Fighting austerity in Greece and beyond A historic moment for the

Transcription

LisaMittendrein,ValentinSchwarz
momentum14,October2014
Fighting austerity in Greece and beyond
AhistoricmomentfortheEuropeanLeft
Introduction
GreecehasbeenatthecentreoftheEurocrisisforyears.NowhereelseintheEurozoneisthe
economiccrisisdeeperandthesocialsituationworse.Theausteritymeasuresimposedbythe
governmentandtheTroikaareaimingtofundamentallychangethedistributionofwealthand
therelationsofpowerwithinGreeksociety,especiallybetweenlabourandcapital.These
policieshavereflectedbackontherestoftheEurozone,e.g.throughtheFiscalcompactin2012
ortheCompetitivenesspactdiscussedsinceearly2013.Greececanthereforebeseenasthe
laboratoryfortheneoliberalrestructuringforEuropeasawhole.Thepoliticalexperiments
Greeksocietyisputthroughmaybemoreradicalthanelsewhere,butatleastindirectlyaffect
everyoneintheEurozoneandtheEU.
Atthesametime,GreeceisthecountrywherethechancesforapartyoftheLeft,SYRIZA,toget
intopowerarebiggest.Fiveyearsago,SYRIZAbarelymanagedtopassthethresholdofvotes
requiredtoenterparliament.Todaytheyarethemainoppositionforce,leadingthepollsbya
largegap.ASYRIZAgovernmentwouldbethefirstandonlyoneintheEurozonetoopenly
opposetheausteritypoliciesandtheneoliberalrestructuringdescribedabove.Theelections
whichcouldmakethispossiblewillbeheldin2016atthelatest,butarewidelyexpectedtotake
placeinlate2014orearly2015.TheseprospectshavemadeGreecethemajorplaceofhopefor
leftistsandthosefightingausterityacrossEurope.Inthissense,theimportanceofSYRIZA’s
strugglegoesbeyondGreece:Iftheymanagetogetintopowerandimplementtheirpolicies,this
willopenspacesforleftalternativesalloverEurope.Iftheyshouldfail,theLeftinEuropemay
losecredibilityandhopeforalongtime.Thus,thequestionofhowwecancontributetoa
politicalchangeinGreeceandinextensionEuropeisthemainfocusofthispaper.
First,wegiveanoverviewofSYRIZA’shistoryanddiscusstheircharacterizationasanewkind
ofparty,closelyconnectedtothesocialmovementscreatedbycrisisprotests.Second,we
analysethechallengesSYRIZAwillfaceinthenearfuture,especiallyontheEuropeanlevel.We
distinguishbetweenthreephases:theelectoralcampaign;theprocessofformingagovernment
aftertheelections;thefirstmonthsofapossibleSYRIZAgovernment.Third,wepresenta
strategicapproachandconcreteideasleftistsandausteritycriticsoutsideGreececoulduseto
supportSYRIZAinthiscrucialperiod.WethinkthatifaleftgovernmentinGreeceistohavea
chance,thisisnotpossiblewithoutseriousandcoordinatedsupportfromotherpartsofEurope.
WewilltrytoinitiateasolidaritycampaigninAustria,onwhichwealsomakesomeremarksin
thelastchapter.
OurpaperisbasedonaseriesofinterviewswithpoliticiansandactivistsfromSYRIZA,the
broaderGreekLeftandotherexpertsfromAustriaandGermany.Theinterviewswere
conductedinAthensinearlySeptemberorviatheinternet.InthecaseofGiorgosChondros,
IoannaMeitani,JohnMilios,EvaVölpel,WalterBaierandHarisTriandafilidou,wetranslatedthe
quotesfromGerman.Wethankourintervieweesfortheirtimeandopennessandwishthemall
thebest.TheirstruggleiscrucialnotonlyforthepeopleinGreece,butthewholeofEurope.
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I. SYRIZA
History
Asanelectoralcoalition,SYRIZAwasfoundedin2004byalargenumberofpartiesand
organisationsfromdiverseLefttraditions,includingCommunist,Trotskyist,Maoist,Greenand
Feministgroups.ThestrongestgroupwithinSYRIZAwasandisuntiltodaySynaspismos.It
developedfromvarioussplitsoftheCommunistpartysince1968.Synaspismoswasitselfan
umbrellagroup,comingfromaeurocommunisttradition.Intheyearsleadinguptothe
foundationofSYRIZA,itsmembershadgainedexperiencesinmobilisationslikeagainsttheG8
summitinGenoa2001,openingthepartytothetopicsandpracticesofsocialmovements.The
firstyearsofSYRIZAweremarkedbyconflictsoverstrategicperspectivesanddisappointing
electoralresults,forexample4,6percentatthegeneralelectionin2009.In2010,therightwing
ofSynaspismos,whichadvocatedamoregovernment-orientedstrategyandcoalitionwith
PASOK,splitfromtheparty.TheywentontobecomethemoderateleftpartyDIMARwhichlater
supportedtheausteritygovernmentunderSamaras.FollowingitssupportoftheDecember
2008revoltandthesplitoftherightwing,SYRIZAtookaleftturnandre-assuredtheirstrategic
orientationtowardsthemovements.Inspring2012,SYRIZAannouncedthattheywereseeking
toformthenextGreekgovernment.(Candeias/Völpel2014:171;Laskos/Tsakalotos2013:128)
SYRIZAreceived16,8%ofthevotesintheelectionofMay2012andasnogovernmentcouldbe
formed,anelectionwascalledagaininJune.Thecampaignculminatedinaconfrontation
betweenSYRIZAandtheconservativeNDandendedwithSYRIZAcomingsecondwith26,9%.
NDwonwithaslightmargin(29,7%)andformedagovernmentwithPASOKandDIMAR.Ever
since,SYRIZAhasconcentratedondevelopingaleftgovernmentprogramme,buildingEuropean
networksandstrengtheningtheirrelationshipwiththemovements.InJuly2013,SYRIZA,upto
thenstillanelectoralcoalition,becameaparty.Intermsofelectoralsupportthepartystabilised,
comingfirstwith26,5%intheEuropeanelectionsof2014.Thesimultaneouslocalelections
yieldedmixedresultsasSYRIZAistraditionallyweakeronthelocallevel,butthecountry’s
largestregionAtticanowhasaSYRIZAgovernor.
Characteristics
Apluralisticparty
The2013politicalresolutionofSYRIZAsays:„SYRIZAhasbeenestablishedasaunified,
democratic,multi-tendency,masspartyofthecontemporaryLeftforthestrengtheningofan
alreadypowerfulpopularmovementofsubversionwiththeaimofcancellingthememoranda,
erasingmostofthedebtandimplementingaprogramofsocialandproductivereconstruction.“
(left.gr2013)Fromthebeginningoftheelectoralcoalitionintheearly2000suntiltoday,
SYRIZAunitesleftistsfromdiversebackgroundsandgenerations.Manywerestrongly
influencedbytheanti-warandaltermondialistmovements,andtheyareunitedbya
commitmenttoatransformativepathtoSocialism.(Candeias/Völpel2014:171;
Laskos/Tsakalotos2013:128)DissentfromwithinthepartyisprominentlyvoicedbythesocalledLeftPlatform.Itdemandsastrongerfocusonmovementsandsocialstrugglestoattach
largerpartsofthepopulationtotheparty.Also,itismorefavourableofanexitfromthe
Eurozonethanthepartymajorityandleadership.(Dericquebourg2013)TheLeftPlatformhas
considerablestrengthwithinSYRIZA:Atthe2013partyconvention,itsmotionsreceived
between25and40percentofvotes.Aroundadozenoftheparty’s70MPssupporttheLeft
Platform.(Kouvelakis2013)Sofar,thedifferentgroupsandfactionshavemanagedtodealwith
theirdifferencesinaproductiveway,notendangeringtheparty’sascent.
