Zuni World View:Conceptual Presuppositions of the Beautiful and

Zuni Language and Ontology: Implications of the Conceptual
Presuppositions of the Zuni Worldview
By
Chet Staley
Amerindian Arts
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Synopsis: (1) Zuni world view and the conceptual presuppositions of
the Beautiful and the Dangerous in Zuni language and cosmology,
according to the writings of Frank Hamilton Cushing, Ruth Bunzel,
Jane M. Young, and Barbara Tedlock on the linguistics and ontology of
the Zuni culture; (2) Ruth Bunzel and Jane M. Young on form and
function in the linguistics and ontology of the Zuni worldview; (3) (a)
Frank Hamilton Cushing on the taxonomic structure of being in Zuni
ontology and (b) the possibility of a Chomskyan analysis of Zuni
transitivity; (4) Color Terms and the universalist and relativist aspects
of the linguistics and ontology of the Zuni worldview; (5) (a) Ruth
Bunzel on Zuni ceremonialism, (b) objectivity and personal
accomplishment, and (c) the final statement of the Zuni worldview; (6)
Frank Hamilton Cushing on form and function in the linguistics and
ontology of the Zuni worldview, and the implications for pragmatics
and cross-cultural referentiality; (7) Frank Hamilton Cushing on Zuni
language and the collective consciousness.
Zuni World View, on the Beautiful and the Dangerous
In Signs from the Ancestors, a study of Zuni cultural symbolism and
perceptions in rock art, M. Jane Young cites the “dialectics of the
beautiful and the dangerous” noted by Barbara Tedlock[1] and states
that “Tedlock posits an underlying aesthetic framework that informs
cosmology, whereas I posit an underlying cosmological principle that
informs aesthetics”[2]. From the perspective of this paper and its
conclusions it would appear that Young is perhaps partially correct in
her ascertainment although the confluence of the two principles makes
it difficult to discern logical priority in either the beautiful (tso’ya) or
the dangerous (attanni), for the multireferential finds manifestation of
beauty in the “aesthetic of accumulation, an elaborate redundancy of
symbolism in Zuni sacred and secular environments”[3] and informs
cosmological principles of the preconditions of the rational, while
aesthetic license premises pragmatics where proper interpretation of
context ensures that rational thought of the “perspective-taker” attains
objectivity as a “personal accomplishment” in the success of “reciprocal
public intentions”.[4] This is because the principle of the “base
metaphor” cited by Young is inclusive of a body of conceptual
presuppositions which include the notion of an interrelatedness of all
things, which is seen here as a cosmological precept akin to notions of
identity and individuation, and the notion of a predetermined harmony
as indicative of the aesthetic. Young notes that the “very generality of
the metaphor lends its ambiguity--an ambiguity quite characteristic of
the Zuni view of the world. Zuni ritual symbols, whether expressed
verbally or visually, are frequently multivalent or multireferential,
standing for both themselves and something else at the same time; yet
all of the meanings are bound together, so that the Zunis say, as do the
Mescalero Apache: ‘They’re all the same thing’ ”[5].
The implications and ambiguity of the base metaphor are immediately
evident. If all things are the same then what constitutes an identity and
how are names used to refer to specific things or images? Ambiguity is
a consequence of the very tentativeness of life itself as perceived by an
agriculturally based community situated in a desert environment; as
ambiguous as the timing of the next planting season, crop yield, and
rainfall. While it may be seen as a method of increasing well-being[6]
most ritual is directed toward a perpetuation of the status quo, i.e. the
rising of the morning sun or the repetition of the turn of the sun at the
winter’s solstice. Sameness as things standing for themselves is a
prerequisite to success in ritual logic and there can be no tolerance for
deviance, especially in utterance. As Redfield noted, “memorizers and
depositors” of tradition may fulfill the role of preserving tradition, but
this is not the concept of a thinker in the sense of building upon basic
principles leading to variant conclusions[7]. Anthropologists have
noted the mechanistic tendency of most aspects of Zuni ceremonialism
and that prayer must be “repeated verbatim to be effectual”[8]. “The
efficacy of prayer depends in no small measure on its correct rendition”
and “is more nearly a repetition of magical formulae”[9].
In this it appears that an effective rendering of a prayer in ritual would
be dependent upon a specificity between words and images where a
name must adequately show the identity of that which it is naming, that
is, the same name usage is imperative as a reliable identifier and if the
name is to refer to something else at the same time then that image
must, a propos, display the same relation with a reliable identifier
(name). Thus, it would seem that the individuating function is
objectively well defined. As Bunzel also notes elaboration is allowed in
individual prayer, but in regard to the common good the “ceremonious
collectivism that characterizes social activities is the essence of
religious participation” and the “supernatural conceived always as a
collectivity” is “approved by the collective force of the people”[10].
Young notes interpretations that reflect individual interests related to
“diverse artistic pursuits” and a “strong thread of individualism” as
“idiosyncratic interpretation” in the categorization of visual
images[11]. The results of a card sorting experiment showed “that
certain visual images evoked similar and sometimes formulaic
responses”[12] while some were categorized as “images that go on
pottery” or as images “that seem to go together”[13] and concluded that
while the “Zunis may recognize designs on pottery, religious
paraphernalia, or rock art, they have no culturally consistent
terminology to apply to such designs-there may be no tradition of
naming these designs”[14].
Bunzel in contrast noted, “At Zuni, where the style is generally uniform,
individual differences are shown mainly in the mastery of
technique”[15] in the more professional artisans but was “unable to find
any noticeable difference in style”[16]. While Bunzel did find design
names that evoked an image such as the “deer”, most design names
could not evoke an image. From this she concluded that there is no
design terminology at Zuni. Bunzel also pursued this to the point of
stating that the lack of linguistic designation would indicate that the
image was experienced as sensual rather than intellectually and that an
experience for which there is no linguistic expression cannot be the
object of rational thought[17]. Bunzel states that the importance the
Zuni attach to the purely aesthetic aspects of pottery design is greater
than assumed[18]. Principles of design are clearly recognized, for
religious ideas are clearly associated with designs, but this does not
strengthen the intellectual aspect at the “expense of the more purely
aesthetic”[19]. In this remark in is evident that aesthetics informs Zuni
cosmology but it also displays tentativeness on Bunzel’s behalf to
relegate the phenomenon to the rational.
Young reiterates religious associations in regard to the analysis of
“clusters” (image groupings by individuals) which displayed an
“inclination to relate rock art to …the important concerns of daily
life”[20] and to the “various facets of their religious practice and/or to
the myths describing the emergence of the Zuni people into this
world”[21], but Young also indicated the rational aspect of a polemic
relation between the “strictly memorized texts of ritual prayers” and the
identification of rock art images characterized by “the organization of
diversity”[22]. An example of organization is where human figures
were grouped according to form (round, stick, etc.), but were included
in the unknown groupings, while known images were grouped by their
content[23]. Here Young is positing a formal, conceptual basis of
presuppositions that appears to inform individual interpretation where
referential distinction is made in relation to function yet inhibited in
regard to specific terms.
Zuni Language and Worldview
While both Young and Bunzel agree on the religious importance of the
images and the lack of a determinate naming process, they disagree on
the role of the individual in interpretation[24] and whether the
interpretive process is sensual or rational. This disparity may be related
to the different methodologies involved, for Bunzel worked through an
interpreter and sought to evoke images in the use of names, often
receiving diverse groupings within clusters while Young relied more so
on ostensive definition, perceiving the images as having the power to
evoke narrative, using the term “metonymic” to describe the power of
images to evoke where ambiguity is present in both meaning and
form[25]. The one most notable aspect of Young’s study in regard to
the individuating function is the observance that Zuni interpreters
“included the entire environmental setting of the rock art in discussions
of meaning rather than focusing on the image alone…and not only
placed individual images in the context of the whole corpus of rock art
figures at the site, but also included other features of the landscaping,
such as springs, plants, birds, and so on”[26].
