1 FINAL REPORT I Core Group Meeting of the German

FINAL REPORT I
Core Group Meeting of the German-Turkish Round Table on International
Affairs 2014
19. September 2014, 2:15 – 5 pm
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin
This report summarizes the main debates which took place during the Core Group
Meeting on September192014, preceding the fifth German-Turkish Round Table, on
the premises of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin.
Prof. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu chaired the discussion; Prof. Dr. Evren Balta discussed
internal security policy of Turkey and Russia, and Prof. Şaban Kardaş presented an
overview of current Turkey-Russia relations.
Overall Framework
The bilateral relationship between the Russian Federation and the Republic of
Turkey has been in general strained and fraught with tension and has even reversed
to confrontation over various disputes throughout history. In recent years, Russia's
strong support for the regime of Bashar Al Assad in Syria and Turkey's backing of
rebel forces put Russia and Turkey on opposing sides in the fault lines of the conflict
in the Middle East.
German–Russian relations also range all the way from cooperation and even alliance
to warfare. Relations turned increasingly hostile in 2014 in response to Russia's
seizure of Crimea from Ukraine and its support of separatist groups in Ukraine.
The conference brought together more than20 experts from German ministries, the
German parliament, embassies, academia and civil society organizations, dealing
with Germany and Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia.
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Dr. Evren Balta, Associate Professor at Yildız Teknik University in Istanbul spoke on
the subject of “Kurds and Chechens, Turkey's and Russia's dealing with internal
threats”.
Dr. Balta outlined the developments of the Kurdish and Chechen conflicts in a
historical, economic and political perspective and pointed out similarities and
differences regarding the political circumstances and the living conditions of the
two ethnic minorities under debate. In a second step, she analyzed Turkey’s and
Russia’s strategies in dealing with political and terrorist activities in the name of
oppressed ethnic and ethnic-religious identities. Furthermore she presented the
practices exploited by Turkey and Russia to counter and outweigh criticism on the
part of the international community regarding the legal system and human rights
abuses. Russia relies on its nuclear power, its central role in the UN Security Council
and its energy resources. Turkey, on the other hand, capitalizes on its membership
and crucial role in NATO, on its capability to act as energy corridor and on
international expectations towards its role as a regional stabilizer in the Middle
East.
Dr. Şaban Kardaş, Associate Professor at TOBB University of Economics and
Technology in Ankara and head of the ORSAM think tank spoke on “Turkey-Russia
Relations since the End of the Cold War: Geopolitics vs. Geo-economics”.
The relationship between the two countries has been severely strained due to
tension and the ongoing confrontation over various disputes in recent years. A
breakthrough in Turkish-Russian relations took place when the Turkish parliament
decided to refuse the USA’s wish to use Turkish territory to launch attacks against
Iraq in March 2003. The rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey prepared the ground for
Turkish-Russian rapprochement in Turkey domestically. Turkey and Russia, today,
manage to put geopolitical conflicts, such as the quarrel about Syria, aside, to
intensify their economic relations. The high level of economic cooperation between
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Turkey and Russia has become the most important component of their bilateral and
multidimensional relations.
The bilateral trade between the two countries started in 1984 by means of a natural
gas deal. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, many Russians started the
so-called “luggage trade”, particularly in textiles. Over the years, the trade
relationship developed rapidly and by 1990, Turkish-Russian trade constituted 1.7
billion Dollars. By 2007, bilateral trade between Turkey and Russia reached 28
billion Dollars. But in 2008 the trade volume reached its peak at38 billion dollars.
Whereas Germany was Turkey’s number one trading partner up until 2007, today,
Russia has taken its place. Turkey’s gas and oil imports from Russia account for
most of the trade volume. Turkey imports 65 % of its natural gas and 25 % of its oil
from Russia. Cooperation in energy trading, thus, forms the backbone of the
relationship, even if minor interests of both countries concerning energy are
clashing. Turkey wants to become an energy hub that not only acts as an energy
corridor but as an energy trader, while Russia is determined to maintain control
over the transport routes of Caspian oil.