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Commitmenttothemovements
ThemostcentralandnotedfeatureofSYRIZAliesintheirrelationshiptoandunderstandingof
theimportanceofpoliticalmovements.Theparty’sgeneralunderstandingofpoliticsisbuilton
theindispensablerelationshipofleftpartiesandapossiblegovernmentwithmovements.
SYRIZAwasactiveinandinsolidaritywithmovementsevenbeforetherecentcrisis.Theyhave
supportedthediversestrugglesofrefugees,studentsandothersandvoicedtheirsupportofthe
December2008riotsdespitemassivepoliticalandpublicpressure.Since2010,SYRIZAhasbeen
stronglyinvolvedintheanti-austerityprotests,movementsandthedevelopingsolidarity
initiativessince2010.Members,activistsandMPstookpart,providedsupportandputforward
leftanalysesandproposals.Thiscommitmenttoequalparticipationinandcooperationwiththe
movementsisvoicedthroughouttheparty.ForAlexandrosBistis,SYRIZA’smaincampaign
coordinator,theattitudeisclear:“Weneedyourparticipationandactionsandweneedtobe
withyou,everyday.Whateverhappensthere,wewilltrytodoittogether.”Throughthisorganic
participation,SYRIZA’srejectionofthememorandumandtraditionalclientelisticpolitics
becamecredibletolargepartsofthemovements.WhenSYRIZAannouncedtheirclaimforaleft
governmentin2012,“itwaspossibleforthepartytotransporttheprotestandsocialstruggles
intothebourgeoisstate,tosharpenexistingpoliticalconflicts,andtodeepenthecrisisof
bourgeoishegemony“(Milios/Triandafilidou2013;Völpel2014:149;Laskos/Tsakalotos2013:
119)
Theparty’scommitmenttothemovementsbecomesclearinthewaytheplatformSolidarity4All
wassetup.FundedbyashareofSYRIZA’sMPs’salaries,itsupportssolidarityinitiatives
throughoutGreecelikesolidarityclinics,communitygardens,socialcentresandothers.The
platformdoesnotinterfereorcoordinate,buttriestosupportthedecentralisedeffortsoflocal
groupsbyprovidinginformationandinfrastructure.
SYRIZA’sleftgovernmentprojectisalsobasedontheideathatthestateisonlyoneofmany
importantpoliticalbattlegroundsforradicalchange.Milios/Triandafilidou(2013)expressthis
atttitudethefollowingway:“Socialstrugglesincivilsocietyandsocialstrugglesinsidethestate
havetostrengthenoneanother.Seekinggovernmentpowerisnotthegoalbutanindispensable
intermediatestep.Weallknowthatwinninggovernmentdoesnotmeanwinningstatepower
andevenlessmeanswinningbackstructuraleconomicandsocialpower.Butitcanhelpto
changepowerrelations.”
Whilethisunderstandingissharedthroughouttheparty,somebelievethatSYRIZAdoesnotdo
enoughtosupportsocialstruggles.ChristosGiovanopoulosfromSolidarity4Allargues:“My
critiquetoSYRIZAandtheradicalLeftisthatwhiletheytrytoprepareaviablealternativefor
aftertheelections,notmuchhasbeendonetoorganisepeoplefrombelow.Itisgoodtorespect
their[themovements’]autonomy,butSYRIZAshouldworkasaproviderofthepoliticalglue”,
i.e.acommoncausethatconnectsthediversestruggles.
Fromconnectivetostrategicparty
ArecenttheoreticaldebatehasidentifiedSYRIZAaswhatPorcarocallsaconnectiveparty.
(Porcaro2013)Ratherthantheoldmassparties,whichmeanttoorganiseandleaditsmembers
andfollowers,aconnectivepartyisacoalitionofparties,unions,movementsorother
organisations.Whilethemasspartieswererepresentationsoftheold,relativelyhomogenous
classesofthe19thand20thcentury,theconnectivepartyorganisestoday’smorefragmented
society.Amongitsmaincharacteristicsisthepracticeof“explicitlymakingthesocialand
culturaldivisionswithinthesubalternclassesandtheirovercominganissueofpoliticalanalysis
andstrategicplanning.”(Rehmann2013)Thetraditionalparty,whichisjustonepartofthe
connectiveparty,doesnotseektodominatetheotherorganisations.Rather,dependingonthe
situationofstruggles,adifferentpartofthecoalitiontakestheleadtemporarily.Whenstreet
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mobilisationsdominate,movementsdirecttheaction.Ifparliamentbecomesthearenaofthe
commonstruggle,thepartydoes.Thesamegoesforunionsincaseofstrikes.Inmanycases,the
diversepartnersoftheconnectivepartyarelinkedbyindividualsbeingactiveinmorethanjust
oneofthem.SYRIZA,givenitspluralisticcharacteranditsrelationshiptothemovements,seems
tocomeclosetothedefinition.
However,theconnectivepartyfacesatleastthreelimits(Porcaro2013):First,itdependsonits
abilitytoorganiseaverylargepartofthepopulation.Second,itismosteffectivewhenthereare
manyandregularlychangingsocialissues,ratherthantheneedtofocusononetask.Third,it
doesnotsolvetheproblematicrelationshipthemodernLefthaswiththestateandpolitical
power–eventhoughrealchangeseemstobeimpossiblewithoutthem.AccordingtoPorcaro,if
theconnectivepartywantstoovercometheselimits,itmusttransformintoastrategicparty.
Thestrategicpartyretainsthepluralityofitspartsandfunctions,butmanagesto“condense
themintoacommon,yetflexiblepolicy.”(Candeias/Völpel217)Thequestionsthisposesinthe
Greekcaseis:CanSYRIZAturnthestruggleagainstthememorandaandforapolitical
alternativetoausterityintotheunifyingpurposetheformationofastrategicpartyneeds?Will
thepartybeabletoprovidethe“glue”ChristosGiovanopoulosmentionedabove?
Inanycase,thecharacteristicsthatmakeSYRIZAanewkindofpartyhavemadetheman
inspirationtoleftistsalloverEurope.
SYRIZA’s strengths and weaknesses
Factorsforsuccess
ThemainstructuralfactorforthefundamentalchangesintheGreekpoliticalsystemisofcourse
thedeepeconomiccrisisandthepoliticalchoicesoftherulingclasses.Undertheregular
conditionsofneoliberalcapitalism,itsconsequenceslikeunemploymentandpovertyareusually
attributedtoindividualshortcomingsofthoseaffected.Leftpartiesfinditincreasinglydifficult
toaddressthemasstructuralproblems.IntheGreekcase,therapidaccelerationofthecrisisand
itseffectonhugepartsofthepopulationmadethisindividualisationofsocialproblems
impossibleandopenedupaspaceforleftinterpretationsanddemands.However,ashistory
shows,thiscanalsoworkinfavouroftheextremeright.
ThereasonswhySYRIZAstillemergedasthemainpoliticalbeneficiaryaremanifoldandthereis
anon-goingdebateaboutthem.Forthepurposeofthispaperwehighlightthreefactorswe
considerrelevantforfurtherstrategies.