In regard to the polemic relation noted by Young, the power to evoke
narrative or to give names in ritual text is its demonstrated effectiveness
in a given context which is dependent upon an accumulation of
knowledge, or in the case of the interpretation of images is based upon
the organization of diverse images into a given context where each
individual image is related to the narrative according to its form and
function as determined in accumulated myth. Multireferentiality is
transitivity among the harmonious interrelations of all things and
individuation is manifest as a thing standing for itself according to its
form and function as determined within a context as perceived by a
perspective taker. An image in isolation has many meanings but it is
also constrained as a means to evoke a narrative. Such statements as
“images that go on pottery” or “they seem to go together” are indicative
of the ambiguity present in their relation and can only take on meaning
by being assembled in conjunction with the form and function of a
vessel[27] or some other object. Thus, where the context of an image or
design is indeterminate the religious associations concerned will inhibit
a naming or narrative because of the danger of a deviant utterance. As
Young’s card sorting analysis showed, in the absence of content images
were categorized according to form, and sensual, aesthetic appreciation
was insufficient to evoke a name.
This would seem to confirm Bunzel’s interpretation of the sensual, but
in an anthropological sense of a theory about rationality as a social fact,
irrationality is used to describe deviant utterance[28]. This would
presuppose an ontological sense of rationality where the viewpoint of
the perspective taker does not guarantee objectivity, but objectivity is
found in the personal accomplishment of an intersubjectivity required in
reciprocal public intentions[29] and the decision not to act (verbalize)
could be considered rational. To appreciate an object sensually yet not
specify that object in linguistic expression in respect of religious beliefs
and for fear of danger to one’s self and the common good in the
prospect of violating socially approved observances is rational thought.
In the absence of verbal expression a sensual, aesthetic appreciation can
be rational and in accordance with the collective force of the people,
that is, it would be a personal accomplishment.
Our use of language is “constrained by our knowledge of objective
reality” and “naming is seen as a process which confers contextual
significance on objective continuities and discontinuities in nature; and
a properly contextual account of naming requires that we include
connotative and metaphoric considerations in a description of the
meaning of names”[30]. This suggests that lexical variation
corresponds to the importance and stability of constrictive contexts
where names make distinctions where contexts require and reference
becomes stable only when it is necessary that a particular discrimination
be made; otherwise, referential distinction does not operate on the level
of individual lexemes and may be used to do more than point[31].
“Through metaphor men discover relevant resemblances between
categories which are not ordinarily related to one another and men
signify these resemblances in words”[32].
Rosaldo’s distinction between referential and metaphoric corresponds to
Samarin’s distinction between the referential and expressive usage of
language. Samarin also notes that the expressive use as distinct from
the referential use transcends category boundaries[33]. For example, in
the English language the statement ‘You’re a skunk’ does more than
point and is an expressive use of language. It would transcend certain
categorical boundaries in ignoring the specific differences of two
individual entities. In regard to the Zuni use of language, this statement
would not transcend any category boundaries typifying any specific
beings and would not be considered expressive or metaphoric in that
sense, for in referential distinction all connotation and metaphor have
been accounted for in contextual significance. What is a metaphoric or
expressive statement in one language may not have a metaphoric or
expressive counterpart in another language. As Rosaldo noted, lexical
variation is dependent upon the stability of context and reference, and
Samarin states that the inventory of expressive language is inverse to
the referential use. The lack of category boundaries within the Zuni
taxonomic structure of beings[34] would imply a low inventory of
expressive terms.
Consider the Navajo language where a single lexeme multireferentially
includes all hues of blue and green and the principle signification of the
word is the sacred stone (turquoise)[35]. The stone itself is appreciated
for its aesthetic properties and has religious associations, thus, the
lexical constraint, or the evident lack of the need to make further
particular discriminations among the wide spectrum of blues and greens
shows its importance and the stability of constructual contexts. To the
outsider this lack of lexical variation to make particular distinctions may
appear ambiguous and represent a lack of stability in context. Showing
a turquoise stone, which may display any combination of blue and
green, would evoke the same response time after time. Any further
expected verbalization in color terms would be to ask the Navajo to
disrupt the contextual stability of their lexical environment by creating
categorical boundaries by means of expressive or metaphoric terms, that
is, to operate on the level of individual lexemes that may do more than
point. Thus, in all likelihood, further referential distinction would be
expressed in the name of a mountain or some other specific geographic
location from which the stone originated.
Zuni Cosmology and Aesthetics: Color Terms
In a like manner, the Zuni terms for colors point to objects, but often by
means of phrases using a comparative particle (ikna), which is a
reference to a cultural norm. Color terms form a significant part of the
Zuni lexicon, frequently occurring in texts (both myth and texts
descriptive of daily life), and are pervasive in art and ritual. There is no
general term for color in the Zuni lexicon and the only indication of an
abstract term for color is where the color has changed or designated as
an unnatural property of the thing (jeli or heli)[36]. To the Zuni the
power inherent in an image (assuming color to be an image) is its ability
to depict vital aspects of the physical world in relation to their
“specificity-their ability to represent living beings”[37]. Thus, in the
absence of a general term for color, color terms have no category sui
generis, but will refer to objects belonging to a separate taxonomic
structure, often referring with religious connotation to the wide category
of beings, which is inclusive of humans, animals, ceremonial objects,
spirits (Koko, Kachinas)[38], and possibly plants, insects, and natural
concretions as well (corn maidens, kokopelli, or the twins of
Towayalane). The similarities and dissimilarities in a contrast between
the Zuni and Navajo, and their own inherent “continuities and
discontinuities” show the cross-cultural implications for comparability
of semantic categories where categories are culturally defined and a
manifestation of a Weltsanschauung[39]. The problem of a Chomskyan
analysis of the Zuni language has been noted[40] and it is apparent that
the best approach to the language is one with a modified relativistic
attitude.
The Zuni perceive of no phenomenon that is exclusively physical.
Their ontological taxonomic structure is permeated with animate matter
and their language has no means of explicitly expressing the distinction
between the animate and inanimate. As Cushing pointed out, and later
Walker in his taxonomy of Zuni terms, the category of ‘beings’ has no
distinct boundaries. There are no types of beings, but rather, degrees of
being. Young also noted in the results of card sorting that figures with
both human and animal characteristics were sometimes grouped as
either, but were less specifiable as specific beings[41]. In contrast to an
ontology such as the Cartesian cogito where it can be assumed that
everything external to the subject is physical, an ontology that admits of
an interrelated sameness throughout animate matter would assume, a
priori, universal subjectivity or other minds, however one wished to
describe the intellectual and individuating function. Thus, objectivity, or
more precisely, the resultant intersubjectivity which is evident in
analysis of their usage of their semantic components seems to indicate
that the distinction between the ontological and the epistemological is
analogous to the confluence of their cosmology and aesthetics in the
beautiful and the dangerous, and is for the most part logically
imperceptible (non-distinct).
Ontologically and epistemically, for the Zuni, logos is deeply embedded
in substance. As Young states, “…Zuni perceptions and interpretations
of rock art reveal much about the Zuni world view…”[42].
