GERPISA

Transcription

GERPISA

GERPISA
Réseau International
International Network
NEUVIÈME RENCONTRE INTERNATIONALE DU GERPISA
NINTH GERPISA INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM
LES RECONFIGURATIONS DE L’INDUSTRIE AUTOMOBILE :
ALLIANCE, CESSIONS, FUSION-ACQUISITION, PARTENARIATS, SCISSIONS …
RECONFIGURING THE AUTO INDUSTRY :
MERGER & ACQUISITION, ALLIANCES, AND EXIT
RESUMÉS - ABSTRACTS
sous la direction de
Yannick LUNG
Neuvième Rencontre Internationale
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SOMMAIRE GÉNÉRAL
SESSION 1. TABLE RONDE
PANEL
Avec la participation de responsables de projet de coopération des constructeurs
automobiles
Practitioner session with managers of cooperative project in the car industry
Management de projet en coopération internationale
Project management in international cooperation
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SESSION 2. LA CONCENTRATION DANS L'INDUSTRIE AUTOMOBILE
CONCENTRATION IN THE CAR INDUSTRY
BOYER Robert, FREYSSENET Michel (France)
Les uns fusionnent, les autres pas.
Quelles recompositions de l’industrie automobile mondiale ?
VOLPATO Giuseppe, CAMUFFO Arnaldo (Italie)
The GM-Fiat strategic alliance
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SESSION 3. ALLIANCES ET COORDINATION DES COMPETENCES
ALLIANCES AND COORDINATION OF COMPETENCIES
FUJIMOTO Takahiro, HELLER Daniel Arturo (Japon)
Recent trends in alliance-enabled capability building :
Implications for firm performance in the global auto industry
MIDLER Christophe, NEFFA Patricio. (CRG, Ecole polytechnique),
MONNET Jean-Claude (Renault)
Mastering joint product development among competitive automobile firms:
toward developing a co-operative competency
SEGRESTIN Blanche, LEFEBVRE Philippe, WEIL Benoît (France)
Les coopérations en conception : nouveaux enjeux et considérations théoriques
à partir de quelques expériences de coordination des compétences
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SESSION 4. VERS LA CONSTITUTION D'INDUSTRIES OLIGOPOLISTIQUES
TOWARDS OLIGOPOLISTIC INDUSTRIES
KRIFA Hadjila (France)
Concurrence oligopolistique et concentration dans le secteur automobile
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LUNG Yannick, FRIGANT Vincent (France)
Modularisation et concentration de l’industrie équipementière en Europe
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GUELLE Françoise (France)
L’oligopole du pneumatique : globalisation des manufacturiers français, japonais
et américains
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SESSION 5, ANALYSE DES RELATIONS PRODUCTIVES
ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS
RIEMENS Wendy, MARCEAU Jane (Australie)
Running on empty ? Innovation and the Australian automotive industry
THAISE Graziadio (Brésil)
Some evidences of technological changes associated to modular production and
supply
MONIZ Antonio, KRINGS Bettina, Van HOOTEGEM Geert, HUYS Rik
(Portugal – Belgique - Allemagne)
Technological practices in the European auto industry :
Exploring case from Belgium, Germany and Portugal
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SESSION 6. ACTIVITES IMMATERIELLES
IMMATERIEL ACTIVITIES
JULLIEN Bernard (France)
Systèmes d'utilisation, systèmes de production et de prestation automobiles :
dynamiques et cohérences économiques
COUTINHO Maria Teresa, SEGRE Lidia Micaela (Brésil)
De l’importance de la vente et du service après-vente dans l’industrie automobile
brésilienne : Étude sur la fidélisation de marque, la formation et la qualification des
ressources humaines
NORBERTO Elaine (Brésil)
Les stratégies de marques et la reconfiguration de l’industrie automobile
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SESSION 7. FUSIONS ET ACQUISITIONS DANS L'AUTOMOBILE
M&A IN THE CAR INDUSTRY
KÖHLER Holm-Detlev (Allemagne)
The TNC as a transnational political complex. Research questions stemming from
DaimlerChrysler and BMW-Rover deals
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SCHMIDT Gert, SRUBAR Ilja, JUNG A, KLEMM Matthias,
SIMEUNOVIC V, (Allemagne)
Culture matters. The VW-SKODA merger
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LOUBET Jean-Louis (France)
Regard de l’histoire : Le cas Peugeot – Citroën – Talbot
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SESSION 8. ANALYSE DES RELATIONS PRODUCTIVES
CAMACHO José Ferro (Portugal)
Intra and inter-firm adaptation behaviours in suppliers environments comparative
case studies in Uk , Germany in Portugal
NETO Mario, TRUZZI Oswaldo (Brésil)
Analysis of manufacturer control over suppliers in Brazil’s truck industry
POSTHUMA Anne Caroline (Brésil)
Industrial renewal and inter-firm relations in the supply chain of the Brazilian
automotive industry
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SESSION 9. ACTIVITES IMMATERIELLE: E-COMMERCE
IMMATERIEL ACTIVITIES: E-BUSINESS
CORNETTE Guy, PONTIER Suzanne (Paris XII, France)
D'un marketing à l'autre : les évolutions de la distribution automobile aux ÉtatsUnis
Relationship marketing versus transactionalmarketing : The evolution of car
distribution channels in the US
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KIM Ki-Chan (Corée)
Customization effects of e-supply chain design with reference to the B2B at the
automobile industry
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LARBAOUI Pascal (France)
L’apport des modèles de diffusion à l’éclairage des conséquences économiques et
sociales du E-commerce sur les réseaux de distribution automobile et bancaire
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SESSION 10. FUSIONS ET ACQUISITIONS DANS L'AUTOMOBILE
MERCER Glenn (USA)
An historical review of five automobile acquisition – The cases of : ChryslerAMC, Fiat-Alfa Romeo, Ford-Jaguar, GM-Saab,VW-SEAT
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GREGGIO Rodolphe, BROUSTAIL Joël (France)
L’automobile et politique de produit : une analyse comparée dans des cas BritishLeyland, Fiat, PSA et Volkswagen.
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IKEDA Masayoshi, NAKAGAWA Yoichiro
Two Ways of Modularization Strategy in Japan : Toyota-Honda vs. Nissan-Mazda
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ZILBOVICIUS Mauro, MARX Roberto, SALERNO Mario (Brésil)
Mapping design and production competencies in the new Brazilian automotive
industry : bottlenecks and opportunities for a higher pattern of development
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PIRES Silvio (Brésil)
New productive systems in the auto industry : the managerial challenges of
automakers and suppliers at three new Brazilian plants
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SESSION 12. ENJEUX GEOGRAPHIQUES
GEOGRAPHICAL ISSUES
YOGUEL Gabriel, NOVICK Marta, CATALANO Ana, ALBORNOZ Facundo
(Argentine)
Spécificités locales et modèles productifs « d’origine » dans le secteur automobile
d’Argentine. Analyse comparative de la relation assembleurs-fournisseurs dans
deux « réseaux productifs » (Volkswagen et Toyota)
de MIGUEL FERNANDEZ Enrique (Espagne)
Location and dislocation at the motor vehicles industry
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SESSION 13. FUSIONS ET ACQUISITIONS DANS L'A0UTOMOBILE
CHUNG Myeong-Kee (Corée)
Strategies alliance and restructuring for survival :
New managerial strategies of Hyundai
JUN Hyunjoong (Corée)
Hyundai motor’s de-chaebolization effects
LEE Byoung-Hoon, CHO Sung-Jae (Corée)
Merger and Reconfiguring of Hyundai-Kia
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SESSION 14, ANALYSE DES RELATIONS PRODUCTIVES
SCOTT Martin (USA)
The social embedding of flexibility:
Contrasting patterns of worker integration in automobile plants of the Americas
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COOKE William, HUXLEY Christopher, MEYER David (USA)
Reconfiguration of the U.S. auto component supplier industry :
Emerging workplace strategies and effects on production workers
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BATTISTINI Osvaldo (Argentine)
Stratégies syndicales dans le cadre d’une réalité nouvelle dans les entreprises
automobiles argentines
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GEOGRAPHICAL ISSUES
ARBIX Glauco, RODRIGUEZ-POSE Andrés (Brésil)
Strategies of waste: Bidding wars in the Brazilian automobile sector
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WANG Hua (Chine)
Automotive industrial policy in China and its impact to the foreign direct investment
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CHEN Jin, FUJIMOTO Takahiro, LEE Chunli (Japon - Chine)
Globalization of Chinese munitions enterprises car production
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BONAZZI Giuseppe (Italie)
The market in the factory : effects and problems of outsourcing at Fiat auto
DONADA Carole (France)
L’externalisation de services dans l’automobile :
une étude statistique des logiques constructeurs et fournisseurs
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SESSION 17. ACTIVITES IMMATERIELLES
IMMATERIEL ACTIVITIES
MORISSE Benjamin (France)
Nouveaux métiers et stratégie des nouveaux entrants :
vers quelle organisation pour le canal de distribution automobile ?
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URI Didier (France)
Les banques des constructeurs dans la dynamique de l’industrie automobile
au Brésil
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GEOGRAPHICAL ISSUES
LARA Arturo (Mexique)
Modular architecture, technological convergence and birth of third generation
offshore plants : the cas Delphi-Juarez (Mexico)
RAMALHO José Ricardo, SANTANA Marco Aurélio (Brésil)
The VW’s modular system, regional development and workers’ organisation in
Resende, Brazil
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DANKBAAR Ben (Pays-Bas)
Scale and scope. Strategic choices in the German passenger car industry
PRIES Ludger, SANDIG Christian, SCHWEER Oliver
Product evolution and the process of competence location.
Three case studies of BMW, DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen
MEDINA Heloisa (Brésil)
L’industrie automobile se réorganise pour le recyclage
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SESSION 20. ACTIVITES IMMATERIELLES : LA NOUVELLE DISTRIBUTION
IMMATERIEL ACTIVITIES : NEW DISTRIBUTION
BALLOT Eric, MOLET Hugues (CGS)
La distribution automobile a flux tires
CHABERT Christophe (France)
Renouveler le modèle stratégique :
la dimension humaine dans le modèle de fabrication à la commande
KAMP Bart (Belgique)
Experiences regarding dealer-delivery distribution from car plants in Flanders
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GEOGRAPHICAL ISSUES
CARRILLO Jorge (Mexique)
TNC’s autoparts in Mexico and development of local firms
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NELDER Geoff, HARRIS Katy, EVENS Lin
The impact on UK Regions of reconfiguration in the automotive industry
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BARDI Andrea, GARIBALDO Francesco (Italie)
Economic and social impacts of acquisitions in local productive systems :
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the automotive cluster in the Emilia Romagna region
POSTERS
DATTE Antonio, VEIGA Antonio (Brésil)
Ten years of Mercosur integration – The evaluation of trade in auto Industry in
the 90’s (1990-99)
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RENARD Loïc (France)
Competitivité globale des firmes multinationales et effets de dimension :
Une application aux constructeurs d’automobiles
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SEGRE Lidia Micaela, ROLDAN Fernando Marmolejo (Brésil)
L’internationalisation de l’industrie automobile. Etude de la Renault
France/Colombie/Brésil par rapport à l’adoption du travail et la formation
professionnelle
SUGUR Nadir, NICHOLS Theo (Grande Bretagne)
Reconfiguration and employment relations in the car industry in Turkey
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COKEAS WORKSHOPS
ADAM-LEDUNOIS Sonia, RENAULT Sophie (France)
Mouvement de création de parc fournisseurs : Le cas de Renault Sandouville
VELOSO Francisco, HENRYChris, TOTH Richard (MIT, USA)
Small firms and global competition : evidence from the portuguese and brasilian
automotive supplier industries
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Session 1. Présentation de la table-ronde / Framework Panel
MANAGEMENT DE PROJET EN COOPERATION INTERNATIONALE
Animée par Benoît WEIL
Les rencontres internationales du GERPISA réunissent tous les ans au mois de juin à
Paris, 100 à 150 personnes qui appartiennent en grande partie à la communauté internationale
des chercheurs en sciences sociales travaillant sur l'industrie automobile. Ces rencontres
permettent la présentation de communications scientifiques, mais elles sont aussi l'occasion
d'un échange entre chercheurs et acteurs de l'industrie automobile. La table-ronde permettant
aux professionnels d'apporter leur témoignage sur les projets dans lesquels ils sont engagés est
ainsi un moment privilégié de cet échange. La prochaine rencontre internationale, qui aura
lieu au Palais du Luxembourg (Sénat), les 7, 8 et 9 juin 2001 porte sur le thème
“Les reconfigurations de l'industrie automobile :
Alliances, cessions, fusion-acquisition, partenariats, scissions,...”
L'objet de ce colloque n'est pas de débattre dans l'absolu de ces intenses mouvements
de recomposition qui affectent l'industrie automobile, mais de les analyser en perspective du
nouveau programme de recherche du GERPISA et du réseau thématique cockeas qui porte sur
l'analyse de la coordination des compétences et des connaissances au sein des systèmes
automobiles. La reconfiguration des relations inter-firmes dans l'industrie automobile traduit
ainsi, pour partie, la recherche des modalités de création de nouvelles connaissances et de
coordination des compétences nécessaires pour mener à bien l'effort permanent d'innovation
auquel les firmes automobiles sont confrontées sous l'effet du renforcement de l'affrontement
concurrentiel (différenciation des produits), de l'introduction de nouvelles technologiques et
du contexte réglementaire.
La table-ronde Management de projet en coopération internationale qui sera organisé
le jeudi 7 juin au matin (10h30-12h45) vise donc à mettre l'éclairage sur la gestion de projets
coopératifs entre constructeurs automobiles. Elle réunira donc des responsables de projets
participants ou ayant participé à des coopérations horizontales pour présenter les
enseignements de telles expériences vécues de l'intérieur. Les échanges avec la salle et
certaines communications scientifiques prolongeront cette discussion dans la suite de la
rencontre.
Sont sollicités pour intervenir à la table-ronde les constructeurs suivants : PSA, Renault, Fiat,
VW et Pininfarina.
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PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN AN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Led by Benoît WEIL
Once a year during the month of June, the GERPISA’s international conference brings
between 100 and 150 persons to Paris. Most belong to the international community of social
science researchers with a particular interest in the automotive industry. These meetings allow
for a presentation of scientific communications – but they are also an opportunity for
exchanges to take place between the researchers and actors who are involved in the
automotive industry. As such, a panel that provides these practitioners with an opportunity to
discuss the projects on which they are working is one of the conference’s high points. The
next international conference will be taking place on 7,8 & 9 June 2001 at the Palais du
Luxembourg premises of the French Senate. Its theme will be:
Reconfiguring the Auto Industry: Merger & Acquisition, Alliances, and Exit
The purpose of this colloquium is not to discuss the intensive restructuring that has
been taking place within the automotive industry in general terms. Instead, we will be
analysing recent trends in terms of the GERPISA’s new research programme, and with a view
towards our cockeas thematic network, with its study of the coordination of competencies and
knowledge within the automotive systems. To a certain extent, the reconfiguration of interfirm relationships within the automotive industry reflects automobile firms’ search for ways
of creating new types of knowledge and/or of coordinating competencies – these being
strengths they will need to develop if they are to successfully implement innovation initiatives
that they are having to undertake as a result of the intensification of competition (product
differentiation), the introduction of new technologies, and the regulatory environment.
The Project management in an international cooperation framework panel set for the
morning of Thursday 7 June (10:30-12:45) is an attempt to cast a spotlight on the
management of the co-operative projects that are being set up between automobile
manufacturers. As such, it brings together project managers who are participating, or who
have participated, in horizontal collaborations. They will be presenting the lessons from the
inside that their experiences have taught them. Following the meeting, the discussion will be
extended through exchanges with the public; and by the distribution of scientific
communications.
The following carmakers have been invited to take part in the round table: PSA,
Renault, Fiat, VW and Pininfarina.
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Session 2. La concentration dans l’industrie automobile / Concentration in the
Car Industrie
LES UNS FUSIONNENT, LES AUTRES PAS.
QUELLES RECOMPOSITIONS
DE L'INDUSTRIE AUTOMOBILE MONDIALE
Robert BOYER, Michel FREYSSENET
En moins de trois ans, le paysage de l'industrie automobile mondiale a profondément
changé. Trois regroupements majeurs ont modifié la hiérarchie entre constructeurs: la fusion
Daimler-Chrysler et leur alliance avec Mitsubishi, la prise de contrôle par Renault de Nissan,
Dacia et Samsung et l'alliance General Motors-Fiat. Ces regroupements ont la particularité
d'être transrégionaux. Si par le passé des opérations de ce type ont pu être observées, elles
n'ont jamais eu une telle ampleur. Enfin les trois regroupements ont profondément bouleversé
la perception que l'on pouvait avoir de la des firmes japonaises et coréennes et de leurs
performances.
Toutefois les trois constructeurs qui ont été constamment profitables depuis les années
soixante-dix, Toyota, Honda et Volkswagen, et qui incarnent chacun un modèle productif ont
préféré rester à l'écart de ces fusions-acquisitions-alliances et poursuivre leur développement
par croissance interne pour les deux premiers, par absorption de constructeurs mineurs pour le
troisième.
A la lumière des résultats des programmes précédents du GERPISA, on essaie de
comprendre les raisons de stratégies aussi différenciées, d'identifier les problèmes que
chacune d'elles génère compte tenu des trajectoires antérieures des firmes, d'évaluer les
possibilités et les capacités que ces dernières ont de les surmonter, et de dessiner les paysages
de l'industrie automobile qui pourraient en résulter suivant les réussites ou les échecs .
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THE GM-FIAT STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
Arnaldo CAMUFFO, Giuseppe VOLPATO
Last year, General Motors Corporation and Fiat S.p.A. Have formed a strategic
industrial alliance, creating an important partnership for the companies in two of world's
largest automotive markets: Europe and Latin America.
Observers seem to share the view that the alliance promises opportunities to create
value for both Fiat and GM shareholders through significant synergies in the areas of
components cost reductions, leveraging of each group's powertrain activities, efficiency in the
financial service operations, cross-sharing of automotive technologies, and effective leverage
of each other's platforms.
From the financial standpoint, despite the fact GM and Fiat will remain independent
from one another and will continue to compete in markets around the world, GM has
acquired a 20 percent stake in Fiat Auto in exchange for approximately a 5 percent share of
GM outstanding stocks.
Objective of this work is to analyze the details of this operation, describing what has
been done in terms of streamlining and synergies seeking in the two major areas of the
alliance (the powertrain and purchasing joint ventures), and how this has impacted on the two
companies, both in economic and social terms. The paper will also focus on cross-firm
relationships and on the possible future implications of the alliance, trying to assess if shared
ownership of assets fosters or hinders learning and performance improvement processes
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Session 3. Alliances et coordination des compétences / Alliances and
Coordination of Competencies
CURRENT TRENDS IN ALLIANCE-ENABLED CAPABILITY BUILDING
A DYNAMIC VIEW OF THE FORD-MAZDA, RENAULT-NISSAN,
& DAIMLERCHRYSLER-MITSUBISHI CASES
Takahiro FUJIMOTO, Daniel ARTURO HELLER
Introduction
The driving force shaping the long-term evolution of the auto industry can be
described as capability-building competition, i.e. Interfirm rivalry centered on the
accumulation of organizational capabilities (Fujimoto 1999b).1 As such, it is fitting to ask the
following questions: What aspects of the ongoing reconfiguration will have the greatest
impact on capability building within firms, and how is the future direction of the industry
likely to be affected by these changes?
The proposed paper seeks to address these two question by an empirical investigation
of the recent capability-building goals and achievements of three high-profile strategic
alliances between Western and Japanese automakers, namely the Ford-Mazda, RenaultNissan, and daimlerchrysler-Mitsubishi cases.
Analysis
The general framework is built on the Resource-based View of the firm (Wernerfelt
1984, etc.) Augmented by the current body of research on strategic alliances, which argues
that close interaction between alliance partners can be a viable means of achieving learning
goals (Doz & Hamel 1998, Yoshino & Rangan 1995). As the actual mechanisms by which
organizational learning takes place within an alliance are still not well understood, the paper
contributes to these research streams by providing theory and examples of the processes of
skill internalization and capability building.
Furthermore, drawing primarily from the three cases, the dynamic, or longer-term,
nature of learning within an alliance is an important focus of attention of the paper, thereby
addressing a common deficiency in the standard analysis of the present reconfiguration phase
in the industry, namely an overemphasis of the static effects of alliances.
1
A capability, or competency, can be defined as “a stable pattern of firms’ productive resources (in
Prenrose’s sense) and their activities which create interfirm differences in organizational performance
(competitiveness in particular) and are hard to imitate by competitors” (Fujimoto, 1999a, p. 395).
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Traditionally capability-acquisition goals of alliances in the auto industry have been in
operational technology areas, such as engineering and manufacturing, and have been
motivated by the desire of Western firms to learn these competencies from Japanese
assemblers that have excelled in these areas. Well-known examples include: Toyota-GM,
Mazda-Ford, and Honda-Rover. Since the mid-1990s, however, a new set of capabilityacquisition goals has emerged, namely learning in strategic areas, such as brand management
and financial control systems. This time the push for these new goals has come from Japanese
firms seeking to learn these skills from Western assemblers. This West to East flow is in the
opposite direction of the general flow of knowledge seen in the auto industry since the early
1980s. Thus, by incorporating a historical perspective and paying attention to important
product-market characteristics, the paper seeks to illustrate the dynamic nature of the alliances
considered and their potential impact on the evolution of the industry as a whole.
The cases
The paper’s analysis of the Ford-Mazda case pays special attention to changes that
have taken place within Mazda in the marketing and finance functions since the mid-1990s.
Mazda’s current depressed performance is also addressed. Analysis of the Renault-Nissan
case examines ongoing changes within Nissan including in its corporate culture and in its
organizational capabilities such as purchasing and styling. Renault’s efforts to learn within the
alliance relationship are also be investigated. Finally, the daimlerchrysler-Mitsubishi case,
while still very new, is also analyzed and the potential for it to achieve its goals is examined.
References
Doz, Yves L. And Gary Hamel (1998), Alliance Advantage: The Art of Creating Value
through Partnering, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Fujimoto, Takahiro (1999a), “Transformation of Japanese Management System: A
Contingency View,” in Daniel Dirks, Jean-François Huchet, and Thierry Ribault,
(Eds.), Japanese Management in the Low Growth Era, Between External Shocks and
Internal Evolution, Tokyo: Springer, pp. 389-407.
Fujimoto, Takahiro (1999b), The Evolution of a Manufacturing System at Toyota. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Wernerfelt, Birger (1984), “A Resource-based View of the Firm,” Strategic Management
Journal, Vol. 5, p. 171-180.
Yoshino, Michael Y. And U. Sriniwasa Rangan (1995), Strategic Alliances- An
Entrepreneurial approach to Globalization, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
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MASTERING JOINT PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AMONG
COMPETITIVE AUTOMOBILE FIRMS :
TOWARD DEVELOPING A CO-OPERATIVE COMPETENCY
Christophe MIDLER, Jean-Claude MONNET, Patricio NEFFA
Interorganisational relationships for new product development has been a predominant
trend during the last decade among automotive firms from the Triad. Building ties with
competitors is one way to meet demands for effective new products development (cost &
risks sharing, resources and production capacity optimisation), internalise new skills, facilitate
access to new markets (licensing agreements, retailer network, etc...) Or expand the product
offer.
In the 1980’s, most of the ties were limited to technical or sales tie-ups aiming to
maintain the company’s independence. What emerged during last decade, is an industry
consolidation where companies compete and co-operate simultaneously ((Clark & Fujimoto,
1991)). Today, no major company has been able to avoid becoming a player in the network,
either by participating in local (licensing and manufacturing agreements, joint development of
components or the full vehicles, etc...) Or global initiatives (equity participation, mergers,
joint purchasing, etc.) .
Among the many types of interorganisational relationships, our field is related to
studying joint product development. This activity has major implications for the management
of new product development. Develop effective international strategic alliances requires not
only to select the appropriate type of partnership (Joint venture, contractual agreement, equity
partnership, etc..) And its governance structure. Above all, it requires the ability to manage
complex development teams that cut across countries and cultures, organisational routines and
habits, development and production ways.
The topic of interorganisational relationships has attracted researchers, consultants and
practitioners from different fields of study. This useful but inconsistent literature has largely
focused it’s attention on the antecedent conditions and determinants, structural properties and
the source of instability in strategic alliances.
With the notable exception of Doz (1996), Doz & Hammel (1998), Ring &Van de
Ven (1994), these studies have largely ignored co-operative process and alliance evolution.
Moreover, prior research has not addressed in detail how knowledge acquired through
extensive co-practice in a joint development can be transferred and re-utilised in other parts of
the organisation or new projects. Finally, ex-post analysis or deterministic studies revealed
their limits to study change over time . Indeed, except for Ariño & de la Torre (1998) and
Piron (1998), grounded empirical studies over a long period are scarce.
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This paper aims to contribute to fill that gap by describing how an organisation have
been able to manage a co-operative project in a multi-national context and then capture, share
and apply the set of skills and management devices to other collaborative projects. We posit
that this typology of firms will have a source of superior advantage to compete in a market
that is global, differentiated and intensely competitive.
Our research is based on a longitudinal field study using research-intervention
techniques. During two years, we have been able to track the development of a full new
family of Light Commercial Vans developed jointly by Renault and GME (the X-83 program)
from the project go-ahead decision up to the start of production (SOP) date and beyond. This
case provides a unique setting to observe in real time the collaboration of development teams
and to collect the “events ” that will impact the evolution of the partnership.
In the following sections, we first examine the research setting and the methodology
used. The second and main section draws on the data from our longitudinal research, and
more selectively on how a new role for co-operative project has been able to transfer and
capitalise the experiences and lessons learned into other collaborative projects. The final
section draws implications and points to limitation and possible further research.
Keywords : product development,
management, competency
automobile
industry,
co-operation,
knowledge
Bibliography
Ariño, A., & de la Torre, J. 1998. Learning from failure: towards an evolutionary model of
colllaborative ventures. Organization Science, 9(3): 306-325.
Clark, K. B., & Fujimoto, T. 1991. Product development performance. Strategy, organization
and management in the world auto industry. Cambridge, Mass.: Havard Business
School Press.
Doz, Y., & Hammel, G. 1998. Alliance advantage. The art of creating value through
partenering: Harvard Business school press.
Doz, Y. L. 1996. The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: initial conditions or
learning processes? Strategic Management Journal, Special issue(17): 55-83.
Piron, P. 1998. Project management in international strategic alliances. The case of the
European tactical missile industry. Paper presented at the IRNOP III Congress,
Calgary-Canada.
Ring, P., & Van de Ven, A. 1994. Developmental process of cooperative Interorganizational
relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19(1): 90-118.
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LES COOPERATIONS EN CONCEPTION : NOUVEAUX ENJEUX ET
CONSIDERATIONS THEORIQUES A PARTIR DE QUELQUES
EXPERIENCES DE COORDINATION DES COMPETENCES
Philippe LEFEBVRE, Blanche SEGRESTIN, Benoît WEIL
L'objet des démarches de coopération peut être extrêmement varié dans le monde
automobile : les partenariats client-fournisseur jouent en particulier sur la complémentarité
des ressources et des savoir-faire, mais ils visent aussi à favoriser l'innovation dans une
économie de variété. Les opérations de développement conjoint d'un sous-ensemble ou d'un
véhicule ont quant à elles plutôt pour objet de permettre la réalisation d'économies d'échelles
(développement, achats conjoints…), mais aussi de favoriser des apprentissages croisés.
Si les objectifs affichés sont relativement clairs, la manière dont ils sont atteints est
évidemment plus problématique, et notamment pour les activités de conception et de
développement. En conception, la littérature a largement montré qu'une coopération étroite
était indispensable entre les protagonistes. Plusieurs arguments sont avancés. Ainsi, comme
les activités de conception sont marquées par un degré élevé d'incertitude et de risques, elles
demandent des relations de confiance, des mécanismes de résolution de conflits, etc. D'autre
part, les partenaires du développement d'un nouveau véhicule interviennent dans un système
très contraint qui les rend fortement interdépendants. Une coordination étroite est donc
nécessaire pour assurer mise au point conjointe. A cet égard, les recherches ont montré la
possibilité d'établir de nouvelles relations contractuelles (Garel, 1994) ou l'intérêt des
systèmes modulaires (Baldwin and Clark, 1997), (Cusumano and Nobeoka, 1999 (trad.
1998)). On voit ici des mécanismes de coordination particuliers en conception, qui ne peuvent
cependant s'appliquer qu'à des situations particulières, et qui ne sont d'ailleurs pas sans poser
de problèmes.
L'analyse des mécanismes concrets de coordination des activités de conception est
d'un enjeu très important : d'une part pour la pratique, alors que ces schémas de coopération
vont se multiplier et se déplacent de l'échange vers la production commune de nouvelles
connaissances (R&D, exploration amont…), d'autre part d'un point de vue théorique, parce
que permettrait de renouveler la représentation des systèmes coopératifs.
A partir de différents cas tirés de l'industrie automobile européenne (partenariats
constructeur-fournisseur dans le développement d'un nouveau véhicule, en amont pour
introduire de nouvelles innovations, ou accord de développement conjoint d'une plate-forme
entre deux constructeurs), plusieurs constats peuvent être formulés :
20
La délégation d'un sous-ensemble permet d'organiser un découplage entre
concepteurs. Bien que pratique, c'est un moyen de coordination risqué pour plusieurs
raisons:
Ø
D'une part, comme les interdépendances sont incontournables dans un système
complexe et comme les connaissances des interactions entre les différents éléments
sont lacunaires, il faut nécessairement conduire un apprentissage sur ces
interactions ;
Ø Ensuite, le "contrôle" est très difficile, les problèmes rencontrés n'étant pas
toujours visibles. En particulier, les problèmes sont d'autant plus difficiles à
repérer que les paramètres d'action et les modes de validation sont propres à
chaque organisation.
Ø Enfin, la délégation repose sur la base de prescriptions qui ont été établies par celui
qui délègue. Or, lorsque les compétences des partenaires sont complémentaires,
quelles sont les garanties de faisabilité de ces prescriptions ?