Mass movements against austerity
Itwasnotprimarilytheharshnessoftheausteritymeasures,butthemassivepopularresistance
againstthemthatprovidedthebasisfortheshifttotheleft.“Themovementwasabigcatalyst
forchange”,PanagiotisSotiris,sociologistandactivistwithAntarsya,says.“Thereisno
automaticlinkbetweensocialcrisisandfarrightrise.Ifthereisamovement,itcanalsoleadto
solidarity,collectiveaspiration,beliefinthepossibilityofcollectivechangeanddemocracy.”
Especiallywhentheprotestsweremetwithbrutalrepressionanddidnotleadtoanypolitical
changes,peopleturnedawayfromthetraditionalpartieswhichtheyperceivedascorruptand
detachedfromthepopulation.HarisTriandafilidoudescribesthedynamicasfollows:“There
wasaradicalisationinallofsociety.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheyallbecameleftistsatonce,but
youcouldveryintenselyfeeltheruptureofthehegemonicdiscourse.Andthisangerresonated
inthe2012elections.”ThisradicalisationopenedupthespaceforSYRIZA,whichhad
consolidatedasapartyandstrengthenedtheirtieswiththemovementsinthepreviousyears.
Theyhadchosentofightthecrisispoliciesbothinsideparliamentandoutinthestreets.Their
organicparticipationintheprotestsandstrugglesprovidedthemwithcredibilityin
representingadifferentpoliticalprogrammeaswellasadifferentwayofpoliticsaltogether.
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Claim to power at the right moment
AnotherreasonthatprovedessentialforSYRIZA’squickrisewastheirstrategicchoicetomakea
claimtopower.WhenthepartyannouncedthattheywantedtoleadthenextGreekgovernment
aheadoftheelectionsinspring2012,theywereapartyof5percentandneitherpoliticallynor
organisationallypreparedforgovernment.However,bypromisingtotakethestruggletothe
levelofthestate,theyprovidedanewvisionafterthedisillusionmentwiththemainstream
partiesandtheslowingmobilisations.AftertheelectionofMay2012,SYRIZAwasaskedtojoina
governmentof“nationalsalvation”withND,PASOKandothers.Theyrefused,statingtheother
parties’attachmenttothememorandaandausterityasthereason.Whenthemandatetoforma
governmentmovedontoSYRIZA,“ouranswerwasnottotalktothebigparties,whichweknew
wouldachievenothing,buttothetradeunionsandorganisationsoftheleft.Thisearnedustheir
respect,”saysHarisTriandafilidou.SYRIZA’sfirmpoliticalattitudeandtheir–albeitsymbolic–
inclusionofthebroaderleftinthepost-electionprocessfurtherhelpedtoestablishthemasa
crediblealternativetothetraditionalparties.
Weakness of other left parties
WhywasitSYRIZAwhoprofitedfromthesituation–andnotanotherpartyoftheLeft?Before
thecrisiseruptedin2010,socialdemocraticPASOKhadastrongbasethroughoutthecountry
andhadjustwonnationalelections.AfterthePASOKgovernmentsignedthememorandaand
enforcedausterity,theirsupportcollapsedspectacularly.Thethirdestablishedparliamentary
partyoftheleft,KKE,isanorthodoxcommunistpartywhichdistancesitselffrommostother
partiesandmovements.Theirdogmaticviewsandrefusaltosupportaleftgovernment
alienatedpartsoftheirbase.DIMAR,whichstartedoutasaright-wingsplitfromSYRIZAand
waslaterjoinedbyformerPASOKMPs,lostitscredibilityasaleftalternativewhentheyjoined
theausteritygovernmentin2012.Smaller,non-parliamentaryleftpartieslikeANTARSYAonly
benefittedalittlefromtheshifttotheleftduetothepolarisationofthepoliticalconfrontation.
Inthispoliticallandscape,peopleturnedtoSYRIZA,whostoodoutaspluralist,honestly
opposingausterityandproposingarealalternative.
Remainingweaknesses
Targeting new voters
SYRIZAhavebeenleadingthenationwidepollssincefall2013.In2014,theycamefirstinthe
Europeanelections.Withnationalelectionsexpectedsoon,oneofthechallengeswillbeto
expandandstrengthentheirelectoralbase.Recentanalysesshowanincreaseofclass
polarisation:SYRIZAarestronginlargeandmediumcities,wherethecrisisandthe
consequencesofausterityhavehithardest.Theyalsohavestrongresultsinworkingandlower
middleclassareas,withyoungvotersandpublicemployees,whiletheyareweakwith
pensionersandprivatesectoremployees.The2014electionsalsoemphasizedtheparty’sneed
tobuildandstrengthenlocalstructures,asSYRIZA’sresultsintheEuropeanelectionswere
betterthaninthesimultaneouslocalelections.(ThePressProject2014;Laskos/Tsakalotos
2013:127)
Expanding the party base
Whileelectionsareoneveryone’sagenda,SYRIZAofficialsarealsoconcernedabouttheweak
connectiontotheirbase.Whiletheirpresenceinmovementsandelectoralresultsarestrong,the
numberofpeoplewhoareactivelyinvolvedwiththepartyisconsideredmuchtoolow.
AlexandrosBistis,SYRIZAcampaigncoordinator,explainshisview:“Wehaveofficesallover
Greeceandwehaveactivists,butnotenoughtosaythatwerepresent30%oftheGreekpeople.
Abigproportionofthevotewegotwaswithoutrealcontactwithus.Soonlyfewofthemare
reallyawareofourideologyandprogramme.Mostchooseusbecausetheycannotstandtheway
thingsareanymore.Theyshiftfromonepartytoanother,hopingthatourpartyisnotgoingto
disappointthemlikepreviouspartiesdid.Butthereisnosolidconnectionbetweenourideology
andtheirvote–that’sabigproblem.”Thislackofconnectionwiththebaseandrealadoptionof
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SYRIZA’sprogrammebyvotersbringsaboutseveralproblems.Itendangersthestabilityoftheir
electoralresultsaspeoplearemorelikelytomoveawaywhentheydon’tfeelconnectedtothe
partyandtheirprogramme.Morefundamentally,iftheirvotersdon’tshareSYRIZA’sconviction,
anyleftgovernmentprojectandstepstowardsradicalchangesareendangered.Itwillbe
essentialforthepeopletowithstandtheuncertaintyofaconfrontationwithEuropeanelitesand
possiblefuturehardshipincontextwithsocialtransformation.AndasmanyinSYRIZAhavetold
us:Aleftgovernmentwillneeddeterminedpeopleandstrongmovementstopushitforward.
Furthermore,ifapartyof30percentstillhasthestructuresandnumberofactivistsofapartyof
5percent,itishardertodefendagainstopportunistswhomightjustwantashareofSYRIZA’s
success.
The left government project
Thepoliticalprogramme
Since2012,SYRIZAhasbeenpreparingintenselyforaleftgovernmentproject.Thereversalof
thememorandumpoliciesisthemostimmediateaim.Itishoweverusuallylinkedinthedebates
totheparty’sambitiontostartaprocessoffundamentalsocialandpoliticaltransformation.In
September2014,AlexisTsipraspresentedthecornerstonesofagovernmentplanfor
reconstruction(Macropolis2014):
 Debt:SYRIZAwilldemandthecancellationofalargepartoftheGreekdebtandtotie
futurerepaymenttogrowthrates.AcentralideathatJohnMiliosandotherhave
repeatedtousisaEuropeandebtconference,wherethesovereigndebtofallEuropean
countriesshouldbedebatedandpartlycancelled.SYRIZAwillalsopushforaEuropean
publicinvestmentprogrammeandfortheECBtodirectlybuysovereignbonds.