In consequence, Turkey faces an ever-growing dependency on Russian energy and
trade between both countries is thus asymmetric, both in terms of absolute figures
and in term of economic and political dependency.
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FINAL REPORT II
German-Turkish Round Table on International Affairs 2014: Russia
23rd and 24th October 2014
Sabanci Center- Istanbul
This report summarizes the central debates which took place during the GermanTurkish Roundtable on International Affairs on October 24, 2014 at Sabanci Center,
Istanbul.
We had a great honour and pleasure to have the former Turkish Foreign Minister of
Foreign Affairs H. E Yaşar Yakış as a key-note speaker of GTRT 2014 on welcome
diner with participation of distinguished guests from the public life.
Minister Yakış started his speech by giving an overview over the development of
Turkey’s foreign relations starting from 1923 until today. He underlined the main
and fundamental principles and pushing factors of foreign policies. Firstly, H.E Yakış
paid more attention on the relations of Turkey with the European Union. He stated
that Turkey would be well advised first of all to put its own country in order. The
negotiation process for EU membership appears to be the best chance not only to
reform Turkish institutions, but also to improve the political system by changing the
political culture in Turkey. In this respect the Turkish governments have to continue
to enforce and to promote the “Europeanization process”, namely restructuring and
modernizing policies in all realms, whether Turkey becomes a full EU member or
not, the implementation of EU legislation, norms, standards, and regulations are
crucial with help of an external anchor, namely the European Union. Only if Turkey
is able to complete its negotiations with the European Union successfully, will its
political and economic role in the region will be able to markedly change as a
consequence.
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In the second part of his speech Minister Yakış focused on the role of Turkey in the
Middle East. He pointed out that he spent half of his diplomatic career in the region
and therefore he knows the political, economic and social structure of the region
quite well.
He stated that we are currently witnessing historic changes in the Middle Eastern
and North African states (MENA), which are destined to transform the region. It is a
common belief in the West that authoritarian regimes are leaving the political arena
one after another and anti-democratic regimes and their establishment and
institutions could be easily replaced by the new elected reformist and westernoriented governments characterized by the so-called “Moderate Islam”. He sharply
criticized the present governments’ Middle East and especially Syrian and Iraqi
policies.
In the last part of his presentation Minister Yakış answered the questions from
audience, especially referring to Ankara’s relations with Syria, Kurdish issue and
Palestine.
Three main panels formed the GTRT 2015 meeting. The first panel, chaired by Dr.
Barbara Lippert, focused on Russian policy towards Ukraine. Lippert stated that
there are different approaches concerning Russia and that it is important to
understand whether Russia or Putin is the real matter.
Associate Professor Lerna K. Yanık discussed Ankara’s perceptions of Russia’s
relationship with Ukraine. Yanık started her speech by quoting Putin’s thoughts on
Russian-Turkish relations: "We might have our differences on particular issues, but
this does not lead to any cooling in our relations. On the contrary, we intensify our
contacts and search for common ground." According to Yanık this sums up the
current state of affairs between the two countries. A big chunk of the trade volume
is taken up by natural gas. Russia supplies almost 60% of Turkey's natural gas and
Turkish demand has tripled since 2000 - greatly increasing its dependency (mostly
through the Blue Stream pipeline). The Russians are furthermore building a
controversial $20bn nuclear power plant in Akkuyu in southern Turkey. As Yanık
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pointed out, the booming trade and investment between the two countries and the
co-operation in energy overshadows many areas of dispute, including the ways in
which Turkey and Russia diverge on the issue of how to handle the conflicts in Syria
and Ukraine. She pointed out that Turkey envisions a Syria without Bashar al-Assad,
while Russia has argued that any foreign intervention to remove him would further
destabilise both Syria and the Middle East.
Dr. Adam Eberhardt contributed his perceptions from Warsaw to the discussion.