La question de la délégation amène donc trois préoccupations :
Ø
Toute stratégie de délégation ou de division des interventions est risquée en
conception et demande une attention particulière, une stratégie de validation
appropriée et des "apprentissages croisés".
Ø La division suppose que des principes généraux de conception soient partagés
(principes d'architecture…) : comment et par qui ont-ils été établis ? Quels sont les
modes de coordination pour y parvenir ?
Ø Se pose enfin la question de la manière dont sont établies les spécifications. Dans
les phases exploratoires et amont, alors qu'il n'y a pas de prescripteur pré-identifié,
quels sont les principes de répartition et les formes d'interaction adoptés ?
La difficulté d'un cadre de coordination tient à ce qu'en conception, l'objet de
coopération est lui-même à définir. Dès lors qu'on sort du cadre où un partenaire pourrait
établir un cahier des charges global, on se heurte à de nouvelles problématiques :
-
S'accorder sur des spécifications communes s'avère extrêmement délicat, non
seulement parce que les partenaires peuvent viser des projets différents, avec des
caractéristiques et un planning propres, mais surtout parce la formulation des
spécifications d'un véhicule et leur déclinaison sur les sous-ensembles sont ellesmêmes des résultats de conception. Les spécifications s'expriment donc très
différemment et sont très difficiles à comparer entre deux constructeurs. En outre,
les spécifications ont été établies progressivement dans un régime de conception
particulier : celles qui ne posaient pas de problème dans ce cadre n'ont donc pas
systématiquement été formalisées ou ont été oubliées. Aussi ne peuvent-elles
même pas être explicitées d'un partenaire à l'autre.
-
Enfin, et c'est le propre des activités de conception, ces spécifications ne sont pas
données d'avance : il ne s'agit donc pas seulement d'arbitrer entre différents
ensemble de spécification, mais de les construire conjointement. La question est de
savoir par quel mode d'interaction.
21
Enfin, les coopérations n'identifient pas forcément ni de planificateur ni d'arbitre a
priori. La mise en place d'une organisation de développement, au-delà d'un planning commun,
est du coup difficile au sein de deux organisations dont la conception fonctionne avec des
régimes différents et des rôles différents. Cette mise en plus est d'ailleurs encore plus
complexe dans les phases préalables au développement (établissement d'un cahier des
charges, définition des principes généraux de conception).
Dans ces conditions, l'objet de la contribution est de proposer une réflexion sur les
enjeux et les problèmes des coopérations en conception, et d'esquisser des principes
managériaux adaptés.
Références
Baldwin, C. Y. And Clark, K. B. (1997), "Managing in an age of Modularity", Harvard
Business Review, , Septembre-Octobre, 84-93.
Cusumano, M. And Nobeoka, K. (1999 (trad. 1998)) Au-delà de l'entreprise au plus juste, le
Management multi-projets : optimiser le développement de produits.
("Thinking beyond lean, how multiproject management is transforming product development
at Toyota and other companies"), Dunod (trad. The Free Press).
Garel, G. (1994) Réduction du temps de conception, concourance et savoirs professionnels :
le cas de l'emboutissage dans les projets automobiles, Thèse de l'école polytechnique,
Paris.
22
23
Session 4. Vers la constitution d’industries oligopolistiques / Towards
Oligopolistic Industries
CONCURRENCE OLIGOPOLISTIQUE ET CONCENTRATION
DANS LE SECTEUR AUTOMOBILE.
Hadjila KRIFA
Depuis le milieu des années 90, le mouvement de concentration semble avoir subi une
nouvelle accélération. Le montant mondial des F&A a ainsi atteint le chiffre record de 2321
milliards de dollars en 1998 contre moins de 500 milliards environ en 1994 (source : Cyclope,
Economica). Pour l’essentiel, ces mouvements concernent les pays les plus développés, même
si des pays en voie de développement sont depuis peu concernés. Ils affectent également la
plupart des secteurs mais de manière prépondérante les plus globalisés.
Cependant, pour beaucoup, le phénomène n’a rien de fondamentalement nouveau. De
fort longue date, la concentration fait partie intégrante de la vie des entreprises. En effet, alors
que certaines choisissent de croître sans s’unir à d’autres firmes, en développant leurs propres
capacités de production (croissance interne), nombre de grandes entreprises notamment ont
une préférence pour la croissance externe1. Cette préférence tient aux avantages théoriques
associés à ce mode de croissance par les entreprises tels que le gain de temps (achats de
capacités de production déjà en fonctionnement, achats de parts de marché rapidement), la
réduction du risque de croissance (pénétration d’activités à fortes barrières à l’entrée), le gain
d’argent (économies d’échelle et synergies, rationalisation de l‘entreprise acquise, “ raid ” sur
une entreprise sous-évaluée...), L’obtention d’avantages stratégiques (accès à des actifs
stratégiques, préemption de nouveaux marchés...). Pour cet ensemble de raisons, la croissance
externe est supposée une stratégie bien adaptée :
Ø
aux secteurs mûrs dans lesquels il faut acquérir ou renforcer ses positions pour
occuper le premier rang en raison de l’intensification de la concurrence par les
prix;
Ø aux secteurs nouveaux où les firmes cherchent à acheter un savoir faire et si
possible gagner du temps tout en jouant sur la différenciation.
1
Celle-ci revêt deux formes principales :
• la fusion lorsque deux ou (plus) entreprises d’importance comparable décident de réunir leur
patrimoine respectif pour donner naissance à une nouvelle entreprise. Les anciennes entreprises cessent alors
d’exister.
• L’acquisition soit lorsqu’une entreprise achète une autre, celle-ci cessant en principe d’exister, soit
dans une acception plus large lorsqu’une entreprise achète les actions d’une autre (tout ou partie), celle-ci
subsistant alors comme une filiale. Bien que le terme de F&A soit devenu le terme général qui désigne les
formes de concentrations, dans la réalité, ce sont les acquisitions qui dominent le marché (Cnuced, WIR 2000).
24
Mais l’analyse théorique se heurte bien souvent à la complexité de la réalité observée.
Le secteur automobile peut constituer de ce point de vue une excellente illustration. Ce
secteur présente, en effet, un certain nombre des symptômes d'une crise de maturité
(essoufflement de la croissance du marché, surcapacités et concurrence par les prix exacerbée)
tout en ayant les traits d'un secteur innovant (recherche en matière de motorisations, nouveaux
concepts automobiles...). Dans ce contexte paradoxal, comment analyser la vague des F&A
dans l’industrie automobile?
Une première piste d’analyse s’inscrit dans la perspective de l’économie industrielle
classique. Les F&A apparaissent comme la meilleure arme stratégique pour supprimer en
partie la concurrence dans les limites plus ou moins strictes qu’imposent les dispositifs
antitrust. Le choix d’une telle arme trouve sa justification dans l’idée qu’il existe une
corrélation entre concentration et profits. Plus le nombre de participants est réduit plus les
profits sont élevés. Les firmes cherchent donc à accroître leur taille pour capter les rentes
monopolistiques sur des marchés imparfaits et élever en même temps les barrières à l’entrée
de leur secteur. Elles peuvent aussi mieux se battre dans un contexte de guerre des prix. Si
cette explication peut encore être retenue pour comprendre la poursuite de la concentration à
l’abri des frontières nationales (exemple : stratégie récente de Toyota), son inconvénient est
qu’elle ne dit rien sur comment poursuivre la croissance dès lors que les opportunités d’achats
d’entreprises se raréfient au plan local.
L’explication complémentaire pourrait être recherchée dans la théorie internationale
de la croissance des firmes. Celle-ci nous dit, en effet, que lorsque les opportunités de croître
sur le territoire national deviennent difficiles (stabilisation de l’oligopole) ou impossibles
(législation antitrust), les firmes peuvent se tourner vers les marchés étrangers. Tout en
admettant depuis Stephen Hymer (thèse de 1960, publiée en 1976) que le fait de s'implanter à
l'étranger comporte un coût important et un risque élevé, la formule de l’investissement direct
est préférable dès lors qu’une firme peut exploiter simultanément les avantages
monopolistiques de la firme supposés transférables internationalement (ownership specifics
advantages), les avantages à l’internalisation des coûts de transaction (internalisation
advantages) et ceux de la localisation du pays hôte (localization advantages). Bien que le
“ paradigme O.L.I. ” de Dunning (1988) synthétise une large partie des arguments de la
multinationalisation des entreprises, il ne permet pas de comprendre pourquoi les firmes ont
une préférence pour la croissance externe au lieu de l’investissement ex-nihilo (greenfield
investment) sur les marchés internationaux. Or contrairement aux années 50 et 60 où
l’investissement ex nihilo était le mode privilégié d’entrée sur un marché étranger, depuis le
milieu des années 80, les F&A transfrontières sont devenues la modalité dominante. Leur
montant s’est élevé à 720 milliards de dollars en 1999 — soit 90 % des flux d’idi sortants et
83,2% des flux entrants — contre 75 milliards de dollars en 1989, soit dix fois moins (Cnuced
2000). Bien que nous n’ayons pas une statistique spécifique au secteur automobile, la
probabilité que celui-ci suive la même tendance est grande au regard de la multiplication des
vagues des fusions-acquisitions et diverses alliances transfrontalières observées (DaimlerChrysler, Ford-Volvo, Renault-Nissan, General Motors-Fiat, etc.).
On peut enfin mobiliser une troisième hypothèse : elle met en exergue l’importance du
facteur concurrence oligopolistique. En effet, depuis les travaux économétriques de
Knickerbocker (1973), on admet que les forces qui poussent à la concentration des firmes
dans des structures oligopolistique sont les mêmes que celles qui leur font envisager
l'investissement à l'étranger. Dans un cadre national, les firmes en place cherchent à dissuader
25
l'entrée de nouveaux entrants pour mieux défendre leurs parts de marché et la rente
monopolistique. Lorsque les conditions d'interdépendance oligopolistiques débordent les
frontières nationales, les comportements stratégiques sont de même nature. Les entreprises
arbitrent entre les différents modes de pénétration des marchés extérieurs en tenant compte
des actions de leurs rivaux pour ne pas se laisser distancer dans la course aux parts de marché,
soit en imitant le comportement du leader, soit par effet de représailles. L’un des meilleurs
indicateurs de l’interaction stratégique est alors le regroupement dans le temps de leurs
opérations d’investissements : celles-ci procèdent, comme cela a été constaté historiquement,
par vagues.
Or le secteur automobile est sans nul doute un des plus beaux oligopoles mondiaux
désormais et une industrie globale, au sens de Porter, 1986. Un nombre de plus en plus limité
de joueurs se confronte les uns aux autres sur différents marchés nationaux autour du globe,
créant ainsi un haut niveau d'interdépendance stratégique. Celle-ci est susceptible d’être un
puissant facteur d’explication de la concentration du secteur. D’ailleurs, à partir de notre base
de données, les opérations de rapprochement entre firmes du secteur s’observent par vagues,
ce qui est le meilleur critère de “ l’interaction stratégique ”. Ce facteur doit cependant être
couplé à la montée de l’incertitude qui caractérise des environnements concurrentiels
mondialisés. Dans de tels contextes, les firmes s’adaptent en mettant en place à la fois des
stratégies globales pour bénéficier des économies d’échelle tout en jouant sur la fragmentation
des marchés qui impliquent des capacités et des compétences adaptées à chacun pour mieux
bénéficier de la proximité avec les consommateurs (stratégie de croissance de Volswaguen).
La gestion du couple globalisation-fragmentation impose de nouer des relations avec des
“ partenaires ” privilégiés sur chacun des marchés de produits ou géographiques visés car
aucune firme aussi puissante soit-elle ne peut gérer seule la gestion d’un tel dilemme.
Cependant, comme le “ stock ” des partenaires potentiels sur chaque marché tend à se réduire
au fur et à mesure des concentrations et des alliances, il s’agit de faire vite pour devancer le
concurrent de l’oligopole dans la mise en place de tels liens privilégiés. En définitive, la
stratégie des firmes devient de moins en moins l’expression d’un choix et de plus en plus
celle de la contrainte par l’oligopole. Dans cette perspective, les réactions oligopolistiques
deviennent un puissant facteur explicatif à la fois de l’accélération de l’internationalisation
des firmes du secteur automobile mais aussi un moyen rapide de préempter les partenaires les
plus stratégiques, que ce soit par la prise de contrôle et/ou par l’alliance-partenariat. Le jeu
concurrentiel justifie la reconfiguration réticulaire du secteur.
26
MODULARISATION ET CONCENTRATION DE L'INDUSTRIE
EQUIPEMENTIÈRE EN EUROPE
MODULAR PRODUCTION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE EUROPEAN
SUPPLIER INDUSTRY
Vincent FRIGANT, Yannick LUNG
La question de la modularisation est aujourd'hui au coeur des réflexions et des
décisions stratégiques des firmes de l'industrie automobile. Les avantages de la production
modulaire pour les constructeurs (réduction des coûts fixes, gestion de la variété, gains en
termes de délais de conception, de flexibilité et réactivité… ) comme pour les équipementiers
semblent aujourd'hui reconnus, même si les formes de la production modulaire peuvent
différer. Si l'externalisation de la conception et de la préparation des modules n'est pas une
voie obligée, la modularisation s’accompagne d’un poids croissant des équipementiers. Ces
derniers prennent en charge la responsabilité complète (développement et production) de
composants qui représentent un poids important dans la valeur du produit final.
Cette délégation croissante de responsabilité pose la question des compétences
requises pour devenir “ systémiers ”. Les équipementiers doivent proposer une offre
potentielle capable de répondre à un cahier des charges de plus en plus lourd : moyens de
recherche et développement, capacité à assumer les risques financiers liés à l’engagement des
dépenses d’investissements irrécouvrables matérielles et immatérielles, moyens de production
(notamment suivi à l’international). La modularisation implique à la fois la maîtrise d'un
ensemble de compétences technologiques et le développement de capacités
organisationnelles, ainsi qu'une surface financière importante pour participer aux projets.
Dans cette perspective, la recomposition de l'industrie équipementière est engagée car
seules un nombre limité de firmes disposent des moyens d’atteindre le statut de fournisseur
sytémier, les autres étant condamnés à rétrograder aux rangs inférieurs. L’industrie
équipementière est ainsi depuis quelques années en proie à d’intenses restructurations
capitalistiques avec des acquisitions, des alliances, des cessions, des fusions et autres
consolidations.
La communication se propose d'analyser les relations entre ces restructurations de
l'industrie équipementière et le développement de la production modulaire, en considérant que
ces mouvements sont largement fondés par la dynamique de modification du périmètre des
compétences foncières des fournisseurs dans le but de devenir maître d’œuvre de systèmes et
de modules. L'analyse portera sur les relations entre constructeurs automobiles et fournisseurs
de premier rang ou rang 0,5 (systémiers) en Europe. Elle s'appuiera sur un traitement
statistique des évolutions récentes dans ce domaine portant sur les mouvements de
27
concentration dans le secteur équipementier et sur les relations d'approvisionnement, en
mobilisant une base de données désagrégée selon le type de composants (répartis en 121
catégories différentes) délivré par les fournisseurs aux usines européennes des constructeurs
automobiles.
28
L'OLIGOPOLE DU PNEUMATIQUE :
GLOBALISATION DES MANUFACTURIERS FRANÇAIS,
JAPONAIS ET AMERICAINS
Françoise GUELLE
Le développement de l'industrie automobile après-guerre a soutenu l'expansion de
l'industrie du pneumatique, qui a accru ses investissements en capital, développé ses lignes de
production et connu une croissance continue depuis les années 70. L'innovation technologique
du pneu radial a permis au Français Michelin d'améliorer la qualité des pneus et de se
développer à l'étranger en imposant son standard. Selon Porter (1985: 534), l'apparition de
changements technologiques discontinus donne un signal très fort que le leader technologique
d'un secteur peut être vulnérable, et dans l'industrie du pneumatique, le pneu radial a fourni
cette rupture technologique qui a donné à Michelin la possibilité de contester la suprématie de
Goodyear et Firestone.
Au début des années 70, la concurrence entre pneumaticiens s'est accrue aux ÉtatsUnis et en Europe, tandis qu'au Japon, les constructeurs automobiles continuaient à équiper
leurs véhicules en pneus japonais, tout en sachant qu'ils étaient inférieurs en qualité au niveau
mondial. Ce soutien a donné le temps et les ressources suffisantes à Bridgestone pour
remonter la courbe d'apprentissage, s'améliorer et atteindre les niveaux Internationaux de
compétition. D'après Krugman (1984), en procurant à une firme une position privilégiée sur
un marché, un pays lui donne un avantage en terme d'échelle par rapport à ses concurrents
étrangers. De nombreuses firmes se concentrent sur leurs concurrents traditionnels et
négligent les firmes japonaises, nouvelles venues sur leur secteur d'autant plus qu'elles
apparaissent comme moins internationalisées. L'industrie du pneumatique offre ainsi dans les
années 80 des exemples d'avancée des firmes japonaises sur les marchés américains et
européens avec le rachat de firmes occidentales renommées. Les firmes occidentales sont
confrontées à un formidable défi tandis que les firmes japonaises démontrent leurs capacités a
gérer des implantations à l'étranger.
Survient ensuite une période de récession, la demande d'automobiles et par contrecoup
celle de pneus se ralentit. Dans un marché mondial touché par la récession, les pneumaticiens
ne peuvent compter que sur la demande de remplacement et les marchés émergents.
L'expansion passe par les rachats, l'absorption de firmes ou des alliances stratégiques.
La communication se propose d'analyser la nouvelle concurrence pour la conquête des parts
de marchés que les grands groupes de l'oligopole se livrent en Asie. Les firmes japonaises
touchées par la récession sont confrontées à une nouvelle donne : l'arrivée dans leur pré-carré
des firmes américaines et européennes. Notre approche privilégiera l'étude empirique des
stratégies d'internationalisation en Asie-Pacifique des trois principales firmes : Michelin,
Goodyear et Bridgestone.
29
Session 5. Analyse des relations productives / Analysis of Productive Relations
RUNNING ON EMPTY?
INNOVATION AND THE AUSTRALIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
Wendy RIEMENS, Jane MARCEAU
The focus of the paper is the sectoral system of innovation operating in the Australian
automotive industry. The paper reports the first results of a 10 year longitudinal study of
developments in the industry. Australia is a ‘branch’ of the internationalised auto industry and
this paper focuses on the implication of this position for the generation of knowledge in the sector
and the organisational policy choices available.
The paper considers the functioning of the automotive ‘complex’ in Australia. It stresses
the importance of national policy that transcends merely subsidising industries and technologies.
In order to design policies to stimulate long-term innovativeness in the economy, governments
need to be aware of the opportunities for new technologies in their relevant institutional context
since public policy has an important influence on a nation’s production system, education system,
R&D system and finance system (Lundvall 1992). Industrial complexes are conceptualised as
innovation networks linking four distinct groups of actors: producers; users; public sector
research institutions; and government regulating authorities involved in delivering a specific
product. It is argued within this theoretical framework that the conditions under which innovation
occurs are shaped by the quality of the linkages across the innovation system (see also Malerba
1999). It traces current strengths and weaknesses in a system of innovation back in part to the
ways in which the national economy was industrialised and further developed but does so in the
context of a globalised industry.
The first motor car was built in Australia in 1897, followed by the manufacturing of
complete vehicles in Australia in 1948 and subsequent policy encouraged industry development.
The Australian automotive industry sector is unique in that it has the capability to do all design,
development, manufacturing and sales and marketing of vehicles in Australia. Between them, the
assemblers (Ford, GM-Holden, Toyota and Mitsubishi) produce more than 300,000 vehicles.
Total registrations in Australia in 2000 of just under 800,000 vehicles account for less than 2 per
cent of world sales and the number remains stagnant. Manufacturing of vehicles is done in two
Federal States and components are supplied by a strong sector concentrated in three States. Less
than two decades ago there were five manufacturers producing fifteen different models with
plants in five States. From the early 1980s the government recognised that the industry had to
change if it was to survive but it took nearly another decade before significant changes were
evident. This paper charts those changes.
Our first study into the automotive industry in Australia was undertaken in the late 1980s,
entitled ‘A Local Division of Production: Technological Change and Productive Interlinkages in
Australian Manufacturing’. It examined the automotive industry along with the clothing and
electronics industries in an attempt to identify whether there were any ‘core’ firms which ‘drove’
30
technological change and innovative behaviour within these industries. It was reported that very
few of the companies had introduced robots or other forms of computer related technology.
Similarly, very little was spent on product-related formal R&D and that new products mainly
resulted from purchasing or licensing deals. One (then recent) change, as reported by Marceau in
1989, was the move towards increasing the purchase of sub-assemblies. Finally, the data showed
that at crucial points of the filière or production chain elements lead out of the country. That
study has formed the basis for what has now become a longitudinal study into the drivers of
innovation in the automotive industry in Australia. A central question is the changing structure of
the automotive complex, ie is it now more integrated and competitive or more dependent for its
product development on external actors?
Innovation is now internationally recognised as an essential condition of economic growth
– whether the innovation concerns the development of a new product or the improvement of a
process (eg. Freeman and Lundvall 1988; Dosi et al 1988; OECD 1999). Understanding the
process of innovation requires appreciation of the operation of the factors that facilitate
developments as well as those that inhibit the development of particular innovations. The
‘systems’ approach in researching innovation focuses on the broader socio-economic context in
which learning and innovation occurs (Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991; Lundvall 1992; Edquist
1997). Strategies of firms and industries are understood as an integral part of their environment,
where one affects the other. Much of the literature treats the strong relationships generated
between users and producers as central to successful innovation (eg. Dodgson and Rothwell
1994; Marceau 1994). These relationships are conduits for the information flows which can
generate new products and diffuse new processes.
Since the early 1990s, restructuring in the global automotive industry has been profound
(Helper and Sako 1995; Bidault et al. 1998; Boyer et al. 1998). The most notable improvement in
the Australian automotive industry over the last decade has been in product quality (ISR 1999).
However, investments in R&D by both core firms and suppliers remain low. The major factors
putting pressure on component manufacturers in Australia are market-related and include
mergers, recession in Asian markets, excess capacity and the reduction in vehicle platforms. In
addition, growing globalisation of the local manufacturers’ operations is evident in global
sourcing and continuing rationalisation of relationships with supplier firms. Environmental and
safety regulations, new selling methods and increased consumer demands intensify pressures for
innovation within the automotive industry. The research therefore investigates the extent to
which interlinkages between assemblers and their suppliers and between suppliers and supplier
firms are developed in response to these global challenges. The system approach is designed to
link analysis and policy action by highlighting areas of strength and weaknesses in a sectorspecific way.
A brief look at some of the relationships between various elements of the complex show
the need of analysis of the complex at the level of a system. In the past, Australia’s supplier
sector expansion has centred around serving local auto plants for the domestic market. However,
the bulk of future automotive revenue growth will come from the component sector as it builds
on the linkages it has begun to establish in the global networks. For example, the growth in
exports have increased from just over A$ 1 billion in 1990 to $A 4.2 billion in 2000. The industry
has a proven ability to become viable on comparative small volumes but has needed the help of
machinery suppliers to do so. Through the production of the axcess concept car more than 120
suppliers and design and engineering companies have shown to have the capacity to style and
build vehicles by applying engine technology developed in the public sector. Similarly, Ford has
31
made long-term investments in magnesium metal processing in Australia, again in close
cooperation with public sector research organisations. Companies such as Johnson Controls,
Dana and Delphi have only recently entered the Australian market and this will have likely
consequences for the development of modules for the Australian complex. Notwithstanding these
positive developments, there is still an emphasis on short term cost savings which has affected
the knowledge flow in the automotive complex.
The sectoral systems approach will help in understanding the dynamics and patterns of
change experienced over the past decade and assist in the development of new public policy
indications.
32
SOME EVIDENCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ASSOCIATED TO
MODULAR PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY
Graziadio THAISE
The current process of changes in the automotive industry is driven by an old and
very well known desire - to increase profits. The novelty, if it can be considered as such, is
how to get there and, for some companies, the new road means a different way to define the
automotive business. That is why the car assemblers rethink their role in an attempt to
evaluate and identify those activities (among project, production and distribution) which
really add more value. Modularity is a crossroad point in this context, since it is deeply related
to costs reduction.
Recently most of the assemblers have assimilated, at least partially, a new production
system based on modularity. Basically, it consists of dividing a car into a few modules, like
instrument dashboard, suspension, axles, wheels and tires, interior (or cockpit), fuel system
and steering system, and no more into a very large number of isolated parts. The idea is to
optimize the processes, to reduce the number of activities and to speed the development and
the manufacturing of cars. In this last case, production, dealing with a minor number of parts
simplifies the process, reduces the assembly time and also allows to reduce the direct
suppliers.
But despite being an assembler's decision, the modular system affects not only these
companies, but also the whole supply chain. At least on the first tier suppliers, its impacts are
considerable. From a technological perspective, the first tier suppliers (or module suppliers)
have to deal with a lot of changes because they assume new and more complex
responsibilities like the co-design, the production and the integration of modules and systems
(an outsourcing process). Besides, as module suppliers (and modules are to be delivered in a
just-in-sequence way), they become responsible for managing their whole supply chain,
including the logistics issue.
The strategies being applied by the assemblers in their new modular plants do not
restrict to modularity in production (and sometimes also in design), they involve two other
concepts: the outsourcing of production (and development) of the modules and the proximity
of a few suppliers (that share the site with the assembler). Due to this last aspect, the
assemblers tend to organize the production site as an industrial condominium or a modular
consortium. The three aspects mentioned above, modularity, outsourcing and proximity,
influence the assembler's decisions in the direction of a particular "modular strategy". For
instance, in Brazil, one may find several differences among the modular strategies being
applied by the assemblers in their new plants like GM (Gravatai), Renault (São José dos
Pinhais), daimlerchrysler (Campo Largo), Volkswagen (Resende), VW-Audi (São José dos
Pinhais) and the oncoming Ford's plant in Camaçari.
33
Taking the Brazilian experience as a perspective, this paper discuss the probable
effects of the modular system in terms of technological changes for the whole supply chain.
Three main dimensions of technology are taken into consideration: product, production
process and inter-firms relation. The idea is to understand at what extent does modularity
impact the supply chain, keeping the focus on the first and the second tiers. A conceptual
review is made to design a preliminary framework of analyses, which is then discussed and
complemented with the observation of the suppliers routine in Brazil.
34
TECHNOLOGICAL PRACTICES IN THE EUROPEAN AUTO INDUSTRY:
EXPLORING CASES FROM BELGIUM, GERMANY AND PORTUGAL
António BRANDÃO MONIZ, Bettina-Johanna KRINGS,
Geert Van HOOTEGEM, HUYS Rik
This paper refers to the relation between work organisation and technological practices
in auto industry.
The concept of “technological practice” in this sector is used to describe the specific
ways of embedding information and communication technology applications into the
organizational forms and cultural patterns. This concept was developed with the Sowing
project (TSER, DG XII) that analysed the process of such practices held in different intra- and
inter-organizational fields. In this case, we will mention only the auto industry, and only in
three European countries. The approach included either the shop floor co-operation up to the
regionally based networks of companies and supporting institutions. The research focused
also how the emerging technological practices within companies were influenced by and how
they exercise influence over the institutions of regional and national environments.
Thus, in this paper we will mention different sectors in the firms of different countries
(Germany, Belgium and Portugal): shopfloor and production lines, design and management
and the local inter-relationships.
The production logic of VCG (Belgium) and autoeuropa (Portugal) still shows some
characteristics of Fordism, such as its traditional belt-driven assembly line and production
jobs containing mainly short-cycle tasks. On other hand, the team concept is implemented and
supported by intensive rotation-schemes. At Daimler Benz the analysis was done specifically
to the design sector. The VW group factory in Portugal revealed an interesting dimension, and
that is the specificity of the local network of institutions and firms that developed new forms
of co-operation with evident regional impact.
A turning point in the evolution of the companies organizational culture can
nonetheless be made out. The Daimler-Benz group had been active on the global level much
earlier than the merger with Chrysler, but executive functions were – culturally and
organizationally – still strogly imbdded in regional and national structures. This, however,
seems to have come to an end with the merger with Chrysler. Information technologies,
however, can’t be held responsible (in the sense of giving the impulse) for these various
transformations, but are rather to be seen as technologies which support this process, and
make it technically feasible.
So, in this paper, it will be underlined some evidencies of the importance and different
alternatives in terms of technological practices for the same sector. Much of the litterature try
35
to disseminate an idea of a single (and optimum) organisational model for the same type of
product. And here, even with the same type of technology, and of product (medium-high
range), one can find different models, different cultures, different ways of organising the
industrial structure (firms, regional institutions, R&D centres) in the same sector (auto
industry).
36
37
Session 6. Activités immatérielles / Immateriel Activities
SYSTEMES D'UTILISATION, SYSTEMES DE PRODUCTION ET DE
PRESTATION AUTOMOBILES :
DYNAMIQUES ET COHERENCES ECONOMIQUES
Bernard JULLIEN
L’approche en termes de modèles productifs privilégiée au Gerpisa, dans le cadre du
premier programme en particulier, a tenté de construire le lien unissant les stratégies de profit
des firmes et les modes de croissance et de distribution du revenu national. Très centrée sur
les composantes amont du système automobile, elle a reposé sur une hypothèse implicite qui
tend à considérer que les marchés automobiles étaient les marchés de véhicules neufs et que
les acteurs du système étaient principalement les constructeurs et les équipementiers.
Le regain d’intérêt pour les services automobiles ou pour les marchés de véhicules
d’occasion que l’on constate aux Etats Unis comme en Europe depuis plus de cinq ans chez
les constructeurs qui s’est en outre traduit par un certain nombre de décisions d’acquisition ou
d’investissement conduit à interroger cette hypothèse. On peut ainsi s’intéresser aux dépenses
automobiles de différentes catégories de ménages et à évaluer la part que les constructeurs
parviennent à capter. Du constat de la relative marginalité des constructeurs dans les systèmes
d’utilisation automobile naît alors une attention accrue à d’autres producteurs ou prestataires,
une vision renouvelée du système automobile et un réexamen du lien entre les stratégies de
profit des uns et des autres et les modes de distribution des revenus. Les questions fiscales et
réglementaires se présentent alors sous un autre jour. La pertinence des stratégies
d’acquisition, d’alliance, d’investissement ou de désinvestissement également.
