"
the legislation says yes - "no action shall be commenced" but the doctrine as contended for by
the Respondents would answer no, the action may be commenced at an indeterminately
extendable time.
The legislative scheme would be incoherent if what was enacted in a
comprehensive code as a three year limitation period intended to create certainty was, by reason
of a common law doctrine, a period that could nonetheless be extended indefinitely in the
discretion of the Court.
Broadcasting Reference, supra at paras. 44-45, R.B.A. , Tab 12
8.
Applied to the facts of this case, the doctrines contended for by the Respondents would
change the words of s. 138.14 of the OSA from "no action shall be commenced ... [more than]
- 4three years after . .. " to "an action may be commenced at an extendable time beyond three years
... if the court thinks fit". That is clearly not filling a gap, or dealing with something not
envisaged by the legislature.
9.
The Respondents gain no support from this Court's decision in Ordon Estate v. Grail
("Ordon Estate") referred to in paragraph 74 of their factum. Ordon Estate considered whether
only the Federal Court had jurisdiction over fatal accident claims arising from boating accidents
or whether a provincial Superior Court's jurisdiction over maritime negligence claims still
applied. It was in that context that this Court stated that inherent jurisdiction (in the sense of a
Superior Court's plenary jurisdiction to hear actions) is not abrogated unless the statute employs
clear language (in the sense of language giving exclusive jurisdiction over such claims to another
tribunal). The statement did not pertain to inherent jurisdiction to extend limitation periods.
Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 at pp. 473-476, 482 and 527, R.B.A.,
Tab 11
10.
The cases of ReNew Alger Mines Limited ("New Alger Mines Ltd.") and Degroote v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce ("Degroote"), cited by other Respondents in companion
appeals whose submissions are adopted by the Respondents in the case at bar, are to the extent
even arguably applicable, completely distinguishable. They were each cases where the plaintiff
had overlooked a requirement under the bankruptcy legislation to obtain leave of the court before
commencing a common law action.
In Degroote, the Court of Appeal held that the leave
requirement there was not foundational, and the failure to obtain it an irregularity only. In
contrast, the OSA leave requirement here is foundational. In New Alger Mines Ltd, unlike in the
case at bar, leave of the Court had been granted before the commencement of the action, but
under a different statute. Unlike the case at bar, in both New Alger Mines Ltd and Degroote the
limitation period, leave requirement and cause of action were not part of a single, comprehensive
-5scheme that created the cause of action and prescribed the components of and the time limit for
advancing it. In those cases there was no single legislative code, like the OSA, whose language
and purpose would be undermined by the type of back-dating the Respondents here propose.
New Alger Mines Limited, Re, [1986] O.J. No. 144 (C.A.) at paras. 9-10 and 36,
R.B.A., Tab 10
Degroote v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1998] O.J. No. 395 (C.A.) at
para. 6, R.B.A., Tab 4
OSA, s. 138.8
11.
Moreover, New Alger Mines Ltd. and Degroote were both cases of slip or oversight. The
motions judge here found that this was not such a case. The Respondents in this case made a
conscious decision not to seek leave before the limitation period expired and instead chose to
rely on their presumption of entitlement to a nunc pro tunc order in proceeding as they did.
Having adopted that strategy, and moreover having been dilatory in proceeding when measured
against the absolute three year time period (in the OSA), the Respondents cannot be given the
benefit of this form of extraordinary relief. It has been held that:
... the Court should not make an order nunc pro tunc when the litigant adopts one
procedure and carries it through to completion, and then decides he might have
been in a more advantageous position if he had adopted some other procedure.
Hogarth v. Hogarth, [1945] O.J. No. 165 (H.C.) at 79, aff'd [1945] O.J. No. 590
(C.A.) at para. 4, R.B.A., Tab 5
Reasons for Decision of Justice G.R. Strathy, dated July 3, 2012 ("Strathy
Reasons"), para. 511, Appellants' Record ("A.R."), vol. I, Tab 1, p. 135
12.