Clarification is needed in regard to this statement however, for while
“perceptions and interpretations” may be revealed conceptually and
have a strong intersubjective basis visually (ostensively), the lack of a
naming process indicates the strong presence of contextual implications
where non-verbal expression is preferable when reference is
indeterminate, for a deviant utterance may be the manifestation of the
dangerous and subsequently the aesthetic is expressed as a communal
act of appreciation visually.
There are some points to be made here in regard to the naming process;
1) because intersubjective objectivity can be revealed conceptually and
non-verbally a linguistic relativism approach is preferable to a linguistic
universalism, 2) given the extent of metaphor and analogy in reference
to particular objects or figures in Zuni language and ritual a possible
world semantics is inappropriate, and 3) Young’s assertion that “one
cannot separate Zuni sacred and secular life”[43] is incorrect in view of
non-verbal aesthetic expression.
Concerning (1), for the language universalist the ineffability thesis of
semantics states that one cannot discuss the relationships that constitute
the meanings of words and other expressions of language because it is
an inescapable intermediary between me and the world, and one with
which I cannot dispense, meaning that I cannot “step outside my
language (and the conceptual system it embodies) and view it from the
outside”[44]. The universality of language to the language universalist
means that language is “inescapable”. Everything we say and
(according to some philosophers) think presupposes the one language
we are using, including the semantic relations in virtue of which it can
be used to say something. We can only say things about our language
by using that which we suppose in order to do so, i.e. our own
language. Language of the user constitutes the language user’s
universe. What lies outside of the language is not only inexpressible,
but is meaningless.
The totality of the relationships that constitute the meanings of words
and other expressions of language is semantics. The relation between
simple objects and their names is presupposed in all use of language and
because of this we have to treat the actual objects as existing necessarily
and as necessarily exhausting the entire realm of all possible
objects[45]. These relationships that are the links between language and
reality cannot, according to universalist, be rationalized for “semantic
ideas can only be conveyed non-verbally…non-conceptually. They rely
on an unexpressed and unexplainable preconceptual Vorwissen” [46].
Herein lies a crucial distinction, for Young notes that where ambiguity
is present in both meaning and form, “the power invoked through
particular images…may at times be metaphorical or ambiguous, but
their form rarely is” and power is the power to invoke narrative of myth
and the time of the beginning.[47] Young’s specific meaning of “form”
is basically that of shapes and is representative of universality. If the
formal aspect of an object is what can be said to be true of it a priori,
then the form of simple objects governs the way in which these objects
can be combined with each other (elements of design) and form
complex logical forms (patterns of design). If a culture’s ontological
taxonomic structure admits of an animate matter, or more precisely, if
the culture’s language has no means of expressing explicitly the
distinction between the animate and the inanimate, and a totality of
relations between things is referred to as a sameness of all things, then it
would seem to admit of an a prior intersubjectivity in these relations.
Semantic ideas are conveyed conceptually for “the power inherent in
those images that depict being associated by the Zuni with vital aspects
of the physical world is related to their specificity-their ability to
‘represent’ ” living beings”[48]. For the Zuni, personification is
inherent in the substance of animate matter and has existed since “the
beginning”. Ontology is then relative to personalization (as distinct
from personification), individuation and context, where ‘to be’, in
Hintikka’s terms, is to be the object of a search[49] and to “find” as an
act of quantification may be better served by the verb “to produce”[50].
‘To be’ is to be somewhere and is a relation that concedes to the eternal
possibility of an existence. Thus, when an image may be recognized
and categorized according to its form, even when labeled as “unknown”
by the lack of content, it is still possible to convey semantic ideas
conceptually according to principles that inhibit the tendency to render a
deviant utterance, and can further be conveyed ostensively, where
knowledge and aesthetic appreciation is dependent upon one’s cultural
assimilation.
Zuni Language and the Ineffability Thesis of Semantics:
Universalist and Relativist Aspects
The language universalist would not accept a doctrine that subscribes to
semantic ideas conveyed conceptually and would, at least in the case of
Wittgenstein, for example, limit context to the meaning a word gains in
its usage in the language. In the case of the Zuni, where meaning can be
expressed non-verbally, the lack of a name would, according to the
universalist, preclude ascertaining an existent’s identity. Both
universalist and relativist would probably agree that ‘the bridge between
the subjective and the objective is the observer who is also a participant.
There is no universe with an observer and no observer who is not a part
of the universe of description. The identity of the two is not, nor can
never be identical”[51]. Friedrich continues that the role of the observer
is also that of the participant and in a manner similar to the Heisenberg
principle can effect the outcome of observation, i.e. the participant’s
description. In this Friedrich is establishing the perspective taker as an
efficient cause that has been eliminated in the universalist position. For
assuming that semantic ideas could be conveyed conceptually and nonverbally, then same name usage is not sufficient to establish identity and
ontological status. Identity is then dependent upon other, perhaps
pragmatic interpretations of the form and function of things as relations
of semantic ideas and to the universalist the subject becomes
transcendent, in Kantian terms, and interpretation is meaningless.
In order to further clarify this position, Friedrich states that reality
involves the 'I' and the external world; organic life and the physical
universe. The bridge between the subjective and the objective is the
observer who is also the participant. The relation of the subject and
object is, in Kantian terms, the transcendental ('I think'), and to
Friedrich, one of continuity. To disregard the continuity is to remove the
'I' from the experiential world and place it as an observer of the
universe, and reference and meaning becomes transcendent (not
transcendental). The effect of continuity is necessarily one where the
participant affects description. Meaning and reference can never be
identical, i.e. 'A is A' is never the case and is unreal. The disruption of
the continuity yields a subjectivity that is just as fallacious as the
positivistic reality ('A is A') of the external world. While it is evident
that both the linguistic relativist and universalist alike agree that one
cannot step outside their language in order to describe the world, there
is a point of disagreement. The relativist would argue that since
meaning and reference can never be identical, communication is only
viable with non-verbal conveyance of semantic concepts, that is, if 'A is
not A' then verbal signification is not ostensive and meaning must rely
on what the universalist would consider pre-conceptual. The universalist
would also consider that a non-verbal conveyance of semantic ideas as
conceptual is transcendent (in effect, the transcendental bridge is
transcendent). On the other hand, the relativist would view this as a
confusion of the transcendent and the transcendental, for the
universalist, in considering same name usage as identity, would be
asserting that 'A is A', and this is itself transcendent by the standard of
the relativist. As an outside observer, Young commented on the
"metaphor and ambiguity" in the multireferentiality of the Zuni base
metaphor. This is the fallacy of a “universe with an observer”, for while
the Zuni may consider an image or name as ambiguous if the context is
not certain, they would not consider the perceived uncertainty of
multireferentiality as metaphoric, but as an integral part of the
schematics of their transcendental bridge. In Young's defense, the
language used was the language that could be understood by colleagues,
much in the same sense that Cushing used the term "savage."
Hintikka also cites the “mutual dependence of linguistic relativity
(impossibility of expressing reality as it is, considered independently of
our language) and the ineffability thesis of semantics”, and would
probably describe Friedrich’s position as generally stating the paradox
of transcendental knowledge[52]. The language universalist and the
relativist would however, disagree on the role of the participant, and in
Kantian terminology, would also disagree on the constitution of the
transcendental subject defined as the logic of scientific language. While
Kant would assert that possession of the concept of a thing is dependent
upon knowing the “use” of an object given in intuition and this
cognition is a prerequisite to consciousness[53], Wittgenstein would
appropriately call this transcendental but as a transcendental subject it is
also something that does not exist in the world[54], an allusion that
Kant would refer to as an interpretation of the transcendent and not the
transcendental[55].