38
DE L’IMPORTANCE DE LA VENTE ET DU SERVICE APRÉS-VENTE
DANS L’INDUSTRIE AUTOMOBILE BRÉSILIENNE: ETUDE SUR LA
FIDÉLISATION DE MARQUE, LA FORMATION ET LA
QUALIFICATION DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES
Maria Teresa COUTINHO, Lidia Micaela SEGRE
Au Brésil, l’ouverture du marché, la stabilisation de la monnaie et la stimulation de la
competitivité favorisent l’augmentation de la diversité des biens et des services, tout en
augmentant le pouvoir de choix des clients / consommateurs / citoyens, ceux-ci devenant
chaque fois plus exigeants. Cet état de fait, incontestablement influence la reformulation du
concept de stratégie d’entreprise des organisations. C’est donc dans ce scénario que les
fabricants brésiliens commencent à repenser leur mission, ainsi que celle de leur réseau de
concessionnaires agréés.
Les fabricants sont chaque fois plus soucieux de répondre aux besoins de leurs clients.
C’est pour cela qu’ils recherchent leur différence compétitive au niveau de l’offre des
services. Dans la bataille de conquête et d’expansion du marché du secteur automobile, leur
préoccupation pour la qualité des produits va jusqu’à l’accueil des clients, et devient un aspect
qui dépend principalement des concessionnaires agréés.
C’est dans ce contexte que le rôle stratégique des concessionnaires, dans le processus
de fidélisation de marque obligent les fabricants à repenser ses relations avec son réseau
officiel. L’investissement dans l’entretien et l’accueil au client est devenu “priorité des
priorités “. Une bonne voiture autant qu’elle le soit, ne garantit pas la fidélité du client. La
quête de la meilleure confiabilité prévoit, outre les attributs du véhicule et ses innovations
technologiques, la qualité des services offerts par les concessionnaires: entretien, reception du
client, respect des délais de livraison etc. Le plus grand défi, tant pour les concessionnaires
que pour les fabricants, est de garantir le perfectionnement continue des professionnels qui
assurent ces services.
Dans ce processus de fidélisation de la clientèle, les prestataires de services des
concessionnaires agréés d’automobile, vente( distribution) et service aprés-vente( entretien ) ,
sont le principal foyer pour cette mission. Des études de cas des réseaux de concessionnaires
de deux fabricants ont été réalisées dans l’état de Rio de Janeiro, un installé depuis les années
50 dans l’état de São Paulo( brownfield ), l’autre récemment implanté en dehors de cette
région( greenfield ).
L ‘analyse sera effectuée considerant de façon integrée et interdépendante, les
politiques de Ressources Humaines adoptées par les concessionnaires et les fabricants em
relation à leurs professionnels, afim de pouvoir répondre aux besoins croissants des clients vis
39
à vis des services incorporés aux véhicules , chaque fois plus complexes vues les avancées
technologiques du secteur. Aussi, sera considéré ce que ces prestataires de services doivent
savoir, être et faire, pour garantir la qualité des services offerts par les concessionnaires
agréés et pour conquérir et maintenir la fidélité des clients. L ‘étude tend a connâitre et
analyser les outils et les programmes de selection, de formation et de qualification des
professionnels de vente et de services aprés-vente pour les fabricants et les concessionnaires.
De plus nous analysons les instituts de formation professionnelle extra-entreprise qui
fournissent les cours pour les fonctionnaires de ces services, en relation à la forme et au
contenu.
La contribution de cette étude , pour le secteur automobile, se justifie par
l’amplification du débat sur les services offerts par les concessionnaires et sur le
comportement commercial des profissionnels la vente et de l’entretien dans le processus de
fidélisation de marque , identifiant les ambivalences et ambiguitées présentes dans le
relationnement entre les acteurs concernés. Ainsi, ressortent non seulement les avantages des
politiques de RH adoptées par les concessionnaires mais aussi, l’importance des stratégies de
marketing, principalement celles de communication, en temps que “differentiel compétitif”
des fabricants.
Références
BERRY, Leonard, L. & PARASURAMAN, A. Serviço de Marketing: competindo através da
Qualidade, São Paulo, Maltese, 1995.
FITZSIMMONS J.A. & FITZSIMMONS M. J. Administração de Serviços: operações,
estratégias e tecnologia de informação. Porto Alegre:Bookman. 2000.
HAMEL, G & PRAHALAD, C. K. Competindo pelo Futuro: Estratégias inovadoras para
obter o controle do seu setor e criar os mercados de amanhã. SP: Campus, 1995.
LOOY, Bart Van, DIERDONCK, R. V. & GEMMEL, Paul. Services Management na
Integrated Approach, Financial Times,Pitman Publishing,1999.
MACHURET, Jean-Jacques, DELOCHE, D. & D’AMART, J. C.Comerciator: Teoria e
Prática da via da qualidade nos sistemas de vendas. Lisboa:Publicações Dom
Quixote. 1999.
TÉBOUL, James. A era dos Serviços: uma nova abordagem de gerenciamento. Rio de
Janeiro, Qualitymark Editora Ltda, 1999.
ZARAFIAN, P. Organization qualifiante et capacité de prise de décision dans líndustrie.
Paris, 1993, (Mimeo).
_____________ Mutação dos sistemas produtivos e competências profissionais: a produção
industrial de serviço: Intervenção durante o seminário “Reestruturação Produtiva,
flexibilidade do trabalho e novas competências profissionais”. COPPE/UFRJ, Rio de
Janeiro, 24 de agosto de 1998 (Mimeo). Dezembro de 1999.
40
LES STRATEGIES DE MARQUES ET
LA RECONFIGURATION DE L'INDUSTRIE AUTOMOBILE
Elaine NORBERTO1
Le thème que propose le GERPISA pour son 9ème Colloque est le processus de
reconfiguration de l’industrie automobile en cours, en insistant sur ses enjeux et sur les
stratégies des firmes à l'œuvre. Nous développons actuellement, à l’Université Fédérale de
Bahia2, une recherche auprès de consommateurs qui porte sur le comportement d’achat
d’automobiles et en particulier sur l'importance de "l’image de marque" dans leurs décisions.
La compréhension du rôle de la marque dans le choix du consommateur va bien au-delà d'une
dichotomie entre “bonne” et “mauvaise” image : une marque recouvre un champ de
significations imaginaires à partir duquel se créent des identifications (plus ou moins)
durables et profondes de la part de catégories particulières d’acheteurs – et qui agissent sur
son comportement d’achat. C’est par cet angle d'attaque - la "réception" de l’automobile par
les consommateurs - que nous souhaitons contribuer à la réflexion sur le thème proposé.
Cet angle n'est certes pas très usuel pour discuter d'un tel thème3. Il conduit à
s'interroger sur la constitution et la gestion de l’identité et l’image de marque par les
constructeurs, thème qui n’est pas explicité dans les axes du programme (l’axe intitulé “les
activités immatérielles”, auquel nous croyons pouvoir rattacher une réflexion qui porte sur la
"production symbolique", ne fait référence qu'à des activités d'un ordre bien différent telles
que la distribution, la sphère financière, ou les usages sociaux de l’automobile).
Certes, les questions concernant le rôle des marques dans les stratégies d’acquisition /
fusion / alliances, etc. Ne sont pas absentes des préoccupations du GERPISA. Ainsi Jetin
(2000) a montré que la stratégie de FORD en Europe a consisté a privilégier les acquisitions
de marques possédant une forte identité (intitulées “Premier Automobiles”) ; du coup elle se
répercute sur sa stratégie de profit, car ces marques concurrencent les produits FORD "haut de
gamme" et, en conséquence, les produits FORD les plus vendus en Europe sont ceux de "bas
de gamme", avec une rentabilité plus faible. Dans cet exemple, les marques sont bien un des
enjeux de la stratégie de reconfiguration.
1
Université Fédérale de Bahia, Brésil.
Avec l’appui du CNPq.
3
A notre avis cela tient, en partie, aux processus de spécialisation disciplinaire en sciences sociales
mais, surtout, à une attitude méthodologique très fréquente qui consiste à privilégier soit le pôle de la production,
soit (plus rarement au Gerpisa) celui de la consommation, en négligeant, sauf comme une question de "bouclage
macro", les processus, nécessairement dynamiques, d'interaction et d'ajustement de ces deux pôles, processus qui
constituent pourtant l'une des composantes importantes de l'activité et des réflexions stratégiques des firmes
automobile.
2
41
De même, s'interrogeant cette fois sur la stratégie d’externalisation de FORD1, Jetin
admet que “toute la difficulté de l’analyse (est) de savoir jusqu’où Ford peut aller sans
remettre en cause son identité.”(Idem, p.76).Si cette question de la relation entre degré
d’externalisation de la production et identité a une pertinence et une actualité indiscutables
dans le processus actuel de redéfinition de leurs champs d'activité, c'est bien que le produit,
pour être vendu sur le marché, doit avoir une identité et que c’est précisément cette identité
qui reste gérée par le constructeur. Et si le produit est un produit FORD, la "marque FORD"
est une composante essentielle de ce produit et c’est la "corporation FORD" qui doit gérer
l’identité de ce produit, de sa marque ainsi que l’identité de chacune des marques qu’elle
possède.
Notre hypothèse est que, à mesure que les constructeurs sont tentés d'externaliser
la production matérielle du produit automobile, s’accroît leur rôle dans la
conceptualisation et la gestion de l’identité et de l’image des marques. Cette activité
essentielle est, a notre avis, négligée par les analyses qui cherchent à cerner le processus
de recentrement des constructeurs dans leur métier de base, démontrant ainsi une certaine
myopie sur l’ampleur des “activités immatérielles”, reconnues surtout sous l'angle de la
financiarisation et des services.
Les politiques d’acquisition, fusion, alliances...permettent la mise en commun de
nombreux éléments, depuis les plate-formes jusqu'aux compétences technologiques, et aux
réseaux de distribution. Se pose alors la question de la mise en commun des territoires
imaginaires que constituent les marques elles-mêmes. Est-elle possible, sous quelles formes et
dans quelle mesure ? Quels en sont les risques (redondances et cannibalisation, par exemple)
et les potentialités (enrichissement et complémentarité des champs imaginaires, par exemple)?
Quel stratégie adopter pour arriver à l'optimisation d'un bouquet de marques sous le contrôle
d'un même groupe ? Dans ce panorama mouvant de reconfiguration de l’industrie, c'est de
telles questions que les stratégies des constructeurs doivent prendre en compte et qu'il nous
paraît intéressant d'étudier.
Ainsi c’est à la compréhension du rôle des marques dans le processus de
reconfiguration du secteur et à l'analyse de ses conséquences sur la redéfinition des activités et
compétences des firmes automobiles que s'attachera notre contribution au 9ème Colloque.
D'abord nous présenterons, à partir d’un corpus empirique constitué par des récits
d’achat d’un carro popular 2, une réflexion sur l’importance de (1) l’image des marques et (2)
des services – d’entretien mais aussi de vente – dans le processus de décision d’achat ; cette
analyse nous montrera aussi l’importance des services dans la constitution d’image de
marque.
Ensuite nous présenterons les résultats relatifs à l’image de marque des constructeurs
qui concourent sur le segment des carros populares, et son impact sur leurs parts de marché
(par comparaison avec les prix des voitures des différents constructeurs / marques sur le
segment en question). Notre objectif est discuter l'hypothèse selon laquelle le concept d'image
de marque est essentiel pour comprendre la réussite de VW (qui dispute avec FIAT la place
1
2
Bahia.
C'est à propos du Projet Amazon, en cours d’implantation à Bahia (Brésil).
Recueillis lors d’entretiens semidirectifs approfondis entre janvier 1999 et mai 2000 à Salvador de
42
de leader), avec des prix plus élevés pour ses produits – à l’égalité d’équipements en série –
que ceux de ses concurrents.
Enfin, nous développerons une réflexion plus conceptuelle – en nous appuyant sur des
fondements théoriques de l’anthropologie – sur la nature du travail des constructeurs pour
gérer l’identité des marques (SAHLINS, 1980 ), ce territoire imaginaire qui se nourrit
d'expériences socialisées de leurs produits, c’est-à-dire d'une dimension matérielle, mais qui
se nourrit aussi d’une production proprement immatérielle - de représentations imaginaires de
la société (CASTORIADIS, 1975).
Références
CASTORIADIS, C. (1975), l’institution imaginaire de la société, Paris, Ed. Du Seuil.
JETIN, B. (2000)“A América Latina e o Brasil nas Estratégias de Internalisação das firmas
automobilísticas”. Nexos Econômicos, CME-ufba, V. II – Nº I (p. 63-77).
NORBERTO, E. (1998) La différenciation Innovatrice: une réflexion sur les changements
conjoints des caractéristiques du produit et des préférences de la clientèle. Thèse de
doctorat, Université Paris-Dauphine.
NORBERTO, E. (2000) “Comportamento do Consumidor : processo de decisão de compra de
carros populares”. Nexos Econômicos, CME-ufba, V. II – Nº I (p. 53-70).
SAHLINS, M. (1980), Au cœur des sociétés (Raison utilitaire et raison culturelle), Paris,
Gallimard.
43
Session 7. Fusions et acquisitions dans l’automobile / M&A in the Car
Industry
THE TNC AS A TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL COMPLEX
RESEARCH QUESTIONS STEMMING FROM DAIMLERCHRYSLER
AND BMW-ROVER DEALS
Holm-Detlev KÖHLER
In spite of the differences, particularly the spectacular failure of the BMW-Rover
merger, there are some common problems and developments of the automobile firms in their
attempts to internationalize by mergers and acquisitions which can be studied in both cases,
the daimlerchrysler merger and the Rover takeover by BMW.
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
The growing pressure of the stock markets and shareholders
Cultural Clashes
Management rotation and firm stability
Neither productivity nor labour, but terms of trade (money) matters
Trade Unions and local community: what can they do?
As a general hypothesis the paper defends that all these trends have to be analised in a
theoretical framework which sees the firm as a transnational political complex. All decisions
are embedded in political struggles with a very low presence of economic rationality. The
internationalisation by M&A increases to a high extend the political complexity of the firm
recomponing the actor relations and creating severe governance problems at all levels.
Globalisation, from this angle, appears as a specific politisation of firms.
44
CULTURE MATTERS.
THE VW-SKODA MERGER
Gert SCHMIDT, Ilja SRUBAR, JUNG A, KLEMM Matthias, SIMEUNOVIC V,
Starting from the assumption that mergers and joint ventures of automobile companies
across cultural boundaries are dependent on the ability to create a working consensus to
overcome intercultural communication and information blockades, we are trying to identify
the intended (reflexive management) and unintended (everyday interaction) mechanisms of
coping with “contested terrain” in the obviously successful case of the VW-SKODA merger.
For the present our findings indicate on the one hand a strong (technically based) SKODA
corporate culture backing and enduring motivation of the SKODA employees and the
acceptance of a temporary asymmetry regarding the association with WOLKSWAGEN in
technical, economic and social terms. On the other hand the management-semantics studies
reflect the success of SKODA that resulted in a remarkable qualitative shift regarding the
merger-process VW-SKODA moving SKODA into the position of a fully accepted member
of the VOLKSWAGEN-GROUP, side by side with AUDI and SEAT.
45
REGARD DE L’HISTOIRE :
LE CAS PEUGEOT - CITROËN - TALBOT
Jean-Louis LOUBET
Au cours de l’entre-deux-chocs pétroliers, Peugeot SA (PSA) est devenu un
constructeur multimarques en reprenant successivement Citroën (1976) et les filiales
européennes de Chrysler (1978), rebaptisées Talbot (1979). Cette stratégie ressemble à n’en
point douter à la constitution d’une General Motors à la française. C’est aussi la
concrétisation d’une politique de volumes permettant à PSA de devenir en 1978 le premier
constructeur automobile européen.
Cette stratégie de croissance externe ne doit pourtant pas se limiter à cette seule vision.
D’autres éléments sont à prendre en compte pour apprécier à sa juste valeur un tel
changement de dimension, notamment ceux touchant l’industrie, le commerce, l’international
et même la politique. Avec deux, puis trois marques différentes, PSA imagine en 1976 la
création d’une banque d’organes, construite autour d’usines modernisées, mais surtout de
moteurs et de boîtes de vitesses entièrement nouveaux pour une meilleure adaptation aux
nouvelles conditions industrielles et automobiles. Dans cette même logique, le Président de
PSA (Jean-Paul Parayre) engage en 1981 une politique dite de plates-formes afin de réduire le
coût de modèles dont les différenciations commerciales sont rigoureusement délimitées entre
Peugeot, Citroën et Talbot. L’aspect commercial se dessine donc clairement ; il se renforce
encore avec l’internationalisation du groupe bâtie sur un partage des marchés mondiaux, puis
sur un accès – grâce à Talbot – à de nouvelles positions à l’étranger.
Le rachat des filiales de Chrysler a de nombreuses significations : outre la présence de
PSA en Europe du nord ou le renforcement des positions en Espagne et en Iran, l’éventualité
d’une très large collaboration avec Chrysler Corporation est engagée dès 1980 : entrée de
PSA sur le marché nord-américain, la production de composants mécaniques pour Chrysler
ou encore la fabrication commune d’un petit véhicule sont les projets que seul un groupe
mondial peut envisager. Pour s’en donner les moyens, PSA vient financièrement au secours
de Chrysler Corporation, non seulement en lui rachetant ses filiales européennes, mais en lui
apportant aussi des crédits nécessaires à sa survie. L’union entre les deux groupes est réelle :
l’Américain n’est-il pas devenu en 1978 le deuxième actionnaire stable de PSA ? C’est là que
cette stratégie d’union prend plus nettement la dimension politique dessinée dès 1976 : la
naissance du grand PSA correspond tour à tour au rééquilibrage dans la construction
automobile française, du secteur privé face au secteur public, à sa consolidation ensuite, avant
d’être l’un des éléments de son éventuelle survie.
Si vingt ans plus tard PSA ne compte plus que deux marques automobiles, il serait
maladroit de réduire aujourd’hui cette politique de concentration à un simple échec. Ce serait
oublier le contexte de l’époque et occulter plusieurs regards novateurs sur l’entreprise.
46
47
Session 8. Analyse des relations productives / Analysis of Productive relations
INTRA AND INTER-FIRM ADAPTATION BEHAVIOURS IN SUPPLIERS
ENVIRONMENTSCOMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES IN UK,
GERMANY AND PORTUGAL
José Ferro CAMACHO
The paper provides a exploratory analysis of data collected by the ongoing project
CASES - Compare Change in Automotive Suppliers environments.
Resulting from the collaboration among INTELI – Intelligence in Innovation (Lisbon),
CENTRIM - Centre for Research in Innovation Management (Brighton) and fhg ISI Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (Karlsruhe).
Supplier firms adjust their strategy, organisation, competences and offer inserted in an
environment determined by the business strategies of the specific carmakers to which they
supply, directly or indirectly, products and services. New focal points are emerging in
suppliers’ networks around global large modules integrators and systems suppliers, as a result
of spin-offs and intense consolidation activity.
In a set of possible configurations, firm’s successful evolutions show some coherence
to local factors where they run their operations. This hybridisation mechanism combines
national and regional embeddeness of industrial practice with transferability of practices.
Although these are the major trends as reported in previous studies and publicly stated
in companies’ goals, reality diverge and show some conflicts, due to the difficulties observed
in the implementation of the strategies, the dynamic adjustment between agents within the
business environment, the national and regional differences and ownership. Preliminary
interviews have shown divergent behaviours between supplier network environments of US
and EU carmakers, including some withdrawing from the previous outsourcing of complete
modules and systems, with the reinforcement of some medium size players’ role.
The comparative case study research strategy was chosen to address, mainly, the
“what”, “how” and “why” forms of questions subject to research, in order to explore and
explain. This seems to be the best way to deal with the complexity of the interactions between
actors and to search for contrasting results emerging from the influence of national and
industry factors.
Learning, innovation and cooperation are adjustment behaviours of firms driven by the
search for a better performance, which is the necessary condition for the survival and future
development of the firm subject to changing competitive pressures.
48
The search is specific of each firm and arises from the dynamics of the interaction
between the organisation and its environment. The changes of the organisational
competences, mechanisms and structure and the emergence of new, but bounded,
representations of the environment and its agents are the results of this search.
These changes at firm level are embedded in a network environment. The evolution of
the inter-organisational network structure results from an evolutionary dynamics in which
changes in firms and structure are inter-related, although subject to the overall driving forces
resulting from the integration in the industry evolving context and the action of national
specific factors.
The production of inter-organisational networks is driven by a dynamic process
involving both exogenous dependencies that prompt organisations to seek cooperation and an
endogenous embeddedness dynamic in which emerging network processes progressively
orients the choice of partners and their behaviour.
In this setting, innovation is a process, from which new knowledge, not previously
available, emerges, and new routines may be developed, including those on how to learn. In
this sense, the innovation process may be characterised as a problem-solving activity, specific
of a context and related to particular actors; interactive, eliminating the false contradiction
between pull and push views and introducing time as an extremely important factor; a
cumulative process, like the learning effects, but also the relational aspects of trust and
opportunism and a non-maximising process, due to bounded rationality and information costs
introducing
routines and heuristic behaviours as the normal mechanisms, instead of
optimisation procedures.
The economic interfirm contract is incomplete by nature like any formal device in
organisational life. This means that there are informal contracts, social interpersonal and
institutional relationships that complete the terms of the economic contract and make possible
its implementation. In the case of the automotive industry, the implementation of the just-intime system and lean production model, as well as the reduction of the time-to-market have
increased the interfirm dependency. It is at informal levels that flexibility is re-introduced in
order to make possible the functioning of the whole system.
In this sense, the project addresses several levels of formal and informal commitments
and operations among firms, as well as changes in internal processes and competences, at
supplier and client sides.
49
ANALYSIS OF MANUFACTURER CONTROL OVER SUPPLIERS
IN BRAZIL’S TRUCK INDUSTRY
Mário Sacomano NETO, Oswaldo Mário SERRA TRUZZI
Many innovative organizational arrangements have been made in recent years in
Brazil’s automotive industry, among them the modular consortium, modular system,
industrial condominium and industrial village. These new flexible forms of production have
placed Brazil in the international circle of discussion regarding organizational models. The
objective of this paper is to present a methodology to analyze the capacity of automakers to
exert control over the Brazilian suppliers. This paper aims to formulate a model of
intermediation between groups of interest (truck makers and their suppliers). The capacity to
exert control is understood as the resources of power that can regulate the exchanges that
occur between different actors, such as technological, informational, financial and
organizational resources. The purpose of this analysis is to gain a better understanding of the
recent changes in the relationships between manufacturers and suppliers in the truck industry,
investigating how the resources of power work to regulate the exchange between different
actors (truck makers and their suppliers). This analysis contributes with a reference model to
understand the capacity of manufacturers to exert control over their suppliers related with
technological, informational, financial and organizational issues. To develop this analysis, a
study was made of two truck manufacturers and their relationships with their suppliers. One
of the plants, which operates under the modular consortium system, belongs to Volkswagen
and is located in Resende, RJ, Brazil. In the modular consortium, the design and production
processes are divided into subsystems or modules, with the suppliers’ employees working
directly in the automaker’s facilities, assembling the subsystems into the end product. The
level of outsourcing and partnership is very high. The second manufacturer, Mercedes Benz,
located in São Bernardo do Campo, SP, Brazil, operates in the traditional chain, which
consists of fairly verticalized automakers with few supplier-produced subsystems; therefore,
very low levels of outsourcing and partnership. The fundamental difference between these
two manufacturers is vertical integration. A comparative study between vertical and
horizontal structures leads to contemporary reflections about a company’s limits and its
relationship with its suppliers. Therefore, this comparative study of different forms of
capacity to exert control calls for studies on the following subjects: how relationships between
truck manufacturers and autoparts suppliers are developed and maintained; different forms of
control (internal and external); intra- and extra-company mechanisms of governance;
asymmetric power and governance inseparability; and the localization, diffusion and
evolution of organizational models.
50
INDUSTRIAL RENEWAL AND INTER-FIRM RELATIONS IN THE
SUPPLY CHAIN OF THE BRAZILIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
Anne Caroline POSTHUMA1
Introduction
Far-reaching transformations took place throughout the global automotive industry
during the nineties, as the final assemblers of motor vehicles diffused technological and
organisational changes throughout their production chains. As these new production practices
reach into developing country markets, and in particular throughout the Latin American
automotive industry, it is important to understand the implications that this raises for
industrial organisation, the basis for continued technological development in these countries
and the scope for competitive insertion in international and regional markets. One of the keys
to understanding the extent of these transformations is to examine changes in inter-firm
relations, between the automotive assemblers and their suppliers of components.
It is particularly relevant to examine the Brazilian automotive industry in this context.
The nineties was a decade of enormous change, where market liberalisation exposed this
formerly protected industry to international competition.
The delayed process of
liberalisation had placed Brazilian producers against a double-impact: exposure to
international competition and the need to undertake industrial restructuring which most
companies in the industrialised countries had already confronted in the eighties. The pace of
change was been rapid, and involved both the shedding of workers and of auto parts firms in
the process. At this stage, the result is a leaner and more productive industry, which
manufactures higher-quality and lower-cost vehicles. However, the impact in terms of
employment consequences - both the scale of jobs generated by this industry, as well as the
quality of workng conditions - indicate that these transformations are a mixed blessing for
workers.
Macroeconomic stabilisation under the Plano Real made Brazil a more attractive
investment site and the country enjoyed significant new investments in automotive plants and
1
The author is Senior Specialist for Small Enterprise Development in the In-Focus Programme/Small
EnterprisE Development (IFP/SEED). The research findings presented in this report were developed as part of
the project "Industrial Restructuring, Innovation and International Competitiveness in Latin America" (phase 2)
(CAN/97/525) at the Economic Comission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Special thanks are
due to Jorge Katz, Director of the Division of Productive and Business Development in ECLAC and the
coordinator of this project, for his comments on this text, as well as authorisation for publication in its entirety.
The views expressed in this report are solely the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the ILO or its constituents.
51
equipment during the mid-nineties. Despite fears of over-capacity, which was already evident
in the industrialised countries, numerous new entrants continued to construct new factories,
often with the assistance of generous state incentives. The conditions that undermined
macroeconomic stability in early 1999 may force companies to re-examine their investment
plans and the process of expanding output.
At the plant level, the diffusion of new manufacturing practices has been significant.
Parts firms have continued to introduce organisational changes to increase product quality,
price and customer delivery, much as they did at the start of the 1990s. The research findings
presented in this document reveal that the modernisation process has deepened and has
involved new diffusion of technological change, especially in the case of parts firms that have
been acquired by multinational producers.
In terms of inter-firm relations, the Brazilian auto parts industry has been transformed
almost beyond recognition from its composition and behaviour ten years ago. The shake-out
and denationalisation of this industry has resulted in a few leading first-tier firms, which are
affiliated with major multinational components producers. The new standards being imposed
by the assemblers is creating a nexus of first-tier firms which are capable of acting as modular
suppliers. This model of higher-quality and lower-cost production is being diffused
throughout the automotive production chain, but in varying degrees, depending upon the type
of product produced.
This report analyses the transformations in the Brazilian automotive industry and
changes in inter-firm relationships by examining these changes in three production chains:
brake systems; car seats; and exhaust pipes. The findings reveal that all production chains
share common trends in terms of closer relationships between assemblers and their first-tier
suppliers that produce systems or modules. These tighter inter-firm relations help to diffuse
modern manufacturing practices and quality programmes down the production chain.
However, differences were identified between different first-tier firms on the basis of their
product type, technological sophistication and relationship with the multinational parent
company.
It will be seen that the modernisation of this industry in Brazil and its insertion into
globalized production patterns has involved an upgrading of firm practices, but in a form
which has exposed this formerly protected national industry to the vulnerabilities of local
market fluctuations, as well as the consequences of decisions based upon the global
competitive strategies of the multinational parent companies.
The study begins with a brief overview of the Brazilian motor vehicle industry,
followed by a mini case study of General Motors do Brasil (GMB) and its supply chain
relationships.
It then looks in-depth at:
1. A high tech manufacturer of braking systems which was, until recently, familyowned and even out competed a local multinational subsidiary located in Brazil. A
successful licensing agreement resulted, however, in it being bought by a British
company, now making it a subsidiary of a multinational.
52
2. A low tech exhaust pipe manufacturer was part of a Brazilian conglomerate until it
was bought by an Italian company to supply the Brazilian and Argentinian
markets.
3. In contrast, the car seat manufacture is a recently established subsidiary of an
American producer and thereby provides an interesting counter weight to the first
two, both in terms of products and production techniques.
Implications for human resource development, training, skill requirements and the
reactions of trade unions are examined.
53
Session 9. Activités immatérielle : e-commerce / Immateriel Activities : EBusiness
D’UN MARKETING A L’AUTRE :
LES EVOLUTIONS DE LA DISTRIBUTION AUTOMOBILE
AUX ETATS-UNIS
Guy CORNETTE, Suzanne PONTIER
L’article a la volonté de situer l’évolution de la distribution automobile aux EtatsUnis, à travers le prisme des deux approches traditionnellement opposées en marketing :
approche relationnelle versus approche transactionnelle.
Après avoir montré que l’approche transactionnelle a longtemps dominé ce marché, il
présente le contenu de l’approche relationnelle imposée aux constructeurs américains par
l’arrivée de concurrents étrangers. Il s’attache ensuite à montrer les différentes évolutions
physiques et géographiques de la distribution automobile ainsi que les mutations de la relation
marketing inhérentes. Enfin, l’apparition du commerce électronique est prise en compte et
décrite à travers ses diverses tentatives d‘introduction dans le panorama de la distribution
automobile américaine. Une première analyse cherche à apprécier dans quelle mesure
l’introduction de la vente en ligne permet de faire cohabiter les deux approches afin de mieux
répondre aux attentes du consommateur.
Mots clés : Marketing transactionnel - Marketing relationnel- E. Commerce. Secteur
Automobile
54
RELATIONSHIP MARKETING VERSUS TRANSACTIONAL
MARKETING : THE EVOLUTION
OF CAR DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS IN THE US
Guy CORNETTE, Suzanne PONTIER
The article aims at situating the evolution of the U.S automobile market seen from the
dual vision of traditionally antagonist approaches in marketing : transaction marketing vs
relationship marketing.