For similar reasons, the Court should not apply the common law doctrine of special
circumstances to extend the s. 138.14 limitation period. An equitable doctrine, such as special
circumstances should never be used where to do so would defeat the very purpose of a limitation
period. Nor is this a case of interpreting new legislation creating a limitation period to preserve a
common law doctrine which had applied to the cause of action before amending limitation
legislation was introduced. The OSA cause of action and limitation period in issue came into
- 6-
existence together. The Respondents seek to impose a doctrine on a cause of action to which it
never applied.
Strathy Reasons, paras. 514 and 521-526, A.R., vol. I, Tab 1, pp. 138-139
13.
Moreover, the doctrine of special circumstances only has application to "peculiar" or
"special" facts that can justify allowing a party to amend a claim to assert a new cause of action
or add a party after a limitation period has expired. But the order the Respondents seek is not to
amend but to commence an action beyond the expiry of a limitation period against the
Appellants against whom no other cause of action is sought to be advanced. Accordingly, the
doctrine cannot assist the Respondents here. Further just as the doctrine cannot apply where a
plaintiff made a conscious decision not to include a particular party as a defendant, a conscious
decision to allow a limitation period to expire and rely on a nunc pro tunc power cannot attract
the special circumstances doctrine.
Basarsky v. Quinlan, [1972] S.C.R. 380 at pp. 383-385, R.B.A., Tab 1
Joseph, supra at para. 28, R.B.A., Tab 6
Chimienti v. Windsor (City), 2011 ONCA 16 at para. 26, R.B.A., Tab 3
Meady v. Greyhound Canada Transportation Corp., 2008 ONCA 468 at para.
14-15, R.B.A., Tab 7
Streamline Foods v. Jantz Canada Corp., 2012 ONCA 174 at para. 8, R.B.A.,
Tab 14
14.
The Respondents' suggestion in paragraph 49 of their factum, that the motions judge
would have made a nunc pro tunc or special circumstances order if he could have, is beside the
point. The motions judge correctly held those doctrines to be inapplicable.
Moreover, his
reasons show why no doctrine could be articulated that would assist the Respondents here
without conflict with the legislative language and purposes:
(i)
The motions judge referred to the motion for leave having been pursued and the
defendants therefore having known of the claim and being able to mount a
-7response, but that consideration is not susceptible to any formulation consistent
with the OSA, which requires an action, not some lesser form of notification, to
satisfy the limitation requirement.
Strathy Reasons, paras. 54 I and 543, A.R., vol. I, Tab I, p. I42
(ii)
The motions judge referred to the claim having a reasonable possibility of
success. But to use that as a factor would entail the hearing and determination of
the leave motion in all cases before one could determine whether the limitation
period could be relied on; moreover, it would limit the application of the
limitation period to cases shown to have no reasonable possibility of success,
relegating it to something to be relied on only when not needed. Clearly this
changes the legislative language and undermines its purpose.
Strathy Reasons, para. 545, A.R., vol. I, Tab I, p. I42
(iii)
The motions judge considered that the position of putative class members should
be protected; but the legislature provided protection to the extent it saw fit to such
persons against the expiry of limitation periods in s. 28 of the CPA. If that section
did not extend to protect such persons unless leave had been granted and an action
commenced within the limitation period, then to use an inherent jurisdiction
doctrine to do so contradicts the legislature's own intentions.
Strathy Reasons, para. 544, A.R., vol. I, Tab I, p. 142
15.
For all of these reasons, the Respondents attempt to uphold the Court of Appeal's
decision on a ground not relied on by it should be rejected.
January 23, 2015
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
Benjamin Z
ett
David D.
Lawyers for the Individual Appellants,
Gerald McCaughey, Tom Woods,
Brian G. Shaw and Ken Kilgour
- 8PART III - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Paragraph
Reference(s)
Authority
Basarsky v. Quinlan, [1972] S.C.R. 380
13
Baxter Student Housing Ltd v. College Housing Co-Operative Ltd., [1976] 2
S.C.R. 475
4
Cheongv. Ontario (Minister ofFinance), [2004] O.J. No. 378 (C.A.)