 Humanitariancrisis:Witha2billionpackage,includingfreeelectricityandfood
subsidiesfor300,000households,SYRIZAwantstosupportthosehithardestbythe
crisis.Theywillre-establishfreeaccesstohealthcare,increasethelowestpensionsand
introducerentsubsidies.Thesemeasureswillbenon-negotiable.
 Growth:Themostimportantaspectoftheplanforgrowthistherestorationofthe
minimumwagetothepre-crisislevelof751eurosandtheincreaseofthetax-free
threshold.Thewidelycriticisedgeneralpropertytaxshouldbereplacedbyataxonlarge
realestates.ThebiggestGreekbanks,whichthestatenationalisedtoalargepartbutleft
inthehandsoftheirformerowners,shouldberestructured.Also,newlyfoundedspecial
purposebanksshouldadministerthereconstructionofcertainsectorsoftheeconomy.
Regardingtheprivatedebtproblem,thereshouldbeahaircutforallbelowthepoverty
lineandtheestablishmentofaspecialboardtonegotiateloansettlementsbetween
debtorsandbanks.
 Employment:Thelabourrightsframeworkwillberestoredtoitspre-crisissituation,reestablishingcollectivebargainingandjobprotection.SYRIZA’splansalsoincludeajob
creationprogrammefor300,000jobsintheprivatesectorandlocalgovernmentswithin
twoyears.
 Memorandum:AnotheroneofSYRIZA’smajordemandsisthecancellationofthe
memoranda.Thisaimmightproveevenmoredifficulttoreachthanothers.“Wherethe
strugglereallyliesandwherewewillreallyneedalliesisinabolishingthememorandum
andregardinglabourrelations”,HarisGolemis,directorofNicosPoulantzasInstitute,
says.WhatthiscancellationwouldmeanforfuturevisitsbytheTroikaremainsunclear
tous.
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Animpossibletask?
ThereareconcernsamongcriticsandmembersofSYRIZAalikewhetherthepartywill
managetheseeminglyimpossible:topushmeasuresforimmediaterelief,renegotiatewith
theEuropeanInstitutionsandcreditorsandpursuearadicalprogrammeoftransformingthe
state.Theseareseriousandrelevantconcerns.Aleftgovernmentprogrammecangowrong
inmanydifferentways.PushingforarupturewithEUactorstoostronglyorsooncould
quicklyalienatetheGreekpeopleanddeprivethepartyofthepossibilitytogovernfurther.
NotpushinghardenoughandacceptingtoomanycompromisescanleadtothefearedsocialdemocratisationofSYRIZA,pullingitawayfromitspoliticalidealsandgoals.However,allof
ourintervieweeswereverymuchawareofthesedangersandshowedastrongwilltotry
andmakeitwork.Thereisastrongconsensusthatsmallmeasuresofreliefand
renegotiationandmoreradicalchangeswillnotbepossibleapartfromoneanother.First,
everyincreaseinsocialrightsorwagesshouldbeconsideredradicalinthecurrentsituation.
Second,becausetherewillsimplybenoturningbacktotheperiodandsocialarrangements
ofthepre-2008era.ManywithinSYRIZAareawarethattherewillnotbeanin-between,or
astwooftheirprominentofficialsputit:“Themostlikelyresolutiontothecrisiswillbe
eitherinthedirectionofafarmoreauthoritariancapitalismormovestotranscend
capitalisminsomeimportantdimensions.“(Laskos/Tsakalotos2013:9)
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II. Challenges
Phase 1: Winning the election
Thenextelection:2015or2016?
Inordertoformagovernment,SYRIZAneedstowinthenextgeneralelectionwhichhastobe
heldinJune2016atthelatest.However,ourintervieweesunanimouslyexpectasnapelectionto
takeplaceeitherinlate2014orearly2015.Ontheonehand,thegovernmentofNDandPASOK
isgettingweakerbythedayandbothpartiessufferedhugelossesattheEuropeanelectionsin
May2014.InOctober2014,thecoalitionhadtoresorttoavoteofconfidenceinparliamentto
keeptheirMPsinline.(Kathimerini2014)Ontheotherhand,theGreekoppositionwillhavethe
chancetoforceasnapelectioninearly2015.InFebruary,thecurrentpresidentKarolos
Papouliaswillleaveofficeandhissuccessorhastobeelectedbyparliament.Thecandidate
needs200outof300votesinthefirsttwoballotsand180votesinathirdandlastballot.Ifthere
isnosuchmajority,theGreekconstitutiondemandsthedissolutionofparliamentandasnap
election.(Kadritzke2014)Sincethecoalitionisonlybackedby155votes,itwouldneedthe
supportofatleasttwoofthesmalleroppositionpartiesand/ormostofthe23independentMPs.
Privatetalkswiththosegroupshavebeeninitiatedbygovernmentrepresentativesasearlyas
summer2014.However,alloppositionpartieshavepubliclydeclarednottosupportany
governmentcandidate.Iftheelectionofanewpresidentreallyshouldfail,parliamentwill
dissolveinFebruaryorMarchnextyearandtheelectionhastobeheldwithin40days.
(ConstitutionofGreece:Art.32)Toourinterviewees,itisunlikelythatNDandPASOKwillwait
foracertaindefeatinparliamentbutmightratherstopnegotiatingatsomepointandcallfora
snapelectionthemselves.Inouropinion,themostlikelyscenarioisforthegovernmenttowait
fortheofficialexitfromthememorandainDecember2014beforecallingtheelection,sothey
canusethispoliticalsuccessintheircampaigns.
Lookingback:The2012elections
LookingbackatthelastgeneralelectionsgivesusanideaofsomeofthechallengesSYRIZAwill
befacingontheEuropeanfront.Thetwoballotsof2012sawSYRIZAjumpingfrom5to17and
finally27percentofvotesagainstalmosteveryone’sexpectations.Thistriggeredawaveof
propaganda(againstSYRIZA)andblackmail(againsttheGreeksovereign)withoutprecedentin
thehistoryoftheEU:
ThemostdirectinterventiontookplacewhentheTroikaheldbackpartofacreditdisbursement
afewdaysaftertheMayelections.(AlJazeera2012)Thiscanbeinterpretedasanattempttoput
pressurebothontheGreekpoliticalestablishmentandthevoters.Otherinterventionswere
intendedtoinfluenceorratherblackmailtheGreekelectoratemoredirectly.Beforethefirst
election,GermanfinanceministerWolfgangSchäublethreatenedGreekvotersbysayingthatif
theresultwasamajorityagainstthememoranda,“Greecewillhavetobeartheconsequencesof
that.”(DigitalJournal2012)InanotherinterviewhecalledSYRIZA“demagogues”.(Mannheimer
Morgen2012)FrenchpresidentFrançoisHollande“warned”Greeksontheirnationaltelevision
that“iftheimpressionisgiventhattheGreekswanttomoveawayfromcommitmentsthatwere
taken[…],therewillbecountriesintheEurozonethatwillwanttoendthepresenceofGreecein
theEurozone.”(Guardian2012a)AustrianfinanceministerMariaFekterstatedthat“Greecewill
notreceiveanymoreeconomicaidiftheelectionon17Juneresultsinagovernmentthat
refusestokeeptothetermsofthememorandum.”TheInstituteofInternationalFinance,the
largestglobalassociationofthefinancialindustry,publishedareportstatingthatacoalition
betweenNDandPASOKwasneeded.Ifthenewparliamentwastoofragmentedtoallowforthat,
anunelectedgovernmentoftechnocratsshouldbeinstalled.(Kathimerini2012)Leadingmedia
outlets,especiallyinGermany,assistedinthepropaganda.Threedaysbeforethesecondelection
inJune2012,FinancialTimesDeutschlanduseditseditorialarticletoissuealettertotheGreek
electorate.InGreekandGerman,itdemandedthatthey“resistthedemagogues”ofSYRIZAand
8
voteforNDinstead.(FinancialTimesDeutschland2012)Onedaybeforetheelection,Germany’s
majortabloidnewspaperBILDfollowedtheexampleandpublishedtheirownlettertitled“Dear
Greeks,makenomistakerightnow”.ItwentonthatGreekscouldvotefor“everyclownfromthe
leftorrighttheywanted”iftheydidn’tneedGermany’sbillions.Theletterclosedbysayingthat
Greeksinfactdidn’thaveanychoice,because“youronlychoiceisbetweenpainfulsanityor
totaldoom.”