After showing that this market has for a long time been transactional, it develops the
contents of the relational approach imposed onto the American car manufacturers by their
foreign competitors. It then tries to show how, through its physical and geographical
evolutions the automobile distribution has modified its marketing relationship to the
customer. Last but not least, e-commerce is taken into account and described through its
various attempts at entering the car market in the US. A first analysis tries to assess to what
extent on-line selling is going to enable both marketing approaches to be used in order to
better meet customers’ expectations.
Keywords : transactional marketing – relationship marketing – e-commerce – automobile
sector
55
CUSTOMIZATION EFFECTS OF E-SUPPLY CHAIN DESIGN
RELATED TO THE B2B AT THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
Ki-Chan KIM
3D concurrent engineering, integrated product, process and supply chain , has pursued
3 core competitiveness : product competitiveness, price competitiveness and time
competitiveness. Especially, product and price competitiveness have been accomplished by
efficient SCD. Price competitiveness have been accomplished by responsive SCD.
However, no longer do they focus on producing standardized products or services for
homogeneous markets (Pine,1993).As the feedback loop is reinforced, the niche markets
become smaller: They begin reaching down closer to the "individual. "Greater and greater
variety" blends into "more and more customized" The more a company can deliver
customized goods on a mass basis, relative to their competition, the greater is their
competitive advantage.
So, they have found their way to a new paradigm by creating customization through
3D concurrent engineering methods. Customization is the process in which it confirms the
needs of the final customers and fulfills them. For this purpose, 3D concurrent engineering
builds the high speed communication inpra among companies inside the supply chain based
on the information technology and the shared information. Pine (1993) noted that it is
important as a competition form to have the active participation of many companies to
practice customization, and that for this, individual companies can not develop if they are
isolated. So, the mass customization can only be accomplished through actively participating
not only the employees, suppliers, circulation company, and retailers, but also the final
customers in the process of confirming the needs and fulfilling them. He called this kind of
organization competition form the dynamic extended enterprise. This is promoted through
virtual space. The accomplishments are pursued through the philosophy of the SCD.
For example, this is the B2B2C organization system that is networked based on the
web. This kind of new system allows the ultimate goal of the organizational management
strategy, which is to, fulfill each customers needs at the shortest time and at the lowest cost.
This goal, which seemed to be a dream in a physical world limited by the laws of time and
space, was already realized in the virtual world that can accessed through a window.
The so-called three elements of the core of the organizational competitiveness, the
right time, the right product, and the right price are fulfilled through the virtual world. Dell
Computer shows the competitiveness that exceeds IBM and Compaq by supplying in low
price within five days of customers order through supply chain using information technology.
Toyota, at the international automobile conference that was held in Michigan, US in August
of 1999, announced that it would manufacture the car that a customer orders and supplies it
56
within five days. This shortened the average time of 15 to 20 days that it took in product
shipment by one third through using information system.
This method, which is called the next generation Just-in-Time production system, is
planned to be applied for the first time to the Camry Solara that is being produced in Ontario,
Canada. Nike is also suggesting that it will supply within seven days of receiving individual
customers order. Motorolla said that it is possible to manufacture one of 29 million types of
pagers in 20 minutes and ship it out within one hour of the order.
This kind of cases that are seen as epoch-making accomplishments in customization in
which they fulfill the individual customers specific needs are quickly increasing. In the case
of Toyota, it is forecasted that the inventory will be decreased by over 37 percent and the
manufacturing space can also be decreased by over 28 percent.
In this type of cyber world that is realized through the internet, the product is not
merely thrown to the customer, but rather the mass customization in which the general service
and the use that customer wants is being made according to the order is becoming possible.
In an organizations customization process, the organizational strategy will promote the
SCD strategy for combining a high degree of organizational specialization and value
activities.
57
L'APPORT DES MODELES DE DIFFUSION A L'ECLAIRAGE DES
CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES DU E-COMMERCE
SUR LES RESEAUX DE DISTRIBUTION AUTOMOBILE ET BANCAIRE
Pascal LARBAOUI
L'objet de cet article consiste à montrer que les modèles de diffusion dits de demande
et d'offre, qui ont servi de support à l'organisation passée des réseaux de distribution et au
recours aux masses média pour vanter et informer la clientèle des nouveaux produits
(automobiles, produits financiers), permettent également d'éclairer les impacts économiques
et sociaux de l'utilisation des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication
sur l'organisation et les performances des réseaux de distribution des constructeurs
automobiles et des établissements bancaires et financiers. Après un rappel rapide des
principaux modèles de diffusion de demande et d'offre (I) dont nous glissons les principales
idées ci-dessous, nous attacherons à mettre en parallèle (II) le rôle des agences bancaires et
des concessionnaires dans la diffusion des produits avant de montrer comment l'introduction
des NTIC modifie l'économie des infrastructures de distribution (III).
Les modèles de demande mettent principalement l'attention sur la manière et la vitesse
avec laquelle se diffuse un nouveau véhicule, ces facteurs demeurant une variable clé du
succès de sa commercialisation. Aux travaux initiaux de Fourt et Woodlock (1960) qui
montrent ainsi qu'“à chaque période de temps, on approche de la population potentielle par
une fraction constante de la distance restant à parcourir” vont s'ajouter de nombreux
développements. Coleman (1964) propose ainsi un modèle de diffusion axé sur la
communication externe. Dodd (1953) met en avant la communication interne dans le
processus de diffusion au sein de la population. Le modèle de Bass (1969) constitue une
première synthèse ; la diffusion résulte d'un mécanisme d'imitation (communication interne,
bouche-à-orielle-) et d'un facteur d'innovation (communication externe, mass média). De
nombreuses extensions ont eu lieu à partir du modèle de Bass.
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Tanny et Derzko (1988) suggèrent de diviser la population potentielle en deux
groupes : des innovateurs potentiels et des imitateurs potentiels ;
Horsky et Simon (1983) introduisent le rôle de la publicité ;
Robinson et Lakhani (1975) mettent en avant un paramètre de sensibilité au prix
de l'innovation, tandis que Mahajan et Peterson (1982) supposent que la population
potentielle est fonction du prix de l'innovation ;
Kalish et Lilien (1986) proposent d'intégrer la qualité dans le processus de
diffusion ;
Kalish (1985) insiste sur l'incertitude dans la fonction de diffusion ; la
confrontration de l'information disponible avec son expérience et celles des autres
58
permet à l'adopteur potentiel de déterminer la prix limite qu'il est prêt à payer étant
donné l'incertitude qui pèse sur le produit ; par conséquent, plus l'incertitude est
forte, plus le prix doit être bas ; plus l'incertitude est forte, plus le marché potentiel
est réduit ;
Ø Bass (1980) et Dolan et Jeuland (1981) intègrent le principe de la courbe
d'expérience dans la diffusion du produit, suggérant notamment que le prix doit
être calqué sur le principe de la maximisation du profit.
En parallèle à ces extensions, certains travaux ont porté sur l'introduction de variables
de rejet dans le processus de diffusion. Ces modèles ont pour conséquence de séparer la
population étudiée en trois composantes au moins : ceux qui ont acheté, ceux qui connaissent
son existence, et ceux qui l'ignorent. Ces modèles, nous montrent Dodson et Muller (1978), et
Sharif et Ramanathan (1982) collent un peu plus de la réalité économique et permettent
d'étudier l'impact de différents degrés de nouveauté et de notoriété de l'innovation sur le
comportement de la population cible.
Cependant, ces modèles ne sont pas exempts de défauts : absence de référence aux
produits concurrents, hypothèse d'homogénéité de la population, non prise en compte des
stratégies commerciales des entreprises et plus particulièrement absence des facteurs d'offre.
Les modèles d'offre pourvoient une solution à cette dernière faille des modèles de
demande. En effet, il apparaît vraisemblable que la diffusion réussie d'un nouveau produit ou
d'une nouvelle technologie implique le recours à une infrastructure de distribution. Qu'ils
s'agissent d'agences de diffusion commerciale ou d'institutions publiques ou privées qui
mettent en place des infrastructures de transport ou participent à l'information du public, ces
acteurs supportent le processus de diffusion. Hargerstrand (1952) porte le premier le regard
sur les infrastructures et plus particulièrement sur la dimension spatiale. Il observe notamment
que les processus de communication sont fortement dépendants ou corrélés à l'espace dans
lequel ils prennent forme ; ainsi ces processus et leurs performances diffèrent selon que l'on se
situe à un niveau local, régional ou national (Brown, 1981). L'une ces conséquence de cette
hiérarchisation est que le temps qui sépare le moment de l'apparition d'une innovation dans
une ville i et celui de son apparition dans une ville j sera notamment fonction de la distance
qui sépare les deux villes et du degré de friction de cette distance (Berry,1972). Parallèlement
à cette distance, il n'est pas certain que la firme puisse implantée dans chaque ville une agence
de diffusion ; la localisation de cette dernière peut être notamment fonction de la taille de
population de la ville sous réserve que les perspectives de rentabilité de l'agence soient
positives (Kotler, 1971). Cette diffusion sera d'autant plus rapide qu'un nombre important
d'entrepreneurs ou d'agences sera présent dans chaque ville, contribuant ainsi à augmenter le
stock d'information spécifique à l'innovation distribué (Pederson, 1970). Dans ces processus
de diffusion, la taille de la ville a une grande importance. Brown (1981) suggère notamment
qu'il est fort possible qu'une ville avec une population importante attirera un plus grand
nombre d'entreprises de grande taille. Supposer une hétérogénéité de la population face à
l'innovation permet de mettre en exergue l'influence primordial des infrastructures dans la
diffusion des innovations.
59
Session 10. Fusions et acquisitions dans l’automobile / M&A in the Car
Industry
AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF FIVE AUTOMOTIVE ACQUISITIONS
THE CASES OF: CHRYSLER-AMC, FIAT-ALFA ROMEO, FORDJAGUAR, GM-SAAB, VW-SEAT
Glenn MERCER
In recent years the automotive assembly industry has been captivated by the notions
of globalization (“be everywhere”), economies of scale (“be big”), and consolidation (“be
fewer”). Supposedly, leverage of these concepts would lead OEMs (VMs) to emerge from
the strategic trap they find themselves in (a trap often summed up as “overcapacity + low
growth + minimal price relief + rising costs + cyclical demand = low profits”). By entering
every major market local demand risk would be offset, by growing to enormous size new
economies of scale could be captured, and by reducing the total number of OEMs some
market power might be gained over both suppliers and consumers. To accomplish all this, a
series of major acquisitions would have to take place. At least this is how the rationale was
laid out, although there have been contrarian opinions expressed (e.g. comments on the diseconomies of scale faced by firms such as General Motors, and a realization that for some
vehicle components, maximum economies of scale are reached long before the purchasing
volume of a large OEM is attained). In any case, we have seen a renewed wave of merger and
acquisition (M&A) activity driven by such reasoning, including of course the formation of
DaimlerChrysler, Ford’s purchase of Volvo, and Hyundai’s acquisition of Kia (though note
the counter-example of BMW’s divestiture of Rover).
For many, if not all of these recent actions, it is still too soon to determine if the
economic benefits will turn out to surpass the costs, which include both “hard” financial
factors (such as recovery of the acquisition premium) and “softer” but still critical factors
such as organizational disarray (it is some managers’ rule of thumb that a major acquisition
tends to “lose” the combined company two years of focused effort versus the competition).
Nevertheless, it is important to try to project the final results of these transactions if one is to
advise or analyse the industry competently. Accordingly, I have turned to the more distant
past for insight. By looking at five acquisitions completed some time ago, one can view
results over a longer time horizon and thereby draw conclusions that would not be possible
regarding, for example, Ford-Land Rover. My sample of cases includes intra-American,
intra-European, and trans-Atlantic deals, but is sadly bereft of Asian examples, of which there
are very few (only Nissan-Prince comes to mind in recent memory in Japan).
I did not undertake a rigorous financial or econometric analysis, as I did not have
appropriate data at my disposal to enable such work. What I have done is, in each case,
described the situation (and some of the participants’ motivations), tried to estimate the
60
relative cost of the deal (both at the time of purchase and in the years of investment that
inevitably followed), and then examine the merged entity’s results against its own stated
objectives for the deal.
My conclusions are broadly negative. I believe it is impossible in Net Present Value
terms to conclude that any clear success was attained in more than one out of the five cases –
and the success story occurred under such uniquely favorable conditions that one could hardly
hope for such a lucky “alignment of the stars” again in the future. While this analysis is both
statistically unreliable and extremely unpopular within the industry, for a variety of obvious
reasons, I have not yet seen a rebuttal of the conclusions.
In my presentation I will make additional comments and observations on what this
analysis might mean for the present industry’s situation, although I have not included these
comments in the attached slides, as they are not germane to the specific case studies.
I eagerly await the feedback of GERPISA participants regarding these cases, as
reaction to date has come more from the business community than from the academic world,
and I highly value an economics-based view of my hypotheses.
No bibliography is attached to this document, as source notes where relevant are
included in the attached slides. Also, no secondary research has been used in any case: all
data is primary or from public sources such as the industry press.
61
FUSIONS DANS L’AUTOMOBILE ET POLITIQUE DE PRODUIT :
UNE ANALYSE COMPAREE DES CAS BRITISH-LEYLAND,
FIAT, PSA ET VOLKSWAGEN
Joël BROUSTAIl, Rodolphe GREGGIO
Il paraît possible, à distance de trente-quarante ans du début de ces opérations de
concentration dans l’automobile européenne, d’établir un bilan comparé de la politique de
produit de ces quatre grands groupes, et d’essayer notamment de mieux comprendre leur
degré très inégal de succès industriel et commercial.
Ces quatre grands cas ne représentent pas l’intégralité des fusions et acquisitions
advenues dans l’automobile européenne (cf. Les filiales des grands groupes américains, la
croissance externe récente de BMW et de Daimler-Benz, etc.). Il représentent cependant un
échantillon à la fois représentatif (grande diversité des opérations, prise en compte de tous les
segments du marché, stratégies et bilans contrastés) et cohérent (quatre grands regroupements
à forte dominante nationale, ce qui d‚ailleurs peut à première vue paraître paradoxal dans un
contexte d’ouverture du marché européen, chronologies proches, constructeurs généralistes
s’emparant le plus souvent de marques plus spécialistes).
Si l’on se concentre sur la politique de produit de ces quatre groupes (l’analyse
organisationnelle, qui pourrait faire l’objet d’une autre présentation, ne sera évoquée que de
façon plus succincte mais pourra intervenir en guise de variable explicative), on peut
remarquer que l’enjeu fondamental est généralement le même : comment exploiter les
économies d’échelle, synonymes de rapprochement technologique et susceptibles de dégager
un avantage-coût, tout en garantissant la spécificité de l’image des firmes rachetées et donc
une offre vraiment différenciée entre les différentes marques ?
Si l’on observe les trajectoires, fort différentes, de ces grands groupes, on ne peut
qu’être frappé par leur grande hétérogénéité : effort de rationalisation insuffisant de British
Leyland aboutissant à un échec magistral, économies d’échelle plus poussées chez Fiat avec
au total un résultat nuancé mais en recul relatif sur le long terme, des difficultés pour Peugeot
à intégrer une philosophie du produit aussi atypique que celle de Citroën, et dans ce cas aussi
un bilan mitigé, enfin une trajectoire qui paraît beaucoup plus convaincante dans le cas du
groupe Volkswagen, leader européen et cas le plus international des quatre, qui paraît avoir
mieux marié une politique de synergies technologiques extrêmement poussée et une
spécificité affirmée de ses différentes marques.
Il s’agira à ce point de montrer pourquoi les politiques de produit des uns ont pu être
plus pertinentes que celle des autres, en évoquant les facteurs les plus discriminants. On se
focalisera notamment sur l’évolution d’une part de la politique de gamme (des choix très
62
contrastés ont été effectués, allant du partage strict du marché des années 1970 entre Audi haut de gamme - et Volkswagen - milieu et bas de gamme -, à la répartition a priori plus
subtile, mais peut-être plus risquée, effectuée par Turin - à Fiat la cible populaire, à Lancia
celle bourgeoise, à Alfa celle sportive - ; d’autre part de la politique d’innovation (capacité de
mise en oeuvre d’une véritable stratégie technologique, degré de partage et de transfert entre
les marques de l’innovation...) ; enfin, de la capacité de prendre en compte les facteurs clés de
succès des différentes époques (perfomances, qualité, rapport prix-équipement...).
Il devrait émerger de ces analyses que la réussite d’une stratégie de fusion sur le long
terme provient en particulier de la capacité à combiner un certain nombre de stratégies
génériques, et notamment celles de coût et de différenciation. Que par conséquent, comme le
démontre notamment le cas Volkswagen, il s’agit d’exploiter de la façon la plus systématique
possible les opportunités d’économies d’échelle sur les composants majeurs (plates-formes,
groupes moto-propulseurs), tout en garantissant un positionnement bien distinct pour chaque
marque. Contrairement aux idées reçues, les synergies techniques, à condition d’être menées
de façon avisée, ne sont pas opposées - bien au contraire - à la perpétuation d’une forte
identité des différentes marques, qui dépend avant tout d’une réflexion pertinente de
marketing produit.
63
Session 11. Analyse des relations productives / Analysis of Productive
Relations
TWO WAYS OF MODULARIZATION STRATEGY IN JAPAN
TOYOTA-HONDA VS. NISSAN-MAZDA
Masayoshi IKEDA, Yoichiro NAKAGAWA
Since a few years ago, we assist at a great transformation of the Japanese automobile
industry; one of the most striking experiences was that American and European carmakers
have controlled the majority of the Japanese carmakers. In-between some carmakers that have
recently tightened their international cooperation have begun to switch their strategy of
modularization from the conventional Japanese type to the European type. The international
strategy of American and European carmakers has largely influenced on it.
In our report, by taking Nissan and Mazda’s cases, we will try to make clear how some
Japanese carmakers pursue the European style modularization in Japan. This will be clarified
in the following five points:
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
In what form the modularization does it take place in assembly factories of
carmakers?
How do carmakers select and choose module suppliers? And what measures do
they adopt for this selection procedure?
How do carmakers develop modules in cooperation with module suppliers?
How do module suppliers select and choose lower tier suppliers?
To what extent do Japanese carmakers increase productivity by adopting modules?
64
MAPPING DESIGN AND PRODUCTION COMPETENCIES IN THE NEW
BRAZILIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY: BOTTLENECKS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR A HIGHER PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT
Mauro ZILBOVICIUS, Roberto MARX, Mario Sergio SALERNO
This paper presents and discusses the first findings of a research on the automobile
sector in Brazil, that is being conducted by a group of researchers in the Production
Engineering Department of the University of Sao Paulo. The research is sponsored by the
Brazilian Bank of Economic and Social Development (a Brazilian state bank).
Many studies of the automobile sector in Brazil have indicated that a lot of
transformations are happening in the sector since the opening of the Brazilian economy in the
beginning of the 1990’s (see, for example, Humphrey, J.; Salerno, M.S., 1999 and Salerno,
M.S.; Arbix, G.; Zilbovicius, M; Dias, A.V., 1998). The sector in Brazil had to face a broader
transformation and restructuring of the sector in global terms: the supply chain management,
the product design process and, broadly, the value adding process were all globalised.
Traditionally verticalized structures in the side of the OEM producers began to give
way to smaller units with much less suppliers. A structure of tiers began to be established,
causing a revolution in the supply chain. From the point of view of the traditionally
established suppliers, most of them operating with Brazilian-owned capital, the picture was
completely changed. New entrants came to the country, establishing new operations and/or
acquiring Brazilian companies.
After just a few years, Brazil is now the country with the bigger diversity of
automobile brands in a single country. Furthermore, Brazil is the place where new
organisational designs are being implemented. Almost all of the new plants present new
schemes of production organisation and supply chain management: it is possible to observe
the “modular consortium” (VW trucks, in Resende – see Marx, R.; Salerno, M.S.; Zilbovicius,
M, 1997) and some variations around the idea of “industrial condominia” (GM Celta plant, in
Gravatai, Ford Amazon plant, in Bahia).
The traditional suppliers sector developed locally an important capability of product
design along the first 30 years of the industry. It was important not only for the sector itself,
but also for the whole Brazilian metal-mechanics industry. The new strategies of globalisation
of technological activities and the result of a number of acquisitions of Brazilian companies
transformed completely the perspectives of the sector.
The main objectives of the research are related to build a broad, integrated and
understandable framework of what is happening in the sector in Brazil and what are the
65
perspectives for local development of technological capability and local value adding. The
conceptual framework will be based on the work of Bell, M., 1984; Porter, M.,1985 and Voss,
C., 1992. In more detail, we will try to identify:
Ø
What are the technological and managerial competencies that remain in the
country or may be further developed;
Ø What are the bottlenecks along the productive chain and in the relation of the chain
and the consumer market;
Ø What are the effects of the implementation of new plants in greenfield areas in
Brazil, and what is going to happen with traditional clusters of the industry;
Ø What are the public policies that can be developed by government agencies of
development in order to tackle with the bottlenecks identified and to induce more
local value added.
Two fronts of research are being followed:
Ø
A comprehensive mapping of the new supply chain in the automobile sector,
through questionnaires that are being sent to all companies in the sector. After the
first phase of analyzing the data obtained through the questionnaires, some
companies will be visited for an in-depth research. The OEM sub sector will also
be visited, especially the new factories built in the last 4/5 years. With this we will
try to understand what are the new relations established between companies, their
operations organisation, what are the criteria for supplying or being supplied by
someone and the economic and financial barriers that define the place in the supply
chain one can occupy.
Ø A comprehensive map of the product design activities developed in the country,
trying to understand, for example, which phases of the product design are
conducted in Brazil, by the OEM companies and the suppliers, what kind of
product is homely design and what are the relationships between multinationals’
headquarters and their local subsidiaries, (considering both oems and suppliers),
which competencies are needed for local operations to take part in the
development of a new product.
We expect to present at Euroma 2001 the first preliminary results of the research,
obtained in the first 8 months of a research project planned to take 18 months until the final
results are available. We also believe that the research of a subject of this magnitude and
scope represents something new and not enough studied, not only for local and regional
research agenda but also for a global perspective, since most of the research already
conducted in the automobile sector did not include countries like Brazil in their samples (see
for example Clark, K.B.; Fujimoto, T., 1991 and others).
Keywords : Brazilian automotive industry – product development – new organisational
patterns
66
NEW PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY: THE
MANAGERIAL CHALLENGES OF AUTOMAKERS AND SUPPLIERS
AT THREE NEW BRAZILIAN PLANTS
Sílvio PIRES
Introduction
Over the last five years, significant investments have been made in the Brazilian
automotive industry and new managerial experiments and innovations have been
implemented in plants installed around the country. Some of these new plants have quickly
become references for several basic processes in the sector (such as inbound logistics) and
have attracted the attention of most of the automotive community. Basically, these new plants
have significantly reconfigured their relationships with the supply chain, thereby producing a
new series of challenges for both automakers and suppliers. This reconfiguration, in turn, has
led to a series of transformations and to the internationalization of the supplier base operating
in Brazil, characterized by a large number of mergers, acquisitions, alliances and closedowns.
The main purpose of this proposal paper is to present the basic characteristics of three
new and innovative productive systems recently implemented in new plants in Brazil and to
discuss some of their relevant implications, focusing on the managerial challenges involved in
the management of competencies and in organizational learning by both automakers and
suppliers. In order to contextualize the description and analysis of this proposal paper, a brief
history of the Brazilian automotive industry is given below.
A brief history of the automotive industry in Brazil
The automotive industry in Brazil started its activities assembling vehicles during the
1930s by the CKD (Completely Knocked Down) method, and the country’s first passenger
car and truck manufacturing units were only inaugurated in the late 50s. From the 60s to the
80s, Brazil’s economic policy strongly inhibited the importation of vehicles and autoparts,
resulting in the significant growth of locally produced components. This nationalization
process reached almost 100% in the 70s. On the other hand, the government’s market reserve
policy also resulted in a technological and managerial gap in Brazilian automotive plants in
comparison to the majority of plants operating in Europe, in the USA and in Japan.
Meanwhile, early in the 90s, the scenario of the automotive industry in Brazil began to change
with the entrance of a liberal government and the gradual opening of the economy. This was
followed by the establishment of Mercosul (the South American Free Trade Agreement),
which created a common market among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Another
more recent and important event was the major reduction in inflation, which increased the
67
importance of manufacturing since, during the long period of high inflation rates, there was a
relatively heavy emphasis on financial activities. One important result of the stabilization and
liberalization process has been the boom that the Brazilian automotive industry, along with
other industries, has experienced since 1995, which has to date amounted to investments of
almost US$ 20 billion. These investments have come both from companies already operating
in the country (such as VW, GM, Ford, Fiat, Daimler-Chrysler) and from others that recently
set up operations in Brazil (such as Renault, Peugeot, Honda, Toyota, Mitsubishi).
This paper will now briefly describe the three innovative productive system
implemented in the plants considered in this proposal paper.
The new productive systems studied
Plant A: The modular consortium of VW’s truck and bus chassis plant in Resende, Brazil
This plant was inaugurated in November 1996, introducing the innovative (and still
unique in the automotive industry) modular consortium model, which delegated the
responsibility for the final on-line modular assembly of the vehicle, the operational
investments, and the management of the module supplier chain to seven module suppliers.
The automaker provided the facilities and is responsible for coordination of the plant and for
new product development, marketing, and final vehicle testing. Before the new plant became
operational, VW’s truck and bus operation purchased from 400 suppliers. This reduction in
the supplier base led to some interesting situations, such as the case of the module supplier
called Power Train, created by two traditional diesel engine competitors (MWM and
Cummins) to supply VW’s new plant. VDO, the traditional German supplier of speedometers
and tachometers, has implemented major expansions of its competencies in the Resende plant,
becoming the cabin module supplier, and today is responsible for 60% of the items for
assembly of a truck. The paper will also deal with other contemporary issues (four years after
the plant’s inauguration) regarding the daily cross-organizational teamwork inside the plant.
Plant B: The industrial condominium of the VW Golf and Audi A3 plant in São José dos
Pinhais, Brazil
The plant, which was inaugurated in March 1999, introduced the concept of the
industrial condominium, whereby twelve key suppliers (installed in a closed condominium
built around the VW plant) supply the plant’s assembly line with complete systems (such as
the brake system) and themselves share several facilities such as a restaurant, bank, medical
service, transportation system, etc. Currently, VW considers this plant state-of-the-art in the
sector and, in loco, the factory is a clean and modern space in which a highly precise
logistical operation is conducted. The basic purpose of the plant is to produce with a
minimum of inventory, achieving high productivity and high flexibility on the shop floor. For
this purpose, the plant uses an efficient logistical system encompassing the entire supply
chain, a just-in-sequence supply system involving the twelve system suppliers, and several
efficient teams of approximately ten employees per station on the assembly line.
68
Plant C: The dedicated supply system of Dana-Chrysler at the Dakota plant in Campo Largo,
Brazil
Chrysler’s plant, which was built to produce the Dakota pick-up in Brazil, was
inaugurated in July of 1998. At the same time, Dana inaugurated a new plant very close to the
Chrysler site, which was built exclusively to supply Chrysler’s pick-up chassis requirements.
For this project, the two companies jointly developed a new technology that they dubbed
“rolling chassis”, with Dana supplying Chrysler on a just-in-sequence basis every 3 hours.
Because the chassis represents about 30% of the pick-up’s total cost for Chrysler and because
Dana has a plant dedicated exclusively to one customer, they have created a partnership with
a high level of interdependency. Recently, in February 2001, the Daimler-Chrysler group
announced that the plant will stop operations in two months because its current high level of
idleness. This will have a series of implications for both Chrysler and Dana.
Furthermore, the proposal paper now goes on to analyze the three systems from the
standpoint highlighted in the introduction, i.e., Focusing on the challenges of competency
management and organizational learning for both automakers and suppliers in the three
productive systems studied. Also, other subjects relating to this discussion will also be
addressed, such as the shift of the automotive industry from the Just-in-Time to the Just-inSequence supply systems and the implications of this change in the reconfiguration of the
sector.
69
Session 12. Enjeux géographiques / Geographical Issues
SPECIFICITES LOCALES ET MODELES PRODUCTIFS « D’ORIGINE »
DANS LE SECTEUR AUTOMOBILE D’ARGENTINE. ANALYSE
COMPARATIVE DE LA RELATION ASSEMBLEURS-FOURNISSEURS
DANS DEUX « RESEAUX PRODUCTIFS »
(VOLKSWAGEN ET TOYOTA).
Gabriel YOGUEL, Marta NOVICK, Ana M. CATALANO, Facundo ALBORNOZ
Ce travail se fonde sur un travail empirique qui porte sur 70 fournisseurs locaux des
filiales Volkswagen et Toyota en Argentine.
Premièrement, nous analysons la stratégie, la forme d’implantation et l’hybridation,
que ces deux dernières firmes ont établi dans ce pays. Cela nous amène à postuler que
différentes formes d’implantation ne dépendent que des différences dans le modèle productif
original, mais aussi d’une manière particulière de comprendre et d’incorporer les variables
économiques et institutionnelles qui se manifestent à l’intérieur de chacun des réseaux
structurés autour de chacune de ces deux entreprises ; d’où l’importance de s’intéresser aux
processus d’hybridation de Volkswagen et Toyota dans le milieu productif local.
Ensuite, nous montrons que l’hybridation ne se manifeste que sous la forme
d’implantation adoptée mais, également, sous les styles de liaison qui s’établissent avec le
réseau de fournisseurs. Nous avons développé une méthodologie (dont une première esquisse
a été déjà présentée lors du VIIIe Colloque de Gerpisa, 2000) qui nous permet de mettre en
évidence la double dimension analysée : intra-firme et intra-réseau. Cette méthodologie
consiste en une batterie d’indicateurs qui rend compte des dimensions suivantes : (a) les
styles du lien mentionné ci-dessus et (b) la sphère à l’intérieur de la firme fournisseur qui
porte sur (b1) la capacité innovatrice, (b2) le mode de gestion sociale du travail et (b3) la
structure et la dynamique de la qualification de la force du travail. Ainsi, nous avons pu
étudier la génération et circulation des connaissances et de l’information (savoir industriel)
d’un sous-ensemble significatif du secteur automobile : le réseau Toyota et le réseau
Volkswagen.