According to this interpretation of a transcendental subject as something
that does not exist in the world, Kant would be considered a linguistic
relativist[56]. Hintikka states that Wittgenstein held both sides of the
linguistic counterpart to the paradox of transcendental knowledge where
“the existence of an object can only be shown through its name’s use in
the language”[57]. “The ineffability of the simple name-object
relation…amounts to maintaining that the existence of an individual can
only be shown by means of language through the use of its name”[58];
it cannot be stated. Identity is shown by the use of the same name. It is
impossible to say what a particular object is, and likewise impossible to
say what its logical form is. Individual existence is inexpressible and
the world as a whole is inexpressible[59]. The relativist could take
exception to this, stating that logical form can be rationalized by
reciprocal public intentions, and that the name’s use in language
presupposes knowing the use of the object.
Both of these positions are thoroughly grounded in the view that
“human action is constitutive of the meanings of the world of our
concepts more generally” and this view should be accepted for
pragmatic reasons because “we cannot detach ourselves from our
concepts, for we cannot possibly stop our conceptual practices without
losing our concepts”[60]. Hintikka’s criticism of this is that it is
transcendental and “there is no reason why the concepts we need to
master in order to talk about our language could not also be grounded
on human activities. Hence, the pragmatic rationale for the ineffability
of our conceptual world is not a valid one”[61].
Since truth is that part of a relation within the totality of such
relationships linking language and the world and is presumed to be
conveyed in a linguistic expression about the world, the ineffability
thesis of semantics is a thesis of the inexpressibility of truth. While
Hintikka would prefer the term “indefinable” rather than inexpressible,
either way it would appear that the universalist cannot speak of truth in
terms of correspondence, or as a cross-cultural identifier. Suggested
remedies of language as a calculus ratiocination or possible world
semantics appear to be designed for an explication of a syllogistic
validity cross-culturally, that is, cross identification as the
“identification of individuals across the boundaries of possible worlds”
which results in “well defined individuations” as an “objectivity of
individuating functions”[62]. Hintikka states that “truth is not ineffable,
but it is indefinable, except by transcending the language for which it
has to be defined”[63]. In this Hintikka seems to be describing the
“unspeakable” of Wittgenstein or that area Langer describes as the
“unexplored possibility of genuine semantics beyond the limits of
discursive language”[64]. Semantics is wider than language and
contains non-discursive, non-translatable symbolism the form and
function of which are not investigated by logicians under the heading of
language[65]. In principle, the “growth law” of semantics is
metaphor[66].
In terms of (2) and a possible world semantics, it is insufficient in
regard to defining truth across possible worlds, for unintentional
metaphoric fancy will always be lost in the defining of intentional, well
defined individuations, meaning that truth will always be nothing more
than a synchronic glimpse, in contrast to, for instance, a Kantian
pragmatics where the synchronic continually eclipses itself as
diachronic development by means of the need for epistemic fulfillment.
“Well defined individuations” may find objectivity where the
individuating function is directed toward a well organized body of
principles, but the subjectivity constituted by the individuating functions
cannot be objectified.
Zuni Language and Ceremonialism: Objectivity and Personal
Accomplishment
In a unique language such as Zuni where multireferential names and
metaphoric symbolism are prevalent it is certain that much would be
lost in translation to a universal syntax. Modal language is ineffective
as well, for there are no possible worlds for the Zuni. Epistemic
fulfillment is found and absorbed in the aesthetic. As Ruth Bunzel
noted in her study of Zuni ceremonialism, a final statement of the Zuni
worldview would be “The world then is as it is and man’s plan in it is
what it is”[67]. Necessity has absorbed the possible in the logic of
ritual where the failure of prayer is attributed to a deviant utterance or a
‘bad heart’. Potential is everywhere in animate matter, but its
manifestation is the actualization of form and function in cognition[68].
Potential is what it is when it is not thought about, and when thought
about it is for the most part restricted to the non-verbal. In the Zuni
language the word for “I think” is the same word for “maybe”, or
“perhaps” (hinik)[69].
This may seem paradoxical if actualization is cognition and the “I
think” is simply the possible or potential, but actualization of form and
function is to know the use of the thing, which presupposes knowledge
of its context. Knowledge of context and the things use is sufficient for
naming. Indeterminacy of context and perhaps one’s belief is the
vagary of cross identification making quantification uncertain and
ontology relative, leaving potential to the non-verbal and subsequently
giving the appearance of a lack of a naming process as well.
Individualism is discouraged and is distinct from personal
accomplishment. Deviant utterance and a bad heart are qualities of
individualism. As Cushing remarked, while learning the language
during his tenure as a participant-observer residing in the Governor’s
household at the Zuni Pueblo, his improper usage of the language never
went uncorrected[70].
Thus, Zuni truth is determination according to the beliefs of the
individual and subsequently to the reciprocal public intentions of a
distinct culture where the individual as a “perspective-taker” performs
rationalization in the ontological sense[71] or the “primitive”[72] and
intersubjectivity is validated as objectivity in “personal
accomplishment”[73]. Personal accomplishment is never identical to
individualism and the beliefs of the individual are expressed objectively
if their interpretation of an image invokes a proper narrative.
Young states “rock art is of special import because it demonstrates the
involvement of the ancestors in present day life, the fluid boundary
between events of the myth times and those of today. Because certain
rock art images evoke recitations of traditional narrative, I regard them
as a means by which to investigate the relationships between verbal and
visual communication codes. This interrelationship is revealed in the
way that the Zuni use these codes to recreate and structure the world of
the myth time, making it a part of their contemporary existence”[74].
What is important here is that verbal and ostensive definition
presupposes myth and that proper interpretation of the image in context
requires that it be related in the now, as a present tense, and where what
is uttered or shown is always true and the belief of the producer.
Existence is the accumulation of the past that naturally conflates to the
present. While it is always an eternal possibility, existence shows itself
only as a necessary present.
Cushing referred implicitly to this phenomenon in equivocating the
Zuni term “I-shothl-ti-mon”[75], meaning “always”, with “ahâi”
(ahoi)[76], meaning “beings”[77]. The prefix I in Zuni is either
reflexive or inchoative[78] and the prefix a[79] is either a verbal
pronominative for the plural absolute or a derivational prefix pluralizing
particles referring to persons[80]. Miner notes that either of these uses
of a is homophonous with the other and as a linguist one must assume
that he intended that while pronunciation is the same they have different
derivations, whereas Cushing, who knew the Zuni language and was
familiar with the musicality of Zuni narrative, translated a as a unison,
conflating their usage in, for example, his translation of Apoyan (sky or
cover) Tatcu (father) as “all covering Father Sky”[81]. Cushing implies
this function of individuation several times throughout his essays,
referring to the “Seven Cities of Cibola” while Frederick Hodge
complained of finding the physical remnants of only six cities (pueblos),
the seventh kiva or direction (there are six), and the nineteenth clan
(eighteen clans divided into the dichotomy of Summer and Winter
people)[82].
Frederick Eggan seems to agree with Cushing’s observations[83] and
Young notes Eggan’s agreement when citing Cushing’s Outline of Zuni
Creation Myths[84]. Young comments a number of times in her essay
that the principle theme of the Zuni cosmology is the notion of the
“center” where its multireferential aspects are integrated as a motion
through time directed inward[85], “collapsing the boundaries of space
and time into the base metaphor, giving it the ability or power to refer to
many disparate concepts simultaneously”[86]. The center is represented
as a class that is itself a member of its class where the multireferential
images of the center refer to themselves and to the class as a whole in a
seemingly paradoxical as well as tautological sense of logical extension,
and is probably responsible for Cushing’s observation that the Zuni
seemed to confuse the subjective with the objective[87]. The extended
and the non-extended are tautologically present in every image, where,
for example, the seventh city is manifest in the collectivity of the six
pueblos known to exist, or the summer-winter dichotomy which is one
representative of the idea of the center as indicative of the nineteenth
clan.