Asintended,thispropagandaandblackmailspreadfearanduncertaintyamongGreeks.
AccordingtoSYRIZA’scampaignmanagerAlexandrosBistis,theirmainproblemwasthenotion
thataSYRIZAwinwouldmeantheexitfromtheEurozoneoreventheEU.“Thecultivationof
fearandourlackofself-confidencewasourmainopponent”,Bistissaysinretrospect.Heknows
ofcompanyexecutiveswhowarnedtheiremployeesnottovoteforSYRIZA.IncaseofaSYRIZA
win,thecompanywouldmoveabroadandalljobswouldbelost.Bistis:“Thefearexistsonall
levelsoflife,publicandpersonal.”
Lookingahead:The2015/6election,nationallevel
Intheupcomingelectoralcampaign,SYRIZAwillfacenumerouschallengesonthenationallevel.
SinceourfocusisontheEuropeanlevel,weonlynamesomeofthem.First,findingandkeeping
thebalancebetweenSYRIZA'stworoles,i.e.representingacrediblealternativetothe
establishmentandpreparingforgovernment,willbecomeevenmoredifficultaselections
approach.Witheachstep,thepartyriskseitheralienatingitsleftistbaseorlosingitsappealto
mainstreamvoters.Atthesametime,SYRIZAneedstofosterastrongerconnectiontoasmany
peopleaspossibletoensurethattheprospectofaleftgovernmentisacceptedamongthem.
Also,theGreekmediaareveryhostiletowardsSYRIZA,usingthewholespectrumofanti-left
demonisation.“Theysayweareanti-religiouscommunists,willconfiscateprivateproperty.
Also,wearecalledfriendsofterrorismandanarchism”,Karitzissays.Thisshowsthatfearwill
beamongSYRIZA’smainproblemsagain–butthistimeitwillmostlybespreadbythenational
government,notEuropeanprotagonists.“Theywillsay:Youhavelostmuch,sokeepwhatyou
haveleft.SYRIZAwillcomeandtakeitfromyou,too”,KostasIsychosfromtheparty’sforeign
relationsdepartmentexpects.SimilarargumentsmightbeusedinregardstoGreece’s
geographicalproximitytoUkraineandtheMiddleEast,usingpeople’swishforpeacetomake
votingfortheLeftseemdangerous.SYRIZAplanstocountergovernmentcampaignsbasedon
fearbyemphasizingthatitispossibletochangecurrentpoliciesandthatpeoplehavetheright
todemandthis.“Themainideaistosupportsociety’sself-confidence,tofighttheideathatwe
aretotallydependentonsomebodyelseandthatwecannotmakeourownplansasapeople”,
Bistissays.Europeansocietieswereindangerofacceptingthattheywouldn’tbefreetodecide
onissueslikeeconomicpolicyandthatdemocracymustnotaffectmarkets,Karitzisadds.“There
arehistorictimeswereyouhavetofightforyourvalues,likedemocracy,liberty,dignity.We
shouldtrytogivehopetopeople.Wehavetosay:Thingsarenoteasy,wehavetobepreparedto
fight–butthat’snotSYRIZA’sfault,that’sourhistoricpredicament.”
Lookingahead:The2015/6election,Europeanlevel
OntheEuropeanlevel,however,ourintervieweesexpectlessopenhostilitythanin2012.“They
won’tdousthefavourtoopenlyopposeus.Thistime,iftheyarehostileitwouldbeagoodthing
forus”,Karitzissays.Accordingtothispointofview,Europeaneliteshaveacceptedtheprospect
ofaSYRIZAgovernmentandmadeplansforthatscenario.Itwasthelackofsuchaplanin2012
thatcausedtheirresorttopropagandaandblackmail.Thistime,Europeanelitesmighttakea
morepatientapproachandquietlytrytomakeaSYRIZAgovernmentfail,relyingonthe
austerityregimeestablishedinEuropethroughnewinstitutionsandcontractsduringthelast
years.“Theywillacceptus,negotiatewithusatthebeginning.Theywillsay:‘Let’sseewhatyou
cando.Therearerulesyoucannotviolate,thereareagreementsyoushouldrespect.’Theyare
confidenttheycreatedasituationsince2012nogovernmentcanchange.”However,Karitzis
adds:“Thisdoesn’taffectwhattheyaregoingtosaytoEuropeansocieties.”OutsideGreece,antiSYRIZA-propagandawillstillbestrong,especiallyinGermany.Recentelectoralsuccessesby
chauvinistAlternativefürDeutschlandcouldpushthepublicdebateontheGreekelectioneven
9
furthertotheright–unlesstheLeftintervenes.GermanauthorandactivistEvaVölpelexpects
publicinterventionsbyJensWeidman,presidentoftheBundesbank,otherneoliberal
economistsandkeymedia.
Generalsentiment:Optimism
Despiteallthesechallenges,thegeneralsentimentamongSYRIZAofficialsandactivistsisthat
theywillwintheelectionandformthenextgovernment.Thisoptimismisbasedonseveral
arguments:First,SYRIZAwontheEuropeanelectioninMay2014andachievedsomesignificant
winsattheregionalelectionstakingplaceatthesametime.Second,theyhavebeenleading
nation-widepollsformonths,scoring36percentinlateSeptember2014.(GreekReporter
2014)Third,themajority-friendlyelectorallawallowsforanabsolutemajorityat35to40per
centofvotes,dependingonthenumberofpartiespassingthethreshold.Thepollcitedabove
givesSYRIZA146outof300seatsinparliament.
Phase 2: Forming a government
IfSYRIZAwinsthenextgeneralelectionbutfailstogainanabsolutemajority,itisnotcertain
thattheywillbeabletoformagovernment.
Lookingback:Thetechnocraticgovernment
Again,lookingbackonthenearpastshedslightonpossiblescenarios.InNovember2011,prime
ministerGiorgosPapandreouresignedandwasfollowedbycentralbankerLucasPapademos.
HistechnocraticgovernmentwasbackedbyPapandreou’sPASOK,then-oppositionalNDandthe
extremerightLAOS.Itenforcedausteritymeasuresandconcludedthenegotiationsforasecond
memorandumbeforegivingwaytothetworoundsofelectionsof2012.Allkeystepsinthat
process–Papandreou’sresignation,ND’ssupportforthetechnocraticgovernmentandthe
choiceofPapademosasprimeminister–wereorchestratedbyJoseManuelBarroso,president
oftheEUcommission.(FinancialTimes2014)AscenariobasedonthisexperienceisthatEU
elitesmightexertpressureonallnon-SYRIZAparties–probablyexceptGoldenDawnandKKE–
toformaso-calledgovernmentofnationalunityagainstSYRIZA.Weconsiderthistobepossible
yetunlikely.