Finalement, nous présentons les résultats de l’analyse comparative qui montre
comment les dimensions analysées expliquent les différences et les similitudes entre les deux
réseaux. De plus, nous avons utilisé des informations provenant des conversations formelles
menées aussi bien avec le secteur administratif que le secteur syndical ; ce qui nous permet de
conjuguer les résultats quantitatifs avec la dimension qualitative du problème étudié.
70
LOCATION AND DISLOCATION
AT THE MOTOR VEHICLES INDUSTRY
Enrique de MIGUEL FERNANDEZ
At the moment, and related to the motor vehicles industry, two opposite tendencies are
produced at the same time: the location of the manufacture at specific geographic areas and
countries and the dislocation from just those countries.
About the manufacture location of motor vehicles in a worldwide level, it is
concentrated regionally in three areas: Europe, North America and Asia. Besides, in each one,
the manufacture is located in certain countries; for example, at Europe the main
manufacturers are Germany, France, Spain, United Kingdom and Italy, all of them from the
European Union. At North America the production is developed principally in the USA, and
at Asia is located in Japan and South Korea (table 1).
Table 1. Motor vehicle manufacture by geographic areas, 1999. Units.
AREA
MANUFACTURE (1)
MANUFACTURE
CONCENTRATION
World
Europe
56.537.912
20.566.154
100,0 %
36,4 %
17.272.157
30,5 %
16.332.720
28,9 %
2.366.881
4,2 %
Germany
France
Spain
U.K.
Italy
5.687.590
3.180.193
2.852.366
1.976.263
1.701.114
North America
USA
13.018.846
Asia
Japan
South Korea
Others
Manufacture + Assembly
Source: OICA, Statistics, 1999.
9.985.476
2.843.114
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In relation to the world motor vehicles exports, the concentration is much more
important because it is reduced to two areas: Europe and Asia (table 2).
Table 2. Motor vehicle exports by geographic areas, 1999. Units.
AREA
EXPORTS
EXPORTS CONCENTRATION
World
22.722.388
100,0 %
13.855.830
61,0 %
6.108.028
26,9 %
2.332.045
10,3 %
426.485
1,9 %
Europe
Germany
France
Spain
U.K.
3.675.756
3.255.292
2.314.111
1.213.481
Asia
Japan
South Korea
North America
Others
Source: OICA, Statistics, 1999.
4.408.943
1.509.660
Furthermore, and as a consequence of the supplying policy with the parts and
accessories, according to a continuous flow scheme, manufacturers have been imposing on
the suppliers the approach to their plants, developing the named <Suppliers Parks>. At Spain
we have the case, for instance, of Zona Franca (SEAT) in Barcelona and Almussafes
(FORD) in Valencia. Next year, MERCEDES will open another one in Álava. These parks
have promoted the local manufacture of components at the expense of the imports (although
the majority of suppliers are part of large foreign groups).
On the other hand, a phenomenon of manufacture dislocation is produced, and then,
for instance, Germany manufactured 5,7 million of motor vehicles in the country in 1999.
But also manufactured 3,5 million abroad. We could follow dislocation studying in which
other countries, apart from the one we are focused on, are manufacturing or assembling the
motor vehicles companies. For example, the German manufacturer BMW assembles in
countries as Thailand, Philippines or Indonesia, whereas Volkswagen manufactures in Brazil,
Spain, Portugal, Poland or Slovakia.
This dislocation is the one that could endanger the industry employment in some
countries because, although the regional concentration of the industries has advantages
(suppliers proximity and others), the companies can found better labour conditions or more
support from the local Governments in other countries where the sector also has its specific
geographic localizations.
At our work we pretend to examine the influence that a possible dislocation of some
Spanish company could have on the main components manufacturers of the sector.
72
73
Sessions 13. Fusion et acquisitions dans l’automobile / M&A in the Car
Industry
STRATEGIES ALLIANCE AND RESTRUCTURING FOR SURVIVAL:
NEW MANAGERIAL STRATEGIES OF HYUNDAI
Myeong-Kee CHUNG
Since last 20th century, it had launched a wave of strategies alliance and M in the
world automobile industry, which is caused high competitions based on globalization and
over-production crisis. There is no doubt that the Korean automobile industry has experienced
a major crisis since late 1997. By viewing the crisis as a reflection of the need for
fundamental structural change and strategies alliance with foreign makers in this sector. M is
one of the major measurements for the reduction of the oversupplied capacity of an
automobile industry in Korea. Hyundai Motor Co. Took over bankrupt Kia Motors Corp. And
its sister commercial vehicle maker, Asia Motors Co., In December 1998.
After the integration of Hyundai Motor Company and Kia, they maintain their own
brands for field full vehicle ranges and maintain individual sales and marketing approaches
throughout world markets. In this context, Hyundai will focus on boosting the synergy effects
from the acquisition of Kia Motors and sister company Asia Motors through the pooled
platforms of Hyundai and Kia, exchange of auto parts, joint use of sales outlets and reductions
in the development of new car models. They will also continue pushing for strategic tie-ups
with major foreign automakers to introduce advanced technology, jointly advance into world
markets and improved liquidity. For this purpose, Hyundai has set-up the strategic alliances
with daimlerchrysler. At same time, Hyundai, Mitsubishi and Daimler Chrysler will push to
speed up their strategic alliances to set up a world car project. Hyundai will develop the nextgeneration car together with the two partners based on a model that it has been developing
independently.
During the restructuring crisis, the Korean automobile industry underwent a series of
major internal changes, focusing on reforms to managerial strategies and industrial relations.
Significant features of these changes included the more flexibility in production process and
more partnership between supplier-buyer in the field of product and technology development.
Under this circumstance, the increased module purchasing policy of parts will lead to the
integration of the affiliated-firm into the overall design and manufacturing process. It is one
of the most important conditions for the survival of the Korean automobile industry in the
competitive global market. With this view in mind, my paper will deal with the new direction
of managerial strategies taking place in the Hyundai motors. In the first part of this paper I
will give a brief description of the Korean Automobile Industry after financial crisis. Then I
will describe in detail managerial strategies, which were combined with rising strategic
alliance with Daimler Chrysler & new purchasing and platform policy that caused acquired
Kia Motors. This takes on particular importance as a factor that will understand to the new
changes of a Korean Automobile Industry in context of new globalizations in world
automobile industry.
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HYUNDAI MOTOR’S DE-CHAEBOLIZATION EFFECTS
Hyunjoong JUN
The first generation chaebol founders have played in motoring the economy. At the
turn of the new millennium, they are giving their place to the second generation.
Since the korean financial crisis of 1997, chaebols are confronted with an economic
difficulty which oblige to reforming. They have problems such as debt ratios that are beyond
sustainable levels in a crisis, cross debt etc.. Korean automobile chaebols are also
restructuring. Korean car firms gave up this industry or try to find partners for strategic
alliance. Hyundai Motor was seperated from the group(de-chaebolization) which has financial
problem. We will study at Hyunai Motor’s de-chaebolization effects and new strategies.
Separation of Hyundai Motor and Hyunadi group
The Hyundai Motor, spun off from the Hyundai Group in 2000, has a new economic
organization. Hyundai car will have different relation with subsidiaries of Hyundai group
from before.
The three subsidiaries of the conglomerate-Hyundai Engineering and
Construction(HEC), Hyundai Electronics Industries(HEI) and Hyundai Trust and Investmentare in cash flow problem. Hyundai Merchant Marine is also in trouble as it has been running
deficit in its Mr. Kumgang tourism project. HEI’s major shareholder Chung Mong-hun called
on his elder brother, Hyundai Motor Co. Chairman Mong-koo, to purchase 78 percent of
HEI’s share in Hyundai autonet.
The effect of acquisition for Kia by Hyundai
The acquisition for Kia by Hyundai because of Kia’s bankrupcy in 1996 change to two
firm’s efficiency, scale and scope economies, parts supply unit, korean car market’s structure
and strategies for foreign market. Hyunadi Motor and Kia Motors are expected to register net
profits of 600 billion won and 340 billion won, respectively, benefiting from increased
efficiency from their merger in 2000. One of the greatest accomplishments the same year was
the serge in the U.S. sales of two car makers, as well as image improvements among
American consumers. Hyndai and Kia cars may run into challenges in 2001 from aggressive
marketing from foreign rivals, including Japanese automakers. Hyundai and Kia cars aim to
become a top-five global car maker by 2005.
Hyundais Mobis , an auto parts-making unit of the Hyundai Motor Group, takes over
Kia Motors’s after-service parts supply unit and now the largest parts supplier in the country.
75
The unit includes Kia’s 11 auto parts outlets, nine parts centers and overseas auto parts outlets
and 900 emploees. The company expects sales from the newly combined 30 outlets to reach 2
trillion won($1.65 billion) a year. The company still plans to operate the auto parts supply
units for Hyundai Motor and Kia Motors independently Which impact of acquisition for Kia
by Hyundai Motor is expect ?
Hyundai’s new strategies
Hyundai stress extreme cost-cutting management and flexible management, promising
to delegate more decision-making powers to top executives. The firm aim the development of
top-quality vehicles that are free from troubles for at least five years. Hyundai-Kia motors
have some new strategies.
Ø
-joint venture : Hyundai Motor and Daimler Chrysler have agreed to establish a
joint venture plant for commercial vehicles in the southwestern city of Chonju in
Korea. Hyundai and daimlerchrysler will hold 50 percent of the plant.
Ø Hyundai will sell its ‘Atoz ’ minicar in Mexico through its strategic alliance
partner daimlerchrysler’s sales networks in the Central American country.
Ø -globalization : The Hyundai Motor Group is pushing to build a car-manufacturing
plant in the southeast of U. S. And start production in 2004. Hyundai Motor and
Kia Motor have tentatively decided to locate their 300,000-unit-per-year joint plant
in the Southeastern United States.
Hyundai Motor and affiliate Kia Motors will jointly set up Chinese headquarter in
Beijing Dec. 2000 in order to more aggressively advance in the pan-Chinese market,
including Tawiwan, Macao, Mongolia and Hong Kong as well as the main land. They will
soon established localmanufacturing facilities in China to produce five kinds of vehiclessubcompact cars, compactcars, vans(recreational vehicle factory in connection with China’s
plan to develop the western inland region.
Ø
-diversification : Hyundai Motors nov. 2000 launch the nation’s first dieselburning sedans carrying its self-developed diesel engine. The new diesel engine
sedans also target Europe and other advanced markets imposing strict
environmental regulations on diesel fuel emissions.
Ø -e-business strategy :The importance of e-business(btob, btoc) in the car industry is
increasing highly.
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MERGER AND RECONFIGURING OF HYUNDAI-KIA
Byoung-Hoon LEE, Sung-Jae CHO
This study focuses on the merger of Hyundai-Kia and their business restructuring,
which is a key part of recent reconfiguring taking place in the Korean auto industry. Kia,
which was the 2 nd automaker in Korea, went to bankruptcy in the summer of 1997. The Kia’s
collapse can be explained by the following three key factors: (1) the company’s worsened
profitability, resulted from the excessive domestic market competition, and its growing
burden of financial costs, derived from management’s over-expansion of production capacity,
(2) the company’s mis-management, associated with the failure of business diversification,
poor performance of new car models, substantial concessions to the militant union, and senior
managers’ moral hazard, (3) the Samsung group’s continued threat to take over the Kia group.
In 1997, although management and the labor union at Kia made great joint efforts to revive
the company on its own, the government and the creditor banks decided to sell out the Kia
group. At the third round of the international bidding process, it was determined in December
1998 that Hyundai which offered the most favorable terms for the took over the Kia group. In
January 1999, top management at Hyundai was reshuffled in accordance with the Hyundai
group owner’s successor plan.
The Hyundai-Kia group has reconfigured the governance structure over its affiliated
operations and re-aligned core business functions, such as R&D, manufacturing, auto parts
purchasing, and marketing & A/S, immediately after the merger of the two automakers.
Above all, Hyundai and Kia both took action to consolidate their business units (the Hyundai
Motor Service and the auto production division of the Hyundai Precision; the Asia Motor, the
Kia Motor Sales, the Asia Motor Sales, and the Kia Daejun Sales). By the mid 2000, the auto
group formed a variety of joint division offices for most of operational functions in order to
promote the coordination and communication between the two companies. The Hyundai-Kia
group has also segmented its auto business by spinning off some of its existing business units
and/or establishing such as new firms as the Hyundai MOBIS (production and sales of auto
parts), the Hyundai PowerTech (manufacturing of power-train), the Korea LogiTech (material
handling), and the Hyundai Autoever.com (internet sales) to specialize in certain business
functions. In June 2000, the Hyundai-Kia group reached a strategic alliance contract with
Daimler-Chrysler.
The Hyundai-Kia group has consolidated the R&D functions for developing passenger
car models and core auto parts into the Namyang R&D center, while integrating R&D units
for commercial vehicles into the Junju R&D center. The consolidation of R&D centers
basically targets at the integration of platforms between the two companies. Top management
of the Hyundai-Kia group has carried out a plan to reduce the number of platforms from 24 to
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7 and types of engines from 29 to 15. The employment size of R&D operations that totaled
over 7,000 until 1999 declines to the level of 5,800 through the consolidation of R&D centers.
The Hyundai-Kia group has made re-alignment of its auto assembly units in
accordance with the type and size of final products. For instance, top management of the
Hyundai-Kia group has designated Kia’s Kwangju plant as a specialized assembly plant of
small-sized commercial vehicles and plans to move the Kwangju plant’s assembly lines of
large-sized commercial vehicles to the Junju plant. Hyundai and Kia have shared power-train
parts (i.e.: engine and transmission) to be supplied to assembly plants, and concentrated many
operations of manufacturing press die sets into the Ulsan and the Hwasung plant until mid
2000. The Hyundai-Kia group has also shared production technology by standardizing the
terminology of production technology as well as the production standards calculation method
(MODAPTS). Moreover, Hyundai and Kia plan to put their overseas manufacturing
operations (i.e.: China and Pakistan) to shared use.
Hyundai and Kia have reconfigured their auto parts suppliers in the direction of
shaping those vendors into a multi-layer system and enlarging them through M&A. They have
also reduced the number of first-tier auto parts suppliers and expanded the shared use of auto
parts between each other. The introduction of a modular production method into Hyundai and
Kia is expected to further promote the integration of their auto parts suppliers. The auto group
aims to promote the Hyundai MOBIS to a specialized supplier of core modular auto parts.
Unlike the other operational functions, the marketing divisions of Hyundai and Kia
have maintained the form of independent business units in accordance with top management’s
policy to promote an inter-company sales competition. Top management of this corporate
group decided to give Hyundai’s sales rights of several car models, such as Optima, Visto
(mini-car), Carstar (SUV), and Pamax to Kia, in order to aid in the recovery of the latter’s
financial performance. The Hyundai-Kia group has worked out a plan to reorganize the
existing dealer chains of the two companies into a region-based network as a transitory step in
2001, and to ultimately spin off those marketing divisions into independent firms specializing
in sales business. the Hyundai-Kia group has integrated the two companies’ operations for
product distribution and A/S parts supply in order to save marketing-related costs. Hyundai
and Kia have saved the substantial cost of auto delivery by sharing an export dock and the
overseas destination port. In a word, the Hyundai-Kia group has pursued not only a strategic
mixture of competition (sales) and coordination (marketing support).
The Hyundai Motor Workers Union (HMWU) and the Kia Motor Workers
Union(KMWU) respectively integrated other unions of affiliated business units to the two
automakers in response to the companies’ business re-organization. In response to
management’s action to reorganize the two companies’ business operations, both of the
unions have shown an ambivalent position. On the one hand, since 1999 the two unions have
accepted most of management’s steps to carry out minor business reconfiguring with a little
impact on the employment conditions of their members. On the other hand, the two unions
have commonly taken a negative stance on management’s plan of large-scale restructuring,
such as outsourcing and spin-off, having a substantial influence over their members
employment. Since the merger of the two companies, the HMWU and the KMWU have set
up a collaborative alliance to exchange company information and share union strategies
between each other.
78
The merger of Hyundai and Kia has created a notable synergy effect on the two
automakers’ business performance. The Hyundai-Kia group has achieved the cost-saving of
approximately 2.5 trillion won through the integrated operation of various business functions
and expects to gain the additional cost-saving of 4.6 trillion won in total by 2004 with a
growing synergy effect. The merger of the two companies has also made significant
contribution to the revival of Kia from 1999 on.
At the same time, the Hyundai-Kia group has the following policy issues to be tackled
for its future growth: (1) to forge cooperative relations with the labor unions in the continuing
process of business restructuring, (2) to enhance technological capability of R&D and
manufacturing operations for itself and auto parts suppliers, and to improve the quality and
reliability of its products, (3) to position the two automakers into different business segments
and overcome senior management’s entrenched interest in the existing business practices.
79
Session 14. Analyse des relations productives / Analysis of productive
relations
THE SOCIAL EMBEDDING OF FLEXIBILITY:
CONTRASTING PATTERNS OFWORKER INTEGRATION IN
AUTOMOBILE PLANTS OF THE AMERICAS
Martin SCOTT
This essay, drawing from the author’s dissertation and book manuscript, will treat the
problem of how workers’ commitment to more flexible work systems is secured and
reproduced over time. It will do so on the basis of a comparative examination of assembly
plants, both “greenfield” and “brownfield,” in terms of their shifting patterns of work
organization and employment relations during the 1980s and 1990s in Brazil, Mexico, and the
United States. The experiences of European- and U.S.-based transnational oems, attempting
selectively to emulate aspects of so-called “lean” or “Japanese” work organization, are the
primary focus.
The main argument is that the problem of worker integration into shifting production
norms and arrangements is qualitatively different than under Fordism. It is argued that the
Polyanian metaphor of the embedding of market relationships in sets of extra-market and
extra-economic social ties provides a means of reconceptualizing the contentious social
process by which employers seek to engage workers (and their representatives) in new
production practices. Two basic contrasting forms of embedding of flexibility are
identified—one based on consensual norms and practices (“collective embedding”) and
another based on a personalized bond between firm and worker with little or no organized
mediation (“individual embedding”).
Based on case studies of four anonymous auto plants (two in the southern U.S., one in
greater São Paulo, one in central Mexico) plus a review of secondary literature, it is found that
the pattern of distribution of brownfield restructuring trajectories across the
individual/collective divide is shaped only partially by company-level and national systemslevel variables (i.e., Firm strategy and structure and the character of national industrial and
especially industrial relations institutions). This is because there is, at least in the U.S. and
Brazil, great intra-national diversity across brownfields. However, much greater uniformity,
around an individual embedding dynamic, is found among greenfields, regardless of the firm
or nation-state.
Turning to explanations, the study offers for brownfields a plant-centric social network
explanation stressing the structured social ties surrounding and linking workers and managers.
Such pre-established ties from the late mass production period of the production unit establish
patterns and repertoires of interaction as well as respective institutional resources, imparting a
“relative autonomy” of social relations at the level of mature plants. However, greenfields
80
have not yet traversed these stages in their plant life cycle, and morever have come of age in a
radically different structural context in terms of the global industry and of national regulatory
patterns. This structural context, in particular the existence of strong subnational regulatory
climates and socio-political alliances in greenfield areas, helps “overdetermine” an initial
individual embedding trajectory at such factories. However, tendencies for conflict to emerge
with the movement through the life cycle are noted, as is an important difference between
corporatist (Brazil and Mexico) and liberal/pluralist non-union representation pattern.
However much favorable to a company unionism not representative of workers initially, the
former pattern opens up greater possibilities for conflict as workers challenge outside
bureuacratic dominations and managers sometimes find it counter-productive. Whether or not
such possibilities are taken advantage depends a great deal on the strength of external
alliances tying together workers and unions across brownfield/greenfield lines (much more
potent in the new Brazilian plants than in new Mexican plants, thus far).
81
RECONFIGURATION OF THE U.S. AUTO COMPONENT SUPPLIER
INDUSTRY: EMERGING WORKPLACE STRATEGIES AND EFFECTS
ON PRODUCTION WORKERS
William COOKE, Christopher HUXLEY, David MEYER
Analytical Framework :
The U.S.-based motor vehicle component supplier industry has been undergoing
substantial structural change over the last twenty years. Indeed, the industry has been
marked by a glut of worldwide motor vehicle capacity and shifting patterns in foreign direct
investment, sourcing, importation, integration and consolidation. In response to an everincreasingly competitive and uncertain global market place, component supplier business
and workplace strategies continue to be transformed as companies seek to find ways to
continuously improve performance while remaining highly flexible.
Toward maximizing market opportunities, companies make strategic business
choices about their positioning in the industries in which they compete, choosing whether
to emphasize solidifying or protecting current market positions, expanding or developing
new market opportunities, or simultaneously maintaining current positions and creating
new ones. Depending on a company’s positioning emphasis, the extent to which it engages
in FDI, imports and exports products, forms joint ventures or consolidates through merger
and acquisitions differs.
Second, manufacturers are generally oriented toward competing either on grounds of
being low-cost producers or on grounds of producing high quality and innovative products.
Although our observations suggest that component suppliers are generally under competitive
pressure to minimize costs and produce high quality, innovative products, companies are
expected, nonetheless, to pursue operational strategies that to some degree emphasize one
performance objective over the other. Depending on their emphasis, companies will differ
with regard to outsourcing, transferring work to offshore locations and downsizing domestic
operations.
Depending on a company’s market positioning and its emphasis on competing as a
low-cost producer, a company’s production complexity is also likely to differ. In particular,
companies that emphasize expanding or developing new markets over protecting current
positions and that emphasize quality and innovation over cost reductions are more likely to
have more complex production systems than otherwise. As such, these companies are more
likely to (1) have multiple and integrated facilities, (2) produce multiple components, (3)
serve as multiple source suppliers, and (4) engage in modular production.
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Importantly, suppliers must also align their workplace strategies with their strategic
market positioning, quality-cost-innovation emphasis and resultant production complexity.
As conceptualized herein, workplace strategies are the system of human resource and labor
relations practices in conjunction with the technologies and technical processes deployed.
Our ongoing project (funded by the Russell Sage and Rockefeller Foundations) is designed to
examine systematically the implications of the ongoing industry restructuring on workplace
strategies and on the workforce. Under the assumption that companies are motivated
primarily to maximize performance, the degree of success of workplace strategies (as viewed
by companies) is ultimately measured by performance achieved. Those workplace strategies
that yield higher levels of performance will, therefore, more likely be embraced, regardless of
the effects of these strategies on workers.
In our proposed report, we will focus on the various combinations of human resource
management/labor relations and technology systems being pursued and the effect of these
combinations on production workers. Our focus on worker adjustments and outcomes
includes the study of wages and benefits, training and skill development opportunities, degree
of employment security, empowerment, and satisfaction with jobs and employers. Pertinent
to our analysis is the influence of union strategies on operations and workplace strategies and,
in turn, on worker and performance outcomes in union represented locations.
Sources of Data:
Our proposed report will draw on data from two ongoing data collections, each of
which elicits information about the business, operational, technological, and human resource
and labor relations strategies being pursued.
Ø
20 Case Studies: We have just completed interviews with the top operations and
human resource managers and top local union officers of 20 firms. These firms
are members of the Labor-Management Council for Economic Renewal and are
located in the south-eastern region of Michigan. We have also surveyed the
workforces of 10 of these participating firms and are attempting to get the
remaining firms to participate in surveys of their workers
Ø
Survey of 300 Firms: Our sample of firms is drawn from a database compiled by
ELM International and updated by telephone calls in December 2000. In this first
wave of surveys, we have focused on firms with three or more manufacturing
facilities. Of the firms in the original directory as of December 1999, over 40 have
been acquired or closed. Our ongoing data collection includes three separate
questionnaires mailed to the top strategy, operations and HRM executives of the
firms. The first wave of surveys was mailed January 8-10, 2001 and we have
begun follow-up telephone calls requesting participation.
Proposed Report and Presentation: Using the above data sources, we will provide
detailed descriptions of the various business, operational and workplace strategies currently
being pursued and how these have changed over the last five years. In addition, we propose
to create a typology of these various strategies and assess their effects on company
performance and worker outcomes.
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STRATEGIES SYNDICALES DANS LE CADRE D'UNE REALITE
NOUVELLE DANS LES ENTREPRISES AUTOMOBILES ARGENTINES
Osvaldo R. BATTISTINI
En Argentine, dès le début des années 1990, les relations professionnelles ont
constitué un espace privilegié pour identifier les transformations se développant dans les
domaines économique, politique et social.
D'un côté, l'imposition d'un taux de change figeant la parité fixe de notre monnaie
nationale par rapport au dollar s'est liée aux ajustements succesifs de l'économie et les
pressions pour inmobiliser ou réduire les salaires. De cette façon on pensait empêcher les
effets inflationaires et offrir aux patrons des marges de profit attractifs pour qu'ils investissent
dans le pays. Les mesures de flexibilisation de la législation du travail ont été conçues dans
cette voie et se sont appuyées sur la détérioration constante du pouvoir du travail.
Un des effets de ce nouveau cadre économique est la permanence du taux de chômage
au dessus de dix dès la moitié de la décennie précedente. Dans ce contexte, la plupart des
emplois crées ont été des emplois précaires, avec des relations professionnales inestables dans
une grande partie de l'économie. Corrélativement à l'augmentation du chômage, le nombre de
travailleurs non régistrés s'est élevé jusqu'à plus de 3.700.000 aujourd'hui dans tout le pays.
Le changement technologique s'est superposé à la nouvelle réalité
socioprofessionnelle. Les nouvelles technologies de l'information et les modifications
organisationnelles ont poussé vers des changements dans le modèle d'embauche des
entreprises. Dans beaucoup de cas, le rajeunissement et l'élévation du niveau de formation des
travailleurs ont été la principale considération au moment de la rénovation ou de la
constitution de leur main d'oeuvre.
Les organisations syndicales, pour la première fois, ont fait face à un contexte où l'Etat
devenait l'allié inconditionel de secteurs donnés du patronat et répondait avec une relative
fidelité aux impératifs des organismes internationaux de crédit. Au fur et à mesure que le
nombre de travailleurs syndiqués diminuait en raison de l'augmentation du chômage, des
contrats atypiques et de l'emploi non régistré, elles ont dû mettre en place des stratégies
différentes pour répondre aux pressions du capital dans leurs secteurs respectifs d'activité.
Dans beaucoup de cas, la diminution des effectifs et de leur mobilité dans les
entreprises poussait les organisations syndicales à chercher des ressources extrêmes pour
maintenir ou faire croître le nombre d'adhérants. En même temps, la modification du schéma
économique n'a pas été assisse sur une prise de position en faveur des secteurs industriels,
mais sur une potentiation des activités de service public, produit des privatisations, des
services financiers et même de ventes et de marketing. Cette nouvelle réalité a amené un
84
bouleversement de la structure de l'emploi, qui a provoqué la perte d'adhérants pour certains
syndicats dans leurs secteurs traditionnels, et l'augmentation des attentes pour d'autres
d'obtenir de nouveaux reccrues dans des secteurs d'activité autres que les leurs d'origine.
Dans l'industrie automobile, ces mutations ont été vécues d'une façon particulière.
Dans ce secteur les transferts et/ou fusions de capitals d'investissement dans des entreprises
installées dans le pays ont coincidé avec le retour d'entreprises de construction automobile qui
avaient quité le pays dans les années précedentes et l'instalation de nouvelles, et la réduction
du nombre de fournisseurs. En plus, la pression des ajustement permanents sur les secteurs
moyens ont détérioré le marché interne et ont favorisé les attentes des patrons par rapport aux
possibilités ouvertes par le MERCOSUR dans un contexte de concurrence avec le puissante
pôle industriel du Brésil.
Dans cette branche les mutations ont eu des répercussions dans l'établissement de
particularités dans le schéma de relations professionnelles dans les entreprises. La diminution
du nombre de travailleurs adhérants et l'installation de nouvelles usines dans le pays a
redoublé la dispute entre les deux organisations syndicales les plus représentatives par le
nombre de leurs adhérents1. Des deux modèles distincts de negociation collective présentés,
celui utilisé par un des deux syndicats (SMATA) est devenu le modèle paradigmatique de la
flexibilisation des relations professionnelles au niveau de l'entreprise. Le terrain de la
négociation collective est devenu le théatre de la dispute entre les organisations syndicales.
L'embauche de travailleurs plus jeunes et avec des niveaux de formation relativement
plus élévés que ceux travaillant dans les entrprises préalablement installées dans le pays a
contribué à une modification substantielle des carcatéristiques des effectifs des entreprises.
Dans la plupart des cas, ce nouveau cadre de relations professionnelles a originé des
lignes contradictoires entre les interêts des travailleurs et la voie choisie par l'organisation
syndicale pour assumer leur représentation. Le maintien d'un structure syndicale
traditionnelle, dans laquelle le poids de l'organisation repose sur le pouvouir du sommet en
détriment du pouvoir des représentations dans les lieux de travail est un fateur qui potentie les
effets contradictoires des nouvelles relations professionnelles.
Dans le travail que nous présenterons nous ferons l'analyse des stratégies syndicales du
secteur automobile argentin et leurs possibles transformations structurelles depuis le début de
la dernière décennie, en prenant comme paramètres privilegiés le nouveau cadre régional, les
mutations dans les entreprises, la conformation d'une nouvelle main d'ouvre dans les
établissements et la mise en ouvre, de la part des syndicats, de ces stratégies aux différents
niveaux face aux pressions des patrons.
1
Les deux syndicats représentatifs sont l'Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (UOM) et le Sindicato de
Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor (SMATA).
85
Session 15. Enjeux géographiques / geographical Issues
STRATEGIES OF WASTE:
BIDDING WARS IN THE BRAZILIAN AUTOMOBILE SECTOR
Glauco ARBIX, Andrés RODRÍGUEZ-POSE
Since the mid-1990s Brazil has become one of the main recipients of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the automobile sector. As already happened in the late 1950s and early
1960s, world car manufacturers are investing heavily in the building of new car plants.
The reasons behind the renewed interest of car companies in Brazil have been the huge
and expanding internal market and the relatively stable macroeconomic panorama of the mid1990s.
However, and in contrast to what happened in the 1950s and 1960s, most new car
plants are being located outside the São Paulo metropolitan area, the traditional hub of the
Brazilian motor industry.