Eberhardt stated that Russia has been the greatest disillusion for Poland in the last
25 years. He discussed Russia’s attempt to forestall Ukraine’s reforms and described
Ukraine’s importance as a factor for Putin’s domestic policy. Furthermore,
Eberhardt mentioned that Russia has attempted to prolong the conflict in Ukraine in
order to turn the country into a failed state. According to Eberhardt Russia is
attempting to dissolve the post-Cold War world order. Dr. Adam Eberhardt also
stated that there are great difference between the Polish and the Turkish
contribution.
Dr. Alexander Libman discussed the crises between Ukraine and Russia from a
Berlin-viewpoint. According to Libman the conflict contains three crucial
perspectives: security concerns, economic integration and diversionary war to
create public support containing democratic diffusion. In Germany, Libman states,
all narratives are equally taken at face value. In contrary to Eberhardt’s statements,
Libman argued that in order to state frankly that Russia is trying to undermine the
post-Cold War order more evidence is needed.
Dr. Dusan Reljic gave his perception on the issues from Brussels. In regard to the
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Reljic argued, that the containment of
democratic diffusion is the most important motive. According to Reljic the EU is
regarded as more dangerous than NATO and Moscow sees no reason to abandon its
tough approach. Also he pointed out that since the Kosovo war, Russia regards the
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US as having bad intentions concerning Russia, and therefore the US treats Russia in
a similar fashion to its treatment of Germany and Japan after the second Word War.
Following these discussions, the delegate of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey stated
that the mistakes of Western policy need to become a point of deliberation in the
debate. The US has nothing to lose with the embargo and indicated that between the
EU and US the interests lie very differently.
The second panel, entitled “The response of the West from the background of
different degrees of energy-dependency and economic cooperation” was chaired by
Prof. Dr. Fuat Keyman. In this panel Dr. Simone Tagliapietra began his discussion
with a quick overview on the historical evolution of the southern gas corridor. He
stated the main points as (1) Turkey’s interest in becoming an energy hub, (2)
energy as an increasingly relevant component of EU-Turkey relations due to
Turkey’s geographical location with the main focus on gas, (3) the Nabucco-project
as an example for geopolitical problems. In order to classify Turkey’s role in the
energy sector, Mr Taligliapeietra continued with potential drivers of change, in
particular the game changers in supply and demand balance. According to
Taligliapeietra the demand side of the Turkish role in energy contains two major
elements (1) Eastwards: impressive room of six percent of growth in comparison to
EU shift to rooms, and (2) an increase in China’s demand in 2014 of 30 billion
barrels per day. The supply side consist of four major issues (1) OPEC as the
producer of less than 30 percent of oil and gas of the world marketplace, (2) Brazil
and Australia replaced Qatar, (3) Iran as one of the biggest real game changers, and
(4) USA. The focal point of his presentation was Turkey’s energy potential and
pointed out the role of Turkey in European energy security as a transit country or an
energy hub.
Volkan Vural discussed the alternative to a politics of containment and his political
and diplomatic experiences as a former Turkish Ambassador to Moscow. Mehmet
Öğütçü discussed the lessons learned from the failure of the Nabucco Project and
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gave some insights into the energy market. Furthermore, he made some predictions
on the future of the world energy market. He advised that Turkish government
should continue to maintain and intensify its economic and political relations with
Moscow in the coming years.
In the last panel chaired by Dr. Günter Seufert, focussing on the question “Forward
defence against Islamist threat or use of a strategic window of opportunity?”, the
panellists discussed different perspectives of Russia’s policy in relation to Muslim
movements and the Middle East. Luke Rodeheffer, and Prof. Dr. Oktay, F. Tanrısever
discussed the development and characteristics of Russia's relations with the
Muslim-majority communities in the North Caucasus and Moscow's responses to
these communities before and after the Arab uprisings which erupted in late 2010.