Lookingahead:Securingamajorityafterthenextelection
IfSYRIZAfailstogainanabsolutemajority,therewillbenolikelypartnertoformacoalition.
KKE,whocampaignedwiththeslogan“Don’ttrustSYRIZA”in2012,hasruledoutanyformof
cooperation.(Candeias/Völpel2014:176,198)DIMARissplitoverwhethertosupportSYRIZA,
buttheywillprobablynotpassthe3percentthresholdneededtoenterparliament.PASOKisin
adeepcrisistoo,losingmanyofitsvoterstoSYRIZAandthusattackingthemfiercely.Somein
SYRIZAseePASOKasapossiblecoalitionpartner,potentiallyafterasplit.“Theradicalleftused
torejectanyparticipationinagovernment”,SYRIZAyouthactivistHarisTriandafilidousays.
“Butnowthatwehavehegemony,theconditionsforcooperationwithsocialdemocracyhave
changed.”However,thegeneralattitudeamongourintervieweesisthatthinkingthroughall
thesescenariosisnotessential.TheGreekpartysystemishighlyunstableandstillin
realignment.Itisunclearwhichandhowmanypartieswillstillmakeitintothenextparliament.
Phase 3: Breaking with austerity
IfSYRIZAsucceedsinformingagovernment,theywillfaceahugenumberofchallengesonthe
domesticandEuropeanlevel.ThedomesticchallengesforSYRIZAwillberelatedtoopposition
bybusinessandtheausterityparties,aswellastotherelationshipwiththeirsupportersandthe
dynamicwithintheparty(seechapterII).WefocusontheEuropeanchallenges,aswewillthen
lookatLeftstrategiesofsupportforGreece.Inouropinion,Europeaneliteswillprobablychoose
oneoftwostrategies:Thefirstoptionistryingtotoppletheleftgovernmentprojectassoonas
10
possiblebyexertingthemaximumamountofpressure.Theaimwouldbetoreplaceitwith
anotherobedientgovernment,technocraticorND-led.Thesecondandmorelikelyoptionisthat
EuropeaneliteswillattempttocorruptSYRIZA.Thiswouldensurethecontinuationofthe
austerityandcompetitivenessagenda,butalsopreventleftistsandmovementsfromaround
EuropefromrallyingbehindSYRIZAandGreece.Whilethefirststrategywouldbemorebrutal
anddirect,thesecondoneismoredangerousfortheGreekandEuropeanLeft,doinglong-term
damagetotheirplansandhopes.BelowwewilldiscusswayshowEuropeanelitesmighttryto
influenceaSYRIZAgovernment,thoughtheirformwilldependonthechosenstrategy.
NegotiatingwithEUpartners
OneofthefirstactionsofaSYRIZAgovernmentwillbetodemandareductionofpublicdebtin
GreeceandEuropethroughaninternationaldebtconference(seechapterII).Itislikelythatthe
Europeangovernmentsandinstitutionswillenternegotiations,butwithoutmakingany
concessions.ThemainopponentsareseentobetheGermangovernmentandtheEU
commission.AndreasKaritzissaysthat“theyareconvincedthatwewilleventuallycompromise,
thattimeisagainstus,sotheywon’tbetoohostileinthebeginning.”GiorgosChondros,director
ofSYRIZA’sdepartmentforenvironmentalpolicy,expectsnegotiationstodragonforawhile.
“WewillnotonlyhavetofighttheGreekelites,butalsotheEuropeanones.Thismakesour
situationmuchmoredifficult.We’llneedthesupportofmovementsinthewholeofEurope.”
JohnMilios,professorofpoliticaleconomyandSYRIZAMPisanticipating“psychological
warfare”onbehalfofEUelitesandcreditors.However,heandothersarguethattheEuropean
UnioncannotaffordtokickGreeceoutoftheEurozoneforeconomicreasons.(Candeias/Völpel
2014:196)
PressurebyEuropeanelites
ThewaysEuropeanelitescanusetoexertpressureonaSYRIZAgovernmentaremanifold.A
generalclimateofhostilityatEUsummitsandduringnegotiationscanbeexpectedandwill
influenceallotherfactors.Moreconcretely,Greecewillmostlikelyviolatesomeofthe
provisionsoftheEU’seconomicgovernance,e.g.thedeficitrules.“Thereisnodoubtthatthe
numbersweseeaboutGreekgovernmentaccounts,the[nationalised]banks,theirassetbooks,
areallforged”,YanisVaroufakisprofessorofeconomicsandSYRIZAadvisor,suspects.Thetrue
stateofpublicfinanceswillprobablycometothesurfacesoonafterthenewgovernmentis
instated.Also,GreekeconomicelitesmightusetheEU’slegalframeworktoworkagainst
SYRIZA,e.g.bankownersfilinglawsuitsattheEuropeanCourtofJusticeagainstthe
restructuringofthebankingsector.Theseproceduresandtrialswilltakeacertainamountof
timebeforetheyeffectivelyinterferewithSYRIZA’sgovernment.
Therearehoweverseveralother,moreshort-termwaysofpressureEuropeanelitescoulduse.
 Theycould“createanextremelynastypictureofGreeceforEuropeantourists”,Yanis
Varoufakissays.TourismhasbeenoneoftheveryfewsectorsoftheGreekeconomyto
growduringthelastyears,generatingmuchneededtaxrevenues.Sabotagingtourism
wouldseverelyhurttheeconomyandtherebyaleftgovernment’sabilitytofundtheir
projects.
 AbankruninsideGreececouldbetriggeredbystatementsofEuropeanelitesand
financialmarketactors.
 TheECBmightstopreturningitsprofitsfrominterestonGreekgovernmentbonds.As
withsabotagingtourism,thiswouldharmthestatebudget.(Varoufakis2013),
 LessstructuralfundsmightbeawardedtoGreece.YanisVaroufakistellsusthattherules
concerningthesefundshavebeenloosenedinthepasttosupportthecurrentGreek
government:“AccordingtoEuropeanrules,therehastobeco-financingforthesefunds.
Ifthereisaroadtobebuilt,theEUpays50percentandtheGreekgovernmentpaysthe
other50percent.Iftheycan’tcomeupwiththatmoney,theyneedbanksorother
investorstojumpin.Ourbanksarebankruptandinvestorswon’ttouchGreekprojects.
SowhattheydidwasthatBrusselsignoresitsownrules.Theygivethemoneywithout
co-financing.ThatonlyhappenedbecauseGermanyandBrusselshadaninterestin
11


supportingthecurrentgovernment.Ifthereisanewone,theycansimplyswitchthis
off.”,
BerlinandBrusselsmightagitateinvestorsagainstGreece.Greecehasstartedlong-term
borrowingfromfinancialmarketsagainthisyear.AstheGreekstateistodayevenmore
heavilyindebtedthanbeforeits“rescue”andtheeconomyisstillinrecession,thiswas
onlypossiblethroughanimplicitguarantee.AccordingtoYanisVaroufakis,Berlinand
theECB“winkedatinvestors‘Look,buythesebonds.IftheGreekscan’trepayyou,we
will.”IfDraghi’sandMerkel’swinksandcommentshaveenabledGreecetosell
governmentbondsagain,theymightaswelldotheoppositetoincreasefinancial
pressureonaleftgovernment.