3-5
Chimienti v. Windsor (City), 2011 ONCA 16
13
Degroote v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1998] O.J. No. 395 (C.A.)
Hogarth v. Hogarth, [1945] O.J. No. 165 (H.C.) at 79, aff'd [1945] O.J. No. 590
(C.A.)
V.
Fraternite des policiers de Levis Inc., 2007
11
3, 13
Joseph v. Paramount Canada's Wonderland, 2008 ONCA 469
Levis (City)
10-11
sec 14
6
Meady v. Greyhound Canada Transportation Corp., 2008 ONCA 468
13
Middleton v. Middleton, [1994] 3 All E.R. 236 (U.K. C.A.)
5
-
Multiple Access Ltd v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161
6
New Alger Mines Limited, Re, [1986] O.J. No. 144 (C.A.)
10-11
Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437
9
-
Reference Re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy
Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168,2012 SCC 68
CRTC
Stelco Inc., Re, [2005] O.J. No. 1171 (C.A.)
2010-167
and
6-7
5
-
Streamline Foods v. Jantz Canada Corp., 2012 ONCA 174
13
Trecothic Marsh, Re (1905), 37 S.C.R. 79
3
Tuli v. Mississauga (City), 2011 ONSC. 3267 (Sup. Ct. J.)
4
.
-9PART IV - STATUTES AND REGULATIONS BEING RELIED UPON
Ontario- Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 8.5 Part XXIII.1, ss. 138.8 and 138.14
Leave to Proceed
Autorisation de poursuivre
138.8 (1) No action may be commenced under section
138.3 without leave of the Court granted upon motion with
notice to each defendant. The court shall grant leave only
where it is satisfied that:
138.8 (1) Une action ne peut etre intentee en vertu de
!'article 138.3 qu'avec l'autorisation du tribunal, accordee
sur motion avec preavis a chaque defendeur, et que si le
tribunal est convaincu de ce qui suit :
(a) the action is being brought in good faith; and
a) !'action est intentee de bonne foi;
(b) there is a reasonable possibility that the action will be
resolved at trial in favour of the plaintiff.
b) il est raisonnablement possible que I' action so it reglee au
moment du proces en faveur du demandeur.
Same
Idem
(2) Upon an application under this section, the plaintiff (2) Sur requete presentee en vertu du present article, le
and each defendant shall serve and file one or more demandeur et chaque defendeur signifient et deposent un ou
affidavits setting forth the material facts upon which each plusieurs affidavits enonc;ant les faits importants sur
lesquels ils ont chacun !'intention de se fonder.
intends to rely.
Same
Idem
(3) The maker of such an affidavit may be examined on it
in accordance with the rules of court..
(3) L'auteur d'un tel affidavit peut etre interroge au sujet de
celui-ci conformement aux regles de pratique.
Copies to be sent to the Commission
Copies envoyees a Ia Commission
(4) A copy ofthe application for leave to proceed and any
affidavits and factums filed with the court shall be sent to
the Commission when filed.
(4) Les copies de la requete en autorisation de poursuivre et
des affidavits et memoires deposes aupres du tribunal sont
envoyees a Ia Commission au moment du depot.
Requirement to provide notice
Obligation de donner un preavis
(5) The plaintiff shall provide the Commission with notice
in writing of the date on which the application for leave is
scheduled to proceed, at the same time such notice is given
to each defendant.
(5) Le demandeur avise par ecrit la Commission de la date
prevue de I' audition de la requete en autorisation, en meme
temps qu'il en avise chaque defendeur.