Zuni Pictographic Language: Pragmatics and Cross-Cultural
Referentiality
The seven kiva is also representative of the center as a polemic of the
inside and outside, which refers to the heart of the individual, as a
center, and inner and outer space occurring in the “same place at the
same time”[88] in their observance of the six directions, or the center of
the pueblo as a center in relation to its periphery. Historical evidence
for the physical existence of the seventh kiva is noted by Dutton where
the Tiwa had a seventh kiva outside the village walls and its original
association was with the scalp society or warrior cult, and the Isleta
which had a seventh kiva where scalps and other dangerous things were
stored[89]. These kivas were representative of a possible fringe element
in opposition to the center and their contents where antithetical to the
peaceful center. It was the task of men with religious knowledge (e.g.
the kiva) to harness and control natural forms outside the pueblo, an
area that the gods ruled, and bring them peaceably to the core. Acts of
violence were reconciled and malevolent spirits transformed, for
example, in a scalp dance required in the presentation of a scalp by a
warrior returning from war, and was reconciliation in a paradoxical
tribute to the sanctity of life[90].
In a like sense, the rock images of the Zuni lie at the periphery of the
village and can stand in opposition to the peaceful center. Their
peaceful integration to the center is dependent upon a proper
interpretation of context that requires an extensive knowledge of Zuni
religion and myth. In this it is representative of the dangerous. While
an image can be appreciated visually, its power to evoke proper
narrative can bring danger in a deviant utterance. Proper interpretation
is the pragmatic elimination of individual expression and the proper
narrative is reflective of a collective cohesion that is manifest as
aesthetic appreciation, and while aesthetics and art find religion as their
motive, aesthetic expression cannot be a part of religious dialogue. As
Walker noted, expressive language tends to categorize the user [91] and
to the Zuni if this act has religious associations it could bring danger to
the individual and lack personal accomplishment for it may
subsequently bring danger to the collectivity.
Bunzel distinguishes between the old and new dances of the Zuni,
remarking that only the new dances allow for self-expression but even
then the “precision of movement belies a union of the totality”[92]. The
exaltation of the religious experience lies in the manifestation of the
activities and appreciation of the aesthetic quality that pervades. This
compensates for the intensity that is inherent in the personal religious
exaltation and subjective satisfaction indicative of the vision quests of
all the plains tribes. To the Zuni, the lack of that feeling is the
descriptive cohesion of the collective unity[93].
Because verbal and ostensive definition is related to the present,
utterances and showings do not refer or display contextual implications.
It is for this reason that contemporary Western logic and
anthropological analysis has failed in distinguishing Zuni concepts of
being from concepts of becoming[94]. Newman comments that the
Zuni language has no specific term for the copula, that function being
filled by the term teya, which means “be” or “to live in a place”[95]; temeaning terrestrial containment and location (both space and time)[96],
and ya a collectivity. Thus, when a Zuni asks you “How you have been
living these many days?” (Ko’na to’ tewanan ateyaye), it is asked in the
present tense and imperative (-ye), for if you have been living according
to observances (teshkwi), then the necessary answer, which may be
provided, is Ketsanishi (happily). Zuni logic dictates that the present
state necessarily affirms all that has proceeded, much in the same sense
that if a prayed for event transpires, then the prayer or ritual was
properly performed, akin to Western logic’s ‘affirming the
consequence’[97].
This phenomenon has been approached in analysis[98] and has shown
some merit in assuming syllogistic (validity) to be universal and
propositional logic (truth) to be culturally sensitive, but appears to have
failed in constructing cross-cultural identifiers in assuming that
“meaning” structures both validity and truth[99]. For instance, in cases
where “kind of” was absent as a semantic universal[100] the probability
of idealizing physics would render ineffective any notion of an ideal
(syntactic) language cross-culturally. The very nature of semantics is
the inherent improbability of idealizing physics. From a Zuni
standpoint, the idealization of physics is not improbable, for ritual
presupposes that in aRb, R is necessary, and relieves the perspectivetaker of substantiating rationality ontologically.
Cushing’s writings are rich with examples of how the Zuni concept of
being must conform to the context of form, function, and a pragmatic
interpretation of context through ceremony. In a narrative on pottery
making he describes how vessels come to be made beings[101]. “The
clay which served for their wares was seldom taken from the native
quarries without propitiatory offerings” and the transition of the
dormant potency of the raw material was by means of coaxing the
“treasured source” which is the source of life that accompanies,
protects, and preserves whatever it is contained within[102]. Through
the finishing and decorating of the vessels “no laughing, music,
whistling or any other unnecessary noises are indulged in, and
conversation was carried on in faint whispers or by signs; for it was
feared that the “voice” would enter the vessels, and that when the latter
were fired, would escape with a loud noise” thereby shattering the
vessel. It is imperative that the “noise made by the pot when struck or
when simmering on the fire is supposed to be the voice of its associated
being”[103]. It is imperative that the voice of the pot be its true voice
and not the voice of a deviant utterance.
Form and function serve to instill meaning to design images. Cushing
also describes the making of a canteen, which is formed in the shape of
a female mammary gland. It is named me’hetonne, according to both
shape and function, where me’hana is the word for a human mammary
gland, and ettonne is a word for fetish or ceremonial object. The design
images receive their specificity, which is to insure that vessel is always
providing the milk of the desert (water), by the context, or function of
the canteen. It is an ettonne because it contains the “treasured
source”[104].
Zuni Religion and Language: The Collective Consciousness
Cushing also cited an incidence where he showed a pole that
accompanies a theodolite to an old Zuni man and asked him what he
thought the name of it was. In response the old man inquired as to the
use of the item. After briefly describing the implementation of the
device the old man provided a rather lengthy sentence-word that
Cushing translated as “heights of the world progressively measuring
stick”. The next day Cushing took the pole to the extreme corner of the
pueblo and began “to flourish it around” until a middle-aged man
relented to curiosity and asked what it was. Cushing then provided the
Zuni name he had learned the day before and the man promptly
requested, “Can they actually tell how far up and down journeying the
world is?”[105].
When a Zuni is planting his field and performs the ceremonious prayer
and ritual of planting prayer sticks, offering cornmeal and reciting to the
six directions, changing the words only to correspond to the direction he
is facing, it not likely that he is distinguishing between his religion and
the agra-science he has learned. Samarin remarked that “as one level of
scientia there is knowing how to perform a task or knowing the effects
that natural and supernatural forces perform. That is primitive science
or- depending on what we are looking at or what our prejudices may be[106]
prescientific thinking”
.
In this regard there is no distinction between religious and secular
language as the logic of scientific language. There does however
appear to be an underlying theme where non-verbal expression and the
prospect of a deviant utterance distinguishes between the secular and
religious in contradistinction to Young’s remark.
In Zuni Law, Smith and Roberts state, “In manifest cultural content,
Zuni law appears less highly elaborated than Zuni religion. It is also true
that Zuni law is less important in Zuni values than Zuni religion…In the
institutional field of religion, direct association between high cultural
elaboration and high evaluation is present” and while there is a an
obvious disparity in elaboration of the religious and legal fields “the
differential between religion and law in cultural evaluation appears to
be less striking”, with the Zuni community possessing a high evaluation
of law and the Tribal Council as a legal body[107].