ThepossiblyworststrategywouldbefortheECBtothreatentostopprovidingliquidity
toGreekbanks.YanisVaroufakisdescribesthisinstrumentasa“nuclearweapon”,which
couldbringtheGreekbankingsectordownalmostimmediately.TheprospectoftheECB
doingthismightseemextremeandunlikely,butitwouldnotbenews:In2011,theECB
threatenedtocutoffIrishbanksfromitslendingactivities,unlessthegovernmenttook
overalldebtofinsolventbanks.Varoufakisisconvincedthatthegovernmentcould
indeedfallquicklyjustoverthepossibleexternalpressures.
WhatremainsunclearatthispointishowSYRIZAwilldealwiththeTroika.Afterthe
memorandahaveexpired,controlsbytheCommissionandtheECBarescheduledeverysix
monthsuntil75percentoftheloansarepaidback.Atthemoment,thiswouldmean25yearsof
Troikavisits.Evenmoreyearswouldbeaddedincasetheloansarestretched,whichiscurrently
beingdiscussed.Inanycase,theCommissioncanalwaysjustextendthemonitoringunlessthe
Councilvetoes.Thecontrolsmightalsoleadtosanctions,whichareonlyvaguelydescribedas
“correctivemeasures”.(Kathimerini2013)
Generalsentiment:Carefuloptimism
Despiteallthosechallenges,thepeoplewespoketoshowacertainoptimismregardingthe
negotiationsontheEUlevel.Althoughmanyconsideritpossiblethattheirgovernmentcould
lastonlyforafewweeks,theysaytheirchancesarebettertodaythantheywouldhavebeenin
2012.TheyseefractionswithintheneoliberalblockthatSYRIZAcouldtrytoexploit,likethe
ECB’sfearofdeflation,thepositionofItaly’sprimeministerMatteoRenziandtherecent
conflictswithintheFrenchgovernment.HarisGolemis,directorofSYRIZA’sPoulantzasInstitute,
saysaboutAlexisTsiprasrecentmeetingwithECBpresidentMarioDraghi:“Ofcourseheisnot
‘withGreece’,butheisagainsttheobviousfallaciesofthebeliefsoftheGermangovernment.”By
gettingintogovernmentandimplementingfirstmeasures,SYRIZAhopestoaccelerateexisting
debates,especiallywithinEuropeansocialdemocracyandthetradeunions.YanisVaroufakis
expectsSYRIZA’sbehaviourintheCounciltotriggerconflictscurrentlyrepressed.Hetoldusofa
conversationhehadwiththefinanceministerofalargeEurozonecountry,whoagreedwith
Varoufakis’positionsbutdidn’tvoicethemintheECOFINbecausethatwouldonlymeantheend
ofhispoliticalcareerwithoutchanginganything.“Butwhatifyourministeroffinancespeaks
outandvetoestheexistingpolicies?Ifhedoesso,peoplelikemyselfcouldchipintothe
conversation”,theministertoldVaroufakis.
12
III. STRATEGIES
Solidarity: A task for the European Left
AfterdecadesofweaknessoftheLeftinEurope,afteryearsofausterityandmillionsrisingup
againstit,weareindireneedofgoingfurther.WithSYRIZAandtheGreekmovements,thereis
nowtherealpossibilityofaleftgovernmentwitharadicalprogrammeofsocialtransformation.
ThestrugglesinGreeceandinSpainalreadyprovideuswithimportantlessonsandinspiration.
Aleftgovernmentthattriestodothingsdifferently,tobreakwithausterityandtofollowa
differentvisionofsocietycouldcreateamomentumfortheLeftoutsideGreece,too.While
neoliberalhegemonymightnotbeasstrongasitusedtobe,thepoliticalsituationinmostof
Europeisstillhopelesslyhostile.Insomeareaspublicdebatehasbecomesonarrowthatthe
mostbasicleftconceptsandpoliciesareperceivedasutopianornaive.Furthermore,decadesof
politicalchangeshaveonlyknownonedirection:cutstowelfare,educationandhealthcare,
pressureonwages,deregulationoflabourmarketsandtaxcutsforcorporationsandtherich.A
leftgovernmentprojectinGreececanbreakwiththislogicandincreaseminimumwagesand
socialexpenditurewhilefollowingamoreradicalvision.Throughthis,aspaceforleftideasand
debatescanopenup.WhatisbeingdoneinGreecemightsuddenlyseemimaginableinother
places,too.
Ifthismomentcomes,thetaskfortheEuropeanleftisnotonlytosupportGreece,buttouseitas
bestaswecantostrengthenstruggles,ignitenewonesandshiftexistingpowerrelations.
Gettingthereanddoingthatisatremendoustaskandbringsaboutdifficultstrategicquestions.
Wehavechosentofocusonthefirstpartofthistask:TosupportSYRIZAandthebroaderGreek
leftinwinningthenextelection,formingaleftgovernmentprojectandstartingtofight
austerity.TheirstrugglesareEuropeanandtheiroppositionwillbeEuropean,soitisour
struggle,too.Intherestofthischapterwewilloutlineideasforthisstrategy.Webelievethat
thisisthepreconditionforplanningfurtherahead,i.e.onhowtousethemomentumgenerated
bySYRIZAforachangeoutsideGreece.Wealsohopethatsomeofourideaswillsupport
thinkinginthisdirection.
Attitude: Our common struggle
IfpartsoftheLeftinEuropedecidetosupporttheGreekstrugglesmoreactively,weneeda
commonunderstandingofwhyandhowwearedoingit.Beinginsolidaritywithandsupporting
SYRIZAisnotthesameasblindadorationoruncriticalbelieving.Wecanandneedtoquestion
theirpositionsandthechoicestheymake.Incasetheyformagovernment,itisessentialthatwe
criticallyexaminewheretheyaregoing.Butweneedtodothiswithanattitudeofrespectand
support.
Furthermore,supportingSYRIZAandtheGreekleftisnotabout“helpingGreece”,butabout
advancingourcommonstruggle.Weshouldnotbemotivatedbyguiltbecauseourgovernments
areresponsible–thiswouldmeanreproducingnationalistsplitsbetweenpeople.Weshould
alsonotbeactingoutofcompassion–thiswouldmeandepoliticisingtheissue.Instead,weneed
tolinkSYRIZA'sstrugglestoourownanddevelopwaystopromotemutuality.Thefightsof
SYRIZA,theGreekmovementsandsolidarityinitiatives,thecleaners,theworkersofERTand
thepeopleofChalkidikiarenotGreekproblemstobeovercome,butpartsofwhatneedstobea
unitedfightagainstoppression.
AsolidaritycampaignshouldaimatopposingthepressurethatEuropeaneliteswillexerton
SYRIZA.Ithastopushpoliticalprotagonistslikegovernmentsandtradeunionstochangetheir
standtowardsGreeceandatleastnotfightwhattheleftgovernmentistryingtodo.Itshould
13
interveneinpublicdebatestomaketherealityofGreekausterityandwhatSYRIZAstandsfor
visibletopeopleinothercountries.Ithastotryandrevealthepoliticalprogrammeandclass
characterbehindausterityinGreece.AnditshouldaimtogetpeopleinotherpartsofEuropein
touchwiththestrugglesoftheGreekpeople.
Structure: Organising a European campaign
Inouropinion,bothanAustrianandaEuropeancampaignwillworkbestiftheycombine
decentralisedactivitieswithcoordinatingefforts.Differentaspectsofasolidaritycampaigncan
attractdifferentpartsoftheLeft:whilesomemightwanttosupportthestrugglesofSYRIZAasa
party,othersmightwanttofocusontheworkofthesolidarityinitiatives,thefightagainst
austerityorotherpartsofbroaderpublicmobilisations.Forsome,theprospectofaleft
governmentprojectwillbethemostinterestingpart,whileothersmightwanttofocuson
opposingthethreattoGreekdemocracy.