Same, appeal of leave decision
Idem, appel de Ia decision quant
l'autorisation
(6) If any party appeals the decision of the court with
respect to whether leave to commence an action under
section 138.3 is granted,
(6) Si l'une des parties interjette appel de la decision du
tribunal quant a !'octroi de l'autorisation d'intenter une
action en vertu de 1' article 13 8.3 :
(a) each party to the appeal shall provide a copy of its
factum to the Commission when it is filed; and
a) d'une part, chaque partie a l'appel fournit un exemplaire
de son memo ire a la Commission au moment de son depot;
(b) the appellant shall provide the Commission with notice
in writing of the date on which the appeal is scheduled to
be heard, at the same time such notice is given to each
respondent.
b) d'autre part, l'appelant avise par ecrit Ia Commission de
la date prevue de !'audition de l'appel, en meme temps qu'il
en avise chaque intime.
a
l'octroi de
- 10Limitation period
Prescription
138.14 (1) No action shall be commenced under section
138.3,
138.14 (1) Aucune action ne doit etre intentee en vertu de
!'article 138.3 :
(a) in the case of misrepresentation in a document, later
than the earlier of,
a) dans le cas de Ia presentation inexacte de faits dans un
document, apres le premier en date des jours suivants :
(i) three years after the date on which the document
containing the misrepresentation was first released,
and
(i) trois ans apres Ia date a laquelle le document
contenant Ia presentation inexacte des faits a ete publie
pour Ia premiere fois,
(ii) six months after the issuance of a news release
disclosing that leave has been granted to commence an
action under section 138.3 or under comparable
legislation in the other provinces or territories in
Canada in respect of the same misrepresentation;
(ii) six mois apres Ia delivrance d'un communique
portant qu'a ete accordee une autorisation d'intenter
une action en vertu de !'article 138.3 ou de dispositions
legislatives comparables d'autres provinces ou
territoires du Canada a l'egard de Ia meme presentation
inexacte des faits;
(b) in the case of a misrepresentation in a public oral
statement, later than the earlier of,
b) dans le cas de Ia presentation inexacte de faits dans une
declaration orale publique, apres le premier en date des
jours suivants :
(i) three years after the date on which the public oral
statement containing the misrepresentation was made, and
(i) trois ans apres la date a laquelle Ia declaration contenant
Ia presentation inexacte des faits a ete faite,
(ii) six months after the issuance of a news release
disclosing that leave has been granted to commence an
action under section 138.3 or under comparable legislation
in another province or territory of Canada in respect of the
same misrepresentation; and
(ii) six mois apres la delivrance d'un communique portant
qu'a ete accordee une autorisation d'intenter une action en
vertu de !'article 138.3 ou de dispositions legislatives
comparables d'autres provinces ou territoires du Canada a
l'egard de Ia meme presentation inexacte des faits;
(c) in the case of a failure to make timely disclosure, later
than the earlier of,
c) dans le cas du non-respect des obligations d'information
occasionnelle, apres le premier en date des jours suivants:
a
(i) three years after the date on which the requisite
disclosure was required to be made, and
(i) trois ans apres Ia date
obligatoire devait etre faite,
(ii) six months after the issuance of a news release
disclosing that leave has been granted to commence an
action under section 138.3 or under comparable
legislation in another province or territory of Canada in
respect of the same failure to make timely disclosure.
2002,c.22,s. 185;2004,c. 3l,Sched. 34,s.23.
(ii) six mois apres la delivrance d'un communique
portant qu'a ete accordee une autorisation d'intenter une
action en vertu de !'article 138.3 ou de dispositions
Iegislatives comparables d'autres provinces ou territoires
du Canada a l'egard du meme non-respect des
obligations d'information occasionnelle. 2002, chap. 22,
art. 185;2004,chap.31,annexe34,art.23.
Suspension of limitation period
laquelle Ia divulgation
Suspension du dcHai de prescription
(2) A limitation period established by subsection (1) in (2) Le delai de prescription cree par le paragraphe (1) a
respect of an action is suspended on the date a notice of l'egard d'une action est suspendu a Ia date ou un avis de
motion for leave under section 138.8 is filed with the court motion en autorisation vise a !'article 138.8 est depose au
tribunal et recommence a courir a la date ou, selon le cas :
and resumes running on the date,
(a) the court grants leave or dismisses the motion and,
(a) le tribunal accorde l'autorisation ou rejette la motion et
l'une des conditions suivantes est remplie:
- 11 (i) all appeals have been exhausted, or
(i) toutes les voies d'appel ont ete epuisees,
(ii) the time for an appeal has expired without an appeal
being filed; or
(ii) le delai d'appel a expire sans qu'un appel ait ete
interjete;
(b) the motion is abandoned or discontinued. 2014, c. 7,
Sched.28,s. 15
(b) Ia motion fait !'obj et d'un des istement. 2014, chap. 7,
annexe 28, art. I 5.