In reports of litigation in both religious and legal trials “there is little
expression …of an awareness of values pertaining to beauty”[108] and
upon examination the most notable instance of any reference remotely
related to aesthetic expression was case 62 where it was stated
“Although in a dance it was desirable that one of the dancers wore
jewelry, it should not have been stolen jewelry”[109]. In fact, most
references were in regard to attanni, such as, “the woman should not
have become a coyote at night”[110], or “the woman should not have
brought a plague of grasshoppers into the valley”, or “it was undesirable
that a man could send a centipede into the side of a woman”. All of
these references are related to violations of observances and are
considered as acts of witchcraft.
The duties of the Bow Society, and latter the Tribal Council, was
enforcement as a secular institution despite religious evaluations. It
would not do to punish or fend witchcraft through religious rite and
ceremony, for to do so the canonical rite would paradoxically expose
itself to the dangerous simply by reference to it, and would be akin to
‘fighting fire with fire’, a very undesirable prospect to the Zuni. Thus,
attanni is negated by observance (teshkwi) and violations are reflections
upon the individual, and dealt with by secular enforcement, which
collectively, may include gossip, criticism, and public ridicule[111].
The underlying dialectic of the beautiful and the dangerous is evident in
distinct dialogues, even in the absence of aesthetic expression, for
attanni is proper to secular dialogue and is pertinent to religious
dialogue only in the sense of observance where ‘if you have been living
rightly, then attanni is not an issue’ (Ko’na to’ tewanan ateyaye). Nonverbal expression is not meaningless nor is a deviant utterance
meaningless where the objective is the immersion of the subject into the
social structure in order to eliminate causes of behavior conducive to the
anti-structure of a social hierarchy where the collective consciousness of
the people is to “pray to become one”[112].
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Notes
[1] Tedlock, Barbara. “Beautiful and the Dangerous: Zuni Ritual and Cosmology as
an Aesthetic System”. Conjunctions: Biannual Volumes of New Writing. 6: 246-265,
1984.
[2] Young, M. Jane. Signs from the Ancestors: Zuni Cultural Symbolism and
Perceptions in Rock Art. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988: 264,
n.3.
[3] Ibid, 106-107.
[4] These terms are Willard’s, Pp. 160-163, 1989.
[5] Op. cit. Young, 1988: 105-106.
[6] Ibid, 107.
[7] Redfield, Robert. “ Thinker and Intellectual in Primitive Society”. In Culture in
History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin. Ed. By Stanley Diamond. Pp. 3-18. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1960: 9.
[8] Bunzel, Ruth L. “Introduction to Zuni Ceremonialism”. (1932a); “Zuni Origin
Myths”. (1932b); “Zuni Ritual Poetry”. (1932c). In Forty-Seventh Annual Report of
the Bureau of American Ethnology. Pp. 467-835. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1932. Reprint, Zuni Ceremonialism: Three Studies. Introduction by
Nancy Pareto. University of New Mexico Press, 1992: a492.
[9] Ibid, c615.
[10] Ibid, a480.
[11] Op. cit. Young, 1988: 90.
[12] Ibid, 93.
[13] Ibid, 86.
[14] Ibid, 91.
[15] Bunzel, Ruth L. The Pueblo Potter: A Study of Creative Imagination in Primitive
Art. New York: Dover, 1929: 68.
[16] Ibid, 65.
[17] Ibid, 54.
[18] Ibid, 51.
[19] Ibid, 53.
[20] Op. cit. Young, 1988: 90.
[21] Ibid, 92
[22] Ibid, 128-129.
[23] Ibid, 92.
[24] Bunzel,does note that new masks and dances are not uncommon and do allow for
aesthetic expression; however, all new dances must be approved by the head priest of
the kiva, and the masks must be defined and absorbed by society. Any new creation is
completely integrated. In this is evident that aesthetics can provide for epistemic
fulfillment in diachronic development.
[25] Op. cit. Young, 1988: 159.
[26] (Ibid, xvii, italics mine)
[27] (Cushing, see Green 1979: 227-245) Green, Jesse, ed. Zuni: Selected Writings of
Frank Hamilton Cushing. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1979.
[28] Willard, Charles. A Theory of Argumentation. Tuscaloosa and London:
University of Alabama Press, 1989:160.
[29] Ibid, 163.
[30] Rosaldo, Michelle Zimbalist. “Metaphor and Folk Classification”. In
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology. 28: 83-99, 1972: 84.
[31] Ibid, 87.
[32] Ibid, 92.
[33] Samarin, William. “Inventory and Choice in Expressive Language”. Word. 26:
153-169, 1970: 153-154.
[34] Cushing, Frank Hamilton. “Zuni Fetishes”. Second Annual Report of the Bureau
of Ethnology, 1880-1881. Pp. 3-45. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1883. Reprint, KC Publications, 1966 and Walker, Willard. “Inflection and
Taxonomic Structure in Zuni”. International Journal of American Linguistics. 32(3):
217-227, 1966.
[35] The term for blue or green is doot•’izh. Turquoise is the same, except with
emphasis and length on the last syllable (doot•’izhii). (Young, Robert W. and William
Morgan. “The Navajo Language”. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1980). Attempts to describe turquoise in terms of blue and green refer to the same
term conjunctively or disjunctively and will thus be described referentially in terms of
things (per an informant who is an artist and jeweler and an informant who isn’t).
[36] See Hickerson, Nancy P. “Two Studies of Color: Implications for Cross-Cultural
Comparability of Semantic Categories”. In Linguistics and Anthropology: In honor of
C.F. Voegelin. Pp. 317-330. Ed. By M. Dale Kinkade, Kenneth Hale, and Oswald
Werner. The Peter De Ridder Press, 1975.
[37] Op. cit. Young, 1988: 159.
[38] Op. cit. Cushing, 1883.
[39] From the showing of a stone the Navajo may not provide a color term but will
refer to an object (location) corresponding to the hue. Conversely, the name of the
location in conjunction with the stone will redundantly refer the name for the stone
(color). Meaning, the color term in this case refers multireferentially from the stone.
For the Zuni, the showing of the color will produce a term that is the name of an object
or direction that belongs to a category other than color, meaning all colors refer back
to an extensive category of religious association (being). There seems to be a
distinction here corresponding to the Navajo as a centrifugal society and the Zuni as a
centripetal society. The Navajo will begin a sandpainting from the center and proceed
outward, whereas the Zuni will begin from the outside and work inward.
[40] Stout, Carol. “Problems of a Chomskyan Analysis of Zuni Transitivity”.
International Journal of American Linguistics. 39: 207-223, 1973.
[41] Op. cit. Young, 92.
[42] Ibid, 158.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Hintikka, Jaakko. Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocination: An Ultimate
Pressupostion of 20th Century Philosophy. Vol.2. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Pub., 1997: 3.
[45] Ibid, 26.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Young, 1988, p. 159.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Hintikka, Jaakko. “Logic, Language Games, and Information: Kantian Themes
in the Philosophy of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon, 1973, p. 91.
[50] Ibid, p.61.