InorganisingadecentralisedcampaigninAustria,weproposeacoordinatingteam.Itsmembers
shouldparticipateincertainactivitiesthemselves,butalsoactivelyinvolveothergroupsand
providesideasandsupportforthemtogetinvolved.
Measures: What a campaign could look like
AcampaignshouldcoverallofthephasesdescribedinchapterII:thetimebetweennowandthe
nextelections,thephaseofformingagovernmentand,mostimportantly,thestartofaleft
governmentproject.TheideasaredevelopedfortheAustriancontext,butifthereisa
coordinatedcampaigninseveralcountries,therecanbecommonandseparateactivities.We
willproposeaseriesofcampaignideas,ofwhichonlyafewaretargetedataspecificphase.The
ideasarestructuredbytargetgroupswethinkwillbeessentialtoaddress.
Targetgroup:Journalistsandmedia
Aim: Change the way news about Greece and SYRIZA are reported. Break up problematic
narratives like the equalisation of left and right as extremism and anti-Europeanism. Debunk the
attempts of the current Greek government and the troika to sell Greece as a success story.  PublicdebatepanelsandjournalisticbackgroundtalkswithcriticalGreekeconomists
likeYanisVaroufakis,MaricaFrangakisorJohnMilios.Besidescriticismofcurrent
policiesandinputontheGreeksituation,someofSYRIZA’smaindemandscanbe
introducedthisway(seebelow).Preferably,theseeventsandtheaccompanyingpress
workwillbedoneincooperationwithdifferentpartnerorganisations.
 Aseriesofopinionpiecesonthe“theoryofextremism”innewspapersandspecial
interestmagazinesforjournalists.Thiscouldincludeatheoreticalperspectiveonits
non-validitybyapoliticalscientist,ahistoricalanalysisofthedefamationofprogressive
strugglesinthepast,andotherapproachesvoicingadifferentfacetofcritiquebutallin
connectionwithcurrentpoliticaldebates.
Targetgroup:Politicalorganisations,activistsandsupporters
Aim: Heighten awareness on the issues and debate the connection between Greek and local
struggles. Mobilise activists for the support of the Greek Left in their political contexts (parties,
trade unions, youth organisations, student groups, church organisations, etc.).
14

SpeakerstourwithactivistsofSYRIZAand/orSolidarity4All,forexampleHaris
TriandafilidouorGiorgosChondros.Anumberofeventscouldbehostedalloverthe
countryincooperationwithvariouslocalgroupswhowanttoworkontheissue.

AsolidaritytriptoGreecewithrepresentativesoftheorganisationsmentionedabove.
Anexchangetripliketheyarealreadyhappeninginthetradeunionsandothercontexts
canbringpeopleofvariousorganisationalbackgroundintouchwiththeGreekstruggles
andwithopportunitiestoconnectthemtotheirown.Theycouldthencarrytheir
experiencestotheirpoliticalcontexts.

DiscussSYRIZA’smaindemandsandpolicies(seeabove)withrelevantstakeholders
beforetheelectiontomakecentralpoliticalgroupsfamiliarwiththeissuesthatwillbe
raised.Possibilitiestodothisinclude:
o ArticlesbyGreekeconomistsinprogressivepublicationsorblogs,trade
union/chamberoflabourmagazines,etc.
o SeekingbackgroundtalkswithmembersoftheSocialDemocraticandtheGreen
partytodiscussSYRIZA’splansandtheirpositionstowardsthem.
TargetGroup:Thepoliticalpublic
Aim: Shift the public debate on Greece. Make the drastic economic and social situation visible.
Present SYRIZA and the left government project as a realistic alternative for Greece and other parts
of Europe.

BailOut–Thefinalverdict:ThiswouldbeanupdateoftheAttacprojectof2013,where
calculationsshowedhowmostofthebailoutmoneywentbacktothefinancialsector.
Thecalculationscouldbeupdatedandpresentedforthe(probably)officialendofthe
programmeinDecember2014.

OpinionpiecesinAustriannewspaperstodiscussvariousaspects:
o Opinionpiecesinnewspapersinfall2014tomakeactivistsofthesolidarity
campaignknowntomediaasexpertsonvariousaspectsoftheGreekcrisis.This
wouldbeinpreparationofthemomentwhenreportingonGreecestartsagain.
o OpinionpiecescounteringthesuccessstoriesoftheGreekgovernmentand
Europeanelites,witheconomic,political,socialandotheraspects.Different
aspectscouldbecoveredbypeoplefromdifferentfieldsandtheyshouldbe
connectedtothebroaderEuropeanausterityandcompetitivenessagenda.
o Asatiricalopinionpieceaboutthemisjudgedresultsandgreatsuccessofthe
memoranda,whichsucceededperfectlyinmakingtherichricher,increasingthe
exploitationoflabourandfreecorporationsfromtheburdenofenvironmental
regulationsandtaxes.

SocialMediaactionsatcrucialmoments,forexampleafterinterventionsfromEuropean
politiciansorotherEuropeanactors.Messagescouldbealongthelinesof“letthemvote”
or“saveGreekdemocracy”andactivitiesshouldinvolveonlineparticipation.

Socialmediacampaign:“KreiskywouldvoteforSYRIZA”
ImagesoffamousleftistsorleftsocialdemocratslikeBrunoKreiskyorWillyBrandt,
combinedwithelementsoftheirpoliticalprogrammewhichresembleSYRIZA'splans.

AsolidaritydelegationofprogressiveintellectualstoGreeceafteraSYRIZAgovernment
takesoffice,sendingthemessagethattheleftprojectinGreeceisnotalone.
15
Targetgroup:Generalandculturalpublic
Aim: Reach people who are not very interested in politics through cultural channels. Get people in
touch with the social and political reality in Greece. Support affection and feelings of mutuality.
 BookpresentationanddebatewithMarleneStreeruwitz,awell-knownAustrianauthor
whojustpublishedanovelcalled“ThetravelsofayounganarchistthroughGreece”.Her
bookiswidelycoveredinAustrianmedia,soapoliticalpresentationanddebateofit
couldattractanaudienceinterestedinliteratureaswellasmedia.
 AphotoexhibitionoftheGreekcrisisandGreekresistance.Thereareseveralcollections
byGreekphotographerswhichhavealreadybeenshowninexhibitionsinGreece.They
couldbebroughtovertoAustriaandshowningalleriesinViennaand/orothercities.
 TranslationandpublicationofaGreekcrisisnovel:Intheseturbulenttimes,thereisa
largenumberofGreeknovelsdealingwithlifeduringthecrisisandwiththepolitical
strugglessurroundingit.Asolidaritycampaigncouldcreatethelinkbetweenselected
publicationsandAustrian/Germanpublishinghouses.Theaimwouldbeatranslated
novelwhichisreviewedinnewspapers,soldinbookstoresandattractivetoreadersand
peoplewhotraveltoGreece.
 “HumansofGreece”
“HumansofGreece”wouldbeasocialmediacampaignmodelledafterthevery
successful“HumansofNewYork”,whichdailypublishesaphotoandaquotebyaNew
Yorker,sometimesexplicitlypolitical,sometimesnot.“HumansofGreece”,couldbea
lightandpopularwayofcommunicatingtherealityoflifeinGreece.
 Artisticexpression:AnimateAustrianactors,performersorcomedianstoworkonthe
Greekcrisis
16
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