Ontario - Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O.l992, c. 6, s. 28
Limitations
28. (1) Subject to subsection (2), any limitation period
applicable to a cause of action asserted in a class
proceeding is suspended in favour of a class member on
the commencement of the class proceeding and resumes
running against the class member when,
Prescription
28. (1) Sous reserve du paragraphe (2), tout delai de
prescription applicable a une cause d'action invoquee dans
un recours collectif est suspendu en faveur d'un membre du
groupe a l'introduction du recours collectif et reprend au
detriment du membre au moment oil, selon le cas:
(a) the member opts out ofthe class proceeding;
a) ce membre se retire du recours collectif;
(b) an amendment that has the effect of excluding the
member from the class is made to the certification order;
b) est apportee une modification de !'ordonnance certifiant
le recours collectif qui a pour effet d'exclure du groupe le
membre;
(c) a dece1tification order is made under section 10;
c) une ordonnance annulant !'ordonnance certifiant le
recours collectif est rendue en vertu de l' article I 0;
(d) the class proceeding is
adjudication on the merits;
d) le recours collectif est rejete sans decision sur le fond;
dismissed without an
(e) the class proceeding is abandoned or discontinued with
the approval ofthe court; or
e) il y a desistement du recours collectif avec !'approbation
du tribunal;
(f) the class proceeding is settled with the approval of the
court, unless the settlement provides otherwise.
f) le recours collectif fait !'objet d'une transaction avec
!'approbation du tribunal, a moins que Ia transaction ne
prevoie autre chose.
Idem
Idem
(2) Where there is a right of appeal in respect of an event
described in clauses (1) (a) to (f), the limitation period
resumes running as soon as the time for appeal has expired
without an appeal being commenced or as soon as any
appeal has been finally disposed of
(2) Lorsqu'il existe un droit d'appel a l'egard d'un des
evenements decrits aux alineas (1) a) a f), le delai de
prescription reprend des !'expiration du delai d'appel, si
aucun appel n'a ete introduit, ou des le reglement d'un
appel.
- 12 -
Ontario- Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 11 and 146
Superior Court of Justice
Cour superieure de justice
11. (I) The Ontario Court (General Division) is
continued as a superior court of record under the name
Superior Court of Justice in English and Cour superieure
de justice in French. 1996, c. 25, s. 9 (3).
11. (I) LaCour de !'Ontario (Division generale) est
maintenue comme cour superieure d'archives sous le nom
de Cour superieure de justice en fran~ais et so us le nom de
Superior Court of Justice en anglais. I996, chap. 25, par. 9
(3).
Idem
Idem
(2) The Superior Court of Justice has all the jurisdiction,
power and authority historically exercised by courts of
common law and equity in England and Ontario. R.S.O.
I990, c. C.43, s. II (2); I996, c. 25, s. 9 (17).
(2) La Cour superieure de justice a la competence et les
pouvoirs traditionnellement exerces par 1es tribunaux de
common law et d'equity en Angleterre et en Ontario.
L.R.O. 1990, chap. C.43, par. II (2); I996, chap. 25, par. 9
(17).
Where procedures not provided
Absence de procedure
146. Jurisdiction conferred on a court, a judge or a justice
of the peace shall, in the absence of express provision for
procedures for its exercise in any Act, regulation or rule,
be exercised in any manner consistent with the due
administration of justice. R.S.O. I990, c. C.43, s. 146.
146. En !'absence de dispositions expresses dans une loi,
un reglement ou une regie sur la procedure a suivre quant a
l'exercice de la competence qui lui est conferee, le tribunal,
le juge ou le juge de paix exerce cette competence d'une
maniere compatible avec la bonne administration de la
justice. L.R.O. 1990, chap. C.43, art. 146.
6410260.6