Although some argue that, among other reasons, this is the result of lower labour costs
elsewhere in Brazil and of improved infrastructure in the country, this article tries to
demonstrate that the recent decentralisation of the Brazilian motor industry is basically linked
to perverse territorial competition among Brazilian states.
This sort of territorial competition –known in Brazil as the ‘fiscal’ wars- represents a
pure waste of resources, both for the states engaged in them, as well as for Brazil as a whole.
Keywords : Foreign direct investment, globalisation, territorial competition, automobile
industry, Brazil.
86
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN CHINA AND ITS IMPACT
TO THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Hua WANG
China's automotive industry abandoned its self-reliant development since the
economic reform started in the 1980s. One of the new industrial policies is to stimulate the
foreign direct investment (FDI) so as to narrow down the gap from the world advanced
level.
This paper examines the changing industrial policy based on systematic data on
trade (tariff and non-tariff barrier on vehicle imports), investment (pattern of FDI) and
production (technology appropriation and local content requirement). It also addresses the
interplay between the multi national corporations and the State in shaping the development
of the industry. The country-of-origin effects manifested while comparing the different
strategy of investments taken by European (American) car manufacturers and by the
Japanese counter parts. The further discussion focuses on the impacts of accession of WTO
to the automotive industry in China.
Introduction
The Chinese automotive industry is currently going through impressive growth.
During these two decades, the average annual growth rate has been 15%.1 The total output of
motor vehicles ranked 9th in the world in 1999 with 1.8 million units of production. In the
Asian region, it is the second largest car-producing nation after Japan and before Korea since
1997. And this position will be kept on the early of 21st century. Despite the continued
growth, there were just four vehicles for every thousand people, one of the lowest figures for
per capita vehicle ownership in the world, along with India. Therefore, multinational
companies are eyeing this huge potential market. Some of the European and American
manufacturers have implanted in the local market. They are playing important role during the
process of restructuring and modernization of the Chinese automotive industry. Competing
with each other for future market share in China, more and more multinational corporations
(mncs) are coming, including the Japanese and Korean companies.
Till the mid-1990s, the auto market in China is highly protected, compare to the others
developing countries more oriented to the trade and economic liberalisation. When the
Chinese government officially announced its "Industrial Policy for the Automotive Industry"
1
Notes and sources are omitted in this proposal.
87
("Industrial policy" hereafter) in July 1994, it showed its intention to develop and to
consolidate China's own automotive industry. This is the approach modelled on that of
Korean government in the 1970s. While at the same time, the need of funds, technology and
management to upgrade the greatly lagged industry urged the authority to attract the FDI.
However, the operational practices involve a set of limitation measures. Concerning the
international trade, high tariffs on the finished-vehicle imports are imposed together with
licenses and quotas. To maintain indigenous control over the fledging industry, a ceiling of
foreign ownership and the form of joint venture are strictly regulated. To set up a complete
industrial system, the transfer of technology and incrementally raised local contents are
required under the legislation. What is more, the Chinese government ruthlessly limits the
number of assemblers in the pursuit of economies of scale and competition among foreign
companies.
For those mncs, they incorporate China government's trade and investment policies
into their production and location decisions. But some other considerations are taken into
account as well. Chief among them, and especially in the case of Chinese auto market, is its
potential enormous market size. It is playing critical role. That is why, foreign manufacturers
struggle to enter the market. Then were the costs of production and low wage. The long-term
Asian regional development strategy is also a crucial issue between Japanese and European
(American) giants. However different strategies were taken by the mncs to the Chinese
automobile market, which shows part of country-of-origin effects.
As China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) looms closer, it poses
numerous challenges for policy makers. The anticipation and reaction of the mncs facing this
big event also make it more complicate to forecast the future scenario of Chinese auto
industry. Promoting sound, predictable, and stable rules, and a complete set of institutional
reform are essential. Deregulatory policy reforms and market liberalisation will jointly
promoting the Chinese automobile industry along with the continuous inflow of FDI.
Keywords : Industrial policy, Chinese automobile industry, FDI
88
GLOBALIZATION OF CHINESE MUNITIONS ENTERPRISES'
CAR PRODUCTION
Jin CHEN, Takahiro FUJIMOTO, Chunli LEE
This paper undertakes a practical analysis on the Chinese munitionsenterprises'
advance to the car production, their formation of the development strategies and the
globalization process with foreign-ventured enterprises in order to formulate their mass
production system.
Along with the end of the cold war, the Chinese munitions enterprises began to
transfer to the production of civilian goods. Automobile industry became the primary
participation circle to each munitions enterprise. The most successful cases are Chang'an
Automobile (Group) Liability Co., Ltd.(Chang' an Auto) to which Armament Industry
Corporation(Armament Co.) Affiliates, Changhe Aircraft Industry Co. And Harbin Aviation
& Automobile Manufacture Corporation Ltd. To which Aviation Industry General
Corporation affiliate. Their auto production were ranked the top forth, seventh and ninth in
1999.
The background conditions and organization structure of munitions enterprises are
quite different with civilian enterprises in their advance to car production. Different with
civilian enterprises, the car production of successful munitions enterprises almost started from
zero and rapidly increased within short duration. Their development are close related with the
development strategy to China of the global enterprises in the Chinese automobile market.
This paper will analyze on the development history of the munitions enterprises and their
globalization development based on the Actual conditions.
From the historical view, the development of the Chinese munitions enterprises were
affected by the relationship changes with Japan, the former Soviet and America, especially by
the China-Japan War. Therefore the production bases of the Chinese munitions industry in the
inner areas were set up during China-Japan War and were more enforced during the cold war
between America and Soviet. The factories groups which were established in these production
bases and produced military goods or machinery goods became the primary enterprises which
shifted to the automobile production.
The successful munitions enterprises possess rather better management resources and
location conditions. Especially, many years' technological know-how of its machinery
production, trial production of jeep, experience of small quantity production and the industrial
foundation of Chongqing as the location of Chang'an Auto are important conditions which led
to its success later.
89
The strategies of "giving up big road, undertaking two-side roads" especially "Mainly
Targeting Minis" formulated by Armament Corporation and Aviation Corporation in their
initial development period of vehicle production played an important role in rapid increasing
of Mini vehicle makers such as Chang'an Auto and the advance to compact car production.
After the technological introduction of compact car production, Armament
Corporation adopted serial strategies, such as the enforcement of its coordination with foreign
makers speedily, structure reorganization and listed stock and mainly increased the car
production capacity of Chang'an Auto.
From now on, along with WTO participation and motorization, munitions enterprises'
coordination with global enterprises such as Suzuki, Mitsubishi, Fuji Heavy Industry, GM
and Daimler-Chrysler. Will be more enforced and will plan more important role in compact
car(around 1L) market.
90
91
relations
THE MARKET IN THE FACTORY:
EFFECTS AND PROBLEMS OF OUTSOURCING AT FIAT AUTO
Giuseppe BONAZZI
For some years the reasons for outsourcing have been analyzed in the business economy
and management studies literature. Sociological research focusing on the impact of
outsourcing on the social aspects of the production process is almost non-existent, however.
This paper examines the four main cases of outsourcing at Fiat Auto in the last few years. The
consequences on the production flow, organization of work, job-content, and problems in the
day-by-day interactions between people once employed by Fiat and now working for different
companies under the same roof are examined. A particular matter for discussion is how the
relationships between the market and organizational interactions (formal and informal) vary
depending on the type of outsourcing. Finally, a typology of characteristics of the outsourced
activity (sequential or interdependent versus low or high complexity) is outlined.
Keywords : outsourcing, modularization,
automobile industry , core competence,
organization of work, job-content, market hierarchy, reciprocity , contract
92
L’EXTERNALISATION DE SERVICES DANS L’AUTOMOBILE :
UNE ETUDE STATISTIQUE DES LOGIQUES
CONSTRUCTEURS ET FOURNISSEURS
Carole DONADA
Les services à l’industrie occupent aujourd’hui une part importante des échanges
économiques entre les entreprises. Ces échanges s’inscrivent dans les stratégies
d’externalisation des firmes, c’est à dire dans la mise en place des relations de partenariat
contractualisées stables et durables (minimum 2 ans) avec des partenaires extérieurs (cf.
Définition du SESSI – Secrétariat d’Etat à l’Industrie). Dans l’industrie automobile, le recours
à l’externalisation est important ; il couvre l’ensemble des principaux services répertoriés :
information et télécommunication, achats, R&D, logistique, administration générale, services
commerciaux et généraux.
Plus qu’un phénomène de mode stratégique adapté au discours dominant,
l’externalisation de services répond à une véritable logique économique des entreprises. Cette
logique vise à long terme, le recentrage des activités sur l’exploitation de quelques
compétences clefs (core competencies) et à court terme, la recherche d’économies immédiates
et l’amélioration de la performance financière. De ce fait, les 4 grandes motivations
théoriques de l’externalisation de services sont : le recours à des compétences spécifiques
extérieures (approche par la complémentarité des actifs), le recentrage sur le cœur de métier
(théorie de la ressource), la maîtrise des coûts (théorie des coûts de transaction et approche
économique industrielle), et la simplification de la gestion avec notamment, la simplification
de la gestion des ressources humaines.
L’objectif de cette étude est de présenter un bilan statistique de l’externalisation des
services dans l’industrie automobile. Les résultats obtenus permettent non seulement de
valider empiriquement les motivations théoriques de l’externalisation, mais aussi de discuter
des critères qui ont présidé aux choix des prestataires de services, et de relever les grandes
difficultés qui découlent de cette stratégie. L’article est structuré en quatre parties. La
première partie est théorique. Elle situe l’importance des logiques d’externalisation de
services pour les entreprises. La seconde partie introduit l’analyse statistique réalisée à partir
de l’ensemble des données d’enquête du ministère de l’industrie en 1999. La position de
l’industrie automobile et ses spécificités par rapport aux autres grands secteurs industriels qui
externalisent est présentée. La troisième partie de l’article approfondit l’analyse sur les
questions de motivation de l’externalisation, des choix des prestataires et des difficultés
relevées. Les différences marquantes entre les entreprises sont analysées et détaillées pour
répondre aux arguments théoriques énoncés en première partie. De plus, un lien entre le degré
d’externalisation des entreprises et leur performance économique est exploré. Enfin, la
quatrième et dernière partie de l’article discute des contributions et des limites de l’étude. Elle
conclue sur la proposition de pistes de recherche.
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Session 17. Activités immatérielles / Immateriel activities
NOUVEAUX METIERS ET NOUVEAUX ENTRANTS :
VERS QUELLE ORGANISATION POUR LE CANAL
DE DISTRIBUTION AUTOMOBILE ?
Benjamin MORISSE
Cette communication se propose de cerner dans les tendances lourdes qui se
manifestent au niveau de l’aval de cette industrie, des germes de rupture propres à réformer la
distribution automobile. La méthodologie de cette recherche ne saurait se détacher d’une
nécessaire proximité avec son terrain ; elle répond en cela à une logique abductive.
Nous relèverons quelques éléments de rupture significatifs rencontrés dans la
distribution automobile depuis une vingtaine de mois pour nous attacher ensuite à élucider les
options organisationnelles qui pourraient être envisagées pour la nouvelle distribution
automobile.
Les éléments de rupture dans la distribution automobile actuelle
L’impératif technologique
Ø
La vente des automobiles, tout d’abord, voit ses fondamentaux évoluer à l’aune des
show rooms virtuels, de la comparaison des offres en ligne et de toutes les
opportunités commerciales offertes par les technologies de l’information et de la
communication. La rapidité de transfert et la prolifération des informations semble
également de nature à mettre acheteurs et vendeurs en quête de solutions de
mobilité plus que d’objets automobiles seuls. La recherche de solutions de mobilité
adéquates (entre propriété individuelle, location longue durée, location avec option
d’achat, etc.) Modifie substantiellement le métier de vendeur qui devient
progressivement broker ès solutions de mobilité, les constructeurs abandonnant
progressivement leur activité industrielle aux équipementiers pour devenir
coordinateurs de prestations globales incluant la mise à disposition d’une
automobile et des services attachés.
Ø Les métiers de l’après-vente sont également affectés par les nouvelles
technologies. S’il demeure que les interventions de réparation voient leur
fréquence réduite du fait d’une fiabilité croissante des mécaniques, de nouvelles
opérations d’entretien se systématisent du fait de la généralisation d’équipements
comme les climatisations, les filtres à pollens, les boîtes de vitesses automatiques
qui nécessitent des opérations régulières de maintenance. Parallèlement, le
matériel de diagnostic et l’outillage nécessaires à l’intervention sur les mécaniques
actuelles nécessitent des compétences (les mécaniciens d’hier sont devenus des
94
techniciens supérieurs spécialisés en diagnostic et programmation des composants)
et des investissements exclusivement dédiés au constructeur, actifs qui
n’apparaissent pas redéployables auprès d’un autre constructeur.
La réduction des coûts liés à la distribution automobile.
La distribution est un poste de la chaîne de valeur automobile qui a été longtemps
négligé comme gisement potentiel d’économies. Il apparaît que la logistique (du traitement
des commandes à la livraison) permette de réaliser des gains dans l’optique de la réponse
efficace aux clients. La pléthore d’offre sur le marché, favorisée par la multiplication des
niches, laisse néanmoins en suspens la question du paradoxe variété/maîtrise industrielle des
coûts, même si les politiques de plate-forme y apportent une réponse partielle.
La satisfaction des clients dans le contexte d’une offre globale
La satisfaction des clients est couramment caractérisée comme passant essentiellement
par la réduction du temps de traitement des commandes. L’effet made-in n’apparaît pas
négligeable dans la construction de la valeur par la clientèle : à la garantie du pays d’origine
(made in Germany) a succédé celle du constructeur-caution (Cf. Phénomènes rencontrés avec
Skoda et les mécaniques Volkswagen ; Mercedes et BMW aux sites de production disséminés
de par le monde, etc.). La satisfaction des clients dépend également étroitement de
l’assortiment de véhicules que peut proposer un distributeur. A ce titre, les groupes de
distribution (dont une typologie sera fournie dans la communication), de par une taille plus
élevée que celle des concessionnaires traditionnels apparaissent plus à même d’offrir une
réponse rapide et efficace à la demande de variété des clients. L’évolution du cadre
réglementaire européen relatif à la distribution des automobiles semble aller dans le sens
d’une ouverture à la concurrence de la vente des automobiles. La satisfaction des clients peut
également passer par la modicité des coûts générés par l’utilisation du véhicule : après la
pièce de rechange d’origine garantie, les constructeurs proposent aujourd’hui des pièces de
rechange standard garanties. De même, la maîtrise des coûts liés à l’utilisation du véhicule se
manifeste dans l’espacement des rythmes des révisions sur les véhicules (exemple : nouvelle
Opel Corsa : une révision tous les 30000 km)., Par les contrôles gratuits, etc.
Quelle organisation pour la nouvelle distribution automobile ?
Quelle entreprise de distribution ?
Notre propos tentera, au vu des éléments de rupture repérés dans la distribution
automobile actuelle, de dresser le portrait de l’entreprise (des entreprises) de distribution
automobile susceptibles de constituer le paysage à venir. Ce questionnement porte sur le
mode de propriété de l’entreprise, sur sa taille et sur l’environnement concurrentiel
(concurrence ou maintien de l’exclusivité) possible.
Monomarquisme/multimarquisme
Il apparaît que l’intérêt de la question de la représentation multi-marque prenne un
tour différent selon qu’on la considère comme multi-représentation intracorporate (plusieurs
marques du même constructeur) ou comme multi-représnentation intercorporate (plusieurs
95
marques de constructeurs différents). Les phénomènes de badge engineering (Skoda et
Volkswagen) ou de co-branding (Peugeot 806, Citroën Evasion, Fiat Ulysse et Lancia Zeta)
réduisent le domaine de pertinence de la représentation monomarque, avec un retentissement
particulier sur les métiers de l’après-vente.
Spécialistes versus généralistes
On oppose traditionnellement les deux populations sur l’exercice de leurs métiers.
Effectivement, les spécialistes de la distribution automobile sont les acteurs qui n’exercent
qu’un métier sur plusieurs marques (rechange de pneumatiques, spécialistes de l’entretien et
de la réparation rapides, etc.). Les généralistes, quant à eux, sont amenés à exercer les cinq
métiers traditionnels de la distribution automobile (vente de véhicules neufs, de véhicules
d’occasion, entretien et réparation, vente de pièces de rechange et activités financières) sur
une marque. Ils correspondent au modèle traditionnel des concessionnaires, agents et
succursales. Chaque population jouit d’indéniables effets d’expérience (sur un métier ou bien
auprès d’une marque) et les deux semblent être amenées à cohabiter dans le jeu concurrentiel
de la distribution automobile de demain.
Création de valeur en aval et qualité
A la recherche systématique de compression des coûts liés à la distribution automobile
engagée par les constructeurs, nous opposons la création de valeur à ce poste dans une logique
de démarche qualité ; qualité en termes de réponse aux sollicitations du client (obtenir le
modèle de son choix dans des délais raisonnables), de transparence des opérations d’entretien
et de leur facturation, qualité pour une distribution citoyenne qui fait grand cas du respect de
l’environnement par une association très étroite avec les constructeurs dès la conception des
véhicules et citoyenne par une politique active d’apprentissage pour préparer les compétences
dont la distribution de demain aura besoin.
Mots clefs : technologies de l’information et de la communication, réduction des temps,
satisfaction de la clientèle, groupe de distribution, mono/multimarquisme,
spécialistes/généralistes, création de valeur.
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LES BANQUES DES CONSTRUCTEURS
DANS LA DYNAMIQUE DE L'INDUSTRIE AUTOMOBILE AU BRESIL
Didier URI
La communication que nous proposons au 9ème Colloque du GERPISA s'intéresse à
certains aspects du développement des activités des constructeurs automobiles installés au
Brésil dans le domaine financier. A cet égard elle se rattacherait sans doute à l'axe 2 du
programme de recherche rappelé dans l'appel à communications;
Les principales firmes automobiles au Brésil ont en effet crée et développé, certaines
depuis fort longtemps, des banques spécialisées dans le financement à crédit de l'achat de
véhicules. Elles sont actuellement 23, rassemblées dans une association spécialisée
commune : l'ANEF, couvrant les trois branches principales de ce type de financement : le
crédit direct au consommateur, le leasing et les consorcios, forme originale de coopération
entre acheteurs, inventée au début des années 60 par des salariés de la Banco do Brasil, pour
faciliter l'acquisition de biens durables. Devant leur succès grandissant, les banques des
constructeurs ont alors compris l'intérêt de créer à leur tour des consorcios.
A un premier niveau, la communication proposée développera une réflexion sur la
genèse de telles formes institutionnelles et le partenariat original qu'elles opérent entre
consommateurs et producteurs.
Au-delà, elle s'efforcera de préciser la nature des relations -financières et
opérationnelles - entre ces organismes et le groupe automobile dont chacun relève ; en
particulier on examinera la mesure dans laquelle la place grandissante occupée par la finance
au niveau mondial dans les 20 dernières années s'est traduite par une modification
substantielle de ces relations au Brésil.
Cet examen cherchera ainsi à éclairer un débat, qui s'est en effet instauré récemment
avec certains chercheurs associés au Gerpisa. Pour certains (M. Laplane [1999, 2000] par
exemple), les banques des constructeurs ont (et ont eu) surtout comme "rôle" de contribuer à
l'élargissement du marché et à la régularisation de sa croissance, en solvabilisant une demande
sinon insuffisante1.. Pour d'autres, le financement de l'achat doit être surtout vu comme une
source bienvenue de profits, pour des constructeurs confrontés d'une part à des surcapacités
industrielles et d'autre part à des exigences de profitabilité élevées de la part de leurs
actionnaires (K. Williams [1999] par exemple).
1
Il serait tentant d'analyser cette "création" de demande supplémentaire en termes d'externalités
"pécuniaires" à la Rosenstein -Rodan et se poserait les question de sa dynamique et de la répartition de son
"coût" entre firmes.
97
Ces deux types d'effets de l'existence et du développement des banques des
constructeurs, sans être en permanence incompatibles (en fonction de l'origine et du coût de la
"ressource" de ces banques d'un côté, de la croissance des marchés de l'autre), relèvent
néanmoins de logiques opposées - celle d'une finance "soumise" ou au contraire
"dominatrice" - dont il s'agit d'apprécier la réalité, et les transformations, dans le cas du Brésil.
Il s'agira enfin, et ce faisant, d'apprécier l'impact des aspects financiers dans la
fomation et l'évolution de la demande intérieure d'automobiles au Brésil. A cet égard, la
communication prolongera des travaux déjà réalisés (Norberto et Uri [2000], Uri [2000])
d'une part sur la "révolution des carros populares", d'autre part sur les "déterminants à long
terme" de cette demande. Dans le premier travail a été mis en évidence, mais de façon plutôt
qualitative, l'effet des consorcios sur l'explosion du segment des petites cylindrées après 1992;
dans le second travail, de nature économétrique, aucune influence des conditions financières
sur la demande n'a au contraire pu être identifiée. Un tel résultat négatif est surprenant et sans
doute insatisfaisant : il tient pour partie à l'absence de mesure fiable, surtout sur longue
période, des conditions financières. En revenant sur les différentes modalités de financement
des achats de voitures et en particulier sur les taux pratiqués par les banques des
constructeurs, on présentera aussi des indicateurs mieux adaptés, au moins sur la dernière
décennie, des conditions, globales et par constructeurs, de financement de la demande. Ce qui,
en retour, permettra de préciser la façon dont à travers leurs offres de financement, s'exercent
concurrence et coordination entre constructeurs.
Références :
M. LAPLANE [1999] : in 8 ème Rencontre Internationale du Gerpisa
M. LAPLANE [2000] : in Colloque de Bahia ( à paraître)
E. NORBERTO et D. URI [2000] : in Actes du Gerpisa
D. URI [2000] : in Colloque de Bahia ( à paraître)
K. WILLIAMS [1999] : in 8 ème Rencontre Internationale du Gerpisa
98
99
MODULAR ARCHITECTURE, TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE AND
BIRTH OF THIRD GENERATION OFFSHORE PLANTS: THE CASE
DELPHI-JUAREZ (MEXICO)
Arturo LARA RIVERO
The objective of this paper is to explain the birth of a modern research and
development center (R&D) of electronic autoparts, located in Mexico. This maquiladora set
up in 1995 by Delphi Automotive Systems, employed in 1999 a total of 1600 engineers,
technicians and support personnel.
The basic questions that guide this paper are:
Ø
Which are the implications of the electronic / automotive technological
convergence on the spatial and hierarchical distribution and number of suppliers?.
This technological convergence, comes to revalue old electric functions (and
therefore to old suppliers of mature electric parts, such as harness suppliers) and to
insert them into a new technological hierarchy with more intense interactions
between harness suppliers (offshore plants of the electric / electronic autopart
sector) and automotive firms.
Ø
Which is the importance of lock-in strategies, diffusion / segmentation strategies of
modular designs or standards inside hierarchical networks of companies and
technological fields?. This aspect is one of the pillars on which the history of third
generation maquiladoras is reconstructed, Delphi´s case is located in the harness
valley (Ciudad Juárez), a highly specialized region in automotive harness
assemble.
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THE VW‚S MODULAR SYSTEM, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND
WORKERS‚ ORGANISATION IN RESENDE, BRAZIL
Jose Ricardo RAMALHO, Marco Aurelio SANTANA
This paper draws upon on-going research into the changes taking place in the
Brazilian vehicle assembly industry with particular reference to the state of Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. It focuses upon a case study of Volkswagens bus and truck assembly plant and its
workers at Resende. The plant opened in 1996 on a green-field site and was presented as a
major development in vehicle assembly. The unique feature of the plant‚s production system
rests on the relationship between the assembler (VW) and its component suppliers. At
Resende these were involved in a joint enterprise to establish a modular system‰ of
production. In this system, the component suppliers finance a part of the factory and organise
the assembly of their components on site. As such few of the production workers are
employed by the assembler whose main role in the process is to co-ordinate production and
market the vehicle.
The text discusses the originality of VW‚s new form of organization of production,
the strategy of the firm to look for localities with less effective trade union action and the
social effects of this process on the local labour market and the economic development of the
region. It also presents the role played by the local union in negotiating the installation of the
plant, as well as its difficulty to intervene more effectively in the process of wage bargaining
in face of new organization of production . The innovative element ˆ modular system of
production - confers an interesting characteristic on trade union experience in this region.
Some initial observations of the actions of the trade union during the plant‚s first years in
operation show some characteristics that warrant closer attention:
Ø
although lacking any background in the automobile sector, the trade union was
established rapidly, soon building up sufficient know-how to negotiate and protect
the interests of the workers with regard to wages;
Ø the recruitment of better educated, more skilled workers as required by the
company(ies) is a key element in firming up a standard for trade union actions with
broader-ranging participation;
Ø the trade union faces organizational difficulties within the factory, but has
managed to achieve in 1999, the formation of a factory committee to represent the
workers inside the plant.
101
relations
SCALE AND SCOPE
STRATEGIC CHOICES IN THE GERMAN PASSENGER CAR INDUSTRY
Ben DANKBAAR
1. The German passenger car industry consists of six major companies: Volkswagen,
BMW, daimlerchrysler, Porsche, Opel and Ford. I am sure that you are familiar with them. I
will just mention a few important data.
Volkswagen was founded by the German state in 1937, but production of the
“people’s car” designed by Ferdinand Porsche didn’t begin until after the Second World War.
Today, the land Lower Saxonia still owns 20% of Volkswagen. Another 10% is owned by the
state of Kuwait. The headquarters of Volkswagen are in Wolfsburg, a town which grew
around the Volkswagen plant. Wolfsburg is one of the largest automobile production sites in
the world. As a partly state-owned company, Volkswagen has a long tradition of social
responsibility. It has good relations with the social-democratic government of Lower Saxonia
(before he became chancellor for all of Germany, mr. Schroeder was prime minister of Lower
Saxonia). It is the only major employer in the region. Volkswagen is the leading brand of the
Volkswagen Group which includes also the brands of Audi, SEAT and Skoda as well as the
luxury/sports brands Lamborghini, Bugatti, Bentley and Rolls Royce (until 2002).
BMW was founded in 1916 as an engine manufacturer (BMW stands for Bavarian
Motor Works). Its headquarters are in Munich, the capital of the land Bavaria. It started to
manufacture cars before the war, but these production facilities were located outside Bavaria,
in the part of Germany that was occupied by the Soviet Union. BMW started manufacturing
cars in Bavaria in 1952. Since 1959 the Quandt family has a controlling interest in BMW (and
in several other major companies). The corporate culture is in line with the Bavarian roots of
the company: relatively closed, with a preference for traditional values of the Bavarian
countryside.
Daimlerchrysler is the result of a merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in 1998.
Daimler-Benz was itself the result of a merger between two of the oldest car manufacurers in
the world in 1926. For the German part of daimlerchrysler, the most important brand is
Mercedes-Benz, but there is also the small car brand Smart and in 2002, the super luxury
brand Maybach will be launched. The culture of the company is one of social conservatism,
much in line with the social and political culture of the land Baden-Württemburg, in which its
headquarters are located (in Stuttgart). Ownership of daimlerchrysler is relatively widely
distributed, with Americans currently owning approximately 10% of the shares.
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Porsche is much smaller than the other manufacturers. It was founded by Ferdinand
Porsche in the 1930s and is now owned by the families Porsche and Piëch. The present
chairman of the Volkswagen Group, Ferdinand Piëch, is therefore one of the owners of
Porsche. The company sells sports cars and engineering services. It is also located in
Stuttgart, close to the Mercedes factories, but it has traditional links with Volkswagen.
Adam Opel founded his company in 1862 and his successors started to manufacture
cars in 1898. In 1929, Opel was bought by General Motors. The company headquarters and
major production facilities are located near Frankfurt, in the land Hessen.
Ford Werke was founded by Ford in 1925. Since 1931, its headquarters and major
production facilities are located in Cologne, in the land Northrhine-Westfalia. In recent years,
Ford’s European headquarters were also moved to Cologne.
Germany is a federal state. Many aspects of social, economic and educational policy
are the decentralized responsibility of the governments of the different lands. With the
exception of Porsche and daimlerchrysler, each car manufacturer has its headquarters in a
different land. To some extent, therefore, each company has its own government to deal with
and if necessary to represent its interests at the national level.
In my presentation I will concentrate on the four manufacturers, which are wholly or
mainly German owned. Over the past 20 years, the share of these four manufacturers in total
production of cars in Germany has slowly increased from 60% to about 70%. Their share in
the West-European market has fluctuated between 32 and 37% (exluding Skoda and SEAT). I
will not say much about the subsidiaries of Ford and General Motors, but it should be clear
that they are also important players both as manufacturers and as parties on the European
market. The fact that they are located in Germany is a reflection of the strength of the German
automobile industry. Many Germans and many people working for these two companies
consider them as German companies, probably more so in the case of Opel than in the case of
Ford.
2. Let us now turn to the position of the German manufacturers on the European
market. It should be noted that the European market for passenger cars is larger than the
markets of North America and Japan put together (this is partly due to the very high share of
light trucks on the North American market). In 1999, 15,045,000 passenger casr were sold in
Western Europe (the 15 members of the European Union, Norway and Switzerland). If we
add Central and Eastern Europa and Turkey, the market increases to 17,469,000 cars in 1999.
The German market accounted for 3.8 million cars in 1999, or about 25% of the West
European market.
The share of the four German car manufacturers in the West-European market has
slowly increased over the past 15 years. If we would include Skoda and SEAT, the share of
Volkswagen would of course be considerably higher in the 1990s. The increasing market
share in Europe cannot be explained by the market share on the home market, but on the
contrary by increasing market shares in other countries. The European market consists of
many national markets with quite distinct characteristics. In all of these countries, the share of
the national manufacturers has been decreasing and the share of the German manufacturers
has been increasing. These pictures also show how different the preferences in these national
markets still are.
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I think that it is safe to conclude that the German car manufacturers have done quite
well over the past twenty years. They have been able to maintain or improve their position in
the face of high and increasing competition.