[51] Friedrich, Paul. “Linguistic Relativity”. In Linguistic Anthropology: Essays in
Honor of Harry Hoijer. Ed. By Jacques Marquet. Malibu: Undera, 1980, p.98. The
prerequisites of Friedrich's position can be found in his discussion of the "principle of
arbitrariness of the language" or the "arbitrariness of the symbol." ("The Lexical
Symbol." In Linguistics and Anthropology in Honor of C. F. Voeglin. Ed. by M. Dale
Kinkade, Kenneth Hale, and Oswald Werner. Peter De Ridler Press, 1975, pp. 199247.) Friedrich argues for the non-arbitrary in the objective semantic character of
language and the subjective intuitions of the speaker, stating that this is necessary for
the transition from positivism to formal structuralism. The inclusion of an interpreter
(i.e. observer) is an important distinction between positivist theories and those of a
"mentalistic cast", and the controversy between idealistic and materialistic conceptions
of meaning could be avoided by recognizing that different semantic systems, and
specifically, systems of lexical symbols, are differently related to reality (Friedrich
citing Sapir, "Language and Environment." American Anthropologist. 14:226-42,
1912. ). The internal consistency of a semantic system is a diachronic development,
generated as symbols are aligned with different categories. A symbol may denote an
image, which in turn can be multi-referential, but relativity at the individual level is
foregone by a series of alternate explanations and the correspondence of semantic
schemata and internal consistency is the result of a common purpose.
The effect of reducing lexicology to syntax is to ignore socio-cultural systems and
increase the theoretical role of arbitrariness in linguistic theory. The position of the
thing interpreted is in terms of linguistic code and must be presumed to belong to an
external world that is ordered and non-arbitrary. It would appear then that the thing
interpreted is semantic at all levels. What may be questionable is, if semantic values
are continuous as a consequence of the interaction of lexemes in their diverse
constructions and occurrences (multireferentiality and combinatory meaning in the
form of underlying propositions) within a socio-cultural setting, then to what degree is
the indexical inventory distinguished from non-egocentric obstensiveness once
symbolism is conventional. That is, is diachronic development terminated in identity,
e.g. same name usage, or is there still a role of the interpreter in distinguishing perhaps
between the use of a word and the use of the thing which the word denotes.
[52] Op. cit. Hintikka, 1973, p.166. The paradox of transcendental knowledge has an
intrinsic link and mutual implication between, 1) the unknowability of things
considered in themselves independently of our knowledge seeking activities and the
conceptual framework they utilize; and, 2) the unknowability of these activities and of
this framework. The linguistic counterpart to the epistemic paradox is the “mutual
dependence of linguistic relativity (impossibility of expressing reality as it is,
considered independently of our language) and the ineffability of language”.
According to Hintikka the transcendental paradox is “Kant’s fallacy”. The “semantic
turn” is that unknowability cannot be expressed apart from the language (Hintikka
1981: 377). Hintikka, Jaakko. “Wittgenstein’s Semantical Kantianism”. Proceeding
of the Fifth International Wittgenstein Symposium: Ethics, Foundations, Problems,
and Applications. Pp. 375-390. Ed. by E. Morscher and Rudolph Stranzinger. Holder,
Pichler, Tempsky, 1981.
[53] Kant, Immanuel. Logic. 1800. Trans., R.S. Hartmann and Wolfgang Scwartz.
New York: Dover Publication, 1974: 37-38.
[54] Apel, K. Otto. “From Kant to Pierce: The Semiotic Transformation of
Transcendental Logic”. In Proceedings of the Third InternationalKant Congress. Pp.
90-104. Ed. by L.W. Beck. D. Reidel, 1972,: 91.
[55] For the distinction between transcendent and transcendental, see Strawson, Peter
F. Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen, 1966:18.
[56] Op. cit. Hintikka, 1997: 166. Also, Hintikka, Jaakko and Merrill. Investigating
Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil-Blackwell, 1986: 5.
[57] Ibid, Hintikka 1997: 168.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid, 162-190.
[60] Ibid, 5-6.
[61] Ibid, 6.
[62] Hintikka, 411,415, italics mine). “The Semantics of Modal Notions and the
Indeterminacy of Ontology. Synthese. 21: 408-424, 1970.
[63] Op. cit. Hintikka, 1997: 36.
[64] Langer, Susanne K. Philosophy in a New Key. Cambridge: University of
Harvard, 1951: 86.
[65] Ibid, 87.
[66] Ibid, 147.
[67] Op. cit. Bunzel, 1932:a486.
[68] Images for water are not put on water vessels, but on bowls for holding cornmeal;
hence, the desire for increase (Bunzel 1929: 23-24, 69-71).
[69] Bunzel, Ruth L. Zuni Texts. Publications of the American Ethnological Society,
15. New York: G.E. Steckert & Co., 1933, and Newman, Stanley. Zuni Dictionary.
Indiana University Research Center Publication Six. Bloomington: Indiana University,
1958.
[70] Cushing, Frank Hamilton. My Adventures in Zuni. 1882. Palmer Lake, CO:
Filter Press, 1999 reprint.
[71] Op. cit. Willard, 1989: 160.
[72] Fabian notes that “primitive” is a essentially a temporal concept (and temporally
distancing), is a category, not an object, of Western thought (1983: 18). Dunn defines
the “primitive” as an interpreter or seer, and that every culture has them, making them
a category of individuals. She also refers to the universal use of systems of symbols
by cultures and implies that symbols, as objects of the interpreters, are primitives.
Dunn, Dorothy. American Indian Painting of the Southwest and Plain’s Area.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1968: 24-25. Fabian, Johannes. Time and
the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. NY: Columbia University Press,
1983.
[73] Op. cit. Willard, 1989: 163.
[74] Op. cit. Young, 1988: 7-8.
[75] Cushing, 1883, (ishalhma-te, per Newman, 1958)
[76] The term ahoi is a superordinate generic term. Ahoi has become a term
translated as ‘people’ by English speaking bilingual Zuni, and is a secondary echelon
in the being hierarchy subsumed under the superordinate generic term. (Walker
1966a).
[77] Cushing, 1883: 10. Compare this with Plato dropping “now” from timeless
propositions and importing “always “ in its place (Timaeus 38a, cited from Owens
1966: 333). Owens, G.E.L. “Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present”.
Monist. 50: 317-340, 1966.
[78] Op. cit. Newman, 1958.
[79] Zuni informants suggest a slight difference is pronunciation corresponding to
context, but it is imperceptible to my ear. They confirm, however, that it can be used
to have simultaneous meaning, but the term apoyanne is associated to strict religious
dialogue and is presently archaic.
[80] Miner, Kenneth L. “Noun Stripping and Loose Incorporation in Zuni”.
International Journal of American Linguistics. 52: 242-254, 1986: 246n.8. Walker
states that a is not only a particle referring to persons, but also categorizes it as a being
(1966a).
[81] Cushing, Frank Hamilton. “Outlines of Zuni Creation Myths”. Thirteenth
Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 1891-1892. Pp. 321-447.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1896. Reprint. Bunzel criticizes
Cushing’s interpretations as containing “endless poetic and metaphysical glossing of
the basic elements” (1932b: 547). Bunzel translates apoyanne as “stone cover” where
a is denoted by its root use as a term for “stone” (1932a: 487). The distinction is
viewed here as relative to the distinction between folklore and mythology, where, as
Benedict notes, a Zuni narrator is free to incorporate his knowledge into folklore and
tales (1969: xiii, Benedict, Ruth. Zuni Mythology. 2 vols. Columbia University
Contributions to Anthropology, no. 21. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935.
AMS Press reprint, 1969). Bunzel had received her version from a man who was not a
priest and was a story that belonged to all the priests for the purpose of storytelling
during the winter retreats. Her source had learned the story from an uncle who had
refused to give the origin myth of his society since that was his “very own prayer”
(1932b: 548).