According to Tanrısever, Russia has a very long history of accommodating the
Muslim-majority communities within its borders since its establishment as an
empire in 1552 when Moscow conquered the predominantly Muslim Tatars and the
capital of the Kazan Khanate, Kazan. Moscow's domination over these peoples was a
result of both repressive and accommodative tactics. Tanrısever stated that along
with the revolts that Muslim groups seized for Russia, at present, Moscow seems to
be using these Chechen terrorists and radicals to destabilize Ukraine. Moscow's
solidarity with the authoritarian Arab regimes, in particular with the regime in
Syria, reflects the general Russian line. Russia treats Islamist groups in terms of
their functional role in promoting Russia's regional political interests.
Following this discussion, Dr. Margarethe Klein discussed Russia’s Syrian policy,
stating that Moscow has managed to escape isolation in the region. According to
Klein, for a common conflict resolution with Russia, three conditions need to be
fulfilled. First of all, she indicated that the fact that Washington and Russia
backtracked in terms of their plans for a quick military blow, arises once again the
opportunity to weaken Moscow's resistance and to attempt common conflict
resolution. According to Klein once the report by the UN inspectors clarify that the
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responsibility for the use of poison gas lies with the Assad regime, Moscow will not
be in the position to back out of the conviction process by the UN Security Council.
She pointed out that, this does not mean that Russia would approve of a military
operation, but its resistance would turn out weaker. Furthermore, Kremlin would
find itself in a tight spot in terms of reducing help for Damascus. According to
Margarethe Klein, in the event of a military punitive action by the Western
countries, a broad support, especially by the regional actors should be taken care of.
The greater the danger of Moscow's self- isolation in the Middle East and North
Africa, the bigger would be the chance of Moscow keeping its resistance small. In the
course of the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis, the Kremlin observed with worry
how its influence and prestige within the region shrunk. Klein clearly stated that by
means of political dialogue and economic cooperation in the past two years, Moscow
successfully managed to limit the damage. Merely the relations with Saudi- Arabia
and Qatar have gotten worse with lasting effect. Now it depends on those countries
with which Moscow maintained relations upright or even expanded - like Turkey,
Egypt, Algeria- to make the danger of self- isolation clear. Thirdly, Dr. Klein talked
that, it should be clarified that a military operation does not represent a substitute
for the finding of a political solution. Only if the punitive action is limited and the
Geneva-2- Process, as in the planned negotiations between the opposition and the
regime get encouraged, it will be possible to dissipate Moscow's greatest sorrow:
the aim of the West to expand its reach of power in the Middle East by forcibly
bringing down the Assad- Regime. According to Dr. Margarethe Klein if Moscow
wants to be perceived as a responsible actor in the region, it also has to cooperate
by distancing itself from its claim of including Assad in finding a political solution
and by making use of the influence it has over the regime in Damascus, in order to
call for readiness to compromise.
As a last speaker in the third session, Dr. Michael Thumann discussed Russia’s policy
concerning Egypt and spoke about the significance of weapon deals with Egypt after
the US-embargo. Dr. Michael Thumann stated that since the coup d'état by then
General Abdul Fatah al-Sissi in July 2013, Russia has been active to reassert its once
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close relations with Egypt. Numerous visits by ministers and the presidents of the
two countries led to the conclusion of a number of high profile trade deals, most
importantly Russian arms supplies to Egypt. According to Thumann, until today,
Egypt’s growing ties with Russia’s are a function of troubled US-Egyptian relations.
The US withheld battle tank kits, F-16 fighters, cruise missiles, and helicopters
under the existing framework of military aid agreed upon after the Camp David
accords. Thumann also talked that Egypt asks Washington to honor the agreements,
and the US asks Cairo to show more tolerance to home based liberals and moderate
Islamists. The two countries have a common enemy, which is ISIS. That irons out
some of the differences of the past year and a half. But Egyptian mistrust in the US is
as strong as their trust in Putin. He also stated that after almost forty years, the
Russians are back in Cairo and a factor to be reckoned with. They have taken
advantage of mishaps and inconsistencies of US policy and will continue to do so.
The German-Turkish Round Table and its two partners, the Istanbul Policy Center at
Sabanci University and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, would like to
thank the Robert Bosch Stiftung for the support they were granted during the
planning and realization of the fifth German-Turkish Round Table in Istanbul.
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