3. What explains the apparent success of the German car manufacturers?
There are many explanations that point to the favorable influence of German national
traditions and institutions. First, there is a strong system of vocational training, based on
apprenticeship in companies (but the training is not company-specific) and co-managed by
unions and employers. Secondly, workers through the freely elected workers’ councils have
legal rights of co-determination on many policy issues in the company. Unions are also
represented in the supervisory boards of the companies. Thirdly, there is a long tradition of
engineers taking top management positions. There are no business schools in Germany, but at
the technical universities, students can follow courses in business administration. These
institutions have resulted in a high skill, high wage, high commitment economy with a
relatively mobile workforce (with generally recognized training certificates), highly trained
first line supervisors and engineering-dominated management.
If these factors can explain the success of the German manufacturers, why is it that the
subsidiaries of Ford and GM have been less successful in the past decade? I would suggest
that this depends on company strategies. The German traditions and institutions are only
supportive of success, if a company makes use of them in an appropriate way. It is my
hypothesis that during the past decade, the American headquarters of Ford and GM have
imposed policies on their German subsidiaries, which did not make adequate use of the strong
points offered by the German environment. The American manufacturers, and especially
Ford, have concentrated too much on global economies of scale, instead of focusing on the
high skill, high quality, high engineering traditions of the German industry.
4. I would suggest that most problems of strategic management in the passenger car
industry can be understood in terms of scale and scope. Scale refers to the long-standing
tradition of the industry to reap economies of scale by making large numbers of more or less
the same product. Economies of scale are expected to result in low prices and therefore a high
market share. Of course, since the days that General Motors took over Ford’s leading position
on the American market in the 1920s, we know that scale is not the only thing that counts, but
it cannot be denied that the car industry is still an industry governed by the logic of mass
production. The logic of mass production is still one of the main forces behind the
globalization of the industry. Behind such concepts as the “world car” is the idea that there
are important savings in making one car for many different markets. Scope on the other hand
refers to the ability to make many different and new products. Not one car for many different
markets, but different cars for different markets. By making different products for different
types of customers, a high market share can be achieved in spite of the fact that economies of
scale are not or only partially realized. The willingness of customers to pay for the costs of
product differentiation and innovation increases with rising incomes. The number of market
segments and niches is constantly increasing. Of course, product differentiation cannot be an
excuse for a neglect of costs and productivity, but there is an important difference if a
company looks for competitive advantage in scale and costs or if it competes on the basis of
product differentiation and innovation.
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In his famous study of the automobile industry, William Abernathy argued in 1978
that the American manufacturers had focused so much on productivity and costs that they had
lost the ability for product innovation. He called this the “productivity dilemma”. Abernathy
warned that competition by innovation would become more and more important. Therefore,
the Americans would have to find a way out of their productivity dilemma. In his view, the
European manufacturers had been much stronger in product innovation, but they had not been
able to achieve the levels of productivity of the American industry. An important reason for
this difference in the development paths of the American and European industries was the
difference in size of the markets. The European market was fragmented, whereas the North
American market was a single and homogeneous market. The fact that the Americans were
more productive than the European manufacturers did not have much impact on competition
in Europe, because the American passenger cars were not sold in Europe. Ford and GM made
European cars in Europe and American cars in the United States. Both companies found it
very difficult to make small cars in the United States, when they wanted to (in the 1970s), in
spite of the fact that they had this capability in house in Europe.
Abernathy’s emphasis on the need for innovation was certainly justified. Indeed, in the
course of the 1980s it became clear that the micro-electronics revolution was re-inventing the
automobile. Nevertheless, most public debate about the industry in the 1980s and early 1990s
was concerned with issues of productivity. Competition by Japanese manufacturers and
especially by Toyota showed that 1) high productivity could be achieved with lower numbers;
2) high productivity/low cost could be combined with high quality. The American study on
“lean production” received a lot of attention in Europe. Looking back ten years later,
however, we can see that the Americans again went much further in adopting “Japanese”
concepts and focusing on productivity than the European manufacturers did. Productivity in
European factories has certainly improved tremendously, but it probably still lags behind
Japanese and American plants.
5. Inside Europe, the same differences that existed between the industries of Europe
and the United States were reproduced at the level of individual corporations. In an OECD
study published in 1984 for which I did some work, it was argued that especially in Europe,
there were two major survival strategies for car manufacturers: the specialist strategy and the
mass production (volume) strategy. On the one hand there were the volume manufacturers
like Volkswagen. Fiat, Renault and Peugeot and on the other hand, there were the specialists
which had survived successfully by focusing mainly on the top segments of the market. In
Italy (Ferrari, Lancia, Maserati, Bugatti, Lamborghini, Alfa Romeo, etc.), In Britain (Rolls
Royce, Bentley, MG), in Sweden (Volvo, Saab), in Germany (Daimler Benz, Porsche,
BMW). The innovative potential of the European industry that Abernathy had talked about,
was particularly apparent in these successful specialist manufacturers.
Now, twenty years later, we know that almost all the specialists have been absorbed by
volume manufacturers, or they are trying to become volume manufacturers themselves. What
happened and what are the strategic options today?
At the beginning of the 1980s, Volkswagen was finally coming out of a long and
difficult period. For several decades after the Second World War, it had been a classical single
product mass manufacturer, manufacturing only the Beetle. Its engineers had devoted a
considerable part of their energy to achieving high levels of (inflexible, dedicated)
automation. Between 1968 and 1980, it changed from a single product company to a modern
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volume manufacturer offering a range of vehicles for different sections of the market. In terms
of our categories, however, the company was still mainly focused on scale and scale
economies. This shows in several ways. First of all, Volkswagen continued to rely on
automation, which is of course only interesting, if you produce large numbers. Building on its
experience with the Beetle and using the strong German engineering environment,
Volkswagen invested considerably in high levels of increasingly flexible automation.
Secondly, Volkswagen invested in production activities in low-wage countries (Mexico,
China, Brazil), not just to supply these markets, but also to export to other regions. The
production facility in the United States, on the other hand, was closed in 1987. Thirdly,
Volkswagen started to invest in non-automotive activities by taking over Triumph-Adler a
manufacturer of typewriters and office equipment. All these strategic choices were based on
the conviction that the automobile is a mature product, that competition will be based on price
(Volkswagen had lost that competiton in the United States against the Japanese
manufacturers) and that as a consequence demand will be strongly fluctuating, which makes
diversification a stabilizing option.
In the second half of the 1980s, however, Volkswagen’s strategy started to shift away
from scale and mere numbers, in the direction of scope and differentiation. This began with
the incorporation of first SEAT (1986) and then Skoda (1991). Of course, these actions were
also efforts to buy market share and increase scale, but the brands were maintained as separate
entities, so that attention had to focus on product development, product differentiation and
product innovation.
Volkswagen had almost overspent itself in these takeovers and when mr. Piëch
became chairman, he had to hire mr. Lopez in order to save costs. However, Piëch’s main
achievement is no doubt the creation of a huge gamma of carefully branded products. The
current product range of the Volkswagen Group covers practically all market niches up to the
very top niches with Bentley and Bugatti. These policies reflect different convictions
compared to those of the 1970s and 1980s: 1. The Volkswagen Group will continue to
manufacture for the European market in European plants. 2. Competition on price can and
should be avoided. 3. Instead, competition should focus on quality and on having an
appropriate car for every customer. Of course, that doesn’t mean that Volkswagen can neglect
the issues of cost and productivity. Like all German car manufacturers, Volkswagen has tried
to learn about the Japanese manufacturing methods. However, it is typical for the engineer
Piëch, but also for the larger German environment, that savings were sought in a drastic
reduction of the number of platforms rather than in labor productivity. Under Piëch, the idea
of a platform strategy has been carried to new levels of sophistication. Today in the
Vokswagen Group, the emphasis of strategy is clearly on scope, innovation and technology.
Special care is undertaken to give the Volkswagen brand a “green” image.
Let us now turn to the strategies of BMW and Daimler Benz.
In the beginning of the 1980s, both companies were proceeding on the assumption that
a specialist strategy was a viable strategy. By the end of the 1980s, however, things began to
change. What happened was that the traditional volume manufacturers were beginning to
offer cars that were competing with the luxury model. Volkswagen was doing that with Audi
(in the 1980s under the leadership of Piëch), but the major impulse for BMW and Daimler
Benz to rethink their strategic position came from the launch of the Lexus. It became clear
that volume manufacturers had acquired the capability to manufacture high quality luxury
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cars, which could compete in the hitherto safe specialist sectors of the market. As a result,
both Mercedes and BMW began to think of ways to increase the scale and scope of their
operations.
Daimler Benz began to increase scale by setting up production in North America and
then also expanded its product range (scope) to lower market segments by the introduction of
the A-class and the launching of the new small car brand Smart. A major move towards
becoming a volume manufacturer was made by the merger with Chrysler in 1998 and more
recently by buying a third of Mitsubishi Motors and .. Hyundai. It is still too early to judge if
this strategy will been successful. The current Chrysler product line-up (Jeep, Ram pick-up,
Minivan) is beginning to age and facing increasing competition. The PT-Cruiser will not be
enough to replace them. It will be a huge challenge in the coming years to come up with a
convincing range of cars for the four main brands. In that sense, daimlerchrysler is now in the
position where Volkswagen was about ten years ago. However, the cultural differences
between Volkswagen/Audi and Skoda and SEAT were in all likelihood much smaller than
those in the new daimlerchrysler Group, even if we take into consideration that Chrysler was
more oriented towards research and product innovation than the other American car
manufacturers.
BMW was relatively slow in reacting to the challenges presented by the upmarket
movement of the volume manufacturers. Then it followed Daimler Benz in expanding scale
by setting up production facilities in the United States. Its major move to increase scope was
the takeover of Rover, which as you know became a complete failure. Cultural differences
may have played a role here, but it appears that Rover has underestimated the problems and
weaknesses of the British car manufacturer, which had been going downhill for several
decades. BMW was afraid to intervene and impose itself. As a result, Rover remained too
British. On top of this, economic developments also had a negative impact, especially the
strength of the pound against the Euro. After the failure of the Rover experiment, BMW is
saying that it wants to achieve its aims of higher volume by itself. The new Mini has been
presented to the public at the Paris auto show. Also, a small BMW model has been announced
and at the top of the market, Rolls Royce will become a BMW brand in 2002. Much will
depend on the success of the Mini. If we look at the recent history of all the other specialist
manufacturers, it seems highly doubtful that BMW will survive as an independent car
manufacturer. This decision is in the hands of the Quandt family.
Porsche is really the only remaining independent specialist manufacturer. It has clearly
chosen to remain a niche player, even though it is not a small company with over 8,000
employees and a turnover of almost 5 billion Deutschmark in 1998/99. Next to the 911 and
the Boxster, it is now developing a multi-purpose vehicle. It can remain an independent
company, because the owners have no interest in selling it.
6. Let me conclude these observations on strategic developments in the German car
industry with a brief discussion of problems and prospects.
Ø
Volkswagen’s platform strategy is currently very successful and can be considered
a model for the other German companies. Volkswagen is making good use of
German technology, engineering, skills and industrial relations and has introduced
some of these features in Skoda and SEAT. Some critics argue that the platform
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strategy is leading to cannibalism and to a loss of identity for the various brands.
So far, it is difficult to prove that cannibalism is important, because the
Volkswagen Group as a whole has gained market share. Many people are still
prepared to pay a considerably higher price and buy a Volkswagen Golf or an
Audi, even if important product features can also be found in a Skoda Octavia or a
SEAT Toledo. Moreover, the four brands are still quite distinct in style and their
products certainly still look different.
Ø The problems of integrating different corporate cultures are easily underestimated.
Volkswagen has been quite successful, probably because it was clearly dominant
in the relationship with Skoda and SEAT. BMW maybe failed because it was too
respectful of the Rover culture. Daimlerchrysler may run into problems, because
none of the partners can completely dominate the other.
Ø There is a natural tendency for every brand to try to move its models towards the
top part of every market segment. This can be seen everywhere, because the profit
margins are higher in the top of a segment. The result is continuous high pressure
on the top brands to come up with new product features without pricing
themselves out of a segment.
7. The German car manufacturers are all set on a strategic course which is
emphasizing scope, more than scale: product innovation more than productivity. In view of
the traditions and institutions of their home country, this is in all likelihood the best strategy
for them to follow.
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PRODUCT EVOLUTION AND THE PROCESS OF COMPETENCE
LOCATIONTHREE CASE STUDIES OF BMW,
DAIMLERCHRYSLER AND VOLKSWAGEN
Ludger PRIES, Christian SANDIG, Oliver SCHWEER
For the success story of the German Big Three – BMW, daimlerchrysler and
Volkswagen – the generation of new products was crucial. The launch of the New Beetle in
the case of Volkswagen, of the sportive Z 3-series in the case of BMW and of the M-class in
the case of daimlerchrylser reveals new product strategies towards specific markets niches
that are coherent with the overall company traditions, image and profile: the worldwide
renown Volkswagen old beetle (Käfer) as symbol of durability, economic efficiency and
rationality, reminiscence to the famous BMW racing cars of the 1950s as expression of high
tech power engines and sportive design for individuals, and the Mercedes-Benz tradition of
producing high valued utility cars with great value stability and image.
Interestingly, all three product innovations – New Beetle, Z 3 and M-class – although
at the core of the correspondent company’s identity and image were not produced in the
headquarters or in central production sites in Germany but abroad and even overseas! In the
case of the Z 3 and the M-class production began in all new plants in the USA. Thus, product
launching and the corresponding production of the new models reveals not only new product
strategies but also new internationalization strategies and new geographic locations.
Ø
Ø
Why was the production of the three new products located in the overseas regions?
Does this indicate a major shift in the spatial location of competencies, functions
and resources of the three companies?
Ø (How) Does the process of product generation in the three cases reveal new
internationalization strategies and profiles of the three companies?
Ø Comparing the three product evolution cases: What are the peculiarities and the
structural problems in each case?
The paper will discuss these questions. Firstly, the paper will outline the product
evolution process as a crucial focus for analyzing organizational changes and shifts in
internationalization strategies (section 1). Some methodological issues of how to measure the
internationalization process of automobile companies will be addressed and the method of
following the product evolution will be presented as a means for analyzing the geographical
mapping of the distribution of resources, functions and competencies in international
companies (see George Marcus’ “Follow the thing” und Gary Geraffi’s “value chain”).
Product evolution will be conceptualized as a social process consisting roughly spoken of four
stages (see Clark/Fujimoto 1992): concept creation, product planning and preparation, product
development, and production preparation.
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Secondly, the paper will analyze the three cases of the New Beetle/Volkswagen, the Z
3/BMW and the M-class/daimlerchrysler (section 2) according to the following four stages of
product generation:
Ø
Concept creation until ‘duty list’/Lastenheft (where came the impulse for
development of new products from? Which were the main strategic aims at the
beginning – if there were explicit goals? When and how were the main definitions
of the new project fixed?);
Ø Product planning and preparation (technical specifications, decision on main
components, mechanical prototype, model layout/styling, technical checks of
viability, final decision on product realisation);
Ø Product development (complete development and test of prototypes, planning of
production system, plant specifications and search for plant location, planning of
sourcing, investment, organization and work);
Ø Production preparation (process development, pilot cars, pre-production, 0-series,
beginning of series production, reaching full production line).
Finally, we will compare the three cases and discuss the structural pending problems
(section 3): What are the main similarities and differences between the three cases? Which are
the most important structural tensions and problems for the future?
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L’INDUSTRIE AUTOMOBILE SE REORGANISE POUR LE RECYCLAGE
Heloisa V. De MEDINA
Cet article est organisé en trois parties, la première fournit un panorama des
reglementations sur l’automobile et l’environnement faisant une comparaison entre l’Europe
et le Brésil. La deuxième partie tient au recyclage à l’intérieur de la stratégie des entreprises,
suivie d’un insight sur les connaissances transversales et le trasfert de savoirs qui sont
entrainées par les nouveaux résaux qui se forment pour le recyclage, et font donc objet de la
troisième partie de ce texte. Les exemples des constructeurs automobiles qui ont récemment
instalé des nouvelles usines au Brésil sont discuté à la fin de cette partie ainsi que les activités
de recycleurs au Brésil, dont nous avons à peine commecer à nous en occuper dans cette
phase de notre étude.
Enfin, compte tenu que notre étude se déroule encore, nos conclusions se constituent
plutôt une ouverture sur le futur que des remarques finales. Pourtant, d’après ce que nous
avons dèjá étudié, nous pouvons remarquer que le recyclage automobile est devenu une
nécessité et que toutes les branches du secteur automobile doivent en prendre conscience. De
nos jours, le nombre et la varieté croissantes des matériaux dont l’automobiles sont constitué
posent aux concepteurs, à la fois, des constraintes téchniques, économiques et écologiques.
Par conséquent, afin de prendre les meilleurs décisions, les constructeurs doivent faire
le choix des matériaux en accord avec les chimistes qui sont chargés de découvrir des
procédés de recyclage. Par exemple, plus le matériau a une forte valeur intrinsèque (cas
notamment des plastiques techniques), plus les conditions économiques sont favorables à une
valorisation physico-mécanique (recyclage complet). Ce choix de matériaux facilitera aussi la
valorisation après broyage.
Un autre élément important de ce choix est le circuit "véhicules en fin de vie". En
effet, les constructeurs doivent optimiser le futur démontage des pièces des véhicules dès la
conception de nouveaux projets. Ils doivent concevoir dans le but d’une valorisation après
démontage. Cette valorisation sera physico-mécanique. Il faut donc favoriser le marquage, le
démontage facile et rapide des pièces afin de faciliter l'opération de démontage.
En plus de ces contraintes techniques, il faut bien sûr ne pas oublier le critère de coût.
Car personne n’ira acheter une voiture 100% recyclable mais cinquante fois plus chère qu’un
véhicule à 80% recyclable. La recherche de la diminution des coûts causés par les nouveaux
efforts de conception en fonction du recyclage ou les procédés de recyclage, peut être à la
base d'une modification des filières automobiles existantes (constructeurs et recycleurs). Une
optimisation du circuit global nécessite un partenariat des différents acteurs. Un tel partenariat
permettra peut-être de concilier totalement "Environnement" et "Economie".
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En outre si le recyclage ne peut pas résoudre à lui seul le problème de la gestion des
déchets, il peut ou moins contribuer a une gestion durable de l’exctraction de matières
premières vierges. Les industriels du recyclage ne doivent pas être surchargés mais au
contraire accompagnés et soutenus aussi bien que ses partenaires founisseurs de matériaux à
recycler. Il reste donc encore beaucoup d’efforts à fournir avant que le recyclage automobile
ne devienne une chose simple, évidente et efficiente. Mais la prise de conscience des
gouvernements et des populations du monde entier maintenant ne peuvent que donner de bons
espoirs.
Mais pour que toute cette prise de conscience environmentale soit effective il faut aux
gouvernements stimuler la construction des réseaux industriels et de recherche et pousser tous
les constructuers et founisseurs automobiles au Brésil à adopter des strategies respectueuses
de l’environnement comme ils font déjà dans leurs pays d’origine. La sauvegarde de
l’environnement ne passe pas seulement par le recyclage certes mais les connaissances sur les
matériaux et les résaux pour le recyclage ont beaucoup à contribuer, soit pour faire les bons
choix dans les projets soit pour les faire récuperer dans les voitures en fin de vie et dans leurs
composants.
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Session 20. Activités immatérielles : la nouvelle distribution / Immateriel
Activities : New Distribution
LA DISTRIBUTION AUTOMOBILE A FLUX TIRES
Eric BALLOT, Hugues MOLET
Le contexte de la logistique en matière de distribution automobile
L’industrie automobile, par son importance économique et par ses nombreuses
innovations productives, est un secteur traditionnellement très fécond en réflexions
économiques et en méthodes d’organisation industrielle. En particulier, la question des
modèles de production fait l’objet de nombreux débats depuis l’origine de cette industrie
jusqu’aux travaux récents du MIT (WOMACK et al. 1990) ou du Gerpisa (BOYER et
FREYSSENET, 2000).
Ces débats abordent essentiellement la question de la production avec une extension
notable vers l’amont sous deux formes : les équipementiers et la conception. Jusqu’à une date
récente la distribution, en aval, n’avait pas fait l’objet d’autant de débats. Cependant les
dernières années ont été marquées par l’émergence d’une profonde mutation de la distribution
et des travaux apparaissent sur ses futures formes possibles (JULLIEN, 1999).
La logistique associée à la distribution automobile, comme pour d’autres produits,
évolue d’une fonction de support vers un rôle plus stratégique, notamment dans le contexte du
built and delivery to order déjà expérimenté par les constructeurs de matériels informatiques.
Le projet de Renault « Nouvelle Distribution » en est un exemple.
Nous rappellerons dans un premier temps les facteurs de déstabilisation de la
distribution automobile, leurs conséquences sur la logistique très spécifique des véhicules
avant d’analyser les facteurs de transformation et de dépendance des acteurs de la chaîne
logistique pour aboutir à une nouvelle distribution automobile.
Les évolutions récentes de la distribution
Elles se déclinent suivant trois axes.
Ces dernières années, les constructeurs et leurs équipementiers ont réalisé des efforts
importants pour fabriquer des véhicules avec une personnalisation de plus en plus grande.
Cependant le mode de distribution traditionnel des véhicules demande aux concessionnaires
de commander des véhicules entre 4 et 6 semaines avant leur livraison, délai qui conduit
fréquemment le client à se rabattre sur un modèle en “stock”. La diversité permise par les
usines ne se retrouve donc pas totalement offerte aux clients finaux sauf s’ils acceptent un
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délai important… Ainsi, même chez Toyota à l’origine de la production en flux tirés, au
maximum 35 % de la production est affecté à des commandes clients (Shimizu 1999). Des
taux voisins peuvent être constatés chez des constructeurs européens. La logistique de
distribution s’achemine donc vers une part de plus en plus importante de flux tirés par la
demande et avec des exigences accrues de délai court et fiable. La contribution de la
logistique à la réduction du délai devrait être de l’ordre d’une semaine à l’échelle de l’Europe.
Les nouvelles technologies de l’information ouvrent de nombreuses perspectives de
changement :
Ø
Personnalisation directe par le consommateur ou son agent, suivi en temps réel de
sa commande et de la distribution de son véhicule,
Ø Utilisation d’Internet pour la vente de véhicules neufs,…
Enfin, l’approche d’une fin probable du règlement d’exemption 1475 en Europe en
2002 ouvre des perspectives stratégiques importantes aussi bien pour les constructeurs que
pour des réseaux indépendants (Kniebhiler et Giaoui 1998).
La spécificité de la logistique des véhicules automobiles
La logistique des véhicules est un secteur un peu à part de la logistique générale par le
fait qu’elle s’appuie sur de nombreuses ressources dédiées et onéreuses. En effet, les moyens
de transport ont en général une capacité très faible, ce qui fait peser une forte contrainte de
saturation sur l’organisation transport.
Malgré des volumes importants, les véhicules sont gérés à l’unité ce qui implique peu
de marges de manœuvre pour lisser la charge ou changer l’affectation des véhicules d’un
concessionnaire à un autre par exemple.
Une très grande irrégularité et une faible prévisibilité des volumes à approcher d’une
destination sont constatées jour après jour. Ce phénomène témoigne d’une polarisation des
usines sur leur fonctionnement interne et la disponibilité de leurs approvisionnements, bien
plus que sur les conditions de la distribution des véhicules.
L’amélioration de la logistique de distribution en termes de fiabilité, de délai et de
coût se fera donc dans un cadre déjà fortement contraint.
Vers la création de supply chains pour l’automobile ?
La logistique en flux tirés n’est qu’un élément par rapport à l’objectif d’une nouvelle
distribution.. Cependant, cette logistique soulève déjà de nombreuses questions qui devraient
contribuer à réorganiser le secteur. En effet, on s’aperçoit que cela :
Ø
Change les termes du contrat qui lie un constructeur avec son logisticien de
distribution, car il n’y est plus seulement question d’acheminement de véhicule
dans un délai convenu mais de gestion de « rendez-vous » avec des clients et ceci
alors que de nombreux aléas peuvent survenir dans l’ensemble de la chaîne
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logistique, notamment en amont. Le partage des risques et des responsabilités
devient alors un enjeu et un facteur d’incertitude important pour les acteurs de
cette chaîne.
Ø
Renforce d’une manière importante l’interdépendance entre la programmation des
usines et la programmation du transport. En effet, la logistique de production se
trouve cernée d’un coté par la séquence de fabrication de l’usine et de l’autre par la
promesse faite au client, d’où une nécessité de cohérence des décisions prises par
chaque partenaire de la chaîne logistique. Cette interdépendance des flux en
entraîne alors d’autres comme : les choix d’organisation y compris physique, les
systèmes d’information, les engagements avec les fournisseurs, …
Ø
Conduit à une parcellisation des flux, notamment auprès des concessionnaires,
facteur d’évolution des réseaux logistiques.
Un haut niveau d’intégration fonctionnelle sera nécessaire à un fonctionnement de la
distribution automobile en flux tendus. Ce mouvement d’intégration, qui fut souligné pour les
produits de grande consommation (Dornier 1997), se trouve ici confronté à la spécificité et à
la complexité des solutions à mettre en œuvre par les prestataires logistiques de l’automobile.
Les interdépendances qui en découlent en termes de systèmes d’information ou d’organisation
ne seront pas neutres sur ce secteur : contrôle hiérarchique des prestataires par les
constructeurs ou les distributeurs, ou apparition, comme dans d’autres domaines, de
prestataires puissants et indépendants des industriels.
Bibliographie
Boyer R. Freyssenet M. 2000, Les modèles productifs, Editions la Découverte.
Dornier P.P. 1997, Recomposition de l’approche logistique dans le secteur des produits de
grande diffusion : intégration fonctionnelle, intégration sectorielle et intégration
géographique, thèse de l’Ecole des Mines de Paris.
Jullien B. 1999, La distribution automobile vers le partenariat ou la taylorisation ?, 8ème
colloque international du Gerpisa.
Kniebhiler M.J. Giaoui F.S., 1998, l’automobile sans concession, Editions de l’Organisation.
Shimizu K. 1999, Le Toyotisme, Editions la Découverte.
Womack J.P., Jones D.T. Ross D., 1990, The machine that changed the world, Rawson
Associates, New York.
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RENOUVELER LE MODELE STRATEGIQUE :
LA DIMENSION HUMAINE DANS LE MODELE
DE LA FABRICATION A LA COMMANDE
Christophe CHABERT
Les firmes automobiles sont aujourd'hui confrontées à de profondes évolutions, tant
technologiques, qu'économiques qui nécessitent un renouvellement d'une partie de leur
modèle productif. Dans ce cadre, la plupart des constructeurs européens partagent la volonté
de re concevoir leur modèle de distribution et de façon générale les systèmes de la chaîne
logistique1 étendue. Cette évolution se traduit par la mise en place de nouveaux systèmes
d'information, et de process de coordination et d'allocation de ressources plus performants et
plus agiles En effet après avoir concentré leurs efforts sur l'amélioration de leur process
productif, les constructeurs automobiles souhaitent désormais faire de la distribution un réel
avantage concurrentiel.
L'article s'efforcera de préciser les enjeux d'une telle évolution. Le cadre théorique
d'analyse repose sur une comparaison des forces et faiblesse de chaque modèle mis en œuvre
par les principaux constructeurs automobiles, et une évaluation2 de leur force d'impact
transverses sur les process connexes de l'entreprise. Nous appréhenderons au travers des
enjeux humains, et des impacts en termes de coordination des compétences et des
connaissances tant au sein de la firme que dans ses interrelations avec son environnement, la
nature de ce défi.
Description synthétique du plan de l'article
Le texte présentera d'abord une rapide taxonomie des systèmes de distribution mis en
œuvre par les constructeurs automobile (du système de fabrication à la commande des
constructeurs spécialistes à faible volume, au système de fabrication à la commande3 des
constructeurs généralistes à fort volume, en passant par le système de fabrication sur stocks
qui demeure le système le plus couramment utilisé par les constructeurs généralistes). Nous
présenterons ensuite les tentatives entreprises par certains constructeurs pour reconfigurer leur
système de chaîne logistique étendue. Nous montrerons combien les évolutions des systèmes
de distribution sont au cœur des interrelations unissant les constructeurs et leur environnement
(fournisseurs en amont de la chaîne logistique, réseau de distribution et client final en aval) et
1
Il s'agit là du concept anglo saxon de "supply chain"
Les données que nous présenterons seront issues, pour une part des données constructeurs, pour l'autre
par des données publiées par des organismes de recherche ou des rapports académiques ou des publications
d'organismes financiers.
3
Il s'agit là du concept de "Build-to-Order" couramment appelé BTO.
2
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en quoi ils participent à l'émergence d'une nouvelle variante de modèle productif centré sur le
client. Nous présenterons les défis technologiques (nouvelles technologies de l'information et
de la communication) et humains (besoin en formation des réseau de commercialisation de
véhicules neufs, ainsi que des acteurs centraux participant à l'animation de la chaîne
logistique) auxquels les constructeurs devront faire face. Nous soulignerons les impacts sur
les structures organisationnelles mises en œuvre et analyserons ces liens sous l'angle de la
coordination des compétences et des connaissances requises pour faire fonctionner des
modèles désormais complexes et hautement intégrés. Nous conclurons sur les enjeux
politiques (en faisant mention
Dans la première partie du texte, nous présentons brièvement les systèmes de
distribution automobiles et leur caractéristiques. Nous montrerons les avantages et
inconvénients de chacun des systèmes et replacerons leur validité dans l'environnement du
système automobile régional. Nous qualifierons ces systèmes en nous appuyant sur quelques
indicateurs de performances (délai entre commande et livraison, niveau des stocks, part des
commandes servies sur fabrication) par classe de constructeur (généralistes, spécialistes).
Nous tenterons ensuite d'esquisser une relation entre les stratégies de profit mises en œuvre
par les constructeurs et les décisions de reconfiguration de leur système de distribution et de
leur chaîne logistique étendue.