In a letter to the to the Peabody Museum, Cushing distinguished between the
“abundant folklore and more serious mythology” (Green, Jesse. 1990: 304, Cushing at
Zuni: The Correspondence and Journals of Frank Hamilton Cushing, 1879-1884.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990.). It is apparent from
information in several correspondences (including Lt. John Bourke’s journal; Ibid,
188, 394 n. 67), that Cushing learned his version of the origin myth from Keasi, who
was second in command in the Order of the Priests of the Bow (Apila Shiwani) and
who’s duty it was, according to Keasi, to preserve the “Sacred Genesis” of the Zuni,
handed down by word of mouth from the “Old Days…given to me by…day and night
pouring it into my ears” (Ibid: 187). In Cushing’s day the Society was the most
powerful of all the kivas and its strength depended upon its secrecy, even to the
exclusion of the collective, for this was the source of its motive as an enforcement
agency of the secular, and also was the unification of the collective (Harvey, Byron III.
p.204. “An Overview of Pueblo Religion”. New Perspectives on the Pueblos. Ed. by
Alfonso Ortiz. Pp. 197-217. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972.).
By the time of Bunzel’s field work however, the war cult was “greatly in abeyance”
and had been “stripped” of its power: the pattern of assignment of the priestly
hierarchy had been drastically altered and the dissemination of information and the
handing down of the society’s ritual history had been drastically curtailed (Bunzel
1932b: 525-526). Thus, it is likely that information that had been available to
Cushing as a member of the Bow was, for the most part, unavailable to Bunzel, at least
in its original form. The most interesting aspect of this is that Bunzel’s informant was
in all likelihood Nick Tamaka, who was persecuted for witchcraft by the Bow in or
around 1895. Tamaka immediately informed the U.S. authorities and later become
Governor of Zuni. Throughout these years it was he who stripped the Bow of its
power.
[82] Cushing gives an account of the division of the summer and winter people in a
myth telling “how soon after the emergence from the under world Yanauluha carried a
staff among the plumes of which appeared four round things, seeds or eggs, two blue
like the sky or turquoise, two dun-red like the earth. Yanauluha told the people to
choose. From one pair would issue beings of beautiful plumage, and where they flew
would be everlasting summer; from the other would come evil beings, ‘uncolored,
black, piebald with white’, and where these flew, and the people should follow, winter
would strive with summer, and food would be obtainable only by labor. The people
choose blue eggs, and the strongest seized them. Worms issued from this pair of eggs,
which grew into ravens. But the other eggs held by Yanauluha and by the fewer and
weaker but wiser people who waited with him, grew into macaws, who flew to the
summer land of the south”. Yanauluha became the “speaker to and of the Sunfather”. In this myth there seems to be an implied moral prescribing aesthetics should
be informed by qualities of a more immanent nature for there is an inherent danger in
the aesthetic (quote cited from Kroeber , 1919: 94-95. Kroeber, Alfred L. “Zuni Kin
and Clan”. Anthropological Papers of the Museum of Natural History, 18. 1919: 39204. Reprint, AMS Press.).
[83] Eggan, Fred. Social Organization of the Western Pueblos. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1970: 300.
[84] Op. cit. Young, 1988: 257n.31.
[85] Ibid, 136.
[86] Ibid, 106.
[87] Op. cit. Cushing, 1883: 10.
[88] Op. cit Young, 1988: 114.
[89] Dutton, Bertha P. American Indians of the Southwest. Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press, 1983: 22.
[90] Gutierrez, Ramón A. When Jesus Came, the Corn Maidens Went Away.
Stanford, CA: University of Stanford Press, 1991: 26.
[91] Walker notes that referential meaning is about the non-linguistic environment of a
speaker, e.g. color-coding. Walker, Willard. “Taxonomic Structure and the Pursuit of
Meaning”. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology. 21: 265-275, 1966b: 266.
[92] Op. Cit. Bunzel, 1932c, 899.
[93] Ibid, 1932a, 480, and Pareto, Nancy. “Introduction”. In the 1992 reprint of
Bunzel’s Zuni Ceremonialism, p.xxix.
[94] Roberts, John. “The Zuni”. In Variations in Value Orientations. Ed. by F.R.
Kluckhorn and F.L. Strodbeck. Pp. 285-316. Evanston, IL and Elmsford, NY: Row,
Peterson, 1961.
[95] Newman, Stanley. “The Zuni Verb ‘To Be’. Foundations of Language,
Supplemental Series. Vol. 1. Ed. by John W. Verhaar. The Humanities Press, 1967.
[96] Time and space are simultaneously implied in te-, a prefix denoting a terrestrial
occurrence or event. Time is circular, corresponding to the seasons and the sun’s
(yatokk/a) revolutions. Yato can be a term meaning “day” or “light”, or an intransitive
verb meaning to “move over or above”. The suffix kk/a is causative and forms a verb.
The Zuni term for a timepiece is yatokk/a, the same as the sun.
[97] Cushing notes this phenomenon where essentially the migration of birds to the
south brings the winter; Zuni Breadstuff. Indian Notes and Monographs, 8. 1920.
Reprint. New York: Museum of the American Indian, 1974: n20), and Dennis
Tedlock notes it as a fallacy citing Aristotelian logic; Tedlock, Dennis. “Pueblo
Literature: Style and Verisimilitude”. New Perspectives on the Pueblos. Ed. by
Alfonso Ortiz. Pp. 219-242. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972.
[98] Hamill, James F. Ethnologic: The Anthropology of Human Reasoning. Chicago,
Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
[99] Ibid, 104.
[100] Ibid, 21. In cases where the universal was true, the subsumptive was not
considered valid. “Some” was not a valid inference from “all”.
[101] Op. cit. Green, 1979: 227-245.
[102] Cushing termed animate matter as “one great system of all conscious and
interrelated life” (1883: 9, italics mine), and Bunzel noted that there is “no antithesis
of…matter and spirit (1932a: 486). Cushing also remarks that the Zuni perception of
the harmony of all things in the universe means that, to the Zuni mind, nature is quite
literally endowed with the gift of reason (Cushing, 1920: n20).
[103] Op. cit. Cushing, 1920: 176.
[104] Op. cit. Grenn, 1979: 241-244.
[105] German and Zuni are both polysynthetic languages. Cushing noted the
similarities in the two languages where with different roots and affixes one could
construct, in any direction, sentence-words (“coinages”). Green, Jesse. Cushing at
Zuni: The Correspondence and Journals of Frank Hamilton Cushing, 1879-1884.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990: 107-108.
[106] Samarin, William. “Theory of Order with Disorderly Data”. In Linguistics and
Anthropology: In honor of C.F. Voegelin. Pp. 509-519. Ed. By M. Dale Kinkade,
Kenneth Hale, and Oswald Werner. The Peter De Ridder Press, 1975.
[107] Smith, Watson and John Roberts. Zuni Law: A Field of Values. Papers of the
Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. 43. Cambridge,
MA: Peabody Museum, 1954: 147.
[108] Ibid, 144
[109] Ibid
[110] Notable in this statement is not that the woman became a coyote, but that she
became a coyote at night. Metamorphosis did not traverse category boundaries, but
the day/night dichotomy as a concept of the center was somehow violated, and
represented attanni.
[111] Op. cit. Dutton, 1983: 13.
[112] Eggan, Fred and T.N. Pandey. “Zuni History, 1855-1970”. Handbook of North
American Indians, Southwest. Vol.9. Ed. By Alfonso Ortiz. Pp. 474-481.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979.
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