Dans la seconde partie, nous nous efforcerons de présenter quelques tentatives de
constructeurs automobiles dans la re conception de leur distribution et de leur chaîne
logistique. Nous en profiterons pour constater la multiplicité des modèles et tenterons de
distinguer les mécanismes communs. Nous identifierons dans ces dispositifs la place des
NTIC et les impacts de celles-ci sur les process métiers et les portefeuilles de compétences à
développer au sein de la structure organisationnelle de la firme. Par ailleurs, nous introduirons
les interrelations avec l'évolution des agencements organisationnels. Nous attirerons
l'attention sur le caractère réellement stratégique de ce domaine et sur la nature transversale de
ses impacts, tant sur les process connexes de l'entreprise (ingénierie produit/process, achat,
approvisionnement, fabrication, …) que sur les structures mêmes des formes
organisationnelles retenues.
Dans la troisième partie, nous analyserons les enjeux et les conditions de succés des
projets de refonte des systèmes de distribution et de la chaîne logistique étendue. Nous
évaluerons les impacts en termes de process commercial et industriel et replacerons cette
problématique au sein du questionnement sur le management des ressources humaines, des
compétences requises, et des connaissances à transmettre aux acteurs de cette révolution que
représente le passage d'un modèle centré sur la fabrication à un modèle centré sur le client
final.
En conclusion, nous attirerons l'attention sur le fait que le renouvellement des
systèmes de distribution et des chaînes logistiques étendues des constructeurs automobiles,
pour nécessaires et ambitieux qu'il soit ne doit pas occulter les efforts nécessaires à engager
dans le domaine du management du savoir. Nous interpellerons sur le lien qu'il convient de
tisser entre le déploiement d'une nouvelle variante d'un modèle productif centré sur le client et
l'indispensable réflexion à mener sur la politique RH à long terme. Par ailleurs nous
soulignerons les nouvelles relations partenariales mises en œuvre par la firme dans ses
contacts avec son environnement et appréhenderons les impacts de la qualité de ces relations
sur les performances induites des systèmes.
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EXPERIENCES REGARDING DEALER-DELIVERY DISTRIBUTION
FROM CAR PLANTS IN FLANDERS
Bart KAMP
Flanders (B) represents the region in Europe with the highest volume of car production
per capita (FFIO, 2000). This concentration not only results in positive economic side-effects
such as employment creation, but also in less desirable externalities in the form of large scale
transport movements.
As most cars are transported to other continental European areas with a high
population density and order-to-delivery times tend to be short, most vehicle transports take
place by road haulage. In this context, the transport externalities created by the car industry
negatively affect its perceived overall environmental performance.
Fortunately, Flanders -being located in the centre of the Rhine-Scheldt delta- has
access to an extensive inland navigation network and a well-functioning harbour system. In
addition, most of the waterways offer adequate conditions for large scale waterway transport.
In order to reduce road haulage pollution as well as congestion of the highly saturated
road traffic system, both the Flemish government and the European Commission support and
initiate multimodal (rail-road and waterway-road) initiatives of private companies, as part of
their transport and environmental policies.
For car producers, multimodal transport offers advantages and means to improve their
distribution capabilities. The larger capacity of alternative transport modes opens e.g.
Possibilities for « rolling stock », for the offering of several additional value added logistics
services on terminals which are conventionally the responsibility of the dealer and a shorter
lead-time for « unsold » cars which can not remain at the production site.
However, whereas rail-road delivery to dealers has already been adopted extensively,
waterway-road distribution is still only used on a very small scale and can be considered to be
almost in an embrionic stage.
Ashayeri et al. (2000) have shown through econometric modelling that on a European
basis, and from a macro-economic point of view, the Western-European car distribution
system, could theoretically obtain approximately 20% cost reduction, 40% CO2 and fuel
consumption reduction and 49% reduction in transported kilometres, by adopting multimodal
and inter-firm supply chain management.
Based on a study of several car distribution cases in Flanders, the really "achievable"
gains and possibilities, barriers and pitfalls related to a more extended use of waterway-road
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transport were identified. Remarkably, not only are investments in infrastructural assets a way
to stimulate its use, but the formation of alliances among several plants of different car
constructors regarding their logistic and distribution apparatus and specific origin-destination
relations, also represents a significant means to increase the use of inland waterway
navigation as part of the distribution chain.
As logistics services providers integrate the product flows from different
manufacturing sites, formal alliances need not necessarily be forged. Instead, a (virtual)
integration of separate distribution systems can take place by means of a logistics providers
planning system.
After inter-firm alliances in the areas of production, product development and design,
transport and distribution may well be the next business functions that may give rise to cooperation and alliances between different car constructors and the joint use of inland
waterways in those areas where the waterway system allows this. This may even be
strengthened if car producers start sharing dealer outlet points (Kamp, 2000) or if U.S.
consolidation practices in dealers networks (Jullien, 2000) are transferred to Europe.
Interestingly, at the same time as synergies between distribution activities can be
obtained, the car industry can also create more space on the highway system where most of its
end products are utilized intensely.
Empirical research led to the identification of logistical synergies and business
economics savings as well as reductions in congestion and pollution. In other words,
environment friendly solutions were formulated and a framework for logistical co-operation
was designed.
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121
TNC’S AUTOPARTS IN MEXICO
AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL FIRMS.
Jorge CARRILLO
En este documento se presenta el caso de las pequeñas y medianas empresas (smes)
vinculadas productivamente con la industria transnacional (tncs) de autopartes en México. Las
industria de las autopartes está constituida por establecimientos de muy distinto tamaño y su
variación depende del producto que manufacturan y de la ciudad donde se localizan En su
mayoría son empresas transnacionales americanas, asiáticas y europeas, las cales juegan un
importante papel en México ya que permiten procesos de upgrading industrial y laboral, spillovers, aprendizaje organizacional, innovación tecnológica, y fortaleciemiento del tejido
industrial local. Pero las relaciones que establecen con empresas de menor tamaño se
desconocen, así como la difusión de SME’s eslabonadas y del impacto en el desarrollo de
éstas.
Si se toma en cuenta que las autopartes orientadas a la exportación hacia Estados
Unidos tienen más de veinte años en México y que el porcentaje de insumos nacionales que
incorporan es extremadamente pequeño, el estudio sobre las vinculaciones potenciales entre
empresas pequeñas y transnacionales de las autopartes es de gran relavancia. Por tanto, el
objetivo principal de la ponencia es identificar, en primer lugar, clusters de autopartes en
donde potencialmente se estén desarrolando empresas vinculadas con la cadena productiva. Y
en segundo lugar, enocntrar, describir y comprender casos existosos de empresas mexicanas
pequeñas articuladas con grandes tranacionales como Delphi, Yasaki, Lear, Valeo, etc.
La metodología del estudio consiste en seleccionar (a) una localidad altamente
aglomerada pero en donde estos vínculos seas mas difíciles de hallar (Ciudad Juárez), (b) una
rama de actividad económica vinculada con las empresas arneseras (talleres de maquinados) y
(c) empresas exitosas económicamente con alto potencial (Estructuras Metálicas y Diva).
Una vez seleccionado se procedió a realizar entrevistas a profundidad con los dueños de las
dos empresas durante el año 2000.
Para dar cuenta de la importancia de las autopartes y de la vinculación con las smes se
estructura este trabajo en tres secciones. En la primera se exponen los antecedentes de la
industria de autopartes en México, con el fin de ubicar su importancia y evolución, así como
sus características centrales. En la segunda sección se presenta la información disponible
sobre el tamaño de empleo en la industria de autopartes, de los arneses y de los talleres de
maquinado, con el fin de destacar el papel de las smes. Y en la tercera sección se exponen los
dos casos de las empresas estudiadas. Por último, se presentan conclusiones y
recomendaciones.
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Entre las principales conclusiones se tiene que la industria arneses en México es de
vital importancia tanto a nivel local y regional como nacional. Que las firmas tncs mantienen
una tendencia hacia el uppgrading industrial, a pesar de contar con diferentes estrategias
corporativas. Que las relaciones intra-firma e inter-tncs son muy intensas y difundidas, no así
las relaciones con SME’s mexicanas. No obstante lo anterior, se econtró un proceso
emergente de spill-overs y start-ups. El ambiente de negocios, competitivo y agresivo, y la
participación de las instituciones de apoyo cumplen una función de gran importancia en el
despertar empresarial de zonas tradicionales de exportación, como el caso de ChihuahuaJuárez, pero el elemento escencial es el involucramiento personal de los actores para lograr
relaciones estables y duraderas con los clientes. En otras palabras, el “espíritu empresarial”
del riesgo asume un rol central.
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THE IMPACT ON UK REGIONS OF RECONFIGURATION IN THE
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
Geoff NELDER, Katy HARRIS, Lin EVENS
In the last year, the UK has experienced at first hand the dramatic effects of
globalisation in the automotive industry, with the sell-off of Rover by BMW, and the
announcements of the end of automotive assembly at Dagenham (Ford) and Luton (General
Motors). The speed with which these changes have followed one another has been a surprise,
but the trajectory and extent of the changes should not be. The ASGARD project (Automotive
Supply Globalisation and Regional Development) was set up in 1999 specifically in
anticipation of such change. The ASGARD partners, a consortium of public authorities, a
research institution and private sector Economic Development specialists, recognised that
plants such as Longbridge, Dagenham and Luton were vulnerable and that those plants and
their supply chains, and therefore regional economic and social conditions, were likely to
suffer sooner rather than later from globalisation. Hence, ASGARD has been in a position to
track some of the immediate effects and responses, and to conjecture about where this leads in
future.
This paper draws on field work and research data collected by ASGARD through year
2000 from a series of events and hands-on engagement, including: regional workshops across
the UK for public sector economic development strategists; comparative, cross-regional
reference studies with four European regions; automotive supplier conferences in Wales and
Hessen; engagement with policy reponse teams in Swindon (Rover) and Luton; and work
with Trades Unions through the MSF automotive sub-group.
Public Sector Policy Response
The initial public sector response to the changes was one of surprise, followed by
desire, driven by political imperatives, to be seen to be doing something. The money that was
then provided to fund response strategies was channelled into short-term, local actions that
demonstrated little understanding of the systemic effects of change, dealing with immediate
issues such as counselling and retraining of those made unemployed, and financial aid to
some of the worst affected suppliers. These responses are necessary but not sufficient – they
do not address the fundamental issue of adaptability to change.
With the immediate crisis over, complacency has returned alarmingly quickly. The
crisis revealed that most regions do not understand the supply chain in their region; and there
is no supra-regional or national picture. Few lower-tier suppliers are able to analyse their own
vulnerability, because they do not have end-customer visibility. And yet, even now, data
collection to predict systemic impacts upon supply chains has only just begun.
124
Adaptation of the Workforce and the Role of Organised Labour
The response of organised labour was also one of surprise and protest. The labour
movement, despite its prominent role in the eventual resolution to the situation at Rover, is
subject to criticism that it has not adapted to change as quickly as the large employers, and is
increasingly ineffectual in preparing and adapting its members to change. The MSF union still
regards Jaguar and Land-Rover as separate entities. Certainly the plants have their own
characteristics of labour-management relationships, with history and locality playing a part,
but the reality is that they will increasingly be regarded as a single entity subject to Ford
Premier Group standards. How will organised labour respond; how will they deal with a
corporate management that regards those operations, plus Volvo and Lincoln, with two more
very different social / labour traditions, as a single entity? Also, organised labour still sees the
assemblers and the supply chain as different and separate entities. Capital, and thus corporate
management, does not; automotive production is increasingly managed as a single system.
Organised labour urgently needs to improve its powers of analysis and speed of response to
be able to represent the workforce.
Economic Development Issues for the Regions
The UK does retain a strong position in the automotive industry. It can be argued that
the UK is as completely representative of the future shape of the automotive industry as any
other country or region, with :
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Very large volume, single / few model plants producing mass-market models
(Sunderland, Burnaston, Ryton, Swindon).
Low / medium volume plants producing luxury / niche models (Halewood,
Solihull, Cowley, Longbridge)
Small volume, high-performance vehicles (Motorsport sector, Lotus, Aston
Martin)
Commercial vehicles (Luton, Southampton).
Module specialisation (Engines and power train).
It is at least questionable whether it is sensible or possible, in economic development
terms, to address this emerging picture as a single industry. Policymakers will need to refine
their existing models of the industry, before they can begin to implement more effective
economic and social strategies. These strategies, in addition to responding to short-term
reconfiguration, also need to encompass medium term issues including the likelihood of
technological change and societal pressures to reduce the environmental impacts of
automotive manufacture and use. Predictable changes will include moves away from the
internal combustion engine to fuel-cell or other prime-mover technologies and increased
demand for in-car electronics, leading to the adoption of 42 volt systems. These changes have
obvious implications for current suppliers of vehicle engines and electronics, sectors in which
the UK has strengths, and which will require strategic action by all stakeholders if these
sectors are to be sustained. To take advantage of these developments will require new
competencies in the supply-chain and sympathetic economic development strategies for
training and education, supplier development, civil and industry infrastructures.
Keywords : Globalisation, Reconfiguration, Regional Impacts, Supply-Chain
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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ACQUISITIONS IN LOCAL
PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS : THE AUTOMOTIVE CLUSTER
IN THE EMILIA ROMAGNA REGION
Andrea BARDI, Francesco GARIBALDO
The globalisation processes shift the competition from a national to a regional
dimension, thus from a competition among national champions we find now a situation of
competition among local productive system. This means that each firm competitiveness is
determined also from the local context where the firm is situated. That is particularly true in
the Emilia Romagna, region situated in the north of Italy and at the top in the EU15 in terms
of pro-capita income, revenue distribution and social cohesion and stability. Emilia Romagna
is well known as a land of industrial districts and clusters.
Sector-specific and geographically bounded clusters is a common phenomenon for
small scale manufacturing in developing countries. Most of them have been very successful,
and they are primarily based on tacit and accumulated knowledge gained by doing and
learning by interaction. The Emilia Romagna automotive cluster, counting in the region about
590 firms and more than 36.000 employees, represents one of the most excellence clusters.
This paper proposal is focused on this automotive cluster, the auto industry production and in
particular sport cars production is relevant in the regional automotive cluster.
The cluster is mainly composed by smes sized, that are both focal firms with brand
and an articulated network of firms specialised in one or more phases of the productive
process, that is sub-suppliers able to produce components manufacturing, manufacturing and
assembly.
The automotive cluster is an inter-sectorial category where there are firms connected
with different productive sector like: sport cars, diesel engines, petrol engines, motorbikes,
coaches, tractors, etc.
This firms are linked by horizontal, vertical and diagonal relationships. Over the last
30 years this system of relationships has developed a regional competitiveness in particular in
terms of collective innovation capabilities, low transaction costs, low co-ordination costs,
local trust, product and process flexibility.
Focal firms, system suppliers, component suppliers and specialised artisans contribute
together to produce and re-produce the accumulated knowledge, the impoverishment of which
would represent a loss not only for the single actor but for the system in general.
126
The Ferrari, together with Lamborghini, Maserati and Ducati represent only some of
the most important regional focal firms with brands belonging to the Emilia Romagna
automotive cluster.
Traditionally, the cluster was mostly composed by medium, small and micro
independent firms. These firms were in general first generation enterprises, where the owner
was the chief of the firm and carried out generally internal functions, not rarely productive
ones. Over the last 5 years the situation changed because the globalisation process increased
the average dimension of the cluster firms and changed the owner structure of the focal firms.
In fact, in the cluster the weight of groups is rapidly increasing. That may bring a redefinition
of the cluster structure. In fact, on one hand focal firms reorganise the sub-supplier local
network, on the other hand the outsourcing of the local productions towards international subsuppliers aimed to increase the economy of scale to the group level, may represent a strategic
advantage for the owner group. This may impoverish both the cluster total revenue and the
accumulated knowledge stock. Frequent process of acquisition, mergers and alliance are
changing the structure of the local productive system and reconfiguring the inter-firm
relationships.
A recent survey1 shows that the 23,4% of the manufacturing firms of the region,
belongs to local, national and international group. This percentage is higher in the automotive
cluster. In general, the presence of international, national and local group is rapidly
increasing. It is not rare seeing that an international group that buys a focal local firm
controlling a sub-supplier local network. This may bring a change in the internal local
network rules (e. G. Advantages and disadvantages distribution criteria). For instance, in the
automotive cluster some important focal firm were acquired by international pension funds
(i.e. Ducati), others by international firms leaders in the auto industry sector (i.e.
Lamborghini), others by national firms leaders in the auto industry sector (i.e. Maserati),
others by local industries.
Our paper proposal aims to discover the implication of this changing in particular as
regards local knowledge, social impacts, organisational changing processes both about focal
firms and sub-suppliers network levels.
In some cases the acquisition coincides with the advent of evolution processes. An
example of reorganisation process is the shifting from a single component supplying to the so
called “pre-assembled group” supplying. Through this organisational modalities the focal firm
externalises part of its own control and co-ordination tasks towards some selected firms, to
which is delegated the supplying of pre-assembled groups.
This has relevant consequences on countless aspects related to both the product and
the organisational structure. These different aspects are each other linked. In this way the
specialisation scale of the network firms changes, thus the division of labour, the investments,
the responsibility distribution and the strategic choice change as well.
This develop the concept of supplying activity, from the supplying of a component
and/or manufacturing component to the supplying of more complex functions, that is
1
Brioschi F, Cainelli G., Diffusione e caratteristiche dei gruppi di piccole e medie imprese nelle aree
distrettuali dell’Emilia-Romagna, in corso di pubblicazione.
127
component, manufacturing component and primary functions like quality, logistic,
procurement, warehousing, planning management, etc. This evolution changes the rules
system among the firms, the responsibility distribution and the external internal organisation.
This paper proposal aims to find out and survey the nature of the strategies brought by
different kinds of property and their consequences in terms of economic and social changing
and development opportunities of both micro (firm) and meso (inter-firms) level. We aim to
understand the nature of different strategic approaches, management views and organisational
cultures introduced by international, national and local groups in terms of relations among
firms, outsourcing strategies, economic and social impacts.
Finally, the topic of this paper proposal collocates the work hypothesis in the first
working group of the cockeas research programme.
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129
Posters
TEN YEARS OF MERCOSUR INTEGRATION – THE EVALUATION OF
TRADE IN AUTO INDUSTRY IN THE 90’S (1990-99)
Antonio DATTE, Antonio VEIGA
The study evaluate the intra-industry trade in autoparts and vehicles (commercial and
cars) between Brazil and Argentina from 1990 to 1999. After the open economy in both
countries in early 90’s, auto trade has increased. The export amount from Brazil to Argentina
reached from US$ 78 million in 1990 to US$ 754 millon in 1999. The amount of imports
from Argentina reached from US$ 79 millon to US$ 517 millon in same period.
Methodological approach use Grubel & Lloyd index to mensurate flows and evaluate trends
in intra-firm trade. The study also divide the exchange of autoparts in four as follows:
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
No metal parts and components;
Metal parts and components;
Mechanical assembled components;
Eletrical and eletronics components.
Besides autoparts intra-industry trade, the study focuses in manufacturer trade of
vehicles. In this case, it will be considered the export-import flows of vehicles by brands
(Volkswagen, Ford, etc.) in three groups, 1. Cars, 2. Light commercial, and 3. Trucks and
buses.
Will be also considered:
Ø
Ø
M & A, global Alliances impacts in Mercosur operations;
Productive connections between manufacturers and autoparts.
Authors:
Professor Antonio Carlos Datte, Economist, Master of Latin American Program at
Universidade de São Paulo, PhD in progress in autoparts industry in Mercosur integration,
former Fiat Director of Purchase, worked for several autoparts companies in Brazil in 70’s
and 80’s.
Professor João Paulo Cândia Veiga, PhD in Political Science at Universidade de São
Paulo, works for CEDEC – Centro de Estudos de Cultura Contemporânea (São Paulo based
“think thank” in Public Policies and International Relations). PhD thesis is about international
bargaining of Mercosur Automotive Regime (Argentina and OECD countries in WTO).
130
COMPETITIVITE GLOBALE DES FIRMES MULTINATIONALES ET
EFFETS DE DIMENSION :
UNE APPLICATION AUX CONSTRUCTEURS D’AUTOMOBILES
Loïc RENARD
L’objet de cet article est d’analyser le rôle des effets de dimension dans la
compétitivité globale des constructeurs d’automobiles comme nous l’avons fait de manière
générale pour les plus grandes firmes multinationales (Renard, 1997). Pour cela, nous
montrons que les principaux constructeurs d’automobiles peuvent associer les deux facteurs
de compétitivité que nous distinguons, la différenciation et le coût, en liaison avec les effets
de dimension. L’opération de croissance externe réalisée par Renault avec Nissan constitue
une illustration type de cette réussite. En effet, l’alliance entre Renault et Nissan permet à
l’ensemble d’accroître l’avantage de différenciation sous ses trois formes, verticale,
horizontale et spatiale, par une amélioration des gammes du groupe, par une variété accrue
des modèles, et par une mondialisation des marché. Par ailleurs, l’avantage de coût de Renault
et Nissan est renforcé par le biais des synergies favorisées entre les constructeurs. DaimlerChrysler semble en revanche moins pouvoir associer les facteurs de compétitivité après la
fusion car les complémentarités sont davantage géographiques que productives.
Après une étude théorique de la liaison entre les facteurs de compétitivité globale et
les effets de dimension en mettant en relief dans ce cadre la croissance externe et la croissance
interne des groupes, nous montrons comment la valorisation des effets de dimension par les
principaux constructeurs d’automobiles doit encore renforcer l’oligopole mondial qu’ils
constituent. Les groupes de taille plus restreinte, notamment Fiat, PSA, Mitsubishi et BMWRover, ne pourront dans ce contexte poursuivre une croissance interne seule. Des
regroupements doivent être envisagés par ces firmes. Fiat et PSA en particulier demeurent
insuffisamment différenciés au niveau spatial car ces constructeurs sont trop centrés sur
l’Europe. BMW-Rover réalise encore trop peu de modèles et n’est donc pas assez différencié
au niveau horizontal. Mitsubishi ne bénéficie pas assez des économies d’échelle. Enfin, nous
voyons comment les principaux constructeurs d’automobiles valorisent à partir des années
1990 les avantages de différenciation et de coût. Ce sont les plus grands constructeurs,
General Motors, Ford, Volkswagen, Toyota et Renault-Nissan qui y parviennent le mieux.
Les opérations de croissance externe devraient se poursuivre dans l’industrie de l’automobile
car ce sont elles principalement qui permettent aux constructeurs d’associer les facteurs de
compétitivité que sont la différenciation et le coût grâce aux effets de dimension.
131
L’INTERNACIONALISATION DE L’INDUSTRIE AUTOMOBILE. ETUDE DE LA
RENAULT FRANCE/COLOMBIE/BRESIL PAR RAPPORT A L’ADOPTION DU
TRAVAIL EN GROUPE ET LA FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE
Lidia Micaela SEGRE1
Fernando Marmolejo ROLDAN2
L’industrie automobile, comprenant les segments d’assemblage d’automobiles et la
fabrication de pièces détachées, a intensifié pendant les années 90 des transformations
profondes. Ces changements sont caracterisés par la globalisation de leurs marchés, la
délocalisation des compagnies, la formation de joint-ventures, la modification de stratégies
dans la recherche de la competitivité industrielle à travers l’intensification de l’adoption de
technologies de l’information et d’ innovations organisationnelles (Amable, B., Barré, R.,
Boyer, R., 1997).
Les entreprises implantent aux pays où se trouvent leurs filiales, de nouveaux modèles
dans le rapport fabricant-fournisseurs (“condominium industriel”, “consortium modulaire”,
montage final d’automobile à partir de CKD) augmentant le degré d’association, outsourcing
et sous-traitance.
Cette étude analyse les caractéristiques les plus importantes des stratégies
différenciées des firmes de l’industrie automobile, dans leur processus d’internationalisation,
en particulier celles chez Renault au Brésil et en Colombie.
Nous analyserons comment le modèle de production à la maison mère (Flins) est
adapté et/ou transformé aux filiales du Brésil et de la Colombie, à partir des théories de
hybridation et/ou tropicalisation développées par le Groupe Gerpisa (Duran, J., Stewart P.,
Castillo, J., 1998).
Em particulier notre objectif principal est d’analyser les nouvelles formes
d’organisation du travail comme instrument de competitivité et flexibilité, à travers l’adoption
du travail en groupe représenté par les UETs (Unités Élémentaires de Travail), implantées
chez Renault à l’usine de Flins (France) et aux filiales de la Colombie (Sofasa-Renault) et au
Brésil (Ayrton Senna).
1
Docteur en Sciences, Professeur d’Université, Programa de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computação,
COPPE/UFRJ, Coordenação dos Programas de Pós-Graduação em Engenharia/Universidade Federal do Rio de
Janeiro, Caixa Postal 68511 Rio de Janeiro-RJ, CEP : 21945-970, Brésil, e-mail : [email protected]
2
Étudiant de Doctorat, Programa de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computação COPPE/UFRJ, Professeur
à l’ Université Plínio Leite – UNIPLI- et Directeur de la Division de Technologie de l’Information au
Sécretariat de Sciences et Technologie de la Ville de Niterói – Brésil . e-mail : [email protected]
132
Cette recherche analyse le fonctionnement du travail en groupe dans les usines audessus mentionées, le degré d’autonomie des ouvriers dans les UETs et la conséquente
décentralisation du processus de décision sur la gestion de la planification, de la production et
des ressources humaines (RH) dans les trois contextes.
Nous cherchons à contribuer au débat sur l’analyse de l’organisation du travail en
raison de l’importance des changements causés par l’adoption du travail en groupe représenté
par les UETs, dans les usines au-dessus mentionnées. C’est alors la diversité des mises en
oeuvre qui nous intéresse et l’analysre de la cohérence des politiques, des stratégies et des
pratiques techniques, organisationnelles, gestionnaires et sociales, au sein de chaque usine.
Il sera analysé également, comment les différentes formes des UETs agissent sur
l’organisation du travail, sur la structure et les relations professionnelles et sur le profil de
qualification de la main-d’oeuvre. Cette recherche étudie aussi les défis des organismes de
formation professionnels en chaque contexte (BEP et BTS en France, SENA en Colombie,
SENAI et CEFET au Brésil), face aux changements technologiques et organisationnels de
l’industrie automobile.
La recherche dans les entreprises a été réalisée à partir de plusieurs visites pendant
lesquelles a été utilisée la méthode d'observation participante dans les sections suivantes:
atelier de finition et montage final, atelier de tôleries (assemblage de la carrosserie), peinture
et presses. Nous focalisons notre étude sur la chaîne de montage final où nous avons participé
à des réunions organisées par les UETs. L'observation avait pour objectif l’analyse de
l'organisation de la production, du lay-out des chaînes, des technologies adoptées, de sa
flexibilité et de la dynamique des UETs. En ce qui concerne le travail en groupe nous avons
identifié sa formation et son fonctionnement, les caractéristiques des réunions, l’autonomie
des ouvriers et leur polyvalence.
Des entretiens semi-dirigés, basés sur un questionnaire structuré qui fonctionne
comme un guide général, ont été réalisés avec le staff de direction de l’entreprise, les gérants
des sections de la production, de RH et de planification et fabrication , aussi bien qu’avec les
ingénieurs et les ouvriers de l’atelier de finition et de montage final, pour compléter
l'observation participante. On a aussi effectué des entretiens avec des représentants des
syndicats auxquels appartiennent les entreprises étudiées et avec des membres du Comité
d’Éntreprise au Brésil.
133
RECONFIGURATION AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE CAR
INDUSTRY IN TURKEY.
Nadir SUGUR, Theo NICHOLS
The paper examines the reconfiguration and growth of the car industry in an emerging
economy, Turkey with special reference to its consequences for employment relationships.
Having examined the influx of new production units in Turkey, their patterns of ownership,
market and union strategies, the paper proceeds to compare two companies in more detail.
The first, Tofas, is a joint venture between Fiat of Italy and the Koc Group, the largest
Turkish conglomerate. It is the oldest car maker in the country. The second, Honda is
another joint venture, jointly owned by Japan’s Honda and Anadolu Industry Holdings, a
large Turkish conglomerate. This is one of the newest car producers. Making use of
fieldwork conducted between 1999-2001 differences are examined between these two
companies with respect to their technology, markets, labour force, industrial relations
systems. In particular their management methods are examined with respect to aspects of the
employment relationship – hiring policy, unionisation, training, pay policy, working
conditions and worker commitment.
134
135
Cockeas Workshops
MOUVEMENT DE CREATION DE PARC FOURNISSEURS :
LE CAS DE RENAULT SANDOUVILLE
Sonia ADAM-LEDUNOIS, Sophie RENAULT
L’article s’attache à appréhender les enjeux stratégiques de la création des parcs
fournisseurs. Il s’appuie sur une étude menée auprès de Renault Sandouville. Centrés sur une
proximité physique immédiate des fournisseurs, les parcs fournisseurs soulèvent un certain
nombre d’interrogations quant à l’opportunité réelle pour les acteurs du système automobile
d’adopter une telle organisation industrielle.
Mots clés : parc fournisseurs, industrie automobile, proximité spatiale, triptyque
qualité-coût-délai, dépendance.
136
SMALL FIRMS AND GLOBAL COMPETITION :
EVIDENCE FROM THE PORTUGUESE AND BRASILIAN
AUTOMOBILE SUPLIER INDUSTRIES
Francisco VELOSO, Chris HENRY, Richard ROTH
Automotive assemblers’ global sourcing strategy is pushing their suppliers to have an
equally global presence. Until recently this trend was confined to large companies, which
expanded their presence to new locations through the exploitation of unique knowledge
assets. This movement has a good fit with existing theories of foreign investment. More
recently, some of the smaller and often local suppliers are trying to use this trend as a growth
opportunity, aiming to gain new business and critical dimension through the establishment of
new plants in some of the industry fast growing areas. Unlike the reaction of the large players,
the behavior of these smaller firms does not fit well with existing theory.
This paper uses a detailed microanalysis of manufacturing cost to explore how the
market characteristics of the home base and the new areas condition the investment
possibilities of small automotive suppliers. The context analyzed is the decision of stamping
and injection molding companies located in Portugal to invest in Eastern Europe or in Brazil.
Paris, Palais du Luxembourg,
7-9 Juin 2001
Boulevard François Mitterrand – 91025 Evry Cedex
Téléphone : 33 (0)1 69 47 70 23 – Télécopieur : 33 (0)1 69 47 80 35
E-Mail : [email protected]
Serveur : http://www.gerpisa.univ-evry.fr

GERPISA

Transcription

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